Calalang-Parulan vs.

Calalang-Garcia
GR. No. 184148

Topic: Succession, Successional rights

Principle:
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code
provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." In Butte v.
Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:

The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by
other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the
legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas
(Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death
of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

Facts:
In a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property, the respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia,
Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S. Calalang asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land against the
petitioners Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang. The said lot was allegedly acquired by the respondents
from their mother Encarnacion Silverio, through succession as the latters compulsory heirs.

According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first
marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this marriage, their parents acquired
the above-mentioned parcel of land from their maternal grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous
possession of the land, however, their parents failed to register the same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was
dissolved with the death of Encarnacion Silverio.

On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who then gave birth to
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Rolando Calalang. According to the respondents, it was only during this time that Pedro
Calalang filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands.

On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 283321 was issued in the name of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. On December 27, 1989,7 Pedro Calalang
died.

The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 arguing that the sale of the land was void because Pedro
Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the respondents who were co- owners of the same.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents were deprived of their respective shares by reason of the sale.

Ruling:
No. It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil
Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." In
Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:

The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by
other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the
legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas
(Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death
of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their respective
inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed
property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and
convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in
officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the
ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear
and convincing evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.20 The Complaint for
Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property must therefore be dismissed.

Bar-type Question:

A, is the child of B and C. During the subsistence of B and Cs marriage, they acquired a parcel of land from Cs
mother. Despite enjoying the continued possession of the said land, B and C failed to register the same until the
marriage was dissolved by reason of Cs death. After some time, B contracted a second marriage with D. It was only
during this time that B filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands. Thereafter,
B sold the land to Z. A new TCT was issued by reason of the sale to Z. A now filed a case for the annulment of sale
and reconveyance of the said property on the ground that his father deprived him of his respective share. If you are the
judge, would you grant the petition?

Suggested Answer:
No. It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil
Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." In
Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:

The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by
other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the
legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas
(Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death
of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

Thus, it is only upon Bs death that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso
shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet
bestowed upon the heirs of B. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly
supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious donation inter vivas), A has no right to question the sale
of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares.
Ining v Vega
GR No. 174727, August 12, 2013

FACTS:

Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject
property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan
(Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.

Sibling #1: Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R.
Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I.
Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.

Sibling # 2: Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children. In short, herein petitioners, except for
Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregorias grandchildren or spouses thereof
(Gregorias heirs). Tresvalles and Tajonera are transferees of the said property.

In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romanas surviving heir, Leonardo
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 for partition, recovery of ownership
and possession, with damages, against Gregorias heirs.

In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregorias heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed that Leonardo had no cause of
action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired
the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo
was aware of this fact.

ISSUES BEFORE LOWER COURTS:

1. Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leons estate;
2. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
3. Whether Leonardos claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or laches.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC
1. No. Declared lot to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining

2. Concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo
Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of Leons estate at the time of his death in 1962.

3. Dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription (30 years adverse possession).

(2) CA:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan;
Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining;
2. Trial courts declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez
and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled by petitioners failure to appeal the same.
3. There was no prescription. Prescription began to run not from Leons death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.s
execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the
property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that [n]o
prescription shall run in favor of a co- owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership,

ISSUES:
I THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO REPUDIATED THE CO-
OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.

II THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.

RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct based on the following reasons:
1. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had become final for failure
of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leons estate.
2. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.

3. Gregorias and Romanas heirs are co-owners of the subject property. no prescription shall run in favor of one of the
co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

4. For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. The CA held that prescription began to run
against Leonardo only in 1979 or even in 1980 when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has
renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that the filing
of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under
Article 1141.

Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolos son-in-law,
being married to Antipolos daughter Teodora.

One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of
the decedents property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed
among the decedents heirs.

OTHER NOTES:
1. Possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the other co- owners but will be held to benefit all,
and that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his
co-owners or co- heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation to deliver the same to his
co- owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee or trustee.
2. Principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and the respondents. It held that laches is controlled by
equitable considerations and it cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to deprive
the respondents of their rightful inheritance.
3. A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-
ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners;
(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
4. Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
(2) Between parents and children;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could seek
partition of the property at any time.
 G.R. No. L-15499 February 28, 1962

ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.

FACTS

1. Jose V. Ramirez was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta Cruz, Manila. Upon the death of Jose V. Ramirez, all
his property including the 1/6 undivided share was bequeathed to his children and grandchildren and 1/3 of the free
portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte.

2. Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez sold the property to Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. including the undivided 1/6
share property in Sta Cruz, Manila. On the same day, a copy of letter regarding the above-mentioned sell was sent to
Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the property of Jose V. Ramirez.

3. Mrs. Angela M. Butte filed a case against Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc for legal redemption when the latter refused Mrs.
Butte to redeem the said sold property.

ISSUE

Whether or not Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal redemption over the share sold by
Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez.

HELD

Yes, Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal redemption over the share sold by Mrs. Marie
Garnier Vda de Ramirez for being one of the co-owners of the heirs of the 1/6 undivided property of Jose V. Ramirez.

According to Article 1620 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of
redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is gross expensive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right to redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the
share that may respectively have in the thing owned in common.
 BALTAZAR vs. LAXA | G.R. No. 174489 | April 11, 2012 | Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and testament in the Pampango dialect on Sept.
13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia
expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter
affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and
his wife Corazon Laza and their children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew whom she treated as her
own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.

Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo and
his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.

On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzos petition. Antonio averred that the
properties subject of Paciencias Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia
had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the
state of being mangulyan or forgetful making her unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will had
been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence.

Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in Lorenzos favor arguing that Lorenzo was
disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of
Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.

RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia signed the will, she was no longer
possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the
decision of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on
Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance
for probate.

HELD: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down
by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and
evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact,
even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question of her
state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of
the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a
person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of
unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the NCC states: To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in
full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B. LOPEZ vs. DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ, MARYBETH DE LEON and
VICTORIA L. TUAZON
G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012

Doctrine:
The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of
the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase
or decrease in the pages.

Facts:
Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez (Lopez), and their four legitimate children, namely,
petitioner Richard, Diana, Marybeth and Victoria as compulsory heirs. Before Enriques death, he executed a Last Will
and Testament and constituted Richard as his executor and administrator.

Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the RTC with prayer for the
issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported last will and
testament was not executed and attested as required by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of Richard. Victoria also adopted the said opposition.

After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, Richard presented the attesting witnesses,
namely: Reynaldo Maneja; Romulo Monteiro; Ana Maria Lourdes Manalo (Manalo); and the notary public who
notarized the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco). The instrumental witnesses testified that after the late
Enrique read and signed the will on each and every page, they also read and signed the same in the latter's presence and
of one another. Photographs of the incident were taken and presented during trial. Manalo further testified that she was
the one who prepared the drafts and revisions from Enrique before the final copy of the will was made.

Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his client for more than 20 years. The latter consulted him in
the preparation of the subject will and furnished him the list of his properties for distribution among his children. He
prepared the will in accordance with Enrique's instruction and that before the latter and the attesting witnesses signed it
in the presence of one another, he translated the will, which was written in English to Filipino and added that Enrique
was in good health and of sound mind at that time.

RTC: disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a
statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is written. It held that while Article
809 of the same Code requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in Article 805 thereof, the rule only
applies if the number of pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence
required. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment
portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not having been executed and attested in accordance with law.

CA: found no valid reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC that the failure to state the number of pages of the
will in the attestation clause was fatal. It noted that while Article 809 of the Civil Code sanctions mere substantial
compliance with the formal requirements set forth in Article 805 thereof, there was a total omission of such fact in the
attestation clause. Moreover, while the acknowledgment of the will made mention of "7 pages including the page on
which the ratification and acknowledgment are written," the will had actually 8 pages including the acknowledgment
portion thus, necessitating the presentation of evidence aliunde to explain the discrepancy.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision to disallow the probate of will.
Held:
The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil Code provide:

ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign,
as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed
the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.

ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved
that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise
failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it
"consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed
substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot
be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.

The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether
all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the
subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects
or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages,
and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation
clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.

Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the will.

 SAMANIEGO-CELADA VS ABENA
556 SCRA 569

FACTS:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decent Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent
was the decedents lifelong companion since 1929.

On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents,
and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins which included petitioner.

Before her death, Margarita executed a will where she bequeathed portions of her undivided shares in real properties to
respondent. Margarita also left all her personal properties to respondent whom she likewise designated as sole executor
of her will.

RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated and respondent as executor of the
will. CA affirmed.

ISSUES:
(1) W/N the CA erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with the formalities required by law.
NO
(2) W/N it erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita, and in not issuing
letters of administration to petitioner. NO

HELD:
We rule in favor of respondent.

(1) A review of the findings of the RTC reveal that petitioners arguments lack basis. The RTC correctly held:
About the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation clause
states that the will is composed of 3 pages while the will, in truth, only consists of 2 pages only because the attestation
is not part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the
will, the court is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation
clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered
with pages A, B, and C which is sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The
error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of 3 pages
inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the
doctrine of liberal interpretation enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code.
The Court also rejects the contention that the signatures of the testator were affixed on different occasions as
the signature on the first page is allegedly different in size, texture, and appearance as compared to the signatures on
the succeeding pages. The picture shows that the testator was affixing her signature in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to show that the first signature was procured earlier than February 2,
1987.

We find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC.

(2) Since, petitioner and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 887 of the Civil Code and
as the decedent validly disposed of her properties in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right to
claim any part of the decedents estate.

The petition is DENIED. The assailed CA decision is AFFIRMED.

 RODRIGUEZ v RODRIGUEZ
532 SCRA 642, September 11, 2007

FACTS:
Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment. On October 27, 1983, he executed a Huling Habilin at Testamento
giving petitioner Cresenciana Tubo Rodriguez, his live-in partner, apartments D and E and his children Benjamin
Rodriguez (the decease husband of respondent Evangeline Rodriguez), apartment A, respondent Buenaventura
Rodriguez, apartment B, and respondent Belen Rodriguez, apartment C. However, on June 14, 1984, Juanito executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondents, alleging that she was the lawful and
registered owner of the property and she only allowed the respondents Evangelin, Buenaventura and Belen, out of
kindness and tolerance, to occupy units A, B and D, respectively. However, without her knowledge and consent,
respondents separately leased the units to lessees, who despite repeated demands, failed and refused to vacate the
premises and to pay rentals.

Respondents, on the other hand, claimed ownership over the subject property by succession and alleged that the
petitioner is not the lawful owner because the Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated and void. Also, they maintained
that petitioner exerted undue influence over their father, who at that time was seriously ill, to agree to the sale of the
property for only P20,000.00 after knowing that only two apartments were given to her in the Huling Habilin at
Testamento. Morover, they alleged that petitioner has no cause of action against them for being a party to thePartition
Agreement wherein they recognized each other as co-owners and partitioned the property in accordance with the
provision of the last will and testament.

MTC rendered a judgment on favor of the respondents and held that the Deed of Sale was simulated. The RTC
reversed the decision of the MTC and held that petitioners certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership of
the subject property. Also, it was held by the RTC that MTC erred when it relied heavily on the Huling Habilin at
Testamento, which was not probated hence has no effect and no right can be claimed therein. The Partition
Agreement which was allegedly entered into pursuant to the Huling Habilin at Testamento should not also be
considered. CA reversed the decision of the RTC further held that he Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted
ownership of the specific apartments not only to the respondents but also to the petitioner; and pursuant thereto, the
parties executed the Partition Agreement in accordance with the wishes of the testator.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondents have right of possession over the subject property in the absence of probate of the will.

HELD:

NO. Respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as the Huling Habilin at Testamento and the Partition
Agreement have no legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have force or validity it must
be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates
that [n]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules
of Court. As the will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto can not be
given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of
the issue of possession.
 [G.R. No. 156407. January 15, 2014.]
THELMA M. ARANAS, petitioner, vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,
CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and
FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, respondents.

FACTS:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V.
Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M.
Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely:
respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty
Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real
properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.

Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the
administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of
administration in favor of Teresita.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the consideration and
approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties
but only personal properties" worth P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth
P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and
30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that
the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. Teresita filed a compliance with the
order of January 8, 1993, 3 supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806
Mervir Realty shares of stock; 4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real
properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par
value of P4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth P30,000.00.

Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory. The RTC issued an order
expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the
motion for approval of the inventory. Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to
examine Teresita on the inventory.

The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had
excluded properties that should be included. The RTC denied the administratrix's motion for approval of inventory and
orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the
late Emigdio S. Mercado. The RTC also directed the administratrix to render an account of her administration of the
estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession.

Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on
the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to
Mervir Realty,

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision insofar as the inclusion of the inclusion of parcels of land known
as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated
February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either
transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?

RULING: No. The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and
erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special
Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to
resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

RATIO:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion
or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional
unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.

Under Section 6 (a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the
discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate.
Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the
preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the
administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters
of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. Within three
(3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the
court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate,
the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their
assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of
the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or
knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in
her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is "to
aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in malting
a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate."
Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what
properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot impose its judgment in
order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in
the absence of "positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, "the judges
enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action
taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion." As long as the RTC commits no
patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
 There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial
court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by
title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that
the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory
of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the
Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates
only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does
not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for
this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or
one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do
as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general
jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a
separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of
each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

The inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important purpose of resolving
the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory
heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which
he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of
the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on the
legitime of an heir "may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the
final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby
expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory
of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous
title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination,
the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in
the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude
properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave
abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of
discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.
 ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR. v. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN

Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo. Subsequently Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta and she gave
birth to Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her co-petitioner. Meanwhile, Lazo gave birth to respondent Leonila Perpetua Aleli
Portugal.

Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the estate of
their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate. In the deed, Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and
participation over a parcel of land in his favor.

Lazo died. Portugal also died intestate. Having such situation, Portugal-Beltran executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person adjudicating to herself the parcel of land. The Registry of
Deeds then issued the title in her name.

Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City a complaint against Portugal-
Beltran for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication alleging that she is not related whatsoever to
the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitledto inherit the parcel of land. But such was dismissed by the RTC for lack of
cause of action on the ground that Puerta and Portugal Jr.s status amd right as putative heirshad not been established
before a probate court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case.
Puerta and Portugal Jr. thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before
they can pursue the case for annulment of Portugal-Beltrans Affidavit of Adjudication and of the title issued in her
name

HELD:

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a
decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there
are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to fileone, then the
determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the parcel of land,
to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of Puerta and Portugal Jr. as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to
the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the
parties to the civil case-subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial
court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate
to administration proceedings since a determination of Puerta and Portugal Jr.s status as heirs could be achieved in the
civil case filed by Puerta and Portugal Jr., the trial court should proceed to evaluatethe evidence presented by the
parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.