Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.

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Rubinv.CoorsBrewingCo.
514U.S.476(1995)
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Opinion PDF
Syllabus | Case
OCTOBERTERM,1994
Syllabus
RUBIN,SECRETARYOFTHETREASURYv.
COORSBREWINGCO.
CERTIORARITOTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHETENTH
CIRCUIT
No.931631.ArguedNovember30,1994DecidedApril19,1995
Because5(e)(2)oftheFederalAlcoholAdministrationAct(FAAAorAct),27U.S.C.
205(e)(2),prohibitsbeerlabelsfromdisplayingalcoholcontent,thefederalBureauof
Alcohol,TobaccoandFirearms(BATF)rejectedrespondentbrewer'sapplicationfor
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/514/476/case.html 1/27
2/25/2016 Rubinv.CoorsBrewingCo.::514U.S.476(1995)::JustiaU.S.SupremeCourtCenter
approvalofproposedlabelsthatdisclosedsuchcontent.Respondentfiledsuitforreliefon
thegroundthattherelevantprovisionsoftheActviolatedtheFirstAmendment'sprotection
ofcommercialspeech.TheGovernmentarguedthatthelabelingbanwasnecessaryto
suppressthethreatof"strengthwars"amongbrewers,who,withouttheregulation,would
seektocompeteinthemarketplacebasedonthepotencyoftheirbeer.TheDistrictCourt
invalidatedthelabelingban,andtheCourtofAppealsaffirmed.Althoughthelattercourt
foundthattheGovernment'sinterestinsuppressing"strengthwars"was"substantial"under
thetestsetoutinCentralHudsonGas&Elec.Corp.v.PublicServoComm'nofN.Y.,447
U.S.557,thecourtheldthatthebanviolatestheFirstAmendmentbecauseitfailsto
advancethatinterestinadirectandmaterialway.
Held:Section5(e)(2)violatestheFirstAmendment'sprotectionofcommercialspeech.
Pp.480491.
(a)Inscrutinizingaregulationofcommercialspeechthatconcernslawfulactivityandisnot
misleading,acourtmustconsiderwhetherthegovernmentalinterestassertedtosupportthe
regulationis"substantial."Ifthatisthecase,thecourtmustalsodeterminewhetherthe
regulationdirectlyadvancestheassertedinterestandisnomoreextensivethanis
necessarytoservethatinterest.CentralHudson,supra,at566.Here,respondentseeksto
discloseonlytruthful,verifiable,andnonmisleadingfactualinformationconcerningalcohol
content.Pp.480482.
(b)Theinterestincurbing"strengthwars"issufficiently"substantial"tosatisfyCentral
Hudson.TheGovernmenthasasignificantinterestinprotectingthehealth,safety,and
welfareofitscitizensbypreventingbrewersfromcompetingonthebasisofalcohol
strength,whichcouldleadtogreateralcoholismanditsattendantsocialcosts.Cf.Posadas
dePuertoRicoAssociatesv.TourismCo.ofP.R.,478U.S.328,341.Thereisnoreason
tothinkthatstrengthwars,iftheywere
477
tooccur,wouldnotproducethetypeofsocialharmthattheGovernmenthopestoprevent.
However,theadditionalassertedinterestin"facilitat[ing]"stateeffortstoregulatealcohol
undertheTwentyfirstAmendmentisnotsufficientlysubstantialtomeetCentralHudson's
requirement.EveniftheGovernmentpossessedtheauthoritytofacilitatestatepowers,the
GovernmenthasofferednothingtosuggestthatStatesareinneedoffederalassistancein
thisregard.UnitedStatesv.EdgeBroadcastingCo.,509U.S.418,431435,distinguished.
pp.483486.
(c)Section205(e)(2)failsCentralHudson'srequirementthatthemeasuredirectlyadvance
theassertedGovernmentinterest.Thelabelingbancannotbesaidtoadvancethe
governmentalinterestinsuppressingstrengthwarsbecauseotherprovisionsoftheFAAA
andimplementingregulationsprevent205(e)(2)fromfurtheringthatinterestinadirect
andmaterialfashion.Althoughbeeradvertisingwouldseemtoconstituteamoreinfluential
weaponinanystrengthwarthanlabels,theBATFregulationsgoverningsuchadvertising
prohibitstatementsofalcoholcontentonlyinStatesthataffirmativelybansuch
advertisements.Governmentregulationsalsopermittheidentificationofcertainbeerswith
highalcoholcontentas"maltliquors,"andtheyrequiredisclosureofcontentonthelabelsof
winesandspirits.Thereislittlechancethat205(e)(2)candirectlyandmateriallyadvance
itsaim,whileotherprovisionsofthesameActdirectlyundermineandcounteractitseffects.
Pp.486490.
(d)Section205(e)(2)ismoreextensivethannecessary,sinceavailablealternativestothe
labelingbanincludingdirectlylimitingthealcoholcontentofbeers,prohibitingmarketing
effortsemphasizinghighalcoholstrength,andlimitingthebantomaltliquors,thesegment
ofthebeermarketthatallegedlyisthreatenedwithastrengthwarwouldprovelessintrusive
totheFirstAmendment'sprotectionsforcommercialspeech.Pp.490491.
2F.3d355,affirmed.
THOMAS,J.,deliveredtheopinionoftheCourt,inwhichREHNQUIST,C.J.,and
O'CONNOR,SCALIA,KENNEDY,SOUTER,GINSBURG,andBREYER,JJ.,joined.
STEVENS,J.,filedanopinionconcurringinthejudgment,post,p.491.
DeputySolicitorGeneralKneedlerarguedthecauseforpetitioner.Withhimonthebriefs
wereSolicitorGeneralDays,AssistantAttorneyGeneralHunger,RichardH.Seamon,
MichaelJaySinger,andJohnS.Koppel.
478
BruceJ.Ennis,Jr.,arguedthecauseforrespondent.
WithhimonthebriefwereDonaldB.Verrilli,Jr.,PaulM.Smith,NoryMiller,M.Caroline
Turner,andTerranceD.Micek.*
JUSTICETHOMASdeliveredtheopinionoftheCourt.Section5(e)(2)oftheFederal
AlcoholAdministrationActprohibitsbeerlabelsfromdisplayingalcoholcontent.Wegranted
certiorariinthiscasetoreviewtheTenthCircuit'sholdingthatthelabelingbanviolatesthe
FirstAmendmentbecauseitfailstoadvanceagovernmentalinterestinadirectandmaterial
way.Because5(e)(2)isinconsistentwiththeprotectionsgrantedtocommercialspeechby
theFirstAmendment,weaffirm.
Respondentbrewsbeer.In1987,respondentappliedtotheBureauofAlcohol,Tobacco
andFirearms(BATF),anagencyoftheDepartmentoftheTreasury,forapprovalof
proposedlabelsandadvertisementsthatdisclosedthealcoholcontentofitsbeer.BATF
rejectedtheapplicationonthegroundthattheFederalAlcoholAdministrationAct(FAAAor
Act),49Stat.977,27U.S.C.201etseq.,prohibiteddisclosureofthealcoholcontentof
beeronlabelsorinadvertising.RespondentthenfiledsuitintheDistrict
*BriefsofamicicuriaeurgingreversalwerefiledfortheCenterforScienceinthePublic
InterestbyBruceA.SilvergladeandfortheCouncilofStateGovernmentsetal.byRichard
Ruda.
BriefsofamicicuriaeurgingaffirmancewerefiledfortheAssociationofNational
Advertisers,Inc.,etal.byBurtNeuborne,GilbertH.Weil,ValerieSchulte,andJohnF.
KampforPublicCitizenbyDavidC.VladeckfortheUnitedStatesTelephoneAssociation
etal.byMichaelWMcConnell,KennethS.Geller,CharlesA.Rothfeld,WilliamBarfield,and
GeraldE.MurrayandfortheWashingtonLegalFoundationbyCharlesFried,DonaldB.
Ayer,DanielJ.Popeo,andRichardA.Samp.
BriefsofamicicuriaewerefiledfortheBeerInstitutebyP.CameronDeVore,JohnJ.
Walsh,andStevenG.BrodyandfortheWineInstitutebyJohnC.Jeffries,Jr.
479
CourtfortheDistrictofColoradoseekingadeclaratoryjudgmentthattherelevantprovisions
oftheActviolatedtheFirstAmendmentrespondentalsosoughtinjunctivereliefbarring
enforcementoftheseprovisions.TheGovernmenttookthepositionthatthebanwas
necessarytosuppressthethreatof"strengthwars"amongbrewers,who,withoutthe
regulation,wouldseektocompeteinthemarketplacebasedonthepotencyoftheirbeer.
TheDistrictCourtgrantedthereliefsought,butapaneloftheCourtofAppealsfortheTenth
Circuitreversedandremanded.AdolphCoorsCo.v.Brady,944F.2d1543(1991).Applying
theframeworksetoutinCentralHudsonGas&Elec.Corp.v.PublicServoComm'nofN.
Y.,447U.S.557(1980),theCourtofAppealsfoundthattheGovernment'sinterestin
suppressingalcoholic"strengthwars"was"substantial."Brady,supra,at15471549.It
furtherheld,however,thattherecordprovidedinsufficientevidencetodeterminewhether
theFAAA'sbanondisclosure"directlyadvanced"thatinterest.Id.,at15491551.Thecourt
remandedforfurtherproceedingstoascertainwhethera"'reasonablefit'"existedbetween
thebanandthegoalofavoidingstrengthwars.Id.,at1554.
Afterfurtherfactfinding,theDistrictCourtupheldthebanonthedisclosureofalcohol
contentinadvertisingbutinvalidatedthebanasitappliedtolabels.Althoughthe
GovernmentaskedtheTenthCircuittoreviewtheinvalidationofthelabelingban,
respondentdidnotappealthecourt'sdecisionsustainingtheadvertisingban.Onthecase's
secondappeal,theCourtofAppealsaffirmedtheDistrictCourt.AdolphCoorsCo.v.
Bentsen,2F.3d355(1993).FollowingourrecentdecisioninEdenfieldv.Fane,507U.S.
761(1993),theTenthCircuitaskedwhethertheGovernmenthadshownthatthe"
'challengedregulationadvances[theGovernment's]interestsinadirectandmaterialway.'"
2F.3d,at357(quotingEdenfield,supra,at767768).Afterreviewingtherecord,theCourt
ofAppealsconcludedthattheGovernment
480
hadfailedtodemonstratethattheprohibitioninanywaypreventedstrengthwars.Thecourt
foundthattherewasnoevidenceofanyrelationshipbetweenthepublicationoffactual
informationregardingalcoholcontentandcompetitiononthebasisofsuchcontent.2F.3d,
at358359.
Wegrantedcertiorari,512U.S.1203(1994),toreviewtheTenthCircuit'sdecisionthat
205(e)(2)violatestheFirstAmendment.Weconcludethatthebaninfringesrespondent's
freedomofspeech,andwethereforeaffirm.
IIA
SoonaftertheratificationoftheTwentyfirstAmendment,whichrepealedtheEighteenth
AmendmentandendedtheNation'sexperimentwithProhibition,CongressenactedtheF
AAA.Thestatuteestablishesnationalrulesgoverningthedistribution,production,and
importationofalcoholandestablishedaFederalAlcoholAdministrationtoimplementthese
rules.Section5(e)(2)oftheActprohibitsanyproducer,importer,wholesaler,orbottlerof
alcoholicbeveragesfromselling,shipping,ordeliveringininterstateorforeigncommerce
anymaltbeverages,distilledspirits,orwinesinbottles
"unlesssuchproductsarebottled,packaged,andlabeledinconformitywith
suchregulations,tobeprescribedbytheSecretaryoftheTreasury,with
respecttopackaging,marking,branding,andlabelingandsizeandfillof
container...aswillprovidetheconsumerwithadequateinformationastothe
identityandqualityoftheproducts,thealcoholiccontentthereof(exceptthat
statementsof,orstatementslikelytobeconsideredasstatementsof,
alcoholiccontentofmaltbeveragesareprohibitedunlessrequiredbyState
lawandexceptthat,incaseofwines,statementsofalcoholiccontentshallbe
requiredonlyforwinescontainingmorethan14percentumofalcoholby
volume),thenetcontentsof
481
thepackage,andthemanufacturerorbottlerorimporteroftheproduct."27U.
S.C.205(e)(2)(emphasisadded).
TheActdefines"'maltbeverage[sJ'''insuchawayastoincludeallbeersandales.211(a)
(7).
ImplementingregulationspromulgatedbyBATF(underdelegationofauthorityfromthe
SecretaryoftheTreasury)prohibitthedisclosureofalcoholcontentonbeerlabels.27CFR
7.26(a)(1994).1Inadditiontoprohibitingnumericalindicationsofalcoholcontent,the
labelingregulationsproscribedescriptivetermsthatsuggesthighcontent,suchas"strong,"
"fullstrength,""extrastrength,""hightest,""highproof,""prewarstrength,"and"fulloldtime
alcoholicstrength."7.29(f).Theprohibitionsdonotprecludelabelsfromidentifyingabeer
as"lowalcohol,""reducedalcohol,""nonalcoholic,"or"alcoholfree."Ibid.seealso
7.26(b)(d).Bystatuteandbyregulation,thelabelingbanmustgivewayifstatelawrequires
disclosureofalcoholcontent.
Bothpartiesagreethattheinformationonbeerlabelsconstitutescommercialspeech.
ThoughweoncetookthepositionthattheFirstAmendmentdoesnotprotectcommercial
speech,seeValentinev.Chrestensen,316U.S.52(1942),werepudiatedthatpositionin
VirginiaBd.ofPharmacyv.VirginiaCitizensConsumerCouncil,Inc.,425U.S.748(1976).
Therewenotedthatthefreeflowofcommercialinformationis"indispensabletotheproper
allocationofresourcesinafreeenterprisesystem"becauseitinformsthenumerousprivate
decisionsthatdrivethesystem.Id.,at765.Indeed,weobservedthata"particular
consumer'sinterestinthe
1BATFhassuspended7.26tocomplywiththeDistrictCourt'sorderenjoiningthe
enforcementofthatprovision.58Fed.Reg.21228(1993).Pendingthefinaldispositionof
thiscase,interimregulationspermitthedisclosureofalcoholcontentonbeerlabels.27
CFR7.71(1994).
482
freeflowofcommercialinformation...maybeaskeen,ifnotkeenerbyfar,thanhisinterest
intheday'smosturgentpoliticaldebate."Id.,at763.
Still,VirginiaBoardofPharmacysuggestedthatcertaintypesofrestrictionsmightbe
toleratedinthecommercialspeechareabecauseofthenatureofsuchspeech.Seeid.,at
771772,n.24.Inlaterdecisionswegraduallyarticulatedatestbasedon"'the
"commonsense"distinctionbetweenspeechproposingacommercialtransaction,which
occursinanareatraditionallysubjecttogovernmentregulation,andothervarietiesof
speech.'"CentralHudson,447U.S.,at562(quotingOhralikv.OhioStateBarAssn.,436
U.S.447,455456(1978)).CentralHudsonidentifiedseveralfactorsthatcourtsshould
considerindeterminingwhetheraregulationofcommercialspeechsurvivesFirst
Amendmentscrutiny:
"Forcommercialspeechtocomewithin[theFirstAmendment],itatleastmust
concernlawfulactivityandnotbemisleading.Next,weaskwhetherthe
assertedgovernmentalinterestissubstantial.Ifbothinquiriesyieldpositive
answers,wemustdeterminewhethertheregulationdirectlyadvancesthe
governmentalinterestasserted,andwhetheritisnotmoreextensivethanis
necessarytoservethatinterest."447U.S.,at566.
WenowapplyCentralHudson'stestto205(e)(2).2
2TheGovernmentarguesthatCentralHudsonimposestoostrictastandardforreviewing
205(e)(2),andurgesustoadoptinsteadafarmoredeferentialapproachtorestrictionson
commercialspeechconcerningalcohol.RelyingonUnitedStatesv.EdgeBroadcastingCo.,
509U.S.418(1993),andPosadasdePuertoRicoAssociatesv.TourismCo.ofP.R.,478
U.S.328(1986),theGovernmentsuggeststhatlegislatureshavebroaderlatitudeto
regulatespeechthatpromotessociallyharmfulactivities,suchasalcoholconsumption,than
theyhavetoregulateothertypesofspeech.AlthoughEdgeBroadcastingandPosadas
involvedtheadvertisingofgamblingactivities,theGovernmentarguesthatwealsohave
appliedthisprincipletospeechconcerningalcohol.SeeCaliforniav.LaRue,409
483
III
Boththelowercourtsandthepartiesagreethatrespondentseekstodiscloseonlytruthful,
verifiable,andnonmisleadingfactualinformationaboutalcoholcontentonitsbeerlabels.
Thus,ouranalysisfocusesonthesubstantialityoftheinterestbehind205(e)(2)andon
whetherthelabelingbanbearsanacceptablefitwiththeGovernment'sgoal.Acareful
considerationofthesefactorsindicatesthat205(e)(2)violatestheFirstAmendment's
protectionofcommercialspeech.
TheGovernmentidentifiestwointerestsitconsiderssufficiently"substantial"tojustify
205(e)(2)'slabelingban.First,theGovernmentcontendsthat205(e)(2)advances
Congress'goalofcurbing"strengthwars"bybeerbrewerswhomightseektocompetefor
customersonthebasisofalcoholcontent.AccordingtotheGovernment,theFAAA's
restrictionpreventsaparticulartypeofbeerdrinkerone
u.S.109,138(1972)(holdingthatStatesmaybannudedancinginbarsandnightclubsthat
serveliquor).
NeitherEdgeBroadcastingnorPosadascompelsustocraftanexceptiontotheCentral
Hudsonstandard,forinbothofthosecasesweappliedtheCentralHudsonanalysis.
Indeed,EdgeBroadcastingspecificallyavoidedreachingtheargumenttheGovernment
makesherebecausetheCourtfoundthattheregulationinquestionpassedmusterunder
CentralHudson.509U.S.,at425.Tobesure,PosadasdidstatethatthePuertoRico
Governmentcouldbanpromotionaladvertisingofcasinogamblingbecauseitcouldhave
prohibitedgamblingaltogether.478U.S.,at346.ButtheCourtreachedthisargumentonly
afteritalreadyhadfoundthatthestateregulationsurvivedtheCentralHudsontest.See
478U.S.,at340344.TheCourtraisedtheGovernment'spointinresponsetoan
alternativeclaimthatPuertoRico'sregulationwasinconsistentwithCareyv.Population
ServicesInt'l,431U.S.678(1977),andBigelowv.Virginia,421U.S.809(1975).Posadas,
supra,at345346.
NordoesLaRuesupporttheGovernment'sposition.LaRuedidnotinvolvecommercial
speechaboutalcohol,butinsteadconcernedtheregulationofnudedancinginplaceswhere
alcoholwasserved.409U.S.,at114.
484
whoselectsabeveragebecauseofitshighpotencyfromchoosingbeerssolelyfortheir
alcoholcontent.IntheGovernment'sview,restrictingdisclosureofinformationregardinga
particularproductcharacteristicwilldecreasetheextenttowhichconsumerswillselectthe
productonthebasisofthatcharacteristic.
RespondentcountersthatCongressactuallyintendedtheFAAAtoachievethefardifferent
purposeofpreventingbrewersfrommakinginaccurateclaimsconcerningalcoholcontent.
Accordingtorespondent,whenCongresspassedtheFAAAin1935,brewersdidnothave
thetechnologytoproducebeerwithalcohollevelswithinpredictabletolerancesaskillthat
modernbeerproducersnowpossess.Further,respondentarguesthatthetruepolicy
guidingfederalalcoholregulationisnotaimedatsuppressingstrengthwars.Ifsuchwere
thegoal,theGovernmentwouldnotpursuetheoppositepolicywithrespecttowinesand
distilledspirits.Although205(e)(2)requiresBATFtopromulgateregulationsbarringthe
disclosureofalcoholcontentonbeerlabels,italsoordersBATFtorequirethedisclosureof
alcoholcontentonthelabelsofwinesandspirits.See27CFR4.36(1994)(wines)5.37
(distilledspirits).
Ratherthansuppressingthefreeflowoffactualinformationinthewineandspiritsmarkets,
theGovernmentseekstocontrolcompetitiononthebasisofstrengthbymonitoring
distillers'promotionsandmarketing.Respondentquitecorrectlynotesthatthegeneral
thrustoffederalalcoholpolicyappearstofavorgreaterdisclosureofinformation,ratherthan
less.Thisalsoseemstobethetrendinfederalregulationofotherconsumerproductsas
well.See,e.g.,NutritionLabelingandEducationActof1990,Pub.L.101535,104Stat.
2353,asamended(requiringlabelsoffoodproductssoldintheUnitedStatestodisplay
nutritionalinformation).
Respondentoffersaplausiblereadingofthepurposebehind205(e)(2),buttheprevention
ofmisleadingstatementsofalcoholcontentneednotbetheexclusiveGovernmentin
485
terestservedby205(e)(2).InPosadasdePuertoRicoAssociatesv.TourismCo.ofP.R.,
478U.S.328,341(1986),wefoundthatthePuertoRicoLegislature'sinterestinpromoting
thehealth,safety,andwelfareofitscitizensbyreducingtheirdemandforgamblingprovided
asufficiently"substantial"governmentalinteresttojustifytheregulationofgambling
advertising.SotootheGovernmentherehasasignificantinterestinprotectingthehealth,
safety,andwelfareofitscitizensbypreventingbrewersfromcompetingonthebasisof
alcoholstrength,whichcouldleadtogreateralcoholismanditsattendantsocialcosts.Both
panelsoftheCourtofAppealsthatheardthiscaseconcludedthatthegoalofsuppressing
strengthwarsconstitutedasubstantialinterest,andwecannotsaythattheirconclusionis
erroneous.Wehavenoreasontothinkthatstrengthwars,iftheyweretooccur,wouldnot
producethetypeofsocialharmthattheGovernmenthopestoprevent.
TheGovernmentattemptstobolsteritspositionbyarguingthatthelabelingbannotonly
curbsstrengthwars,butalso"facilitates"stateeffortstoregulatealcoholundertheTwenty
firstAmendment.TheSolicitorGeneraldirectsustoUnitedStatesv.EdgeBroadcasting
Co.,509U.S.418(1993),inwhichweupheldafederallawthatprohibitedlottery
advertisingbyradiostationslocatedinStatesthatdidnotoperatelotteries.Thatcase
involvedastationlocatedinNorthCarolina(anonlotteryState)thatbroadcastlottery
advertisementsprimarilyintoVirginia(aStatewithalottery).Weupheldthestatuteagainst
FirstAmendmentchallengeinpartbecauseitsupportedNorthCarolina'santigambling
policywithoutundulyinterferingwithStatesthatsponsoredlotteries.Id.,at431435.Inthis
case,theGovernmentclaimsthattheinterestbehind205(e)(2)mirrorsthatofthestatute
inEdgeBroadcastingbecauseitprohibitsdisclosureofalcoholcontentonlyinStatesthat
donotaffirmativelyrequirebrewerstoprovidethatinformation.IntheGovernment'sview,
thissavesStatesthatmightwishto
486
bansuchlabelsthetroubleofenactingtheirownlegislation,anditdiscouragesbeer
drinkersfromcrossingstatelinestobuybeertheybelieveisstronger.
WeconcludethattheGovernment'sinterestinpreservingstateauthorityisnotsufficiently
substantialtomeettherequirementsofCentralHudson.EveniftheFederalGovernment
possessedthebroadauthoritytofacilitatestatepowers,inthiscasetheGovernmenthas
offerednothingthatsuggeststhatStatesareinneedoffederalassistance.Statesclearly
possessampleauthoritytobanthedisclosureofalcoholcontentsubject,ofcourse,tothe
sameFirstAmendmentrestrictionsthatapplytotheFederalGovernment.Unlikethe
situationinEdgeBroadcasting,thepoliciesofsomeStatesdonotpreventneighboring
Statesfrompursuingtheirownalcoholrelatedpolicieswithintheirrespectiveborders.One
State'sdecisiontopermitbrewerstodisclosealcoholcontentonbeerlabelswillnot
precludeneighboringStatesfromeffectivelybanningsuchdisclosureofthatinformation
withintheirborders.
TheremainingCentralHudsonfactorsrequirethatavalidrestrictiononcommercialspeech
directlyadvancethegovernmentalinterestandbenomoreextensivethannecessaryto
servethatinterest.Wehavesaidthat"[t]helasttwostepsoftheCentralHudsonanalysis
basicallyinvolveaconsiderationofthe'fit'betweenthelegislature'sendsandthemeans
chosentoaccomplishthoseends."Posadas,supra,at341.TheTenthCircuitfoundthat
205(e)(2)failedtoadvancetheinterestinsuppressingstrengthwarssufficientlytojustifythe
ban.Weagree.
JusttwoTermsago,inEdenfieldv.Fane,507U.S.761(1993),wehadoccasiontoexplain
theCentralHudsonfactorconcerningwhethertheregulationofcommercialspeech"directly
advancesthegovernmentalinterestasserted."CentralHudson,447U.S.,at566.In
Edenfield,wedecided
487
thattheGovernmentcarriestheburdenofshowingthatthechallengedregulationadvances
theGovernment'sinterest"inadirectandmaterialway."507U.S.,at767.Thatburden"is
notsatisfiedbymerespeculationorconjecturerather,agovernmentalbodyseekingto
sustainarestrictiononcommercialspeechmustdemonstratethattheharmsitrecitesare
realandthatitsrestrictionwillinfactalleviatethemtoamaterialdegree."Id.,at770771.
Wecautionedthatthisrequirementwascriticalotherwise,"aStatecouldwitheaserestrict
commercialspeechintheserviceofotherobjectivesthatcouldnotthemselvesjustifya
burdenoncommercialexpression."Id.,at771.
TheGovernmentattemptstomeetitsburdenbypointingtocurrentdevelopmentsinthe
consumermarket.Itclaimsthatbeerproducersarealreadycompetingandadvertisingon
thebasisofalcoholstrengthinthe"maltliquor"segmentofthebeermarket.3The
Governmentattemptstoshowthatthiscompetitionthreatenstospreadtotherestofthe
marketbydirectingourattentiontorespondent'smotivesinbringingthislitigation.
Respondentallegedlysuffersfromconsumermisperceptionsthatitsbeerscontainless
alcoholthanotherbrands.AccordingtotheGovernment,oncerespondentgainsrelieffrom
205(e)(2),itwilluseitslabelstoovercomethishandicap.
UndertheGovernment'stheory,205(e)(2)suppressesthethreatofsuchcompetitionby
preventingconsumersfromchoosingbeersonthebasisofalcoholcontent.Itisassuredlya
matterof"commonsense,"BriefforPetitioner27,thatarestrictionontheadvertisingofa
productcharacteristicwilldecreasetheextenttowhichconsumersselectaproductonthe
basisofthattrait.Inadditiontocommonsense,theGovernmenturgesustoturntohistory
asaguide.Ac
3"'Maltliquor'isthetermusedtodesignatethosemaltbeverageswiththehighestalcohol
content....Maltliquorsrepresentapproximatelythreepercentofthemaltbeveragemarket."
AdolphCoorsCo.v.Bentsen,2F.3d355,358,n.4(CAlO1993).
488
cordingtotheGovernment,atthetimeCongressenactedtheFAAA,theuseoflabels
displayingalcoholcontenthadhelpedproduceastrengthwar.Section205(e)(2)allegedly
relievedcompetitivepressurestomarketbeeronthebasisofalcoholcontent,resultingover
thelongterminbeerswithloweralcohollevels.
Weconcludethat205(e)(2)cannotdirectlyandmateriallyadvanceitsassertedinterest
becauseoftheoverallirrationalityoftheGovernment'sregulatoryscheme.Whilethelaws
governinglabelingprohibitthedisclosureofalcoholcontentunlessrequiredbystatelaw,
federalregulationsapplyacontrarypolicytobeeradvertising.27U.S.C.205(f)(2)27
CFR7.50(1994).Like205(e)(2),theserestrictionsprohibitstatementsofalcohol
contentinadvertising,but,unlike205(e)(2),theyapplyonlyinStatesthataffirmatively
prohibitsuchadvertisements.Asonly18Statesatbestprohibitdisclosureofcontentin
advertisements,App.toBriefforRespondentla12a,brewersremainfreetodisclose
alcoholcontentinadvertisements,butnotonlabels,inmuchofthecountry.Thefailureto
prohibitthedisclosureofalcoholcontentinadvertising,whichwouldseemtoconstitutea
moreinfluentialweaponinanystrengthwarthanlabels,makesnorationalsenseifthe
Government'strueaimistosuppressstrengthwars.
OtherprovisionsoftheFAAAanditsregulationssimilarlyundermine205(e)(2)'seffortsto
preventstrengthwars.While205(e)(2)bansthedisclosureofalcoholcontentonbeer
labels,itallowstheexactoppositeinthecaseofwinesandspirits.Thus,distilledspiritsmay
containstatementsofalcoholcontent,27CFR5.37(1994),andsuchdisclosuresare
requiredforwineswithmorethan14percentalcohol,27CFR4.36(1994).Ifcombating
strengthwarswerethegoal,wewouldassumethatCongresswouldregulatedisclosureof
alcoholcontentforthestrongestbeveragesaswellasfortheweakestones.Further,the
Governmentpermitsbrewerstosignalhighalcoholcontentthroughuse
489
oftheterm"maltliquor."AlthoughtheSecretaryhasproscribedtheuseofvariouscolorful
termssuggestinghighalcohollevels,27CFR7.29(f)(1994),manufacturersstillcan
distinguishaclassofstrongermaltbeveragesbyidentifyingthemasmaltliquors.One
wouldthinkthatiftheGovernmentsoughttosuppressstrengthwarsbyprohibiting
numericaldisclosuresofalcoholcontent,italsowouldprecludebrewersfromindicating
higheralcoholbeveragesbyusingdescriptiveterms.
Whilewearemindfulthatrespondentonlyappealedtheconstitutionalityof205(e)(2),
theseexemptionsandinconsistenciesbringintoquestionthepurposeofthelabelingban.
Tobesure,theGovernment'sinterestincombatingstrengthwarsremainsavalidgoal.But
theirrationalityofthisuniqueandpuzzlingregulatoryframeworkensuresthatthelabeling
banwillfailtoachievethatend.Thereislittlechancethat205(e)(2)candirectlyand
materiallyadvanceitsaim,whileotherprovisionsofthesameActdirectlyundermineand
counteractitseffects.
Thisconclusionexplainsthefindingsofthecourtsbelow.
BoththeDistrictCourtandtheCourtofAppealsfoundthattheGovernmenthadfailedto
presentanycredibleevidenceshowingthatthedisclosureofalcoholcontentwouldpromote
strengthwars.IntheDistrictCourt'swords,"noneofthewitnesses,noneofthedepositions
thatIhaveread,nocredibleevidencethatIhaveheard,lead[s]metobelievethatgiving
alcoholiccontentonlabelswillinanywaypromote...strengthwars."App.toPet.forCert.
A38.SeealsoBentsen,2F.3d,at359.Indeed,theDistrictCourtconcludedthat"
[p]rohibitingthealcoholiccontentdisclosureofmaltbeveragesonlabelshaslittle,if
anything,todowiththetypeofadvertisingthatpromotesstrengthwars."App.toPet.for
Cert.A36.4AstheFAAA'sexceptionsandreg
4NotonlywastherelittleevidencethatAmericanbrewersintendtoincreasealcohol
content,butthelowercourtsalsofoundthat"intheUnitedStates...thevastmajorityof
consumers...valuetasteand
490
ulationswouldhavecounteractedanyeffectthelabelingbanhadexerted,itisnotsurprising
thatthelowercourtsdidnotfindanyevidencethat205(e)(2)hadsuppressedstrength
wars.
TheGovernment'sbriefsubmitsanecdotalevidenceandeducatedguessestosuggestthat
competitiononthebasisofalcoholcontentisoccurringtodayandthat205(e)(2)'sban
hasconstrainedstrengthwarsthatotherwisewouldburstoutofcontrol.Thesevarious
tidbits,however,cannotovercometheirrationalityoftheregulatoryschemeandtheweight
oftherecord.TheGovernmentdidnotofferanyconvincingevidencethatthelabelingban
hasinhibitedstrengthwars.Indeed,itcouldnot,inlightoftheeffectoftheFAAA'sother
provisions.Theabsenceofstrengthwarsoverthepastsixdecadesmayhaveresultedfrom
anynumberoffactors.
Nordowethinkthatrespondent'slitigatingpositionscanbeusedagainstitasproofthatthe
Government'sregulationisnecessary.Thatrespondentwishestodisseminatefactual
informationconcerningalcoholcontentdoesnotdemonstratethatitintendstocompeteon
thebasisofalcoholcontent.Brewersmayhavemanydifferentreasonsonlyoneofwhich
mightbeadesiretowageastrengthwarwhytheywishtodisclosethepotencyoftheir
beverages.
Evenif205(e)(2)didmeettheEdenfieldstandard,itwouldstillnotsurviveFirst
AmendmentscrutinybecausetheGovernment'sregulationofspeechisnotsufficiently
tailoredtoitsgoal.TheGovernmentarguesthatasufficient"fit"existsherebecausethe
labelingbanappliestoonlyoneproductcharacteristicandbecausethebandoesnot
prohibitalldisclosuresofalcoholcontentitappliesonlytothoseinvolvinglabelingand
advertising.Inresponse,respondentsuggestsseveralalternatives,suchasdirectlylimiting
thealcoholcontentofbeers,prohibitingmarketingeffortsem
lowercaloriesbothofwhichareadverselyaffectedbyincreasedalcoholstrength."Bentsen,
2F.3d,at359accord,App.toPet.forCert.A37.
491
phasizinghighalcoholstrength(whichisapparentlythepolicyinsomeotherwestern
nations),orlimitingthelabelingbanonlytomaltliquors,whichisthesegmentofthemarket
thatallegedlyisthreatenedwithastrengthwar.Weagreethattheavailabilityofthese
options,allofwhichcouldadvancetheGovernment'sassertedinterestinamannerless
intrusivetorespondent'sFirstAmendmentrights,indicatesthat205(e)(2)ismore
extensivethannecessary.
IV
Insum,althoughtheGovernmentmayhaveasubstantialinterestinsuppressingstrength
warsinthebeermarket,theFAAA'scountervailingprovisionsprevent205(e)(2)from
furtheringthatpurposeinadirectandmaterialfashion.TheFAAA'sdefectsarefurther
highlightedbytheavailabilityofalternativesthatwouldprovelessintrusivetotheFirst
Amendment'sprotectionsforcommercialspeech.Becausewefindthat205(e)(2)failsthe
CentralHudsontest,weaffirmthedecisionofthecourtbelow.
Itissoordered.
JUSTICESTEVENS,concurringinthejudgment.
AlthoughIagreewiththeCourt'spersuasivedemonstrationthatthisstatutedoesnotserve
theGovernment'spurportedinterestinpreventing"strengthwars,"Iwriteseparately
becauseIamconvincedthattheconstitutionalinfirmityinthestatuteismorepatentthanthe
Court'sopinionindicates.InsteadofrelyingontheformulaicapproachannouncedinCentral
HudsonGas&Elec.Corp.v.PublicServoComm'nofN.Y.,447U.S.557(1980),Ibelieve
theCourtshouldaskwhetherthejustificationforallowingmoreregulationofcommercial
speechthanotherspeechhasanyapplicationtothisunusualstatute.
Inmyopinionthe"commercialspeechdoctrine"isunsuitedtothiscase,becausethe
FederalAlcoholAdministra

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