AGRARIAN LAW REVIEWER
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AGRICULTURAL TENANCY
Republic Act No. 1199
AN ACT TO GOVERN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN
LANDHOLDERS AND TENANTS OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS
(LEASEHOLDS AND SHARE TENANCY)
PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Agricultural
Tenancy Act of the Philippines."
Section 2. Purposes. - It is the purpose of this Act to establish
agricultural tenancy relations between landholders and tenants upon the
principle of school justice; to afford adequate protection to the rights of
both tenants and landholders; to insure an equitable division of the
produce and income derived from the land; to provide tenant- farmers
with incentives to greater and more efficient agricultural production; to
bolster their economic position and to encourage their participation in
the development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural
communities.
Section 3. Agricultural Tenancy Defined. - Agricultural tenancy is the
physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging
to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production
through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate
farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the
harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in
produce or in money, or in both.
Section 4. Systems of Agricultural Tenancy; Their Definitions. -
Agricultural tenancy is classified into leasehold tenancy and share
tenancy.
Share tenancy exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking
for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the
other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of the
items of production, the tenant cultivating the land personally with the
aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household,
and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the
tenant in proportion to their respective contributions.
Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either personally or with
the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household, undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land
susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of
his immediate farm household, belonging to or legally possessed by,
another in consideration of a price certain or ascertainable to be paid by
the person cultivating the land either in percentage of the production or
in a fixed amount in money, or in both.
Section 5. Definitions of Terms. - As used in this Act:
(a) A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available
from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land
belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under
the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold
tenancy system.
(b) A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who, either as
owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, lets or grants to another
the use or cultivation of his land for a consideration either in shares
under the share tenancy system, or a price certain or ascertainable under
the leasehold tenancy system.
(c) Agricultural year is the period of time necessary for the raising of
seasonal agricultural products, including the preparation of the land, and
the sowing, planting and harvesting of the crop: Provided, however,
That in the case of coconuts, citrus, coffee, ramie, and other crops where
more than one harvest is obtained from one planting, the words
"agricultural year" shall mean the period of time from the preparation of
land to the first harvest and thereafter from harvest to harvest. In both
cases, the period of time may be shorter or longer than a calendar year.
(d) Farm implements include hand tools or machines ordinarily
employed in a farm enterprise.
(e) Work animals include animals ordinarily employed in a farm
enterprise. The words include carabaos, horses, bullocks, etc.
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(f) Pulling of the seedlings is a phase of farm work in which seedlings
are uprooted from the seed beds immediately before transplanting.
(g) Final harrowing in the last stage in pulverizing the soil into fine
particles in readying the field for the transplanting of the seedlings.
(h) Reaping is the cutting of rice stalks.
(i) Harvesting shall mean the gathering of the fruits or produce of a crop
other than rice.
(j) Piling into small stacks used as a term in rice share tenancy shall
mean the piling into several small stacks within the tenant's holdings of
reaped and bundled stalks containing the grain, preparatory to their
transportation to the place designated for their threshing.
(k) Piling into big stacks used as a term in rice share tenancy shall mean
the piling into one huge stack of the several small stacks of reaped and
bundled stalks containing grain, which constitute the entire harvest of
the tenant from his holdings, preparatory to threshing.
(l) Proven farm practices include those sound farming practices which
have attained general acceptance through usage or are officially
recommended by the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
(m) Fair rental value is an amount of money not in excess of allowable
depreciation plus six per cent interest per annum on the investment
computed at its market value: Provided, however, That the fair rental
value for the work animal or animals and farm implements required to
produce the crop shall not exceed five per cent of the gross harvest for
the animal or animals and five per cent for implements: And, provided,
further, That whenever a tractor or power and the necessary implements
are utilized interchangeably with work animals in the same holding
during the same agricultural year the rental shall not exceed ten per cent
for the combined services.
(n) Immediately after as used in this Act shall be inclusive of the last
day of harvesting, threshing or processing and the next five days
thereafter.
(o) Immediate farm household includes the members of the family of the
tenant, and such other person or persons, whether related to the tenant or
not, who are independent upon him for support and who usually help
him operate the farm enterprise.
(p) Incapacity means any cause or circumstances which prevents the
tenant from fulfilling his contractual obligations and those imposed by
this Act.
(q) Inspect means to examine and observe. However, such examinations
and observations shall not include any acts of intimidation or coercion.
(r) Auxiliary crop is any product raised other than the crop to which the
cultivation of the land is principally devoted; and excluding the produce
of the lot referred to in Section twenty-six.
Section 6. Tenancy Relationship; Its Definition. - Tenancy relationship
is a juridical tie which arises between a landholder and a tenant once
they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of
land belonging to the former, either under the share tenancy or leasehold
tenancy system, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the
right to continue working on and cultivating the land, until and unless he
is dispossessed of his holdings for any of the just causes enumerated in
Section fifty or the relationship is terminated in accordance with Section
nine.
Section 7. Tenancy Relationship; How established; Security of
Tenure. - Tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in
writing, expressly or impliedly. Once such relationship is established,
the tenant shall be entitled to security of tenure as hereinafter provided.
Section 8. Limitations of Relation. - The relation of landholder and
tenant shall be limited to the person who furnishes land, either as owner,
lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and to the person who actually
works the land himself with the aid of labor available from within his
immediate farm household.
Section 9. Severance of Relationship. - The tenancy relationship is
extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or
incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate
farm household may continue to work the land until the close of the
agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by
the parties, and the sale or alienation of the land do not of themselves
extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee
shall assume the rights and obligations of the former landholder in
relation to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs
shall likewise assume his rights and obligations.
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Section 10. Contracts; Nature and Continuity of Conditions. - The
terms and conditions of tenancy contracts, as stipulated by the parties or
as provided by law, shall be understood to continue until modified by
the parties. Modifications of the terms and conditions of contracts shall
not prejudice the right of the tenant to the security of his tenure on the
land as determined in Section six, seven, and forty-nine.
Section 11. Freedom to Contract in General. - The landholder and the
tenant shall be free to enter into any or all kinds of tenancy contract, as
long as they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy. Except in
case of fraud, error, force, intimidation or undue influence, when such
contract is reduced to writing and registered as hereinafter provided, the
latter shall be conclusive evidence of what has been agreed upon
between the contracting parties, if not denounced or impugned within
thirty days after its registration.
Said contract shall be contrary to law, morals and public policy;
A. In Share Tenancy
(a) If the tenant is to receive less than the corresponding share for the
different contributions be made to the production of the farm as
hereinafter provided.
(b) If it is stipulated that the tenant or any member or his immediate
farm household shall without compensation perform any work or render
any service not connected with the tenant's duties and obligations
provided under this Act.
B. In Leasehold Tenancy
(a) If the tenant-lessee is to pay to the landholder, lessor, as a
consideration for the use of the land, an amount in excess of that
hereinafter provided for the kind and class of land involved.
(b) If the tenant-lessee is to pay the landholder-lessor a consideration in
excess of the amount prescribed as fair rental value, as determined
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, for the use of work animals,
services and/or farm implements belonging to the landholder-lessor, in
case it is agreed between the parties that the latter shall furnish any or all
of these items of production.
(c) If it is stipulated that, as a condition precedent to the commencement
or continuance of the lease, the tenant-lessee shall rent work animals,
services or farm implements, or shall make use of any store or services
operated by the landholder-lessor or any other person, or that the
landholder-lessor may impose fines, deductions and/or assessments, or
that the tenant-lessee shall, without compensation, perform any work or
render any service not connected with the tenant's duties and obligations
provided under this Act.
Section 12. Form and Registration of Contract. - A contract of tenancy
in writing, in order to be conclusive as evidence, shall be drawn in
quadruplicate in the language or dialect known to all the parties thereto
and signed or thumb-marked both by the landholder or his authorized
representative, and the tenant himself, before two witnesses, one to be
chosen by each party. If any of the parties does not know to read, one of
the witnesses, to be chosen by him, shall read the contents of the
document to him. Each of the contracting parties shall retain a copy of
the contract and the third and fourth copies shall be delivered to the
municipal treasurer of the municipality where the land which is the
subject-matter of the contract is located, who shall file and register the
third copy in his office and forward the fourth copy to the court:
Provided, That in order that a tenancy contract may be registered, it
shall be the duty of the municipal treasurer and tenant, respectively, and
to place an annotation on each copy of the fact of registration in his
office, stating the date, time and place of registration as well as the entry
or registration number.
The form of contract shall be uniform and shall be prepared and
furnished by the court. The contracting parties shall acknowledge the
execution of the contracting before the municipal treasurer or justice of
the peace or the mayor of the municipality where the land is situated. No
fees or stamps of any kind shall be paid or required.
When one of the parties is unable to read, in case of doubt the burden of
proof to show that he understood the terms of the contract shall rest
upon the other party who is able to read.
Section 13. Registry of Tenancy Contracts. - For the purposes of this
Act, the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein the land which
is the subject-matter of a tenancy contract is situated shall keep a record
of all such contracts entered into within his jurisdiction, to be known as
"Registry of Tenancy Contracts." He shall keep this registry together
with a copy of each contract entered therein, and make annotations on
said registry of all subsequent acts relative to each contract, such as its
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renewal, novation, cancellation, etc.: Provided, That the municipal
treasurer shall not charge any fee for the registration of said contracts or
of any subsequent acts relative thereto, none of which shall be subject to
the documentary stamp tax.
Section 14. Change of System. - The tenant shall have the right to
change the tenancy contract from one of share tenancy to the leasehold
tenancy and vice versa and from one crop-sharing arrangement to
another of the share tenancy. If the share tenancy contract is in writing
and is duly registered, the right may be exercised at the expiration of the
period of the contract. In the absence of any written contract, the right
may be exercised at the end of the agricultural year. In both cases the
changed to the leasehold system shall be effective one agricultural year
after the tenant has served notice of his intention to change upon the
landholder.
Section 15. Interest on Loans or Advances. - On all loans or advances
obtained by the tenant from the landholder in connection with the
cultivation, planting, harvesting and other incidental expenses for the
improvement of the crop planted, as well as loans or advances for the
subsistence of the tenant and his family, the interest which may be
stipulated shall not exceed eight per centum per calendar year: Provided,
That on all loans or advances other than money, such as grain or other
agricultural products, made computed on the basis of the current price of
the produce at the time it was loaned. Violation of the provisions of this
section shall be punished in accordance with the Usury Law.
Section 16. Memorandum of Loans or Advances. - Any obligation
referring to any amount either in money or in kind, including the
payment of interest, which the tenant may have received from time to
time as loan or advance from the landholder, shall be void unless the
same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing in a language
or dialect known to the party charged, and subscribed by said party, or
by his authorized agent.
Section 17. Form of Final Accounting. - The final accounting between
landholder and tenant at the end of each agricultural year shall be
effected within ten days after the threshing in case of rice and within the
same period of time after the harvest or gathering of the fruits in the
case of crops. In case of crops which have to be said in processed form,
the final accounting shall be within five days after the sale is
consummated and the sales receipt shall be exhibited to the tenant.
The accounting shall be made to appear in a not or memorandum written
in a language or dialect known to the tenant and signed by both parties
in the presence of two witnesses who shall be selected by each party.
Each of the contracting parties shall be furnished with a copy of said
note or memorandum and such final accounting, once duly signed by
both parties and two witnesses, shall be deemed conclusive evidence of
its contents, except in case of fraud, error, force, intimidation or undue
influence. When one of the parties is unable to read, the burden of proof,
in case of doubt, to show that he understood the accounting, shall rest
upon the other party who is able to read.
In the absence of a written accounting in accordance with the preceding
paragraph, the tenant may, within three years from the date of the
threshing of the crop in question, petition the Court to compel the
landholder to render an accounting of the same in accordance with this
section.
Section 18. Settlement of Debts. - Once the accounting is made, any
amount of money which the landholder may have advanced to the tenant
for expenses of cultivation, harvesting or gathering of the crop or for his
own private use, as well as any amount of grain or agricultural products
advanced for his subsistence and that of his family, shall be paid by the
tenant out of his share either in grain or in money, at the option of the
latter; Provided, That such grain or agricultural products shall be
appraised in money according to their current market value at the place
where the land is located at the time of their delivery to the tenant:
Provided, further, That in case his share is not sufficient, his outstanding
debt shall be reduced to money and shall bear an interest of not more
than ten per cent per annum: And provided, finally, That the remaining
debts of the tenant once converted into money shall not again be
converted into kind. Said outstanding debt money may, however, be
paid in money or in agricultural products appraised at the local current
market price at the time of payment.
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Section 19. Exemption from Lien and/or Attachment. - Twenty-five
per centum of the tenant's share of the produce of the land in share
tenancy, or of the entire produce in leasehold tenancy, one work animal
and one of each kind of farm implement belonging to the tenant,
provided that the value of such work animal and implements do not
exceed five hundred pesos, shall be exempt from lien and attachment.
Section 20. Use of Official Weights and Measures. - In all transactions
entered into between the landholder and the tenant concerning
agricultural products the official weights and measures of the
Government shall be used.
Section 21. Ejectment: Violation; Jurisdiction. - All cases involving
the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder or by a third party and/or
the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship
of landholder and tenant, as well as the violation of any of the
provisions of this Act, shall be under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law
to take cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes
PART II
THE SHARE SYSTEM
CHAPTER I - Common Provisions
Section 22. Rights of the Tenant. -
(1) The tenant shall be free to work elsewhere whenever the nature of
his farm obligation warrants his temporary absence from his holdings.
(2) The tenant shall, aside from his labor, have the right to provide any
of the contributions for production whenever he can do so adequately
and on time.
(3) The tenant's dwelling shall not, without his consent, be removed
from the lot assigned to him by the landholder, unless there is a
severance of the tenancy relationship between them as provided under
Section nine, or unless the tenant is ejected for cause, and only after the
expiration of forty-five days following such severance of relationship or
dismissal for cause.
If the tenant is dismissed without just cause and he is constrained to
work elsewhere, he may choose either to remove his dwelling at the
landholder's cost or demand the value of the same from the landholder at
the time of the unjust dismissal.
(4) The tenant shall have the right to be indemnified for his labor and
expenses in the cultivation, planting, or harvesting and other incidental
expenses for the improvement of the crop raised in case he is
dispossessed of his holdings, whether such dismissal is for a just cause
and not, provided the crop still exists at the time of the dispossession.
Section 23. Obligations for the tenant. - It shall be the obligation of the
tenant:
(1) To cultivate and take care of the farm, the growing crop and other
improvements entrusted to him as a good father of a family, by doing all
the work necessary in accordance with proven farming practices.
(2) To inform the landholder at once of any trespass committed by a
third person upon the farm.
(3) To take reasonable care of the work animals and farm implements
used in the point undertaking. He shall not use the work animals and
farm implements entrusted to him by the landholder for purposes other
than those intended, or allowed their use by other persons without the
knowledge and consent of the landholder.
The tenant shall not abandon or surrender his holdings and leave the
farm and growing crop and other improvements unattended during the
watch season, except for just and reasonable cause. In case of such
unjustified abandonment or surrender, any or all of his expected share in
the crop may, in the discretion of the court, be forfeited in favor of the
landholder to the extent of the damage caused thereby.
Any of the following shall be considered just and reasonable cause for
the tenant to terminate the tenancy relationship;
(a) Cruel, inhuman or offensive treatment on the part of the landholder
of his representative toward the tenant or any member of his immediate
farm household.
(b) Non-compliance on the part of the landholder with any of the
obligations imposed upon him by the provisions of this Act or by the
contract.
(c) If the landholder or his representative compels the tenant or any
member of his immediate farm household to do any work or render any
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service not in any way connected with his farm work, or even without
compulsion if no compensation is paid.
(d) Commission of a crime by the landholder or his representative
against the tenant or any member of his immediate farm household.
Section 24. Prohibitions to Tenant: -
(1) It shall be unlawful for the tenant, whenever the area of his holdings
is five hectares or more, or is sufficient size to make him and the
members of his immediate farm household fully occupied in its
cultivation, to contract to work at the same time on two or more separate
holdings belonging to different landholders under any system of
tenancy, without the knowledge and consent of the land-holder with
whom he first entered into tenancy relationship.
(2) It shall be unlawful for a share-tenant to employ a sub-tenant to
furnish labor or any phase of the work required of him under this Act,
except in cases of illness or any temporary incapacity on his part, in
which eventuality the tenant or any member of his immediate farm
household is under obligation to report such illness or incapacity to the
landholder. Payment to the sub-tenant, in whatever form, for services
rendered on the land under this circumstance, shall be for the account of
the tenant.
(3) Subject to provisions of the next preceding paragraph, land entrusted
for cultivation to a leasehold tenant shall not be sub-let nor shall the
lease be assigned by the tenant to another person, except with the
written consent of the lessor.
Section 25. Rights of the Landholder: -
(1) The landholder shall have the right to choose the kind of crop and
the seeds with the tenant shall plant in his holdings: Provided, however,
That if the tenant should subject, the court shall settle the conflict,
according to the best interest of both parties.
(2) The landholder shall have the right to require the use of fertilizer of
the kind or kinds shown by proven farm practices to be adapted to the
requirements of the land.
(3) The landholder shall have the right to inspect and observe the extent
of compliance on the part of the tenant with the terms and conditions of
their contract and the provisions of this Act.
(4) In cases where the crop has to be sold in processed form before
division and the tenant has no representative, the landholder, shall have
the right to deal with millers or processors in representation of the
tenant.
Section 26. Obligations of the Landholder:
(a) The landholder shall furnish the tenant an area of not less than one
thousand square meters where the latter may construct his dwelling,
raise vegetables, poultry, pigs, and other animals and engage in minor
industries, the products of which shall accrue to the tenant exclusively.
(b) The landholder shall keep the tenant in the peaceful possession and
cultivation of his landholdings which are the subject matter of the
contract.
Section 27. Prohibitions to the Landholder:
(1) The landholder shall not dispossess the tenant of his holdings except
for any of the causes enumerated in Section fifty, and without the cause
having been proved before, and the dispossession authorized by, the
court; otherwise, he shall, aside from the penalty of fine and/or
imprisonment provided for any violation of this Act, be liable to the
tenant for damages to the extent of the landholder's right under Section
twenty-two of this Act.
(2) The landholder shall be responsible for the payment of taxes levied
by the Government upon the land which is the subject-matter of the
contract and it shall be unlawful to make the tenant bear in part of all of
the same, either directly or indirectly.
(3) The landholder shall not require the tenant to bear, directly or
indirectly, any part of the rent, "canon" or other consideration which he,
the former, may be under obligation to pay to a third person for the use
of the land.
Section 28. Expenses for Seeds; Fertilizer; Pest and Weed Control
Expenses.
(1) The same amount of seeds or seedlings used in the production of any
crop shall be deducted from the gross harvest and returned to the party
who furnished the same.
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(2) The cost of fertilizer and expenses for pest and weed control as
evidenced by sales invoices shall be paid out of the gross harvest and
returned to the party who advanced the cost and expenses.
Section 29. Irrigation System. - The cost of the construction of an
irrigation system, including the distributory canals, shall be borne
exclusively by the landholder. The cost of maintenance and operation of
the system shall, however, be borne by the landholder and the tenant in
proportion to their respective shares in the harvest.
Section 30. Auxiliary Crop. - In case the land is planted to an auxiliary
crop, the tenant shall receive eighty per centum and the landholder
twenty per centum of the net produce, provided all expenses of
production are borne by the tenant.
Auxiliary crops shall, not, however, be construed to include the crops or
products raised from the garden, poultry and other industries carried on
the lot specifically provided for the tenant under Section 26(a) hereof.
Section 31. Cost of Fertilizer, etc.; when to be Advanced by the
landholder. - Whenever the use of fertilizer or the application of insect,
disease and rodent control measures is directed by the landholder, he
shall advance their cost, which shall be deducted from the gross
produce.
CHAPTER II - Rice Share Tenancy
Section 32. Share Basis. - The parties shall, on ricelands which
produces a normal average of more than forty cavanes per hectare for
the three agricultural years next preceding the current harvest, receive as
shares in the gross produce, after setting aside the same amount of palay
used as seed, and after deducting the cost of fertilizer, pest and weed
control, reaping and threshing, the amount corresponding to the total
equivalent of their individual contributions, computed as follows;
Contribution Participation
1. Land 30%
2. Labor 30%
3. Farm implements 5%
4. Work Animals 5%
Final harrowing of the field immediately before
5. transplanting 5%
6. Transplanting 25%
Section 33. Share basis on Second Class Land. - On ricelands, which
produce a normal average of forty cavans or less per hectare for the
three agricultural years next preceding the current harvest, the
participation for the contribution of the land shall be twenty-five per
centum and that of labor, thirty-five per centum.
Section 34. Reimbursement Not Allowed. - Contributions or shares in
the contribution to the production of the crop in the form of cash, grain
or services, once shouldered or rendered alone by one party may not be
reimbursed by the other party after the phase or phases of work required
in the joint undertaking shall have been completed.
Section 35. Sharing of Expenses. - In case the landholder and the
tenant agree to share equally in the expenses of final harrowing of field
and transplanting, the latter may engage the services of persons or
helpers to perform these phases of farm work, provided the rates for
each shall have been previously determined and agreed upon between
the landholder and the tenant. In case of disagreement upon said rates,
the party who undertakes to the corresponding share in the harvest, after
deducting the expenses of reaping.
Section 36. Further Rights of the Tenant. - In addition to the provision
of Section twenty-two, the tenant shall have the right to:
1. Determine when to scatter the seeds, to transplant the seedlings, and
to reap the harvest, provided they shall be in accordance with proven
farm practices and after due notice to the landholder.
2. Choose the thresher which shall thresh the harvest whenever it is the
best available in the locality and the best suited to the landholder's and
tenant's needs and provided the rate charged is equal to or lower than the
rate charged by the owner of other threshers under similar
circumstances: Provided, further, That in cases where there are more
than tenant the selection of the majority of the tenants shall prevail:
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Provided, finally, That if the landholder is the owner of a thresher and is
ready and willing to grant equal or lower rates under the same
conditions, the use of the landholder's thresher shall be given preference.
3. Apply appropriate pest, insect, disease and rodent control measures
whenever in his judgment such action is necessary: Provided, however,
That if a tenant fails to apply any of the above control measures after the
landholder has made a request in writing for such action, he shall be
liable for any loss resulting from such failure.
4. Apply fertilizer of the kind or kinds shown by proven farm practices
to be adapted to the requirements of the land, provided the landholder
has not exercised his right under Section twenty-five to require the use
of such fertilizer.
Section 37. Further Rights of the Landholder. - In addition to the
provisions of Section twenty-five, the landholder, by himself or through
his representative, may determined:
1. The proper height of pilapils or dikes according to the local practices.
2. The location and size of irrigation canals.
3. The site for the stacking of the harvest, provided it shall not be farther
than one kilometer from the center of the area cultivated by a majority
of the tenants.
4. The date of threshing.
Provided, however, That in case of disagreement by the tenant in any of
the foregoing instances, the court shall determine whatever may be in
the interest or both parties.
Section 38. Labor; What It Constitutes. - The tenant shall perform the
following as the labor contributed by him under Section thirty-two;
1. The preparation of the seedbed which shall include plowing,
harrowing, and watering of the seedbed, the scattering of the seeds, and
the care of the seedlings.
2. The plowing, harrowing, and watering of the area he is cultivating,
except final harrowing of the field as an item of contribution specified in
Section thirty-two of this Act.
3. The maintenance, repair and weeding of dikes, paddies, and irrigation
canals in his holdings.
4. The pulling and bundling of the seedlings preparatory to their
transplanting.
5. Care of the growing plants.
6. Gathering and bundling of the reaped harvest.
7. The piling of the bundles into small stacks.
8. The preparation of the place where the harvest is to be stacked.
9. Gathering of the small stacks and their transportation to the place
where they are to be stacked.
10. Piling into a big stack preparatory to threshing.
Section 39. Prohibition on Pre-Threshing. - It shall be unlawful for
either the tenant or the landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or
thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the date set for its
threshing. Any violation by either party shall be treated and penalized in
accordance with this Act and/or under the general provisions of law
applicable to the act committed.
Section 40. Place of Crop Division. - The division of the crop shall be
made in the same place where the harvest has been threshed and each
party shall transport his share to his warehouse or barn, unless the
contrary is stipulated by the parties.
CHAPTER III - Share Tenancy on Crops other than Rice
Section 41. Basis of Shares in Crops other than Rice. - The landholder
and the tenant on lands which produce crops either than rice shall be
free to enter into any contract stipulating the ratio of crop division. In
the absence of a stipulation, the customs of the place shall govern:
Provided, That whether the basis of division of the crop is the contract
between the parties or the customs of the place, the share of the tenant
for his labor in the production shall not less than thirty per cent of the
harvest or produce, after deducting the expenses for harvesting and/or
initial processing: Provided, further, That in cases where the share of the
tenant is, according to local practices or customs prevailing at the time
of the approval of this Act, more than the minimum herein set, the
tenant's share thus established by local practices or customs shall prevail
and be considered the minimum.
PART III
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THE LEASEHOLD TENANCY
Section 42. Landholder-Lessor and Tenant-Lessee, Defined. Any
person, natural or juridical, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal
possessor or agricultural land, who lets, leases or rents to another said
property for purposes of agricultural production and for a price certain
or ascertainable either in an amount of money or produce, shall be
known as the landholder-lessor; and any person who, with the consent
of the former, tills, cultivates or operates said land, susceptible of
cultivation by one individual, personally or with the aid of labor
available from among his own immediate farm household, is a tenant-
lessee.
Section 43. Rights and Obligations of Tenant-Lessee. - With the
creation of the tenancy relationship arising out of the contract between
the landholder-lessor and tenant-lessee, the latter shall have the right to
enter the premises of the land, and to the adequate and peaceful
enjoyment thereof. He shall have the right to work the land according to
his best judgment, provided this manner and method of cultivation and
harvest are in accordance with proven farm practices. Upon termination
of the relationship, he shall be entitled to one half of the value of the
improvements made by him, provided they are reasonable and adequate
to the purposes of the lease.
The tenant-lessee shall pay the consideration stipulated in the lease
contract provided it shall not exceed the limit fixed in Section forty-six.
In the absence of stipulation, the consideration shall be that established
in said Section forty-six. He shall make proper use of the land and the
improvements thereon and shall be under obligation to cultivate it as a
good father of a family, by doing all the work considered reasonable and
necessary in accordance with proven farm practices. He is likewise
obliged to take reasonable care of the work animals and farm
implements that may be delivered to him by the land-holder, in case it is
agreed between the parties that the landholder-lessor shall furnish any or
all of them.
Section 44. Rights of Landholder-lessor. - The landholder-lessor or his
duly authorized representatives shall have the right to inspect the
premises of the land which is the subject of the lease for the purpose of
ascertaining the tenant's compliance with the provisions of the contract
and of this Act, but in no case shall he exercise any coercion,
intimidation or violence in word or deed.
Section 45. Manner of Rental Payment. - Payment of the consideration
for the use of land may be made either in an amount certain or
ascertainable in money or in produce, or both.
Section 46. Consideration for the Use of Land. -
(a) The consideration for the use of ricelands, shall not be more than
thirty per centum of the gross produce for first class lands and not more
than twenty-five per centum for second class lands. Classification of
ricelands shall be determined by productivity: first class lands being
those which yield more than forty cavanes per hectare and second class
lands being those which yield forty cavanes or less, the same to be
computed upon the normal average harvest of the three preceding years.
(b) The consideration for agricultural land where exist fruit trees and
other useful trees and plants, from which the whole or any portion of the
produce of the said land is taken, shall not be more than what have been
specified in the preceding section: Provided, however, That additional
considerations for the employment of said trees and useful plants, if the
principal product is rice or other crops, shall be decided and specified by
negotiation between the landholder-lessor and the tenant-lessee;
Provided, further, That where the tenant-lessee, during the period of the
lease and/or in consideration thereof, plants and/or takes care of said
trees and plants, with the consent of the landholder-lessor, the tenant-
lessee shall be compensated by the latter in the manner agreed between
them.
(c) The consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds, saltbeds and
of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be governed by
stipulation between the parties.
Section 47. Rental of Work Animals, etc., and Applicability of
Schedules. - Upon agreement of the parties, the tenant- lessee may make
use of such work animals, farm implements or services belonging to the
landholder-lessor as are available for hire, the consideration of which
shall be based on their fair rental value.
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The rates on the fair rental value for the use of work animals, farm
implements and services, belonging to the landholder-lessor shall be
those provided in Schedules "A", "B", and "C", which shall apply upon
approval of this Act and shall remain in force, unless the Secretary of
Agricultural and Natural Resources revises the same in accordance with
Section fifty-two.
Section 48. Loans and Interests. - Loans, either in money or in kind,
obtained by a tenant-lessee from the landholder lessor shall be payable
at the time stipulated: Provided, however, That this shall not be
construed as prejudicing the right of the borrower to repay his obligation
before the date of maturity. The loan, unless it is otherwise stipulated,
shall be payable in money at not more than eight per cent interest per
annum, computed from the date of the indebtedness was contracted up
to and including the date of payment. A note or memorandum to
evidence such indebtedness shall be executed in accordance with the
provisions of Section sixteen.
PART IV
SECURITY OF TENURE
Section 49. Ejectment of Tenant. - Notwithstanding any agreement or
provision of law as to the period, in all cases where land devoted to any
agricultural purpose is held under any system of tenancy, the tenant
shall not be dispossessed of his holdings except for any of the causes
hereinafter enumerated and only after the same has been proved before,
and the dispossession is authorized by, the court.
Section 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. - Any of the
following shall be a sufficient cause for the dispossession of a tenant
from his holdings:
(a) The bona fide intention of the landholder to cultivate the land
himself personally or through the employment of farm machinery and
implements: Provided, however, That should the landholder not
cultivate the land himself or should fail to employ mechanical farm
implements for a period of one year after the dispossession of the tenant,
it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the land and damages
for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossession: Provided,
further, That the land-holder shall, at least one year but not more than
two years prior to the date of his petition to dispossess the tenant under
this subsection, file notice with the court and shall inform the tenant in
wiring in a language or dialect known to the latter of his intention to
cultivate the land himself, either personally or through the employment
of mechanical implements, together with a certification of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources that the land is suited for
mechanization: Provided, further, That the dispossessed tenant and the
members of his immediate household shall be preferred in the
employment of necessary laborers under the new set-up.
(b) When the current tenant violates or fails to comply with any of the
terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Act:
Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply when the tenant
has substantially complied with the contract or with the provisions of
this Act.
(c) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the
landholder's share: Provided, however, That this shall not apply when
the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure.
(d) When the tenant uses the land for a purpose other than that specified
by agreement of the parties.
(e) When a share-tenant fails to follow those proven farm practices
which will contribute towards the proper care of the land and increased
agricultural production.
(f) When the tenant through negligence permits serious injury to the
land which will impair its productive capacity.
(g) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his
immediate family or farm household of a crime against the landholder or
a member of his immediate family.
Section 51. Burden of Proof. - The burden of proof to show the
existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of a tenant shall rest upon
the landholder.
PART V
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
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Section 52. Duties of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. - It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to:
1. Conduct such educational programs as circumstances may require
adequately to acquaint tenants and landholders with their rights and
responsibilities under this Act.
2. Revise the rental rates provided for in Schedules "A", and "B",
whenever such revision is made necessary by changes in values and
prices, so that the rental rates shall conform to the standard of fair rental
value as defined in Section 5(m).
3. Facilities the preparation and registration of land- holder-tenant
contracts through the distribution of appropriate printed forms and
instructions to guide the interested parties in drafting and executing
rental agreements. The forms of contracts must bear the approval of the
court.
4. Conduct surveys and researches to determine the extent of
compliance, adaptability to different crops and areas and the fairness of
this Act to all parties affected by its implementation.
5. Submit an annual report to the President containing an analysis
showing the progress made toward attaining the objectives enumerated
in Section two of this Act and recommendations concerning methods of
improving the implementation and general effectiveness of this Act.
Copies of this report shall be provided to members of the Congress.
Section 53. Duties of Secretary of Justice. - The Secretary of Justice,
through the Executive Judge of the Court, shall be responsible for
formulating a national enforcement program, among other things,
through the assignment of judges and personnel, which will insure the
full enforcement of the provisions of this Act.
Section 54. Representation by Counsel. - In all cases wherein a tenant
cannot afford to the represented by counsel, it shall be the duty of the
Public Defender of the Department of Labor to represent him, upon
proper notification by the party concerned, or the court of competent
jurisdiction shall assign or appoint counsel de oficio for the indigent
tenant.
Section 55. Applicability of General Laws. - The provisions of existing
laws which are not inconsistent herewith shall apply to the contracts
governed by this Act as well as to acts or omissions by either party
against each other during, and in connection with, their relationship.
Section 56. Doubts to Be Solved in Favor of the Tenant. - In the
interpretation and enforcement of this Act and other laws as well as of
the stipulations between the landholder and the tenant, the courts and
administrative officials shall solve all grave doubts in favor of the
tenant.
Section 57. Penal Provision. - Violation of any of the provisions of this
Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both in the discretion of the
Court.
Section 58. Separability of Provisions. - If for any reason, any section
or provision of this Act shall be questioned in any court, and shall be
held to be unconstitutional or invalid, no other section or provision of
this Act shall be effected thereby.
Section 59. Repealing Provisions. - Public Act Numbered Four
thousand fifty-four, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Thirty-four,
Commonwealth Act Numbered Fifty-three, Commonwealth Act
Numbered Four hundred sixty-one as amended by Republic Act
Numbered Forty- four, and all laws, rules and regulations inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed.
Section 60. Effective Date. - This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
Approved: August 30, 1954
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REPUBLIC ACT No. 3844
AN ACT TO ORDAIN THE AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM
CODE AND TO INSTITUTE LAND REFORMS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INCLUDING THE ABOLITION OF TENANCY
AND THE CHANNELING OF CAPITAL INTO INDUSTRY,
PROVIDE FOR THE NECESSARY IMPLEMENTING
AGENCIES, APPROPRIATE FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
CHAPTER I AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD SYSTEM
Section 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share Tenancy - Agricultural share
tenancy, as herein defined, is hereby declared to be contrary to public
policy and shall be abolished: Provided, That existing share tenancy
contracts may continue in force and effect in any region or locality, to
be governed in the meantime by the pertinent provisions of Republic
Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, until the
end of the agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council
proclaims that all the government machineries and agencies in that
region or locality relating to leasehold envisioned in this Code are
operating, unless such contracts provide for a shorter period or the
tenant sooner exercise his option to elect the leasehold system:
Provided, further, That in order not to jeopardize international
commitments, lands devoted to crops covered by marketing allotments
shall be made the subject of a separate proclamation that adequate
provisions, such as the organization of cooperatives, marketing
agreements, or other similar workable arrangements, have been made to
insure efficient management on all matters requiring synchronization of
the agricultural with the processing phases of such crops: Provided,
furthermore, That where the agricultural share tenancy contract has
ceased to be operative by virtue of this Code, or where such a tenancy
contract has been entered into in violation of the provisions of this Code
and is, therefore, null and void, and the tenant continues in possession of
the land for cultivation, there shall be presumed to exist a leasehold
relationship under the provisions of this Code, without prejudice to the
right of the landowner and the former tenant to enter into any other
lawful contract in relation to the land formerly under tenancy contract,
as long as in the interim the security of tenure of the former tenant under
Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended,
and as provided in this Code, is not impaired: Provided, finally, That if a
lawful leasehold tenancy contract was entered into prior to the
effectivity of this Code, the rights and obligations arising therefrom
shall continue to subsist until modified by the parties in accordance with
the provisions of this Code.
Section 5. Establishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The
agricultural leasehold relation shall be established by operation of law in
accordance with Section four of this Code and, in other cases, either
orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly.
Section 6. Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural
leasehold relation shall be limited to the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal
possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same.
Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural
leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural
lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such
leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected
therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.
Section 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The
agricultural leasehold relation established under this Code shall be
extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee,
written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee,
in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.
Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death
or Incapacity of the Parties - In case of death or permanent incapacity of
the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall
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continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who can
cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor
within one month from such death or permanent incapacity, from among
the following: (a) the surviving spouse; (b) the eldest direct descendant
by consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest descendant or descendants in the
order of their age: Provided, That in case the death or permanent
incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year,
such choice shall be exercised at the end of that agricultural year:
Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural lessor fails to
exercise his choice within the periods herein provided, the priority shall
be in accordance with the order herein established.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the
leasehold shall bind his legal heirs.
Section 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by
Expiration of Period, etc. - The agricultural leasehold relation under this
Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period
in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells,
alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the
purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
Section 11. Lessee's Right of Pre-emption - In case the agricultural
lessor decides to sell the landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have
the preferential right to buy the same under reasonable terms and
conditions: Provided, That the entire landholding offered for sale must
be pre-empted by the Land Authority if the landowner so desires, unless
the majority of the lessees object to such acquisition: Provided, further,
That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be
entitled to said preferential right only to the extent of the area actually
cultivated by him. The right of pre-emption under this Section may be
exercised within ninety days from notice in writing which shall be
served by the owner on all lessees affected.
Section 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption - In case the landholding is
sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee,
the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price
and consideration: Provided, That the entire landholding sold must be
redeemed: Provided, further, That where these are two or more
agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption
only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of
redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from
the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of
legal redemption.
Section 13. Affidavit Required in Sale of Land Subject to Right of Pre-
emption - No deed of sale of agricultural land under cultivation by an
agricultural lessee or lessees shall be recorded in the Registry of
Property unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given the written notice required in Section eleven of this Chapter or
that the land is not worked by an agricultural lessee.
Section 14. Right of Pre-emption and Redemption Not Applicable to
Land to be Converted into Residential, Industrial and Similar
Purposes - The right of pre-emption and redemption granted under
Sections eleven and twelve of this Chapter cannot be exercised over
landholdings suitably located which the owner bought or holds for
conversion into residential, commercial, industrial or other similar non-
agricultural purposes: Provided, however, That the conversion be in
good faith and is substantially carried out within one year from the date
of sale. Should the owner fail to comply with the above condition, the
agricultural lessee shall have the right to repurchase under reasonable
terms and conditions said landholding from said owner within one year
after the aforementioned period for conversion has expired: Provided,
however, That the tenure of one year shall cease to run from the time the
agricultural lessee petitions the Land Authority to acquire the land under
the provisions of paragraph 11 of Section fifty-one.
Section 15. Agricultural Leasehold Contract in General - The
agricultural lessor and the agricultural lessee shall be free to enter into
any kind of terms, conditions or stipulations in a leasehold contract, as
long as they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy. A term,
condition or stipulation in an agricultural leasehold contract is
considered contrary to law, morals or public policy:
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(1) If the agricultural lessee is required to pay a rental in excess of that
which is hereinafter provided for in this Chapter;
(2) If the agricultural lessee is required to pay a consideration in excess
of the fair rental value as defined herein, for the use of work animals
and/or farm implements belonging to the agricultural lessor or to any
other person; or
(3) If it is imposed as a condition in the agricultural leasehold contract:
(a) that the agricultural lessee is required to rent work animals or to hire
farm implements from the agricultural lessor or a third person, or to
make use of any store or services operated by the agricultural lessor or a
third person; or (b) that the agricultural lessee is required to perform any
work or render any service other than his duties and obligations
provided in this Chapter with or without compensation; or (c) that the
agricultural lessee is required to answer for any fine, deductions and/or
assessments.
Any contract by which the agricultural lessee is required to accept a loan
or to make payment therefor in kind shall also be contrary to law,
morals or public policy.
Section 16. Nature and Continuity of Conditions of Leasehold
Contract - In the absence of any agreement as to the period, the terms
and conditions of a leasehold contract shall continue until modified by
the parties: Provided, That in no case shall any modification of its terms
and conditions prejudice the right of the agricultural lessee to the
security of his tenure on the landholding: Provided, further, That in case
of a contract with a period an agricultural lessor may not, upon the
expiration of the period increase the rental except in accordance with the
provisions of Section thirty-four.
Section 17. Form and Registration of Contract - Should the parties
decide to reduce their agreement into writing, the agricultural leasehold
contract shall be drawn in quadruplicate in a language or dialect known
to the agricultural lessee and signed or thumb-marked both by the
agricultural lessee personally and by the agricultural lessor or his
authorized representative, before two witnesses, to be chosen by each
party. If the agricultural lessee does not know how to read, the contents
of the document shall be read and explained to him by his witness. The
contracting parties shall acknowledge the execution of the contract
before the justice of the peace of the municipality where the land is
situated. No fees or stamps of any kind shall be required in the
preparation and acknowledgment of the instrument. Each of the
contracting parties shall retain a copy of the contract. The justice of the
peace shall cause the third copy to be delivered to the municipal
treasurer of the municipality where the land is located and the fourth
copy to the Office of the Agrarian Counsel.
Except in case of mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or
fraud, an agricultural contract reduced in writing and registered as
hereinafter provided, shall be conclusive between the contracting
parties, if not denounced or impugned within thirty days after its
registration.
Section 18. Registration of Leasehold Contract - The municipal
treasurer shall, upon receipt of his copy of the contract, require the
agricultural lessee and agricultural lessor to present their respective
copies of the contract, and shall cause to be annotated thereon the date,
time and place of registration as well as its entry or registration number.
Section 19. Registry of Agricultural Leasehold Contracts - The
Municipal Treasurer of the municipality wherein the land is situated
shall keep a record of all such contracts drawn and executed within his
jurisdiction, to be known as "Registry of Agricultural Leasehold
Contracts". He shall keep this registry together with a copy of each
contract entered therein, and make annotations on said registry of all
subsequent acts relative to each contract, such as its renewal, novation,
cancellation, etc. No registration fees or documentary stamps shall be
required in the registration of said contracts or of any subsequent acts
relative thereto.
Section 20. Memorandum of Loans - No obligation to pay money on
account of loans including interest thereon obtained by the agricultural
lessee from the agricultural lessor or his representative shall be
enforceable unless the same or a memorandum thereof be in writing in a
language or dialect known to the agricultural lessee, and signed or
thumb-marked by him, or by his agent.
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Section 21. Exemption from Lien and/or Execution - The following shall
be exempt from lien and/or execution against the agricultural lessee:
(1) Twenty-five per centum of the entire produce of the land under
cultivation; and
(2) Work animals and farm implements belonging to the agricultural
lessee: Provided, That their value does not exceed one thousand pesos.
But no article or species of property mentioned in this Section shall be
exempt from execution issued upon a judgment recovered for its price or
upon a judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage thereon.
Section 22. Use of Accepted Standards of Weights and Measures - In all
transactions entered into between the agricultural lessee and the
agricultural lessor concerning agricultural products the official or, upon
agreement of the parties, the accepted standards of weights and
measures shall be used.
Section 23. Rights of Agricultural Lessee in General - It shall be the
right of the agricultural lessee:
(1) To have possession and peaceful enjoyment of the land;
(2) To manage and work on the land in a manner and method of
cultivation and harvest which conform to proven farm practices;
(3) To mechanize all or any phase of his farm work; and
(4) To deal with millers and processors and attend to the issuance of
quedans and warehouse receipts for the produce due him.
Section 24. Right to a Home Lot - The agricultural lessee shall have the
right to continue in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of any home
lot he may have occupied upon the effectivity of this Code, which shall
be considered as included in the leasehold.
Section 25. Right to be Indemnified for Labor - The agricultural lessee
shall have the right to be indemnified for the cost and expenses incurred
in the cultivation, planting or harvesting and other expenses incidental to
the improvement of his crop in case he surrenders or abandons his
landholding for just cause or is ejected therefrom. In addition, he has the
right to be indemnified for one-half of the necessary and useful
improvements made by him on the landholding: Provided, That these
improvements are tangible and have not yet lost their utility at the time
of surrender and/or abandonment of the landholding, at which time their
value shall be determined for the purpose of the indemnity for
improvements.
Section 26. Obligations of the Lessee - It shall be the obligation of the
agricultural lessee:
(1) To cultivate and take care of the farm, growing crops, and other
improvements on the landholding as a good father of a family and
perform all the work therein in accordance with proven farm practices;
(2) To inform the agricultural lessor within a reasonable time of any
trespass committed by third persons upon the farm, without prejudice to
his direct action against the trespasser;
(3) To take reasonable care of the work animals and farm implements
delivered to him by the agricultural lessor and see that they are not used
for purposes other than those intended or used by another without the
knowledge and consent of the agricultural lessor: Provided, however,
That if said work animals get lost or die, or said farm implements get
lost or are destroyed, through the negligence of the agricultural lessee,
he shall be held responsible and made answerable therefor to the extent
of the value of the work animals and/or farm implements at the time of
the loss, death or destruction;
(4) To keep his farm and growing crops attended to during the work
season. In case of unjustified abandonment or neglect of his farm, any or
all of his expected produce may, upon order of the Court, be forfeited in
favor of the agricultural lessor to the extent of the damage caused
thereby;
(5) To notify the agricultural lessor at least three days before the date of
harvesting or, whenever applicable, of threshing; and
(6) To pay the lease rental to the agricultural lessor when it falls due.
Section 27. Prohibitions to Agricultural Lessee - It shall be unlawful for
the agricultural lessee:
(1) To contract to work additional landholdings belonging to a different
agricultural lessor or to acquire and personally cultivate an economic
family-size farm, without the knowledge and consent of the agricultural
lessor with whom he had entered first into household, if the first
landholding is of sufficient size to make him and the members of his
immediate farm household fully occupied in its cultivation; or
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(2) To employ a sub-lessee on his landholding: Provided, however, That
in case of illness or temporary incapacity he may employ laborers whose
services on his landholding shall be on his account.
Section 28. Termination of Leasehold by Agricultural Lessee During
Agricultural Year - The agricultural lessee may terminate the leasehold
during the agricultural year for any of the following causes:
(1) Cruel, inhuman or offensive, treatment of the agricultural lessee or
any member of his immediate farm household by the agricultural lessor
or his representative with the knowledge and consent of the lessor;
(2) Non-compliance on the part of the agricultural lessor with any of the
obligations imposed upon him by the provisions of this Code or by his
contact with the agricultural lessee;
(3) Compulsion of the agricultural lessee or any member of his
immediate farm household by the agricultural lessor to do any work or
render any service not in any way connected with farm work or even
without compulsion if no compensation is paid;
(4) Commission of a crime by the agricultural lessor or his
representative against the agricultural lessee or any member of his
immediate farm household; or
(5) Voluntary surrender due to circumstances more advantageous to him
and his family.
Section 29. Rights of the Agricultural Lessor - It shall be the right of the
agricultural lessor:
(1) To inspect and observe the extent of compliance with the terms and
conditions of their contract and the provisions of this Chapter;
(2) To propose a change in the use of the landholding to other
agricultural purposes, or in the kind of crops to be planted: Provided,
That in case of disagreement as to the proposed change, the same shall
be settled by the Court according to the best interest of the parties
concerned: Provided, further, That in no case shall an agricultural lessee
be ejected as a consequence of the conversion of the land to some other
agricultural purpose or because of a change in the crop to be planted;
(3) To require the agricultural lessee, taking into consideration his
financial capacity and the credit facilities available to him, to adopt in
his farm proven farm practices necessary to the conservation of the land,
improvement of its fertility and increase of its productivity: Provided,
That in case of disagreement as to what proven farm practice the lessee
shall adopt, the same shall be settled by the Court according to the best
interest of the parties concerned; and
(4) To mortgage expected rentals.
Section 30. Obligations of the Agricultural Lessor - It shall be the
obligation of the agricultural lessor:
(1) To keep the agricultural lessee in peaceful possession and cultivation
of his landholding; and
(2) To keep intact such permanent useful improvements existing on the
landholding at the start of the leasehold relation as irrigation and
drainage system and marketing allotments, which in the case of sugar
quotas shall refer both to domestic and export quotas, provisions of
existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding.
Section 31. Prohibitions to the Agricultural Lessor - It shall be unlawful
for the agricultural lessor:
(1) To dispossess the agricultural lessee of his landholding except upon
authorization by the Court under Section thirty-six. Should the
agricultural lessee be dispossessed of his landholding without
authorization from the Court, the agricultural lessor shall be liable for
damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in addition to the fine or
imprisonment prescribed in this Code for unauthorized dispossession;
(2) To require the agricultural lessee to assume, directly or indirectly,
the payment of the taxes or part thereof levied by the government on the
landholding;
(3) To require the agricultural lessee to assume, directly or indirectly,
any part of the rent, "canon" or other consideration which the
agricultural lessor is under obligation to pay to third persons for the use
of the land;
(4) To deal with millers or processors without written authorization of
the lessee in cases where the crop has to be sold in processed form
before payment of the rental; or
(5) To discourage, directly or indirectly, the formation, maintenance or
growth of unions or organizations of agricultural lessees in his
landholding, or to initiate, dominate, assist or interfere in the formation
or administration of any such union or organization.
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Section 32. Cost of Irrigation System - The cost of construction of a
permanent irrigation system, including distributory canals, may be borne
exclusively by the agricultural lessor who shall be entitled to an increase
in rental proportionate to the resultant increase in production: Provided,
That if the agricultural lessor refuses to bear the expenses of
construction the agricultural lessee or lessees may shoulder the same, in
which case the former shall not be entitled to an increase in rental and
shall, upon the termination of the relationship, pay the lessee or his heir
the reasonable value of the improvement at the time of the termination:
Provided, further, That if the irrigation system constructed does not
work, it shall not be considered as an improvement within the meaning
of this Section.
Section 33. Manner, Time and Place of Rental Payment - The
consideration for the lease of the land shall be paid in an amount certain
in money or in produce, or both, payable at the place agreed upon by the
parties immediately after threshing or processing if the consideration is
in kind, or within a reasonable time thereafter, if not in kind.
In no case shall the agricultural lessor require the agricultural lessee to
file a bond, make a deposit or pay the rental in advance, in money or in
kind or in both, but a special and preferential lien is hereby created in
favor of the agricultural lessor over such portion of the gross harvest
necessary for the payment of the rental due in his favor.
Section 34. Consideration for the Lease of Riceland and Lands Devoted
to Other Crops - The consideration for the lease of riceland and lands
devoted to other crops shall not be more than the equivalent of twenty-
five per centum of the average normal harvest during the three
agricultural years immediately preceding the date the leasehold was
established after deducting the amount used for seeds and the cost of
harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling and processing, whichever are
applicable: Provided, That if the land has been cultivated for a period of
less than three years, the initial consideration shall be based on the
average normal harvest during the preceding years when the land was
actually cultivated, or on the harvest of the first year in the case of
newly-cultivated lands, if that harvest is normal: Provided, further, That
after the lapse of the first three normal harvests, the final consideration
shall be based on the average normal harvest during these three
preceding agricultural years: Provided, furthermore, That in the absence
of any agreement between the parties as to the rental, the maximum
allowed herein shall apply: Provided, finally, That if capital
improvements are introduced on the farm not by the lessee to increase
its productivity, the rental shall be increased proportionately to the
consequent increase in production due to said improvements. In case of
disagreement, the Court shall determine the reasonable increase in
rental.
Section 35. Exemption from Leasehold of Other Kinds of Lands -
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Sections, in the case of
fishponds, saltbeds, and lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts,
cacao, coffee, durian, and other similar permanent trees at the time of
the approval of this Code, the consideration, as well as the tenancy
system prevailing, shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended.
Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions - Notwithstanding
any agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an
agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the
Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is
shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family
will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding,
if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or
other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five
years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections
twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by
the agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case
instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an
advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment
proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the
landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to
substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad
faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land
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and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossessions.
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the
terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this
Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a
purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as
determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is
substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated
through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls
due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop
failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous
event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession,
although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not
thereby extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of
the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.
Section 37. Burden of Proof - The burden of proof to show the existence
of a lawful cause for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee shall rest
upon the agricultural lessor.
Section 38. Statute of Limitations - An action to enforce any cause of
action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three
years after such cause of action accrued.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 6389
AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY-
EIGHT HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOUR, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL LAND
REFORM CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Section 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Republic Act No. thirty eight hundred
and forty-four, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
are hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the Code of Agrarian
Reforms of the Philippines."
"Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State:
"(1) To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and
work on the land as tillers, owner-cultivatorship and the economic
family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a
consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial
development;
"(2) To achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from
pernicious institutional restraints and practices;
"(3) To create a truly viable social and economic structure in agriculture
conducive to greater productivity and higher farm income through a
cooperative system of production, processing, marketing, distribution,
credit and services;
"(4) To apply all labor laws equally and without discrimination to both
industrial and agricultural wage e earners;
"(5) To provide a more vigorous and systematic land resettlement
program and public land distribution;
"(6) To make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and
responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic
society;
"(7) To give first priority to measures for the adequate and timely
financing of the Agrarian Reform Program pursuant to House Joint
Resolution Numbered Two, otherwise known as the Magna Carta of
Social Justice and Economic Freedom; existing laws; executive and
administrative orders; and rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding;
"(8) To involve local governments in the implementation of the
Agrarian Reform Program; and
"(9) To evolve a system of land use and classification."
"Sec. 3. Composition of Code. - In pursuance of the policy enunciated in
Section two, the following are established under this Code:
"(1) An agricultural leasehold system to replace all existing share
tenancy systems in agriculture;
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"(2) A system of crediting rental as amortization payment on purchase
price;
"(3) A declaration of rights for agricultural labor;
"(4) A machinery for the acquisition and equitable distribution of
agricultural land;
"(5) An institution to finance the acquisition and distribution of
agricultural land;
"(6) A machinery to extend credit and similar assistance to agricultural
lessees, amortizing owners-cultivator, and cooperatives;
"(7) A machinery to provide marketing, management, and other
technical assistance and/or services to agricultural lessees, amortizing
owners-cultivator, owners-cultivator, and cooperatives;
"(8) A machinery for cooperative development;
"(9) A department for formulating and implementing projects of
agrarian reform;
"(10) An expanded program of land capability survey, classification,
and registration;
"(11) A judicial system to decide issues arising under this Code and
other related laws regulations; and
"(12) A machinery to provide legal assistance to agricultural lessees,
amortizing owners-cultivator, and owners-cultivator."
"Sec. 4. Automatic Conversion to Agricultural Leasehold. - Agricultural
share tenancy throughout the country, as herein defined, is hereby
declared contrary to public policy and shall be automatically converted
to agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of this section.
"The credit assistance traditionally extended by a land-owner and a local
lender to a tenant under the share tenancy systems in agriculture for
production loans and loans for the purchase of work animals, tillage
equipment, seeds, fertilizers, poultry, livestock feed and other similar
items, and advances for the subsistence of a lease and his family, may be
continued by said landowner and local lender: Provided, That the total
charges on these loans, including interest and service, inspection and
issuance fees, shall not exceed fourteen per cent per calendar year and
the principal thereof shall not be subject to upward adjustment even in
case of extraordinary inflation and/or devaluation: Provided, further,
That on all loans or advances other than money, the interest shall be
computed on the basis of current price of the goods at the time when the
loans or advances were made.
"Any work animal and tillage equipment in the possession of a share
tenant but owned by a landowner shall automatically be sold to said
tenant on installment for a period not exceeding five years and at a price
agreed upon by the parties: Provided, however, That the tenant shall pay
in advance ten per cent of the price agreed upon.
"Existing share tenancy contracts may continue in force and effect in
any region or locality, to be governed in the meantime by the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine,
as amended, until the end of the agricultural year when the President of
the Philippines shall have organized by executive order the Department
of Agrarian Reform in accordance with the provisions of this
amendatory Act, unless such contracts provide for a shorter period or
the tenant sooner exercises his option to elect the leasehold system:
Provided, That in order not to jeopardize international commitments,
lands devoted to crops covered by marketing allotments shall be made
the subject of a separate proclamation by the President upon the
recommendation of the department head that adequate provisions, such
as the organization of cooperatives, marketing agreement, or other
similar workable arrangements, have been made to insure efficient
management on all matters requiring synchronization of the agricultural
with the processing phases of such crops.
"In case some agricultural share tenants do not want to become
agricultural lessees of their respective landholding, they shall, with the
assistance of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, notify in writing
the landowners concerned. In such a case, they shall have one
agricultural year from the date of the notice to accept leasehold
relationship, otherwise the landowner may proceed to their ejectment."
Section 2. Sections 11 and 12 of the same Code are hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 11. Lessee's Right of Pre-emption. - In case the agricultural lessor
decides to sell the landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have the
preferential right to buy the same under reasonable terms and
conditions: Provided, That the entire landholding offered for sale must
be pre-empted by the Department of Agrarian Reform upon petition of
the lessee or any of them: Provided, further, That where there are two or
more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said preferential right
only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of
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pre-emption under this Section may be exercised within one hundred
eighty days from notice in writing, which shall be served by the owner
on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform.
"If the agricultural lessee agrees with the terms and conditions of the
sale, he must give notice in writing to the agricultural lessor of his
intention to exercise his right of pre-emption within the balance of one
hundred eighty day's period still available to him, but in any case not
less than thirty days. He must either tender payment of, or present a
certificate from the land bank that it shall make payment pursuant to
section eighty of this Code on, the price of the landholding to the
agricultural lessor. If the latter refuses to accept such tender or
presentment, he may consign it with the court.
"Any dispute as to the reasonableness of the terms and conditions may
be brought by the lessee or by the Department of Agrarian Reform to the
proper Court of Agrarian Relations which shall decide the same within
sixty days from the date of the filing thereof: Provided, That upon
finality of the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Land
Bank shall pay to the agricultural lessor the price fixed by the court
within one hundred twenty days: Provided, further, That in case the
Land Bank fails to pay within that period, the principal shall earn an
interest equivalent to the prime bank rate existing at the time.
"Upon the filing of the corresponding petition or request with the
department or corresponding case in court by the agricultural lessee or
lessees, the said period of one hundred and eighty days shall cease to
run.
"Any petition or request for pre-emption shall be solved within sixty
days from the filing thereof; otherwise, the said period shall start to run
again."
"Sec. 12. Lessee's right of Redemption. - In case the landholding is sold
to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the
latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and
consideration: Provided, That where there are two or more agricultural
lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the
extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of the redemption
under this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days
from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees
affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration
of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal
redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the
land at the time of the sale.
"Upon the filing of the corresponding petition or request with the
department or corresponding case in court by the agricultural lessee or
lessees, the said period of one hundred and eighty days shall cease to
run.
"Any petition or request for redemption shall be resolved within sixty
days from the filing thereof; otherwise, the said period shall start to run
again.
"The Department of Agrarian Reform shall initiate, while the Land
Bank shall finance, said redemption as in the case of pre-emption."
Section 3. Section fourteen of the same Code is hereby repealed.
Section 4. Section 32 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 32. Cost of Irrigation System. - The cost of construction of a
permanent irrigation system, including distributary canals, may be borne
exclusively by the agricultural lessor who shall be entitled to an increase
in rental proportionate to the resultant increase in production: Provided,
That if the agricultural lessor refuses to bear the expenses of
construction the agricultural lessee/or lessees may shoulder the same, in
which case the former shall not be entitled to an increase in rental and
shall, upon the termination of the relationship, pay the lessee or his heir
the reasonable value of the improvement at the time of the termination:
Provided, further, That if the irrigation system constructed does not
work, it shall not be considered as an improvement within the meaning
of this Section: Provided, furthermore, That the lessees, either as
individuals or as groups, shall undertake the management and control of
irrigation systems with their respective jurisdiction. However, those
constructed and operated by the government may be given to the lessees
either as individuals or as groups at their option with the right to
maintain, manage and operate such irrigation systems and to collect and
receive rentals therefrom: Provided, still further, That the lessees, either
as individuals or as groups, shall allocate not more than twenty-five per
cent of their collection for rentals to the government if the irrigation
systems has obligations to meet until paid, otherwise such irrigation
system will be maintained, managed and operated solely by the lessees
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either as individuals or as groups, subject to such rules on water rights
and water use promulgated by the National Irrigation Administration or
such other government agencies authorized by law: Provided, finally,
That if the irrigation system is installed and/or constructed at the
expense of the landowner or agricultural lessor, the Department of
Agrarian Reform shall initiate, while the Land Bank shall finance, the
acquisition of such irrigation system at its current fair market value so
that the ownership thereof may be vested in the lessees as individuals or
groups."
Section 5. Section 34 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 34. Consideration for the Lease of Riceland and Lands Devoted to
Other Crops. - The consideration for the lease of riceland and lands
devoted to other crops shall not be more than the equivalent of twenty-
five per centum of the average normal harvest or if there have been no
normal harvests, then the estimated normal harvest during the three
agricultural years immediately preceding the date the leasehold was
established after deducting the amount used for seeds and the cost of
harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling and processing, whichever are
applicable: Provided, That if the land has been cultivated for a period of
less than three years, the initial consideration shall be based on the
average normal harvest or if there have been no normal harvests, then
the estimated normal harvest during the preceding years when the land
was actually cultivated, or on the harvest of the first year in the case of
newly cultivated lands, if that harvest is normal harvests, the final
consideration shall be based on the average normal harvest during these
three preceding agricultural years.
"In the absence of any agreement between the parties as to the rental, the
Court of Agrarian Relations shall summarily determine a provisional
rental in pursuance of existing laws, rules and regulations and
production records available in the different field units of the
department, taking into account the extent of the development of the
land at the time of the conversion into leasehold and the participation of
the lessee in the development thereof. This provisional rental shall
continue in force and effect until a fixed rental is finally determined.
The court shall determined the fixed rental within thirty days after the
petition is submitted for decision.
"If capital improvements are introduced on the farm not by the lessee to
increase its productivity, the rental shall be increased proportionately to
the consequent increase in production due to said improvements. In case
of disagreement, the Court shall determine the reasonable increase in
rental."
Section 6. A new section is hereby inserted after Section 34, to be
designated as Section "34-A", which shall read as follows:
"Sec. 34-A. Rental credited as amortization payment on purchase price.
- The rental paid under the preceding section after the approval of this
amendatory Act shall be credited as amortization payment on the
purchase price of the landholding tilled by the lessee in any of the
following instances:
"(1) When the landholding is expropriated by the government for the
lessee; and
"(2) When it is redeemed.
"The purchase price of the landholding shall be determined by the
parties or the government agencies concerned on the same basis
prescribed under section fifty-six of this Code: Provided, That whatever
balance remains after crediting as amortization the rental paid, the same
may be financed by the Land Bank in the same ratio and mode of
payment as provided under section eighty of this Code.
"The provisions of Act Numbered Four hundred ninety-six, as amended,
and other laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the Land Registration
Commission is hereby authorized concurrently with the Bureau of Lands
to approve survey plans of lands intended for original registration and to
issue transfer certificate of title in favor of the new amortizing-owner-
beneficiaries under this section and the Registries of Deeds to register
the same. For this purpose, the Land Registration Commissioner shall
issue the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of this
provision.
"The Department and/or the Bank, in appropriate cases, shall facilitate
the immediate issuance of the corresponding transfer certificate of title
of the landholding to the new amortizing owner with the encumbrance
thereof duly annotated.
"Provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, any amortizing owner may use this transfer certificate
of title to obtain a loan from any public or private lending institution and
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he shall be entitled to borrow therefor an amount not less than sixty per
centum of the fair market value of the property: Provided, That the
proceeds of such loan shall be applied as follows: fifty per centum as
partial payment of any unpaid balance on the landholding and the
remaining fifty per centum for the capital improvement of the land and
operating capital for farm operations of the amortizing owner.
"The payment of all loans obtained pursuant to the provisions of this
section shall be guaranteed by the Land Bank and for this purpose, it
shall set aside a sinking fund in such amount as may be necessary to be
determined by its Board of Trustees.
"In case of default in the payment of three consecutive installments on
the loan, the lender shall immediately notify, among others, the Land
Bank and the department of such default, and thereafter, these agencies
shall take the appropriate steps either:
"(1) To answer for the default in case the reason therefor is due to
fortuitous event, or
"(2) In any other case, to take over the ownership and administration of
said property.
"In the latter case mentioned under the preceding paragraph, the
government shall endeavor to substitute the defaulting amortizing owner
with a new one who does not own any land and who shall be subrogated
to the rights, and shall assume the obligations, of the former amortizing
owner.
"The rules prescribed in the two immediately preceding paragraphs shall
apply in case the lessee defaults in the payment of at least three
consecutive rental amortizations, with the former landowner giving the
required notice in proper cases.
"In all instances where default is due to fortuitous events the Land Bank
shall be answerable for such default and the farmers shall be released
from the obligations to pay such installment or installments due together
with interest thereon."
Section 7. Section 36(1) of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes:
Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests
on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years;"
Section 8. Section 39(2) of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"(2) Right to engage in concerted activities as defined under Republic
Act Numbered Eight hundred and seventy-five."
Section 9. The Titles of Chapter III and Article I and Section 49 and 50
of the same Code are hereby amended to read as follows:
"Chapter III Department of Agrarian Reform."Article I
Organization and Functions of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
"Sec. 49. Creation of the Department of Agrarian Reform. - For the
purpose of carrying out the policy of establishing owner-cultivatorship
and the economic family size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture
and other policies enunciated in this Code, there is hereby created a
Department of Agrarian Reform, hereinafter referred to as Department,
which shall be directly under the control and supervision of the
President of the Philippines. It shall have authority and responsibility for
implementing the policies of the state on agrarian reforms as provided in
this Code and such other existing laws as are pertinent thereto.
"The Department shall be headed by a Secretary who shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
"He shall be assisted by one Undersecretary who shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
"Sec. 50. Qualifications and Compensations of Secretary and
Undersecretary. - No person shall be appointed Secretary or
Undersecretary of the Department unless he is a natural born citizen of
the Philippines, with proven executive ability and adequate background
and experience in land reform here and/or elsewhere for at least five (5)
years, and at least thirty-five years of age: Provided, however, That the
Undersecretary shall be a career administrator and, at the time of his
appointment, shall not be more than fifty-seven (57) years of age, unless
the President has determined that he possesses special qualifications and
his services are needed.
"The Secretary and the Undersecretary shall have, among other
qualifications, demonstrated interest in, and concern for, the needs and
problems of the rural and farm populations and the solutions thereto:
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Provided, That no person who owns any farmholding shall be appointed
as Secretary or Undersecretary unless such farmholding is under the
leasehold system or the system of agricultural land ownership transfer
direct to the tiller.
"The Secretary shall receive an annual compensation equivalent to any
other executive department secretary; the Undersecretary shall receive
an annual compensation equivalent to any other executive department
undersecretary."
Section 10. The following new sections are hereby inserted after Section
50, to be designated as Sections "50-A to 50-I," which shall read as
follows:
"Sec. 50-A. Powers and functions of the Secretary. - In addition to the
powers and functions specified in this Code, the Secretary shall exercise
such powers and perform such functions and duties as are required of
any executive department secretary under existing laws."
"Sec. 50-B. Powers and functions of the Undersecretary. - In addition to
the powers and functions specified in this Code, the Undersecretary
shall exercise such powers and perform such functions and duties as are
required of any executive Department Undersecretary under existing
laws."
"Sec. 50-C. Vacancy in office or incapacity. - In case of vacancy in the
office of Secretary or inability of the Secretary to exercise his powers
and perform his functions and duties due to his illness, absence or any
other cause, the Undersecretary shall temporarily perform the functions
of the said office."
"Sec. 50-D. Office of the Secretary; Appointment of Personnel. - The
office of Secretary shall be composed of the Secretary, the
Undersecretary, the chiefs of the staff services or units directly under the
department proper, together with the personnel thereof.
"All personnel of the department proper shall be appointed by the
Secretary in accordance with applicable civil service law and rules."
"Sec. 50-E. Creation of Staff Services; Functions. - There shall be
created in the department a planning service, a financial and
management service, an administrative service, and such other staff
services as the Secretary may deem necessary to establish in accordance
with this section, each to be headed by a chief, which shall be organized
and shall perform the functions as follows:
"(1) Planning Service
"The Planning Service shall be responsible for providing the department
with economical, efficient, and effective services relating to planning,
programming and project development.
"(2) Financial and Management Service
"The Financial and Management Service shall be responsible for
providing the department with staff advice and assistance on budgetary,
financial, and management improvement matters.
"(3) Administrative Service
"The Administrative Services shall be responsible for providing the
department with economical, efficient, and effective services relating to
personnel, legal assistance, information, records, supplies, equipment,
collection, disbursements, security, and custodial work.
"Sec. 50-F. Creation of Bureaus; Functions. - There shall be under the
department the following bureaus each to be headed by a Director who
shall be assisted by an Assistant Director, charged with the direct
implementation of the programs and policies of the Department:
"(1) The Bureau of Farm Management which shall be responsible for
the development and implementation of programs on increased
productivity, home improvement, and rural youth development;
"(2) The Bureau of Land Acquisition, distribution and development
which shall be responsible for the distribution of lands to bona fide
farmers, for conducting land capability survey and classification, and for
the improvement of lands acquired by the Department;
"(3) The Bureau of Resettlement which shall be responsible for the
resettlement of displaced farmers, landless families, and urban workers
in the settlement projects of the Department, the construction of houses,
roads and other facilities, and the taking of a census of all proclaimed
and unproclaimed resettlements; and
"(4) The Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance which shall be
responsible for extending legal assistance to farmers including those
provided under Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred and
eighty-six, the execution of leasehold contracts and apprising the
farmers with their rights and duties under the law.
"Each of these bureaus may establish such divisions as are necessary for
the economical, efficient and effective performance of its functions."
"Sec. 50-G. Appointment, Qualifications and Compensations of
Directors and the Assistant Directors; Appointment of Personnel. - The
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Director of a Bureau and his assistant shall each receive the equivalent
compensation and shall be appointed in the same manner as any other
director or assistant director of a bureau.
"No person shall be appointed director or assistant director of a bureau
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, with proven
executive ability and adequate background and experience in land
reform here and/or elsewhere for at least three (3) years, and at least
twenty-five years of age; Provided, That the Director or Assistant
Director shall be a career administrator and; at the time of his
appointment, shall not be more than fifty-seven (57) years of age, unless
the President has determined that he possesses special qualifications and
his services are needed: Provided, further, That the Director or Assistant
Director shall have, among other qualifications, demonstrated interest
in, and concern for, the needs and problems of the rural and farm
population and the solutions thereto: Provided, finally, That no persons
who owns any farmholding shall be appointed as Director or Assistant
Director unless such farmholding is under the leasehold system or the
system of agricultural land ownership-transfer direct to the tiller.
"All personnel of the Bureaus shall be appointed by the Secretary, upon
recommendation of their respective Director, in accordance with
applicable civil service law and rules."
"Sec. 50-H. Functions of Directors and Assistant Directors. - The
Director or in his absence, the Assistant Director, shall exercise such
powers and perform such functions and duties as are provided for under
existing laws, in addition to the powers and functions provided for in
this Code."
"Sec. 50-I. Regional and Field Offices. - The Department may have
regional and other field offices, the number, location and organization of
which shall be determined by the Department in conformity with the
area pattern prescribed hereunder:
"(1) The Department, in the establishment of regional and other field
offices, shall follow the field service area pattern authorized below.
There are established ten regions, each with definite regional centers
within the region as follows:
"a. Region No. 1 is called the Ilocos Region, and comprises the
provinces of Batanes, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Abra, La Union,
Benguet, and Mountain Province and the cities of Baguio, and Laoag,
with the regional center at San Fernando, La Union;
"b. Region No. 2 is called the Cagayan Valley Region, and comprises
the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino (Sub-
province), Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao, with the regional center at
Tuguegarao, Cagayan;
"c. Region No. 3 is called the Central Luzon Region, and comprises the
provinces of Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Zambales,
Bulacan, Bataan, and the cities of Angeles, Cabanatuan, Dagupan,
Olongapo, Palayan, San Carlos (Pangasinan) and San Jose (Nueva
Ecija), with the regional center at San Fernando, Pampanga;
"d. Region No. 4 is called the Southern Tagalog Region, and comprises
the provinces of Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Quezon, Marinduque,
Oriental Mindoro, Occidental Mindoro, Romblon, Aurora (Sub-
province), and Palawan, and the cities of Batangas, Caloocan, Cavite,
Lipa, Lucena, Manila, Pasay, Puerto Princesa, Quezon, San Pablo,
Tagaytay, and Trece Martires with the regional center at greater Manila;
"e. Region No. 5 is called the Bicol Region, and comprises the
provinces of Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Albay, Catanduanes,
Masbate, and Sorsogon, and the cities of Iriga, Legazpi and Naga, with
the Regional center at Legazpi City;
"f. Region No. 6 is called the Western Visayas Region, and comprises
the provinces of Negros Occidental, Iloilo, Guimaras (Sub-province),
Antique, Aklan and Capiz, and the cities of Bacolod, Bago, Cadiz,
Iloilo, La Carlota, Roxas, San Carlos (Negros Occidental) and Silay,
with regional center at Iloilo City;
"g. Region No. 7 is called the Central and Eastern Visayas Region, and
comprises the provinces of Negros Oriental, Siquijor (Sub-province),
Cebu, Bohol, Northern Samar, Eastern Samar, Western Samar, Leyte,
Southern Leyte, and Biliran (Sub-province) and the cities of Bais,
Calbayog, Canlaon, Catbalogan, Cebu, Danao, Dumaguete, Lapu-lapu,
Ormoc, Mandawe, Tacloban, Tagbilaran, and Toledo, with the regional
center at Cebu City;
"h. Region No. 8 is called the Western Mindanao Region, and comprises
the provinces of Misamis Occidental, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur,
Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and Sulu, and the cities of
Basilan, Dapitan, Dipolog, Iligan, Marawi, Oroquieta, Ozamis,
Pagadian, Tangub, and Zamboanga with the regional center at
Zamboanga City;
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"i. Region No. 9 is called the Central Mindanao Region, and comprises
the provinces of Camiguin, Misamis Oriental, Bukidnon, Cotabato, and
South Cotabato, and the cities of Cagayan de Oro, Cotabato, General
Santos, and Gingoog, with the Regional center at Cagayan de Oro City;
"j. Region No. 10 is called the Eastern Mindanao Region, and comprises
the provinces of Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Norte,
Agusan del Sur, Davao del Norte, Davao Oriental, and Davao del Sur,
and the cities of Butuan, Davao, and Surigao, with the regional center at
Davao City;
"(2) The Department shall organize an integrated and department-wide
field services as the exigencies of the Agrarian Reform Program may
require: Provided, That the Department shall establish in every regional
or other field office organized, a consultative and coordinating body
which shall include in its membership a tiller-lessee representing the
agricultural lessees and a representative from the local governments of
the area where said office is operating.
"(3) The regional office shall be headed by a Regional Director who
may be assisted, whenever necessary, by an Assistant Regional Director.
The Regional Director and Assistant Director, if any, shall be appointed
by the Secretary in accordance with applicable civil service law and
rules; Provided, however, That the Regional Director and Assistant
Regional Director shall have the same qualifications as Bureau Director
and Assistant Director, respectively.
"All personnel of the Regional and other offices shall be appointed by
the Secretary upon recommendation of their respective regional director,
in accordance with applicable civil service law and rules: Provided, That
applicants from the region, who possess the required qualifications, shall
be appointed to vacant positions in the said region, unless nobody
among the said applicants is qualified; in which case, applicants from
other regions may be considered.
"(4) The Regional Director shall be responsible in carrying out the
policies and implementing the plans and programs of the Department in
the regional area under his jurisdiction: Provided, however, That when
the department's function or activity transcends regional boundaries and
requires central and/or inter-regional action, said functions may be
performed under the direct supervision and control of the department.
"(5) The Regional offices shall have units on agricultural extension,
credit and legal assistance, as well as cooperative development; or
personnel in which the functional areas of the department may be
represented. There shall be in these regional units as much combination
of related functions as possible.
"(6) The functions of a regional office shall be as follows:
"a. Implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations of
the Department in the regional areas;
"b. Provide economical, efficient, and effective service to the people in
the area;
"c. Coordinate with regional offices of other departments, bureaus,
agencies in the area;
"d. Coordinate with local government units in the area; and
"e. Perform such related functions as may be provided by other existing
laws."
Section 11. The Land Reform Project Administration and its governing
body, the National Land Reform Council, under the Office of the
President, are hereby abolished; and their functions are transferred to the
Department, together with applicable appropriations, records,
equipment, property and all the organic, contributed and/or assigned
personnel to the Land Reform Project Administration pursuant to this
Code, other existing laws and Executive Order Numbered Seventy-five,
Series of Nineteen hundred and sixty-four, as well as such personnel as
may be necessary from its governing body, the National Land Reform
Council.
Section 12. The Land Authority under the Office of the President and a
member-agency of the Land Reform Project Administration is hereby
abolished; and its functions are transferred to the Department, together
with applicable appropriations, records, equipment, property, and such
personnel as may be necessary.
Section 13. The Secretary shall, in consultation with the Undersecretary
and Bureau Directors, allocate by Department Order to the different
bureaus, agencies and regional offices of the Department the functions
of the agencies, offices and/or units abolished and not otherwise
assigned by this Amendatory Act or by the organization plan of the
Department to a particular agency or office.
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Section 14. The Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby attached to the
Department as its land financing arm and shall devote all of its resources
to agrarian reforms.
The Land Bank of the Philippines and the Agricultural Credit
Administration, in addition to the functions and duties assigned to them
under existing laws, executive and administrative orders, and rules and
regulations, shall be responsible for rendering staff advice and
assistance to the Secretary of the Department. The regional offices or
field units of these entities and/or instrumentalities shall likewise
coordinate and cooperate with the regional office or field units of the
Department, respectively.
Section 15. Within sixty (60) days from the approval of this
Amendatory Act, the President by Executive Order shall, upon
recommendation of the Special Technical Committee created under
Special Order Numbered Eleven, Series of Nineteen hundred and
seventy-one, of the Land Reform Project Administration, and the
Commission on Reorganization created pursuant to Republic Act No.
5435, as amended, organize the said Department in accordance with the
provisions of this Amendatory Act with the end in view of achieving
economy and maximum efficiency and effectiveness and of strictly
observing the merit system in the retention and promotion of the best
qualified personnel: Provided, That the administrative machineries of
the entities attached and/or required under this Code to coordinate and
cooperate with the Department, as well as the agencies servicing the
same, shall also be reorganized to enable them to align their activities
with the requirements and objectives of this Code: Provided, further,
That not more than ten per cent of the personnel of the Department and
the bureaus, offices, agencies and/or entities under, coordinating or
servicing it shall be stationed in the Central Office; Provided, finally,
That not more that five per cent of the total personnel in the regional,
team, resettlement agency or equivalent field offices shall be stationed
in such offices.
Section 16. Section 51 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 51. Powers and Functions. - It shall be the responsibility of the
Department:
"(1) to initiate and prosecute expropriation proceedings for the
acquisition of private agricultural lands as defined in Section one
hundred sixty-six of Chapter XI of this Code for the purpose of
subdivision into economic family-size farm units and resale of said farm
units to bona fide tenants, occupants and qualified farmers: Provided,
That the powers herein granted shall apply only to private agricultural
lands subject to the terms and conditions and order of priority herein
below specified.
"a. all idle or abandoned private agricultural lands, except those held or
purchased within one year from the approval of this Code by private
individuals or corporations for the purpose of resale and subdivision into
economic family-size farm units of not more than six (6) hectares each
in accordance with the policies enunciated in this Code: Provided, That
the subdivision and resale shall be substantially carried out within one
year from the approval of this Code;
"b. all private agricultural lands suitable for subdivision into economic
family-size farm units of not more that six (6) hectares owned by private
individuals or corporation worked by lessees, no substantial portion of
whose landholding in relation to the area sought to be expropriated, is
planted to permanent crops under labor administration, in excess of
twenty-four hectares except all private agricultural lands under labor
administration: Provided, That private agricultural lands occupied and
cultivated continuously for not less that ten years by tillers or their
ascendants who are not farm laborers or lessees may be subject to
expropriation under this Code: Provided, further, That any court action
filed for the ejectment of the tiller shall not interrupt the running of the
ten-year period unless such action is filed within three years from the
date of occupancy: Provided, finally, That if the final decision rendered
in the court action is favorable to the tiller, the ten-year period shall be
considered as continuous and uninterrupted; and
"c. in expropriating private agricultural lands declared by the
Department of Agrarian Reform to be necessary for the implementation
of the provisions of this Code, the following order of priority shall be
considered;
1. idle or abandoned lands;
2. those whose area exceeds of 1,024 hectares;
3. those whose area exceeds 500 hectares but is not more than 1,024
hectares;
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4. those whose area exceeds 144 hectares but is not more than 500
hectares;
5. those whose area exceeds 75 hectares but is not more than 144
hectares; and
6. those whose area exceeds 24 hectares but is not more than 75
hectares.
"(2) To acquire private agricultural lands regardless of area through
negotiated purchase subject to approval of the court as to price for
distribution and sale at cost to their actual occupants who are tillers of
the land in lots of not more than six hectares: Provided, That where
there are several groups or individuals of such tillers petitioning for the
acquisition of their respective occupancy, priority shall be given to the
group with a greater number of tillers who first filed the petition over a
group with a lesser number of tillers, and the latter over individual
tillers: Provided, further, That the group or individual who has
continuously tilled the land longest shall have the first priority;
"(3) To help bona fide farmers without lands or agricultural owner-
cultivators of uneconomic size farms to acquire and own economic
family-size farm units of not more than six hectares each;
"(4) To administer and dispose of agricultural lands of the public
domain under the custody and administration of the National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration and the Economic
Development Corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines prior to the
approval of this Amendatory Act and such other public agricultural
lands as may hereafter be reserved by the President of the Philippines or
by law for resettlement and sale, in accordance with such terms and
conditions as are set forth under this chapter: Provided, That the
exercise of the authority granted herein, as well as the preceding
subparagraph, shall not contravene public policy on the permanency of
forest reserves or other laws intended for the preservation and
conservation of public national and municipal forests, parks and
watersheds: Provided, further, That said authority shall not be construed
to exclude the other modes of disposition of public agricultural lands
under the public land Act or to contravene the authority granted by law
to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources over all public
agricultural lands not covered by the Agrarian Reform Program:
Provided, finally, That the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources shall within a period of ten years from the
approval of this Amendatory Act, release to the Department of Agrarian
Reform for resettlement and sale all lands of the public domain reserved
for agricultural resettlement and sale except public agricultural lands
which are reserved as settlements for the national cultural minorities
under the administration of the Commission on National Integration;
"(4) To develop plans and initiate actions for the systematic opening of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for speedy
distribution to and development by deserving and qualified persons who
do not own any land in sizes of not more than six hectares;
"(5) To recommend to the President, from time to time after previous
consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
what portion of the alienable, or disposable public lands shall be
reserved for resettlement or disposition under this Chapter;
"(6) To give economic family-size farms of not more than six hectares
to landless citizens of the Philippines who need, deserve, and are
capable of cultivating the land personally, through organized
resettlement, under the terms and conditions the Department may
prescribe, giving priority to qualified and deserving farmers in the
province where such lands are located;
"(7) To reclaim swamps and marshes for agricultural purposes only,
obtain titles thereto whenever feasible and subdivide them into
economic family-size farms of not more than six hectares for
distribution to deserving and qualified farmers;
"(8) To undertake measures which will insure the early issuance of titles
to persons or corporations who have actually settled and cultivated
alienable lands of the public domain;
"(9) To survey, subdivide and set aside lands or areas of land-holdings
under its custody and administration for economic family-size farms,
large-scale farm operations, town sites, roads, parks, government centers
and other civic improvements as circumstances may warrant: Provided,
That the Bureau of Lands and the Land Registration Commission, as the
case may be, shall verify the said surveys or subdivisions, and after such
verifications, approve or disapprove the same; and issue, in case of
approval of said surveys or subdivisions, the corresponding patents and
titles thereto;
"(10) To inform the Agricultural Productivity Commission and the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the problems of
settlers and farmers on lands under its administration and in land reform
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areas: Provided, That it is mandatory for the said Commission and
Department to provide field agricultural extension service to these areas
upon being informed of the problems obtaining: Provided, further, That
settlement projects and lands reform areas, especially private
agricultural lands acquired by the government, shall be given first
priority in the diffusion of useful and practical information, knowledge
and skills on agriculture, soil conservation, livestock, fisheries, forest
conservation, public lands and natural resources laws, home economics
and rural life, in order to encourage their application through field
demonstrations, lectures and conferences, publications and other means
of imparting information, stimulation, promotion and organization of
agricultural cooperatives and encouragement in the formation and
growth of private associations, study clubs, committees and other groups
of farmers and members of their family that will enhance their social
and economic conditions;
"(11) To acquire for agricultural lessees exercising their right to pre-
emption and redemption under Chapter I of this Code, any land-holdings
mentioned thereunder;
"(12) To conduct land capability survey and classification of the entire
country and print maps;
"(13) To make such arrangements with the Land Bank with respect to
titles of agricultural lands of the public domain under its administration
as will be necessary to carry out the objectives of this Code;
"(14) To expropriate home lots occupied by agricultural lessees outside
their landholdings for resale at cost to said agricultural lessees;
"(15) To see to it that all agricultural lands, either public or private,
distributed by the government to the beneficiaries of the Agrarian
Reform Program shall be sold only by the said beneficiaries to the
government; and
"(16) To submit to the President of the Philippines and to both Houses
of Congress through their presiding officers, to the Secretary of Finance
and to the Auditor General within sixty days of the close of the fiscal
year, an annual report showing its Accomplishments during the year; the
expropriation proceedings it has undertaken; the expenditures it has
incurred and other financial transactions undertaken with respect
thereto;"
Section 17. Section 56 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 56. Just Compensation. - In determining the just compensation of
the land to be expropriated pursuant to this Chapter, the Court shall
consider as basis, the fair market value, without prejudice to considering
the assessed value and other pertinent factors.
"The owner of the land expropriated shall be paid in accordance with
Section eighty of this Code by the Land Bank and pursuant to an
arrangement herein authorized."
Section 18. Section 71 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 71. Power of the Department of Agrarian Reform to sell to
Holders of Bonds Issued to Former Landowners whose Land have been
Purchased for Redistribution. - The Department of Agrarian Reform
shall sell, for a price not less than the appraised value, any portion not
exceeding one hundred forty-four hectares in the case of individuals of
the public agricultural lands transferred to the Land Bank which is
suitable for large-scale farm operations to any holder, who is qualified
to acquire agricultural lands through purchase, of bonds issued to former
landowners whose lands have been purchased for redistribution under
this Code, subject to condition that the purchaser shall, within two years
after acquisition, place under cultivation at least thirty per centum of
entire area under plantation administration and the remaining seventy
per centum within five years from the date of acquisition. The Secretary
shall issue the title of said land upon showing that the purchaser has
developed and cultivated at least one-fourth of his land under plantation
administration.
Any public agricultural land sold as hereinabove specified shall not be
the object of any expropriation as long as the same is developed and
cultivated for large-scale production under farm labor management:
Provided, however, That after the capital invested therein for
development, plus a reasonable margin of profit shall have been fully
recovered, or after the lapse of twenty-five years from the date of
acquisition, whichever comes earlier, said land shall become
expropriable.
The selling price of the portion of the public agricultural land sold under
this Section shall be credited to the Land Bank. As payment for the land
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sold under this Section, the Land Bank shall accept as sole instruments
of payment the bonds issued pursuant to Section seventy-six. Issued
bonds accepted as payment for the land sold shall be cancelled to the
extent of the amount paid.
All sales under this Code shall be subject to the rules and regulations
which the Department of Agrarian Reform in consultation with the Land
Bank, shall prescribe insofar as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Code.
Section 19. Sec 76 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 76. Issuance of Bonds. - The Land Bank shall, upon
recommendation by the Board of Trustees and approval of the Monetary
Board of the Central Bank, issue bonds, debentures and other evidences
of indebtedness at such terms, rates and conditions as the Bank may
determine up to an aggregate amount not exceeding, at any one time,
five times its unimpaired capital and surplus. Such bonds and other
obligations shall be secured by the assets of the Bank and shall be fully
tax exempt both as to principal and income. Said income shall be paid to
the bondholders every six (6) months from the date of issue. These
bonds and other obligations shall be fully negotiable and
unconditionally guaranteed by the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and shall be redeemable at the option of the Bank at or prior
to maturity, which in no case shall exceed twenty-five years. These
negotiable instruments of indebtedness shall be mortgageable in
accordance with established banking procedures and practice to
government institutions, existing charters and/or laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, not to exceed sixty per centum of their face value to
enable the holders of such bonds to make use of them in investments in
productive enterprises. They are eligible as legal reserves against
deposit liabilities of banks, subject to the terms and conditions which the
Central Bank of the Philippines may impose. They shall also be
accepted as payments for reparation equipment and materials, the
provisions of Republic Act Numbered Seventeen hundred and eighty-
nine, as amended, to the contrary notwithstanding.
The Board of Trustees shall have the power to prescribe rule and
regulations for the registration of the bonds issued by the Bank at the
request of the holders thereof."
Section 20. Section 80 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 80. Making Payment to Owners of Landed Estates. - The Land
Bank shall make payments in the form herein prescribed to the owners
of the land acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform for division
and resale under this Code. Such payment shall be made in the
following manner: twenty per centum in cash and the remaining balance
in six per cent, tax-free, redeemable bonds issued by the Bank in
accordance with Section twenty-six, unless the landowner desires to be
paid in shares of stock issued by the Land Bank in accordance with
Section seventy-seven in an amount not exceeding thirty per centum of
the purchase price.
"In the event there is an existing lien or encumbrance on the land in
favor of any Government institution at the time of acquisition by the
Land Bank, the bonds and/or shares, in that order, shall be accepted as
substitute collaterals to secure the indebtedness, existing charters of
these institutions to the contrary notwithstanding.
"The profits accruing from payment shall be exempt from the tax on
capital gains."
Section 21. Section 85 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 85. Use of Bonds. - The bonds issued by the Land Bank may be
used by the holder thereof and shall be accepted in the amount of their
face value as any of the following:
"(1) Payment for agricultural lands or other real properties purchased
from the Government;
"(2) Payment for the purchase of shares of stock of all or substantially
all of the assets of the following Government owned or controlled
corporations: The National Development Company; Philippine National
Bank; Philippine National Railways; Cebu Portland Cement Company;
National Shipyards and Steel Corporations; Manila Gas Corporation;
and the Manila Hotel Company.
"Upon offer by the bondholder, the corporation owned or controlled by
the Government shall, through its Board of Directors, negotiate with
such bondholders with respect to the price and other terms and
conditions of the sale. In case there are various bondholders making the
offer, the one willing to purchase under terms and conditions most
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favorable to the corporations shall be preferred. If no price is acceptable
to the corporation, the same shall be determined by the Committee of
Appraisers composed of three members, one to be appointed by the
corporation, another by the bondholder making the highest or only offer,
and the third by the two members, so chosen. The expense of appraisal
shall be borne equally by the corporation and the successful purchaser.
"Should the Government offer for sale to the public any or all of the
shares of stock or the assets of any of the Government owned or
controlled corporation enumerated herein, the bidder who offers to pay
bonds of the Land Bank shall be preferred provided that the various bids
be equal in every respect except in the medium of payment.
"(3) Surety, bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons or
performance bonds in all cases where the government may require or
accept real property as bonds;
"(4) Payment for reparations goods, the provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Seventeen hundred and eighty-nine, as amended, to the
contrary notwithstanding;
"(5) Security for loans applied with the Philippine National Bank,
Development Bank of the Philippines, Government Service Insurance
System, Social Security System, and other government financial
institution, existing charters of these institutions to the contrary
notwithstanding; and
"(6) Legal reserves against deposit liabilities of banks, subject to the
terms and conditions which the Central Bank of Philippines may impose
pursuant to the General Banking Act."
Section 22. Section 101 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 101. Reorganization of ACA to align its activities. - The
administrative machinery of the Agricultural Credit Administration,
shall be reorganized to enable it to align its activities with the
requirements and objectives of this Code: Provided, That the Board of
Governors established by Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred and
twenty-one, as amended, shall be composed of a chairman and four (4)
members, three (3) of whom shall be the Undersecretary of Agrarian
Reform who shall be the Chairman ex-officio, the Administrator of the
Agricultural Credit Administration who shall be the Vice-Chairman ex-
officio and the Vice-President in charge of agricultural loans of the
Philippine National Bank, who shall be ex-officio member thereof. The
two other members shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines with the consent of the Commission of Appointments for a
term of three years, one of whom shall represent the farmers-beneficiary
of the Agrarian Reform Program and shall be appointed upon
recommendation of either or both the farmers and/or cooperatives
movement, federation or league existing at the same time such
recommendation is submitted, and the other to represent the political
party receiving the second highest number of votes in the immediately
preceding presidential elections: Provided, however, That the term of
the farmers' representative shall ipso facto terminate when such member
cease to be in the farmers and/or cooperatives movement, federation or
league, and that of the minority party at the pleasure of the nominating
political party.
"The Administrator shall be the Chief Executive of the Administration
and shall serve for a term of six years unless he resigns or is removed
for cause. The compensation of the Administrator shall be fixed by the
President but shall not be less that twenty-four thousand pesos per
annum. The members of the Board shall receive per diems of not more
than fifty pesos for each session of the Board that they attend: Provided,
however, That the total per diems, including all other remunerations,
shall not exceed six hundred pesos a month.
"No person shall be appointed as Administrator unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, with proven executive ability and
experience in the field of agricultural cooperatives and/or banking and
finance, adequate background and experience in land reform here and/or
elsewhere for at least five (5) years, and at least thirty-five years of age:
Provided, however, That he shall have, among other qualifications,
demonstrated interest in, and concern for, the needs and problems of the
rural population and/or peasantry and the solutions thereto: Provided,
further, That no person who owns any farmholding shall be appointed as
Administrator unless such farmholding is under the leasehold system or
the system of agricultural land ownership-transfer direct to the tiller."
Section 23. Section 105 and 106 of the same Code are hereby amended
to read as follows:
"Sec. 105. Loaning Activities. - Loaning activities of the Agricultural
Credit Administration shall be directed to stimulate the development and
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operation of farmers' cooperatives. The term "Farmers Cooperatives"
shall be taken to include all cooperatives relating to the production and
marketing of agricultural products and these formed to manage and/or
own, on a cooperative basis, agricultural farmlands, services and
facilities, such as irrigation and transport systems, established to support
production and/or marketing of agricultural products.
"Under such rules and regulations in accordance with generally accepted
banking practices and procedures as may be promulgated by the
Agricultural Credit Administration, Rural Banks, Cooperative Banks,
and Development Banks may, in their respective localities, be
designated to act as agents of the Agricultural Credit Administration in
regard to its loaning activities."
"Sec. 106. Credit to Small Farmers and/or Tillers of the land. -
Production loans and loans for the purchase of work animals, tillage
equipment, seeds, fertilizers, poultry, livestock, feed and other similar
items, may be extended to small farmers as defined in Republic Act
Numbered Eight hundred twenty-one and/or tillers of the land, based
upon their paying capacity and such securities as they can provide, and
under such terms and conditions as the Agricultural Credit
Administration may impose, provided the amount thereof does not
exceed two thousand pesos, or such amount as may be fixed by the
President at any given agricultural year: Provided, That his total
outstanding obligations shall not exceed five thousand pesos, but in no
case shall the amount of loan exceed eighty per centum of the value of
the collateral pledged. In instance where credit is extended for items
which are not consumed in their use, such items may be pledged as
security thereof. The Agricultural Credit Administration shall
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the
extension of the loans herein authorized so as to assure their repayment:
Provided, That such rules and regulations shall follow and be in
accordance with generally accepted financing practices and procedures."
Section 24. Section 108 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 108. Loans to Cooperatives. - The Agricultural Credit
Administration is hereby authorized to extend such types of loans as it
may deem necessary for the effective implementation of this Code to
eligible farmers' cooperatives as herein defined, under such terms and
conditions as it may impose and with such securities as it may require:
Provided: That the said Administration is hereby authorized to extend
production loans to cooperatives at not more than eight per cent interest
per calendar year and directly to the farmers at not more than twelve per
cent per calendar year: Provided, further, That cooperatives are hereby
authorized to extend loans directly to their members at not more than
twelve per cent per calendar year. A farmers' cooperative that has been
registered with the Agricultural Credit Administration shall be eligible
for loans if, in the judgment of the latter, its organization, management
and business policies are of such character as will insure the safety and
effective use of such loans."
Section 25. Section 110 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 110. Total charges on Loans. - The total charges including
interest, insurance fees and inspection, notarization and other service
charges on all kinds of loans shall not be more than twelve per centum
per calendar year: Provided, That if an impairment of the capitalization
of the Agricultural Credit Administration is imminent by reason of the
limitation appropriated out of the unappropriated funds in the National
Treasury such amounts as is necessary to cover the losses of the
Agricultural Credit Administration, but not exceeding six million pesos
for any one year."
Section 26. Section 112 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 112. Registration of and guidance to Cooperatives, Associations
and Organizations. - The Agricultural Credit Administration shall have
the power to register, finance and supervise all agricultural cooperatives,
including multi-purpose cooperatives, and farm associations or
organizations; and provide credit guidance or assistance to all
agricultural, irrigation, and other cooperative associations, multi-
purpose cooperatives, farm organizations or fund corporations:
Provided, That all cooperatives, associations or organizations registered
under this Section shall have juridical personality."
Section 27. Section 124 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
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"Sec. 124. Function of Extension Workers. - In addition to their
functions under Republic Act Numbered six hundred eighty, it shall be
the duty of extension workers:
"(1) To reside in the locality where they are assigned, to disseminate
technical information to farm families, and to demonstrate improved
farm and home management practices and techniques;
"(2) To work with individual farmers in farm planning and budgeting,
guide them in the proper conduct of farm business and work out
schedules of re-payment of loans obtained by farmers;
"(3) To assist farmers in securing the services or assistant of other
agencies, or their personnel, having to do relevant activities and
problems of farmers;
"(4) To visit newly-established independent farm operators either singly
or collectively at least once a month;
"(5) To promote and stimulate the growth and development of the youth
towards improved farm and home management practices and
techniques, as well as the development of their skills for small-scale
industries and the like;
"(6) To encourage the formation and growth of private associations,
study clubs, committees and other organized groups of farmers,
familiarize them with modern methods of farming and interest them to
actively participate, collaborate or take the initiative in agricultural
research, experimentation and implementation of projects in cooperation
with the Agricultural Productivity Commission and other agencies; and
"(7) To promote, stimulate and assist in the organization of farmers'
cooperatives, including multi-purpose cooperatives."
Section 28. Sections One hundred twenty-six and One hundred twenty-
seven of the same Code is hereby repealed.
Section 29. A new section is hereby inserted after Sec. 128, to be
designated therein as "Section 128-A," which shall read as follows:
"Sec. 128-A. Participation of Local Governments. - The Department of
Agrarian Reform shall, in every way possible to insure the successful
implementation of the Agrarian Reform Program, involve local
governments and secure their participation in the various aspects of the
program, such as the leasehold system, the acquisition and distribution
of private and public agricultural lands, the development of cooperatives
and small-scale industries and the like, and the other corollary
operational activities that should be carried out through barrio,
municipal, provincial and city governments.
"In pursuing this approach, however, the Department shall formulate the
policies and programs necessary in the implementation of this Code.
"The Department shall also render technical assistance to local
governments necessary to carry out the objective of agrarian reforms."
Section 30. Section 155 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 155. Powers of the Court; Rules of Procedure. - The Courts of
Agrarian Relations shall have all the powers and prerogatives inherent
in or belonging to the Court of First Instance.
"The Courts of Agrarian Relations shall be governed by the Rules of
Court: Provided, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of
any question or controversy pending before them, the Courts without
impairing substantial rights, shall not be bound strictly by the technical
rules of evidence and procedure, except in expropriation cases:
Provided, further, That in case the persons referred to under Section one
hundred sixty-three hereof, are not represented by a lawyer of their own
choice, the duly authorized leaders of duly registered farmers
organizations may enter their appearances as counsel for their respective
member and/or organization before the Court of Agrarian Relations, if
the Court is fully convinced that the said leader could competently
protect the interest of his client subject to the basic duties and
obligations as officers of the Court.
"The Court of Agrarian Relations is hereby authorized to conduct
compulsory arbitration between agricultural labor and agricultural
management, agricultural share tenants and agricultural landlords, and
agricultural lessees and agricultural lessors in conflicts arising out of,
and in connection with, their agrarian relations upon certification by the
Secretary of Justice.
"The rights and duties of the parties to the proceedings, the functions
and responsibilities of the Court, and the bidding effect of awards,
orders and processes of the Court shall be covered by Section six to
twenty-four of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred three.
"Where the litigant is an agricultural tenant, tiller or lessee, he shall be
entitled to the rights of a pauper litigant under the rules of Court and the
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privileges of an indigent litigant under Republic Act Numbered Sixty
hundred and thirty-five, without further proof thereof."
Section 31. Section 163 of the same Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4886, is further amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 163. Functions of the Office of the Agrarian Counsel. - It shall be
the responsibility of the Office of the Agrarian Counsel upon proper
notification by the party concerned or by the association or organization
to which he belong, to represent tenants, agricultural lessees,
agricultural farm workers and agricultural owner-cultivators or the
members of their immediate farm household referred to in this Code
who cannot engage the services of competent private counsel in cases
before the Court of Agrarian Relations. This responsibility shall include
representation before courts, including appellate, in cases civil or
criminal, instituted by or against said tenant, agricultural lessees, farm
workers or owners-cultivator or the members of their immediate farm
household, where the cases arise from or are connected with, or results
or effects of an agrarian dispute. The decision of the Office of the
Agrarian Counsel to provide legal assistance shall be final."
Section 32. Section 164 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 164. Authority to Administer Oath and Acknowledgment. - The
Agrarian Counsel, the Deputy Agrarian Counsel and the Special
Attorneys of the Office of the Agrarian Counsel are hereby authorized to
administer oaths and acknowledgment free of charge."
Section 33. Section 167 of the same Code is hereby amended by adding
after paragraph (5) thereof, the following two paragraphs which shall
read as follows:
"(6) Any collusion between an agricultural lessee and an agricultural
lessor and between a vendor and a vendee on installment sales to
simulate agricultural contracts, agricultural loans, or any application for
benefits under the Agrarian Reform program shall be punishable by
imprisonment of not more than five years and a fine not exceeding five
thousand pesos.
"The period for filing the corresponding criminal action for any criminal
violation falling under the foregoing provisions of this section shall
cease to run, whenever a case is filed before the Court of Agrarian
Relations for the determination of a prejudicial question in relation to
the criminal action, until said determination has become final."
Section 34. To carry out the objectives of this Amendatory Act, and
notwithstanding any provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to
the contrary, all lending institutions, whether public or private, shall set
aside at least twenty-five per cent of their loanable funds and make it
available for agricultural credit to agricultural lessees, owner-cultivator,
amortizing owners, and cooperatives, including multi-purpose
cooperatives and farm associations and organizations owned and
operated by those who live and work on the land as tillers and registered
with the Agricultural Credit Administration.
Section 35. Notwithstanding any provision of existing laws, rules and
regulations to the contrary, the Department of Agrarian Reform is
hereby authorized to segregate any area of three thousand hectares out
of any of its reservations as demonstration farm or pilot project for the
resettlement program of the Department on the moshave-type of
communal agriculture.
Section 36. The personnel of the agencies, offices and/or units
abolished, merged, renamed and/or reorganized under this Amendatory
Act shall have the same rights and privileges afforded to the personnel
of abolished or reorganized agencies under the Agricultural Land
Reform Code and in pursuance of Section One hundred sixty-nine
thereof.
To carry out the provisions of this Section, there is hereby appropriated
the sum of One million pesos out of the unappropriated funds in the
National Treasury: Provided, That ten per cent of this appropriation or
so much thereof as may be necessary is hereby set aside for the expenses
of the organizing staff created under Section 15 hereof.
Section 37. Any reference to the Land Reform Project Administration,
the National Land Reform Council and the Land Authority in the
Agricultural Reform Code or under any other existing laws shall be
understood to refer to the Department of Agrarian Reform.
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Section 38. If, for any reason, any section or provisions of this
Amendatory Act shall be held unconstitutional or invalid, no other
section or provision of the same shall be affected thereby.
All laws or parts of any law inconsistent with the provisions of this
Amendatory Act are hereby repealed and/or modified accordingly.
Section 39. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: September 10, 1971
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
Primero vs. Court of Agrarian Relations
101 Phil. 675 (1957)
Facts:
Primero owns a tenanted riceland in Cavite. Because of his desire to let
the property to one Porfirio Potente, he notified his tenant advising the
latter to vacate the land. The tenant refused. Primero filed a case with
CAR which subsequently dismissed the same. On appeal, Primero
assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 9 and 50 of RA 1199 claiming that
said provisions are limitations on freedom of contract, a denial of equal
protection of law, and an impairment of, or limitation on, property
rights.
Held:
The provisions of law assailed as unconstitutional do not impair the
right of the landowner to dispose or alienate his property nor prohibit
him to make such transfer or alienation; they only provide that in case of
transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy
relationship between the landowner and his tenant should be preserved
in order to insure the well-being of the tenant or protect him from being
unjustly dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser of the land; in other
words, the purpose of the law in question is to maintain the tenants in
the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them
protection against unjustified dismissal from their landholdings.
Republic Act 1199 is unquestionably a remedial legislation promulgated
pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the
exercise of the police power of the state to promote the commonwealth.
It is a statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general
legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public
welfare of the entire community affected by it. Republic Act 1199, like
the previous tenancy laws enacted by our lawmaking body, was passed
by congress in compliance with the constitutional mandates that "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people should be the concern of the State" (Art II, sec.
5) and that "the state shall regulate the relations between landlord and
tenant in agriculture" (Art. XIV, sec. 6). (at 680).
In Pineda vs. de Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450 (1967), the Supreme Court
also held:
Section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, Republic Act 1199, as
amended, enunciates the principle of security of tenure of the tenants,
such that it prescribes that the relationship of landholder and tenant can
only be terminated for causes provided by law. The principle is
epitomized by the axiom on land tenure that once a tenant, always a
tenant. Attacks on the constitutionality of this guarantee have centered
on the contention that it is a limitation on freedom of contract, a denial
of the equal protection of the law, and an impairment of or a limitation
on property rights. The assault is without reason. The law simply
provides that the tenancy relationship between the landholder and his
tenant should be preserved in order to insure the well-being of the tenant
and protect him from being unjustly dispossessed of the land. Its
termination can take place only for causes and reasons provided in the
law. It was established pursuant to the social justice precept of the State
to promote the common weal. (Primero vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
G.R. No. L-10594, May 29, 1957) (at 1456).
Rights and Responsibilities of the Parties
Rights and responsibilities of lessee
The lessee shall have the following rights:
a) To have possession and peaceful enjoyment of the land;
b) To manage and work on the land in a manner and method of
cultivation and harvest which conform to the proven farm
practices;
c) To mechanize all or any phase of his farm work;
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d) To deal with millers and processors and attend to the issuance
of quedans and warehouse receipts of the produce due him/her;
e) To continue in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of any
homelot the lessee may have occupied upon the effectivity of
RA 3844;
f) To be indemnified for the costs and expenses incurred in the
cultivation and for other expenses incidental to the
improvement of the crop in case the lessee surrenders, abandons
or is ejected from the landholding;
g) To have the right of pre-emption and redemption; and
h) To be paid disturbance compensation in case the conversion of
the farmholding has been approved (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963],
sec. 23, 24, 25, 11, 12, 36)
On the other hand, the lessee shall have the following responsibilities
under Sec. 26 of RA 3844:
a) Cultivate and take care of the farm, growing crops, and other
improvements on the land and perform all the work therein in
accordance with proven farm practices;
b) Inform the lessor within a reasonable time of any trespass
committed by third persons on the farm, without prejudice to
his/her direct action against the trespasser;
c) Take reasonable care of the work animals and farm implements
delivered to him/her by the lessor and see to it that they are not
used for purposes other than those intended, or used by another
without the knowledge and consent of the lessor;
d) Keep the farm and growing crops attended to during the work
season; and
e) To pay the lease rental to the lessor when it falls due.
One of the rights of a lessee is to be entitled to a homelot. But only the
tenant-lessee has this right and that members of the immediate family of
the tenants are not entitled to a homelot.
De Jesus v. IAC
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on February 28, 1985 which reconsidered its
previous decision dated July 29, 1984 in A.C. G.R. No. 70261-R entitled
"Socorro Calimbas-Miaco v. de Jesus" and reversed the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Bataan (Branch II) dismissing an action for
"Recovery of Possession with Damages" for lack of jurisdiction.
The pivotal issue posed by petitioner is whether or not he is an
agricultural lessee or a civil law lessee. It is of paramount importance in
this case to appreciate the contra distinction between an agricultural
lessee whose security of tenure is guaranteed by the Tenancy Law (Sec.
5(b) R.A. 1199) and a civil law lessee whose right to work on the land
expires in accordance with the terms of the Lease Agreement.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondents are owners of some 7.162 hectares of land in
Pilar, Bataan known as Lot No. 513 of Pilar cadastre and covered by
TCT No. T-3975. About four (4) hectares of the above lot is a fishpond
possession of which has been in petitioner since 1962 as a lessee. On
April 22, 1972, private respondents, as heirs of Spouses Eustacio
Calimbas and Modesta Paguio who in their lifetime were the registered
owners of the land, entered into a civil law contract of lease, with
petitioner de Jesus and one Felicisima Rodriguez. This contract was to
be effective for 2-1/2 years starting January 1, 1972 to July 1, 1974.
Petitioner de Jesus and Felicisima Rodriguez formed a partnership
over the fishpond with de Jesus as the industrial partner and Rodriguez
as the capitalist. Upon the expiration of the civil law lease contract on
July 1, 1974, Felicisima Rodriguez gave up the lease but petitioner de
Jesus refused to vacate the leased premises despite repeated demands.
On December 5, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint for
"Recovery of Possession with Damages" against the petitioner before
the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court of Bataan Branch
II, docketed as Civil Case No. 4016. On July 20, 1979, the Court of First
Instance of Bataan ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
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"WHEREFORE, premises above considered, this case is hereby
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to the filing of the
same with the proper court with respect to the other incident which is for
adjustment and filing of the rentals." 1
According to the lower court, the fishpond is an agricultural land as
held in the case of Tawatao & del Rosario v. Garcia, et al., G.R. No. L-
17649, July 31, 1963. 2 It further held that petitioner is an agricultural
lessee and not a civil law lessee, therefore jurisdiction over the dispute
belongs to the Court of Agrarian Relations and not to the Court of First
Instance. The bases for holding that petitioner de Jesus is an agricultural
lessee are the following: [1] the land is agricultural; [2] Felicisima
Rodriguez testified that she left the lease after the expiration in 1974 and
it was petitioner who managed the fishpond alone, thereby qualifying as
an agricultural lessee; and [3] the CFI Judge, motu propio, visited the
fishpond and saw no one but the petitioner working on the fishpond,
thereby further strengthening the contention that the land is subject to a
one-man cultivation.
Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was
denied. They appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court
of Appeals, and on June 29, 1984, the latter rendered a decision
affirming the Court of First Instance of Bataan; to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 20, 1979 dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction of the lower court, is hereby AFFIRMED." 3
On Motion for Reconsideration the Intermediate Appellate Court,
after a thorough review and assessment of the records for any oversight,
realized its error which was to some extent influenced by the lower
court's findings as above discussed and reversed itself in the resolution
of February 23, 1985, holding that petitioner is not an agricultural lessee
but a civil law lessee and further ordered the latter to vacate the land. On
the basis of stronger evidence, where petitioner himself admitted that he
hired the services of many people other than the members of his family
to cultivate the land, respondent appellate Court ruled that petitioner
failed to qualify as an agricultural lessee under the doctrine laid down in
Gabriel v. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974) and as defined in Paragraph
2, Section 166, Chapter XI of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code. 4 Moreover, he admitted that he cultivated an adjacent fishpond of
11-1/2 hectares by employing other laborers, whereby he was more
correctly categorized as a business enterpreneur engaged in the fishpond
industry.
Hence, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the Motion for Reconsideration meritorious,
the decision sought to be reconsidered is hereby REVERSED and set
aside, except the statement of facts thereof which is hereby incorporated
by reference, and a judgment is hereby entered:
"1. Declaring the Lease Contract (annex B) between the parties as
having been lawfully terminated as of July 1, 1974;
"2. Ordering the defendant-appellee and/or any person acting under
him, to immediately vacate the land in question including the fishpond,
and restore and deliver the possession thereof to the plaintiffs-appellants
in good condition as before;
"3. Ordering the defendant-appellee to pay to the plaintiffs-appellants
reasonable rentals over the premises at the rate of P4,000.00 per annum
from July 1, 1974 until said appellee shall have completely restored
possession thereof to the plaintiff-appellants; and
"4. Ordering the defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants
attorney's fees of P5,000.00 and litigation expenses of P5,000.00, plus
costs.
"SO ORDERED." 5
On September 25, 1985, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied. Hence this Petition for Review on
Certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court
as not supported by evidence, inconclusive and contrary or violative of
applicable laws, Rules of Court, B.P. 129 and established
jurisprudence.
We rule against petitioner.
The Agricultural Land Reform Code was enacted by Congress to
institute land reforms in the Philippines. It was passed to establish
owner-cultivatorship and the family size farm as the basis of Philippine
agriculture; to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free
from pernicious industrial restraints and practices; to make the small
farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens and a
source of a genuine strength in our democratic society. 6
In other words, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was enacted to
help the small farmers and to uplift their economic status by providing
them a modest standard of living sufficient to meet a farm family's
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needs for food, clothing, shelter, education and other basic necessities. "Q You said you improved the fishpond from one and one-half
The law further protects the small farmer by conferring upon him hectares to four hectares, is that correct?
security of tenure over the landholding he is working on. The leasehold "A Yes, sir.
relation cannot be extinguished by the mere expiration of the term or "Q Did you do this by yourself?
period in a leasehold contract or by the sale, alienation or transfer of the "A With my sons and my father-in-law.
legal possession of the landholding. He can only be ejected by the Court "Q You did not employ any other person except your immediate
for cause. 7 But with this benevolence is his obligation to work on the relatives?
land by himself or with the aid of his immediate farm household. By "A I did sir, I hired many." 10
"immediate farm household", the law means the members of the family A disclosure made before the court is a judicial admission and
of the lessee or lessor and other persons who are dependent upon him under the rules this cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to
for support and who usually help him in his activities. 8 have been made by palpable mistake. 11
Petitioner de Jesus contends that he is an agricultural lessee In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that
because a fishpond is an agricultural land as held in the case of Tawatao petitioner committed a palpable mistake in making the above
v. Garcia, supra. While this is true, the mere fact that the land is disclosures. Hence, absent the requisite of personal cultivation,
agricultural does not ipso facto make him an agricultural lessee. The law petitioner de Jesus cannot be considered an agricultural lessee. In the
provides conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the case of Evangelista v. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court held that one
land being agricultural is only one of them. Among others, the law is cannot be said to be an agricultural lessee if he has not personally or by
explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the his farm household cultivated the land in question.
land. 9 Moreover, it is an undisputed fact that petitioner is cultivating an
Thus, petitioner also contends that he is the sole cultivator of the adjacent fishpond with a size of 11-1/2 hectares which further proves
fishpond as supported by the testimony of his former partner, Felicisima that he is not a small farmer but a businessman. He testified thus:
Rodriguez and as found by the trial judge. But on review by the Court of
Appeals these allegations gave way to a much stronger evidence the "Q: Do you have any other source of income between 1963 and
judicial admissions of petitioner himself, that he hired many persons to 1969?
help him cultivate the fishpond. The pertinent portion of his testimony "A: There is sir.
reads: "Q: What?
"A: Fishpond also.
"Q When you first took possession of the property, how large was "Q: Up to the present?
this fishpond in question? "A: Yes, sir.
"A There is only one and a half hectares that could be used sir and "Q: What is the area of the fishpond in question which are you
this area is the only one that has water. operating at present excluding this one?
"Q But according to the complainant, the area is now four hectares, "A: Eleven hectares and a half.
can you explain why it has grown to four hectares? "Q: Who owns this eleven and a half hectares?
"A I had it constructed, this is ricefield and grassland before. "A: Maximo Reyes, sir.
"Q Do you mean to tell us that you spent effort and money in "Q: Where is this located?
improving this fishpond to four hectares? "A: Adjacent, sir.
Atty. Origuera: Leading "Q: Do you employ help in operating this eleven and a half hectares?
Court: Sustained "A: Yes sir.

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"Q: How many?
"A: Sometimes plenty, sometimes few.
"Q: You employ help because you cannot work in that eleven and a
half hectares yourself?
"A: No, sir." 13
Petitioner asserts that the cultivation of another fishpond is
irrelevant as the law does not require or prohibit the total absence of
other sources of income. In ruling on this matter, it is of much
significance to look into the spirit of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code. First and foremost, the law is meant to assist and help the small
farmers as enunciated in its Declaration of Policy. In the case at bar,
petitioner de Jesus is not a small farmer but a businessman. To consider
him an agricultural lessee despite the fact that he is cultivating another
fishpond with an area of 11-1/2 hectares, and furthermore despite the
fact that he does not cultivate the fishpond personally and/or with the
help of his immediate farm household as defined by law, would render
nugatory the letter and intent of the Agricultural Reform Code.
Petitioner further contends that the civil law lease contract he
signed in 1972 is unenforceable because his consent was vitiated. We
have to disagree. Under the law on contracts, 14 vitiated consent does
not make a contract unenforceable but merely voidable. If indeed
petitioner's consent was vitiated, his remedy would have been to annul
the contract for voidable contracts produce legal effects until they are
annulled.
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance has also been put in
issue on the assumption that if petitioner is an agricultural lessee, then
the case should have been filed in the Court of Agrarian Relations. We
hold that this issue has now become moot and academic in view of the
passage of B.P. 129. Section 19 of said law provides that the Court of
First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, shall have jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the questioned
Resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals,
is hereby affirmed.
B. DEFINITION OF AGRICULTURAL TENANCY
De los Reyes v. Espinelli
Facts: Petitioner, the owner of a coconut plantation, has his overseer
who took into the land the 17 respondents under an agreement that the
latter were to receive 1/7 portion of every coconut harvest. Sometime
later, petitioner dismissed said overseer upon the suspicion that the latter
had been deceiving him, in connivance with the respondents.
Respondents filed petitions, seeking the delivery to them of the
difference between the 1/7 share which the petitioner had been giving
them and the 30% share to which they, as share tenants, were allegedly
entitled. Upon the finding that the respondents were mere agricultural
workers of the petitioner, the CAR ordered the latter to retain them as
such and to pay them
Issue: Whether or not the relationship is that of agricultural share
tenancy or that of farm employer and agricultural laborer.
Ruling: The characteristics of a share tenancy contract are: (1) the
parties are a landholder, who is a natural or juridical person and is the
owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of agricultural land, and a
tenant who, himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivates the land which is the subject-
matter of the tenancy; (2) the subject-matter is agricultural land; (3) the
purpose of the contract is agricultural production; and (4) the cause or
consideration is that the landholder and the share tenant would divide
the agricultural produce between themselves in proportion to their
respective contributions. A "farm worker" is "any agricultural wage,
salary or piece worker but is not limited to a farm worker of a particular
farm employer unless this Code explicitly states otherwise, and any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection
with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has
not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment." The
term includes "farm laborer and/or farm employees."10 An "agricultural
worker" is not a whit different from a "farm worker." In determining the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are
generally considered are the following: (1) the selection and engagement
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of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal;
and (4) the employer's power to control the employee's conduct. It is this
last element that constitutes the most important index of the existence of
relationship. The share tenant works for that joint venture. The
agricultural laborer works for the farm employer, and for his labor he
receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a
profit. On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural
produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of the
harvest. The record is devoid of evidentiary support for the notion that
the respondents are farm laborers. They do not observe set hours of
work. The petitioner has not laid down regulations under which they are
supposed to do their work. The argument tendered is that they are
guards. However, it does not appear that they are under obligation to
report for duty to the petitioner or his agent. They do not work in shifts.
Nor has the petitioner prescribed the manner by which the respondents
were and are to perform their duties as guards. We do not find here that
degree of control and supervision evincive of an employer-employee
relationship. Furthermore, if the respondents are guards, then they are
not agricultural laborers, because the duties and functions of a guard are
not agricultural in nature.
Gabriel v. Pangilinan
Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the owner
of a 169,507 sqm fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An oral
contract of lease with a yearly rental was entered between them.
Defendant was notified that the contract would be terminated, but upon
request was extended for another year.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that the
trial court had no jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the Court of
Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy
relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by plaintiff, the
motion was denied. The defendant filed his answer that the land was
originally verbally leased to him by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for
as long as the defendant wanted, subject to the condition that he would
convert the major portion into a fishpond and that which was already a
fishpond be improved at his expense, which would be reimbursed by
Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease. Plaintiff
also assured him that he could continue leasing as long as he wanted
since she was not in a position to attend to it personally.
Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining
which Court shall take cognizance of the case.
It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings,
repairing dikes and such, personally with the aid of helpers since he
became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over
who said that she helps her father in administering the leased property,
conveying his instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar who is
residing near the fishpond, defendants other children are all
professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila.
None of these has been seen working on the fishpond.
Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold
tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to
section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the
aid of the members of his immediate farm household (Section 4,
Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties has
been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and
therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
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Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New
Civil Code. No tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and the
defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199. Court is vested with
jurisdiction to try and decide this case.
Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.
ISSUES:
1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and
appellant as that of a civil lease and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep.
Act No. 1199 as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction, the cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature
pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.
HELD:
Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law
lease. The leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil
law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and
cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to,
and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not
personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the
landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in
civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to
the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code,
whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy
Act to exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with
members of his immediate farm household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of
labor available from members of his immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount
in money or in produce or in both
There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and
the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land",
specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the
use thereof. The mere fact that a person works an agricultural land does
not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec 4
of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the
other requisites as above enumerated are complied with.
The court doesnt want to decide on the second requisite since it wasnt
raised. For the third requisite, the tenancy agreement was severed in
1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond personally because he
became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's
immediate farm household work the land. Only the members of the
family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant
or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help
him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate
farm household".
Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his
immediate family to work the land. A person, in order to be considered a
tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm
household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually
work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others
whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and
is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning
of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the
status, rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the
relationship between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant
Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No.
1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is
affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
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Gelos v. CA
Facts:
Rafael Gelos was employed by Ernesto Alzona and his parents as their
laborer on a 25,000-sq. m farmland. They executed a written contract
which stipulated that as hired laborer Gelos would receive a daily wage
of P5.00. Three (3) years later, Gelos was informed of the termination of
his services and was asked to vacate the property. Gelos refused and
continued working on the land. Alzona filed a complaint for illegal
detainer. The lower court found Gelos as tenant of the property and
entitled to remain thereon as such. The decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeals. DHACES
Issue:
What is the nature of the contract between Gelos and Alzona?
Held:
The parties entered into a contract of employment, not a tenancy
agreement. The agreement is a lease of services, not of the land in
dispute. . . . The petitioner would disavow the agreement, but his
protestations are less than convincing. His wife's testimony that he is
illiterate is belied by his own testimony to the contrary in another
proceeding. Her claim that they were tricked into signing the agreement
does not stand up against the testimony of Atty. Santos Pampolina, who
declared under his oath as a witness (and as an attorney and officer of
the court) that he explained the meaning of the document to Gelos, who
even read it himself before signing it. . . . Gelos points to the specific
tasks mentioned in the agreement and suggests that they are the work of
a tenant and not of a mere hired laborer. Not so. The work specified is
not peculiar to tenancy. What a tenant may do may also be done by a
hired laborer working under the direction of the landowner, as in the
case at bar. It is not the nature of the work involved but the intention of
the parties that determines the relationship between them. As this Court
has stressed in a number of cases, "tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It
is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding
when the farmer is installed, and as in this case, their written
agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to
law, are even more important."
Classes of agricultural tenancy
Agricultural tenancy is classified into share tenancy and leasehold
tenancy (M. A. GERMAN, SHARE AND LEASEHOLD TENANCY,
13 [1995]).
Share tenancy means "the relationship which exists whenever two
persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein
one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant
cultivating the land personally with aid of labor available from members
of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided
between the landholder and the tenant." (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963]. Sec.
166 [25]).
With the passage of RA 3844, share tenancy has been declared to be
contrary to public policy and abolished (Rep. Act No. 3844[1963], sec.
4) except in the case of fishponds, saltbeds, and lands principally
planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao, coffee, durian and other similar
permanent trees at the time of the approval of said Act (Rep. Act No.
3844 [1963], sec. 35). When RA 6389 (1971) was enacted, agricultural
share tenancy has been automatically converted to leasehold but the
exemptions remained. It was only under RA 6657 when the exemptions
were expressly repealed.
Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either personally or with
the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible
of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household, belonging to or legally possessed by,
another in consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in
both (Rep. Act No. 1199 [1954], sec. 4).
Under RA 6657, the only agricultural tenancy relation that is
recognized is leasehold tenancy. Said law expressly repealed Sec. 35 of
RA 3844, making all tenanted agricultural lands throughout the country
subject to leasehold.
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Leasehold tenancy may be established by operation of law, that is,
through the abolition of share tenancy under Sec. 4 of RA 3844; through
the exercise by the tenant of his right to elect leasehold; or by agreement
of the parties either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly, which
was the condition before 1972 (M.A. German,supra, at 27).
Leasehold relation is instituted in retained areas with tenant(s) under
RA 6657 or PD 27 who opts to choose to remain therein instead of
becoming a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with
similar or comparable features. The tenant must exercise his option
within one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of
the area for retention (Rep. Act No. 6657[1988], sec. 6). Leasehold
relation also exists in all tenanted agricultural lands that are not yet
covered under CARP (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]).
The institution of leasehold in these areas ensure the protection and
improvement of the tenurial and economic status of tenant-tillers
therein. (Rep. Act No. 6657 [1988], sec. 6).
Leasehold tenancy distinguished from civil law lease
In Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974), the Supreme Court
distinguished leasehold tenancy from civil law lease.
There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil
law lease. The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to
agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban
property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold
tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land,
whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the
thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is
devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be
for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law
lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is
governed by special laws (at 596).
b) The subject is agricultural land;
c) There is consent by the landholder for the tenant to work on the
land, given either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly;
d) The purpose is agricultural production;
e) There is personal cultivation or with the help of the immediate
farm household; and
f) There is compensation in terms of payment of a fixed amount in
money and/or produce. (Carag vs. CA, 151 SCRA 44 [1987]; Gabriel
vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 [1974]; Oarde vs. CA, 280 SCRA 235
[1997]; Qua vs. CA, 198 SCRA 236 [1991])
The Supreme Court emphasized in numerous cases that "(a)ll these
requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between
the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of
land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is
so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant,
he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws."
(Caballes v. DAR, 168 SCRA 254 [1988])
In the case of Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7 (1969), the Court
found all the elements of an agricultural leasehold relation contained in
the contract of lease executed by the parties.

Elements of Agricultural Tenancy

The following are the essential requisites for the existence of a
tenancy relation:
a) The parties are the landholder and the tenant;

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Bejasa v. CA
This is a petition[1] assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals[2] reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro[3] and ordering petitioners Reynaldo and Erlinda
Bejasa (hereinafter referred to as "the Bejasas") to surrender the
possession of the disputed landholdings to respondent Isabel Candelaria
("hereinafter referred to as Candelaria") and to pay her annual rental
from 1986, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs.[4]
Inescapably, the appeal involves the determination of a factual issue.
Whether a person is a tenant is a factual question.[5] The factual
conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are contradictory
and we are constrained to review the same.[6]
We state the undisputed incidents.
This case involves two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-
58191[7] and TCT No. T-59172,[8] measuring 16 hectares and 6 hectares
more or less, situated in Barangay Del Pilar, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro.
The parcels of land are indisputably owned by Isabel Candelaria.
On October 20, 1974, Candelaria entered into a three-year lease
agreement over the land with Pio Malabanan (hereinafter referred to as
"Malabanan"). In the contract, Malabanan agreed among other things:
"to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to purchase or procure calamansi,
citrus and rambutan seeds or seedlings, to attend and care for whatever
plants are thereon existing, to make the necessary harvest of fruits,
etc."[9]
Sometime in 1973, Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and
to clear it. The Bejasas claim that they planted
citrus, calamansi, rambutan and banana trees on the land and
shouldered all expenses of production.
On May 3, 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over
the land, modifying their first agreement. As per the agreement,
Malabanan was under no obligation to share the harvests with
Candelaria.[10]
Sometime in 1983, Malabanan died.
On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime
Dinglasan (hereinafter referred to as "Jaime) as her attorney-in-fact,
having powers of administration over the disputed land.[11]
On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over
the land with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaimes wife (hereinafter referred to as
"Victoria"). The contract had a term of one year.[12]
On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of
P15,000.00 in consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na
bunga"[13] agreement, with a term of one year. The agreement is below
quoted:[14]
"Ako si Victoria Dinglasan bilang tagapamahala ni Isabel Candelaria
ay ipinaaryendo kay Reynaldo Bejasa ang lupang dating aryendo ni Pio
Malabanan sa nasabing Ginang Buhat sa ika-30 ng Disyembre 1984
hanggang Ika-30 ng Disyembre 1985. Ako ay tumanggap sa kanya ng
pitong libong piso at ito ay daragdagan pa niya ng walong libong piso
(P8,000) dito sa katapusan ng buwan ng Disyembre 1984.
(signed) (signed)
Reynaldo Bejasa Victoria Dinglasan
"Witness
"(unintelligible)
"(unintelligible)"
During the first week of December 1984, the Bejasas paid Victoria
P7,000.00 as agreed. The balance of P8,000.00 was not fully paid. Only
the amount of P4,000.00 was paid on January 11, 1985.[15]
After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victorias demand to vacate the
land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give any
consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or a shared harvest.[16]
On April 7, 1987, Candelaria and the Dinglasans again entered into a
three-year lease agreement over the land.[17] The special power of
attorney in favor of Jaime was also renewed by Candelaria on the same
date.[18]
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On April 30, 1987, Jaime filed a complaint before the Commission on
the Settlement of Land Problems ("COSLAP"), Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro seeking ejectment of the Bejasas.
On May 26, 1987, COSLAP dismissed the complaint.
Sometime in June 1987, Jaime filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court, Calapan Oriental, Mindoro[19] against the Bejasas for "Recovery
of possession with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages." The
case was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR").
On December 28, 1987, the DAR certified that the case was not proper
for trial before the civil courts.[20]
The trial court dismissed Jaimes complaint, including the Bejasas
counterclaim for leasehold, home lot and damages.
On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint for "confirmation of leasehold
and home lot with recovery of damages."[21]against Isabel Candelaria
and Jaime Dinglasan.[22]
On February 20, 1991, after trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the
Bejasas.[23] First, they reasoned that a tenancy relationship was
established.[24] This relationship can be created by and between a
"person who furnishes the landholding as owner, civil law lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor and the person who personally
cultivates the same."[25] Second, as bona-fidetenant-tillers, the Bejasas
have security of tenure.[26] The lower court ruled:[27]
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:
"(1) Ordering the defendants to maintain plaintiffs in the peaceful
possession and cultivation of the lands in question and to respect
plaintiffs security of tenure on the landholdings of Isabel Candelaria and
the home lot presently occupied by them;
"(2) Confirming the leasehold tenancy system between the plaintiffs as
the lawful tenant-tillers and the landholder, Isabel Candelaria, with the
same lease rental of P20,000.00 per calendar year for the use of the
lands in question and thereafter, same landholdings be placed under the
operation land transfer pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657;
"(3) Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs
the amount of P115,500.00 representing the sale of calamansi which
were unlawfully gathered by Jaime Dinglasan and his men for the period
July to December, 1987 and which were supported by receipts and duly
proven, with formal written accounting, plus the sum of P346,500.00
representing the would-be harvests on citrus, calamansi, rambutan and
bananas for the years 1988, 1989 and 1990, with legal rate of interest
thereon from the date of the filing of the instant complaint until fully
paid;
"(4) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the
amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fee and expenses of litigation; and
"(5) Authorizing the plaintiffs as tenant-farmers to litigate as pauper not
only in this Court but up to the appellate courts in accordance with
Section 16 of P. D. No. 946.
"SO ORDERED."
On February 20, 1991, respondents filed their notice of appeal.[28]
On February 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision
reversing the trial courts ruling.[29] Reasoning: First, not all requisites
necessary for a leasehold tenancy relationship were met.[30] There was
no consent given by the landowner. The consent of former civil law
lessee, Malabanan, was not enough to create a tenancy
relationship.[31] Second, when Malabanan engaged the services of the
Bejasas, he only constituted them as mere overseers and did not make
them "permanent tenants". Verily, even Malabanan knew that his
contract with Candelaria prohibited sublease.[32] Third, the contract
("aryenduhan") between the Bejasas and Victoria, by its very terms,
expired after one year. The contract did not provide for sharing of
harvests, means of production, personal cultivation and the
like.[33] Fourth, sharing of harvest was not proven. The testimony of
Reynaldo Bejasa on this point is self-serving. Fifth, the element of
personal cultivation was not proven. Reynaldo Bejasa himself admitted
that he hired laborers to clear and cultivate the land.[34] The Court of
Appeals disposed of the case, thus:[35]
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"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The interlocutory order issued on
September 5, 1988 is DISSOLVED and the appellees are hereby ordered
to surrender possession of the disputed landholdings to appellant Isabel
Candelaria and pay her the amount of P15,000.00 in annual rents
commencing from 1986 plus attorneys fees and litigation expenses of
P35,000.00 and costs.
"SO ORDERED."
Hence, this appeal filed on March 3, 1993.[36]
The issue raised is whether there is a tenancy relationship in favor of the
Bejasas.
The elements of a tenancy relationship are:[37]
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests.
After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that
there is no tenancy relationship between the parties.
Malabanan and the Bejasas. True, Malabanan (as Candelarias
usufructuary) allowed the Bejasas to stay on and cultivate the land.
However, even if we assume that he had the authority to give consent to
the creation of a tenancy relation, still, no such relation existed.
There was no proof that they shared the harvests.
Reynaldo Bejasa testified that as consideration for the possession of the
land, he agreed to deliver the landowners share (1/5 of the harvest) to
Malabanan.[38] Only Reynaldo Bejasas word was presented to prove this.
Even this is cast into suspicion. At one time Reynaldo categorically
stated that 25% of the harvest went to him, that 25% was for Malabanan
and 50% went to the landowner, Candelaria.[39] Later on he stated that
the landowners share was merely one fifth.[40]
In Chico v. Court of Appeals,[41] we faulted private respondents for
failing to prove sharing of harvests since "no receipt, or any other
evidence was presented."[42] We added that "Self serving statements ...
are inadequate; proof must be adduced."[43]
Candelaria and the Bejasas. Between them, there is no tenancy
relationship. Candelaria as landowner never gave her consent.
The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with
Candelaria.[44] They acknowledge that Candelaria could argue that she
did not know of Malabanans arrangement with them.[45] True enough
Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the Bejasas during
Malabanans lease possessed the land.[46] However, the Bejasas claim
that this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to
the Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in
1983.[47] We do not agree. In a tenancy agreement, consideration should
be in the form of harvest sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria agreed
to lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year,[48] such agreement did
not create a tenancy relationship, but a mere civil law lease.
Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the
authority as civil law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy
agreement, there is no proof that they did.
Again, there was no agreement as to harvest sharing. The only
agreement between them is the "aryenduhan",[49] which states in no
uncertain terms the monetary consideration to be paid, and the term of
the contract.
Not all the elements of tenancy being met, we deny the petition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals of
February 9, 1993, in toto.
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Victorio v. CA & Fernandez
Facts:
Sometime in 1967, Alfredo Victorio (as lessee) and Tomas Fernandez
(as lessor), the fathers of herein petitioner Anastacio Victorio and
private respondent Dominador Fernandez, respectively entered into a
lease contract over a fishpond located in Brgy. Balangobon, Lingayen,
Pangasinan for a 10-year period. After the said contract expired in 1977,
the same was renewed, albeit verbally, for another 10 years until 1987
but adopting the terms and conditions of the original contract. When the
second contract expired, private respondent repeatedly asked petitioner
to vacate the premises but the latter adamantly refused. Consequently, a
case for ejectment was filed by respondent against petitioner but was
consequently dismissed by the trial court on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
On appeal, the regional trial court revised the decision holding that
the lease contract is a civil law lease agreement and ordering petitioner
to vacate the fishpond in question and surrender peaceful possession
thereof.
Petitioner having been rebuked on reconsideration, elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. However, the
Court of Appeals turned down the appeal, in effect, ratiocinating that the
court is strongly convinced and hereby finds and holds that the
agreement entered into by the parties is a civil law contract of lease and
not one under the agricultural leasehold system as expressly termed
under R.A. No. 3844, as amended. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under Republic Act
No. 3844 and thus entitled to security of tenure over the fishpond in
question, or a mere civil lessee whose right over the subject premises
ceased upon the expiration of the contract of lease?
Held:
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3)
there is consent among the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of
harvests. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties (Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA
33 [1198]; Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 235 [1997]; Odsique
vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626 [1994]; see also Sintos vs. Court of
Appeals, 246 SCRA 223 [1995).
Petitioner's right to the fishpond emanated from the lease contract
between his father and private respondent's father wherein petitioner's
father was designated as a "lessee" and not as a "tenant". Petitioner
cannot, therefore, be more than a lessee like his father because "the
spring cannot rise higher than its source". Secondly, there was no
stipulation regarding the sharing of the harvest, whether explicitly or
implicitly. One of the essential requisites for existence of tenancy
relationship is sharing by the landowner and tenant of the produce, and
no proof of this fact has been shown in this case. What the parties
agreed upon, as established by the evidence, was for the petitioner to
pay private respondent a yearly lease rental, with an advance payment of
3 years' rental. This is not the case obtaining in a tenancy relationship
where the parties share in the produce of the land as this falls due, or as
it becomes available, during harvest time.
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C. TYPES OF AGRICULTURAL TENANCY
Ilusorio v. CAR
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, the
dispositive part of which reads:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby holds that
Sec. 14 of Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended, is constitutional and the
leasehold system of tenancy shall govern the relationship of the parties,
except Nicodemus Magcalas and Miguel Santiago, starting with the
1961-1962 agri-year.
"Petitioners are hereby ordered to pay per agri-year to respondent-
landholders rentals in the amount appearing opposite their names:
TOTAL 208.83 cavans
"The petition with respect to Nicodemus Magcalas and Miguel Santiago
is hereby dismissed. The prayer of Pascual Manalili for the
determination of the rent he is to pay is likewise, dismissed for lack of
evidence..
"All other claims are dismissed."
Petitioners herein, Potenciano Ilusorio and Teresa Ilusorio, are co-
owners of a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Bantug, Municipality
of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan. The main respondents herein
i.e. the fifteen (15) winning tenants named in the dispositive part above-
quoted have for years worked on said land under the share tenancy
system. Before the beginning of the agricultural year 1960-1961, they
gave notice to the petitioners, in conformity with the provisions of
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, that they
(respondents) wanted to change their tenancy contract from said system
to leasehold tenancy. The Ilusorios having refused to agree thereto, said
respondents -- and three other tenants whose claims were dismissed by
the Court of Agrarian Relations -- instituted this proceedings, in said
court, on November 16, 1960. The main defense set up by petitioners
herein, as respondents in said court, is that the aforementioned Section
14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, is unconstitutional, which
was rejected by the lower court. Hence this appeal in which the Ilusorios
maintain: (1) that said provision is unconstitutional; and (2) that the
lower court had acted arbitrarily in fixing the rentals collectible by them
from respondents herein at 20% of the average harvest for the
agricultural years 1959-1960, 1960-1961, and 1961-1962.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 14 of Republic Act
No. 1199, as amended, upon the ground that it violates the freedom of
contract and impairs property rights, as well the obligation of contracts.
The Court has already held, however, that:
"The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against
impairing the obligation of contracts is not an absolute one and is not to
be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula. Such
provisions are restricted to contracts with respect property, or some
object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of
justice, and have no application to statute relating to public subjects
within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State, and
involving the public right and public welfare of the entire community
affected by it. They do not prevent proper exercise by the State of its
police powers. By enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure
the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community,
even the contracts may thereby be affected; for such matter cannot be
placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control
them." (Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, et al., 86 Phil. 50.)
Although mainly concerned with the constitutionality of Sections 9
and 50 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended the validity of this law in
its entirety was upheld in Primero vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, L-
10594 (May 2, 1957), in the following language:
". . . We find no merit in this contention. The provisions of law assailed
as unconstitutional do not impair the right of the landowner to dispose
or alienate his property nor prohibit him to make such transfer or
alienation; they only provide that in case of transfer or in case of lease,
as in the instant case, the tenancy relationship between the landowner
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and his tenant should be preserved in order to insure the well-being of twenty per centum in case of second class land of the average gross
the tenant or protect him from unjustly dispossessed by the transferee or produce, after deducting the same amount of palay used as seed and the
purchaser of the land; in other words, the purpose of the law in question cost of harvesting a and threshing of the past three normal harvests."
is to maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and cultivation of
the land or afford them protection against unjustified dismissal from It should be noted, also, that the rental thus fixed subject to the
their landholdings. Republic Act No. 1199 is unquestionably a remedial qualification, found in a proviso to the effect:
legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the
Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the State to "That, if the landholder introduced improvements on the farm which
promote the common weal. It is a statute relating to public subjects increase its productivity, he may demand for an increase in the rental
within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and proportionate to the increase in production resulting from such
involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community improvements. In case of disagreement the court shall determine the
affected by it. Republic Act No. 1199, like the previous tenancy laws reasonable increase in rental. Classification of ricelands shall be
enacted by our law-making body, was passed by Congress in determined by productivity; first class lands being those which yield
compliance with the constitutional mandate that 'the promotion of social more than forty cavans per hectare and second class lands being those
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people which yield forty cavans or less, the same to be computed upon the
should be the concern of the State' (Art. II, sec. 5) and that 'the State normal average harvest of the three preceding years."
shall regulate the relations between landlord and tenant . . . in
agriculture . . ..' (Art. XIV, sec. 6)." (Emphasis supplied.) Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against petitioners herein. It is so ordered.
As regards, particularly, Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended, which is the main object of petitioners' appeal, its validity has
been repeatedly sustained by this Court in Mateo de Ramas vs. Court of
Agrarian Relations, L-19555 (May 29, 1964), Macasaet vs. Court of
Agrarian Relations, L-19750 (July 17, 1964), and Uichanco vs.
Gutierrez, L-202750-9 (May 31, 1965). We find no cogent reason to
depart from the view we have so far adhered to, which is in consonance
with our consistent jurisprudence on the police power of the State.

As regards the second issue, it is urged that respondent court has

acted arbitrarily in fixing, in its decision, dated June 27, 1962, the
rentals to be paid by respondents herein on the basis of the average
harvest for the three (3) preceding agricultural years, for said rentals,
petitioners maintain, should be determined from year to year. This
pretense is refuted by Section 46(a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended by Republic Act No. 2263, pursuant to which:

"The fixed consideration for the use of ricelands, shall not be more than
the equivalent of twenty-five per centum in case of first class land and

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Dela Paz v CAR
Availing of the right provided for in section 14 of the Republic Act No.
1199, as amended, which reads:
Sec. 14. Change of system. The tenant shall have the right to change
the tenancy contract to leasehold tenancy and vice versa and from one
crop-sharing arrangement to another of the share tenancy. If the share
tenancy contract is in writing and is duly registered, the right may be
exercised at the expiration of the period of the contract. In the absence
of any written contract, the right may be exercised at the end of the
agricultural year. In both cases the change to the leasehold system shall
be effective one agricultural year after the tenant has served notice of his
intention to change upon the landholder.
respondent Marcos Papag tenant under the share system of a 3-
hectare riceland situated in barrio Tagapo, Sta. Rosa, Laguna sent a
letter to the landowner (herein petitioner Lucila de la Paz) on February
16, 1962, informing the latter of his desire to change their tenancy
relation to leasehold. Said notice was admittedly received by petitioner
on February 19, 1962.
The landowner demurred. Instead of agreeing to the tenant's proposal,
Lucila de la Paz filed on March 7, 1962 a petition with the Court of
Agrarian Relations, Fifth Regional District, Sta. Cruz, Laguna (CAR
Case No. 856),praying that court to order and cause confrontation of the
parties before said court of "arbitration". In his answer the tenant prayed
that the petition be dismissed on the ground that it had been filed mainly
to delay the change sought by him.
While CAR Case No. 856 was pending, petitioner filed on September
17, 1962 another case before the same court against the same tenant
(CAR Case No. 1002). This time petitioner sought to eject the tenant
from his landholding on the ground that the latter had deliberately failed
to deliver to the former her share of the rice crop in the harvest of
August 1962.
At the joint hearing of the two cases on March 12, 1963, the parties
entered into a partial stipulation of facts in which they recognized "that
the only disputes between the parties are (1) the constitutionality of
section 14 of Republic Act 1199 and (2) if said provision of law is held
constitutional, then the rental that shall be determined by the Court
based on the evidence to be submitted by the parties."
In a decision dated March 22, 1963 the Court of Agrarian Relations,
after upholding the constitutionality of section 14 of Republic Act 1199,
dismissed the two cases against the tenant and declared the relation
between him and the landowner to be that of leasehold effective April of
1962, the start of the agricultural season for the second (panahon)
crop.1 Respondent court likewise fixed separate rentals for each crop
period as follows: for the palagadcrop, at 13- cavans of palay; and for
the panahon crop, at 18 cavans of palay, said rentals to be paid to the
landowner within ten (10) days from the threshing of the crop or in
accordance with future adjustments that maybe made in consonance
with law.
Her motion to reconsider the decision having been denied, Lucila de la
Paz appealed to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari, with an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. On August 8, 1963 we
issued the writ prayed for, restraining respondents from issuing a writ of
execution in CAR Cases Nos. 856 and 1002.
The question as to the constitutionality of section 14 of Republic Act
No. 1199, pleaded anew by petitioner in this appeal, is a settled one. The
validity of said provision has been repeatedly upheld by this Court in
many previous cases 2 and we do not consider it necessary to elaborate
further on that matter. Very recently3 this Court reaffirmed its ruling.
Another question raised by petitioner refers to the lower court's
classification of the land worked by the tenant as second class land, on
the basis of its average production per hectare, computed according to
the normal average harvest for the three (3) preceding agricultural
years.4
Petitioner contends that this method of computation is erroneous since
the latter part of section 46(a) of Republic Act 11995 merely speaks of
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years, not agricultural years, so that if two crops are raised during a
given calendar year, both should be taken together in computing the
production for one year to serve as basis in determining the land's
productivity for purposes of classification under the law. The issue boils
down to what the law means when it speaks of "years". Does the term
refer to calendar or to agricultural years? If to the first, all the crops
produced during one calendar year have to be added together, and the
average for three such years is the measure of productivity. But if the
word "years" means agricultural years, every crop represents one year,
and the average of three such crops should be used as basis to determine
productivity.
In this connection it may be noted that in rice share tenancy the
classification of ricelands into first or second class is determined on the
basis of the normal average produce per hectare for the three agricultural
years next preceding the current harvest: ricelands yielding an average
of more than forty cavans are considered as first class, while those
which yield less are considered as second class(secs. 32-33, Republic
Act No. 1199). We see no reason, and none has been advanced in this
case, why the classification of ricelands under the leasehold system
should be on a different basis. The use of the word "years" instead of
"agricultural years" as in the case of share tenancy, does inject some
vagueness as to the legislative intention on the point, but the logic of the
situation convinces us that no change was actually intended.
This interpretation finds support in that portion of sec. 46(a) of Republic
Act No. 1199 which specially refers to rentals to be paid by the lease
tenant:
(a) The fixed consideration for the use of ricelands, shall not be more
than the equivalent of twenty five per centum in case of first class lands
and twenty per centum in case of second class lands of the average gross
produce, after deducting the same amount of palay used as seed and the
cost of harvesting and threshing of the past three normal harvests.
This time the consideration declared by law as rentals for the use of
ricelands is computed on the basis of thepast three normal harvests,
without any qualification. Obviously, whether there be one or two
harvests in one calendar year is immaterial: in either case the average
for three harvests, after the corresponding deductions, is the basis for
computing the rental.
The present classification of petitioner's riceland as second class, based
as it is on the yield for three previous agricultural years, does not
preclude a re-classification in the future, depending upon the
corresponding increase in yield for any subject period. The rentals fixed
by the trial court are subject to the qualification "that, if the landholder
introduced improvements on the farm which increase its productivity, he
may demand for an increase in the rental proportionate to the increase in
production resulting from such improvements (and that) in case of
disagreement the court shall determine the reasonable increase in
rental."6
In fixing the rentals to be paid by the tenant, the Court of Agrarian
Relations adopted the following method:
Since respondent produces two crops a year, namely, the palagad and
the panahon crops, the produce of the latter being in variably much
bigger than that of the former, we think it only fair and equitable to both
parties that separate rentals be fixed for each kind of crop, one for
the palagad, and another for thepanahon crop, especially as the law
requires the landholder and tenant to effect an accounting "at the end of
each agricultural year ... within ten days after the threshing in case of
rice ..." (sec. 17 Republic Act No. 1199). A single fixed rental for both
kinds of crop would be disadvantageous to the tenant at harvest time of
the palagad crop, where the produce of the land is normally lesser than
that of the panahon crop, and disadvantageous to the landholder at
harvest time of the panahon crop, where the produce is normally much
bigger.
We belief the trial Court acted correctly to avoid any inequity that
would result if a single rental had been fized for both kinds of crop. We
find no error in the actual computation of the rent for each crop as set
forth in the decision appealed from. The other points raised by petitioner
would have merit only on the assumption that such computation was
erroneous, and therefore cannot materially affect the conclusion herein
reached. We deem it unnecessary to consider them further.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations is
affirmed. The writ of preliminary injunction previously issued is
dissolved. No pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
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De Borja v CAR
Fidel Hernandez, Sixto Baltao, Vivencio Gaivez, Roman Baltao, Tirso
Galvez, Laureano Esquivel and Buenaventura Salvador (hereinafter
referred to as the respondents) share tenants of Cayetano de Borja
(hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) on separate parcels of riceland
in San Miguel, Bulacan, and Gapan, Nueva Ecija through a letter
dated March 29, 1964 sent by' registered mafl informed the petitioner of
their desire to change their relationship from share tenancy to leasehold
effective the regular Crop season of the agricultural year 1964-1965.
The petitioner Opposed the conversion, but the respondents, pursuant to
their demand for change of the tenancy system, contributed all the items
of production for the agricultural year 1964-1965 the regular crop
season of which started in July, 1964.
The respondent subsequently filed an action against the petitioner with
the Court of Agrarian Relations, asking the court (1) to order the
renuidation of harvests from the agricultural year 1959-1960 up to and
including the agricultural year 1963-1964, and the reimbursement of
hauling fees and of overpayment of irrigation charges; (2) to uphold the
change of tenancy system; and (3) to grant damages and attomey's fees.
The agrarian court rendered a partial decision dated February 22, 1965
declaring the relationship between the petitioner and the respondents as
under the leasehold system effective the agricultual year 1964-1965.
Hence, the petition for review docketed as L-24398 of the partial
decision of the agrarian court filed by the petitioner with this Court on
April 30, 1965.
In the interim, the respondents, on December 7, 1964, moved the
agrarian court to order the threshing and the temporary liquidation of
their harvests for the agricultural year 1964-1965. Finding the harvests
already reaped and threshed, the agrarian court only decreed, per its
order dated February 23, 1965, the temporary liquidation of the net
produce, that is, the harvests after deducting from the gross produce the
seeds used and the fees for the reaping and threshing.
Almost a year later, the respondents, through a motion dated February
12, 1966, sought an order from the agrarian court for the threshing and
the temporary liquidation of their harvests for the agricultual year 1965-
1966. On February 16, 1966, the agrarian court ordered the threshing
and the temporary liquidation of the respondents' harvests, directing the
deduction of the following from the gross produce: (1) the seeds used;
(2) the fees for reaping and threshing; and (3) the costs of irrigation. The
agrarian court denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration of the
aforestated order.
Thus, on April 18, 1967, the petitioner filed the present petition for
certiorari docketed as L-27478 with this Court, to annul the orders
of the agrarian court dated February 16, 1966 and March 16, 1967
insofar as the said orders directed the deduction of the costs of irrigation
from the gross harvests of the respondents.
In L-24398, the petitioner assails the interpretation accorded by the
agrarian court to a common provision found in the share tenancy
contracts entered into between him and the individual respondents, and
attacks the constitutionality of section 14 1 of Republic Act 1199
(otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines).
I. The questioned contractual provision reads: +.wph!1
5. Ang kasunduang ito'y magkakabisa sa taning na samantalang ang
Kasama sa Bukid ay Kasama sa lupang nasasabi sa itaas nito (-- ------)
taon ng pagsasaka mula ngayon.
Construing the aforequoted provision found in tie share tenancy
contracts, the agrarian court, considering that the parties entered into
and executed the share tenancy contracts during the effectivity of Act
4054, 2 observed:+.wph!1
The period stated in paragraph 5 of said contracts is that said contracts
shall have force and effect as long as the said plaintiffs shall remain the
tenants of the defendant on their respective landholdings. It is clear from
said paragraph that the exact date of the expiration of the period of said
contracts (month, day and year) is not stipulated. The period is
undefinite; hence, the same shall last only for one agricultural year (Sec.
6, Act 4054).
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Disagreeing with the agrarian court, the petitioner contends that the
provision in question does provide for a period for the efficacy of the
share tenancy contracts and maintains that the said contracts shall have
force and effect for as long as the respondents shall remain his tenants;
this means that the respondents shall remain as tenants until death,
dismissal by the court or voluntary surrender of the landholding.
The agrarian court, according to the petitioner, erred in concluding that
the share tenancy contracts do not provide a period, and in applying
section 6 3 of Act 4054 by declaring an absence of stipulation as to the
period between the parties and limiting the efficacy of the said contracts
to only one agricultural year.
Section 6 of Act 4054 appropriately titled "Duration of contract"
contemplates two situations: one wherein the parties (the landlord and
the tenant or the farm laborer) expressly stipulate the duration of the
contract, and the other wherein the parties omit to stipulate the same, In
the first situation, section 6 declares that the contract "shall last in
accordance with the stipulation of the parties;" in the second situation,
the same section states that the cOntract "shall be understood to last only
during one agricultural year." And the stipulation referred to in section 6
relates to a stipulation on the duration of the contract, that is, a definite
statement of the fixed term of the efficacy of the contract. Section 6
clearly and accurately worded, thus leaves no room for interpretation.
The petitioner insists that section 6 simply requires a "stipulation" of the
parties without need of specifying the definitive period for the duration
of the contract. Section 6, he urges, also covers and includes an
indefinite stipulation which he inadequately explains as that which
provides for "a period intended, though indefinite" for the efficacy of the
contract. This stance of the petitioner obviously gives no importance to
the very, title of the section involved herein "Duration of contract"
at the same time that it renders incongruous the provision of the section
on the renewal of the contract "after the expiration of the original
period" in relation to the other provisions. The related provisions of
section 6 definitely require, in the event that the parties-stipulate on the
duration of the contract, a fixed and determinate period for the efficacy
of the contract and not "a period intended, though indefinite," as the
petitioner claims.
The controversy thus relates to the common provision found in the share
tenancy contracts entered into between the petitioner and the
respondents. This provision, the agrarian court aptly observed, provides
no fixed period for the duration of the share tenancy contracts. Against
this observation, the petitioner argues, rather vaguely, that the common
provision fixes the duration of the share tenancy contracts and urges that
the said provision reveals that the parties intended that the said contracts
shall last as long as the respondents shall remain his tenants on their
respective landholdings. And, continuing, the petitioner states that the
respondents shall, as implied in the common provision, remain his
tenants until death, dismissal by the court, or voluntary surrender of the
landholding; since the share tenancy contracts shall expire upon the
happening of any of the aforementioned causes, the common provision
provides for a certain and definite period, because any of the causes
"must necessarily come although it might not be known when."
The petitioner's argument that the common provision in the share
tenancy contracts implies that the contracts shall expire only upon the
occurrence of any of the causes enumerated by him renders nugatory the
fight of the respondents to seek the change of the relationship from one
of share tenancy to leasehold explicitly secured to thein by section 14 of
Republic Act 1199. Notably, as to the causes specified by the petitioner,
death and voluntary surrender of the landholding, per section 9 of
Republic Act 1199, constitute causes for the severance of the tenancy
relationship, while dispossession judicially decreed also inevitably
results in the same final effect the extinguishment of the tenancy
relationship. Thus, the petitioner believes that the respondents shall
remain his share tenants for as long as the tenancy relationship between
them subsists. This contravenes the very spirit and purpose of section 14
which expressly gives the respondents the right of choice and
determination of the system that will control and govern their
relationship with the petitioner.
In addition, with the tenancy relationship no longer subsisting, how does
the petitioner expect the respondents to make use of their right to
demand a change from share tenancy to leasehold?
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The petitioner also points to two other considerations that he believes
conclusively indicate the intention of the parties to impress permanence
upon the tenancy relationship under the terms of the share tenancy
contracts. He argues that (1) paragraph 3 of the share tenancy contracts
gives the respondents the right to construct houses for dwelling purposes
on portions of the landholdings; and (2) paragraph 5 of the said
contracts provides a blank space intended to be filled in with the specific
period of the duration of the contracts, but the parties disregarded the
blank space and omitted to fill in the same.
As to the first contention. the petitioner overlooks the provisions of
section 22 of Act 4054, as amended by section 3 of Republic Act 34.
Section 22, in part reads: +.wph!1 contracts, which omission resulted in ambiguity as to the intention of the
SEC. 22. Lot for dwelling. The tenant shall be entitled to construct a
dwelling on the land cultivated by him, if he so chooses, and once a
dwelling is constructed, he shall be intitled to a fixed residential lot of
not less than six hundred square meters, but not exceeding one thousand
square meters in area, depending upon the availability of suitable land
and the are cultivated by the tenant belonging to the landowner, the
same to be devoted to the purposes of garden, poultry and such other
minor industries as may be necessary for his livelihood, the products of
which shall accure to the tenants exclusively: ...
The aforequoted section expressly recognizes the right of the
respondents to ask the petitioner, if they so desire, to provide them with
suitable areas in the landholdings cultivated by them for the purpose of
constructing their dwellings thereon. Paragraph 3 of the share tenancy
contracts merely reiterates this statutory right of the respondents. In
truth. the said paragraph, as worded "3. Na ang Kasama sa Bukid ay
may karapatang magtayo ng bahay na titiran sa lupang kanyang
sinasaka, at magagamit din sa kanyang sariling kapakinabangan, na
ang sukat ay ____________________ (_______) metrong parisukat.
(Hindi liliit sa 600 at di naman lalaki sa 1,000). constitutes but a
paraphrase in Pilipino of section 22.
Anent the petitioner's second contention, the failure or omission of the
parties to fill in the blank space in paragraph 5 of the share tenancy,
contracts said blank space is obviously intended for the period of the
duration of the contracts is susceptible of several interpretations. The
petitioner's interpretation that such failure or omission projects in
unmistakable light the desire of the parties to perpetuate their tenancy
relationship under the share tenancy system constitutes a strained
presumption of the probable intention of the parties albeit twisted, to
further strengthen his stand.
This second contention of the Petitioner the respondents counter with an
imputation that the petitioner himself caused the omission. To this
allegation the petitioner offers no refutation whatsoever. The petitioner
himself having caused the omission in paragraph 5 of the share tenancy
parties regarding the duration of the contracts involved, the ambiguity
should be taken against him. Hence, we reject the petitioner's second
contention.
II. The second question raised in L-24398 relates to the alleged
unconstitutionality of section 14 of Republic Act 1199. The petitioner
assails the option granted to the respondents to change the relationship
from share tenancy to leasehold as oppressive and unreasonable because
the said section, according to him, impairs the obligation of contracts
and deprives him of his property rights without due process of law.
The petitioner invokes the same objections already resolved repeatedly
by this Court. 4 This Court has time and time again sustained the
constitutionality of section 14, holding that the contested section is a
reasonable and valid exercise of the police power of the State to
alleviate the socio economic situation then prevailing in the Philippines.
Also, section 14 stems from the fundamental constitutional mandates
providing that "[T]he promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of
the State" 5 and that the State "shall regulate the relations between
landowner and tenant ... in agriculture." 6 We find neither cogent reason
nor sufficient justification to heed the petitioner's proposition to revise
or after the view we have so far adhered to on the constitutionality of
section 14.
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III. In L-27478, the petitioner questions the orders dated February 16,
1966 and March 16, 1967 issued by Judge Jose M. Santos (hereinafter
referred to as the respondent Judge) of Branch I, Fifth Regional District
of the Court of Agrarian Relations, insofar as the said orders decreed the
deduction of the irrigation fees from the gross produce of the individual
respondents. The petitioner avers that the respondent Judge issued the
controverted orders in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion.
The petitioner anchors his arguments on the status of the respondents as
his leasehold tenants. He states that the agrarian court, in its partial
decision dated February 22, 1965, declared the relationship between the
parties as leasehold effective the agricultural year 1964-1965. His
subsequent appeal of the partial decision of the agrarian court to this
Court did not stay the aforesaid partial decision, pursuant to section
10, 7 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The agrarian court itself, in two
orders dated March 1, 1965 and May 2, 1967, consistently considered
the status of the respondents as leasehold tenants. And under the
leasehold, the petitioner argues, the tenant shoulders the costs of
irrigation.
The petitioner also alleges that the respondents, in the proceedings
before the agrarian court, expressed their readiness to pay the
corresponding irrigation fees. And, in truth, the individual respondents,
in keeping with their desire to become leasehold tenants and with their
manifestation of willingness to shoulder the costs of irrigation, paid the
said irrigation fees from their respective net shares relative to the
harvests for the agricultural years 1964-1965 and 1965-1966.
The respondents, on the other hand, aver that the petitioner himself
agreed to the deduction of the costs of irrigation from the gioss produce
and that the agrarian court merely issued the questioned orders in
conformity with the agreement of the parties.
Resolution of this question requires resort to the provisions of section
10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Section 10 provides that the
institution of an appeal from the decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations to this Court does not stay the execution of the appealed
decision. For this reason, the appeal in the case at bar did not suspend
the declaration by the agrarian court of the relationshit.) between the
parties as "under the leasehold tenancy system effective the agricultural
year 1964-1965 (regular crop or panag- araw season)."
In fact, the petitioner, through a motion dated July 19, 1965 and filed
with this Court on July 31, 1965, asked this Court to stay the partial
decision of the agrarian court dated February 22, 1965 during the
pendency of the appeal. This court however, per resolution dated August
4, 1965, denied the motion for the petitioner.
The change in the relationship between the petitioner and respondents
from one of share tenancy to leasenold took effect on the agricultural
year 1964-1965. Thus the agrarian court, in its partial decision dated
February 22, 1965, took significant note that the respondents
"contributed all the items of production in the regular crop season of the
agricultural year 1964-1965 (panag-araw)."
The following subsequent events confirmed the change, translating into
reality the declaration of the agrarian court:
1. The respondent Judge, on February 23, 1965, ordered the threshing of
the respondents' harvest for the agricultural year 1964-1965, stating in
the order as deductible from the gross produce only the seed used in the
reaping and threshing fees;
2. The respondent Judge, at the March 5, 1965 hearing of case,
specifically ordered the payment of the irrigation fees from shares of the
respondents in the harvests, thereby modifying order of February 23,
1965;
3. The respondents, in their motion dated February 12, 1966 wherein
they sought an order for the threshing of their harvests the agricultural
year 1965-1966 and for the temporary liquidation the same, included as
deductible items from the gross produce the seeds used and the reaping
and threshing fees; and
4. The respondents, at the hearing of their motion dated February 12,
1966, agreed to continue paying the irrigation fees.
The foregoing uncontested developments and the payment by the
respondents from their net shares of the irrigation fees for the
agricultural years 1964-1965 and 1965-1966 readily point to the
indubitability of the said respondents' knowledge of their standing
obligation, under the system of leasehold, to shoulder the expenses for
the irrigation of their respective landholdings. This obligation arose as a
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logical concomitant of the change of the relationship from one of share
tenancy to leasehold. For, under the system leasehold, the tenant-lessee
possesses full managerial rights over the landholding the tenant-
lessee the right to work the land according to his best judgment provided
he observes tested farm practices in the manner and method of
cultivation and harvest. The tenant-lessee contributes, with the
exception of the land, and all the items of production and the expenses
of cultivation. And, definitely the cost of irrigation constitutes an item of
expense of cultivation.
Another factor strengthens the petitioner's stand. Under the system of
leasehold, the tenant-lessee has the correspondin obligation to pay the
landholder-lessor consideration for the use the land. And section 46 (a)
of Republic Act 1199, as amended by Republic Act 2263, 8 in fixing the
rental for the use of the landholding, states as deductible items from the
gross produce of the past three normal harvests only the amount of seeds
and the expenses for harvesting and threshing for the past three normal
harvests.
In the case at bar, the respondents assumed the payment of the irrigation
fees for the agricultural years 1964-1965 and 1965-1966. They
acquiesced to and did not impugn the order of the respondent Jdge dated
February 23, 1965 stating as deductible fron the gross produce only the
seeds used and the reaping and threshing fees. They now offer no
sufficient and valid reason repudiation of the obligation they complied
with for two agricultural years. The duty to respect and adhere to the
obligation that flows from their status as lessees rests upon the
respondents.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered (1) in L-24398,
affirming the partial decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations dated
February 22, 1965, which declared the relationship between the parties
as leasehold effective the agricultural year 1964-1965; and (2) in L-
27478, declaring null and void the orders of the respondent Judge dated
February16, 1966 and March 16, 1967 insofar as the said orders directed
the deduction of the expenses of irrigation from the gross produce. No
costs.
Endaya v CA
Spouses Natividad and San Diego owned an agricultural land
with 20,200 sq.m at San Pioquinto, Malvar, Batangas devoted
to rice and corn.
1934 Fideli has been cultivating that land as tenant of Spouses
San Diego under 50-50 sharing agreement.
1974 Spouses San Diego and Cassonova entered into a lease
contract for 4 years (May 1974-1978). Fideli signed as one of
the two witnesses of that contract.
The lease contract was renewed until May 1980 but the rental
was raised from 400 to 600php. Again, Fideli signed the
contract as witness.
During the entire duration of the lease contract, Fideli
continuously cultivated the land, sharing equally with
Cassanova the net produce of the harvests.
Spouses San Diego then sold the land to Spouses Endaya and
the sale was registered with Register of Deeds.
But Fideli continued to farm even though Endaya told him to
vacate.
Fideli then filed at RTC Batangas saying that he be declared the
agricultural tenant of petitioner. (DENIED)
CA reversed RTC decision saying that Fideli is an agricultural
lessee.
Endaya appealed alleging that:
landowner cannot have a civil law lease contract w/ one person
then have an agricultural leasehold agreement with another over
the same land
private respondent consented to the lease agreement b/w
Spouses San Diego and Cassanova by signing the lease
agreement and renewal as a witness of such contract, hence,
Fideli waived his right as an agricultural lessee.
ISSUE: W/N Fideli is an agricultural tenant of petitioner? YES
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HELD:
RA 3844, established the agricultural leasehold system and abolished
the share tenancy.
Sec 8 gave agricultural lessees security of tenure "The
agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer
upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the
landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his
landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized
by the Court for causes herein provided"
The fact that the landowner entered into a civil lease contract
over the same land is not among the causes for extinguished of
agricultural leasehold relation.
Sec 10: Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by
Expiration of Period, etc.The agricultural leasehold relation
under this code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of
the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding.
In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers
the legal possession of the landhold-ing, the purchaser or
transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
Hence, transactions involving the agricultural land over which
an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in change of
ownership will not terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee
who is given protection by the law by making such rights
enforceable against the transferee or the landowners successor
in interest.
The fact that private respondent knew of, and consented to, the
said lease contract by signing as witness to the agreement may
not be construed as a waiver of his rights as an agricultural
lessee. On the contrary, it was his right to know about the lease
contract since, as a result of the agreement, he had to deal with
a new person instead of with the owners directly as he used to.
The consent given by the original owners to constitute private
respondent as the agricultural lessee of the subject landholding
binds private respondents who, as successors-in-interest of the
Spouses San Diego, step into the latters shoes, acquiring not
only their rights but also their obligations
Fideli has unilaterally decided to pay only 25% of the net
harvests to petitioner but his agreement with the Spouses San
Diego, the original owners, was for a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing
of the net produce of the land. The court held that the same
sharing agreement should be maintained between Endaya and
Fideli. Hence, the Court ordered Fideli to pay the back rentals
from 190 -1992 + legal interest at legal rate.
(Doctrine: Once a leasehold relationship is established, the
Agricultural lessee is entitled to security of tenure)
DIFFERENCE WITH CIVIL LAW LEASE
Evangelista v. CA
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision ** of the Court of
Appeals, dated 21 August 1973, in CA G.R. No. 00033-R, entitled
"Antonio Evangelista, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Luz Castaeda, et al.,
defendants-appellants" which reversed the decision *** of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, dated 29 October 1970, in CAR Case No. 1182-
Bulacan '65, which found petitioner to be an agricultural lessee of the
landholding of the private respondents.
Rosario Mendoza Sanchez (Sanchez, for short), the private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, was the owner of a parcel of land
with an area of 5 hectares, more or less, situated at Lugam, Malolos,
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6870 of the Land
Records of Bulacan.
On 24 May 1965, the petitioner filed a complaint for reinstatement,
with damages, in the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in Bulacan
against Sanchez and Felipe Domingo, on the strength of his claim that
he was the occupant of the landholding of Sanchez.
In his complaint, petitioner alleged that since 1953, he was the
tenant of Sanchez over the aforesaid landholding, until he was illegally
ejected from the same on 15 April 1965, for having informed Sanchez of
his desire to fix the amount of the rental in accordance with Republic
Act No. 3844 as amended, otherwise known as the Land Reform
Code. 1
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The private respondents denied the alleged forcible eviction of the
petitioner from the landholding. They claimed that petitioner occupied
the land in question as a lessee under a contract of civil lease, and not as
an agricultural lessee under Republic Act No. 3844, as amended: and
that he (petitioner) voluntarily surrendered the land to them (private
respondents) sometime in March, 1965. 2
The defense of the private respondents was anchored on three (3)
written contracts executed by Sanchez and the petitioner, one entitled
"Kasulatang Option" 3 and the other two, "Kasulatan ng Buwisan." 4
The contract entitled "Kasulatang Option," executed on 14 June
1956, contained the following terms and conditions:
KASULATANG "OPTION"
MALAMAN NG LAHAT:
Na akong si ROSARIO M. SANCHEZ, Pilipino may sapat na gulang,
kasal kay G. Juan J. Sanchez at nananahanan sa Calumpit, Bulacan, ay.
Pinagtitibay:
Na ako ang tunay at tanging may-ari ng isang sukat na lupa gaya ng
nasasaad sa "Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6870" ng "Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Bulacan, "at lalong makikilala gaya ng mga
sumusunod:
"xxx xxx xxx"
Na sa lupang nabanggit ay lima (5) hektarea ay nasa buwisan sa
kasalukuyan kay Antonio Evangelista, Pilipino, may sapat na gulang,
binata at nananahanan sa Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan na matatapos sa
taong anihan 1956-1957;
Na dahil at alang-alang sa halagang P2,000.00 na ibibigay sa akin ng
nasabing Antonio Evangelista (at ang pagtanggap ng nasabing halaga ay
patutunayan ng recibo) dito ay binibigyan ko siya ng pangunang
pagkakataon (option) sa muling pagpapabuwis ng nasabing pangkat na
lupa. Ang panibagong kasunduan sa buwisan ay gagawin namin sa
buwan ng Enero, 1957;
Na ang halagang P2,000.00 ay bilang utang sa panibagong buwisan,
datapuwa't hanggang hindi umiiral ang panibagong buwisan, ang
nasabing halaga ay ituturing na pautang at magkakaroon ng patubo na
12%.
Na akong si Antonio Evangelista, ang naba-banggit sa itaas, ay
sangayon sa lahat ng mga mababasa sa itaas.
Sa katunayan ay lumagda kami sa ibaba nito dito sa Calumpit, Bulacan,
ngayong ika 14 ng Hunyo, 1956."
The period of the aforesaid agreement was from 14 June 1956 until
the agricultural year 1956-57. Pursuant to said agreement, the petitioner
was given by Sanchez the option to renew the lease of the land in
question in January, 1957 in consideration of the sum of P2,000.00. 5
On 13 February 1960, petitioner and Sanchez executed a
"Kasulatan ng Buwisan," 6which contained the following terms and
conditions:
KASULATAN NG BUWISAN
MALAMAN NANG LAHAT:
Na akong si ROSARIO MENDOZA, Pilipina, may sapat na gulang,
asawa ni Juan Sanchez, at nananahanan sa Calumpit, Bulacan, na sa
kasulatang ito ay tatawagin ding Nagpapabuwis, ay tunay at tanging
may-ari ng isang lagay na lupa nasa nayong Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan,
at nakatala alinsunod sa Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6870 ng
Register of Deeds for Bulacan, at ang mga hanggahan at takal ay gaya
nang mga sumusunod:
"xxx xxx xxx"
Na dahil at alang-alang sa halagang ISANG DAAN (100) kabang palay
kauri ng inani sa nasabing lupa bawat taon, bilang upa o buwis na
ibibigay sa akin ni Antonio Evangelista, Pilipino, may sapat na gulang,
binata at naninirahan sa nayon nang Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan, na sa
kasulatang ito ay tatawagin ding Namumuwisan, ay aking inililipat,
isinasalin at pinabubuwisan sa nasabing namumuwisan ang isang bahagi
nang lupang sa itaas ay binabanggit na may sukat na limang (5)
hektarea, humigit, kumulang, at ang hanggahan ay itong mga
sumusunod:
"xxx xxx xxx"
Ang mga kasunduan at pasubali ng buwisan ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
1. TANING NANG BUWISAN: Tatlong (3) taon na sisimulan sa
taong anihang ito, 1960-1961, at matatapos sa taong anihan 1962-1963,
buwan ng Pebrero, ngunit ang Namumuwisan ay may pangunang
karapatan (option) batay sa kanyang lagak, upang magpatuloy ng
pamumuwisan, kung ang lupa ay pabubuwisan pa;
2. PAGBABAYAD NG BUWIS: Ang 100 kabang palay na buwis ay
ibibigay nang Namumuwisan sa nagpapabuwis pagkatapos nang
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paggiik, ngunit ang pagbabayad ay hindi lalampas ang Pebrero nang
bawat taon nang pamumuwisan:
3. LAGAK: Ang lagak nang Namumuwisan ay P2,500.00 na
walang patubo, na ito'y nananagutan kung hindi makatupad ang
Namumuwisan sa kaniyang mga tungkulin sa ilalim nang kasunduang
ito, at ang hindi pagkakasaoli nang lagak na ito, ay hindi magiging
dahilan nang hindi pagkatapos nang buwisan;
4. MEJORA: Tungkulin nang Namumuwisan na sikapin at
alagaang mabuti ang lupang binubuwisan at isaoli sa Nagpapabuwis
pagkatapos nang buwisan, at iiwanang lahat ang mejorang ilagay niya at
dito'y wala siyang karapatang humingi o sumingil nang ano man;
5. PATUBIG AT BUWIS SA PAMAHALAAN: Ang patubig ay
babayaran nang Namumuwisan ang dalawa sa tatlong bahagi (2/3) at
ang ikatlo (1/3) ay ang Nagpapabuwis;
6. PAGSASAKA: Ang pamumuwisang ito ay hindi dapat na
ipakahulugan nang sino mang magsaka sa lupa sa panahon nang
pamumuwisan ay naging kasama nang Nagpapabuwis, kaya, pagkatapos
nang buwisan, ang posecion ay isasaoli nang Namumuwisan sa
Nagpapabuwis at siya o sino man ay walang ano mang paghahabol sa
pagsasaka;
7. PAGPAPATALA: Kung sakali't ipatatala sa Register of
Deeds ang kasulatang ito, ang gugol ay sa Namumuwisan at ang
kasulatan na ring ito ang magiging sapat na pabala sa Register of Deeds,
pagkatapos nang buwisang ito, upang pawalang bisa ang pagkakatala sa
titulo nang lupa (cancel on incumbrance on the title) [sic].
Na akong si Antonio Evangelista, ang Namumuwisan sa itaas na
nababanggit, ay sangayon sa lahat nang mababasa sa itaas at katunayan
linagdaan namin ito sa Calumpit, Bulacan, ngayong 13th ng Pebrero,
1960, sa harap nang dalawang saksi sa kasulatan."
On 11 September 1963, petitioner and Sanchez executed a new
"Kasulatan ng Buwisan" 7 which provided for the same terms and
conditions stated in their previous "Kasulatan ng Buwisan, dated 13
February 1960, except as to the period of the contract and the amounts
of rental and deposit. The contract was for a period of one agricultural
year, 1963-64, and expired on February, 1964, The rental for the use of
the landholding was reduced to 90 cavans of palay a year. And
petitioner deposited with Sanchez the sum of P2,250.00 without interest,
which was to be returned to the petitioner after the period of the contract
shall have expired.
On 30 March 1965, following the expiration of the period provided
in the last "Kasulatan ng Buwisan" executed by petitioner and Sanchez,
the latter executed another "Kasulatan ng Buwisan" 8 over the land in
question, effective for the agricultural year 1965-66, with Felipe
Domingo.
Hence, the filing of petitioner of the action in the Court of Agrarian
Relations which, after hearing, rendered judgment, the dispositive part
of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the plaintiff to be the agricultural lessee on the land in
question with an area of 5 hectares more or less, situated at Lugam,
Malolos, Bulacan;
2. Ordering the defendant Felipe Domingo to vacate said landholding
and surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiff;
3. Ordering defendants Luz S. Castaeda and Benedicto Sanchez to
reinstate the plaintiff to said landholding and to return to the plaintiff the
sum of P3,500.00;
4. Dismissing the other claims and counterclaims of the parties.
No pronouncement as to costs." 9
The private respondents appealed the CAR judgment to the Court
of Appeals which, as earlier stated, reversed the decision of the trial
court, on the following grounds:
"1. That when the appellee, Antonio Evangelista first took possession
of the property in 1954, it was by virtue of a lease contract which he
admitted was given to him by the late Rosario Mendoza, but that he lost
the same (pp. 15-17. tsn, Dec. 15, 1956), which was for a term of 3
years and this is confirmed by Exh. C or 3, titled "KASULATANG
OPTION" under a proviso which states
"Na sa lupang nabanggit ay lima (5) hectarea ay nasa buwisan sa
kasalukuyan kay Antonio Evangelista, Pilipino, may sapat na gulang,
binata, at nananahan sa Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan, na matatapos sa
taong anihan 1956-1957;
"2. That the two most important conditions of the lease agreement
which was renewed by both the appellee Antonio Evangelista as the
lessee, and the late Rosario Mendoza, as shown by Exhibit A or 1, titled
"KASULATANG BUWISAN," are as follows:
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"3. LAGAK: Ang lagak ng Namumuwisan ay P2,500.00 na
walang patubo, na ito'y nanagutan kung hindi makatupad ang
Namumuwisan sa kanyang mga tungkulin ng kasunduang ito, ay hindi
magiging dahilan ng hindi pagkatapos nang buwisan;
xxx xxx xxx
"6. PAGSASAKA: Ang Namumuwisang ito ay hindi dapat na
ipakahulugan nang sino mang magsaka sa lupa sa panahon nang
pamumuwisan ay naging kasama nang Nagpapabuwis, kaya pagkatapos
nang buwisan ang posecion ay isasaoli nang Namumuwisan sa
Nagpapabuwis at siya o sino man ay walang ano mang paghahabol sa
pagsasaka;
xxx xxx xxx
"3. That herein appellee Antonio Evangelista voluntarily agreed to
these two conditions imposed by the late Rosario Mendoza, as shown by
the following portion of the said written agreement
"Na akong si Antonio Evengelista, ang Namumuwisan sa itaas na
nabanggit, ay sangayon sa lahat nang mababasa sa itaas at katunayan
linagdaan namin ito sa Calumpit, Bulacan, ngayong ika-13 ng Pebrero,
1960, sa harap ng dalawang saksi sa kasulatan."
"4. That this lease agreement was again renewed as shown by
Exhibits B or 2, incorporating the same above-stated conditions, and
that all these questioned lease agreements were all duly acknowledged
before a Notary Public; and were worded in Tagalog the dialect
prevailing in Bulacan province, and is therefore clearly understood by
the appellee Antonio Evangelista;
"5. That even prior to 1954 when appellee first took possession of the
landholding in question, the same has been previously leased to one
Macario Domingo, wayback in 1945, as disclosed by Exh. 6-B, which is
an annotation at the back of the title of the questioned property, and
such lease agreement was finally cancelled only in 1954, Exh. 6-C, all
of which are found in Exhibit 6-A, at the lapse of which the appellee
herein took over from said Macario Domingo, and all these are
confirmed by the latter who declared that he was the lessee of the same
land from 1946-1954; that it expired in March, 1954; and the appellee
took over from him in April, 1954; that he also pays a rental of 90
cavans like the appellee, irrespective of the harvest of the land; that the
other lessee before him were Jose Albania, Urbano Lopez and Pablo
Caluag (tsn. pp. 17-26, Dec. 9, 1969);
"6. That the appellee's original status. therefore in 1954 was that of
a lessee, is also confirmed by his own Exhibit D, captioned "Patalastas",
the pertinent parts of which read
CONDISION SA PARTIHAN NG ANI:
Buwisan ng 90 cavans isang taon.
xxx xxx xxx
"(1) Pagbabago ng pagsasamahan na ang dati na Buisan ay mahalinhan
ng samahang Buisan na batay sa batas . . ."
xxx xxx xxx
all of which reveal that the herein appellee started working for the first
time in 1954 as a lessee, and not as tenant, furthermore his very own
witness, Nicolas Maclang, admitted that herein appellee used to
hire many plowers, harrowersand planters and also farm laborers, who
are paid by him (tsn, pp. 60-62, Sept. 26, 1969); that he himself helped
the appellee worked on the land for 3 years (tsn., p. 53, id)
"7. That the herein appellee Antonio Evangelista is a Rice Dealer,
with a total net worth of about P17,112.10, as shown clearly by a "Profit
and Loss Statement," (Exh. 4) duly attested by a Certified Public
Accountant, executed in appellee's favor by a law and accounting firm
of Santos A. Avenir & Associates, on January 22, 1963;
"8. That he is the owner of two (2) duly licensed guns namely
One (1) .22 Cal. Rifle; and one (1) .22 Cal. Revolver, as shown by Exhs.
4-Land 4-D (sic);
"9. That there is no express provisions of any existing law,
particularly under Republic Act 1199, as amended, or under Republic
Act 3844, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Reform Code,
which prohibits the parties from entering into a contract of civil lease of
an agricultural land, under the New Civil Code, for a limited period of
time, as in fact this latter law, Republic Act 3844, as amended,
impliedly recognizes the existence of a civil law lessee, as this is
distinguished from an agricultural lessee, as may be found under Sec.
166, (2) which reads
"(2) "Agricultural lessee" means a person who, by himself and with the
aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the
land, belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for
purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or
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both. It is distinguished from civil law lessee as understood in the Civil
Code of the Philippines."
implying in effect that if the lessee does not personally cultivate the
landholding, the agreement becomes a civil law lease under the Civil
Code.
"10. That as may be observed from the terms and conditions of the
questioned lease agreements, particularly under the common conditions
found in par. (6) thereof, the appellee-lessee, is in fact authorized to hire
plowers, harrowers and other farm laborers or workers, but that this does
not authorize them to later on claim that they are the tenants of the
lessor therein, the late Rosario Mendoza Sanchez, over the said
landholding."
"Consonant to the foregoing, it is the considered opinion of this Court
that the herein appellee Antonio Evangelista, had not worked personally
or could (not) have worked on the land holding in question by himself,
and with the aid of the members of his immediate farm household,
consequently he could not therefore be considered either as a share
tenant, or a lease-hold tenant, contemplated by Republic Act 1199, as
amended, or as an agricultural lessee, as defined by Republic Act 3844,
as amended, also known as the Land Reform Code, who is entitled to a
security of tenure, as provided therein, under and pursuant to the
questioned lease agreements, for these covenants clearly fall under the
provisions of the New Civil Code whereby one of the parties, binds
himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of his property for a
price certain, and for a definite period specified therein. (Art. 1643, New
Civil Code)." 10
Hence, the petitioner's present recourse to this Court.
The only issue in this case is whether or not petitioner is an
agricultural lessee under Rep. Act No. 3844, and therefore entitled to
security of tenure over the landholding, in question, or a mere civil law
lessee, who does not enjoy security of tenure in the sense that he may he
ejected from the landholding upon the expiration of the term provided in
the contract of lease.
A share tenant (under Rep. Act No. 1199) or an agricultural lessee
(under Rep. Act No. 3844) is entitled to security of tenure over the
landholding he works at. Not even the expiration of any term or period
fixed in the leasehold contract, in the case of an agricultural lessee, will
cause the lessee's ejectment from the land. On the other hand, a civil
lessee, under a contract of civil lease, 11 does not enjoy security of
tenure over the land object of the contract. A civil lessee can be ejected
from the land after the expiration of the term provided for in the
contract.
The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals that the petitioner was
not a bona fidetenant-farmer on the land in question, which are based on
the evidence on record, is final and conclusive. 12 The salient
characteristic which would make the relationship between the petitioner
and Sanchez one of agricultural leasehold, and which is personal
cultivation by the petitioner and the immediate members of his farm
household, is absent in the case at bar. As cited in the decision of the
respondent court, petitioner's own witness, Nicolas Maclang, admitted
that petitioner used to hire many plowers, harrowers and planters as well
as farm laborers, who were paid by him, and that he himself (Maclang)
helped the appellee work on the land for 3 years. Even the decision of
the trial court showed that petitioner did not personally cultivate the land
in question. It held that:
"Nicolas Maclang declared that he saw plaintiff (Evangelista) work on
the land in question from 1962 to 1965; . . .; that he (Maclang) helped
the plaintiff work the land in question by plowing and harrowing the
same for 3 years under the suyuan system; that the Plaintiff used his 2
carabaos and own farm implements in the cultivation of the land in
question and that the plaintiff had other companions in plowing and
harrowing the landholding under the suyuan system (tsn, hearing of
September 26, 1969, pp. 47-60). Defendant Domingo declared that
during the time he was working the land of his mother which is adjacent
to the land in question, he saw Nicolas Maclang, Pedro Caparas and
Felipe Bernardino plowing and harrowing the landholding in question
and cleaning the dikes thereon (tsn., hearing of January 8, 1970 pp. 22-
23)." 13 [emphasis supplied]
As held in Carag v. Court of Appeals, 14 absent the requisite of
personal cultivation, by the alleged tenant, no tenancy relationship can
be said to exist between him and the landowner. Hence, the petitioner
cannot be said to be an agricultural lessee. He has not personally or by
his farm household, cultivated the land in question.
The fact that the contracts of lease signed by the parties did not
stipulate that the land holding should be personally cultivated by the
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petitioner and the immediate members of his farm household, indicates
the intent of the parties to establish only a civil lease relationship.
A person who signed for three consecutive times a contract of lease
(Kasulatang Option and Kasulatan ng Buwisan), with the intent of
establishing a civil lease contract, cannot later be heard to claim that he
is a tenant or an agricultural lessee.
This Court is aware of the practice of many landowners, as a way
of evading the provisions of tenancy laws, to have their tenants sign
contracts or agreements intended to camouflage the real import of their
relationship. But in the case at bar, the grounds cited in the decision of
the respondent court indicate that the contracts entered into were bona
fidecivil lease in nature, and that they were entered into by the petitioner
voluntarily.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED; the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
ELEMENTS OF TENANCY RELATIONS
Matienzo v. Servidad
In a private document agreed upon between appellant and appellee,
appellant was made head-overseer over a 7-hectare land belonging to
appellee. Under the agreement, appellant was to supervise applications
for loans from those residing therein; he was allowed to build his house
thereon and plant specified plants without being compensated; he was
free to clear and plant the land as long as he wished; he had no sharing
arrangement with appellee; and he was not obligated to pay any price
certain to, nor share the produce with, the latter. Subsequently, the
parties entered into another agreement regarding upland planting and
copra-making for the year 1963, pursuant to which, appellant and his
wife were made "caretakers" of the land. Under this second agreement,
appellant would receive 1/3 of the copra as payment for processing, but
as in the first agreement, there was a definite provision that appellee
would not share in the produce of appellant's plants. In 1964, appellee
prohibited appellant from interfering with the plants and from planting
and clearing the land stating that they had no agreement yet for that
year. Efforts to settle the difference between the parties failed. Thus,
appellant filed a suit for illegal ejectment against appellee, where he
stated that in view of his strained relationship with appellee, he was
waiving his right to reinstatement provided he be paid reasonable
compensation for the improvements he had introduced on the land, plus
actual and moral damages. The trial Court dismissed the case based on
the Report of the Court-appointed Commissioner. Hence, this Petition.
The Supreme Court held, that it is clear from the agreements
entered into between the parties that their intention was to make
appellant an overseer of appellee and not a tenant, there being no
sharing arrangement between them.
Petition dismissed.
Under review is the judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations,
Branch I, Naga City, in CAR Case No. 920-CS-64, entitled "Jose
Matienzo vs. Martin Servidad," dismissing plaintiff's action for
Reinstatement, Reliquidation and Damages. This case was certified to us
by the Court of Appeals on September 20, 1967, the principal issue
being one of law, particularly, the interpretation of the contracts
between the parties.
The controversy stemmed from the following uncontroverted facts:
Defendant Martin Servidad is the owner of a sixteen hectare
agricultural land situated at Barrio Binahian, Sipocot, Camarines Sur.
On April 16, 1961, he and plaintiff Jose Matienzo executed a private
instrument 1 handwritten in the dialect of the locality by Feliza
Servidad, wife of defendant Martin Servidad 2 , and translated into
English as follows:
"I Jose Matienzo, Elenita Robles, we husband and wife were
instituted head-overseer in the land of Martin and Feliza de Servidad
who will take care of their plants. Whoever resides in our land will have
to obey the head-overseer as we have then authorized to supervise the
landholding. Like borrowing loans needed if there is no letter from the
Head-overseer to us we will not accommodate. So that whatever need
you have you must inform the Head-overseer as the latter is the one to
inform us.
The conditions for clearing the land are these: With respect to all your
plants we will share no percentage for the land. But you will have to
plant coconut in our land. We will not pay as this is our conditions. You
are free to clear and plant the land as long as you wish. We must help
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one another for our betterment. Let us not do anything prejudicial to care. For clearing the coconut plantation, he was paid per coconut tree
others. Let's do the best as it is better. he cleared. For his labor in making copra, he was paid 1/3 of the copra
To show our conformity to the terms given by Martin and Feliza de he made. Other persons who made copra therein were also
Servidad, we signed in the presence of two witnesses this date." correspondingly paid.
(Emphasis supplied) On January 30, 1964, defendant wrote plaintiff telling him not to
Witnesses: "interfere with the plants" as they had no agreement yet for that year,
1. Jose Matienzo and that being the landowner, he should be the one to decide in
2. Paulino Ponayo accordance with the "tenancy law." 5 On March 4, 1964, defendant sent
3. S. Ralles. another letter to plaintiff prohibiting him from planting and clearing the
The area entrusted to plaintiff was seven hectares, on a portion of land for the same reason. 6 Plaintiff sought the assistance of the Office of
which he constructed his house. the Agrarian Counsel in Naga City. Efforts to settle the case amicably
On January 1, 1963, the parties entered into another agreement failed, as a consequence of which, plaintiff brought an action against
concerning the conditions of copra making and upland planting for the defendant in the Court of Agrarian Relations of Naga City praying that
year 1963. 3 This was again handwritten in the local dialect by Feliza defendant be held guilty of illegal ejectment; that in view of the strained
Servidad. 4 The English translation of the agreement reads: relationship with defendant, he was waiving his right to reinstatement
"Condition in Copra Making and Upland provided he be paid reasonable compensation for his improvements; and
Planting This Year 1963. that defendant be ordered to pay him actual and moral damages.
Binahian, Sipocot, Camarines Sur. The case was heard by Judge Valeriano A. del Valle, then by Judge
"I, JOSE MATIENZO and ELENITA ROBLES, husband and wife, are Agustin Frivaldo, and terminated by Commissioner Benjamin G.
hereby made caretakersof the land of Martin Servidad and Feliza de Fernandez, who was appointed by the Court to hear the case on January
Servidad, and, when we arrived on their land all plants are productive. 20, 1966, with the consent of the parties. 7 Based on the Commissioner's
The condition given to us in copra making is one third, but before we Report, which was adopted in toto by the Court, a judgment was
begin copra making, we are to clean the plantation and everytime we rendered on May 17, 1966 dismissing the suit for lack of merit. Plaintiff
make copra we separate nuts for seedling. We are given one male moved for reconsideration, but this was denied. In its judgment, the
carabao (castrated). The condition for upland planting is this: all those Court a quo specifically made a finding that plaintiff had expressly
that we are to plant no share will be taken for the land, but we are also waived his right to reinstatement "on account of his strained relationship
to plant coconut, coffee, abaca, and the owner shall not pay the same. with defendant."
Before I signed this I have read the same. In truth we agree to the Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which Court, however,
condition given to me, and I signed this 1st day of January, 1963 before as hereinabove stated, certified the case to us on the theory that "where
two witnesses. In the year 1964 new agreement will be made. (Emphasis the issue is the construction or interpretation of contracts, or where all
ours) the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the conclusion drawn
SGD. Jose Matienzo Elenita Robles therefrom, the question is one of law reviewable by the Supreme
Sgd. Pedro Moreno Barrio Lieut. Court." 8
Sgd. Jose Bacho Plaintiff has assigned the following errors:
Jose Matienzo Elenita Robles" I
Plaintiff planted bananas, bancocan, coffee, coconuts, breadfruits, "The lower Court erred in holding that appellant is merely an overseer
abaca and some auxiliary crops. He also looked after the coffee and of appellee over the landholding in question.
abaca plants of defendant, as well as the latter's goats entrusted to his II

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The Court a quo committed a grave error in considering exhibits '2', 'C',
& 'C-1', as contracts that established merely an overseer relationship
between the appellant and appellee; in this regard the Court a
quo deviated from the established procedures in determining the nature
of a contract.
III
The Court a quo committed a grave error in authorizing the ejectment of
appellant.
IV
The Court failed to observe the requirements of Sections 10 & 11, Rule
33 of the New Rules of Court."
The sole issue for determination is whether under the parties'
agreements, plaintiff was instituted as an overseer or as a tenant by
defendant.
To start with, a few basic principles on the interpretation of
contracts should be reiterated. When there is no doubt as to the intention
of the contracting parties, its literal meaning shall control. 9 Article 1372
of the New Civil Code further provides that however general the terms
of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things
that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the
parties intended to agree. 10 Therefore, a meaning other than that
expressed or an interpretation which would alter its strict and literal
significance should not be given to it. 11 Moreover, the entirety of the
contract must be taken into consideration to ascertain the meaning of its
provisions. 12
It is clear from Exhibit C that plaintiff was made an overseer of
defendant, not a tenant. It was likewise expressly stipulated therein that
"the conditions for clearing the land are these: With respect to all your
plants we will share no percentage for the land." And again, "all those
(coconuts) that we are to plant no share will be taken for the
land." 13 The basic element of sharing in agricultural tenancy, therefore,
is absent. The one-third share plaintiff received from copra-making
constituted payments for the processing of copra. These are evidenced
by receipts. 14 Plaintiff also got paid for clearing the coconuts as shown
by Exhibits 7 and 7-A. 15
A tenant is defined under section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as
a person who, himself, and with the aid available from within his
immediate household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the
produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying
to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money
or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. From the above definition
of a tenant, it is clear that absent a sharing arrangement, no tenancy
relationship had ever existed between the parties. What transpired was
that plaintiff was made overseer over a 7-hectare land area; he was to
supervise applications for loans from those residing therein; he was
allowed to build his house thereon and to plant specified plants without
being compensated; he was free to clear and plant the land as long as he
wished; he had no sharing arrangement between him and defendant; and
he was not obligated to pay any price certain to, nor share the produce
with, the latter.
Although Exhibit 6 states that plaintiff and his wife were made
"caretakers" of the land, there is a definite provision in both Exhibits C
and 6 that defendant would not share in the produce of plaintiff's plants.
Because of this aspect, the ruling in Latag vs. Banog, 16 SCRA 88
(1966), which holds that a "caretaker of an agricultural land is also
considered cultivator of the land," finds no applicability.
Besides, even if we were to rule that plaintiff is a tenant, the whole
exercise would become academic since he has waived his right to
reinstatement.
With respect to the fourth assignment of error, plaintiff asserts, for
the first time, that the trial Court committed grave error in failing to
notify the parties of the filing of the Commissioner's Report, and in not
giving them ten days to object thereto pursuant to Section 10, Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court. He also claims that the Court failed to set the Report
for hearing in accordance with Section 11 of the same Rule. Be that as it
may, well established is the rule that issues not raised in the trial Court
can not be raised for the first time on appeal.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby dismissed.
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Caballes vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
Facts:
Spouses Caballes acquired subject land from the Millenes family. Prior
to the sale, Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the property,
paying a monthly rental to the owner. Abajon was also allowed to plant
on a portion of the land and that the produce thereof would be shared by
them on a 50-50 basis. When the new owners took over, they told
Abajon to transfer his dwelling to the southern portion of the property
because they would be building a poultry near Abajon's house. Later,
the Caballes asked Abajon to leave because they needed the property.
Abajon refused. During the trial the former landowner testified that
Abajon dutifully gave her 50% share of the produce of the land under
his cultivation.
Held:
The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship. The circumstances of this case indicate that the private
respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner
out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a
garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the
said portion. Agricultural production as the primary purpose being
absent in the arrangement, it is clear that the private respondent was
never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently,
Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the
private respondent is not a tenant of the herein petitioner.
Personal cultivation
Cultivation
Under DAR AO 5 (1993), cultivation is not limited to the plowing
and harrowing of the land, but also the husbanding of the ground to
forward the products of the earth by general industry, the taking care of
the land and fruits growing thereon, fencing of certain areas, and the
clearing thereof by gathering dried leaves and cutting of grasses. In
coconut lands, cultivation includes the clearing of the landholding, the
gathering of the coconuts, their piling, husking and handling as well as
the processing thereof into copra, although at times with the aid of hired
laborers.
Meaning of "Personal Cultivation"
"Personal cultivation" exists when a person cultivates the land by
himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm household.
In Oarde vs. CA, et al., supra, the Court held that the element of
personal cultivation is essential for an agricultural leasehold. There
should be personal cultivation by the tenant or by his immediate farm
household or members of the family of the lessee or other persons who
are dependent upon him for support or who usually help him in his
activities (Evangelista vs. CA, 158 SCRA 41). The law is explicit in
requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land
(Bonifacio vs. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294), and the lessee cannot hire many
persons to help him cultivate the land (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA
559). In Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, supra, the Court held that the tenancy
relation was severed when the tenant and/or his immediate farm
household ceased from personally working the fishpond when he
became ill and incapacitated.
Compensation in money and/or produce
In Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 (1981), the Supreme Court
held that:
A tenant is defined under section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a
person who, himself, and with the aid available from within his
immediate household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the
produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying
to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money
or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. From the above definition
of a tenant, it is clear that absent a sharing arrangement, no tenancy
relationship had ever existed between the parties. What transpired was
that plaintiff was made overseer over a 7-hectare land area; he was to
supervise applications for loans from those residing therein; he was
allowed to build his house thereon and to plant specified plants without
being compensated; he was free to clear and plant the land as long as he
wished; he had no sharing arrangement between him and defendant; and
he was not obligated to pay any price certain to nor share the produce,
with the latter. CaSHAc
Security of Tenure
Under Sec. 7 of RA 1199, "the agricultural leasehold relation once
established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue
working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished.
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The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his
landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the
Court for causes herein provided."
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that once a leasehold
relation has been established, the agricultural lessee is entitled to
security of tenure. The tenant has a right to continue working on the
land except when he is ejected therefrom for cause as provided by law
(De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559 [1989]).
Transfer of ownership or legal possession does not affect security of
tenure.
In Tanpingco vs. IAC, 207 SCRA 653 (1992), the Court upheld the
validity of donation but the donee must respect the rights of the tenant
and ordered the donee to pay the tenant disturbance compensation.
Bernas vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Natividad Deita is the owner of a 5,831-sq m property which she
entrusted to her brother, Benigno, so that he could use the fruits thereof
to defray the cost of his children's education in Manila. The property
was leased by Bernas pursuant to a production sharing arrangement
executed between Bernas and Benigno. Natividad played no part in this
arrangement. In 1985, the lots were returned by Benigno to his sister but
when the owners sought to take possession, Bernas refused to relinquish
the property. Bernas was claiming that he was an agricultural lessee
entitled to security of tenure. Natividad filed an action for recovery of
possession. The trial court ruled in favor of Bernas but this was
subsequently reversed by the CA.
Issue:
Is consent by a legal possessor, even if without the consent of
landowner, sufficient to create tenancy relationship?
Held:
Yes. As legal possessor of the property, Benigno had the authority and
capacity to enter into an agricultural leasehold relation with Bernas.
"The law expressly grants him, as legal possessor, authority and
capacity to institute an agricultural leasehold lessee on the property he
legally possessed." (at 125-126)
Subject is agricultural land
For agricultural tenancy to exist, the subject of the agreement must
be an agricultural land.
RA 6657 defines the term "agricultural land" as "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." (see discussion on
scope of CARP, Chapter I). Under RA 3844, "agricultural land" refers to
land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, salt
beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned land.
The area of agricultural land that a lessee may cultivate has no limit,
but he should cultivate the entire area leased. The three (3) hectare limit
under RA 6657 applies only to the award that may be given to the
agrarian reform beneficiary.
Consent by landholder
As discussed earlier, consent must be given by the true and lawful
landholder of the property. In Hilario vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 573 (1987),
the Supreme Court held that tenancy relation does not exist where a
usurper cultivates the land.
Valencia v. CA
Facts:
Victor Valencia is a government retiree who owns two parcels
of land situated at Barangay Linothangan, Canlaon City,
Negros Oriental. One with an area of 23.7279 hectares and
covered by TCT No. H-T-137 and another covering 6.4397
hectares under Homestead Application No. HA-231601.
Valencia entered into a ten-year civil law lease agreement with
a certain Glicerio Henson. And later, into a five-year civil law
lease agreement with Fr. Andres Flores. The agreement was
subject to a prohibition against subleasing or encumbering and
against installing a leasehold tenant without Valencia's consent.
Henson instituted Cresenciano Frias and Marciano Frias while
Fr. Andres Flores designated fourteen others together with the
Friases to cultivate the land. Of the farmworkers, twelve
became recipients of CLTs. Upon the expiration of the lease
agreements, Valencia demanded that the respondents vacate the
premises but to no avail. Valencia wanted to gain possession of
his landholdings and had in fact designated Bernie Bautista to
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be his overseer. Valencia filed a letter of protest but it was too
late, the property was placed under the Operation Land Transfer
Program of the government and the CLTs were issued to the
respondents. Valencia again protested but to no avail.
However, in February 1988, petitioner Valencia and Catalino
Mantac entered into a profit sharing agreement. No other
respondent entered into any kind of agreement with the
petitioner, Henson or Fr. Flores. Twelve years after the filing of
the protest, an administrative investigation was finally
conducted. The report revealed that from 1975 to 1983, it was
only Bautista who received the shares in the produce.
Respondents only stopped paying when Bautista refused to
issue a receipt for such. Valencia did not receive a single cavan
for the said years. to aggravate matters, some of the respondents
have even subleased their properties despite the pending protest
of Valencia. While all this was transpiring, Valencia and
Catalino Mantac entered into a leasehold contract over a 0.0425
hectare of the 23.7279 hectares covered by TCT-H-T-137.
Valencia's protest was dismissed. The respondents were
maintained in the landholding, prompting Valencia to appeal to
the Office of the President. However, the Order was affirmed
with the modification that the Homestead be excluded from the
coverage of P.D. No. 27.
Valencia appealed to the CA but it was dismissed for having
been filed out of time. His Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied. Hence, Valencia filed a Petition for Review or
Certiorari under Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Can petitioner's civil law lessee, Fr. Flores, install tenants on
the subject premises without express authority to do so under
Article 1649 of the Civil Code, more so when the lessee is
expressly prohibited from doing so, as in the instant case?
Held:
A contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from
employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease
agreement. An extensive and correct discussion of the statutory
interpretation of Section 6 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, is
provided by the minority view in Bernas vs. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 85041, 05 August 1993, 225 SCRA 119).
When Section 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold
relations shall be limited to the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or
legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the
same, it assumes that there is already an existing agricultural
leasehold relation, i.e., tenant or agricultural lessee already
works the land. The epigraph of Sec. 6 merely states who
are "Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations", which
assumes that there is already a leasehold tenant on the land; not
until then.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that
a civil law lessee cannot automatically institute tenants on the
property under Section 6 of R.A. No. 3844. The correct view
that must necessarily be adopted is that the civil law lessee,
although a legal possessor, may not install tenants on the
property unless expressly authorized by the lessor. And if a
prohibition exists or is stipulated in the contract of lease, the
occupants of the property are merely civil law sublessees whose
rights terminate upon the expiration of the civil law lease
agreement.
Reyes v. Joson
Facts of the Case:
In 1962, Hilarion Caragay hired Loreto Reyes as caretaker/ watcher of a
fishpond and lot 1482 in Doa Francisca, Balanga, Bataan which he
leased from Apolonio Aguire. The contract of lease between Caragay
and Aguire expired in 1973. Later on, Tomas Aguire, son of Apolonio
leased to Honorio Joson the same fishpond until it expires in 1982.
Tomas Aguire appointed Joson as administrator while Loreto Reyes
continued to work as fishpond/watcher. Joson as administrator leased
the fishpond to Felizardo Maliboran for five years. Reyes as bantay
palaisdaan signed the contract as witness. Soon enough, same contract
of lease, expired. Joson reverted to the possession of the fishpond.
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In November 1989, Caragay, the former lessee, re-entered the fishpond
and proceed to harvest bangus and prawn with the assistance of Reyes.
Joson requested Caragay to vacate the premise, but Caragay refused to
that prompted Joson to file forcible entry in MTC Balanga Bataan. They
entered in a compromise agreement approved by the MTC that Caragay
and workers will vacate the property but Caragay failed to comply.
MTC issued writ of execution. With this, Reyes filed TRO in RTC
Brach 3, Balanga, Bataan enjoining MTC from implementing the writ.
RTC dismissed the petition for injunction for lack of jurisdiction and
conferring upon the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate Agrarian Reform matters. MTC issued writ of execution,
ejectment of petitioner.
On October 1, 1990, Reyes filed in PARAB-San Fernando, Pampanga
complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession. Reyes alleged that he
is agricultural tenant on the fishpond, entitled to security of tenure and
cannot be summarily ejected from property. Additionally, he invoked
that Caragay hired him as fishpond cultivator and he is an industial
partner, hence his share consist of 50% of the harvest. He also raised
that when Caragays contract of lease expired, Thomas Aguire hired him
as caretaker-industrial partner and that his status for 14 years ripened
into bona fide tenant by operation of law. But Joson, denied the
allegations and according to him, Reyes is a mere fishpond watcher.
On August 18, 1992, PARAB rendered its decision, that Reyes is lawful
owner the TRO is permanent and awarded peaceful possession and
actual occupation to Reyes. Joson appealed in DARAB but of no avail.
On November 2, 1996, DARAB affirmed the decision of PARAB and
reinstate back Reyes as tenant-tiller to the fishpond in question
immediately without further delay. The motion for reconsideration of
Joson was denied. The case was elevate to CA and disposed the case
saying that DARAB erred in finding that petitioner is an agricultural
tenant. On March 20, 2000, CA granted Josons petition, set aside
DARABs decision and conculsed that circumstances contradicted by
Reyes own averments in the complaints he filed with PARAD but also
incompatible with his act of signing the Malibaran lease contract in his
capacity as fishpond watcher and not as tenant.
Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Reyes is an agricultural tenant and therefore enjoys
security of tenure.
Held:
No, Reyes is not and agricultural tenant.
Intent is the principal factor in determining whether a tenancy
relationship exists. Tenancy Relationship is not purely factual
relationship but legal relationship.
The requisites to establish tenancy relationship are the following: (1)
that the parties are landowner and tenant and agricultural lessee (2)
subject matter of relationship is agricultural land (3) consent
between parties to relationship (4) purpose of relationship is to
bring about agricultural production (5) personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant/agricultural lessee (6) harvest is shared between
the landowner and tenant/agricultural lessee.
Absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, a de jure
tenant, only when established, he is entitled to security of tenure.
Consent of the landowner to a tenancy arrangement is clearly absent. No
proof that Aguirre hired petitioner as tenant.
Crop sharing is not enough to establish tenancy as it is unusual for the
landowner to receive the production of the land from caretaker who
sows.
Mere occupation of an agrarian landowner does not automatically
convert a tiller or farm worker into an agricultural tenant recognized
under the agrarian law.
Tenancy status only arises if an occupant has been given possession of
an agricultural landholding for primary purpose of agricultural
production.
Tiongson v. CA
In this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of,
Appeal declaring the existence of a landholder-tenant relationship and
ordering the private respondent's reinstatement, the petitioners contend
that the appellate court committed an error of law in:
1. Disregarding the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations
which are supported by substantial evidence; and
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2. Substituting the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations
with its own findings.
Briefly, the facts of the case as found by the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Seventh Regional District, Branch 1 at Pasig, Metro Manila
are as follows: Sometime in 1946, the late Severino Manotok donated
and transferred to his eight (8) children and two (2) grandchildren
namely: Purificacion Manotok, Eliza Manotok, Perpetua manotok,
Filomena Manotok, Severino Manotok, Jr., Jesus Manotok, Rahula
Ignacio Manotok, Severino Manotok III, Fausto Manotok and Rosa
Manotok, a thirty-four-hectare lot located in Payong, Old Balara,
Quezon City covered by a certificate of title. Severino Manotok who
was appointed judicial guardian of his minor children 'accepted on their
behalf the aforesaid donation. At that time, there were no tenants or
other persons occupying the said property.
In that same year, Teodoro Macaya accompanied by Vicente Herrera,
the overseer of the property, went to the house of Manotok in Manila
and pleaded that he be allowed to live on the Balara property so that he
could at the same time guard the property and prevent the entry of
squatters and the theft of the fruits and produce of the fruit trees planted
by the owner. Manotok allowed Macaya to stay in the property as a
guard (bantay) but imposed the conditions that at any time that the
owners of the property needed or wanted to take over the property,
Macaya and his family should vacate the property immediately; that
while he could raise animals and plant on the property, he could do so
only for his personal needs; that he alone could plant and raise animals
on the property; and that the owners would have no responsibility or
liability for said activities of Macaya. Macaya was allowed to use only
three (3) hectares. These conditions, however, were not put in writing.
On December 5, 1950, the property-owners organized themselves into a
corporation engaged primarily in the real estate business known as the
Manotok Realty, Inc. The owners transferred the 34-hectare lot to the
corporation as part of their capital contribution or subscription to the
capital stock of the corporation.
From 1946 to 1956, Macaya did not pay, as he was not required to pay
anything to the owners or corporation whether in cash or in kind for his
occupancy or use of the property. However, the corporation noted that
the realty taxes on the property had increased considerably and found it
very burdensome to pay the said taxes while on the other hand, Macaya
had contributed nothing nor even helped in the payment of the taxes.
Thus, Macaya upon the request of the owners agreed to help by
remitting ten (10) cavans of palay every year as his contribution for the
payment of the realty taxes beginning 1957.
On June 5, 1964, the corporation requested Macaya to increase his
contribution from ten (10) cavans to twenty (20) cavans of palay
effective 1963 because the assessed value of the property had increased
considerably. Macaya] agreed.
In 1967, Macaya informed the corporation that he could not afford
anymore to deliver any palay because the palay dried up. He further
requested that in the ensuring years, he be allowed to contribute only ten
(10) cavans of palay. The corporation said that if that was the case, he
might as well not deliver anymore. Thus, from 1967 up to 1976, Macaya
did not deliver any palay.
On January 31, 1974, Manotok Realty, Inc. executed a "Unilateral Deed
of Conveyance" of the property in favor of Patricia Tiongson, Pacita Go,
Roberto Laperal III, Elisa Manotok, Rosa Manotok, Perpetua M.
Bocanegra, Filomena M. Sison, Severino Manotok, Jr., Jesus Manotok,
Ignacio S. Manotok, Severino Manotok III and Fausto Manotok.
Sometime in 1974, Macaya was informed by the Manotoks that they
needed the property to construct their houses thereon. Macaya agreed
but pleaded that he be allowed to harvest first the planted rice before
vacating the property.
However, he did not vacate the property as verbally promised and
instead expanded the area he was working on.
In 1976, the Manotoks once more told Macaya to vacate the entire
property including those portions tilled by him. At this point, Macaya
had increased his area from three (3) hectares to six (6) hectares without
the knowledge and consent of the owners. As he was being compelled to
vacate the property, Macaya brought the matter to the Department (now
Ministry) of Agrarian Reforms. The Manotoks, during the conference
before the officials of the Department insisted that Macaya and his
family vacate the property. They threatened to bulldoze Macaya's
landholding including his house, thus prompting Macaya to file an
action for peaceful possession, injunction, and damages with
preliminary injunction before the Court of Agrarian Relations.
The sole issue to be resolved in the present petition is whether or not a
tenancy relationship exists between the parties. The Court of Agrarian
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Relations found that Macaya is not and has never been a share or
leasehold tenant of Severino Manotok nor of his successors-in-interest
over the property or any portion or portions thereof but has only been
hired as a watchman or guard (bantay) over the same. On Macaya's
appeal from the said decision, the respondent appellate court declared
the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship and ordered
Macaya's reinstatement to his landholding.
Since what is involved ed is agricultural tenancy, we refer to Republic
Act No. 1199 as amended by Republic Act No. 2263. Section 3 thereof
defines agricultural tenancy as:
xxx xxx xxx
... the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture
belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of
production through the labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees
to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain, either in
produce or in money, or in both.
Thus, the essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: 1) the parties
are the landholder and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3)
there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; and 5) there is
consideration (Agustin, Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines,
1981, p. 19). As
xxx xxx xxx
All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship
between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites do not
make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant, as contra-distinguished from a
de jure tenant, This is so because unless a person has established his
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he
covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws. ...
The key factor in ascertaining whether or not there is a landowner-tenant
relationship in this case is the nature of the disputed property.
Is the thirty-four (34) hectare lot, of which the six (6) hectares occupied
by the private respondent form a part, against agricultural land? If not,
the rules on agrarian reform do not apply.
From the year 1948 up to the present, the tax declarations of real
property and the annual receipts for real estate taxes paid have always
classified the land as "residential". The property is in Balara, Quezon
City, Metro Manila, not far from the correctly held by the trial court:
University of the Philippines and near some fast growing residential
subdivisions. The Manotok family is engaged in the business of
developing subdivisions in Metro Manila, not in farming.
The trial court observed that a panoramic view of the property shows
that the entire 34 hectares is rolling forestal land without any flat
portions except the small area which could be planted to palay. The
photographs of the disputed area show that flush to the plantings of the
private respondent are adobe walls separating expensive looking houses
and residential lots from the palay and newly plowed soil. Alongside the
plowed or narrowed soil are concrete culverts for the drainage of
residential subdivisions. The much bigger portions of the property are
not suitable for palay or even vegetable crops.
The trial court noted that in a letter dated April 12, 1977, the City
Engineer of Quezon City certified on the basis of records in his office
that the property in question falls within the category of "Residential I
Zone."
The respondent court ignored all the above considerations and noted
instead that the appellees never presented the tax declarations for the
previous year, particularly for 1946, the year when Macaya began
cultivating the property. It held that while the petitioners at that time
might have envisioned a panoramic residential area of the disputed
property, then cogonal with some forest, that vision could not
materialize due to the snail pace of urban development to the peripheral
areas of Quezon City where the disputed property is also located and
pending the consequent rise of land values. As a matter of fact, it found
that the houses found thereon were constructed only in the 70's.
Whatever "visions" the owners may have had in 1946, the fact remains
that the land has always been officially classified as "residential" since
1948. The areas surrounding the disputed six hectares are now dotted
with residences and, apparently, only this case has kept the property in
question from being developed together with the rest of the lot to which
it belongs. The fact that a caretaker plants rice or corn on a residential
lot in the middle of a residential subdivision in the heart of a
metropolitan area cannot by any strained interpretation of law convert it
into agricultural land and subject it to the agrarian reform program.
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On this score alone, the decision of the respondent court deserves to be
reversed.
Another requisite is that the parties must be landholder and tenant. Rep.
Act No. 11 99 as amended defines a landholder
Sec. 5(b) A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who,
either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, lets or grants to
another the use or cultivation of his land for a consideration either in
shares under the share tenancy system, or a price certain under the
leasehold tenancy system.
On the other hand, a tenant is defined as
Sec. 5(a) A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land
belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter's consent for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under
the share tenancy system or paying to the landholder a price certain in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
Under these definitions, may Macaya be considered as a tenant and
Manotok as a landholder? Significant, as the trial court noted, is that the
parties have not agreed as to their contributions of the several items of
productions such as expenses for transplanting, fertilizers, weeding and
application of insecticides, etc. In the absence of an agreement as to the
respective contributions of the parties or other terms and conditions of
their tenancy agreement, the lower court concluded that no tenancy
relationship was entered into between them as tenant and landholder.
On this matter, the respondent Appellate Court disagreed. It held that:
... Whether the appellant was instituted as tenant therein or as bantay, as
the appellees preferred to call him, the inevitable fact is that appellant
cleared, cultivated and developed the once unproductive and Idle
property for agricultural production. Appellant and Don Severino have
agreed and followed a system of sharing the produce of the land
whereby, the former takes care of all expenses for cultivation and
production, and the latter is only entitled to 10 cavans of rice per
harvest. This is the essense of leasehold tenancy.
It should be noted, however, that from 1967 to the present, Macaya did
not deliver any cavans of palay to the petitioners as the latter felt that if
Macaya could no longer deliver the twenty (20) cavans of palay, he
might as well not deliver any. The decision of the petitioners not to ask
for anymore contributions from Macaya reveals that there was no
tenancy relationship ever agreed upon by the parties. Neither can such
relationship be implied from the facts as there was no agreed system of
sharing the produce of the property. Moreover, from 1946 to 1956 at
which time, Macaya was also planting rice, there was no payment
whatsoever. At the most and during the limited period when it was in
force, the arrangement was a civil lease where the lessee for a fixed
price leases the property while the lessor has no responsibility
whatsoever for the problems of production and enters into no agreement
as to the sharing of the costs of fertilizers, irrigation, seedlings, and
other items. The private respondent, however, has long stopped in
paying the annual rents and violated the agreement when he expanded
the area he was allowed to use. Moreover, the duration of the temporary
arrangement had expired by its very terms.
Going over the third requisite which is consent, the trial court observed
that the property in question previous to 1946 had never been tenanted.
During that year, Vicente Herrera was the overseer. Under these
circumstances, coupled by the fact that the land is forested and rolling,
the lower court could not see its way clear to sustain Macaya's
contention that Manotok had given his consent to enter into a verbal
tenancy contract with him. The lower court further considered the fact
that the amount of ten (10) cavans of palay given by Macaya to the
owners from 1957 to 1964 which was later increased to twenty (20)
cavans of palay from 1964 to 1966 was grossly disproportionate to the
amount of taxes paid by the owners. The lot was taxed as residential
land in a metropolitan area. There was clearly no intention on the part of
the owners to devote the property for agricultural production but only
for residential purposes. Thus, together with the third requisite, the
fourth requisite which is the purpose was also not present.
The last requisite is consideration. This is the produce to be divided
between the landholder and tenant in proportion to their respective
contributions. We agree with the trial court that this was also absent.
As earlier stated, the main thrust of petitioners' argument is that the law
makes it mandatory upon the respondent Court of Appeals to affirm the
decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations if the findings of fact in said
decision are supported by substantial evidence, and the conclusions
stated therein are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence. On the
other hand, private respondent contends that the findings of the Court of
Agrarian Relations are based not on substantial evidence alone but also
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on a misconstrued or misinterpreted evidence, which as a result thereof,
make the conclusions of the Court of Agrarian Relations clearly
contrary to law and jurisprudence.
After painstakingly going over the records of the case, we find no valid
and cogent reason which justifies the appellate court's deviation from
the findings and conclusions of the lower court. It is quite clear from the
44-page decision of the trial court, that the latter has taken extra care
and effort in weighing the evidence of both parties of the case. We find
the conclusions of the respondent appellate court to be speculative and
conjectural.
It bears re-emphasizing that from 1946 to 1956, there was no agreement
as to any system of sharing the produce of the land. The petitioners did
not get anything from the harvest and private respondent Macaya was
using and cultivating the land free from any charge or expense. The
situation was rather strange had there been a tenancy agreement between
Don Severino and Macaya.
From 1957 to 1964, Macaya was requested to contribute ten (10) cavans
a year for the payment of the realty taxes. The receipts of these
contributions are evidenced by the following exhibits quoted below:
(a) Exhibit "4" adopted and marked as Exhibit "K" for plaintiff
(Macaya):
Ukol sa taon 1961
Tinanggap naniin kay G. Teodoro Macaya ang sampung (10) cavan na
palay bilang tulong niya sa pagbabayad ng amillaramiento sa lupa ng
corporation na nasa Payong, Q.C. na kaniyang binabantayan.
(b) Exhibit "9" adopted and marked as Exhibit "L" for plaintiff
(Macaya):
Tinanggap namin kay Ginoong Teodoro Macaya ang TATLONG (3)
kabang palay bilang kapupunan sa DALAWAMPUNG (20) kabang
palay na kanyang tulong sa pagbabayad ng amillaramiento para sa taong
1963 ng lupang ari ng Manotok Realty, Inc. na nasa Payong, Quezon
City, na kanyang binabantayan samantalang hindi pa ginagawang
SUBDIVISION PANGTIRAHAN.
c) Exhibit "10" adopted and marked as Exhibit "N" for plaintiff
(Macaya):
Tinanggap namin kay Ginoong Teodoro Macaya ang
DALAWAMPUNG (20) kabang palay na kanyang tulong sa
pagbabayad ng amillaramiento para sa taong 1964 ng lupang ari ng
Manotok Realty Inc., na nasa Payong, Quezon City, na kanyang
binabantayan samantalang hindi pa ginagawang SUBDIVISION PANG
TAHANAN.
d) Exhibit "11" adopted and marked as Exhibit "M" for plaintiff
(Macaya):
Tinanggap namin kay Ginoong Teodoro Macaya ang
DALAWAMPUNG (20) kabang ng palay na kanyang tulong sa
pagbabayad ng amillaramiento para sa taong 1965 ng lupang ari ng
Manotok Realty, Inc., na nasa Payong, Quezon City, na kanyang
binabantayan samantalang hindi pa ginagawang SUBDIVISION PANG
TAHANAN.
From the above-quoted exhibits, it clearly appears that the payment of
the cavans of palay was Macaya's contribution for the payment of the
real estate taxes; that the nature of the work of Macaya is that of a
watchman or guard (bantay); and, that the services of Macaya as such
watchman or guard (bantay) shall continue until the property shall be
converted into a subdivision for residential purposes.
The respondent appellate court disregarded the receipts as self-serving.
While it is true that the receipts were prepared by petitioner Perpetua M.
Bocanegra, Macaya nevertheless signed them voluntarily. Besides, the
receipts were written in the vernacular and do not require knowledge of
the law to fully grasp their implications.
Furthermore, the conclusion of the respondent appellate court to the
effect that the receipts having been prepared by one of the petitioners
who happens to be a lawyer must have been so worded so as to conceal
the real import of the transaction is highly speculative. There was
nothing to conceal in the first place since the primary objective of the
petitioners in allowing Macaya to live on the property was for security
purposes. The presence of Macaya would serve to protect the property
from squatters. In return, the request of Macaya to raise food on the
property and cultivate a three-hectare portion while it was not being
developed for housing purposes was granted.
We can understand the sympathy and compassion which courts of
justice must feel for people in the same plight as Mr. Macaya and his
family. However, the petitioners have been overly generous and
understanding of Macaya's problems. For ten years from 1946 to 1956,
he lived on the property, raising animals and planting crops for personal
use, with only his services as "bantay" compensating for the use of
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another's property. From 1967 to the present, he did not contribute to the
real estate taxes even as he dealt with the land as if it were his own. He
abused the generosity of the petitioners when he expanded the permitted
area for cultivation from three hectares to six or eight hectares. Mr.
Macaya has refused to vacate extremely valuable residential land
contrary to the clear agreement when he was allowed to enter it. The
facts of the case show that even Mr. Macaya did not consider himself as
a true and lawful tenant and did not hold himself out as one until he was
asked to vacate the property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations is AFFIRMED.
Hilario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:
Salvador Baltazar was working on the land pursuant to a contract
executed between him and Socorro Balagtas involving a two (2)-ha
property. According to Baltazar, in 1965, he relinquished 1.5 ha to
certain individuals and what remained under his cultivation was -ha
owned by Corazon Pengzon. After Socorro's death, no new contract was
executed. Sometime in 1980, the Hilarios started cultivating a 4,000-sq
m portion of the property and enjoined Baltazar from entering the same.
The Hilarios claimed that they acquired the landholding from the
Philippine National Bank after a foreclosure proceeding. On the other
hand, Corazon Pengzon explained that she did not get any share from
the produce of the land since 1964 and she would not have accepted it
knowing that she did not own the property anymore.
Held:
Baltazar is not a tenant because no consent was given by Pengzon. As
held in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482, tenancy
relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful
landholder through lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation.
"So the mere cultivation of the land by usurper cannot confer upon him
any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of
security of tenure of the law(Spouses Tiongson vs. Court of Appeals,
130 SCRA 482)."
Successors-in-interest of the true and lawful landholder/owner who
gave the consent are bound to recognize the tenancy established before
they acquired the agricultural land.
Bonifacio v. Dizon
The issue raised in the instant petition for certiorari certified to us by the
Court of Appeals in its resolution 1 dated November 28, 1986 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 10033 as involving a pure question of law is phrased by
petitioners, thus:
"WHETHER OR NOT, THE FAVORABLE JUDGMENT OBTAINED
BY THE DECEDENT IS INHERITED BY THE COMPULSORY
HEIRS, THEREBY VESTING TO THE LATTER, ALL THE RIGHTS
CONFERRED BY THE JUDGMENT TO (sic) THE DECEDENT." 2
The favorable judgment adverted to by petitioners traces its origin
to the complaint filed on July 1, 1968 by Olimpio Bonifacio before the
then Court of Agrarian Relations, Fifth Regional District, Branch I-A of
Baliwag, Bulacan, seeking the ejectment of private respondent Pastora
San Miguel from Bonifacio's two-hectare agricultural land situated at
Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-27298. The ground relied upon therefor was personal cultivation
under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural
Land Reform Code (CAR Case No. 2160-B '68).
After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered therein on
September 18, 1970 by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio:
"1. Granting authority to plaintiff OLIMPIO BONIFACIO to eject
defendant PASTORA SAN MIGUEL from the landholding in question
situated at Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares,
more or less, and consequently, ordering said defendant to vacate the
same landholding and deliver possession thereof to said plaintiff for the
latter's personal cultivation, subject to the provisions of Section 25 of
R.A 3844; and
"2. Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims of the parties." 3
On appeal by private respondent Pastora San Miguel, the Court of
Appeals 4modified said judgment with respect to her counterclaim by
ordering Olimpio Bonifacio to pay her the amount of P1,376.00. The
judgment was affirmed in all other respects. 5
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Still dissatisfied, private respondent Pastora San Miguel sought
relief from this Court. During the pendency of her petition, on August 7,
1983, Olimpio Bonifacio died. As no notice of such death was given to
the Court, no order for the substitution of his heirs was made. On July
31, 1985, the Court En Banc resolved to deny private respondent's
petition for lack of merit and to affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals. 6
Subsequently, petitioners Rosalina Bonifacio, as surviving wife,
and Gabriel, Ponciano, Tiburcio, Beatriz, Generosa, Silveria, Leonardo,
Felomena, Encarnacion and Leonila all surnamed Bonifacio, as children
and heirs of Olimpio Bonifacio, moved for the execution of the decision
in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68 before the respondent Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan. A writ of execution was issued on February 20, 1986
and on March 6, 1986, the Deputy Sheriff submitted his Report (Partial
Delivery of Possession), stating in part that except for a portion thereof
occupied by the house of Pastora San Miguel which the latter refused to
vacate, he had delivered the land subject matter of the action to Rosalina
Bonifacio as surviving wife of Olimpio Bonifacio.
Thereafter, private respondent Pastora San Miguel moved to quash
the writ of execution. This was opposed by petitioners who in turn
sought the issuance of a writ of demolition and an order declaring
Pastora San Miguel in contempt of court for allegedly re-entering the
subject land.
After hearing, respondent Judge Natividad G. Dizon issued a
resolution on July 15, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the implementation of the writ of execution of the
Decision dated September 18, 1970 made by the Sheriff of this Court,
per directive contained in our Order of February 18, 1986, is hereby
declared null and void; the "Motion for Demolition" filed by plaintiff is
hereby denied; and, the "Petition for Contempt" likewise denied.
"SO ORDERED." 7
Petitioners assail this resolution in the petition for certiorari filed
before the Court of Appeals, which as stated earlier, was certified to us
pursuant to Section 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in relation to
Section 5 (2) [e], Art. X of the 1973 Constitution and Rule 50, Sec. 3 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners contend that respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in ruling that the decision
in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68 can no longer be executed as said action is
purely personal in character and therefore cannot, upon Olimpio
Bonifacio's death, be inherited by his heirs. They assert that CAR Case
No. 2160-B '68, being an ejectment case and not one of those
specifically provided by law to be purely personal, survives the death of
a party. Furthermore, as under Rule 39, Section 49 (b) of the Rules of
Court, a judgment is binding not only upon the parties but also on their
successors-in-interest, petitioners are entitled to enforce the decision in
CAR Case No. 2160-B '68.
Private respondent, on the other hand, places stress on the fact that
the action under consideration is not an ordinary ejectment case but an
agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee. She theorizes
that the right being asserted in the action is personal to Olimpio
Bonifacio, which necessarily died with him. She further contends that
the non-substitution of Olimpio Bonifacio by his heirs rendered the
proceedings taken after his death null and void. She also points to
certain supervening events which allegedly prohibit execution of the
judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68, to wit: the amendment of
Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844 by R.A. No. 6389 and 2) the promulgation of
P.D. No. 27.
Private respondent is correct in characterizing CAR Case No.
2160-B '68 as more than an ordinary ejectment case. It is, indeed, an
agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee, which in the
light of the public policy involved, is more closely and strictly regulated
by the State. This factor, however, does not operate to bar the
application to the instant case of the general rule that an ejectment case
survives the death of a party. 8
Much of the problem lies in the term "personal cultivation" by
which the ground for ejectment under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 was
loosely referred. As it is, the term gave the impression that the ejectment
of an agricultural lessee was allowed only if and when the landowner-
lessor and no other opted to cultivate the landholding; thereby giving
rise to a bigger misconception that the right of cultivation pertained
exclusively to the landowner-lessor, and therefore his personal right
alone. A reading of Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844 however readily
demonstrates the fallacy of this interpretation. Said section provides:
"Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of
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the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that:
"(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the immediate
family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the
landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or
school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes . . ."
Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was
authorized not only when the landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the
landholding, but also when a member of his immediate family so
desired. In so providing, the law clearly did not intend to limit the right
of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner but to extend the
exercise of such right to the members of his immediate family. Clearly
then, the right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right
exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. To say otherwise would
be to put to naught the right of cultivation likewise conferred upon the
landowner's immediate family members.
The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's immediate
family members evidently to place the landowner-lessor in parity with
the agricultural lessee who was (and still is) allowed to cultivate the land
with the aid of his farm household. In this regard, it must be observed
that an agricultural lessee who cultivates the landholding with the aid of
his immediate farm household is within the contemplation of the law
engaged in "personal cultivation."
Thus, whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee,
the term "personal cultivation" cannot be given a restricted connotation
to mean a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either
case, the right extends to the members of the lessor's or lessee's
immediate family members.
Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the
immediate family members of the deceased landowner-lessor as well.
The right to cultivate the landholding asserted in CAR Case No. 2160-B
'68 not being a purely personal right of the deceased landowner-lessor,
the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in-
interest. Petitioners are entitled to the enforcement of the judgment in
CAR Case No. 2160-B '68.
Rules of procedure make it the duty of the attorney to inform the
court promptly of his client's death, incapacity or incompetency during
the pendency of the action and to give the name and residence of his
executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative. 9In case
of a party's death, the court, if the action survives, shall then order upon
proper notice the legal representatives of the deceased to appear and to
be substituted for the deceased within a period of 30 days or within such
time as may be granted. 10
In the case at bar, Olimpio Bonifacio's death during the pendency
of private respondent's petition was not communicated to the Court. As
ruled by this Court in the case of Florendo, Jr. vs. Coloma, supra,
involving substantially the same facts and issue:
". . . The petitioners challenge the proceeding in the Court of Appeals
after the death of the plaintiff-appellant Adela Salindon. They are of the
opinion that since there was no legal representative substituted for
Salindon after her death, the appellate court lost its jurisdiction over the
case and consequently, the proceedings in the said court are null and
void. This argument is without merit.
"There is no dispute that an ejectment case survives the death of a party.
The supervening death of plaintiff-appellant Salindon did not extinguish
her civil personality (Republic v. Bagtas, 6 SCRA 242; Vda. de Haberes
v. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 534) . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"In the case at bar, Salindon's counsel after her death on December 11,
1976 failed to inform the court of Salindon's death. The appellate court
could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of
Salindon without the proper manifestation from Salindon's counsel. In
such a case and considering that the supervening death of appellant did
not extinguish her civil personality, the appellate court was well within
its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. There is no showing
that the appellate court's proceedings in the case were tainted with
irregularities."
Private respondent's challenge against the proceedings held after
Olimpio Bonifacio's death cannot therefore be heeded.
Neither can private respondent derive comfort from the amendment
of Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 by Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 11 and the
promulgation of P.D. No. 27. 12 In Nilo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
34586, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 519, we categorically ruled that both
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R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied retroactively under
the general rule that statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwise
provided therein.
There being no cogent reason to nullify the implementation of the
writ of execution in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68, respondent judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion in having done so. The writ prayed for
should issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution
dated July 15, 1986 is hereby set aside. The immediate execution of the
decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68 is ordered. This decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
Zamoras vs. Su, Jr.
Facts:
Zamoras was hired by Su as overseer of his coconut land in Dapitan
City. Zamoras was tasked to have the land titled in Su's name. He was
also "assigning portions of the land to be worked by tenants, supervising
the cleaning, planting, care and cultivation of the land, the harvesting of
coconuts and selling of the copra." As compensation, he was paid salary
of P2,400 per month plus 1/3 of the proceeds of the sales of the copra.
Su got another 1/3 of the proceeds while the other third went to the
tenants. In 1981, Su obtained a loan from Anita Hortellano and the latter
was authorized by Su to harvest the coconuts. Meanwhile, he informed
Zamoras that he was being temporarily laid-off until the loan is settled.
Zamoras filed a case for illegal termination and breach of contract
before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the Ministry of Labor. The
Labor Arbiter held that Zamoras' dismissal was without just cause and
ordered Zamoras reinstatement. On appeal, the National Labor Relation
Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter by holding that there is no
employee-employer relation existing between the parties but a landlord-
tenant relation hence jurisdiction rests with the agrarian court. Zamoras
assailed the decision of NLRC.
Held:
The NLRC's conclusion that a landlord-tenant relationship existed
between Su and Zamoras is not supported by the evidence which shows
that Zamoras was hired by Su not as a tenant but as overseer of his
coconut plantation. As overseer, Zamoras hired the tenants and assigned
their respective portions which they cultivated under Zamoras'
supervision. The tenants dealt directly with Zamoras and received their
one-third share of the copra produce from him. The evidence also shows
that Zamoras, aside from doing administrative work for Su, regularly
managed the sale of copra processed by the tenants. There is no
evidence that Zamoras cultivated any portion of Su's land personally or
with the aid of his immediate farm household.
The following circumstances indicate an employer-employee
relationship between them: 1. Zamoras was selected and hired by Su as
overseer of the coconut plantation. 2. His duties were specified by Su. 3.
Su controlled and supervised the performance of his duties. He
determined to whom Zamoras should sell the copra produced from the
plantation. 4. Su paid Zamoras a salary of P2,400 per month plus one-
third of the copra sales every two months as compensation for managing
the plantation."
There is no tenancy relation because the element of personal
cultivation does not exist.
Oarde v CA
Trial and appellate courts determine the existence (or nonexistence) of a
tenancy relationship on the basis of the evidence presented by the
parties. Certifications of administrative agencies and officers declaring
the existence of a tenancy relation are merely provisional. They are
persuasive but not binding on courts, which must make their own
findings.
The Case
This principle is stressed by this Court as it rules on the instant petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
February 26, 1992 Decision 1of Respondent Court of Appeals 2 in CA
G.R. CV No. 29453-54, the dispositive portion of which reads: 3
"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is set aside and another
one entered as follows:
In Civil Case No. 7975:
(1) Plaintiff Zacarias Oarde is ordered reinstated as lawful tenant-
tiller of Lot 17 of the Agrarian Reform Project for Barangay Gotob,
Camalig, Albay and restored immediately to the possession thereof.
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(2) Defendants Rogelio Molar and Vilma Molar are ordered to pay
damages to plaintiff Zacarias Oarde in the sum of P5,850.00.
The decision of the court a quo dismissing the complaint of
Presentacion Molar in Civil Case No. 7960 is hereby affirmed.
No pronouncement as to costs."
Although Oarde was reinstated as tenant by the Court of Appeals,
he is nonetheless dissatisfied and claims a larger amount of damages.
On the other hand, Molar desires to be recognized as a tenant of private
respondents and to be granted damages for her eviction. Hence, this
recourse to this Court.
The Facts
The Court finds that the facts and allegations of the contending
parties are fairly recited in the trial court's decision, viz.: 4
"The plaintiffs [petitioners herein] seek to enjoin the defendants [private
respondents herein] from removing the former as tenant-tillers of the
land in question and are likewise requesting for damages, as a result of
their dislocation from the land.
The following facts are admitted by the parties:
1. Their identity;
2. That the original tenant-tiller of the land was Francisco Molar,
father of the plaintiff Presentacion Molar, and father-in-law of the other
plaintiff Zacarias Oarde,
3. That the eldest and only son of Francisco Molar is Basilio Molar;
4. That defendant Rogelio Molar is the grandson of Francisco
Molar, the former being the son of Basilio Molar;
5. That defendant spouses Wilfredo Guerrero and Lourdes
Guerrero sold the herein involved parcels of land to the defendant
spouses Rogelio Molar and Vilma Molar sometime in October 1987.
The issue to be determined as per order of the Court dated 15 September
1988 in Civil Case No. 7975, and order dated 27 June 1988 in Civil
Case No. 7960, is whether plaintiffs in both cases are tenants of
defendants in possession of the land and cannot be ejected therefrom
except for cause.
It is the claim of the plaintiffs that they are [tenant-tillers] of the land in
question.
Plaintiff Zacarias Oarde, testified that he began to till the land in
question on April 29, 1964 when he got married to the daughter of
Francisco Molar, and to substantiate his claim, he presented as one of
his witnesses Gregorio Magnaye, an employee of the Bureau of Lands.
He was the Chief of a Survey Team that conducted the survey in Gotob.
The other members were technicians from the DAR.
He testified on cross-examination that in preparing the Summary Lists
of the tenant-tillers in Gotob, Camalig, Albay, they conducted a barrio
assembly. They arrived at the conclusion that certain persons were
tilling certain properties owned by other persons because that was the
listing of the DAR technicians (p. 11, tsn, Nov. 16, 1988). Before the
survey was conducted, they gathered the tenants together with the
barangay officials and interviewed them if they are the ones cultivating
the property. The ones listed in the Summary Lists were the ones whose
names were given by the barrio officials (p. 13, tsn. Nov. 16, 1988).
Based on their survey, Zacarias Oarde was tilling two lots, Lots 17 and
18. These were the areas pointed to by Pedro Cervantes (p. 15, tsn. Nov.
16, 1988). (Zacarias, however, when he testified claims that he is tilling
only one lot, Lot 17) Witness Magnaye alleged that as far as the
property being tilled by Zacarias is concerned, information was given by
Pedro Cervantes (p. 19). During the survey, Zacarias Oarde was not
around. Zacarias admitted that when the survey was made, he was not
present.
Another witness presented was Gregorio Medina. He was the President
of the Samahang Nayon of Gotob in 1977. He knows the plaintiff
Zacarias Oarde because the latter is a member of the Samahang Nayon.
He alleged that he is not very particular about the land that the farmer-
members till, but when they register for membership, he is informed that
they are leaseholders (p. 2, tsn. 8 Dec. 1988). He signed this Exhibit A,
in 1977, when he was called by the DAR personnel to their office. The
document was already prepared. He did not read the contents. He really
does not know if Zacarias was doing the farming all by himself because
several people are tilling the land aside from Zacarias. Zacarias likewise
works on the field of others. He had no hand in the preparation of the
lists and he was not present when the persons included therein signed
their names. He likewise did not verify whether the persons in the list
were really farmers of the landholdings as mentioned therein. He knows
for a fact that the former farmer of these lands in question was Francisco
Molar.
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Another witness presented was Gil Nabio. He testified that he personally
knows Zacarias Oarde being a neighbor. Zacarias is tilling a land owned
by Atty. Wilfredo Guerrero and saw him working on the field.
The wife, Melicia Oarde, likewise took the witness stand and testified
that as tenant-tillers, they gave the owner's share to Atty. Wilfredo
Guerrero.
On the claim of plaintiff Presentacion Molar in Civil Case 7960, she
alleged that she is a tenant-lessee of the land in question previously
owned by Atty. Wilfredo Guerrero. She started tilling the land in 1965.
Before, she owned a carabao but sold it. She caused the land to be
worked on 'Pakyaw' basis, hiring different persons for different work.
She actually does not till the land (p. 16, tsn. July 11, 1989).
According to Zacarias Oarde who testified in behalf of Presentaction
(sic), the latter began tilling in 1968. She is not married and she only
hires laborers to till the land. It was Francisco Molar who distributed to
his children the land they are farming. Presentacion hires laborers to
prepare and plant the land. She does not actually till the land (p. 18, tsn.
May 16, 1989).
Jose Neo, an employee of the DAR, testified that he did not in any way
participate in the preparation of the document presented in evidence. He
did not know whether it is genuine or a tampered one.
On the other hand, defendants in both cases claim that plaintiffs
Presentacion Molar and Zacarias Oarde are not tenant-tillers of the land
in question.
Basilio Molar, a witness for the defendants testified that Atty. Wilfredo
Guerrero owns only one parcel of land in Gotob and this was previously
farmed by his father Francisco Molar. After Francisco Molar's death, the
land was tilled by witness Basilio Molar. Presentacion Molar and
Zacarias Oarde are only helpers. From the share of the tenant-tiller
Francisco Molar, Presentacion and Zacarias get their share.
Another witness was Ernesto Nares. He was one of the buyers of the
property together with Rogelio Molar.
On cross-examination he stated that Zacarias Oarde and Presentacion
Molar are not tillers of any land, whether coconut or riceland (p. 6, tsn,
Nov. 3, 1989).
Rogelio Molar and defendant Wilfredo Guerrero likewise took the
witness stand but their testimony centered on the denials that
Presentacion Molar and Zacarias Oarde are tenants of the land."
The trial court held that Petitioners Molar and Oarde were not
lawful tenants of private respondents. As noted above, public respondent
affirmed the trial court's ruling in regard to Petitioner Molar, but
reversed it with respect to Petitioner Oarde. It ordered the reinstatement
of Oarde as a tenant and awarded him damages in the sum of P5,850.00.
Before us, Petitioner Molar prays that she be declared as a lawful
tenant, and Petitioner Oarde asks that the damages awarded to him be
increased from P5,850.00 to P13,850.00. Private respondents do not
question the Decision of public respondent.
The Issues
Petitioners list the following assignment of errors in their
petition 5 and memorandum: 6
"I. The appellate court erred in not giving credence and probative
value to the official and public documents showing Presentacion Molar
as the registered tenant-tiller of the lot in question.
II. The appellate court erred in notconsidering (sic) substantial
facts, the testimonial evidence and admissions that greatly affected the
result of this case.
III. The appellate court erred in not applying the provsions (sic) of
the New CARP 7 Law (RA 6657) and other applicable laws and
jurisprudence favorable to tenant-tiller, Presentacion Molar.
IV. The appellate court erred in not computing correctly the total
share that Zacarias Oarde was deprived of since October 1987 to the
present.
V. The appellate court erred in not awarding actual damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, moral and exemplary damages to
plaintiffs."
To avoid needless repetition, the Court believes that the issues may
be condensed into three:
1. Is Petitioner Molar a lawful tenant?
2. Is the award to Petitioner Oarde of P5,850 as his lawful share in
the harvests of his tilled land from October 1987 to May 1991 correct?
3. Are petitioners entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well
as attorney's fees and litigation expenses?
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
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First Issue: Is Petitioner Molar a landlord is divested of his landholding and somebody else is installed to
Lawful Tenant-Tiller?
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are the following:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of
harvests. All these must concur to establish the juridical relationship of
tenancy. 8
Markedly absent in the case of Petitioner Molar is the element of
"personal" cultivation. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found that Molar herself did not actually cultivate the land, nor did her
immediate family or farm household. Instead, shehired other people to
do all phases of farm work. 9 Even her co-petitioner testified that she did
not actually till the land and that she merely paid laborers to perform
such task. 10 Thus, public respondent aptly held: 11
"The trial court noted that Presentacion made inconsistent answers when
asked when she began tilling the land, before she finally declared that
she started tilling the property way back in 1965 (tsn, July 1, 1989).
However, the element of personal cultivation is essential for an
agricultural leasehold; that is, that there should be personal cultivation
by the tenant or by his immediate farm household or members of the
family of the lessee or other persons who are dependent upon him for
support or who usually help him in his activities (Evangelista vs. CA,
158 SCRA 41). The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his
immediate family to work the land (Bonifacio vs. Dizon, 177 SCRA
294), and the lessee cannot hire many persons to help him cultivate the
land (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559).
In this case, Zacarias Oarde, testifying for Presentacion Molar, (tsn,
May 16, 1989) declared that Presentacion 'does not actually till the land
but she pays laborers to till the land' (p. 12); she is single, owns no
working animals, nor farm implements (p. 9). Presentacion herself
admitted that she has 'the property tenanted on pakyaw basis' meaning
that she hires different persons for harrowing, for plowing, and for
harvesting and that she did not actually till the land, but merely pays
others 'because (I) am a woman'; she owns a small store (tsn, July 11,
1989, pp. 16-19).
We agree with the trial court that We cannot have a case where a
become a new landlord." (Emphasis supplied.)
We stress that both the respondent appellate court and the trial
court found that Petitioner Molar was not a tenant of Private Respondent
Wilfredo Guerrero. Petitioners are in effect asking this Court to assess
the evidentiary basis of the foregoing factual conclusion. This we cannot
do. In Fuentes vs. Court of Appeals, 12 we explained that only questions
of law could be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court:
"Jurisprudence teaches us that '(a)s a rule, the jurisdiction of this Court
in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals . . . is limited to the
review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the
appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As such
this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below. This rule,
however, is not without exceptions.' 13 The findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals, which are as a general rule deemed conclusive, may admit
of review by this Court: 14
(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial
court are contradictory;
(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures;
(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its
findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts;
(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond
the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a
misapprehension of facts;
(7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the
specific evidence on which they are based; and
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(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the
evidence on record."
Whether Petitioner Molar was a tenant-tiller is a question of fact.
Molar has not shown that her case falls under any of the recognized
exceptions to the ironclad rule that only questions of law may be raised
before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. 15
In any event, Petitioner Molar submitted the following
documentary exhibits to support her claim that she was a tenant:
"Exhibit A Summary List of Rice and Corn Lands
A-1 Signature of defendant Rogelio Molar
A-2 Signature of the Barangay Captain
A-3 Signature of the President, Samahang Nayon
B Addendum Index Log Sheet
B-1 Lot 17 & 18
C Police Blotter re: complaint of plaintiffs-appellants
C-1 Signature of Jose Segovia, Team Leader I, DAR
D Parcellary Map[p]ing Sheet
E Letter of Atty. Lladoc of DAR to the Station
Commander, Camalig, Albay
G DAR letter to parties re: Mediation Conference."
She adds that she "has been a registered tenant-tiller of Lot 1 since
1977" 16 as evidenced by certifications from a team leader of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). These documents, she argues,
show that she was a tenant of the land in question because "factual
findings of administrative agencies are entitled to great respect and even
accorded finality." 17 Petitioner Molar prays that we give credence to
these documents in her favor, in the same way that the Respondent
Court did in favor of Petitioner Oarde. She also contends that Don Pepe
Henson Enterprises vs. Pangilinan 18 is "on all fours" with the present
controversy, specifically citing the following pronouncement of the
Court therein:
"We also note that private respondents have already been listed as
farmer beneficiaries of the Land Transfer program of the government, as
certified by the Team Office of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. This
fact reaffirms the conclusion of tenancy reached in this case, and
strengthens our view that these tillers of the soil are to be respected in
the cultivation of their landholdings."
We are not impressed by petitioner's reliance on numerous
certifications of administrative agencies that she was a tenant of Lot 1.
Assessing the evidence in hand, both lower courts concluded that
Petitioner Molar was not a tenant. The certifications issued by
administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are
merely provisional and not conclusive on courts, as ruled by this Court
in Cuao vs. Court of Appeals, 19 citing Puertollano vs. IAC 20 :
"Secondly, the certification issued by Mr. Eugenio Bernardo of the
MAR (Ministry of Agrarian Reform) is very much like the certifications
issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and other officials of the
Ministry and later the Department of Agrarian Reform concerning the
existence of tenancy relationships in respect of agricultural lands from
which persons, who claim to be tenants, are sought to be ejected. It is
well-settled that the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality
concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between
the contending parties is merely preliminary or provisional and is not
binding upon the courts. Thus, in Puertollano, et al. v. Hon. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., this Court held that:
'From the foregoing provisions of the law [Section 2 P.D. No. 316 and
Section 2 P.D. No. 1038], it is clear that the trial court cannot take
cognizance of any ejectment case or any other casedesigned to harass or
remove a tenant in an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and
corn without first referring the same to the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform or his authorized representative in the locality for a preliminary
determination of the relationship between the contending parties. If said
officer finds that the case is proper for determination by the court it shall
so certify and thence said court may assume jurisdiction over the dispute
or controversy.Such preliminary determination of the relationship
however, is not binding upon the court. Said court may after due
hearing confirm, reverse or modify said preliminary determination as
the evidence and substantial merit of the case may warrant. (Emphasis
supplied)"
Furthermore, these documents were based merely on bare ex
parte allegations of different persons. 21 Even worse, Molar's own
witness, Jose Neo, "an employee of DAR," testified that "he did not in
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any way participate in the preparation of the document presented in
evidence." 22
In Don Pepe Henson Enterprises, cited by petitioners, the
conclusion of this Court on the existence of a tenancy relationship was
based on the evidence presented before the trial court and not on the
certifications issued by the DAR; said certifications merely
"reaffirm[ed]" and "strengthen[ed]" the conclusion of the court. In other
words, the cited case is inapplicable to the present controversy because
Petitioner Molar has not convinced us that she was a tenant in the first
place.
Petitioner Molar further argues that Respondent Court failed to
apply the following laws:
"1. Section 6, RA 6657 23
2. Section 106, PD 1529 24
3. Section 10, RA 3844 25
4. Section 9, RA 1199 as Amended by RA 2263 26
5. Section 4, PD 583 27
6. Section 12, RA 6389 28 "
The foregoing provisions enumerate the benefits available to a
tenant. Presentation Molar cannot claim such benefits because,
precisely, she failed to prove that she was a tenant at all.
Second Issue: Share of Petitioner Oarde from Harvests
Petitioner Oarde contends that Respondent Court erred in
computing the award due him. He claims it should be P13,850.00, not
P5,800.00, representing "the loss of 70 cavans of palay for the period
October 1987 to May 1991 (filing of Brief) priced at P195.00 [each] or a
total of P13,850.00, corresponding to seven (7) harvest seasons for three
and one-half years (3 1/2) counted from October 1987 to May 1991." 29
We are not convinced. A party is entitled to adequate compensation
only for duly proved pecuniary loss actually suffered by him or her.
Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but
must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Damages
cannot be presumed or premised on conjecture or even logic. In making
an award, courts must point out specific facts which show a basis for the
amount of compensatory or actual damages. 30 The claim of 70 cavans
of palay is based on the unsubstantiated allegation that the subject
riceland yielded two harvests a year. We need only to quote the finding
of the appellate court to show the folly of Oarde's peroration on this
point: 31
"In their brief, the plaintiff-appellant Oarde seeks actual damages
corresponding to the loss he suffered for failing to get his share of the
produce since October 1987 alleging that his average share is 10
cavanes. Melicia Oarde testified that since October 1987, they were not
able to get their share of the produce, averaging 10 cavanes of palay
(after deducting the landowner's share) for the third planting season (tsn,
Dec. 9, 1988, p. 8). There is no other credible evidence of record
pertinent to the claim of pecuniary loss of 70 cavanes based on the
alleged prevailing price of P184.00 to P197.00 per cavan of palay.
Accordingly, the award for actual damages on the basis of the unlawful
dispossession by the vendee defendants Rogelio and Vilma Molar is
calculated at 30 cavanes at the average price of P195.00 prevailing at
that time (not disputed by appellee) or P5,580.00."
Third Issue: Damages, Litigation Costs and Attorney's Fees
Petitioners plead that they were "dispossessed of their landholding"
and "compelled to litigate and incur expenses in the prosecution of this
suit," which entitle them to attorney's fees under Article 2208 32 of the
Civil Code. Further, they also pray for an award of P6,000.00 as "actual
expenses" and the additional amount of P4,000.00 which they incurred
in this appeal. Petitioners claim P10,000.00 as moral damages for their
"economic, physical and emotional sufferings" which were the
"inevitable and proximate result of their being ousted from the land
without any justifiable cause." They leave to the sound discretion of this
Court their claim for exemplary or corrective damages. 33
Respondent Court denied the claims for "moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees . . . for lack of legal and/or factual
basis." 34 We find no error in such ruling.
The award of attorney's fees depends upon the circumstances of
each case and lies within the discretion of the court. We scoured the
records and, like the Court of Appeals, found no legal, factual or
equitable justification for the award of attorney's fees.
Likewise, we deny the claim for moral and exemplary damages.
Aside from the naked allegations of physical and emotional sufferings,
petitioners failed to substantiate their claims. Likewise, exemplary
damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but
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to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to socially
deleterious actions. In this case, no harmful act can be attributed to the
private respondents which warrants the award of exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
DECISION is AFFIRMEDin toto. Costs against petitioners.
Cornes v Leal Realty
For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals, dated 31 March 2005 and 5 April
2005, respectively, which reversed the Decision[3] dated 1 February
2000 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), and reinstated the Decision[4] dated 31 July 1997 of the
Provincial Adjudicator in DARAB Cases No. 6489-6492 (Reg. Case
Nos. 234-T91, 396-T93, 397-T93 and 827-T95).
The instant Petition traces its origins from four separate Complaints
filed with the Provincial Adjudication Board, Region III in Tarlac,
Tarlac.
DARAB Case No. 234-T91
The first Complaint[5] dated 19 August 1991, and docketed as DARAB
Case No. 234-T91 was filed by petitioners and their predecessors-in
interest Rodolfo Cornes, Pablo Cornes, Sr., Renato T. Cornes, Virgilio
T. Cornes, Enriquito T. Cornes, Ernesto T. Cornes, Juanito Robles,
Donato Robles, Francisco Gadiano and Eduardo Robles against
respondents Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc. (LEAL REALTY), Leal
Haven, Inc. (LEAL HAVEN), their Managing Director Ernesto M.
Legaspi, and all persons claiming rights under them for maintenance of
peaceful possession and for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioners contended that they had been farmers and full-
fledged tenants for more than 30 years of an agricultural landholding
which was previously owned and registered in the name of Josefina
Roxas Omaa (JOSEFINA) under TCT No. 103275 of the Registry of
Deeds of Tarlac. The subject landholding consists of at least 21 hectares
and is principally devoted to rice and sugar. According to petitioners,
the subject landholding is covered by Republic Act No. 6657,[6] but was
sold by JOSEFINA to respondents in contravention of the
law. Meanwhile, LEAL HAVEN converted a portion of the subject
landholding into a memorial park.
It is petitioners stance that when respondents entered into a contract of
sale with JOSEFINA, they were aware of the tenancy relationship which
existed between petitioners and JOSEFINA. Respondents purportedly
negotiated with petitioners to renounce their tenancy rights under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) in exchange for a
compensation package as a form of disturbance
compensation. However, respondents failed to comply with the terms
and conditions thereof. For this reason, petitioners filed a complaint
with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) in Victoria,
Tarlac; but the conciliation efforts of the latter proved to be futile,
prompting petitioners to move for their termination. Petitioners further
claim that in a letter[7] dated 16 February 1991, respondents admitted
their inability to pay the balance in the compensation package drawn
between them and advised petitioners to continue working on the
subject landholding, and to continue to appropriate for themselves the
fruits thereof until complete payment shall have been made.
Finally, petitioners allege that they were residing in their respective
homes made of strong materials built within the premises of the subject
landholding. However, they were threatened to be ousted and evicted by
respondents who had solicited the assistance of saboteurs and military
officers to disturb their peaceful possession without any lawful order
from the courts. Petitioners sought an injunction against respondents,
and prayed for the declaration of the landholding as subject to the
compulsory coverage of the CARL and their entitlement to the rights
and privileges accorded thereby, as well as for the payment of damages.
DARAB Case No. 396-T93
The second Complaint,[8] dated 2 March 1993, docketed as DARAB
Case No. 396-T93 was filed by petitioners against respondent LEAL
REALTY and Spouses William Tugadi and Remedios Tugadi (SPS.
TUGADI) for violation of Republic Act No. 6657, annulment of
documents, title and damages, reiterating their averments in DARAB
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Case No. 396-T93. In addition, petitioners posited that LEAL REALTY
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the SPS. TUGADI without
proper conversion of the lot from agricultural to non-agricultural in
breach of the CARL. Petitioners contended that LEAL REALTY,
without proper authority, caused the subdivision of the subject
landholding into smaller lots. One of such lots is Lot No. 1961-B-3-B
which was transferred by LEAL REALTY in favor of the SPS.
TUGADI. Petitioners impugned the subdivision as having been done
without the approval of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). Fearing that they may be ejected from their dwellings,
petitioners prayed that respondents be declared to have violated
Republic Act No. 6657; and that the transfer from JOSEFINA to LEAL
REALTY, the subdivision of the subject landholding into smaller lots,
and the transfer of Lot No. 1961-B-3-B to SPS. TUGADI be declared
null and void.
DARAB Case No. 397-T93
The third Complaint,[9] also dated 2 March 1993, and docketed
as DARAB Case No. 397-T93 was filed by petitioners against
respondent LEAL REALTY and Spouses Romeo Alcazaren and Juliet
Astrero-Alcazaren (SPS. ALCAZAREN) for violation of Republic Act
No. 6657, annulment of documents, title and damages. In like manner,
as with their prior Complaints, petitioners questioned the subdivision of
the subject landholding into smaller lots as contrary to law. In particular,
petitioners contested the issuance of TCT No. T-237899 of the Register
of Deeds of Tarlac over Lot No. 1961-B-1-A in favor of the SPS.
ALCAZAREN. As with their prior two Complaints, petitioners prayed
for the declaration of nullity of the transfer of the subject landholding
from JOSEFINA to LEAL REALTY, including the nullity of TCT No.
T-237899 in the name of the SPS. ALCAZAREN.
DARAB Case No. 329-T95
On 17 March 1995, respondent LEAL REALTY, represented by its
Manager, Ernesto Legaspi, filed a Complaint[10] with the Provincial
Adjudication Board, Region III in Tarlac against petitioner Nita Cornes-
Valenzuela (VALENZUELA), docketed as DARAB Case No. 827-
T95 for injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. LEAL REALTY alleged that sometime in
February 1995, despite its objection, VALENZUELA constructed a
residential house within the premises of the subject landholding; hence,
it prayed for the removal of the construction at VALENZUELAs
expense.
Later, all four Complaints were consolidated.
The Ruling of the Provincial Adjudicator
On 31 July 1997, Provincial Adjudicator Benjamin M. Yambao
rendered a Decision in favor of respondents and against petitioners. The
Complaints filed by petitioners, i.e.,DARAB Cases No. 234-T91, No.
396-T93, and No. 397-T93 were ordered dismissed. On the other hand,
the prayer of respondent LEAL REALTY in the fourth Complaint,
DARAB Case No. 329-T95 was granted.
The Provincial Adjudicator found that there was no tenancy relationship
which existed between the parties. He maintained that no convincing
evidence was established to prove the tenancy arrangement other than
petitioners self-serving declaration. The Provincial Adjudicator ruled
that Jacinto Cornes (JACINTO), the father and predecessor-in-interest
of the petitioners Cornes, declared that he was a hired laborer in the
subject landholding.[11] Petitioners other predecessors-in-
[12]
interest, namely, Pablo Cornes (PABLO), Francisco Gadiano
(FRANCISCO), Domingo Pagarigan (DOMINGO), and Juanito Robles
(JUANITO), were also found to have worked as hired hands. As
petitioners merely derived the relationship from their predecessors-in-
interest who were hired workers, they cannot be expected to rise above
their source. According to the Provincial Adjudicator, the fact that
petitioners were seen working on the subject landholding did not raise a
presumption of the existence of a tenancy relationship.
Further, the Provincial Adjudicator declared that a tenancy relationship
cannot be inferred from the alleged compensation package entered into
by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest with respondent LEAL
REALTY in the amount of P114,000.00, leaving an unpaid balance
of P46,000.00. At best, it was deemed as a gesture of compassion akin
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to a pabuya upon the instruction of JOSEFINA, the former landowner,
to respondent LEAL REALTY.
The Provincial Adjudicator also declared the sale between JOSEFINA
and LEAL REALTY as valid on the following rationalization:
On the issue of coverage or non-coverage. The landholding in question
consists of 201,051 square meters, more or less, located at
Brgy. Bulo, Victoria, Tarlac. The property was formerly owned by
Josefina Roxas Omana then covered by TCT No. 103275. On June 6,
1988 or nine (9) days before Republic Act No. 6657 took effect,
Josefina Roxas Omana sold the land by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of defendant corporation. A title was subsequently issued
in favor of the latter under TCT No. 215216 of the Register of Deeds of
Tarlac, Tarlac and registered on September 12, 1988.
Given this situation, there is no question that the sale between the
previous owner, Josefina Roxas Omana, and defendant corporation is
valid. [The] [p]rovision of Section 6, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No.
6657 states that:
x x x Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease,
management contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed
by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null and void;
Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid
only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three
(3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of
Deeds shall inform the DAR within thirty (30) days of any transaction
involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.
What is being prohibited by law is the disposition of the property after
the effectivity of RA 6657 in order to circumvent the provision of the
said law.[13]
The Provincial Adjudicator also declared that a portion of the subject
landholding was within the coverage of the CARL. He reached the
foregoing conclusion in this wise:
Likewise, the remaining portion which is 17 hectares, more or less,
which is agricultural in nature, excluding the memorial park duly
approved for conversion appears to be within the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. It should be noted that
on July 22, 1988, former President Corazon C. Aquino approved and
signed Proclamation No. 131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program which shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangements
and commodity produce, all public and private agricultural lands as
provided in the Constitution, including whenever applicable in
accordance with law, other land if the public domain is suitable for
agriculture. On the same date, Executive Order No. 229 was
promulgated providing for the mechanism for the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. On June 15, 1988, or nine
(9) days after the sale of the land in issue, RA 6657 took effect.Said law
covers, regardless of tenurial arrangements and commodity produced,
all public and private agricultural land as provided in Proclamation No.
131 and Executive Order No. 229, including lands of public domain
suitable for agriculture.
The fact that the landholding in question was not covered by Operation
Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27 is well[-]taken considering that the
land in issue is predominantly sugar land[,] whereas PD No. 27 covers
only rice and corn lands. In its schedule of implementation provided in
Section 7 thereof, the land in question clearly, squarely and timely falls
within its last phase of implementation. Under Phase III (b) of the said
section, Landholdings from the retention limit up to twenty-four (24)
hectares, to be covered on the sixth (6th) year from the effectivity of this
Act and to be completed within four (4) years, to implement principally
the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they till.[14]
The Provincial Adjudicator held that the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) was, thus, duty-bound to look into the petitioners
qualification as prospective farmer-beneficiaries, notwithstanding the
fact that they were found to be hired laborers.
Finally, the Provincial Adjudicator held that LEAL REALTY violated
Republic Act No. 6657 when it subdivided and inter-subdivided the
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subject landholding and sold portions thereof to the SPS. TUGADI and
SPS. ALCAZAREN. Both sales were found to have been made after the
effectivity of the said Act. However, it denied jurisdiction thereon on the
ground that the matter was within the cognizance of the Regional Trial
Court. Also, anent the fourth Complaint which was filed by LEAL
REALTY against petitioner VALENZUELA, the Provincial Adjudicator
found that VALENZUELA constructed the improvements on the
portion of the landholding in question as an extension of the house of
her father and predecessor-in-interest Pablo Cornes. As the latter cannot
be said to be a bona fide tenant, VALENZUELA was ordered to have
the said improvements removed.
The decretal portion of the Provincial Adjudicators Decision of 31 July
1997 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
the following cases, to wit:
1. Dismissing DARAB CASE NO. 234-T91 for lack of merit;
2. Dismissing DARAB CASE NO. 396-T93 and 397-T93 for lack of
jurisdiction;
3. Ordering the removal of any improvements made by the defendant in
DARAB CASE NO. 827-T95; and
4. No cost.[15]
Petitioners brought forth an appeal of the 31 July 1997 Decision of the
Provincial Adjudicator of Tarlac before the DARAB Central Office in
Diliman, Quezon City.
The Ruling of the DARAB
On 1 February 2000, the DARAB vacated the appealed Decision. It
reversed the 31 July 1997 Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator, and
disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
SETTING ASIDE the decision of the Honorable Adjudicator and
ENTERING A NEW ONE as follows:
1. Declaring [herein petitioners] as bona fide tenants of the subject
landholding;
2. If reinstatement is no longer possible due to the effective change of
the subject landholding unto other purposes other than agricultural, then
[herein respondents] are ordered to pay [herein petitioners] disturbance
compensation and other benefits provided for in par. VI-B (6), DAR
Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1997 without prejudice to the
prosecution of the former for illegal conversion.[16]
The DARAB held that the right to security of tenure does not only apply
to bona fide tenants; but also to actual tillers of the land. It also declared
that there was an implied tenancy between the parties. The DARAB
ruled that for more than 30 years, the petitioners were deemed tenants of
the subject landholding.
The DARAB pronounced:
Pursuant to Department Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1973
issued by the DAR for the implementation of P.D. No. 27, security of
tenure is likewise available to actual tillers of the land and actual tillers
has been defined to be the tenant-farmer, sublessee and purchaser or
mortgagee of possession who at the time the decree was promulgated
has been in actual possession and cultivation of his farmholding and
who has shared the products thereof for at [l]east one (1) agricultural
year preceding the Decree. x x x.
xxxx
For tenancy to exist, there must have been an agreement between the
tenant and the landowner, x x x x this means that without such
agreement, express or implied there can be no tenancy.[Herein
respondents] claimed that [herein petitioners] had not been instituted as
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tenants on the land in suit. However, the fact that they did not at all
question his tenancy over the land in question for quite several years, is
an implied admission or consent to the establishment of a tenancy
relationship between the parties.
Thus, Sec. 5 [of] Republic Act No. 3844 provides:
Sec. 5. Establishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation The
agricultural leasehold relation shall be established by operation of law in
accordance with Sec. 4 of this Code and, in other cases, either orally or
in writing express or implied.
Consequently, the tenant herein is entitled to security of tenure on this
landholding and can not be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the
Court (Sec. 7 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms (sic), R.A. No. 3844,
Baoanan vs. Reyes, CA-G.R. No. SP-04210, July 15, 1976). Security of
tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as
life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to
deprivation of their and their families[] only means of livelihood. Such
dispossession, therefor, is indeed a grave injury which social justice
seeks to vindicate (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 440,
December 14, 1988).
Likewise in Sec. 56, Republic Act No. 1199, it provides that in case
there is doubt in the interpretation and enforcement of laws or acts
relative to tenancy, including agreements between the landowner and
the tenant, it should be resolved in favor of the latter to protect him from
unjust exploitation and arbitrary ejectment by unscrupulous landowners.
Sect[ion] 7 of Republic Act No. 38844 (sic) provides:
Sec. 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. The agricultural
leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural
lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such
leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected
therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.
The Supreme Court in the case of Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 168
SCRA 440-441, December 14, 1988, held that the purchaser of the
landholding is subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations
of the agricultural lessor (Sec. 10, Rep. Act No. 3844), the agricultural
leasehold relationship continues between the agricultural lessee and the
purchaser automatically by operation of law and the latter, an
agricultural lessor, is bound to respect the agricultural lessee[s]
possession and cultivation of the land.
[Petitioners] have been in possession and cultivation of the subject
landholding for more than thirty (30) years and have been identified as
tenants therein by Araceli Pascua, an employee of DAR, Victoria,
Tarlac in an ocular inspection conducted by the latter on the subject
landholding.[17] (Underscoring supplied.)
Respondents moved for reconsideration of the foregoing DARAB
Decision. On 20 February 2002, the DARAB issued a
Resolution[18] denying the Motion for lack of merit.
Respondents went to the Court of Appeals on a Petition for
Review. On 24 April 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution[19] dismissing the same. It found that the certification of non-
forum shopping attached to the Petition was signed by Ernesto M.
Legaspi sans a board resolution and a special power of attorney giving
him authority to file the action in behalf of LEAL REALTY and LEAL
HAVEN, and the individual respondents. Also, certified copies of
pertinent pleadings were not shown to have been attached to the
Petition.
On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution,[20] dated 7
August 2002, reinstating the Petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 31 March 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein assailed
Decision which granted respondents Petition for Review. The
dispositive portion of the judgment states:
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WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 1, 2000 of the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is VACATED and SET
ASIDE, while the decision dated July 31, 1997 of the Provincial
Adjudicator is REINSTATED.[21]
Essentially, the Court of Appeals sided with the findings of the
Provincial Adjudicator. It was adamant in ruling that for a tenancy
relationship to exist, there must be a concurrence of the six
requisites, i.e., (i) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (ii) the
subject is agricultural land; (iii) there is consent by the landowner; (iv)
the purpose is agricultural production; (v) there is personal cultivation;
and (vi) there is sharing of the harvest. The Court of Appeals ruled that
substantial evidence was wanting to support a conclusion that a tenancy
relationship existed between the parties. It held that the fact that
petitioners had worked on the subject landholding did not give rise to
the existence of a tenancy relationship. However, it opined that
notwithstanding the lack of tenancy relationship between the parties, the
compensation agreement package entered into between LEAL REALTY
and petitioners must be respected. Hence:
Rodolfo, et al[.] failed to prove that Josefina agreed to constitute them
as tenants of the landholding and that there was sharing of the produce
thereof between them. On the contrary, Josefina executed an affidavit of
non-tenancy in respect to the landholding which was annotated on the
back of TCT No. 103275 as Entry Nos. E-17-7182, E-22-4361 and E-
28-16373. Such non-tenancy was confirmed by Jacinto, Pablo, Juanito
and Francisco in their affidavit admitting that they were merely hired
laborers. Although the aforesaid annotations are not conclusive upon
courts as to the legal nature and incidents of the relationship between
Josefina and said hired laborers (Cuao vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA
122), the same corroborate the sworn declaration of Jacinto, Pablo,
Juanito and Francisco that they were mere hired laborers, thereby
precluding the existence of tenancy relationship.
Respondents contend that the status of Rodolfo, et al[.] as tenants was
substantially supported by (i) the unrebutted testimony of Rodolfo, (ii)
the testimony of [Senior Agrarian Reform Technologist] Araceli, (iii)
their compensation package agreement with Leal Realty which partakes
of the nature of tenants disturbance compensation, (iv) the affidavits
executed by the chairman of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council and
the barangay chairman of Bulo, Victoria, Tarlac recognizing them as
tenants and (v) Leal Realtys letter admitting its inability to comply with
the financial package and allowing them to continue working on the
landholding.
Nevertheless, Rodolfo et al[.] failed to establish the concurrence of all
the requisites of tenancy relationship; the absence of one does not make
an occupant or a cultivator of a land or a planter thereon a de jure tenant
(Heirs of Jose Juanite vs. Court of Appeals, 375 SCRA 273).
It is noteworthy that [Senior Agrarian Reform Technologist] Aracelis
testimony indicates that in 1989, she conducted an ocular inspection of
the landholding and found five tenants working thereon, including
Jacinto, Pablo, Juanito and Francisco. However, the former hired
laborers occupation of their respective portions of the landholding was
part of their compensation package agreement with Leal Realty which
was found by the Provincial Adjudicator to be a gesture of compassion
(pabuya) extended by the latter, upon the instruction of Josefina, that
Rodolfo, et al[.],being her laborers, be given some consideration.
It is settled that certifications issued by administrative agencies or
officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely provisional and not
conclusive on courts (Bautista vs. Araneta, supra,citing Oarde vs. Court
of Appeals, 280 SCRA 235). Thus, affidavits of administrative officials
recognizing Rodolfo, et al[.] as tenants cannot be given weight in the
absence of substantial evidence supporting such fact.[22]
The Court of Appeals also pronounced the sale of the subject
landholding to LEAL REALTY as valid for the reason that it was
entered into before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the 31 March 2005 Decision
was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 5 April
2005. Moreover, in the same Resolution, the Court of Appeals granted
petitioners Motion for Substitution of Parties, to wit:
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It appears from respondents Motion for Substitution of Parties
dated July 18, 2005, that respondents Pablo Cornes, Sr., Ernesto T.
Cornes, Juanito C. Robles and Francisco M. Gadiano died onSeptember
23, 2001, April 2, 1997, May 9, 2005 and October 5, 2005,
respectively. Consequently, Pablo Cornes, Sr. is substituted by his
children Alfredo Cornes, Eleseo Cornes, Benito Cornes and Consuelo
Nita Cornes-Valenzuela; Ernesto T. Cornes is substituted by his widow
Ma. Alberta Cornes and their children Cherilyn, Jonalyn, Dianalyn,
Marie Joy, Ernesto Jr., Jerson and Erika, all surnamed Cornes, the last
three, being minors, represented by their guardian ad litem Ma. Alberta
Cornes; Juanito Robles is substituted by his widow Maria Robles and
their children Donato Robles, Eduardo Robles, Rizalino Robles, Edwin
Robles, Vicente Robles, Jessie Robles, Aniceto Robles, Jerry Robles
and Marites Robles-Fabian; and Francisco Gadiano is substituted by his
children Crisanto, Randy, Dinia, Maureen, Joana, Nova, Francisco, Jr.
and Beatriz, all surnamed Gadiano, the last four represented by their
siblings and guardians ad litem.[23]
Hence, the instant Petition.
The Issue
Petitioners assign several errors[24] which revolve on the jugular issue of
whether petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest are tenants de
jure of the subject landholding.
The Ruling of the Court
A. Tenancy Relationship
It must be initially emphasized that for the DARAB to have jurisdiction
over a case, there must be a tenancy relationship between the
parties.[25] We stress that a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed.[26] In order for a tenancy agreement to arise, it is essential to
establish all its indispensable elements, viz: 1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of
the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part
of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.[27]
Tenants are defined as persons who in themselves and with the aid
available from within their immediate farm households cultivate the
land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latters consent, for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under
the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold tenancy
system.[28]
In resolving the question of tenancy, it must be borne in mind that
whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not is basically a question
of fact.[29] The general rule is, a question of fact is beyond the office of
this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in
which only questions of law may be raised.[30] It is settled doctrine that
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon
this Court.[31] Such factual findings shall not be disturbed, unless: (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and
conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.[32]
We find herein a proper application of the exception to the rule. In the
case at bar, the findings of fact are conflicting. The Provincial
Adjudicator and the Court of Appeals were in concurrence that no
tenancy relationship existed between the parties. In contrast, the
DARAB ruled that petitioners are bona fide tenants of the subject
landholding.
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After a thorough evaluation of the records, we conclude that petitioners
failed to adduce substantial evidence to show the existence of all the
indispensable requisites for the constitution of a tenancy
relationship. We shall address the elements of tenancy[33] seriatim as
they apply to the instant Petition.
At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and the
tenants. While it appears that there was personal cultivation[34] by
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest of the subject landholding,
what was established was that petitioners claim of tenancy was founded
on the self-serving testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes that his
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the landholding for
more than 30 years and had engaged in a 50-50 sharing scheme with
JOSEFINA and JOSEFINAs grandmother, the previous owner
thereof. Self-serving statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must
be adduced.[35] Such claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence to
support them. The burden rests on the shoulders of petitioners to prove
their affirmative allegation of tenancy, which burden they failed to
discharge with substantial evidence.Such a juridical tie must be aptly
shown. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of proof, and from the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of
proof never parts.[36] The same rule applies to administrative cases. In
fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his
cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon
which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove
his exception or defense.[37] While it might have been shown and not
contested that petitioners predecessors-in-interest, namely JACINTO,
PABLO, JUANITO and FRANCISCO[38] occupied the subject
landholding as tillers thereof, the records support the fact that their
occupancy was in the nature of hired laborers of JOSEFINA. This was
the factual finding of the Provincial Adjudicator which was seconded by
the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, there is evidence to support
that the subject landholding was not tenanted. As can be gleaned from
the Entry No. E-17-7182,[39] annotated on 2 June 1977 at the back of
TCT No. 103275, covering the subject landholding in the name of
JOSEFINA, the same was not tenanted. Moreover, Entry No. E-22-
4361, dated26 March 1982, also annotated on the aforesaid certificate of
title, is explicit that the subject landholding is not tenanted.[40] Further,
the records reveal that petitioners predecesssors-in-interest, namely
PABLO, JACINTO, FRANCISCO and JUANITO, executed an affidavit
on 8 December 1988, attesting that they were working on the subject
landholding as hired laborers only. These facts taken together were
deemed by both the Provincial Adjudicator and the Court of Appeals to
be corroborative of the entries annotated on TCT No. 103275 that the
subject landholding was indeed not tenanted, and that petitioners
predecessors-in-interest were hired laborers of JOSEFINA. Such type of
occupation on the subject landholding does not create a presumption of
tenancy in petitioners favor. Clearly, the fact alone of working on
anothers landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of
agricultural tenancy.[41]
Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed a
sharing of harvests in the context of a tenancy relationship between
petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest and
JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is illuminating to the effect that to prove such
sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be
presented.[42] None was shown. No receipts were presented as
testaments to the claimed sharing of harvests. The only evidence
submitted to establish the purported sharing of harvests was the
testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes. The sharing arrangement cannot
be deemed to have existed on the basis alone of petitioner Rodolfo
Corness claim. It is self-serving and is without evidentiary value. Self-
serving statements are deemed inadequate; competent proof must be
adduced.[43] If at all, the fact alone of sharing is not sufficient to
establish a tenancy relationship.[44]
We also sustain the conclusion reached by the Provincial Adjudicator
and the Court of Appeals that the testimony of Araceli Pascua, an
employee of the DAR in Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject landholding
was tenanted cannot overcome substantial evidence to the contrary. To
prove the alleged tenancy no reliance may be made upon the said public
officers testimony. What cannot be ignored is the precedent ruling of
this Court that the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality
concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between
the contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not
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binding upon the courts.[45] This ruling holds with greater effect in the
instant case in light of the fact that petitioners, as herein shown, were
not able to prove the presence of all the indispensable elements of
tenancy.
The element of consent in the creation of the tenancy relationship was
sorely missing. As was seen earlier, even petitioners predecessors-in-
interest were unequivocal in their admission that they worked as hired
laborers on the subject landholding. The intent, if any, to institute them
as tenants of the landholdings was debunked by their very admission.
All the requisites[46] must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more
requisites is fatal to petitioners cause. It cannot even make the alleged
tenant a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de
jure tenant.[47] This is so because unless a person has established his
status as a de juretenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he
covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws.[48]
One glaring factor that strikes the mind of this Court is the fact that
petitioners did not implead JOSEFINA, the seller of the subject
landholding, in any of their Complaints filed below. JOSEFINA, who is
a party[49] to the said contract of sale, is an indispensable party. An
indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the
controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made,
in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.[50] As a party
to the contract of sale, which petitioners seek to declare voided and
annulled, there cannot be a determination between the parties already
before the court, a determination that is effective, complete, or
equitable[51] without impleading JOSEFINA; hence, rendering their
action dismissible. From the beginning, this was a legal hindrance which
petitioners were not able to successfully overcome. It is hornbook
doctrine that the joinder of all indispensable parties must be made
under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the
exercise of the judicial power.[52] When an indispensable party is not
before the court, the action should be dismissed.[53]
B. Compensation Package Agreement
For a wholistic determination of the issues in the case at bar, we proceed
to consider the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the compensation
package agreement (compensation agreement) between petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest and respondent LEAL REALTY. On this
matter, the Court of Appeals held that notwithstanding the lack of
tenancy relationship, the compensation agreement must be
respected.[54] However, we note that the aforesaid finding concerning the
compensation package was not incorporated by the Court of Appeals in
the dispositive portion of its 31 March 2005 Decision. The Court of
Appeals, in affirming the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator, merely
reinstated the latters Decision, which was silent on the manner in which
the compensation agreement may be settled.
We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the compensation
package agreement must be respected.
As evident from the records, on 10 August 1988, the compensation
agreement[55] was particularized, as follows:
Relative to the Omaa property per T.C.T. No. 103275 now owned by
LEAL REALT CENTRUM CO., INC., hereunder is the compensation
package for you:
1. The amount of PESOS: ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND
ONLY (P160,000.00) to be prorated according to the area
apportioned to you with terms as follows:
a. P10,000.00 payable upon signing of affidavit and upon issuance of
clearance by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR). Oct. 17, 1988
b. P20,000.00 payable upon issuance of locational clearance by Housing
& Land Use Regulatory Board (HLRS) Nov. 17, 1988.
c. P65,000.00 payable on or before Dec. 15, 1988 upon the beginning of
project.
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d. P65,000.00 payable upon relocation to new residential area- 2,500 As agreed the following would be the terms and conditions of the land
square meters more or less. located after the barangay road (ricefield consisting of six (6) hectares
and sugarland of nine (9) hectares estimatedly erpsectively). (sic)
2. The area across the railroad on the southern portion of the property
will be given free to you as your work area. It is understood and agreed that within a period of two (2) years
from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1990, you can cultivate the
3. An area of 2,500 square meters will be given free to you as your riceland covering an area of six (6) hectares per attached plan, and
residential area which you will occupy within a year from todate. appropriate for yourselves the fruits thereof after which LEAL
(sic) REALTY CENTRUM CO., INC. will exclusively cultivate and operate
the said parcels of Riceland without need of any demand for you to
4. We will provide trucking services in transporting your home surrender possession thereof.
paraphernalia.
As regards the sugarland consisting of seven (7) hectares per attached
5. You are given first priority as your workforce recruitment scheme for location plan, you will cultivate the same within a period of two (2)
manual labor. years from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1990 and divide the fruits
and expenses thereof equally between yourselves and LEAL REALTY
6. USAGE OF LAND: CENTRUM CO., INC. through MR. FRANCISCO RIVERA, our Farm
The property can be used for livelihood while it is not yet needed by the Supervisor, who is duly authorized to transact in our behalf.
owner however, the term and condition of the usage will be at the
discretion of the owner. (Emphasis supplied.) On the third year thereof, that is, on January 1, 1991 LEAL REALTY
CENTRUM CO., INC., will takeover the cultivation of said parcel of
land exclusively, without need of any further demand for you to
In addition, the compensation agreement was set forth in more detail in surrender possession thereof.
a Memorandum dated 6 January 1989,[56] stating thus:
It is also agreed and understood that you are freeing LEAL REALTY
January 6, 1989 CENTRUM CO., INC. and LEAL HAVEN, INC., from any and all
further civil or criminal liabilities which may arise out of this
MESSRS. JUANITO ROBLES usufructuary contract and that you have entered this contract on your
PABLO CORNES free and voluntary will by signing on the spaces provided for below.
JACINTO CORNES
FRANCISCO GADIANO Very truly yours,
Brgy. Bulo, Victoria LEAL REALTY CENTRUM CO., INC.
Tarlac
(sgd.)
GENTLEMEN: ERNESTO M. LEGASPI
Managing Director

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CONFORME:
(sgd.) (sgd.)
JUANITO ROBLES PABLO CORNES
(sgd.) (sgd.)
JACINTO CORNES FRANCISCO GADIANO
Due to LEAL REALTYs failure to pay the full amount as contained in
the compensation agreement, petitioners were allowed to continue tilling
the land for their sole benefit until such time that it is able to pay the
balance thereof. On 16 February 1991, Ernesto M. Legaspi as Managing
Director of LEAL REALTY sent a letter[57] to JACINO, which is
worded in like manner as the letters addressed to PABLO, JUANITO
and FRANCISCO, except as to amount owed, to wit:
Feb. 16, 1991
MR. Jacinto Cornes
BRGY. BULO, VICTORIA, TARLAC
Under our compensation package dated August 10, 1988 and the
Memorandum dated January 6, 1989 on our Victoria property (Omaa
Property), you have been paid so far the total sum of P31,000.00 leaving
a balance of P27,000.00 (which includes P2,000.00 representing your
unrealized harvest for that piece of lot which had been included in the
simple subdivision).
In this regard, please be advised that because of our inability to pay you
the balance, you may continue working in the property and continue
appropriating for yourself the fruits thereof until we shall have paid
you. In other words, we are not yet taking over exclusive cultivation of
the area under our agreement but will do so upon payment to you of the
balance.
Very truly yours,
(sgd.)
ERNESTO M. LEGASPI
Managing Director
Therefore, LEAL REALTY may not be allowed to ignore the terms of
the compensation agreement on the premise that petitioners have long
been tilling the land for their sole benefit. The terms of the
compensation agreement must be respected.
The records show that out of the amount of P160,000.00 stated in the
compensation package, LEAL REALTY has already paid P114,000.00
thereof, leaving a balance ofP46,000.00. This amount should, thus, be
paid to JACINTO, PABLO, JUANITO and FRANCISCO (or their
heirs, where applicable) by LEAL REALTY in accordance with the
compensation agreement. In the same vein, LEAL REALTY is enjoined
to respect the terms of the compensation agreement by turning over the
2,500 square-meter lot[58] to JACINTO, PABLO, JUANITO, and
FRANCISCO as described therein.
Finally, anent the question on the coverage of the subject landholding
under the CARP, it pays well to heed that the jurisdiction over the
aforesaid issue is within the proper confines of the DAR Secretary,
pursuant to DARAB Revised Rules, Rule II, Section 1(g), as well as
Section 2 of Administrative Order No. 06-00, providing for the Rules of
Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases, granting exclusive
jurisdiction to the DAR Secretary in matters involving the classification
and identification of landholdings for coverage under the CARP,
including the identification, qualification or disqualification of potential
farmer-beneficiaries.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated 31 March 2005 and 5 April
2005, respectively, areAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(1) Respondent LEAL REALTY are DIRECTED to PAY
JACINTO, PABLO, JUANITO, and FRANCISCO (and their heirs,
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where applicable) the amount ofP46,000.00 to be pro-rated among the
latter in accordance with the compensation agreement; and
(2) Respondent LEAL REALTY is ORDERED to TURN
OVER THE 2,500 square-meter lot to JACINTO, PABLO, JUANITO,
and FRANCISCO (and their heirs, where applicable) per the
compensation agreement.
Jeremias v Estate of Mariano
Irene P. Mariano (Irene), a widow, owned two parcels of land located at
Barangay Balatas, Naga City, Camarines Sur, with an aggregate area of
a little more than 27 hectares. In 1972, the 2 parcels of land were placed
under the Operation Land Transfer program pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27. The tenanted portion of the landholdings were
subdivided among identified tenant-beneficiaries, and a subdivision plan
was made. Santiago Jeremias (father of petitioner Leopoldo) was one
the 40 tenant-beneficiaries. On June 26, 1988, Irene died intestate who
was succeeded by his two children, Jose P. Mariano and Erlinda M.
Villanueva. On 14 May 1989, Helen Mariano, Jose's wife, allegedly
instituted Ruben Vias (Ruben) as a tenant, through an unsigned
handwritten letter, despite the estate of the late Irene still unpartitioned
and under intestate proceedings. In 1991, Danilo Mariano was appointed
as administrator of the estate of Irene Mariano. He lodged before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) separate complaints
of ejectment and damages against both Ruben Vias and Leopoldo
Jeremias for their refusal to vacate despite oral and formal demands.
Ruben's basis for saying he was a tenant is the unsigned letter by Helen
Mariano, while on the other hand, Leopoldo claims that by virtue of
succession, he lawfully acquired right to cultivate granted by Irene to his
father Santiago Jeremias. Issue: Whether or not Leopoldo Jeremias and
Ruben Vias are tenants of the lands belonging to the late Irene Mariano
which entitles them to security of tenure. Ruling: No. The Court ruled
that they are not considered tenants entitle to security of tenure under
the law. Tenancy relationship arises if all the following essential
requisites are present: 1)that the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee; 2)that the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; 3)that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4)that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; 5)that there is personal cultivation on the part of
the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6)that the harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Claims by one of the
existence tenancy do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. In
this case, there is no substantial evidence that the petitioners were
installed by the owner of the lots in question as agricultural tenants on
the property. There is, likewise, no evidence that the petitioners shared
with the landowner the harvest and/or produce from the landholding.
Hence, the Court reinstated the decision of the PARAD.
Ceneze v. Ramos
acts: Petitioner Welfredo Ceneze filed an action for declaration as bona
fide tenant-lessee of two parcels of agricultural land owned by
respondent Feliciana Ramos located in Lelemaan, Manaoag,
Pangasinan. Petitioner alleged that in 1981, Julian Ceneze Sr.,
petitioners father, transferred his tenurial rights over the landholding to
him with the consent and approval of respondent and that, since then,
petitioner had been in actual and peaceful possession of the landholding
until April 12, 1991, when respondent forcibly entered and cultivated
the land for the purpose of dispossessing the petitioner of his right as
tenant.
Respondent denied that a tenancy relationship existed between her and
petitioner, asserting that she had never instituted petitioner as a tenant in
any of her landholdings. She averred that petitioner had never been in
possession of the landholding, but admitted that it was Julian, Sr. who
was the tenant of the landholding. After Julian Sr., his wife and his son
Julian Jr. migrated to the U.S.A. she reported on April 8, 1991, to the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Manaoag, Pangasinan,
the abandonment of the landholding by Julian, Sr., his wife and his son,
Julian, Jr.
On December 19, 1997, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision
in favor of petitioner for it find the petitioner a bona fide tenant-lessee of
the landholding. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
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Board (DARAB) affirmed the decision. evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The Certification of the BARC Chairman and the affidavits
Respondent elevated the case to the CA through a petition for review. of Julian, Sr. and of the tenants of the adjacent landholdings certainly do
On December 29, 2005, the CA resolved the petition in favor of not suffice. By themselves, they do not show that the elements of
respondent landowner and dismissed petitioners complaint. Likewise, consent of the landowner and of sharing of harvests are present.
petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review was filed. In any case, the fact alone of working on a landholding does not give
rise to a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner had tenancy relationship with Substantial evidence requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence in
respondent. order that the fact of sharing can be established; there must be concrete
evidence on record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing. To
Held: The petition is not meritorious. prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be
presented, because self-serving statements are inadequate. In this case,
In resolving this petition, the Court is guided by the principle that petitioner failed to present a receipt for respondents share in the
tenancy is not purely a factual relationship dependent on what the harvest, or any other solid evidence proving that there was a sharing of
alleged tenant does upon the land; it is also a legal relationship. A harvest.
tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to
prove the presence of all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) the To recap, petitioner is not a de jure tenant entitled to security of tenure.
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural There being no tenancy relationship between the parties, the DARAB
land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is did not have jurisdiction over the case. We, therefore, sustain the ruling
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is of the CA, dismissing petitioners complaint.
sharing of the harvest. The absence of one element does not make an
occupant of a parcel of land, its cultivator or planter, a de jure tenant.

The certification or findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (or of

an authorized representative) concerning the presence or the absence of
a tenancy relationship between the contending parties are merely
preliminary or provisional in character; hence, such certification does
not bind the judiciary.

From our own assessment of the evidence at hand, we find that

petitioner failed to establish the existence of a tenancy relationship
between him and respondent. To prove a tenancy relationship, the
requisite quantum of evidence is substantial evidence, or such relevant
evidence as a From our own assessment of the evidence at hand, we find
that petitioner failed to establish the existence of a tenancy relationship
between him and respondent. To prove a tenancy relationship, the
requisite quantum of evidence is substantial evidence, or such relevant

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