Finn Lundy

Professor Stevens

Transitions to Democracy

24 March 2017

Civil Society's Role in Democratizations: Its Strengths and Constraints

In the years of the democratization boom following the Cold War, scholars have often

praised the influence of civil society in the creation and consolidation of democratic regimes in

Africa and South America. And, in most cases, researchers claim that anti-governmental civil

society action played a vital role in bringing about increased gender equality in the wake of

apartheid as well as influencing the democratization of many South American countries.

However, the overly simplistic idea that civil society on its own is the primary driver of

democratization is a naive view of a highly complicated and nuanced issue. The current

conception of civil society does not acknowledge the fact that certain groups that are said to

represent civil society do much less in the promotion of democracy than do others. The civil

society groups that are most important, then, are those that can engage the powers that be,

usually the state or ruling regime and those that are organized hierarchically and possess a

leadership cadre that can interact with key elites such as the ANC Womens League in South

Africa and select municipalities in Mexico (Hassim, 170)(Selee, 66).

Given this information, it is clear that the relationship between civil society and

democratization is far from settled, and the simplistic antinomy between state and civil society,

locked in a zero-sum struggle, will not do. Instead, what is required is a more complex

conceptualization and nuanced theory (Diamond, 5). Perhaps the first step in this process is the

recognition that some groups that make up civil society play a larger role to play in the
democratization process than others. One must distinguish between those civil society

associations that are purely social and those that are directly and overtly politically oriented.

And, while one could argue that membership in even a nonpolitical organization will affect

political attitudes it would also then be expected that those organizations more directly involved

in the political process would have greater effects on the political perspectives of their

constituents. Given this information, it can be assumed that membership in a politically oriented

organization would lend itself to greater political competence than membership in a nonpolitical

organization. Further, it can be assumed that active membership in an organization has more

significant impact on political power than does passive membership. In other words, bowling

leagues will not be lobbying Congress or leading revolutions in the foreseeable future.

The differentiations within the realm of civil society brings up an important point.

Contrary to popular belief, a vibrant civil society is probably more essential for consolidating

and maintaining democracy than for initiating it (Diamond, 7). Thus, the promotion of civil

society concerning bowling leagues, bridge clubs, and bird-watching groups may be essential for

established democracies like the United States, but the support of these types of groups makes

little sense for countries in the initial phases of democratization. For such countries as South

Africa and Mexico, the Tocquevillian ideal of civil society as a laboratory for democracy is

overly optimistic. Civil society within the liberal model is simply beyond the capacities of

groups and organizations in countries facing the early stages of democratization. And, while

these conceptions may gain salience as countries already well along the path to democracy, they

lack the ability to generate the type of political environment where each can survive in a country

in the early stages of democratization. As such, rather than purely civil society, what should be
highlighted are groups that can voice previously neglected demands while maintaining contact

with the powers that be within that country.

And, there is no better example of this theory than the events that took places in the years

leading up to and after the end of apartheid in South Africa. Frene Ginwala, the head of the

ANCs Emancipation Commission, commented that if we are going to push for a real challenge

to gender oppression and the real emancipation of women, what we need is a strong womens

organization, organized around the issues of concern to women. Therefore, while the League has

a particular role to play, we still need a national womens organization (Hassim 134). In effect,

the ability to bring all women, and even existing womens civil society which do not necessarily

subscribe to particular ANC positions together would allow women to have much better

collective bargaining clout. In Ginwalas words it will allow us to force decisions in our favor

when it comes to the either or situation, in a budget debate or anything else. . . . I mean politics is

about power and womens liberation is about power. Unless we empower women

organisationally, we cant liberate ourselves (Hassim 134). In short, this goes back to the idea

that without the ability to voice the previously neglected demands of its constituents civil society

will prove useless and lack membership.

Ginwala words came to fruition when in May 1990, the ANC Womens League met with

approximately seventy women from various womens organizations inside the country to discuss

the disbanding of current organizations and the possibility of their joining the ANC Womens

League (Hassim, 116). Within the ANC Womens League, there was much discussion

revolved around empowering women, increasing their participation at all levels of the movement

and especially in decision-making and policy formulation. Perhaps the most important aspect of

this discussion was the policy that resulted from it. Of the proposed amendments to the ANC
constitution was the requirement that the ANC be responsible for the emancipation of women

and the need for developing enforcement mechanisms relating to gender relations, political

rights, women workers rights, harassment and abuse (117, Hassim). During the meeting, they

also resolved to recommend an amendment to the ANC constitution which would require that 25

to 30 percent of the National Executive Committee members be women (117, Hassim). And, as

the ANC Womens League become the dominant women's political organization it became

increasingly evident at least according to Lucy Nyembe that The ANC must become the

political home of women in this country. Our primary task is to go into our communities and to

organize in such a way that we draw women nearer to the ANC (118, Hassim). This

consolidation of power within womens groups allows for increased democratization.

To be effective within the ANC, and strengthen its argument for greater autonomy, the

league had to be seen to be leading a strong constituency as well as strong leadership. As such, in

April of 1991, the ANC Womens League held its first national conference after its unbanning

where delegates elected the national executive of the Womens League. In the end, Gertrude

Shope, former leader of the Womens Section, was elected president and UDF member Albertina

Sisulu was elected vice president. Importantly both Shope and Sisulu were sensitive to the

concerns of younger women activists, recognizing the importance of shaping the new direction

of the league (123 Hassim). And, while progress was slow at first by the April 1994 election

demands made by the coalition for womens representation in decision-making structures finally

found support among political parties, especially within the ANC (Hassim, 171). And, as a result

of the first democratic election in 1994, women constituted a record 27.7 percent of all

parliamentarians elected, placing South Africa in the ranks of the top ten democracies in the

world in relations to women's parliamentary representation (Hassim, 173). In the end, without
the ANCWLs ability to show it had a strong constituency coupled with a leadership cadre that

interacted with key elites such as Nelson Mandela none of this democratization would have been

possible.

Unlike apartheid South Africa where the government banned ANC activities for a short

period, municipalities in Mexico have long had institutional structures to facilitate the

participation of citizens in policy decisions and the assignment of municipal resources (Selee,

66). The institutions included the likes of the Municipal Planning Councils (Copladem),

Municipal Development Councils (Codemun), and an array of locally designed neighborhood

councils and public works committees (Selee, 67). However, during Mexico's decades of single-

party dominance, these institutions were very clientelistic in nature and were often closely tied to

the PRIs internal structures. As such, while one might initially think that these institutions were

beneficial in creating civil society within the municipalities, it ended up doing more harm than

good due to their clientelistic tendencies. However, according to Selee, the available evidence

suggests that many municipalities have Copladem or Coplademun, but they tend to be mere

formalities, often consisting of an ad hoc group of government officials and program

beneficiaries (Selee, 67). To be expected, almost no municipalities actually use these bodies to

incorporate citizen voices into planning and decision making. Nonetheless, according to one

study of municipal mayors, over half of all municipalities have institutions for getting citizen

input concerning municipal investment priorities, even though few of these institutions are used

to decide on whether to fund a project or for evaluating it after implementation (Selee, 67). In a

sense, these institutions create an illusion of a vibrant civil society when the truth is these

institutions hold very little power.

 However, despite these limitations, there have been municipalities that have used the

Copladem and Codemun to open channels for more robust citizen participation in planning and

public policy decisions (Selee, 68). For the most part, these rare experiences have taken place in

municipalities where opposition parties have won for the first time. Two examples were the

small municipality of Cuquo in Jalisco, which, under a PRD government, implemented a

twelve-year experiment in participatory planning using an expanded Copladem, and Berriozbal

in Chiapas, which did the same during two PRD administrations (Selee, 68).

The limited scope and durability of participatory mechanisms in Mexico is perhaps not

surprising. Given the poor quality of representative institutions, they hardly create incentives for

municipal leaders to reach out to citizens. However, the weakness of participatory channels

might also suggest a significant separation between the emergence of a more active citizenry, on

the one hand, and the structure of the municipality, on the other. In other words, according to

Selee, if an "autonomous civil society is developing in Mexico as old clientelistic channels

within the PRI lose some of their importance, then participation will have to take place at the

margin of public institutions because municipal governments have created few durable channels

for citizen engagement between elections" (Selee, 68).

In both cases, the final piece of the strategy of influence is that such groups must be

capable of having their claims heard and recognized. An effective civil society should be able to

mobilize political clout as the ANCWL did in South Africa. Not only is such clout important for

having claims heard, but it is also vital for the continued recruitment of new members. People are

more likely to join organizations which they perceive as possessing a degree of power like the

ANC in South Africa. Given this information, granting autonomous civil societies recognition

on the macro level should have positive effects on their ability to recruit members on the micro
level. Ultimately, then, eventual state involvement is crucial for the success of civil society. In

part, this is where Mexico is lacking because the initial movement should originate from

organizations with little initial connections to the government in order to avoid clientelism.

Finally regardless of the strength of the civil society, if these groups lack a stable and coherent

state to hear and respond to their demands, further progress towards democracy is unlikely to

unfold.

By arguing that democratization is better guaranteed by civil society that can engage the

powers that be, usually the state or ruling regime and those that are organized hierarchically and

possess a leadership cadre that can interact with key elites I hope to add a different dimension to

a previously very limiting theory. Perhaps my greatest takeaway from the paper is that not all

civil society groups are created equal. Conceiving of civil society from a spatial perspective no

longer reflects the changing relationships between state, market, and society, and moreover fails

to account for groups, like paramilitary organizations, which transcend the boundaries between

state and society. Moreover, the idealistic definitions inherited from Tocqueville of democracy as

a laboratory for democracy is not reflected in the role of civil society organizations, NGOs, and

other groups that have been theorized to be major players in democracy promotion. The current

conception of civil society, in other words, does not acknowledge the fact that certain groups that

are said to represent civil society do much less in the promotion of democracy than do others.

The groups that are most important, then, are those that can engage the powers that be, usually

the state or ruling regime and those that are organized hierarchically and possess a leadership

cadre that can interact with key elites such as the ANCWLs movement in South Africa. By

directing aid and advice to these groups that make up political society, transitions to democracy

are likely to be less time-intensive, less violent, and more likely to result in long-lasting
 democracies. In other words, only by emphasizing political civil society can the theoretical

promises of civil society be realized.

Works Cited

Diamond, Larry Jay. "Toward Democratic Consolidation." Journal of Democracy 5.3 (1994): 4-17.

Web.

Selee, Andrew D. Decentralization, Democratization, and Informal Power in Mexico. University

Park: Penn State UP, 2011. Print.

Hassim, Shireen. Women's Organizations and Democracy in South Africa Contesting Authority.

Madison: U of Wisconsin, 2006. Print.