PoliRev (2nd Recit)

Sovereignty
1. Tecson vs. Comelec

FACTS:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his
certificate of candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his
certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his
parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject.

The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on
the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding such election.
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on
the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that
the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father
of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954
at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate,
the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at
least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was
also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not
substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is
no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was
a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed under
1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or
illegitimate.
2. BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA.
As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act
Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired
(1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other,
rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased
by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the
U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630
[(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of
the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd
District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was
then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent
HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is
not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz
the duly elected Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:

1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due
to:
 1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance
with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a
natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.
It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his
original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

3. Republic of the Philippines vs. Sagun

FACTS:

Respondent is the legitimate child of father, aChinese national, and mother, a Filipino
citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio Cityand did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. At the age of 33, she executed an
Oath of Allegianceto the Republic of the Philippines. The document was notarized but
was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City. In 2005,
she applied for a Philippine passport but was denied due to the citizenship of her
father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected
Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election
of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be
ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.

ISSUE/s:

1.) Whether respondents petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is

authorized by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; and
2.) Whether the respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law.
 RULING:

1.) Yes. But it should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule
which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship before the courts. Respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the
intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she
has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
2.) No. Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with
the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine
citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
citizenship by election.All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of
election of Philippinecitizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil
registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents
petition before the trial court must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for judicial declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
4. Maquiling vs. COMELEC
THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The
Resolution[1] in SPA No. 10-109(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 2010
is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the
Resolution[2] of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for
finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is
solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a
U.S. passport.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.[3] However, as a consequence of

his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his
Filipino citizenship.

Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.[4] On the same day an
Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his
favor.[5]

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.[6]

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually

renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a
citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief.[7]

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of

Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion.[8]
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate,
filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for
municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010
local and national elections.[9] Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a
resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as USA-American.[10]

To further bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in his

Memorandum a computer-generated travel record[11] dated 03 December 2009
indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14
April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving
back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010, certifying that the name Arnado, Rommel Cagoco appears in the available
Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the
following pertinent travel records:
 DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700[12]
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order[13] requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from
receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and
to present evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where
Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the
winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the
following documents as evidence:[14]

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia
Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado,
attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has
been conspicuously and continuously residing in his familys ancestral house in
Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his
barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and
returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government
Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served
as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February
1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan
certifying that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April
2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of

candidacy based on misrepresentation,[15] the COMELEC First Division considered it as
one for disqualification. Baluas contention that
Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that Balua
failed to present any evidence to support his contention,[16] whereas the First Division
still could not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency
requirement under the Local Government Code.[17]

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with
Arnados claim that he is a Filipino citizen.[18]

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnados act of consistently using his US passport after
renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.

x x x x

Arnados continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no
real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring
inconsistency between Arnados unexplained use of a US passport six times and his
claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship.
As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, [a] passport is defined as an official
document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn
in foreign countries. Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would
not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.[19]

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC First Division
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to

cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel
C. Arnados proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.[20]

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the
ground that the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said
Resolution is contrary to law.[21] He raised the following contentions:[22]

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the

evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation,
which show that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 9225;
 2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his
American citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his
Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a
country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the
issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport
after he obtained it;
4. Baluas petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was
filed out of time, and the First Divisions treatment of the petition as one for
disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction;[23]
5. He is undoubtedly the peoples choice as indicated by his winning the
elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from
jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition
for quo warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his
proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of

Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified
Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnados
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as
the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and
his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling,
claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered,
and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does
not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6
of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose
qualifications for office is questioned.

As to Maquilings intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections
if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as
the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees
with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition
as one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period
prescribed by law,[24] having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11
May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division
and granted Arnados Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent

embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another
country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure
Philippine Citizen again.

x x x x

The use of a US passport [] does not operate to revert back his status as a dual
citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the
use of a US passport does not operate to un-renounce what he has earlier on
renounced. The First Divisions reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said
case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the
conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice,
thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of
allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is
not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by
working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of
Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the
mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.

x x x x

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport.

Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18,
2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that
he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his
subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondents submission of a
certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the
following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010,
March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use.
As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is
within his control during that time.[25]
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the
use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

[T]he application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is

more appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen,
either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a
citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates
himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use
of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of
expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention
of citizenship.[26]

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

[R]espondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his
allegiance to the United States. The latters continued use of his US passport and
enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the
afore-mention[ed] citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain
only his Philippine citizenship. Respondents submission with the twin requirements
was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running for
the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements;

once any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost
his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither
does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post
cure the latters failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding
his citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having
received the highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held
that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against a candidate
but was adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest
number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does not
violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it
when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who
enacted the law.[27]

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and
praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use
of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc
that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the
First Divisions disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the
applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC
committed reversible error in ruling that the succession of the vice mayor in case the
respondent is disqualified is in order.

ISSUES

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be
addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones qualifications to run for
public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government
Code is applicable to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC
En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes,
Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against
Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him
should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner
in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC
First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for
disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano[28] clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In

that case, the Court said:

That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt
is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.[29]

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the
COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites
for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC[30] are
present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not
deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.

Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and
respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot
be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining
finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant
petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will
attain finality.

The use of foreign passport

after renouncing ones
foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of
representation as to ones
nationality and citizenship; it
does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the
Oath of Renunciation required
to qualify one to run for an
elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

x x x x

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. x x x[31]

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He
took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question
that after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible
to run for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10
July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the
execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he
likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his

American citizenshipby executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the
requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,

regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.[32]

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack
when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts
showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.[33]

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing
his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the
country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal
question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for
public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions
that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his
foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an
American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he
is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United
States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano[34] already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine citizenshipthrough expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu
v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner
on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the
renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against
anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of
Philippine citizenship,[35] it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another
country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he
renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation[36] that he
absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA[37] and that he divest(s) [him]self of full employment of all civil
and political rights and privileges of the United States of America.[38]

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not
divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However,
by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it
took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his
US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal
to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to
run for an elective local position.

Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired

through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those
considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the
oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries
with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.[39] Dual citizens by
naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in
order to qualify as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a
dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He
was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code,[40] he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of
eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his
American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. x x x.[41]

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens
the citizenshipissue to attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that Arnados act of
consistently using his US passport effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.[42] This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after complying with the
requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from
running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running
for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has
earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a
foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was
not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of
which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later. [43]

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national
who sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his
renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the
Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of representation as a US
citizen before the immigration officials of this country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated Yet, as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his
subsequent travels abroad.[44] We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months
from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he
was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.

Besides, Arnados subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact
that after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of
candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign
passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine
passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with

attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise
demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to ones flag and country. While
those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those
who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands
full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his
American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only
from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010
elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes[45] which is the
jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as
the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its
soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-
placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite,
to fill the office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the
respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received
430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that
Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the
municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045
having intervened.[46]

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of Topacio on the basis of a statutory prohibition
for seeking a second re-election absent the four year interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots.[47]

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was
comparing the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x [with] that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office.

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast
between the two situations, thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of
fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after
an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate
declared to have received a plura[l]ity by the board of canvassers actually received
the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board
of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of
holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it
cannot be determined who received a [plurality] of the legally cast ballots. In the
latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting
and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result
can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict
sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be
found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a
plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the
former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility
of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the
question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the
question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single
individual.[48] (Emphasis supplied)

Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with In the other case, there
is not, strictly speaking, a contest in contrast to the earlier statement, In the
former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing
parties are striving for supremacy.

The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots.

A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of
First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the
eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdiction being confined to determine which of the contestants has been duly
elected the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he declared that no one had been
legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in
that town on 4 June 1912 where the only question raised was whether or not
Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president.

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second
placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge
exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elect[ed]
municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that
said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no
effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to the order to
show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment
be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.[49]

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a
legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one
process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent
statement, it is even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to

any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots.

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to
another candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what
stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next
highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that wreath?

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner.
By express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place,
but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his
ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he
may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and
duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his
ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to
his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office.
The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify
with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.

The popular vote does not cure the

ineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain
qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met
before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for
and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that
sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well
write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of
who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC[50]when
we pronounced:

x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to
the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot
be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed,
as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring
and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.[51] (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC[52] where the
Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without
qualifications lest Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements.[53]

[W]e have ruled in the past that a candidates victory in the election may be
considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified
if the main issue involves defects in the candidates certificate of candidacy. We said
that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it
is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory
provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after
the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v.
COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our
above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading
and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of
law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may
provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at
providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice about
a candidates eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39
of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials.
Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out
what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere
delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can
render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state
the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that
an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory
then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations
omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC,
concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any
disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and
win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot
by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice
spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It
is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the electorates voice
spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.

Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes

from among the qualified candidates.

With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as
he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC[54] and Jalosjos v.

COMELEC[55] that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in
favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of
an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible
candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The
votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications
and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there
are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is
awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks
any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC[56] that when the voters
are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidates disqualification and still
cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that
further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to
ineligible ones.

The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a prerequisite for

the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying
circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidates disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed
second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in
the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is
of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that
existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but
also the proclamation.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnados proclamation to be suspended under this rule
because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification.
Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he
was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy involves

his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for
in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is
to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been
elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed,
Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of
candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position. The prohibition serves as a bar against the
individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in
the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of
candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any
other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when
the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The affirmation of Arnados disqualification, although made long after the
elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared
to be not a candidate at all in the May 2010 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been
counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code
will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the

COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any
local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly
elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission
on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
5. Lee vs. Republic of the Philippines
ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE, HON. JUDGE JOSE D. ALOVERA,* Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Roxas City, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF ROXAS CITY, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,* respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The case under consideration is a petition for review on certiorari of the

decision[1] of the Court of Appeals nullifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Roxas
City, in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928,[2] pertaining to Lot 398, Capiz Cadastre,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389.
Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon, Lourdes,
Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all surnamed
Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate
area of 1,631 square meters, designated as Lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 3389, situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas
City.[3]
However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz
an action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of
land.[4] The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional
prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private agricultural land, including
residential, commercial or industrial land. Rebuffed in the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. On June 27, 1956, the Supreme
Court ruled thus:

granting the sale to be null and void and can not give title to the vendee, it does not
necessarily follow therefrom that the title remained in the vendor, who had also
violated the constitutional prohibition, or that he (vendor) has the right to recover the
title of which he has divested himself by his act in ignoring the prohibition. In such
contingency another principle of law sets in to bar the equally guilty vendor from
recovering the title which he had voluntarily conveyed for a consideration, that of pari
delicto.[5]

On July 1, 1968, the same former owners Rafael A. Dinglasan, together with
Francisco, Carmen, Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto,
Rizal, Jimmy, and Jesse Dinglasan filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an
action for recovery of the same parcel of land.[6] Citing the case of Philippine Banking
Corporation v. Lui She,[7] they submitted that the sale to Lee Liong was null and void
for being violative of the Constitution. On September 23, 1968, the heirs of Lee Liong
filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res
judicata.[8] On October 10, 1968, and November 9, 1968, the trial court denied the
motion.[9] The heirs of Lee Liong elevated the case to the Supreme Court by petition
for certiorari. On April 22, 1977, the Supreme Court annulled the orders of the trial
court and directed it to dismiss the case, holding that the suit was barred by res
judicata.[10]
On September 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 of
the Capiz Cadastre, formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389 of the
Register of Deeds of Roxas City.[11] Petitioners alleged that they were the widows of
the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the
owner of the lot. Lee Liong died intestate in February 1944. On June 30, 1947, Lee
Liongs widow, Ang Chia, and his two sons, Lee Bun Ting and Lee Bing Ho, executed an
extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Lee Liong, adjudicating to themselves the
subject parcel of land.[12] Petitioner Elizabeth Lee acquired her share in Lot No. 398
through an extra-judicial settlement and donation executed in her favor by her
deceased husband Lee Bing Hoo. Petitioner Pacita Yu Lee acquired her share in the
same lot by succession from her deceased husband Lee Bun Ting, as evidenced by a
deed of extra-judicial settlement.[13]
Previously, on December 9, 1948, the Register of Deeds, Capiz, Salvador Villaluz,
issued a certification that a transfer certificate of title over the property was issued in
the name of Lee Liong.[14] However, the records of the Register of Deeds, Roxas City
were burned during the war. Thus, as heretofore stated, on September 7, 1968,
petitioners filed a petition for reconstitution of title.
On June 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17, ordered the
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on
the basis of an approved plan and technical description.[15] The dispositive portion of
the trial courts decision reads thus:

WHEREFORE, in reiteration, the Register of Deeds for the City of Roxas is ordered to
reconstitute the lost or destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong,
deceased, of Roxas City, with all the conditions stated in paragraph 2 of this decision.
This decision shall become final after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the
Register of Deeds and by the Commissioner of LRA of a notice of such judgment
without any appeal having been filed by any of such officials.

SO ORDERED.

Given at Roxas City, Philippines,

June 10, 1994.

JOSE O. ALOVERA
Judge[16]

On August 18, 1994, the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch
17 issued an Entry of Judgment.[17]
On January 25, 1995, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of judgment in Reconstitution Case No. 1928, alleging that the
Regional Trial Court, Roxas City had no jurisdiction over the case.[18] The Solicitor
General contended that the petitioners were not the proper parties in the
reconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire
title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified
to own the subject land.
On April 30, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the
judgment of reconstitution void.[19]
On May 24, 1996, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.[20] On February 18, 1997, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion.[21]
 Hence, this petition.[22]
Petitioners submitted that the Solicitor General was estopped from seeking
annulment of the judgment of reconstitution after failing to object during the
reconstitution proceedings before the trial court, despite due notice. Petitioners
alleged that the Solicitor General merely acted on the request of private and
politically powerful individuals who wished to capitalize on the prime location of the
subject land.
Petitioners emphasized that the ownership of the land had been settled in two
previous cases of the Supreme Court, where the Court ruled in favor of their
predecessor-in-interest, Lee Liong.Petitioners also pointed out that they acquired
ownership of the land through actual possession of the lot and their consistent
payment of taxes over the land for more than sixty years.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that the decision in the
reconstitution case was void; otherwise, it would amount to circumventing the
constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring ownership of private or public
agricultural lands.
We grant the petition.
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form
and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a
piece of land.[23] The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing
the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has
been when the loss or destruction occurred.[24]
In this case, petitioners sought a reconstitution of title in the name of Lee Liong,
alleging that the transfer certificate of title issued to him was lost or destroyed during
World War II. All the documents recorded and issued by the Register of Deeds, Capiz,
which include the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of Lee Liong, were all
destroyed during the war. The fact that the original of the transfer certificate of title
was not in the files of the Office of the Register of Deeds did not imply that a transfer
certificate of title had not been issued.[25] In the trial court proceedings, petitioners
presented evidence proving the sale of the land from the Dinglasans to Lee Liong and
the latters subsequent possession of the property in the concept of owner. Thus, the
trial court, after examining all the evidence before it, ordered the reconstitution of
title in the name of Lee Liong.
However, there is a question as to whether Lee Liong has the qualification to own
land in the Philippines.
The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936,
during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,[26] aliens
could not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary
succession.[27] Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land
in question.[28]
The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not
validate the transaction, for it was still contrary to the constitutional proscription
against aliens acquiring lands of the public or private domain. However, the proper
party to assail the illegality of the transaction was not the parties to the
transaction.[29] In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by
virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are
deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari
delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party.[30] The proper party to
assail the sale is the Solicitor General. This was what was done in this case when the
Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of reconstitution of
title. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred
from initiating such action. Prescription never lies against the State.[31]
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of
the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion
or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set
forth.[32]
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings
because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has
since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs,
petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does
not dispute.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private
domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this
case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the
hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen,
the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee
is rendered valid.[33] Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified
Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial
transfer.[34] The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved.
Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certificate of
title must be based on an owners duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other
valid sources of the title to be reconstituted.[35] In this case, reconstitution was based
on the plan and technical description approved by the Land Registration
Authority.[36] This renders the order of reconstitution void for lack of factual
support.[37] A judgment with absolutely nothing to support it is void.[38]
As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new
certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.[39] It does not
pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.[40] Any
change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate
suit.[41] Thus, although petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate proceeding
is necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the land.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 36274. In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside the order of
reconstitution of title in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas
City, and dismisses the petition, without prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 Kapunan, J., on official leave.

6. Muller vs. Muller

Doctrine:

He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands.

Facts:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married
in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a
house owned by respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently
in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in
Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of
a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction
of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in
the name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller.

Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and

maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.

On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties

before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It
also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those
acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because
the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.

The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for
the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership
to him. It ordered the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of
P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for
the construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.

Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.
Ruling:
No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.
Ratio Decidendi:
There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite
a constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he
put the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what
the fundamental law bars him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.

7. Matthews vs Taylor

PHILIP MATTHEWS vs. BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and JOSELYN C. TAYLOR

G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 2009

Facts:
1. On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin, a British subject, married Joselyn, a 17-
year old Filipina.
2. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M.
Martin a lot (Boracay property).
3. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
4. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements
thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known
as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.
5. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in
the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister.
6. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim
Philippsen.
7. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a SPA in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the
latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with
third parties with respect to their Boracay property.
8. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee,
entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property for a period of 25
years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00.
9. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as
Music Garden Resort.
10. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn
without Benjamins consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner.
11. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of
the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns husband, any
transaction involving said property required his consent.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a
Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband is valid
2. Whether or not Benjamin is the actual owner of the property since he provided the
funds used in purchasing the same

Ruling:

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred
or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision,
they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of this
constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. Our
fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public
domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the
capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or
private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions.
There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more
aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and
petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private
and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership
thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds
for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no
implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be
allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity
or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on
the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in
respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared
conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the
land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a
right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

8. Beumer vs. Amores

BEUMER V. AMORES
G.R. 195670 December 3, 2012
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J

FACTS:
Petitioner. a Dutch national, assails the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of
RTC Negros Oriental. Petitioner and Filipina respondents marriage was nullified by
basis of the formers psychological incapacity. Petitioner thus filed for Dissolution of
Conjugal Partnership praying for distribution of the properties acquired during their
marriage which include 4 lots of land acquired through purchase and 2 lots by
inheritance. RTC ruled that all parcels of land be given to the respondent, tools and
equipment in favour of the petitioner and the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-
owned by the parties.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA?

HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines.
However, there are no restrictions to the ownership of buildings or structures on lands
of foreigners. As such, the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered co-owned by
the parties.

STATE IMMUNITY
11. Republic vs Hidalgo

Via this verified petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for short), thru the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), comes to this Court to nullify and set aside the decision dated
August 27, 2003 and other related issuances of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 37, in its Civil Case No. 99-94075. In directly invoking the Courts
original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition,
without challenge from any of the respondents, the Republic gave as justification
therefor the fact that the case involves an over TWO BILLION PESO judgment against
the State, allegedly rendered in blatant violation of the Constitution, law and
jurisprudence.

By any standard, the case indeed involves a colossal sum of money which, on the face
of the assailed decision, shall be the liability of the national government or, in fine,
the taxpayers. This consideration, juxtaposed with the constitutional and legal
questions surrounding the controversy, presents special and compelling reasons of
public interests why direct recourse to the Court should be allowed, as an exception to
the policy on hierarchy of courts.

At the core of the litigation is a 4,924.60-square meter lot once covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 118527 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila in the name of
the herein private respondent Tarcila Laperal Mendoza (Mendoza), married to Perfecto
Mendoza. The lot is situated at No. 1440 Arlegui St., San Miguel, Manila, near the
Malacaang Palace complex. On this lot, hereinafter referred to as the Arlegui
property, now stands the Presidential Guest House which was home to two (2) former
Presidents of the Republic and now appears to be used as office building of the Office
of the President.[1]

The facts:

Sometime in June 1999, Mendoza filed a suit with the RTC of Manila for reconveyance
and the corresponding declaration of nullity of a deed of sale and title against the
Republic, the Register of Deeds of Manila and one Atty. Fidel Vivar. In her complaint,
as later amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94075 and eventually raffled to
Branch 35 of the court, Mendoza essentially alleged being the owner of the
disputed Arlegui property which the Republic forcibly dispossessed her of and over
which the Register of Deeds of Manila issued TCT No. 118911 in the name of the
Republic.

Answering, the Republic set up, among other affirmative defenses, the States
immunity from suit.

The intervening legal tussles are not essential to this narration. What is material is
that in an Order of March 17, 2000, the RTC of Manila, Branch 35, dismissed Mendozas
complaint. The court would also deny, in another order dated May 12, 2000, Mendozas
omnibus motion for reconsideration. On a petition for certiorari, however, the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 60749, reversed the trial courts assailed orders and
remanded the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.[2] On appeal, this Court,
in G.R. No. 155231, sustained the CAs reversal action.[3]

From Branch 35 of the trial court whose then presiding judge inhibited himself from
hearing the remanded Civil Case No. 99-94075, the case was re-raffled to Branch 37
thereof, presided by the respondent judge.
On May 5, 2003, Mendoza filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file a Third Amended
Complaint with a copy of the intended third amended complaint thereto attached. In
the May 16, 2003 setting to hear the motion, the RTC, in open court and in the
presence of the Republics counsel, admitted the third amended complaint, ordered the
Republic to file its answer thereto within five (5) days from May 16, 2003 and set a
date for pre-trial.
In her adverted third amended complaint for recovery and reconveyance of
the Arlegui property, Mendoza sought the declaration of nullity of a supposed deed of
sale dated July 15, 1975 which provided the instrumentation toward the issuance of
TCT No. 118911 in the name of the Republic. And aside from the cancellation of TCT
No. 118911, Mendoza also asked for the reinstatement of her TCT No. 118527.[4] In the
same third amended complaint, Mendoza averred that, since time immemorial, she
and her predecessors-in-interest had been in peaceful and adverse possession of the
property as well as of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 118527. Such possession,
she added, continued until the first week of July 1975 when a group of armed men
representing themselves to be members of the Presidential Security Group [PSG] of
the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had forcibly entered [her] residence and
ordered [her] to turn over to them her Copy of TCT No. 118525 and compelled her
and the members of her household to vacate the same ; thus, out of fear for their
lives, [she] handed her Owners Duplicate Certificate Copy of TCT No. 118527 and had
left and/or vacated the subject property. Mendoza further alleged the following:

1. Per verification, TCT No. 118527 had already been cancelled by virtue of a deed of
sale in favor of the Republic allegedly executed by her and her deceased husband on
July 15, 1975 and acknowledged before Fidel Vivar which deed was annotated at the
back of TCT No. 118527 under PE: 2035/T-118911 dated July 28, 1975; and

2. That the aforementioned deed of sale is fictitious as she (Mendoza) and her husband
have not executed any deed of conveyance covering the disputed property in favor of
the Republic, let alone appearing before Fidel Vivar.

Inter alia, she prayed for the following:

4. Ordering the Republic to pay plaintiff [Mendoza] a reasonable compensation

or rental for the use or occupancy of the subject property in the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS a month with a five (5%)
per cent yearly increase, plus interest thereon at the legal rate,
beginning July 1975 until it finally vacates the same;

5. Ordering the Republic to pay plaintiffs counsel a sum equivalent to TWENTY

FIVE (25%) PER CENT of the current value of the subject property and/or
whatever amount is recovered under the premises;
Further, plaintiff prays for such other relief, just and equitable under
the premises.

On May 21, 2003, the Republic, represented by the OSG, filed a Motion for Extension
(With Motion for Cancellation of scheduled pre-trial). In it, the Republic manifested its
inability to simply adopt its previous answer and, accordingly, asked that it be given a
period of thirty (30) days from May 21, 2003 or until June 20, 2003 within which to
submit an Answer.[5] June 20, 2003 came and went, but no answer was filed. On July
18, 2003 and again on August 19, 2003, the OSG moved for a 30-day extension at
each instance. The filing of the last two motions for extension proved to be an idle
gesture, however, since the trial court had meanwhileissued an order[6] dated July 7,
2003 declaring the petitioner Republic as in default and allowing the private
respondent to present her evidence ex-parte.

The evidence for the private respondent, as plaintiff a quo, consisted of her testimony
denying having executed the alleged deed of sale dated July 15, 1975 which paved the
way for the issuance of TCT No. 118911. According to her, said deed is fictitious or
inexistent, as evidenced by separate certifications, the first (Exh. E), issued by the
Register of Deeds for Manila and the second (Exh. F), by the Office of Clerk of Court,
RTC Manila. Exhibit E[7] states that a copy of the supposed conveying deed cannot,
despite diligent efforts of records personnel, be located, while Exhibit F[8] states that
Fidel Vivar was not a commissioned notary public for and in the City of Manila for the
year 1975. Three other witnesses[9] testified, albeit their testimonies revolved around
the appraisal and rental values of the Arlegui property.

Eventually, the trial court rendered a judgment by default[10] for Mendoza and against
the Republic. To the trial court, the Republic had veritably confiscatedMendozas
property, and deprived her not only of the use thereof but also denied her of the
income she could have had otherwise realized during all the years she was illegally
dispossessed of the same.

Dated August 27, 2003, the trial courts decision dispositively reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the deed of sale dated July 15, 1975,

annotated at the back of [TCT] No. 118527 as PE:2035/T-
118911, as non-existent and/or fictitious, and, therefore,
null and void from the beginning;

2. Declaring that [TCT] No. 118911 of the defendant

Republic of the Philippines has no basis, thereby making
it null and void from the beginning;
 3. Ordering the defendant Register of Deeds for the
City of Manila to reinstate plaintiff [Mendozas TCT] No.
118527;

4. Ordering the defendant Republic to pay just

compensation in the sum of ONE HUNDRED FORTY THREE
MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P143,600,000.00) PESOS, plus interest at the legal
rate, until the whole amount is paid in full for the
acquisition of the subject property;

5. Ordering the plaintiff, upon payment of the just

compensation for the acquisition of her property, to
execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favor of the
defendant Republic ; and, on the other hand, directing
the defendant Register of Deeds, upon presentation of
the said deed of conveyance, to cancel plaintiffs TCT No.
118527 and to issue, in lieu thereof, a new Transfer
Certificate of Title in favor of the defendant Republic;

6. Ordering the defendant Republic to pay the

plaintiff the sum of ONE BILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT (P1,480,627,688.00) PESOS,
representing the reasonable rental for the use of the
subject property, the interest thereon at the legal rate,
and the opportunity cost at the rate of three (3%) per
cent per annum, commencing July 1975 continuously up
to July 30, 2003, plus an additional interest at the legal
rate, commencing from this date until the whole amount
is paid in full;

7. Ordering the defendant Republic to pay the

plaintiff attorneys fee, in an amount equivalent to
FIFTEEN (15%) PER CENT of the amount due to the
plaintiff.
With pronouncement as to the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket and emphasis added.)

Subsequently, the Republic moved for, but was denied, a new trial per order of the
trial court of October 7, 2003.[11] Denied also was its subsequent plea for
reconsideration.[12] These twin denial orders were followed by several orders and
processes issued by the trial court on separate dates as hereunder indicated:

1. November 27, 2003 - - Certificate of Finality declaring the August 27,

2003 decision final and executory.[13]
 2. December 17, 2003 - - Order denying the Notice of Appeal filed on
November 27, 2003, the same having been filed beyond the reglementary
period.[14]

3. December 19, 2003 - - Order[15] granting the private respondents motion

for execution.

4. December 22, 2003 - - Writ of Execution.[16]

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

By Resolution[17] of November 20, 2006, the case was set for oral arguments. On
January 22, 2007, when this case was called for the purpose, both parties manifested
their willingness to settle the case amicably, for which reason the Court gave them up
to February 28, 2007 to submit the compromise agreement for approval. Following
several approved extensions of the February 28, 2007 deadline, the OSG, on August 6,
2007, manifested that it is submitting the case for resolution on the merits owing to
the inability of the parties to agree on an acceptable compromise.
In this recourse, the petitioner urges the Court to strike down as a nullity the trial
courts order declaring it in default and the judgment by default that followed. Sought
to be nullified, too, also on the ground that they were issued in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, are the orders and processes
enumerated immediately above issued after the rendition of the default judgment.

Petitioner lists five (5) overlapping grounds for allowing its petition. It starts off by
impugning the order of default and the judgment by default. To the petitioner, the
respondent judge committed serious jurisdictional error when he proceeded to hear
the case and eventually awarded the private respondent a staggering amount without
so much as giving the petitioner the opportunity to present its defense.

Petitioners posture is simply without merit.

Deprivation of procedural due process is obviously the petitioners threshold theme.

Due process, in its procedural aspect, guarantees in the minimum the opportunity to
be heard.[18] Grave abuse of discretion, however, cannot plausibly be laid at the
doorstep of the respondent judge on account of his having issued the default order
against the petitioner, then proceeding with the hearing and eventually rendering a
default judgment. For, what the respondent judge did hew with what Section 3, Rule 9
of the Rules of Court prescribes and allows in the event the defending party fails to
seasonably file a responsive pleading. The provision reads:

SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- If the defending party fails to answer within
the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming
party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure,
declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall
proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his
pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the
claimant to submit evidence .[19]

While the ideal lies in avoiding orders of default,[20] the policy of the law being to have
every litigated case tried on its full merits,[21] the act of the respondent judge in
rendering the default judgment after an order of default was properly issued cannot
be struck down as a case of grave abuse of discretion.

The term grave abuse of discretion, in its juridical sense, connotes capricious,
despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.[22] The abuse must be of such degree as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
power is exercised in a capricious manner. The word capricious, usually used in
tandem with arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action.[23]

Under the premises, the mere issuance by the trial court of the order of default
followed by a judgment by default can easily be sustained as correct and doubtless
within its jurisdiction. Surely, a disposition directing the Republic to pay an enormous
sum without the trial court hearing its side does not, without more, vitiate, on due
procedural ground, the validity of the default judgment. The petitioner may have
indeed been deprived of such hearing, but this does not mean that its right to due
process had been violated. For, consequent to being declared in default, the
defaulting defendant is deemed to have waived his right to be heard or to take part in
the trial. The handling solicitors simply squandered the Republics opportunity to be
heard. But more importantly, the law itself imposes such deprivation of the right to
participate as a form of penalty against one unwilling without justification to join
issue upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff.

And going to another point, the petitioner would ascribe jurisdictional error on the
respondent judge for denying its motion for new trial based on any or a mix of the
following factors, viz., (1) the failure to file an answer is attributable to the
negligence of the former handling solicitor; (2) the meritorious nature of the
petitioners defense; and (3) the value of the property involved.

The Court is not convinced. Even as the Court particularly notes what the trial court
had said on the matter of negligence: that all of the petitioners pleadings below bear
at least three signatures, that of the handling solicitor, the assistant solicitor and the
Solicitor General himself, and hence accountability should go up all the way to the top
of the totem pole of authority, the cited reasons advanced by the petitioner for a new
trial are not recognized under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court for such
recourse.[24] Withal, there is no cogent reason to disturb the denial by the trial court
of the motion for new trial and the denial of the reiterative motion for
reconsideration.

Then, too, the issuance by the trial court of the Order dated December 17,
2003[25] denying the petitioners notice of appeal after the court caused the issuance on
November 27, 2003 of a certificate of finality of its August 27, 2003 decision can
hardly be described as arbitrary, as the petitioner would have this Court believe. In
this regard, the Court takes stock of the following key events and material dates set
forth in the assailed December 17, 2003 order, supra: (a) The petitioner, thru the
OSG, received on August 29, 2003 a copy of the RTC decision in this case, hence had
up to September 13, 2003, a Saturday, within which to perfect an appeal; (b)
On September 15, 2003, a Monday, the OSG filed its motion for new trial, which the
RTC denied, the OSG receiving a copy of the order of denial on October 9, 2003; and
(c) On October 24, 2003, the OSG sought reconsideration of the order denying the
motion for new trial. The motion for reconsideration was denied per Order dated
November 25, 2003, a copy of which the OSG received on the same date.

Given the foregoing time perspective, what the trial court wrote in its aforementioned
impugned order of December 17, 2003 merits approval:

In the case at bar, it is clear that the motion for new trial filed on the fifteenth
(15th) day after the decision was received on August 29, 2003 was
denied and the moving party has only the remaining period from notice
of notice of denial within which to file a notice of appeal. xxx

Accordingly, when defendants [Republic et al.] filed their motion for new trial
on the last day of the fifteen day (15) prescribed for taking an appeal,
which motion was subsequently denied, they had one (1) day from
 receipt of a copy of the order denying new trial within which to perfect
[an] appeal . Since defendants had received a copy of the order
denying their motion for new trial on 09 October 2003, reckoned from
that date, they only have one (1) day left within which to file the
notice of appeal. But instead of doing so, the defendants filed a motion
for reconsideration which was later declared by the Court as pro forma
motion in the Order dated 25 November 2003. The running of the
prescriptive period, therefore, can not be interrupted by a pro
forma motion. Hence the filing of the notice of appeal on 27 November
2007 came much too late for by then the judgment had already become
final and executory.[26] (Words in bracket added; Emphasis in the
original.)
It cannot be over-emphasized at this stage that the special civil action of certiorari is
limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction; it is not a remedy to correct errors of
judgment. Hence, the petitioners lament, partly covered by and discussed under the
first ground for allowing its petition, about the trial court taking cognizance of the
case notwithstanding private respondents claim or action being barred by prescription
and/or laches cannot be considered favorably. For, let alone the fact that an action
for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract, as here, does not
prescribe;[27] that a void transfer of property can be recovered by accion
[28]
reivindicatoria; and that the legal fiction of indefeasibility of a Torrens title cannot
be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud,[29] the trial courts disinclination not to
appreciate in favor of the Republic the general principles of prescription or laches
constitutes, at best, errors of judgment not correctable by certiorari.
The evidence adduced below indeed adequately supports a conclusion that the Office
of the President, during the administration of then President Marcos, wrested
possession of the property in question and somehow secured a certificate of title over
it without a conveying deed having been executed to legally justify the cancellation of
the old title (TCT No. 118527) in the name of the private respondent and the issuance
of a new one (TCT No. 118911) in the name of petitioner Republic. Accordingly,
granting private respondents basic plea for recovery of the Arlegui property, which
was legally hers all along, and the reinstatement of her cancelled certificate of title
are legally correct as they are morally right. While not exactly convenient because the
Office of the President presently uses it for mix residence and office purposes,
restoring private respondent to her possession of the Arlegui property is still legally
and physically feasible. For what is before us, after all, is a registered owner of a
piece of land who, during the early days of the martial law regime, lost possession
thereof to the Government which appropriatedthe same for some public use, but
without going through the legal process of expropriation, let alone paying such owner
just compensation.

The Court cannot, however, stop with just restoring the private respondent to her
possession and ownership of her property. The restoration ought to be complemented
by some form of monetary compensation for having been unjustly deprived of the
beneficial use thereof, but not, however, in the varying amounts and level fixed in the
assailed decision of the trial court and set to be executed by the equally assailed writ
of execution. The Court finds the monetary award set forth therein to be erroneous.
And the error relates to basic fundamentals of law as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion.

As may be noted, private respondent fixed the assessed value of her Arlegui
property at P2,388,990.00. And in the prayer portion of her third amended complaint
for recovery, she asked to be restored to the possession of her property and that the
petitioner be ordered to pay her, as reasonable compensation or rental use or
occupancy thereof, the sum of P500,000.00 a month, or P6 Million a year, with a five
percent (5%) yearly increase plus interest at the legal rate beginning July 1975.From
July 1975 when the PSG allegedly took over the subject property to July 2003, a month
before the trial court rendered judgment, or a period of 28 years, private respondents
total rental claim would, per the OSGs computation, only amount
to P371,440,426.00. In its assailed decision, however, the trial court ordered the
petitioner to pay private respondent the total amount of over P1.48 Billion or the
mind-boggling amount of P1,480,627,688.00, to be exact, representing the
reasonable rental for the property, the interest rate thereon at the legal rate and the
opportunity cost. This figure is on top of the P143,600,000.00 which represents the
acquisition cost of the disputed property. All told, the trial court would have the
Republic pay the total amount of about P1.624 Billion, exclusive of interest, for the
taking of a property with a declared assessed value of P2,388,900.00. This is not to
mention the award of attorneys fees in an amount equivalent to 15% of the amount
due the private respondent.

In doing so, the respondent judge brazenly went around the explicit command of Rule
9, Section 3(d) of the Rules of Court[30] which defines the extent of the relief that may
be awarded in a judgment by default, i.e., only so much as has been
alleged and proved. The court acts in excess of jurisdiction if it awards an amount
beyond the claim made in the complaint or beyond that proved by the
evidence.[31] While a defaulted defendant may be said to be at the mercy of the trial
court, the Rules of Court and certainly the imperatives of fair play see to it that any
decision against him must be in accordance with law.[32] In the abstract, this means
that the judgment must not be characterized by outrageous one-sidedness, but by
what is fair, just and equitable that always underlie the enactment of a law.

Given the above perspective, the obvious question that comes to mind is the level of
compensation which for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui property - would be fair
to both the petitioner and the private respondent and, at the same
time, be within acceptable legal bounds. The process of balancing the interests of
both parties is not an easy one. But surely, the Arlegui property cannot possibly be
assigned, even perhaps at the present real estate business standards, a monthly rental
value of at least P500,000.00 or P6,000,000.00 a year, the amount private respondent
particularly sought and attempted to prove. This asking figure is clearly
unconscionable, if not downright ridiculous, attendant circumstances considered. To
the Court, an award of P20,000.00 a month for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui
property, while perhaps a little bit arbitrary, is reasonable and may be granted pro
hac vice considering the following hard realities which the Court takes stock of:

1. The property is relatively small in terms of actual area and had an

assessed value of only P2,388,900.00;
2. What the martial law regime took over was not exactly an area with a
new and imposing structure, if there was any; and

3. The Arlegui property had minimal rental value during the

relatively long martial law years, given the very restrictive entry and egress
conditions prevailing at the vicinity at that time and even after.

To be sure, the grant of monetary award is not without parallel. In Alfonso v. Pasay
City,[33] a case where a registered owner also lost possession of a piece of lot to a
municipality which took it for a public purposes without instituting expropriation
proceedings or paying any compensation for the lot, the Court, citing Herrera v.
Auditor General,[34] ordered payment of just compensation but in the form of interest
when a return of the property was no longer feasible.

The award of attorneys fees equivalent to 15% of the amount due the private
respondent, as reduced herein, is affirmed.
The assessment of costs of suit against the petitioner is, however, nullified, costs not
being allowed against the Republic, unless otherwise provided by law.[35]

The assailed trial courts issuance of the writ of execution[36] against government funds
to satisfy its money judgment is also nullified. It is basic that government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments.[37] Republic v. Palacio[38] teaches that a judgment against the State
generally operates merely to liquidate and establish the plaintiffs claim in the absence
of express provision; otherwise, they can not be enforced by processes of law.

Albeit title to the Arlegui property remains in the name of the petitioner Republic, it
is actually the Office of the President which has beneficial possession of and use over
it since the 1975 takeover. Accordingly, and in accord with the elementary sense of
justice, it behooves that office to make the appropriate budgetary arrangements
towards paying private respondent what is due her under the premises. This, to us, is
the right thing to do. The imperatives of fair dealing demand no less. And the Court
would be remiss in the discharge of its duties as dispenser of justice if it does not
exhort the Office of the President to comply with what, in law and equity, is its
obligation. If the same office will undertake to pay its obligation with reasonable
dispatch or in a manner acceptable to the private respondent, then simple justice,
while perhaps delayed, will have its day. Private respondent is in the twilight of her
life, being now over 90 years of age.[39] Any delay in the implementation of this
disposition would be a bitter cut.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated August 27, 2003
insofar as it nullified TCT No. 118911 of petitioner Republic of the Philippines and
ordered the Register of Deeds of Manila to reinstate private respondent Tarcila L.
Mendozas TCT No. 118527, or to issue her a new certificate of title is AFFIRMED.
Should it be necessary, the Register of Deeds of Manila shall execute the necessary
conveying deed to effect the reinstatement of title or the issuance of a new title
to her.

It is MODIFIED in the sense that for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui property,
petitioner Republic is ordered to pay private respondent the reasonable amount
of P20,000.00 a month beginning July 1975 until it vacates the same and the
possession thereof restored to the private respondent, plus an additional interest of 6%
per annum on the total amount due upon the finality of this Decision until the same is
fully paid. Petitioner is further ordered to pay private respondent attorney's fees
equivalent to 15% of the amount due her under the premises.

Accordingly, a writ of certiorari is hereby ISSUED in the sense that:

1. The respondent courts assailed decision of August 27, 2003 insofar as it ordered the
petitioner Republic of the Philippines to pay private respondent Tarcila L. Mendoza
the sum of One Billion Four Hundred Eighty Million Six Hundred Twenty Seven
Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Eight Pesos (P1,480,627,688.00) representing the
purported rental use of the property in question, the interest thereon and the
opportunity cost at the rate of 3% per annum plus the interest at the legal rate added
thereon is nullified. The portion assessing the petitioner Republic for costs of suit is
also declared null and void.

2. The Order of the respondent court dated December 19, 2003 for the issuance of a
writ of execution and the Writ of Execution dated December 22, 2003 against
government funds are hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the presiding judge
of the respondent court, the private respondent, their agents and persons acting for
and in their behalves are permanently enjoined from enforcing said writ of execution.

However, consistent with the basic tenets of justice, fairness and equity, petitioner
Republic, thru the Office of the President, is hereby strongly enjoined to take the
necessary steps, and, with reasonable dispatch, make the appropriate budgetary
arrangements to pay private respondent Tarcila L. Mendoza or her assigns the amount
adjudged due her under this disposition.

12. Shell Philippines Exploration BV vs. Jalos

13. UP vs. Dizon
14. DoTC vs. Spouses Abecina
15. Republic of Indonesia vs. Vinzon
16. Deutsche Gesselschaft fur technische vs. CA
17. Arigo vs. Swift
 Branches of the Government
A. Judiciary
1. Landmark Case: RH BILL CASE -- Imbong vs Ochoa et.al. G.R. No. 204819 April 8,
2014 ( Digested Case)
This a Landmark Case not only citing the validity of the RH Bill but also the classic
scenario where of the Catholic Church vs the Government. It is no secret that the
Catholic Church plays political power in the Philippines for many years. This displays
ow the separation of the State and the Church paves it way.

Digested Case: Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957,
205003, 205138, 204988, 205043, 205478, 205491, 205720, 206355, 207111,
207172, 207563)

FACTS:
Concerned citizens and the Catholic Church had petitioned for the constitutionality of
the Reproductive Health Bill.

ISSUES:
A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional
for violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the
State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs
of e.g. the petitioners
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling
medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of
penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious objections
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be
spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
determine WON a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
* HELD:
A.
1. NO.
2. NO.
3.
a.) NO.
b.) YES.
c.) NO.
4. YES.
5. NO.
6. NO.
7. NO.
8. NO.
B. NO.
C. NO.
* RATIO:
1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins
is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without
proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could
express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional
meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is
that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception
begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the
moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization.
In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional;
only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives
that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn
child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The
Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and
actually prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section
4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but
also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the
mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and
that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients
only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the
same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also
uses the term primarily, must be struck down.
2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables
and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite
risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather,
they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws
prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-
licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec.
10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729:
the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered
mandatory only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated
and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe,
legal, non-abortificient and effective.
3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or
participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, the
Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or
restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion,
and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population
control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to
immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another
accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on
religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article
VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for
the inviolability of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers to
refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7
and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate information and perform
RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section
24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion. While penalties may be
imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must
prevail over the effective implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of
the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction
between public health officers and their private counterparts. In addition, the
freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this freedom
remains even if he/she is employed in the government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit
the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life
or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In
addition, the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive
means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken
other secular steps to ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA
6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of
Women).
3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the
issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. The law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to
be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject
information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family
life without the intervention of the State.
4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal
content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the
constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly,
Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations
to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger
the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. In
addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the
written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising
parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what
is involved is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their
minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject
the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.
5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law,
which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation
in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be
filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education
has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents
in the development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of
parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other
interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said
that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The
private health care institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous
to private health care service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious
groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods
(as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section
23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill
motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs
and services on reproductive health.
7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to
Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize
the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and
that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since
Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering
from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not
prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority
to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education
program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom
of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and
to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government
health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not
amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the
State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers
to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is
imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious
beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of
this digest.)
B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not
only has the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health
services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).
C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph
(c) of Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded
projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program
for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual
general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services
within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these
services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue
encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely
delineates the powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These
provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare.