THE CITY OF ANGELES, Hon.
ANTONIO ABAD plans to be submitted within six (6) months by the
SANTOS, in his capacity as MAYOR of
Angeles City, and the SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD OF THE CITY OF
ANGELES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and TIMOG SILANGAN
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In resolving this petition, the Court addressed the
questions of whether a donor of open spaces in a
residential subdivision can validly impose conditions
on the said donation; whether the city government as
donee can build and operate a drug rehabilitation
center on the donated land intended for open space;
and whether the said donation may be validly
rescinded by the donor.
Petitioners claim they have the right to construct
and operate a drug rehabilitation center on the
donated land in question, contrary to the provisions
stated in the amended Deed of Donation.
On the other hand, private respondent,
owner/developer of the Timog Park residential
subdivision in Angeles City, opposed the construction
and now, the operation of the said center on the
donated land, which is located within said residential
subdivision.
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals[2] dated October 31, 1990, which affirmed
the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City Branch 56,[4] dated February 15, 1989.
The Antecedents
In a Deed of Donation dated March 9, 1984,
subsequently superseded by a Deed of Donation
dated September 27, 1984, which in turn was
superseded by an Amended Deed of Donation dated
November 26, 1984, private respondent donated to
the City of Angeles, 51 parcels of land situated in
Barrio Pampang, City of Angeles, with an aggregate
area of 50,676 square meters, more or less, part of a
bigger area also belonging to private
respondent. The amended deed[5]provided, among
others, that:
2. The properties donated shall be devoted and
utilized solely for the site of the Angeles City Sports
Center (which excludes cockfighting) pursuant to the
DONEE to the DONOR for the latters approval, which
approval shall not be unreasonably withheld as long
as entire properties donated are developed as a
Sports Complex. Any change or modification in the
basic design or concept of said Sports Center must
have the prior written consent of the DONOR.
3. No commercial building, commercial complex,
market or any other similar complex, mass or
tenament (sic) housing/buildings(s) shall be
constructed in the properties donated nor shall
cockfighting, be allowed in the premises.
4. The construction of the Sports Center shall
commence within a period of one (1) year from 09
March 1984 and shall be completed within a period of
five (5) years from 09 March 1984.
xxx xxx xxx
6. The properties donated (which is more than five
(5) percent of the total land area of the DONORs
subdivision) shall constitute the entire open space for
DONORs subdivision and all other lands or areas
previously reserved or designated, including Lot 1
and Lot 2A of Block 72 and the whole Block 29 are
dispensed with, and rendered free, as open spaces,
and the DONEE hereby agrees to execute and
deliver all necessary consents, approvals,
endorsements, and authorizations to effect the
foregoing.
7. The properties donated are devoted and described
as open spaces of the DONORs subdivision, and to
this effect, the DONEE, upon acceptance of this
donation, releases the DONOR and/or assumes any
and all obligations and liabilities appertaining to the
properties donated.
8. Any substantial breach of the foregoing provisos
shall entitle the DONOR to revoke or rescind this
Deed of Donation, and in such eventuality, the
DONEE agrees to vacate and return the premises,
together with all improvements, to the DONOR
peacefully without necessity of judicial action.
On July 19, 1988, petitioners started the
construction of a drug rehabilitation center on a
portion of the donated land. Upon learning thereof,
private respondent protested such action for being
violative of the terms and conditions of the amended
deed and prejudicial to its interest and to those of its
clients and residents. Private respondent also offered
another site for the rehabilitation center. However,
petitioners ignored the protest, maintaining that the
construction was not violative of the terms of the
donation. The alternative site was rejected because,
according to petitioners, the site was too isolated and
had no electric and water facilities.
On August 8, 1988, private respondent filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, in
Angeles City against the petitioners, alleging breach
of the conditions imposed in the amended deed of
donation and seeking the revocation of the donation
and damages, with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order to halt the construction of
the said center.
On August 10, 1988, the trial court issued a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the petitioners
from further proceeding with the construction of the
center, which at that time was already 40% complete.
However, the trial court denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction based on the prohibition in
Presidential Decree No. 1818.
In their Answer with counterclaim, petitioners
admitted the commencement of the construction but
alleged inter alia that the conditions imposed in the
amended deed were contrary to Municipal Ordinance
No. 1, Series of 1962, otherwise known as the
Subdivision Ordinance of the Municipality of
Angeles.[6]
On October 15, 1988, private respondent filed a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the ground
that the main defense of the petitioners was
anchored on a pure question of law and that their
legal position was untenable.
The petitioners opposed, contending that they
had a meritorious defense as (1) private respondents
had no right to dictate upon petitioners what to do
with the donated land and how to do it so long as the
purpose remains for public use; and (2) the cause of
action of the private respondent became moot and
academic when the Angeles City Council repealed
the resolution providing for the construction of said
drug rehabilitation center and adopted a new
resolution changing the purpose and usage of said
center to a sports development and youth center in
order to conform with the sports complex project
constructed on the donated land.
On February 15, 1989, the trial court rendered its
decision, in relevant part reading as follows:
x x x the Court finds no inconsistency between the
conditions imposed in the Deeds of Donation and the
provision of the Subdivision Ordinance of the City of
Angeles requiring subdivisions in Angeles City to
reserve at least one (1) hectare in the subdivision as
suitable sites known as open spaces for parks,
playgrounds, playlots and/or other areas to be
dedicated to public use. On the contrary, the
condition requiring the defendant city of Angeles to
devote and utilize the properties donated to it by the
plaintiff for the site of the Angeles City Sports Center
conforms with the requirement in the Subdivision
Ordinance that the subdivision of the plaintiff shall be
provided with a playground or playlot, among others.
On the other hand the term public use in the
Subdivision Ordinance should not be construed to
include a Drug Rehabilitation Center as that would be
contrary to the primary purpose of the Subdivision
Ordinance requiring the setting aside of a portion
known as Open Space for park, playground and
playlots, since these are intended primarily for the
benefit of the residents of the subdivision. While
laudable to the general public, a Drug Rehabilitation
Center in a subdivision will be a cause of concern
and constant worry to its residents.
As to the third issue in paragraph (3), the passage of
the Ordinance changing the purpose of the building
constructed in the donated properties from a Drug
Rehabilitation Center to a Sports Center comes too
late. It should have been passed upon the demand of
the plaintiff to the defendant City of Angeles to stop
the construction of the Drug Rehabilitation Center,
not after the complaint was filed.
Besides, in seeking the revocation of the Amended
Deed of Donation, plaintiff also relies on the failure of
the defendant City of Angeles to submit the plan of
the proposed Sports Center within six (6) months and
construction of the same within five years from March
9, 1984, which are substantial violations of the
conditions imposed in the Amended Deed of
Donation.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) Enjoining defendants, its officers, employees and
all persons acting on their behalf to perpetually cease
and desist from constructing a Drug Rehabilitation
Center or any other building or improvement on the
Donated Land.
(2) Declaring the amended Deed of Donation
revoked and rescinded and ordering defendants to
peacefully vacate and return the Donated Land to
plaintiff, together with all the improvements existing
thereon.And,
(3) Denying the award of compensatory or actual and
exemplary damages including attorneys fees.
NO PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO COST.
In March 1989, petitioners filed their Notice of
Appeal. On April 15, 1989, while the appeal was
pending, petitioners inaugurated the Drug
Rehabilitation Center.[7]
On April 26, 1991, the respondent Court
rendered the assailed Decision affirming the ruling of
the trial court. Subsequently, the petitioners motion
for reconsideration was also denied for lack of merit.
Consequently, this Petition for Review.
The Issues
The key issues[8] raised by petitioners may be
restated as follows:
I. Whether a subdivision owner/developer is legally
bound under Presidential Decree No. 1216 to donate
to the city or municipality the open space allocated
exclusively for parks, playground and recreational
use.
II. Whether the percentage of the open space
allocated exclusively for parks, playgrounds and
recreational use is to be based on the gross area of
the subdivision or on the total area reserved for open
space.
III. Whether private respondent as subdivision
owner/developer may validly impose conditions in the
Amended Deed of Donation regarding the use of the
open space allocated exclusively for parks and
playgrounds.
IV. Whether or not the construction of the Drug
Rehabilitation Center on the donated open space
may be enjoined.
V. Whether the donation by respondent as
subdivision owner/developer of the open space of its
subdivision in favor of petitioner City of Angeles may
be revoked for alleged violation of the Amended
Deed of Donation.
Central to this entire controversy is the question
of whether the donation of the open space may be
revoked at all.
First Issue: Developer Legally Bound to Donate
Open Space
The law involved in the instant case is
Presidential Decree No. 1216, dated October 14,
1977,[9] which reads:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1216
Defining Open Space In Residential Subdivisions
And Amending Section 31 Of Presidential Decree
No. 957 Requiring Subdivision Owners To Provide
Roads, Alleys, Sidewalks And Reserve Open Space
For Parks Or Recreational Use.
WHEREAS, there is a compelling need to create and
maintain a healthy environment in human settlements
by providing open spaces, roads, alleys and
sidewalks as may be deemed suitable to enhance
the quality of life of the residents therein;
WHEREAS, such open spaces, roads, alleys and
sidewalks in residential subdivisions are for public
use and are, therefore, beyond the commerce of
men;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 953
at least thirty per cent (30%) of the total area of a
subdivision must be reserved, developed and
maintained as open space for parks and recreational
areas, the cost of which will ultimately be borne by
the lot buyers which thereby increase the acquisition
price of subdivision lots beyond the reach of the
common mass;
WHEREAS, thirty percent (30%) required open
space can be reduced to a level that will make the
subdivision industry viable and the price of residential
lots within the means of the low income group at the
same time preserve the environmental and ecological
balance through rational control of land use and
proper design of space and facilities;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 757,
government efforts in housing, including resources,
functions and activities to maximize results have
been concentrated into one single agency, namely,
the National Housing Authority;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order
and decree:
SECTION 1. For purposes of this Decree, the term
open space shall mean an area reserved exclusively
for parks, playgrounds, recreational uses, schools,
roads, places of worship, hospitals, health centers,
barangay centers and other similar facilities and
amenities.
SECTION 2. Section 31 of Presidential Decree No.
957 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 31. Roads, Alleys, Sidewalks and Open
Spaces The owner as developer of a subdivision
shall provide adequate roads, alleys and
sidewalks. For subdivision projects one (1) hectare or
more, the owner or developer shall reserve thirty per
cent (30%) of the gross area for open space. Such
open space shall have the following standards
allocated exclusively for parks, playgrounds and
recreational use:
a. 9% of gross area for high density or social housing
(66 to 100 family lots per gross hectare).
b. 7% of gross area for medium-density or economic
housing (21 to 65 family lots per gross hectare).
c. 3.5% of gross area for low-density or open market
housing (20 family lots and below per gross hectare).
These areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and
recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands,
and non-buildable. The plans of the subdivision
project shall include tree planting on such parts of the
subdivision as may be designated by the Authority.
Upon their completion certified to by the Authority,
the roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall be
donated by the owner or developer to the city or
municipality and it shall be mandatory for the local
governments to accept provided, however, that the
parks and playgrounds may be donated to the
Homeowners Association of the project with the
consent of the city or municipality concerned. No
portion of the parks and playgrounds donated
thereafter shall be converted to any other purpose or
purposes.
SECTION 3. Sections 2 and 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 953 are hereby repealed and other laws,
decrees, executive orders, institutions, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with these
provisions are also repealed or amended
accordingly.
SECTION 4. This Decree shall take effect
immediately.
Pursuant to the wording of Sec. 31 of P.D. 957
as above amended by the aforequoted P.D. No.
1216, private respondent is under legal obligation to
donate the open space exclusively allocated for
parks, playgrounds and recreational use to the
petitioner.
This can be clearly established by referring to
the original provision of Sec. 31 of P.D. 957, which
reads as follows:
SECTION 31. Donation of roads and open spaces to
local government. The registered owner or developer
of the subdivision or condominium project, upon
completion of the development of said project may, at
his option, convey by way of donation the roads and
open spaces found within the project to the city or
municipality wherein the project is located. Upon
acceptance of the donation by the city or municipality
concerned, no portion of the area donated shall
thereafter be converted to any other purpose or
purposes unless after hearing, the proposed
conversion is approved by the Authority. (Italics
supplied)
It will be noted that under the aforequoted
original provision, it was optional on the part of the
owner or developer to donate the roads and open
spaces found within the project to the city or
municipality where the project is located. Elsewise
stated, there was no legal obligation to make the
donation.
However, said Sec. 31 as amended now states
in its last paragraph:
Upon their completion x x x, the roads, alleys,
sidewalks and playgrounds shall be donated by the
owner or developer to the city or municipality and it
shall be mandatory for the local government to
accept; provided, however, that the parks and
playgrounds may be donated to the Homeowners
Association of the project with the consent of the city
or municipality concerned. x x x.
It is clear from the aforequoted amendment that it is
no longer optional on the part of the subdivision
owner/developer to donate the open space for parks
and playgrounds; rather there is now a legal
obligation to donate the same. Although there is
a proviso that the donation of the parks and
playgrounds may be made to the homeowners
association of the project with the consent of the city
of municipality concerned, nonetheless, the
owner/developer is still obligated under the law to
donate. Such option does not change the mandatory
character of the provision. The donation has to be
made regardless of which donee is picked by the
owner/developer. The consent requirement before
the same can be donated to the homeowners
association emphasizes this point.
Second Issue: Percentage of Area for Parks and
Playgrounds
Petitioners contend that the 3.5% to 9% allotted
by Sec. 31 for parks, playgrounds and recreational
uses should be based on the gross area of the
entire subdivision, and not merely on the area of the
open space alone, as contended by private
respondent and as decided by the respondent
Court.[10]
The petitioners are correct. The language of
Section 31 of P.D. 957 as amended by Section 2 of
P.D. 1216 is wanting in clarity and exactitude, but it
can be easily inferred that the phrase gross area
refers to the entire subdivision area. The said phrase
was used four times in the same section in two
sentences, the first of which reads:
x x x For subdivision projects one (1) hectare or
more, the owner or developer shall reserve thirty per
cent (30%) of the gross area for open space. x x x.
Here, the phrase 30% of the gross area refers to
the total area of the subdivision, not of the open
space. Otherwise, the definition of open space would
be circular. Thus, logic dictates that the same basis
be applied in the succeeding instances where the
phrase open space is used, i.e., 9% of gross area . . .
7% of gross area . . . 3.5% of gross area . .
. Moreover, we agree with petitioners that construing
the 3.5% to 9% as applying to the totality of the open
space would result in far too small an area being
devoted for parks, playgrounds, etc., thus rendering
meaningless and defeating the purpose of the
statute. This becomes clear when viewed in the light
of the original requirement of P.D. 953 (Requiring the
Planting of Trees in Certain Places, etc.), Section 2
of which reads:
Sec. 2. Every owner of land subdivided into
residential/commercial/industrial lots after the
effectivity of this Decree shall reserve, develop and
maintain not less than thirty percent (30%) of the total
area of the subdivision, exclusive of roads, service
streets and alleys, as open space for parks and
recreational areas.
No plan for a subdivision shall be approved by the
Land Registration Commission or any office or
agency of the government unless at least thirty
percent (30%) of the total area of the subdivision,
exclusive of roads, service streets and alleys, is
reserved as open space for parks and recreational
areas x x x.
To our mind, it is clear that P.D. 1216 was an
attempt to achieve a happy compromise and a
realistic balance between the imperatives of
environmental planning and the need to maintain
economic feasibility in subdivision and housing
development, by reducing the required area for
parks, playgrounds and recreational uses from thirty
percent (30%) to only 3.5% - 9% of the entire area of
the subdivision.
Third Issue: Imposition of Conditions in Donation
of Open Space
Petitioners argue that since the private
respondent is required by law to donate the parks
and playgrounds, it has no right to impose the
condition in the Amended Deed of Donation that the
properties donated shall be devoted and utilized
solely for the site of the Angeles City Sports
Center. It cannot prescribe any condition as to the
use of the area donated because the use of the open
spaces is already governed by P.D. 1216. In other
words, the donation should be
absolute. Consequently, the conditions in the
amended deed which were allegedly violated
are deemed not written. Such being the case,
petitioners cannot be considered to have committed
any violation of the terms and conditions of the said
amended deed, as the donation is deemed
unconditional, and it follows that there is no basis for
revocation of the donation.
However, the general law on donations does not
prohibit the imposition of conditions on a donation so
long as the conditions are not illegal or impossible.[11]
In regard to donations of open spaces, P.D.
1216 itself requires among other things that the
recreational areas to be donated be based, as
aforementioned, on a percentage (3.5%, 7%, or 9%)
of the total area of the subdivision depending on
whether the subdivision is low -, medium -, or high-
density. It further declares that such open space
devoted to parks, playgrounds and recreational areas
are non-alienable public land and non-
buildable. However, there is no prohibition in either
P.D. 957 or P.D. 1216 against imposing conditions
on such donation.
We hold that any condition may be imposed in
the donation, so long as the same is not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. The contention of petitioners that the donation
should be unconditional because it is mandatory has
no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that the
donation of the open space for parks and
playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule that it
should be so is tantamount to unlawfully expanding
the provisions of the decree.[12]
In the case at bar, one of the conditions imposed
in the Amended Deed of Donation is that the donee
should build a sports complex on the donated
land. Since P.D. 1216 clearly requires that the 3.5%
to 9% of the gross area allotted for parks and
playgrounds is non-buildable, then the obvious
question arises whether or not such condition was
validly imposed and is binding on the donee. It is
clear that the non-buildable character applies only to
the 3.5% to 9% area set by law. If there is any
excess land over and above the 3.5% to 9% required
by the decree, which is also used or allocated for
parks, playgrounds and recreational purposes, it is
obvious that such excess area is not covered by the
non-buildability restriction. In the instant case, if there
be an excess, then the donee would not be barred
from developing and operating a sports complex
thereon, and the condition in the amended deed
would then be considered valid and binding.
To determine if the over 50,000 square meter
area donated pursuant to the amended deed would
yield an excess over the area required by the decree,
it is necessary to determine under which density
category the Timog Park subdivision falls.
If the subdivision falls under the low density or
open market housing category, with 20 family lots or
below per gross hectare, the developer will need to
allot only 3.5% of gross area for parks and
playgrounds, and since the donated land constitutes
more than five (5) percent of the total land area of the
subdivision,[13] there would therefore be an excess of
over 1.5% of gross area which would not be non-
buildable. Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged
(and private respondent did not controvert) that the
subdivision in question is a medium-density or
economic housing subdivision based on the sizes of
the family lots donated in the amended deed,[14] for
which category the decree mandates that not less
than 7% of gross area be set aside. Since the
donated land constitutes only a little more than 5% of
the gross area of the subdivision, which is less than
the area required to be allocated for non-buildable
open space, therefore there is no excess land to
speak of. This then means that the condition to build
a sports complex on the donated land is contrary to
law and should be considered as not imposed.
Fourth Issue: Injunction vs. Construction of the
Drug Rehabilitation Center
Petitioners argue that the court cannot enjoin the
construction of the drug rehabilitation center because
the decision of the trial court came only after the
construction of the center was completed and, based
on jurisprudence, there can be no injunction of
events that have already transpired.[15]
Private respondent, on the other hand, counters
that the operation of the center is a continuing act
which would clearly cause injury to private
respondent, its clients, and residents of the
subdivision, and thus, a proper subject of
injunction.[16] Equity should move in to warrant the
granting of the injunctive relief if persistent repetition
of the wrong is threatened.[17]
In light of Sec. 31 of P.D. 957, as amended,
declaring the open space for parks, playgrounds and
recreational area as non-buildable, it appears
indubitable that the construction and operation of a
drug rehabilitation center on the land in question is a
continuing violation of the law and thus should be
enjoined.
Furthermore, the factual background of this case
warrants that this Court rule against petitioners on
this issue. We agree with and affirm the respondent
Courts finding that petitioners committed acts
mocking the judicial system.[18]
x x x When a writ of preliminary injunction was
sought for by the appellee [private respondent] to
enjoin the appellants [petitioners herein] from further
continuing with the construction of the said center,
the latter resisted and took refuge under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1818 (which
prohibits writs of preliminary injunction) to continue
with the construction of the building. Yet, the
appellants also presented City Council Resolution
No. 227 which allegedly repealed the previous
Resolution authorizing the City Government to
construct a Drug Rehabilitation Center on the
donated property, by changing the purpose and
usage of the Drug Rehabilitation Center to Sports
Development and Youth Center to make it conform to
the Sports Complex Project therein. Under this
Resolution No. 227, the appellants claimed that they
have abandoned all plans for the construction of the
Drug Rehabilitation Center. Nonetheless, when
judgment was finally rendered on February 15, 1989,
the appellants were quick to state that they have not
after all abandoned their plans for the center as they
have in fact inaugurated the same on April 15,
1989. In plain and simple terms, this act is a mockery
of our judicial system perpetrated by the
appellants. For them to argue that the court cannot
deal on their Drug Rehabilitation Center is not only
preposterous but also ridiculous.
It is interesting to observe that under the appealed
decision the appellants and their officers, employees
and all other persons acting on their behalf were
perpetually enjoined to cease and desist from
constructing a Drug Rehabilitation Center on the
donated property. Under Section 4 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, it is provided that:
Section 4 A judgment in an action for injunction shall
not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal
is taken or during the pendency of an appeal.
Accordingly, a judgment restraining a party from
doing a certain act is enforceable and shall remain in
full force and effect even pending appeal. In the case
at bar, the cease and desist order therefore still
stands. Appellants persistence and continued
construction and, subsequent, operation of the Drug
Rehabilitation Center violate the express terms of the
writ of injunction lawfully issued by the lower court.
This Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the
above mentioned findings of the respondent
court. The allegation of the petitioners that the
construction of the center was finished before the
judgment of the trial court was rendered deserves
scant consideration because it is self-serving and is
completely unsupported by other evidence.
The fact remains that the trial court rendered
judgment enjoining the construction of the drug
rehabilitation center, revoking the donation and
ordering the return of the donated land. In spite of
such injunction, petitioners publicly flaunted their
disregard thereof with the subsequent inauguration of
the center on August 15, 1989. The operation of the
center, after inauguration, is even more censurable.
Fifth Issue: Revocation of a Mandatory Donation
Because of Non-compliance With an Illegal
Condition
The private respondent contends that the
building of said drug rehabilitation center is violative
of the Amended Deed of Donation. Therefore, under
Article 764 of the New Civil Code and stipulation no.
8 of the amended deed, private respondent is
empowered to revoke the donation when the donee
has failed to comply with any of the conditions
imposed in the deed.
We disagree. Article 1412 of the Civil Code
which provides that:
If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause
consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the
following rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting
parties, neither may recover what he has given by
virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of
the others undertaking;
comes into play here. Both petitioners and private
respondents are in violation of P.D. 957 as amended,
for donating and accepting a donation of open space
less than that required by law, and for agreeing to
build and operate a sports complex on the non-
buildable open space so donated; and petitioners, for
constructing a drug rehabilitation center on the same
non-buildable area.
Moreover, since the condition to construct a
sports complex on the donated land has previously
been shown to be contrary to law, therefore,
stipulation No. 8 of the amended deed cannot be
implemented because (1) no valid stipulation of the
amended deed had been breached, and (2) it is
highly improbable that the decree would have
allowed the return of the donated land for open space
under any circumstance, considering the non-
alienable character of such open space, in the light of
the second Whereas clause of P.D. 1216 which
declares that xxx such open spaces, roads, alleys
and sidewalks in residential subdivisions are for
public use and are, therefore, beyond the commerce
of men.
Further, as a matter of public policy, private
respondent cannot be allowed to evade its statutory
obligation to donate the required open space through
the expediency of invoking petitioners breach of the
aforesaid condition. It is a familiar principle that the
courts will not aid either party to enforce an illegal
contract, but will leave them both where they find
them.Neither party can recover damages from the
other arising from the act contrary to law, or plead the
same as a cause of action or as a defense. Each
must bear the consequences of his own acts.[19]
There is therefore no legal basis whatsoever to
revoke the donation of the subject open space and to
return the donated land to private respondent. The
donated land should remain with the donee as the
law clearly intended such open spaces to be
perpetually part of the public domain, non-alienable
and permanently devoted to public use as such
parks, playgrounds or recreation areas.
 Removal/Demolition of Drug Rehabilitation (1) Petitioners are
Center hereby ENJOINED perpetually from operating the
drug rehabilitation center or any other such facility on
Inasmuch as the construction and operation of the donated open space.
the drug rehabilitation center has been established to
be contrary to law, the said center should be (2) Petitioner City of Angeles is ORDERED to
removed or demolished. At this juncture, we hasten undertake the demolition and removal of said drug
to add that this Court is and has always been four- rehabilitation center within a period of three (3)
square behind the governments efforts to eradicate months from finality of this Decision, and thereafter,
the drug scourge in this country. But the end never to devote the said open space for public use as a
justifies the means, and however laudable the park, playground or other recreational use.
purpose of the construction in question, this Court
cannot and will not countenance an outright and (3) The Amended Deed of Donation dated
continuing violation of the laws of the land, especially November 26, 1984 is hereby declared valid and
when committed by public officials. subsisting, except that the stipulations or conditions
therein concerning the construction of the Sports
In theory, the cost of such demolition, and the Center or Complex are hereby declared void and as
reimbursement of the public funds expended in the if not imposed, and therefore of no force and effect.
construction thereof, should be borne by the officials
of the City of Angeles who ordered and directed such No costs.
construction. This Court has time and again ruled
that public officials are not immune from damages in SO ORDERED.
their personal capacities arising from acts done in
bad faith. Otherwise stated, a public official may be
liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage
he may have caused by his act done with malice and
in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.[20] In the instant case, the public officials
concerned deliberately violated the law and persisted
in their violations, going so far as attempting to
deceive the courts by their pretended change of
purpose and usage for the center, and making a
mockery of the judicial system. Indisputably, said
public officials acted beyond the scope of their
authority and jurisdiction and with evident bad
faith. However, as noted by the trial court,[21] the
petitioners mayor and members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Angeles City were sued only in
theirofficial capacities, hence, they could not be held
personally liable without first giving them their day in
court. Prevailing jurisprudence[22] holding that public
officials are personally liable for damages arising
from illegal acts done in bad faith are premised on
said officials having been sued both in their official
and personal capacities.

After due consideration of the circumstances, we

believe that the fairest and most equitable solution is
to have the City of Angeles, donee of the subject
open space and, ostensibly, the main beneficiary of
the construction and operation of the proposed drug
rehabilitation center, undertake the demolition and
removal of said center, and if feasible, recover the
cost thereof from the city officials concerned.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the

Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
 CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON
OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST
DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING
MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW
RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code
considers as void a "donation between the spouses
during the marriage", policy considerations of the
most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should
apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of
Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G.
3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil
Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is,
in the language of the opinion of the then Justice
J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in
favor of the other consort and his descendants
because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted
in our ancient law; porque no se engaen
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de
consuno, [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl,
LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore
invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I,
De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every
reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to
persons living together as husband and wife without
benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that
assent to such irregular connection for thirty years
bespeaks greater influence of one party over the
other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid
is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already
pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr.
1), it would not be just that such donations should
subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt
should turn out to be better. So long as marriage
remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason
and morality alike demand that the disabilities
attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION;
SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER
SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. The lack of
validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to
defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily
result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the
relationship between him and the defendant was
legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She
is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code,
she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in
this litigation. We are called upon to decide
whether the ban on a donation between the
spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now
appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the
deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a
donation made while he was living maritally
without benefit of marriage to defendant, now
appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void.
Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower
court, after noting that it was made at a time
before defendant was married to the donor,
sustained the latters stand. Hence this
appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in
character, this Court not having had as yet
the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision
of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v.
Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes,
who was appointed to this Court later that
year, is indicative of the appropriate response
that should be given. The conclusion reached
therein is that a donation between common-
law spouses falls within the prohibition and is
"null and void as contrary to public policy." 3
Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this
Court. The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the
lower court, after stating that in plaintiffs
complaint alleging absolute ownership of the
parcel of land in question, she specifically
raised the question that the donation made by
Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila
Cervantes was null and void under the
aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that
defendant on the other hand did assert
ownership precisely because such a donation
was made in 1956 and her marriage to the
deceased did not take place until 1962, noted
that when the case was called for trial on
November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of
facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff
and the defendant assisted by their respective
counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That
the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the
property in question; (2) That said Felix
Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation
inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila
Cervantes over the parcel of land in question
on February 20, 1956, which same donation
was accepted by defendant; (3) That the
donation of the land to the defendant which
took effect immediately was made during the
common law relationship as husband and
wife between the defendant-done and the
now deceased donor and later said donor and
done were married on March 28, 1962; (4)
That the deceased Felix Matabuena died
intestate on September 13, 1962; (5) That the
plaintiff claims the property by reason of being
the only sister and nearest collateral relative
of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of
self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and
had the land declared in her name and paid
the estate and inheritance taxes thereon" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above
facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out
thus: "A donation under the terms of Article
133 of the Civil Code is void if made between
the spouses during the marriage. When the
donation was made by Felix Matabuena in
favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956,
Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena
were not yet married. At that time they were
not spouses. They became spouses only
when they married on March 28, 1962, six
years after the deed of donation had been
executed." 6 what is just and what is right would be
We reach a different conclusion. While Art.
133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the
marriage," policy considerations of the most
exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition
should apply to a common-law relationship.
We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion,
a 1954 Court of Appeals decision,
Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7 interpreting a
similar provision of the old Civil Code 8
speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law
is, in the language of the opinion of the then
Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law; porque no se engaen
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que
han de consuno [according to] the Partidas
(Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the
rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem
spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1,
De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is
every reason to apply the same prohibitive
policy to persons living together as husband
and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it
is not to be doubted that assent to such
irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks
greater influence of one party over the other,
so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid
is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as
already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad
Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such
donations should subsist, lest the condition of
those who incurred guilt should turn out to be
better. So long as marriage remains the
cornerstone of our family law, reason and
morality alike demand that the disabilities
attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in
the absence of the above pronouncement,
any other conclusion cannot stand the test of
scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of
the Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable
rule to a situation which in its essentials
cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at
all to be differentiated, the policy of the law
which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of
nullified if such irregular relationship instead
of being visited with disabilities would be
attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm
should not be susceptible to such a reproach.
If there is ever any occasion where the
principle of statutory construction that what is
within the spirit of the law is as much a part of
it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the
basic purpose discernible in such codal
provision would not be attained. Whatever
omission may be apparent in an interpretation
purely literal of the language used must be
remedied by an adherence to its avowed
objective. In the language of Justice Pablo:
"El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz
que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la
aplicacin de sus disposiciones. 10

3. The lack of validity of the donation made by

the deceased to defendant Petronila
Cervantes does not necessarily result in
plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix
Matabuena, the relationship between him and
the defendant was legitimated by their
marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore
his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code,
she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the
other half. 11

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of

November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint
with costs is reversed. The questioned
donation is declared void, with the rights of
plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to
the property in question recognized. The case
is remanded to the lower court for its
appropriate disposition in accordance with the
above opinion. Without pronouncement as to
costs.

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA
TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO
C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA,
LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C.
TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE
A. COMILLE, and ABNER A.
COMILLE, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on
certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed with modification the decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No. 4593,
declaring as void a deed of donation inter
vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her
favor and its subsequent resolution[3] denying
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his
wife Zosima Montallana became the registered
owners of Lot No. 437-A located at the corner of
Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street) and Calle
Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of the lot was
418 square meters.[4] After the death of Zosima on
October 3, 1980, Francisco and his mother-in-law,
Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which
the latter waived her share consisting of one-fourth
(1/4) of the property to Francisco.[5] On June 27, 1916,
Francisco registered the lot in his name with the
Registry of Deeds.[6]
Having no children to take care of him after his
retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia
Bellosillo,[7] the latters cousin, Luzviminda
Paghacian,[8] and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a
widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store
inside.[9]
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the
nature of the relationship between Cirila and
Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila
were lovers since they slept in the same
room,[10] while Erlinda Tabancura,[11] another niece of
Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that
Cirila was his mistress.[12] On the other hand, Cirila
said she was a mere helper who could enter the
masters bedroom only when the old man asked her
to and that Francisco in any case was too old for
her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse.[13]
It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda
were married, only Cirila was left to take care of
Francisco.[14] Cirila testified that she was a 34-year
old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old widower
when she began working for the latter; that he could
still walk with her assistance at that time;[15] and that
his health eventually deteriorated and he became
bedridden.[16] Erlinda Tabancura testified that
Franciscos sole source of income consisted of
rentals from his lot near the public streets.[17] He did
not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper,
though he provided her family with food and
lodging.[18]
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his
death, Francisco executed an instrument
denominated Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, in which
he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150
square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who
accepted the donation in the same
instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268
square meters in his name. The deed stated that the
donation was being made in consideration of the
faithful services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the
past ten (10) years. The deed was notarized by Atty.
Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.[19] and later registered by Cirila as
its absolute owner.[20]
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any
children. In 1993, the lot which Cirila received from
Francisco had a market value of P57,105.00 and an
assessed value of P28,550.00.[21]
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a
complaint against petitioner for declaration of nullity
of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of
possession, and damages. Respondents, who are
the decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the
common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inter
vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void under
Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage,
direct or indirect, between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which
the spouses may give each other on the occasion of
any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply
to persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of respondents, holding the
donation void under this provision of the Family
Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based
on the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and certain
documents bearing the signature of one Cirila
Comille. The documents were (1) an application for a
business permit to operate as real estate lessor,
dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the
signature Cirila Comille;[22] (2) a sanitary permit to
operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate
showing the signature Cirila Comille in black
ink;[23] and (3) the death certificate of the decedent
with the signature Cirila A. Comille written in black
ink.[24] The dispositive portion of the trial courts
decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
executed by the late Francisco Comille recorded as
Doc. No. 7; Page No. 3; Book No. V; Series of 1991
in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Vic T.
Lacaya (Annex A to the Complaint) null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of
the house and lot subject of the deed unto the
plaintiffs within thirty (30) days after finality of this
decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fees in the
sum of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which rendered on June 19, 2000 the decision
subject of this appeal. As already stated, the appeals
court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion was
based on (1) the testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and
Cirila; (2) the copies of documents purportedly
showing Cirilas use of Franciscos surname; (3) a
pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of
rentals to Cirila as Franciscos common-law wife; and
(4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash
wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having
been committed by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner was the common-law wife of the late
Francisco Comille is not correct and is a reversible
error because it is based on a misapprehension of
facts, and unduly breaks the chain of circumstances
detailed by the totality of the evidence, its findings
being predicated on totally incompetent or hearsay
evidence, and grounded on mere speculation,
conjecture or possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33
SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in Quiason,
Philippine Courts and their Jurisdictions, 1993 ed., p.
604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden
of evidence from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v.
Reyes, 39 SCRA 504; Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in a way
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
jurisprudence in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA
908, and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil. 577, 584.[26]
The issue in this case is whether the Court of
Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code
to the circumstances of this case. After a review of
the records, we rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, subject only to certain
exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (b) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where
there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g)
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when
the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised
on the supposed absence of evidence but is
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (j) when
the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which,
if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.[27] It appearing that the Court of Appeals
based its findings on evidence presented by both
parties, the general rule should apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan,[28] we held that the term
cohabitation or living together as husband and wife
means not only residing under one roof, but also
having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of
course, means more than sexual intercourse,
especially when one of the parties is already old and
may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least,
cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a
woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together
as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to
the public as such. Secret meetings or nights
clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated,
do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are SO ORDERED
merely meretricious.[29] In this jurisdiction, this Court
has considered as sufficient proof of common-law
relationship the stipulations between the parties,[30]a
conviction of concubinage,[31] or the existence of
illegitimate children.[32]

Was Cirila Franciscos employee or his common-

law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco
resided under one roof for a long time. It is very
possible that the two consummated their relationship,
since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and
Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the
very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs
was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient,
but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and
wife.

Aside from Erlinda Tabancuras testimony that

her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there
are other indications that Cirila and Francisco were
common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura
presented documents apparently signed by Cirila
using the surname Comille. As previously stated,
these are an application for a business permit to
operate as a real estate lessor,[33] a sanitary permit to
operate as real estate lessor with a health
certificate,[34] and the death certificate of
Francisco.[35] These documents show that Cirila saw
herself as Franciscos common-law wife, otherwise,
she would not have used his last name. Similarly, in
the answer filed by Franciscos lessees in Erlinda
Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio
Sy, RTC Civil Case No. 4719 (for collection of
rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as the
common-law spouse of Francisco. Finally, the fact
that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular
cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a
caregiver-employee, but Franciscos common law
spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash
wage under the law.[36] It is difficult to believe that she
stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure
beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the
conclusion that she was Franciscos common-law
spouse.

Respondents having proven by a preponderance

of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together
as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of

Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED.