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Analysis

No. 259, June 2014





THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE END

OF THE ISAF AND MORE GENERALLY

OF NATOS MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
IN AFGHANISTAN


Claudio Bertolotti



Afghanistan faces a major milestone in 2014: the withdrawal of the ISAF (International Security Assistance
Force) troops by the end of the year.
ISAFs combat troops are scheduled to leave Afghan soil, ending a 13year war against an unbeatable insurgency.
The new NATO military mission which will be formalized through the signing of the Bilateral Security
Agreement (BSA) by the next president of Afghanistan (successor to Hamid Karzai) should begin on January
2015. This is likely to have deep implications for NATOs role in Afghanistan.
In brief:.
NATO forces remaining in Afghanistan from 2015 in order to make an enduring contribution to stability, could be
about 8,000 to 12,000 advisors/trainers and counterterrorism and special forces, largely from the US; and, as
declared by President Obama, the US plans to withdraw the last American troops from Afghanistan by the end of
2016 when there would be only a reduced force able to protect the embassy in Kabul and to support Afghans in
security work.
This transition process is marked by interconnected dynamics:
on the one hand, a decrease in territory under the control of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
has been recorded;
on the other, the reduction of ISAF troops led to a lack in security conditions, because of the increased
operational capabilities of Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) and decreased ANSF capability (fewer direct
actions against ISAFNATO forces and an increase of attacks against the ANSF have been seen);
finally, the Afghan statebuilding process has not been achieved, leaving the country without primary
infrastructure for development. The Afghan government is currently powerless, unable to maintain stability
within the country and economically dependent on the international community: in brief it is not far from
substantial failure.


Claudio Bertolotti (PhD), Strategic Analyst and CrossCultural Advisor, is Senior External Researcher at
Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS)
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1
The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI.
The ISPI online papers are also published with the support of Cariplo

The current situation in Afghanistan and NATOs strategic road


map
The United States presence
The United States presence in Afghanistan is smaller at present than it
in Afghanistan is smaller
was in 2001, when the invasion of the country began; this is the
at present than it was in
consequence of the new strategic map drawn by the US which placed
2001, when the invasion of
Afghanistan in a peripheral position. An interest limited to maintaining
the country began; this is
the ability to be ready to operate eventually with drone and air forces
the consequence of the new
on the regional level (Iran, Central Asia, Russia, China, Pakistan, India).
strategic map drawn by
In line with NATOs strategic road map (Chicago, May 2012), formal the US which placed
disengagement from the Afghan war is underway. The US-led ISAF Afghanistan in a
mission will conclude by the end of 2014 (formally the 31st of December) peripheral position
and a new NATO mission will start on January 1, 2015: the Resolute
Support Mission (RSM).
The NATO mission in Afghanistan is changing its name, size and mandate,
although the basic principles of its medium- to long-term presence are
going to remain the same because of formal and substantial difficulties.
But, as a consequence of this transformation, NATO will no longer be able
to ensure widespread operational support to complex operations, but
would be able to ensure its medium-long term presence in the country and
its support to the Afghan government.
Because of concrete difficulties and political impasses, this strategic
approach is sustained by talks and negotiations involving the US, the
Taliban and the Afghan government (and Pakistan possibly as mediator).
The formal end of ISAF
The formal end of ISAF operations and the beginning of the new NATO
operations and the
mission represent a symbolic watershed for international commitment in
beginning of the new NATO
Afghanistan. Based on the indispensable Bilateral Security Agreement
mission represent a
between the Afghan government and the United States, this commitment
symbolic watershed for
will change its nature through an accelerated transition from combat
international commitment
to train and assist; it means reducing conventional combat troops in
in Afghanistan
favor of special operations forces, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and
training and advisory support for the Afghan National Security Forces. In
line with the basic principle that troop withdrawal decisions are based on
the assessment of conditions on the ground, the decision to change the
nature of the mission can be translated as an unspoken admission of the
impossibility of directly stabilizing the country.
By the end of the summer, the United States and the next Afghan
government will be signing the aforementioned Bilateral Security
Agreement in accordance with the previous Strategic Partnership
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Agreement (formalized on May 2012) on the basis of which a long-term


relationship between the two countries was established. A political result
guaranteeing:

1. Afghanistan the status of a US, non-NATO ally, and


2. Washington (and, consequentially, NATO) the chance to maintain a
long-term presence and
3. the management of important strategic military bases in the country.
Finally, due to social imbalances, a progressively deteriorating political
and social situation and growing social discontent have been ascertained.
For these reasons, the international community is committed to
economically supporting the Afghan government for a period of at least
four years (Tokyo, July 2012).

The double front on the battlefield: ANSF and AOG


Ready or not, by the end of the 2014 the Afghan government will be
responsible for the security of the country and there will be two main
actors on the battlefield: the Afghan security forces and the multifaceted
regional insurgency.

Afghan National Security Forces limitations


On one side of the front, the ANSF are afflicted by structural and
operational limitations, and lacking in capabilities, effectiveness and
cohesion.
In addition, extensive defections and a high rate of combat casualties have
decimated the ANSF (deaths have doubled since NATO troops handed
over security responsibility to local troops), making them weak regarding
air and logistical support and able to guarantee a minimum security level
in urban but not in rural and peripheral areas of the country.
Furthermore, a limited part of the army battalions and of the police units
are classified as operatively independent with advisors1.
Finally, the US Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction
(SIGAR) reported that ANSF are not yet able to manage and protect the
military bases NATO turned over to Afghanistan.
For these reasons, it is assessed that, in the medium-term, the ANSF are
unable to guarantee security and control autonomously, in particular in
the rural areas and in the southern and eastern parts of the country.
The other side of the front: AOG and the Taliban, between action and
reaction
On the other side of the front, the AOG will keep on expanding their
operational and political capabilities through the negotiation process and
opposition activities. Strategically, the AOG, and the Taliban in particular,
have shown their interest in gaining time so as to obtain more advantages
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1 See, Us Government Accountability Office report Afghanistan security: Longstanding challenges may affect progress and sustainment of Afghan

national security forces, 2013, and CNA Strategic Studies, Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces, 2014.

in the negotiation process and in a possible political agreement; an


agreement that could lead to a political partition that would make
possible fault-line conflicts boosted by the lack of governmental
capability.
It is important to
It is important to underline that the AOG showed increased ability and underline that the AOG
willingness in complex attacks and propaganda activities (both traditional showed increased ability
and via hi-tech media); this trend may be confirmed for the future. and willingness in complex
It is assessed that the AOG will benefit from NATOs disengagement attacks and propaganda
because of significant reductions in troops and military pressure. A activities (both traditional
favorable condition that on the one hand should facilitate drug trafficking and via hitech media);
and other criminal activities and, on the other, will propel the AOG efforts this trend may be
towards their main targets: ANSF members and government structures confirmed for the future
and representatives.
In general, political dynamics will be influenced by the increase of AOG
presences and influence in rural and peripheral areas where their greater
role in local conflict resolution processes is plausible. Also for these
reasons, they will strive to get access to power, firstly at the local and then
at the central level.
Furthermore, a recent increase in the activities of militants from Central
Asia, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), in northern
Afghanistan indicates that they intend to take advantage of the security
vacuum that may ensue post-2014. The magnitude of recent insurgents
attacks in northern Afghanistan shows an effort to gain a country-wide
presence ahead of the drawdown of NATO forces. Central Asian militants
fit into this setting as experienced and trusted allies for the Taliban who
have some affinity with local communities in the area.
All these factors together will give AOG the ability to operate and obtain
positive outcomes, exalting the myth of unbeatable mujahidin.
Finally, as reported by the Afghanistan Analysts Network, the Taliban
are changing their public face, they are no longer a clandestine movement
that people have to go through all kinds of channels to find them in a
backwater.

Possible future scenarios


In brief, regarding the military engagement in Afghanistan, two
assumptions concerning the role of the new NATO (RSM) military
commitment in Afghanistan can be formulated:
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1. The first is the option of a Kabul-centric military effort focused on the


capitals region, oriented towards maintaining control of the capital
while abandoning, de facto, peripheral areas. This option does not

exclude an agreement based on compromise between the Afghan


government, the United States, Pakistan, and the AOG. An estimated
military effort not exceeding 8,000 troops (2,000/2,500 Special Forces,
2/3 of which US). This option may be interpreted as an implicit
admission of the ISAFs mission failure.
2. The second option is Regional limited, based on troop deployment in
the main regional military commands (Kabul, Herat, Kunduz,
Kandahar, and Helmand). It requires 12-15,000 troops (3,000 Special
Forces, 2/3 of them US); a number considered adequate to guarantee
support and operational capabilities aiding the ANSF, but too little to
conduct deep and prolonged conventional operations. This balanced
proposal does not preclude further developments of the mission.
In brief the Regional limited approach is assessed as being the more
probable and the less disadvantageous in term of strategic costs.

Indirectly connected with the aforementioned military options, there are


three possible scenarios concerning Afghanistan post-2014.
1. Collapse and conflict. On the one hand, there is the worst-case scenario
that might involve the collapse of the Afghan state and of the ANSF; it
is implicit in the economic collapse following troop withdrawal and,
furthermore, in the exodus already underway of those Afghan citizens
who have the funds to leave the country. This would lead the power
groups and the AOG to a new phase of civil war: NATO would be facing
the choice of further intervention or abandoning Afghanistan
definitively.
2. Compromise. On the other hand, there is a more probable scenario
based on the consequences of political and social instability and ANSF
unpreparedness - partially counterbalanced by NATO support - that
should keep Afghanistan in a condition of unstable dynamic
stalemate in the short term. It includes the possibility of reaching
some sort of power-sharing agreement with Armed Opposition Groups
(the Taliban in primis).
In both cases, following ISAF disengagement, the AOG increased
military pressure will have an impact on ANSF and Afghan government
capabilities.

NATOs perspective on Afghanistan scenarios


From a security viewpoint, NATOs long-term presence can be seen as a
guarantee for the implementation of cooperation and development
projects as well as for the protection of the national interests of the donors
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engaged in Afghanistan.

Political and diplomatic dynamism, nourished by the competition between


Afghan factions and their external supporters, will contribute to an
intensification of low-level conflicts with a multiple civil war effect.
Because of international public opinion pressures oriented towards
quitting the expensive engagement in Afghanistan, NATO will reduce the
costs of the war through the reduction of military efforts acting on two
connected levels:
1. Strategic-Operational level
a. Combat troop disengagement (by the end of 2014);
b. ANSF support activity aimed at maintaining control of urban areas
(but not peripheral ones);
c. Conducting drone and counter-terrorism operations;
d. Maintaining strategic bases serving as internal support for the
ANSF and external (regional) intervention.
2. Communication-Media level
a. Emphasis on the non-combat role of NATO troops in Afghanistan;
b. Media attention on electoral and negotiation processes;
c. Creation of a perceived end of the Afghan war.

Conclusions: What consequences for NATOs engagement in


Afghanistan? Quit or stay?
2014 is the year of the substantial breakdown of the military's approach. The steppedup transition
of security responsibilities
Compromise, conflict or collapse, are the possible effects for the from ISAF to Afghan forces
short-term future; for this reason, the conclusion of the Afghan war will be and the closure of
political and NATO will play a marginal role on it. international forward
In 2015 NATO will support Afghanistan with the Resolute Support operating bases was met
Mission aimed at assisting the ANSF. with increased attacks by
AOG, augmented mainly at
Finally by the end of 2016, if Obamas new strategy is confirmed US and
checkpoints, on strategic
NATO forces will leave Afghanistan (leaving behind a residual force in
highways, on secondary
support of counterterrorism and advisory activities); it is not the optimal
lines of communication, in
approach but would serve to respond to the financial difficulties of NATO
some areas that had been
members and to American domestic political goals (the last troops would
transitioned and in
depart 20 days before President Obama leaves office in 2017, giving him
districts bordering
the opportunity to close the Afghan war and declare success).
neighboring countries
On the tactical level these actions will have strategic consequences. The
stepped-up transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to Afghan forces
and the closure of international forward operating bases was met with
increased attacks by AOG, augmented mainly at checkpoints, on strategic
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highways, on secondary lines of communication, in some areas that had been


transitioned and in districts bordering neighboring countries.

Furthermore we must consider, on the one hand, the Improvised


Explosive Devices, the suicide attacks and the green on blue attacks (a
direct threat to NATO advisers and trainers) and, on the other, the
reduction of the ANSF terrain-control capability; the latter as the
consequence of the insurgents increased military and political capability
in particular in rural and peripheral areas.
Afghan AOG are growing stronger at the expense of the ANSF and NATO Afghan AOG are growing
has lost its momentum. The US and NATOs interest was to bring the stronger at the expense of
Taliban to the negotiating table from a position of weakness, but during the ANSF and NATO has
the past two years the equation has been reversed. lost its momentum. The US
The smart strategic waiting of the Taliban contrasts with the dynamic and NATOs interest was to
stalemate of the United States (and its allies) who are interested in bring the Taliban to the
concluding the withdrawal because of domestic reasons and loss of negotiating table from a
legitimacy for the war. position of weakness, but
The sum of all these factors shows during the past two years
the equation has been
the Afghan situations limitations, reversed
a greater risk of Armed Opposition Groups expansion and,
consequentially,
the peril of instability in post-2014 Afghanistan,
when foreign combat troops will leave the battlefield formally, and in
particular after 2016.
In brief, it is assessed that
- the reduction in NATO counterinsurgency/counterterrorism
activities combined with the continued existence of AOG
sanctuaries in Pakistan will make the insurgency a greater threat
in the short-term future than it is now;
- the AOG will conserve resources in the near term for such an
offensive;
- the AOG will continually beleaguer the ANSF.
Concluding, the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating and NATO troops
will remain in a multifaceted war shaped by inter-ethnic conflicts and
unstable transnational/regional dynamics; the NATO presence in
Afghanistan after 2014 is aimed at avoiding a high degree of insecurity and
making possible an acceptable compromise for the future of the country.
A compromise based on power sharing with the Taliban; and it is
important to accept not whether the Taliban will participate in power
sharing but in what form and under what terms and conditions they will
really participate in Afghan political processes.
This may be the acceptable exit strategy alternative to the slow collapse of
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the central state in which NATO, with its function, tasks and
responsibilities reduced, will assume the role of a minor but not marginal
player in the last fragile phase of the transition process.

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