The Four Types of

Science-and-Religion

Herman Johan Pietersen

 The Four Types of
Science-and-Religion

by

Herman Johan Pietersen

2015
 Copyright KR Publishing and Herman Johan Pietersen

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First published in 2015

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To all explorers of antinomies
THE FOUR TYPES OF SCIENCE-AND-RELIGION
CONTENTS
Chapter 1. Fundamental approaches in human thought 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Ancient bifurcations 2
1.3 Modern thought 4
1.4 An integrated proposal 6
1.5 A spectrum of the four types in science-religion 10
1.6 Concluding remarks 10
Chapter 2. Science and religion: A review 11
2.1 Science and religion in perspective 11
2.2 Historical choice-points 13
2.3 Modern science-religion thought 22
2.4 Concluding remarks 27
Chapter 3. Metaphysical S-R thinkers 29
3.1 Ian Barbour 29
3.2 Philip Clayton 34
3.3 Wentzel van Huyssteen 38
Chapter 4. Scientific S-R thinkers 43
4.1 John Polkinghorne 43
4.2 Arthur Peacocke 50
4.3 Gregory Peterson 55
Chapter 5. Narrative S-R thinkers 59
5.1 Philip Hefner 59
5.2 Karl Peters 63
5.3 Ursula Goodenough 66
Chapter 6. Pragmatic S-R thinkers 71
6.1 Philip Hefner 71
6.2 Arthur Peacocke 71
6.3 William Grassie 73

iii
Chapter 7. The four types of S-R in review 75
7.1 Type I Science-Religion 75
7.2 Type II Science-Religion 75
7.3 Type III Science-Religion 75
7.4 Type IV Science-Religion 76
7.5 Concluding comments 76

References 79
Bibliography 93

iv
 PREFACE
The present work brings together the authors previous
writing on fundamental approaches in the field of science and
religion.
For this purpose the existing material were subjected to
minor revision and re-arranged according to each of four
main types of human thought. A new chapter was written to
provide a concluding review of the contents of the book.
The overall project started out as an experiment, a
philosophical hypothesis, and repeatedly received clear
evidentiary support across a global range of knowledge
disciplines, traditions and thinkers in the history of thought.
I thank our Creator for the life given to me, to continue to
pursue my dream even though in the end we merely see
through a glass darkly.
The search for fundamentals has been a most meaningful
and worthwhile part of in my life - something which words
can never fully express. I am deeply grateful and can only
hope that the work will be of value to readers interested in
the topic.

Herman Johan Pietersen

Haenertsburg
South Africa
Herman.pietersen@ul.ac.za

v
 CHAPTER 1
FUNDAMENTAL APPROACHES IN HUMAN
THOUGHT
1.1 Introduction
The history of thought shows a continuous and unfolding
succession of competing ideas and theories concerning,
especially, the nature of the true and the good.
The struggle between different ideas and systems of
thought arose from the very beginning. This is evidenced in,
for instance, Heraclitus rejection of the Pythagorean
obsession with number and Platos opposition to the Ionian
pre-occupation with matter.
Today, human thought is characterised by many
conceptualisations that seems to defy any meaningful overall
view. Many different approaches to the nature of truth and
reality have emerged over time, for example: rationalism,
positivism, realism, nominalism, humanism, utilitarianism,
empiricism, pragmatism, behaviourism, naturalism,
existentialism, and postmodernism.
The question is how to make sense of it all? In striving to
find answers to this question, it became clear that the issues
the ancients grappled with still provide an important starting
point for understanding the nature of the problem.
A consideration of different intellectual emphases that
continually surface in the history of thought, starting with the
Greeks, led to the insight, namely, that a number of axiomatic
and interrelated orientations towards knowledge of the world
and of human beings underlie and shape the human intellect
in its endeavours.
Taken together, these dispositions emanate from the same
source, namely, the human being. As the body cannot rid

1
itself of its shadow, so human thought cannot be rid of - but
is embedded in - prototypical ways of looking at and
experiencing the world.
The current endeavour is a project in meta-theory
application, and will focus on a range of prominent
philosophical thinkers and approaches.

1.2 Ancient bifurcations

It was a major event in the history of humanity when the
ancients moved away from being in a state of dependency on
powerful forces around them, which they could not fathom
and were in awe of, to the awakening of reason. For Plato all
things were confounded together until reason gave order.
This provided the spark that triggered independent thinking,
away from blindly obeying social custom and the gods of
tradition.
The Greek quest for natural origins changed in about 600
BCE from seeking answers to the question who is the cause of
everything (for which the Olympic pantheon, under the
leadership of Zeus, typically was the source of explanation),
to the question what non-personal, primary force or principle
is behind or in nature and existence.
Cornford 1 describes two traditions, the scientific and
mystical modes of thought, which existed in Greek religion
and which influenced the development of Greek philosophy.
In Homers mythological thought (at about 800 BCE) it was
still the rule by impersonal force of destiny or fate (Moira), in
which everything was assigned to its allotted position or
province. Eventually, the family of Olympian gods became
the dominant source of answers, but, in turn, had to make
room for Reason - the rule by impersonal necessity of law

2
and principle. As the historical record shows, the occurrence
of swings between subjectifying (personal) and objectifying
(impersonal) orientations of mind is an early phenomenon in
human thought.
Basic intellectual differences appear in mythology in the
kind of powers and functions ascribed to, especially, the
Greek gods Apollo and Dionysus. 2, 3 Apollo and Dionysus
were depicted as very different type of Gods, with the
exception that the ancients attributed powers of music, poetry
and the arts to both of them. Figure 1.1 illustrates some of
the contrasts.
Figure 1.1: Apollo and Dionysus as paradigmatic opposites
Apollo Dionysus
God of temple at Delphi God of temple at Delphi
Ruled by reason Ruled by emotions and will
Intellectual, spiritual Freedom and equality
Purity, radiance, and light Excitement of life and
growth
Self-restraint and discipline Self-indulgence and passion
God of intellect God of senses

The conflicting elements in the characterization of these

two major deities of the ancient Greek world points to a root
distinction in human thought. Apollo is depicted as the aloof
deity, the impersonal god of reason, principle and a
hierarchical order that is superior to and above desires of the
flesh. Dionysus shows just the opposite qualities: of rule by
the passions and will; of an unbridled celebration of the
senses and of the drive toward equality and freedom of
expression.

3
 In the profiles of these mythical figures, the central
distinction between the impersonal and personal in human
thought emerges. Overall, Greek religion maintained the
dominance of Apollo (the God of law and order) over the
urges of the Dionysian in human nature, and of the rule of
the intellect over the senses. Yet, there was an intuitive
understanding that society had to accommodate both forces,
in order to avoid the tendency toward excess of each mode of
being, if left unopposed.
In the course of history, and despite continuing efforts by
the rational mind to subdue it, the Dionysian side of human
nature kept surfacing. From orgiastic festivals in ancient
Greece, to modern rock concerts, of which Woodstock (in
1969) is perhaps the iconic 20th century example; from the
temperamental and unruly steed (representing the passions) in
Platos parable of the charioteer, to Freuds modern
unveiling of the unconscious Id with its sexual libido - the
Dionysian drive refuses to be suppressed.

1.3 Modern thought

The scholarly literature of modern times shows that
bifurcated thought continues unabated. Kant, for instance,
aimed to provide a grand metaphysics of mind, yet he also
acknowledged the presence of different orientations in the
history of thought.
At the end of his main work 4 he provides his own
taxonomy that reflects basic divisions in human thought. He
distinguishes between intellectualists and nologists (Plato,
Leibnitz) on the one hand and sensualists and empiricists
(Epicurus, Aristotle, Locke) on the other. According to Kant,

4
the former strives to find truth and certainty in Reason, the
latter in Experience and sensuous objects.
Kant desired to enthrone Reason by giving the world a
comprehensive system of rational, pure, concepts of mind -
a master methodology of Reason that would: bring
Reason to perfect contentment 5
On the other side of the divide, and during the same
period, the poet-philosopher, Friedrich Schiller, eloquently
described the destructive effects of a one-sided, rational-
scientific approach to life. In Schiller the Dionysian
resentment against the soul-destroying characteristic of an
impersonal and mechanistic way of thought and life rises to
the surface: Like the analytical chemist, the philosopher can
only discover how things are combined by analyzing them,
only lay bare the workings of spontaneous Nature by
subjecting them to the torment of his own techniques? 6
His approach is a clear reflection of the romantic (Dionysian)
protest and reaction against an impersonal (Apollonian)
objectification of nature and human existence.
In the 20th century, the political philosopher Isaiah Berlin 7
distinguishes between formal and empirical categories of
thought in relation to human values and ethics. He echoes
Schillers distinction between sensuous and formal drives;
Kants sensualists and intellectualists and, prototypically,
Platos account (in the Sophist), of the everlasting battle
between the Giants (the friends of matter) and the Gods of
intellect (the friends of form).
For Bernstein 8 it is a struggle between "objectivism" and
"relativism"; between the basic conviction of the existence of
some permanent, a-historical truth or knowledge framework
and the equally basic view that all such thinking is relative to

5
the varied and changing nature of specific social and cultural
contexts.

1.4 An integrated proposal

The various intellectual tendencies, outlined in the previous
section, reflect different aspects or elements of what, at first
sight, seems to be two major streams in the history of
thought. This is conveniently summarized in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Some contrasts in human thought
Source #1 #2
Mythology Apollo: Dionysus:
(Greek) God of Intellect God of Senses
Impersonal (Logos) Personal (Mythos)
Order (hierarchy) Freedom (equality)
Plato Gods (form) Giants (matter)
Cornford Scientific tradition Mystical tradition
Kant Intellectualists Sensualists (Aristotle;
(Plato; Leibniz) Epicurus)
Schiller Faculty of Intellect Faculty of Feeling
Berlin Monists Pluralists
(hedgehogs) (foxes)
Utopianism Romanticism
Snow Scientific culture Literary culture

However, the list is potentially confusing if it is not borne

in mind that these classifications were generated by thinkers
and traditions of thought who themselves regarded the world
in different ways. They wore different spectacles, and
therefore adopted different approaches to truth and reality.
Kant, for instance, is the analytic philosopher who
favoured science and a universally applicable logic of mind.

6
Schiller, his contemporary, is the poet-philosopher who
anguished in moving and expressive language about the
destructive effect of an impersonal Kantian world of
scientific thought, with its cold logic, on the human spirit
and well-being.
The various elements may be reduced to a number of core
elements of thought, namely, the:
Impersonal (I It) vs Personal (I Thou)
Reason (ratio; logic) vs Meaning (will, feeling)
Form (abstract ideas) vs Matter (things/senses)
At the heart of these descriptions is the most fundamental
distinction of all, namely, what the ancients referred to as the
One and the Many - in its modern guise known as monism
and pluralism. This was regarded as an axiomatic and very
old truth already in the times of Socrates.
In Platos Philebus, Socrates enlightens his conversational
partner (Philebus) about the origin of this piece of wisdom,
which the ancient oral tradition passed on in the Greek
world, describing it as a divine gift from the gods. 9
From the above discussion, two intersecting kinds of
polarities may be derived, namely between Objectivist
(Apollonian) and Subjectivist (Dionysian) thought and between
Empyrean (Platos Gods; the super-sensible) and Empiricist
thought (Platos Giants; matter).
With reference to the Objectivist-Subjectivist distinction there
are, on the one hand, those thinkers and schools of thought
that prefer the truths arrived at by the workings of an
impersonal, calculating, mind or intellect (in answer to the
root question: what is this?). This is exemplified by Platos
episteme and known bias toward the immutable truths of logic
and mathematics. On the other, are the truths grounded in

7
values, will, and feeling, and in a personal and social context;
largely in response to the other enduring question, namely:
how should we live?
The Empyrean-Empiricist distinction, in turn, refers to two
basic approaches to the perennial ontological question,
namely, what is the nature of reality? Throughout the
history of thought, even before Platos formulation almost
two and a half millennia ago, answers to this question were
given by two different and enduring intellectual camps: the
friends of matter (Ionian materialism) and the friends of
form (Pythagorean idealism ).
The one group, the giants, exemplified by the Greek
Atomists, forever harks to the empirical truths of matter, the
sensible, so-called hard facts of nature. The other group, the
gods, is forever drawn to the transcendent and metaphysical
truths of forms, laws, and principles to an invisible and
super-sensible world beyond the human sensory apparatus.
Concerning the distinction between empyrean and
empiricist approaches, a modern historian of philosophy
aptly summarises it: whereas for Plato the best thought
was freed from sense experience altogether, for Aristotle it
remained rooted in sense experience. 11
The classic Western exemplars of objectivist thought are:
Plato, the empyrean theorist (conveniently designated as Type
I) and the quintessential empiricist thinker, Aristotle (Type
II). Types III and IV are best represented in Greek thought
by, respectively, Protagoras and the poetic-expressive,
subjectivist approach of Sophism, in general, and Plato, as
social theorist and reformer.
It is important to note that the proposed scheme of basic
orientations of mind does not imply that one particular

8
approach is necessarily better or worse than the other. They
should rather be seen as distinctive modalities or forces of
mind.
For each modality a cluster of typical descriptors has been
identified, as shown in Figure 1.3.
Although variations occur in the extent to which all
elements of each cluster apply to an individual or community
of thinkers and scholars, they are useful in characterizing the
different paradigms of thought. Collectively they do provide,
for each type, a more or less coherent meta-theoretical
profile. A more detailed discussion of the four paradigms of
human thought is provided elsewhere. 12, 13
Figure 1.3: The four modalities of mind
ARISTOTLE: Scientific PLATO: Metaphysical
Question: What is this? Question: What is behind?
Impersonal Impersonal
Description of life/world Essentials of life/world.
Reason (rationality) Reason (rationality)
Systematic-analytical Theoretical-integrative
Detailed explanation Broad understanding

PROTAGORAS: Narrative PLATO: Pragmatic

Question: What is the story? Question: What to do?
Personal Personal
To praise, tell inspiring To change, renew, life/world
stories OR to criticize, tell according to valued ideals
sad stories, Emphasizes values
Emphasizes values (humanism)
(humanism) Communal-engaged/
Personal-engaged / ideological
experiential Advocacy-general and
Poetic-particular and critical reformist

9
1.5 A spectrum of Western philosophies
The present work discusses various science-religion
approaches as examples of the four main types of modalities
of mind. The selection of leading S-R figures is shown in
Figure 1.4 below.
Fig. 1.4: A spectrum of S-R thought
TYPE II MODALITY TYPE I MODALITY
Polkinghorne Barbour
Peacocke Clayton
Peterson Van Huyssteen

TYPE III MODALITY TYPE IV MODALITY

Hefner Hefner
Peters Peacocke
Goodenough Grassie

1.6 Concluding remarks

There is much, though uncoordinated, evidence in the history
of thought of the existence of archetypal orientations of the
mind. The theory that is briefly presented in the present
chapter proposes an encompassing perspective on the nature
and dynamics of these enduring inclinations of the mind.

10
 CHAPTER 2
SCIENCE AND RELIGION: A REVIEW
2.1 Science and religion in perspective
The chapter approaches the field of science-and-religion
(hereafter also referred to as: S-R) from a broad historical
point of view. It attempts to show that the scientific, religious
and philosophical character of its discourse is often closely
intertwined.
The endeavours of science and of religion are central to
human life. Although reason (manifested in the achievements
of modern science) and revelation, or faith, has, since the
Enlightenment, increasingly become separated, their
fundamental co-existence as ineradicable dimensions of
human nature and of culture continues.
Classical Greek thought 1 presents a striking example of
the ebb and flow of basic powers of the mind; of the close
and dynamic interconnectedness of archetypal orientations.
These may be described as the Impersonal (reflected in the
search for abstract principles and laws of science and of
metaphysics) and the Personal (reflected in narratives of
divinities and gods in the world).
They operate in pre-Socratic thought, for instance,
through varying combinations and sequences of philosophy
and theology; of objectivist and subjectivist mixes in the early
Greek mind. But, passim Kant, like oil and water they never
really mix. 2 Poetry (and religious prose) may have its
metaphysical moments; metaphysics may be rendered in
poetical or quasi-poetical prose (e.g., Platos dialogues), but
poetry is not metaphysics, and vice versa. Similarly (and in
conformity with the meta-theoretical stance of the present
work and its predecessors), science is not religion (though, for

11
some, it may become so, or treated as such); religion is not
science (though many theologians - such as Aquinas and
Harnack have attempted to explain its beliefs and doctrines
from the perspective of the scientific modality of mind). The
fact is that these domains speak different languages; reflect
different realms of experience and understanding, and
account in different ways for the world that we live in and of
which we are part.
Attempts to amalgamate or go beyond these modalities of
knowing and being do not succeed. Such, for example, may
be observed about the, otherwise stimulating, ideas of Jan
Smuts and Teilhard de Chardin (see further on). In these
cases the waters are muddied, by either describing the
personal in terms of the impersonal (the objectivist modality
of mind), or the impersonal in terms of the personal (the
subjectivist modality of mind), and so too often end up as
examples of question-begging and unconvincing intellectual
splicing.
The bifurcation of the impersonal and the personal (as well as
of empirical and empyrean modalities) is therefore at the root of
ancient as well as modern attempts to reconcile faith and
reason, religion and science. In a fundamental sense they
should be viewed as inseparable, yet separate modes of being
and activity each of which provides meaning to our
existence (see Figure 2.1). In the religious sphere this is well-
expressed by John Paul II in the opening lines of his
encyclical, Fides et Ratio: Faith and reason are like two wings
on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of
truth. 3

12
 Figure 2.1: Basic intellectual modalities
Impersonal Personal
Worldly Science (II) Poetry ( III)

Other-Worldly Metaphysics (I) Religion (IV)

2.2 Historical choice-points

As far as the topic of the relationship between science and
religion is concerned, one may conveniently start with its
early manifestation in the thought of the ancient (pre-
Socratic) Greeks.
The first point to note is that, contrary to the Jewish (and
later on also Christian) religion, the divinities of the ancient
Greeks were part of and operated inside the world of nature
(partly also a recurring theme through panentheistic and
process theological tendencies in the modern S-R literature).
In contrast to the Hebrew belief in the world as the free
creation of God (the Logos) who: is stationed outside the
world and brings that world into existence by his own
personal fiat [the] Greek gods are stationed inside the world;
they are descended from Heaven and Earth, the two greatest
and most exalted parts of the universe; and they are generated
by the mighty power of Eros, who likewise belongs within
the world as an all-engendering primitive force. 4
In the ancient Greek mind the intellectual and religious
dimensions of life (reflecting both objectivist and subjectivist
modalities in the present context) were, in varying degrees,
enmeshed in a way that, contrary to the modern worldview,
cannot easily be separated. Jaeger observes: Taking the
natural world as their starting-point, they develop the idea of
some highest principle and then proceed to assert of it that

13
'this must be the Divine'. 5 This represents a shift from the
arche (rule) of the Divine; i.e., the principle (idea; force) of the
Divine Hesiodic family of gods that rule everything on earth,
to the divinity of the ruling rational Principle, namely, the
divine Principle of the first philosophers. But it should be noted
that philosophy and religion (or S-R in its modern context) is
still closely held together in the minds of the early Greek
thinkers.
It is interesting to observe the existence of pendulum-
swings between the rational and religious content of ancient
Greek thought. Meta-theoretically, it must be stated that this
also highlights the problem of mixing the personal (namely,
mythical Greek divinities) with the first attempts of
philosophy to achieve a rational (impersonal) understanding
of nature. Following the renowned German classicist, Werner
Jaeger, this recurring phenomenon in pre-Socratic thought
may briefly be sketched, as follows:
In the cosmogony of Hesiod, who saw the divine
everywhere in the physical elements and forces of
nature, an underlying desire to develop a rational
(objectivist) scheme of the origins of the gods can
be detected: a type of causal thinking
unmistakably rational in the consistency with
which it is carried out, even though it takes the
form of myth; 6
Thales is known for his assertion that everything is
full of gods, meaning: everything is full of
mysterious living forces; the distinction between
animate and inanimate nature has no foundation in
fact; everything has a soul; 7

14
 Parmenides philosophy of one reality and truth
that admits no change, an important influence on
Plato, is presented in the form of a poem, in
which: he seeks to proclaim the 'truth' (aletheia)
which he has learned from the mouth of the
goddess herself, and the whole body of his poem
professes to be her direct address to him; 8
Heraclitus, in turn, is known for his philosophy of
perpetual flux and change, which he relates to a
divine cosmic law operating in the world: This
one thing that keeps asserting itself in struggle and
in change is what Heraclitus calls God; 9
The Ionian philosophy of nature of Empedocles
(regarded as an early progenitor of natural science)
is similarly presented in terms of mythical religious
figures, referring to: the four principles or roots
of all things as gods, and names them Zeus, Hera,
Aidoneus, and Nestis; 10

Anaxagoras, for whom the sun was a mere
glowing stone, tries to find a place for mind in his
physical theory of the world and argues that,
because mind is not a diverse mix of elements such
as the physical world consists of, it must be the
divine in us: the Divine is Pure reason. 11
Some notable figures in later periods of history may next
be considered for their relevance to the S-R field. Roger
Bacon, a contemporary of Thomas Aquinas, was convinced
that the best source of certain knowledge is sense-experience;
knowledge which is to be gained through experimenting with
the objects and phenomena of nature. Thus, the mind
becomes satisfied that a fire burns, not by propositional

15
reasoning or argument, but by actually putting ones hand or
some combustible thing into it. 12
Four hundred and seventy one years later David Hume
echoes this Ionian sentiment, by stating that we cannot form
any idea or concept of what the taste of a pineapple is, until
we have actually tasted one. 13 However, the difference is that
for Hume sense-perception was the only reliable source or
basis of truth and of knowledge of the world, whilst Roger
Bacon, following the Scholastics, acknowledged the truth of
argument or reason, as well as the authority of the Church.
Given the times that he lived in, Bacon also included the
religious dimension of divine inspiration. Yet, he clearly
preferred the certitude of experience provided by experiment
the kind of knowledge that calms the mind.
A name that frequently appears in the S-R literature is, of
course, that of Galileo Galilei (1564 1641). Never publicly
doubting the primacy of the church and of faith, he famously
observed that religion teaches us how to go to heaven;
science teaches us how the heaven goes. As an aside,
fundamentalists would probably favour the reverse
expression: how the heaven goes (science) depend on how to
go to heaven (faith); upon which S-R proponents may likely
respond: how to go to heaven (faith) depends on how the
heaven is (science).
His downfall and well-known recantation of his scientific
theories which were based on almost unimpeachable
empirical measurements and mathematical analysis is, as the
historical record shows, largely the result of his own
personality and of the intrigues of certain Aristotelian
academics and an ambitious priest, 14 and not of a clash
between science and religion as such. In short, in Galileos

16
time: science had been the handmaiden of philosophy,
which in turn was the handmaiden of theology. He wished to
free science from subservience to philosophy as the historical
obstacle to its utility and progress. 15
For Immanuel Kant reason (science) and religion must be
separated so that: the pure religion of reason will rule
overall, so that God may be all in all. 16 Thus, it would seem
that Kant leaves the door open for supernatural intervention,
yet, on the other hand, views religion as being embedded in
experience and history and therefore not inside the
trustworthy circle of pure reason, so to speak.
In the end, for Kant, outside of rational thought about
religion in terms of the fundamental moral law (existing
objectively as a universal, immutable, super-sensible principle)
and of the moral disposition (existing and operating within the
human as a subjective, inner, basic moral orientation that is
conditioned by the Moral Law), there is no room for a faith
based on dogma or opinion. Hence, also no compelling
reasons for giving primacy to beliefs based on Church
doctrine, enforced by ecclesiastical authority.
In the mid-nineteenth century, with the rising influence of
science, and of its establishment as a profession (the
designation scientist first came into use at this time) the two
spheres became increasingly estranged from one another. The
names of Draper and White are oft-quoted examples of
thinkers using terms such as antagonism, conflict, 17 and
warfare, 18 to depict the relationship between science and
religion.
Draper characterizes this antagonism as a:
continuation of a struggle that commenced when
Christianity began to attain political power 19 He also

17
states that he did not include so-called moderate religions in
his attack: it is not with the moderates but with the
extremists that the impartial reader is mainly concerned. 20
Further-on he sings the praises of science, and expresses the
view that: She has never attempted to throw odium or inflict
social ruin on any human being. 21 In reaction to this
nineteenth century pro-science sentiment, the question for
the present-day (post WW II) reader inevitably arises: but
what answer, other than mea culpa, can science give to
humanity after Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
At the end of the nineteenth century, the historian,
Andrew Dickenson White wrote his History of the warfare of
science with theology in Christendom. 22
In the North American context this work set the tone for
much of the S-R debate during the first half of the twentieth
century. In a public address he expounded the thesis that: In
all modern history, interference with science in the supposed
interest of religion, no matter how conscientious such
interference may have been, has resulted in the direst evils
both to religion and science, and invariably; and, on the other
hand, all untrammelled scientific investigation, no matter how
dangerous to religion some of its stages may have seemed for
the time to be, has invariably resulted in the highest good
both of religion and science. 23
Next to be considered is the work of Teilhard de Chardin,
Jan Smuts and Alfred North Whitehead, the first two being
clear examples, in the present context, of stimulating but
eventually unsuccessful attempts to resolve the impersonal-
personal antinomy in human thought.
For Teilhard de Chardin the pinnacle of a complex
process of evolution is what he describes as the Omega-

18
point. In terms of its meta-theoretical significance, de
Chardins thought is confusing. He firstly expresses the view
that: at the world's Omega, as at its Alpha, lies the
Impersonal, 24 which is then followed further-on with the
statement that: The Future-Universal could not be anything
else but the Hyper-Personal - at the Omega Point. 25
His view of the S-R relationship is that the conflict must
be resolved by way of a synthesis: when we turn towards
the summit, towards the totality and the future, we cannot
help engaging in religion. Religion and science are the two
conjugated faces or phases of one and the same complete act
of knowledge 26 For the celebrated historian of
philosophy, Frederick Copleston, de Chardins thought in the
end turns out to be: vague impressions and concepts
which are not clearly defined. The whole thing, it may be said,
is a mixture of science, poetry and religious faith. 27
During the early decades of the twentieth century, the
South African statesman and scientist-philosopher, Jan Smuts
(who coined the term holism) engaged in a venture similar
to but independently of Teilhard de Chardin. Unlike the
latter, Smuts, however, does not include religion or theology
in his own grand metaphysical vision and synthesis of the
process of evolution, though it is similarly utopian in its main
thrust.
For Smuts: Evolution is nothing but the gradual
development and stratification of progressive series of
wholes, stretching from the inorganic beginnings to the
highest levels of spiritual creation. 28 This is the principle of
holism, a process of creative synthesis, a universe of
whole-making. 29

19
 Again one finds the unfortunate mix of the impersonal
and personal dimensions or modalities of mind. By way of
example, he states that: Finally, there emerge the ideal
wholes, or Holistic Ideals, or Absolute Values, disengaged
and set free from human personality, operating as creative
factors on their own account in the upbuilding of a spiritual
world. Such are the Ideals of Truth, Beauty and Goodness,
which lay the foundations of a new order in the universe. 30
Towards the end of his book, however, he reaches the
conclusion that: Personality is the supreme embodiment of
Holism both in its individual and its universal tendencies. 31
Further-on he continues in quasi-poetic, almost mystical,
fashion with: Wholeness as free and harmonious self-
realization thus sums up the summum bonum of Holism, 32
and: Holism, not Spiritualism, is the key to the interpretation
of the universe. Mind is not at the beginning but at the end,
but Holism is everywhere and all in all. 33
Finally, he concludes with: The groaning and travailing of
the universe is never aimless or resultless. Its profound
labours mean new creation, the slow, painful birth of wholes,
of new and higher wholes, and the slow but steady realization
of the Good 34
Here, it must be observed, Smuts smuggles in teleology
through the back door. And the struggle between the personal
(Smuts poetic moments; the value he attaches in his
scheme, to Personality) and the impersonal (an irresistible
Force, Principle or Process) surfaces again. Rephrasing
Copleston, one may remark of Smuts system that: the whole
thing is a mixture of Darwinian science and metaphysics,
tinged with poetical mysticism.

20
 In his Religion in the Making, Whitehead argues for a non-
personal, metaphysically defensible, religion. In this system
God becomes an actual entity, the: ...supreme God of
rationalized religion. 35 But even Whitehead cannot avoid the
dichotomy of God as the impersonal order of the universe,
and of God as the one person creating the universe. 36
Another figure often mentioned in the S-R literature, is
Albert Einstein, with his now widely (if not exhaustingly)
quoted: science without religion is lame, religion without
science is blind. 37 Einstein, the pantheist, took an essentially
Humean position, separating science (the is) from religion
(the ought). As far as he was concerned, the idea of a
personal God is at the root of the conflict between science
and religion, and should be dispensed with. He went on to
urge teachers of religion: to have the stature to give up
the doctrine of a personal God. 38
Coming from another direction, the philosopher Mary
Midgley is concerned about what she perceives to be a
modern trend to regard science as the source of salvation,
with scant regard for humankinds spiritual needs. 39 To the
notion that science and religion is in conflict, her pointed
response is that it: ...is an extremely odd idea, since it has to
mean that they have somewhere been competing for the same
job 40 She asks the question, which she suggests should be
taken seriously by the S-R scholarly community, whether
science: is in the business of providing the faith by which
people live. Is it actually in that business? 41 She also puts her
finger on an important motive of many S-R participants,
namely: ...the hunger for a unifying pattern, 42 the urge to
bring science and religion under one roof.

21
 For Brooke, 43 the view that the science and religion
relationship is one of conflict, is narrow and inappropriate.
The history of science shows a much more complex picture,
such as, for example in the case of Isaac Newton who also
ascribed the operation of the law of gravitation to God. Both
Robert Boyle, the chemist, and Albert Einstein applies
religious imagery: nature as temple and the scientist as priest
by Boyle; 44 the temple of science for Einstein 45
For many scientists (at least in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries), the laws of nature reflects the order in
the universe created by God. In the philosophy of law this
was, for example, also a basic premise in The Institutes of
Justinian (535 CE) and, twelve centuries later (in 1758), by
William Blackstones Commentaries on the Laws of England. 46
Brooke 47 unfortunately and mistakenly, refers to the
burning of Michael Servetus (1511 1553) as an example that
is reportedly used to portray conflict between religion and
science. However, the historical record shows that Servetus
suffered the auto-da-fe for his persistent attack on the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity, something which greatly disturbed the
leading Protestant reformer of the time, John Calvin. Briefly,
in an earlier letter to a colleague Calvin stated that if Servetus
ever set foot in Geneva, he (Calvin) would never allow him to
leave alive. And so it turned out to be the case. It was
therefore not a clash between science and religion.
Brooke concludes with the surely more reasonable view
that the conflict thesis is overdrawn. Science and religion:
should rather be seen as complex social activities
involving different expressions of human concern, the same
individuals often participating in both. 48

22
2.3 Modern science-religion thought
The pioneering figure in the modern S-R discussion is Ralph
Burhoe, a biologist and public intellectual, who strongly
advocated the idea of bringing religion into line with the
insights and truths of modern science. Hoping to replace the
conventional, supernatural, religion, Burhoe enthuses about:
beginning to speak scientifically about both the human
spirit and the Holy Spirit. A scientific spirituality is aborning!
49

In the mid-sixties a journal, ostensibly aiming to promote

dialogue between science and religion, was established, and
named Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science. Zygon means: the
yoking or harnessing of a team which must effectively pull
together 50 This journal, which soon became a primary
(but not only) outlet for scholarly publications in the S-R
field, had as its main objective: the task of reformulating
religion for an age of science, not simply analyzing
scientifically or historically what has gone on thus far 51
It should therefore be noted that the modern science-and-
religion interface or discussion is essentially an ideology-
driven enterprise. It is, in the main, a North American reform
movement (incentivized by the financial largesse of the
Templeton Foundation), which aims to lay the groundwork
for and help bring about a new (non-supernatural) theology
for a scientific age. The major scholarly figure in this
endeavour is Ian Barbour, a physicist who also trained as a
minister of religion, more about whom will be said in the next
chapter.
Given the present aim, only a brief sample from the
burgeoning S-R literature will be given in the following
paragraphs, to indicate some of the diversity of issues and

23
proposals that are put forward. With few exceptions, almost
all contributors share the scientific worldview, and a
conviction that the way of science is the prime example to
follow. The main group of S-R participants consists of
scientists, philosophers and theologians (mostly the former
two groups), and of those with a background in one or more
of these disciplines (such as the leading S-R figures of
Barbour, Polkinghorne, and Peacocke).
One may observe that there is in much of the S-R writing
a contradictory tendency. 52 On the one hand, the palm is
offered for friendly dialogue with religion, but at the same
time it is also insisted that for religion/theology to be a
worthy conversational partner it should re-think and re-invent
itself, so as to become a credible faith in an age of science.
In addition, only a few theologians have so far entered the S-
R arena, to the dismay of many current members of this
scholarly community, especially Arthur Peacocke.
The prevailing and generally optimistic view among S-R
participants is, as Ted Peters confidently phrases it, that:
Both scientists and theologians are engaged in a common
search for shared understanding. 53 But there are also those
who are doubtful about the kind of integration of science and
religion that many in the S-R community aim (or rather hope)
for. As one author rather pessimistically concludes: while
we may no longer have two totally separate realms of
discourse, we also have little likelihood of achieving a single
integrated intellectual enterprise. 54
Some of the more unconventional proposals that appear
in Zygon are as follows:

24
 Discussion of how an artificial intelligence project,
namely: Cog, a humanoid robot can be enriched by
theology; 55
A complexity theory-based approach called chaos
theology; 56
Based on the phenomenon of ecstatic feelings that
accompanies epileptic seizures, it is concluded that
the human brain is a God module; 57
Discussion of the neurological roots of religious
experience, in which Abraham, Moses, Muhammad
and Jesus Christ, are portrayed as examples of limbic
system hyperactivity. 58
In view of the above it should perhaps not come as a
surprise that a former Templeton prize-winner, the
philosopher Michael Ruse, became wholly disillusioned with
the field. In a paper in Zygon, he expresses the following
criticisms:
Article after article, book after book, seems to me to
hover between the trivial and the inane; 59
Fundamental questions about the nature of
existence, about God, about the human being (the
soul, for instance), about morality, get thin
discussions...too often spin wheels, epicycles on
epicycles.; 60
Too many people in the science-religion field are
simply not properly trained. You cannot write on
these things without some real understanding of
philosophy and theology.; 61
There is an enthusiasm in the field these days for the
notion of emergence...it seems all too clear that by
uncritically embracing emergence people are trying on

25
 the cheap or on the sly to get spirituality or some such
thing out of material things. It cant be done 62
This section concludes with a summary of agreements and
differences 63 between leading S-R thinkers, shown in Figures
2.2 and 2.3.
Figure 2.2: Agreement between Barbour, Polkinghorne and
Peacocke
(1) Critical realism
(2) Holism, emergence, and levels of organization
(3) Human nature (namely: bio-cultural evolution)
(4) Limitations in Gods power

Figure 2.3: Disagreements between S-R thinkers

Theme Barbour Peacocke Polkinghorne
Conception Dipolar Pan- Trinitarian
of God: theism entheism theism
(Gods (Gods (Gods
necessary voluntary voluntary
self- self- self-
limitation) limitation) limitation)
Laws of Temporary Immanent in Ordained by
nature are: habits of nature. God.
nature.
Divine Two-way Whole-part Information
action is: interaction constraint input
Christ is: A man A new The incarnate
responsive to emergent Son
Gods call

26
2.4 Concluding remarks
The S-R field is a multi-disciplinary endeavour, and it is
therefore to be expected that there will be a variety of
theoretical and methodological stances, and mutual
borrowing of ideas and concepts from different areas. It is
not, as such, science, or theology, or philosophy, but
essentially a speculative venture straddling all three areas.
A common denominator is that participants, especially the
scientists, share a belief in (or are at least admirers of) the
scientific way, in the type II modality of mind. The physicist,
John Polkinghorne succinctly phrases a core premise of the
empiricist mode of science, as the conviction that:
epistemology (truth) models ontology (reality), or, stated
differently, that what we know (epistemology) indeed tells us
is a true account or reflection of - the way things really are
(ontology), and not a social construction, or truth as text.

27
 CHAPTER 3
METAPHYSICAL S-R THINKERS
3.1 Ian Barbour
Ian Barbour (a physicist and priest) is generally recognized as
the leading figure in the modern S-R enterprise, and perhaps
best known for his Religion in an Age of Science, a magisterial
survey and comparison of paradigms, models and methods in
science and religion. His question (which is also at the heart
of the S-R endeavour) is: What view of God is consistent
with the scientific understanding of the world? 1
The basic challenge to religion is undoubtedly still the
successes of modern science. Scientists themselves, though
they are aware of and acknowledge the fallibility and open-
endedness of the scientific endeavour, are guided by the
regulating belief that science (and the methods of science)
provides objective (empirically supported) truths about nature
and the universe. There are many reliably confirmed truths in
the natural and life sciences, which no amount of anti-
science, anti-establishment critique and rhetoric (mostly
under the umbrella-term postmodernism) can explain away.
The law of gravity holds everywhere its neither literary
fiction, nor a colonialist ploy, for that matter.
In typical objectivist-empyrean fashion, Barbour starts
with a basic framework of various types of relationship
between science and religion, namely, independence, conflict,
dialogue and integration. His aim is to pursue dialogue
between and eventual integration of science and religion, and
favours a top-down, hierarchical, multi-levelled systems view
of the world, that, he believes, avoids the Cartesian duality of
mind and body, spirit and matter. As far as divine action is
concerned he prefers process theology as answer.

29
 Barbour emphasises the importance of philosophy for the
S-R field: especially epistemology and metaphysics, 2 thus
showing his empyrean orientation. Though he acknowledges
the position of independence of science and religion as a first
approximation, his thought (in line with the ideological thrust
of the Zygon movement) is mainly directed toward its
integration. He proposes a systematic synthesis in which:
both science and religion contribute to the development
of an inclusive metaphysics, such as that of process
philosophy, 3 though he also cautions against uncritical use
of the latter.
According to Barbour, both science and religion are
characterized by similar cognitive components, namely:
paradigms, theories, models and data. Figure 3.1 presents his
comparison of the structures of scientific and religious
thought. He presents the same criteria for assessing theories
in both domains, namely: agreement with data, coherence,
scope, and fertility.
Figure 3.1: Barbours structures of S and R 4
Science Religion
Imagination/analogies/ Imagination/analogies/
models models
Concepts/theories Concepts/beliefs/doctrine
Theories influence Beliefs/doctrine influence
observation experience and interpretation
Observation/data Religious experience/
story/ritual

He follows an approach of critical realism which holds

that existence or being precedes theorizing. In this process,
models are important for both science and religion, though in

30
the religious sphere models also serve the purpose of
personal transformation and reorientation, which is not the
case in science: Models, [which forms the basis of
theories]...are to be taken seriously but not literally; they are
neither literal pictures [Classical realism] nor useful fictions
[Instrumentalism] but limited and inadequate ways of
imagining what is not observable. 5
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 (below) present a sketch of parallels
between scientific and religious paradigms, and a summary of
his discussion of changing views of nature, respectively. It is
interesting to note (see Figure 3.2) the bias that creeps into
Barbours comparison of these paradigms. While he strives to
identify similarities, science is positively portrayed as being
more flexible and open to new ideas and findings; whilst
dogma seems to be the rule in religion.
Figure 3.2: Barbours parallels between S & R6
Science Religion
1. All data are paradigm- 1. Religious experience is
dependent, but there are data paradigm-dependent.
on which adherents of rival
paradigms can agree.
2. Paradigms are resistant to 2. Religious paradigms are
falsification by data, but data highly resistant to
do affect the paradigm. falsification.
3. There are no rules for 3. There are no rules for
paradigm choice, but there are paradigm choice in religion.
shared criteria.

31
 Figure 3.3: Barbours comparison of views of nature 7
Medieval Newtonian Twentieth Century
1. Fixed order Change as Evolutionary,
rearrangement emergent
2. Teleological Deterministic Law and chance,
and openness
3. Substantive Atomistic Relational,
ecological
4. Hierarchical, Reductionistic Systems and
anthropocentric wholes, organismic
5. Dualistic Dualistic Multi-levelled
(spirit/matter) (mind/body)
6. Kingdom Machine Community

He also discusses the relevance of process philosophy, and

(contrary to his own conviction) presents a variation of the
Cartesian split when he observes that process thought:
...takes mental and neural phenomena to be two aspects of
the same events. 8 Figure 3.4 summarises his wide-ranging
discussion of different models or ways of conceiving Gods
role in the world. 9
Barbours groundbreaking contribution to the S-R field is
widely acknowledged. But, of course, there is also the
inevitable criticism that follows in the wake of any intellectual
product that is put in the marketplace of ideas.
Some issues and concerns about his thought are briefly
indicated below:
His four-fold framework, nested in the conflict-thesis,
is too one-sided, analytically unhelpful and ideological
in its basic thrust; 10

32
 Figure 3.4: Barbours models of Gods role in nature
Theology Dominant Conceptual elaboration
model
Classical Rule-Kingdom Omnipotent, omniscient,
unchanging sovereign
Deist Clockmaker- Designer of a law-
Clock. abiding world.
Neo-Thomist Workman-Tool Primary cause working
through secondary
causes
Kenotic Parent-Child Voluntary self-limitation
and vulnerability
Existentialist None God acts only in
personal life
Linguistic Agent-Action Events in the world as
Gods action
Embodiment Person-Body The world as Gods body
Process Leader- Creative participant in
Community the cosmic community

His approach is too cognitive in content and does not

sufficiently address religious aspects: ...it omits the
crucial role of faith, salvation, and the revelation of
such fundamental doctrines as the Trinity.; 11

He does not address the question of: How is it
possible to conceive of a personal Godspecifically,
the God in whom Christians confess beliefcreating
and active within the universe revealed by the natural
sciences?; 12

33
 There is little if any discussion concerning: ...the
relationship between various world theologies and the
natural sciences.; 13
Barbours work: ...echoes the logical positivist vision
of unification and has a strong bias toward science as
the sole source of rationality, which does not take
theology fully seriously.; 14
Barbour (as with the S-R field in general) does not
address the basic question: Why do we need an
interaction between science and religion? 15

3.2 Philip Clayton

Philip Clayton holds doctorates in both philosophy and in
religious studies, and is a prominent second-generation S-R
scholar.
Given his background, he by and large takes a
philosophical (philosophy of mind, philosophy of science)
approach to the science and religion relationship, with a focus
on topics such as rationality models, models of emergence,
and the Lakatosian framework of research programs for
discussing the God/world relationship. Within the context of
the meta-theory utilized in the present work, this places him
in the objectivist-empyrean category.
In Explanation from physics to theology: An essay in rationality
and religion, he explores the nature of justification and
explanation in science and religion: With the aid of the work
of Imre Lakatos, I steer a middle course between purely
formal and purely contextual treatments of rationality. 16 His
thesis is that there is continuum of epistemic positions that
lies: between absolute, universal, or objective justification
claims and purely private justifications. 17 Thus, it would

34
seem, he attempts to accommodate both objectivist and
subjectivist modes of thought. He also wishes to make room
for the intersubjective approach to rationality.
He sees his main task in the above-mentioned work, as
going beyond the private and communal explanations of
religion, and proposes a transcommunal, pansubjectivist
(thus, empyrean) approach: since these explanations often
claim validity for (virtually) all knowing subjects. 18
In Claytons view, the philosophy of science of Imre
Lakatos (which he interprets as post-foundationalism) has:
effectively overcome the traditional dichotomy between
rationalism and fideism in the faith/reason debate, thus
requiring a complete rethinking of what a natural theology
would entail. 19
Although he seems to subscribe to what one may describe
as a pluralistic rationality, and do not wish to provide a list
of rationality standards, he nevertheless follows the
objectivist impulse to state a number of epistemological
criteria or rationality conditions for religion.
His criteria are: external reference (indicating his preference
for ontological realism); truth as referring to the epistemology
of justified true belief or: what is in fact the case, 20
thus going beyond individual or collective religious
experience; validity, which, according to Clayton is not a
return to objectivism, yet requires a certain burden of proof
from believers, that goes beyond claims of intersubjective
validity; rationality, which, for him, means that: that
theology cannot avoid an appeal to broader canons of
rational argumentation and explanatory adequacy. 21
He specifies the following criteria for theology to become
a science: 22

35
 It must be open to intersubjective examination and
criticism;
In principle no limits can be set as to who should
participate;
No solution should be based on privileged premises;
All beliefs should be treated as hypotheses that are:
internally coherent and clearly criticizable 22
In God and contemporary science, he asks the empyrean
question: what general framework for conceiving of the
God/world relation is adequate both to the biblical data and
to the contemporary philosophical and scientific context? 23
His answer is that: panentheism dissolves the dichotomy
that structured so many of the theological debates on this
topic. 24 For Clayton panentheism avoids reduction to the
world of creatures and of matter: God was before the world
and will exist after it. 25 Figure 3.5 shows Claytons
arguments for panentheism. 26
Clayton, like many other scholars, also finds himself
confronted with the antinomy of the personal and the
impersonal, wishing to accommodate both, yet favoring the
latter (objectivist) option, stating: Still, one must be careful
not to attribute personal attributes to the one all-that-is which
are denied by the pantheistic position itself. 27
Figure 3.5: Claytons reasons for choosing panentheism
1. The inadequacy of atheism
2. The inconsistency of classical Western theism
3. The biblical resistance to dualism
4. Divine infinity logically encompasses the finite world
5. The problem of divine causality (the action of God is
analogous to the bodys relationship to the mind or soul).

36
 In addition to his panentheism Clayton is also a leading
voice for the so-called emergentist approach.
Emergence, in Claytons view, is the: theory that
cosmic evolution repeatedly includes unpredictable,
irreducible, and novel appearances. 28 His purpose is to
establish a theoretical framework 29 for discussing the concept
of emergence.
Figure 3.6 presents Claytons scheme for representing the
characteristics of the theory of strong emergence (a top-
down approach that postulates the causal impact of higher
levels on lower levels in the world).
Figure 3.6: Claytons structure of strong emergence 30
Characteristic Description
(1) Monism There is one natural world
(2) Hierarchical This world appears to be
complexity hierarchically structured
(3) Temporal or It takes place over time:
emergentist monism Darwinian evolution from simple
to complex
(4) No monolithic law of The details of the process of
emergence emergence vary greatly
(5) Patterns across levels Broad similarities of emergence
of emergence in natural history
(6) Downward causation Phenomena at L2 exercise a
causal effect on L1 which is not
reducible to an L1 causal history.
(7) Emergentist pluralism Downward causation mean that
the position is 'pluralist' - distinct
levels occur within the one world
(8) 'Mind' as emergent Both upward and downward
influences are operative.

37
 Finally, some critical comments on Claytons ideas are as
follows:
He uses: the relationship between mind and brain
as analogy for the relationship between God and the
world [but] this runs the risk of understanding God as
analogous to the mind and hence secondary and
emergent relative to the world.; 31
He: concentrates on cognitive claims rather than
on religions as complex practices.; 32
Clayton's thesis becomes an exercise in trying to make
the way God acts in the world commensurate with
human conceptual capacity. 33

3.3 Wentzel van Huyssteen

Wentzel van Huyssteen is a theologian with a background
also in philosophy.
Utilizing ideas and concepts from philosophy of science,
his empyrean venture aims to explore the possibility of a
broad approach to rationality, one that will provide a truth
perspective encompassing both scientific and theological
reasoning. The motive behind his work is to achieve a
position of intellectual credibility (equal scholarly status) for
theology in a science-dominated world.
Already in his early work, Theology and the justification of faith:
Constructing theories in systematic theology, and relying on both
philosophy of science theories and more science-inclined
theologies such as those of Pannenberg, van Huyssteen
became: convinced that no rationality model in modern
philosophy of science can finally and conclusively define the
term rationality. 34.
The issues of rationality, objectivity and truth are of

38
central interest to him. He also expresses his support for
critical realism, an approach common to most S-R
participants. Setting the tone for his later work, van
Huyssteen decided to adopt an approach to rationality that:
has a historico-sociological character but is not exhausted
by this contextuality, because certain criteria of rationality are
also inter-contextually or inter-paradigmatically valid. 35
At the turn of the century he delivered his matured
thought with: The shaping of rationality: toward interdisciplinarity in
theology and science. In this work he offers a model of rationality
for theology that respects both the rationality of science and
the more contextualized rationality of interdisciplinary
reflection, stating that: In the wake of the postmodern
challenge to rationality we will therefore be pursuing the
possibility that shared rationality may actually be identified for
the sciences, for theology, and for other forms of inquiry. 36
This alternative he refers to as postfoundationalist
rationality, a model of rationality that: will take seriously
the challenge of much of postmodern thinking, but will
carefully distinguish between constructive and deconstructive
modes of postmodern thinking. 37 Although he is at pains to
avoid any suggestion of a totalizing meta-narrative, his
empyrean meta-theoretical inclination shows in his emphasis
on: the need for a more comprehensive and integrative
approach to the problem of human knowledge. 38 For van
Huyssteen this essentially means: splitting the difference
between modernity and postmodernity 39
He goes on to describe various elements and facets that
are important in the shaping of rationality as an
intersubjective and fallibilist process of progressive problem-
solving, a commonsense reasonableness, 40 that utilizes the

39
rich resources of rationality (a favorite expression). Figure
3.7 shows some of the elements and characteristics that van
Huyssteen includes in his broad conception of rationality; a
rationality in which: Scientific knowing will thus turn out to
differ from other forms of human knowing, and therefore
from theological knowing, only in degree and emphasis. 41
In sum: van Huyssteen identifies various human
characteristics that play a part in and form the constituent
components or rich resources of his postfoundationalist
rationality.
Figure 3.7: Van Huyssteens rationality model

Discernment
Clarity
Intelligibility

Common
Rationality
sense
Responsible
Optimal judgment
understanding
Experiential
adequacy

In sum: van Huyssteen identifies various human

characteristics that play a part in and form the constituent
components or rich resources of his postfoundationalist
rationality.
Some critical comments on van Huyssteens ideas are as
follows:

40
 The question may be asked: what are the reasoning
procedures and criteria (rules), involved in this
beyond-disciplinary (transversal) discourse and
decision-making, apart from being a space where
problem-solving minds, using common-sense
reasoning, meet to hopefully agree on what is to be
regarded as truth or knowledge?
With reference to his proposal of cross-contextual
and interdisciplinary conversation, it is remarked that:
the demonstration of their actual possibility is not,
however, as clear as one might hope for.; 42
He has made a claim for a theistic outlook as the
best explanation, but has never argued the case for
this claim.; 43

There is not much: about the conflict of

interpretations and the criteria by which such
conflicts are to be settled.; 44
It is: ...surprising to find so little mention of God;
45

Like most impressionistic pictures...this one is best

viewed from a distance. Those who look closely for
detailed, even mundane connections, will be
disappointed by the sweeping generalities and swift
associations... 46

41
 CHAPTER 4
SCIENTIFIC S-R THINKERS
4.1 John Polkinghorne
John Polkinghorne is a theoretical physicist who made a mid-
career change to become an Anglican priest. Together with
Ian Barbour and Arthur Peacocke he is one of the three
leading first-generation science and religion thinkers and
writers in the post WWII context.
In an objectivist-empiricist (type II) fashion, his venture is
primarily one of drawing parallels between natural science
(mostly physics) and religion (Christianity), in an effort to
seek consonance between them. An important personal
motive for Polkinghorne is that: my experience as a
physicist and my experience as a priest have to be capable of
being held together, without compartmentalism or dishonest
adjustment. 1 Here is another example of the drive in the S-
R field, to seek some unifying pattern (similar to the search in
physics for a grand unified theory, or GUT).
An Aristotelian (what he refers to as a bottom-up)
approach is characteristic of his work in the S-R field, and is
expressed in the meta-theoretically revealing metaphor that
he prefers: A hut on the ground rather than a castle in the
sky. 2 Though he appreciates the role of philosophy in the S-
R discussion, he is not, contra Barbour for instance, keen on
developing a metaphysical (empyrean) theory or framework.
This is clearly reflected in his aversion to building a castle in
the sky. He starts from the world of science and then seeks
connections with religion (specifically, the Christian
religion).

43
 In one of his earlier works, Science and creation: the search for
understanding, he sets out some of his views on the science and
religion relationship, briefly sampled as follows:

The arena of their interaction, is natural theology (to
be distinguished from a theology of nature), which,
in the type II modality of mind, he describes as:
the search for the knowledge of God by the
exercise of reason [objectivist] and the inspection of the
world [empiricist].; 3
The aim should be: to construct a natural
theology in true accord with the way things are, one of
his favorite expressions that also reflect his
ontological realism as scientist.; 4
He is convinced that the Rationality of the Creator is
the source of the: deep-seated congruence of the
rationality present in our minds with the rationality
present in the world.; 5
The S-R dialogue can be mutually beneficial, with the
proviso that: Religion, if it is to take seriously its
claim that the world is the creation of God, must be
humble enough to learn from science what that world
is actually like.; 6
God can only will what is in accord with his character,
thus: The rational God must respect reason.; 7
Although the personal (anthropological) God is not
denied, it is important to realize that: God's love
for the world in creation, though including humanity,
is not exclusively man-centred.; 8
Panentheism is rejected because it does not accept
Gods true sovereignty and otherness.; 9

44
 With regard to resurrection, there is the: hope of a
destiny beyond death in which the information-
bearing pattern (which is the persisting element of
ourselves continuing through the ceaseless changes in
the matter making up our bodies) will be recreated in
an unimaginable new environment of God's
choosing.; 10
Miracles must be understood as: as a sign of a
deeper rationality underlying the whole, rather than as
a divine tour de force bearing an arbitrary relation to the
rest of the world's process.; 11

Following his motto of epistemology models
ontology, he refuses: to join the idealists in
assigning an ontological priority to the mental over
the material.; 12
He discards the Cartesian duality of mind and matter,
stating that: all I can set is the humble picture of
material/mental complementarity by which the
physical world participates in a wider noetic world, all
being held in being by the creative will of God. 13
In a later work Serious talk: science and religion in dialogue, 14 he
provides a series of parallels between science and religion.
The gist of this work is conveniently summarized in Figures
4.1 to 4.9.
In Beyond science: the wider human context, Polkinghorne
addresses broader issues that affect the S-R field, such as the
knowledge-as-social-construction approach (coming mostly
from the sociology of knowledge and postmodern quarters).
His answer, simply stated, is that: Science is socially
influenced but it is not socially constructed. 15

45
 In his The faith of a physicist, Polkinghorne reiterates his
(anti-Cartesian) preference for what he refers to as a dual-
aspect monism, which he explains as follows: There is only
one stuff in the world (not two - the material and the mental),
but it can occur in two contrasting states (material and mental
phases, a physicist would say) which explain our perception
of the difference between mind and matter. 16
He acknowledges the importance of the poets and
artists, 17 to which theology may turn. However, he also
firmly states that: ...expressivist views take too existential,
psych-centred, a view of religious belief. Natural theology
(understood as the search for God through reason and
general experience) is an antidote 18
Figure 4.1: Polkinghornes parallels between science and
theology
SCIENCE THEOLOGY
1. Concerned with the 1. Concerned with the
rational exploration of rational exploration of what
what is. is.
2. The physical world is 2. The physical world
rationally transparent. testifies to the Logos.
3. The universe depends 3. The world is a creation
upon its physical laws. endowed with freedom.
4. The physical world is 4. The world allows for
endowed with becoming. Gods providential action.
5. The physical world is 5. Theology challenges
often surprising. commonsense.
6. The investigation of the 6. The insights of theology
physical world is exciting. are exciting.
7. Science is problematic. 7. Theology is problematic

46
 Figure 4.2: Polkinghornes first parallel
SCIENCE
Science is concerned with
rational exploration.
1. Theory and experiment
(critical realism).
2. Science is about the
impersonal (it).
3. Significant scientific
facts are theory laden.
4. Scientists wear
spectacles.
THEOLOGY
Theology is concerned with
rational exploration.
1. Church (and theology)
employs critical reason.
2. Theology is about the
personal (thou).
3. Theological beliefs are
theory laden (scripture)
4. Theology wears
spectacles.

5. Science depends on tacit 5. Faith involves

skills (intuitive). commitment.

Figure 4.3: Polkinghornes second parallel

SCIENCE
The physical world is rationally
transparent.
1. The reason within
(mathematics) and the
reason without (physics)
match perfectly.
2. Universe's intelligibility
signifies transcendence -
there is more than has met
the scientific eye.
THEOLOGY
The physical world testifies to
the Logos.
1. The unreasonable
effectiveness of
mathematics reveals the
Mind of God.
2. Universe's intelligibility
lies in a deeper rationality -
the rational will of the
Creator.

47
 Figure 4.4: Polkinghornes third parallel
SCIENCE
The universe depends upon fine-
tuning in its physical laws.
1. A fruitful world - a
world capable of evolving
anthropoi - is a very special
universe (the anthropic
principle).
2. An evolving universe
involves chance and
necessity.
THEOLOGY
The world is a creation endowed
with freedom.
1. The fine-tuning of the
physical world is given to
the universe by a Creator
who wills it to be a fruitful
history.
2. An evolutionary universe
is allowed to realize its God-
given potential.

Figure 4.5: Polkinghornes fourth parallel

SCIENCE
The physical world is endowed
with becoming.
1. The open possibilities of
a world of becoming have
the character of active
information and represent
a top-down causality
operating within wholes,
and bottom-up energetic
causality of parts.
THEOLOGY
The world allows for Gods
providential action.
1. God's hidden hand is
working within a physical
process that is open and
unpredictable; God's
providence is conceived as
acting within the processes
of nature, not against it.

48
 Figure 4.6: Polkinghornes fifth parallel
SCIENCE
The physical world is often
surprising.
1. Classical logic is true-
false (either-or) logic,
whereas quantum theory
allows probabilistic adding
together of possibilities
beyond common sense.
THEOLOGY
Theology challenges commonsense
assumptions.
1. The infinity of God and
the finiteness of human
nature which is focused on a
single figure is a perplexing
paradox that needs to be
engaged with.

Figure 4.7: Polkinghornes sixth parallel

SCIENCE THEOLOGY
The investigation of the physical The insights of theology are
world is exciting. exciting.
1. There is grandeur in the 1. That the ineffable God
pattern and structure of who is beyond human power
the physical world that is to grasp should have made
deeply exciting to discover himself known by living the
and satisfying to life of a human being (Jesus
contemplate. Christ) is deeply exciting.

Figure 4.8: Polkinghornes seventh parallel

SCIENCE
Science is problematic.
1. Quantum theory is used
effectively, but still not
properly understood.
2. General relativity and
quantum theory.
THEOLOGY
Theology is problematic.
1. The problem of evil and
suffering.
2. The problem of religious
diversity.

49
 Figure 4.9: Polkinghornes eighth parallel
SCIENCE
Science has things to say to
theology.
1. The discoveries of
physics will impose
constraints upon of
theological discourse.
2. The theologian must
consider the scientific
certainty that humanity
will only be a fleeting
episode in the history of
the universe.
THEOLOGY
Theology has things to say to
science.
1. The impersonal approach
of science will never touch
more than the periphery of
human experience.
2. Science does not address
the questions of human
significance, hope of life after
death; the purpose of the
universe (the why).

Finally, some criticisms of Polkinghornes approach are as

follows:

His work: does not easily engage ethical, political,
and cultural landscapes where the concrete contexts
of particular peoples lives engage their faith.; 19

He has: not seriously taken into account the
postmodern critiques including discussions of how
language functions and of the power of metaphor.; 20
His idea of God is God as Mind. 21

4.2 Arthur Peacocke

Arthur Peacocke discusses various similarities (as well as
dissimilarities) between science and religion, but is much
more adamant that religion/theology must be brought into the
scientific fold.

50
 Peacocke is a biochemist and priest, who, already in his
early work, Science and the Christian experiment, stated his desire
for a synthesis of science and theology. However, for him (as
for many S-R participants), this must be achieved in a way
that is consistent with the methodology of science and the
scientific understanding of the world: ...in both, the grounds
and evidence for hypotheses and beliefs summarized in
apparently propositional terms must be sought 22
His work and approach to S-R is characteristic of the type
II (objectivist-empiricist) or scientific modality of mind,
though he also substantially involves himself in the advocacy
(type IV) mode. At times he demands that theology become
more like science (see next chapter). Peacocke also does not
shy away from being a strong critic of conventional
religion/theology: the scientific vista for the twenty-first
century constitutes a stimulus to theology to become more
encompassing and inclusiveTo some this might appear an
iconoclastic program. 23
Throughout his writing he emphasizes both the
impersonal and personal dimensions of understanding God
and world, yet finds it difficult (as would be expected in terms
of the meta-theoretical approach followed in the present
work, and his own bias toward science) to reconcile them.
He strives hard to accommodate the impersonal-personal
antinomy. He speaks of both abstraction and personal
involvement, and states that: both the scientific and
theological enterprises are personal activities in the context of
a community andthis personal dimension is a necessary
element in the attainment of their ends. 24 He even admits
the importance of poetry (Dante seems to be his favourite),
and re-emphasizes the personal dimension when he states

51
that: The cosmos depends for its being on God who is at
least personal and has created personalness in man out of
non-personal materiality. 25
Like others, such as Barbour and Polkinghorne, he desires
unity and proposes the sacramental universe as unifying
concept, stating that: even on a Christian basis, men must
centre their hope on this world Any end to be achieved in
a sacramental universe must be in and through the medium
of the world we are actually in. 26
More recently he opted for panentheism and a theology of
evolution, though still retaining the idea of a sacramental
universe. 27 For Peacocke: Such a revitalized theology allows
one to conceive of humanity and Jesus the Christ in a fully
evolutionary perspective without loss of an emphasis on the
particularity of the Incarnation. 28 He emphasizes the fact
that humans are part of an evolving cosmos: we are
stardust become persons; 29 rising beasts rather than
fallen angels 30 expressing the wish that: Surely we now
have to escape from our anthropocentric myopia 31
He takes a dynamic systems view of the world, a world
consisting of: webs of interconnection in which the state
of the whole system influences the behavior of its parts. 32
His thesis is that of: ...whole-part influence as a clue to the
understanding of Gods interaction with the world (and
possibly also to understanding personal agency and the mind-
body problem). 33 Thus, God creates in and through the
processes of the natural order, which is not God himself (the
pantheistic view), but only his action as Creator. 34
Peacockes choice of panentheism leads him to the view
that: the world is to God rather as our bodies are to us as
personal agents 35 According to this scheme Jesus the

52
Christ is seen as representing: the consummation of the
evolutionary creative process 36
Peacocke is a critical realist with respect to both science
and theology and against what he refers to as the:
corruption of postmodernist relativities. 37 He supports
the methodology of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE)
for both ventures, and prefers the scientific truth criteria of:
comprehensiveness; fruitfulness; general cogency and
plausibility; internal coherence and consistency; and,
simplicity or elegance. 38
He uses the concept of an Ultimate Reality to refer to the
Creator who must be: supremely and unsurpassedly
rational. 39 This Ultimate Reality must be: the self-
existent Ground of Being; one, but a diversity in - unity, a
Being of unfathomable richness; supremely and
unsurpassedly rational; omniscient; omnipotent; omnipresent
and eternal; and at least personal or supra-personal. 40
Peacocke wishes to preserve human freedom and agency
in the world: We are then seen not to be the mere playthings
of God, but as sharing as co-creating creatures 41 The term
fits Peacockes naturalism, in that the main component or
stem of this expression refers to humans as creatures. By
contrast, in Hefners created co-creator, with its stronger
personalistic emphasis, humans are depicted more
optimistically and autonomously as co-creators. Here is
another instance of the contrast between types II (Peacocke)
and III (Hefner) modalities of mind.
A summary of Peacockes ideas on God as Ultimate
Reality 42 follows:
1. God is the self-existent Ground of Being, giving
existence to and sustaining in existence all-that-is;

53
2. God is One - but a diversity-in-unity, a Being of
unfathomable richness;
3. God includes and penetrates all-that-is, but Gods Being is
more than and is not exhausted by it (panentheism);
4. God is supremely and unsurpassedly rational;
5. God is the immanent Creator creating continuously in
and through the processes of the natural order
6. God is omniscient, with only a probabilistic knowledge of
the outcomes of some events;
7. God is omnipotent, but self-limited by his nature as Love;
8. God gives existence to each segment of time for all-
that-is-becoming;
9. God is omnipresent to all past and present events and will
be to all future ones;
10. God is eternal, exists at all times - past, present and
future;
11. God transcends past and present created time (but does
not know the future, which does not exist to know);
12. God possesses a dipolarity in relation to time,
transcendent but also experiencing succession in relation
to events and persons; hence is not 'timeless'; and is
temporally, and so personally, related to humanity;
13. God is (at least) personal or supra-personal - yet also has
impersonal features;
14. God is the ultimate ground and source of both law
('necessity') and chance an Improvisor of unsurpassed
ingenuity;
15. God has something akin to 'joy' and 'delight' in
creation;
16. God suffers in the creative processes of the world;
17. God took a risk in creation;

54
 18. God is an Agent who affects holistically the state of
the world-System and thereby, mediated by whole-part
influences, can affect particular patterns of events to
express divine intentions;
19. God communicates with human persons through the
constituents of the world by imparting meaning and
significance to particular patterns of events.
Finally, some critical comments on Peacockes work are as
follows:
He focuses largely on the health of theology, but:
Whether and how theology can provide health care
for science is a question that remains waiting in the
wings.; 43
In Peacockes approach to S-R it is a case of:
science talks and theology listens. 44

4.3 Gregory Peterson

Petersons background is in theology, and in science and
religion studies.
The possibilities that cognitive science has for theology
(and the S-R relationship), holds special interest for him.
Peterson is convinced that: Cognitive science challenges our
complacent theological claims about human nature and the
human relation to God. 45 In Minding God: theology and the
cognitive sciences he discusses the topic in detail.
For those scholars working in the field of cognitive
science (and artificial intelligence or AI), the mind is
essentially an information processor. Peterson admits that its
relevance for theology is not obvious, but sets out to
demonstrate its applicability in the S-R context. 46

55
 Figure 4.10 contains, by way of brief extracts, Petersons
discussion of the relevance of cognitive science for theology
in five areas: the unity of self and soul; human uniqueness;
mind and body; human nature, and the mind of God.
Figure 4.10: Cognitive science and theology 47
Area 1: The Unity of Self and Soul. A basic premise of Western
thought, but not obvious from research in neuroscience.
Area 2: Human Uniqueness. Computers and robots do not
appear capable of doing things that is indicative of our
humanity...human beings are not absolutely unique, but
share a wide range of traits with animals.
Area 3: Mind and Body. Cognitive science is influenced by the
software-hardware distinction in computer science. The
reservation among some cognitive scientists, is
consciousness. The real losers are traditional forms of
dualism. Under the traditional conception, the soul is the
seat of the emotions, rationality, and languageBut if the
soul is no longer assigned these functions, its only
remaining function is to serve as the repository of
consciousness.
Area 4: Human Nature. Theology has historically made
claims regarding both the unity of the self and human
uniqueness. Debates have ranged over the extent and
nature of free will, as well as the possibility and exhortation
to act for the good.
Area 5: The Mind of God. Most Christians think of God in
terms of an analogy with humankind...But if a brain is the
prerequisite of a mind, in what sense can one speak of the
mind of God?

56
 Peterson believes that developments in the field of
cognitive science: render supernatural dualism suspect for
explaining the human mind. 48 In its place he suggests that
God be regarded as: an intentional system, rather than
being approached by way of analogical reasoning. 49 This
stance shows his preference for the type II (scientific)
orientation of mind, rejecting the type III modality of
analogical reasoning.
Finally, some critical comments on Petersons approach
are briefly indicated:
It is not clear what: precisely does theology gain
from what is central to cognitive science: the
emphasis on information processing, inner
representation, and the computer model of the mind?
What exactly does cognitive science offer to theology
beyond the now-standard rejection of Cartesian
dualism, the affirmation of an embodied mind, and
the repudiation of reduction?; 50
It would seem that: cognitive science provides us
with no models or metaphors for the theological task
of understanding God; 51
Information processing models are: inappropriate
for understanding the divine mind. 52

57
 CHAPTER 5
NARRATIVE S-R THINKERS
5.1 Philip Hefner
Philip Hefner is a theologian who spent much of his career in
the science and religion field. For many years he served as
editor of Zygon, thus performing a key role also in the public
sphere of the S-R endeavour.
Hefner has an abiding interest in bio-cultural evolution
coupled with a deep respect for science, and, more
importantly for him, with considering the wider implications
of these for theology/religion and the health of the planet. In
other words, he is concerned about the well-being of both
humans and the biosphere of which they are part, and about
making people aware of their responsibilities as created co-
creators (similar to the stewardship role of the Christian
tradition).
He persistently attempts to relate science and human
values to the wider social and ecological issues that is of
concern to humanity today, and for which humans is largely
responsible. As the discussion in chapter 6 will show, Hefner
also has a substantial affinity for the advocacy mode in the
type IV orientation of mind.
He is neither scientist nor philosopher, preferring to leave
it to others more competent in those areas. It must be
remarked, though, that the ideas of the philosopher of
science, Imre Lakatos figures prominently in his exposition.
With his concept of the created co-creator, he has
provided an alternative (and apparently generally accepted)
perspective in the S-R literature. It is an approach that falls
within the ambit of the humanistic tradition in the narrative-
interpretive (type III) paradigm of thought. In fact, the title of

59
his most prominent work: The human factor: evolution, culture and
religion, is indicative of where his interest and focus lies. He
phrases it as follows: these pages attempt to sketch a
framework of meaning that can include our human lives as
they work their way in the world about us. 1
Hefners starting point, his problem, is the impersonality
of a universe portrayed by the Nobel physicist Steven
Weinberg, which leaves little room for the meaning and
purpose of human life. 2
He speaks of the experience of the scientific and the social
(namely, science and liberation) as the two main sources in
the human quest for meaning: This book will exhibit more
clearly the impact of science, but at every point I want to
acknowledge the importance of liberation in our quest for
meaning. 3
True to the type III modality, he prefers his work to be
seen as relating the stories of science and religion, stating:
This context of story is the setting in which I introduce my
reflections upon science and the relationship of science to
religion 4
His basic argument revolves around answers to a few
important questions, namely:
Who are we human beings? We are, first of all,
thoroughly natural creatures. We have emerged from
the natural evolutionary processes, 5 but also:
creatures of culturegrounded in the fact that we
are biologically formed culture-creators.; 6
What is our situation today? Planet earth has reached
the point where the success of human beings in
actualizing who we are - self-aware creators of culture

60
 - is critical for the entire planetary ecosystem,
including the planet's nonhuman inhabitants.; 7
The importance of the role of myth, defined as: a
story that is of ultimate concern; 8
What is required of us today? It is science that sets forth
the fundamental descriptions of our human
teleonomy, but it is myth and ritual [culture] that
make the basic proposals concerning the direction,
meaning, and purpose of the structures and processes
whose fulfilment shapes the form of human being. 9
His core thesis is that: Human beings are God's created
co-creators whose purpose is to be the agency, acting in
freedom, to birth the future that is most wholesome for the
nature that has birthed usExercising this agency is said to
be God's will for humans. 10 In this regard Hefners values
stance is that: we can no longer tolerate understandings of
human nature that insist upon separating us from our fellow
human beings, from the natural ecosystem in which we live,
or from the evolutionary processes from which we have
emerged. 11
Linking his thesis to the sphere of religion, Hefner
expresses himself in the following manner: The paradigm
set by Jesus, as mythically, ritually, socially, and
psychologically sketched here, is proposed as the Christian
vision for the created co-creator, the human purpose. 12
Hefners Lakatosian theory of the created co-creator is
summarized in Figure 5.1 below.

61
 Figure 5.1: Hefners Lakatosian hypotheses 13
Core Elements Auxiliary Hypotheses
The First Element. The Hypothesis #1: Humans and their
human being is created evolutionary history consist of
by God to be a co- structures, processes, goals.
creator in creation. Hypothesis #2: The meaning and
purpose of humans are seen as
natural processes.
Hypothesis #3: Wholesomeness is
necessary to govern the behavior
of humans in their natural setting.
Hypothesis #4: Nature is the
medium for knowledge and grace.
The Second Element: The Hypothesis #5: Freedom is the
matrix that has produced condition in which humans act
humans is God's process and construct stories and
of creating freedom and symbols.
emergence of a free Hypothesis #6: The human is a
creation. two-natured creature, of genes
and culture.
The Third Element: Hypothesis #7: Culture is a
Freedom as created co- constructed system of
creator and culture is an information.
instrumentality of God Hypothesis #8: Human decision is
for fulfillment of God's the major factor in the ongoing
purposes. functioning of the planet.
Hypothesis #9: Myth and ritual are
critical components of culture.

62
5.2 Karl Peters
Peters describes himself as ...a teacher of philosophy and
religious studies and a scholar in religion and science... 14 and
follows the school of process thought. He is also a former
editor of Zygon (preceding Philip Hefner, in fact).
In Dancing with the sacred: evolution, ecology and God he shows
his preference for the type III mode of thought, stating that
in his career: I have been developing a way of understanding
the presence of God in my life that is compatible with the
ideas of modern scienceSeeking a practical theology has led
me to engage in a thought experiment. I have come to think
of God as the creative process or creative event rather than a
being who creates the world. 15 He describes how he
personally became estranged from Christianity: Christian
religious ideas simply broke down for me, because I could
not attach them to my sense experiences. 16
Like other S-R participants, Peters also struggles with the
personal-impersonal antinomy. Although the title of his main
work and his narrative style of exposition (interspersed with
events from his own life) clearly bespeaks the narrative (story-
telling) modality of mind, he maintains that his is an
impersonal approach that explores: non-personal
metaphors and models 17
The well-known mechanisms in the theory of evolution,
namely, random variation and natural selection, become for
Peters a metaphorical Darwinian two-step, 18 which,
incidentally, explains the title of his book. He goes further
and states that: God is like the dance I have called the
Darwinian two-step 19 Peters God is to be conceived:
not as a being who creates the world but as the process of
creation itself. 20

63
 For him: both scientists and religious thinkers are
involved in telling stories about the past and spinning
scenarios about the future 21 In an earlier publication he
states that his aim is to develop a Lakatosian framework, and
to discuss: how religious stories might be evaluated
pragmatically 22 He also declares that his own version of
Lakatos consists of: empirical justification in two senses:
first, a more general pragmatic sense; second, a more specific
sense that leads to what might be called scientific theology
and that echoes positivist notions of verification from the
middle of the twentieth century. 23
Following Barbour he makes the following distinction
between science and religion, namely: religion seeks not
just knowledge for its own sake, as does science, but
knowledge which is salvational 24
Peters describes his aim as being three-fold, namely:

Firstly, to try and see: how the sacred can be
understood as the creative activity of nature, human
history, and individual life.; 25
Secondly, to: explore how we might understand
ourselves in a way that motivates us to live more in
harmony with the rest of life on planet Earth; 26
Thirdly, to try and discover: how we might live
meaningfully in a world in which suffering and death
are creatively intertwined with life.; 27
In terms similar to Hefner, Peters states that: in
helping create a global village, science is unifying the world in
three ways: through the use of scientific technology, through
the use of empirical methods, and through seeing the causes
of natural events in non-personal rather than in mental or
personal terms. 28

64
 However, he still seems to struggle with the personal-
impersonal aspects, and asks the question: Can we think
about the sacred in ways that are consistent with the
nonpersonal way of understanding things that is part of the
scientific worldview? I think so. Although personal ways of
characterizing the sacred are more prevalent, if one looks at
the cultures of the world, one still finds examples of the use
of nonpersonal metaphors. 29
For Peters it is important to emphasize that one should
feel at home in an evolutionary universe, for which he has the
following advice:

we can use our intelligence, our brains that have
been created in the fourteen billion years of evolution,
to anticipate when we might be confronted with an
increased rate of possible chance events. ; 30
we can place ourselves in communities of
supporting persons. Families, friends, colleagues at
work, and members of religious communities can be
sources of support.; 31
we can use the chance encounters of life as
opportunities to participate in the jazz of creative
existence. Creation itself occurs through unforeseen,
chance re-combinations of events. Once we
understand this, we can be at home in the universe,
uniting ourselves with the processes that have
brought us into being by joining the improvisational
music of the spheres. 32
Some critical reaction to Peters ideas is that:
His idea of an ecological responsibility or ethic:
must itself be grounded in a wider theology.; 33

65
 In religious terms: dancing with the sacred cannot
be conceived in terms of projected purposes.; 34
It is objected that: Peters has no conception of
human fault, or sin. 35

5.3 Ursula Goodenough

Goodenough is a biological scientist with an interest in
religion, or, perhaps more accurately stated, in the spiritual
response that nature (and the scientific understanding of it, in
her view) evokes in us.
In her Sacred Depths of Nature she expresses a desire for a
general or common religion that goes beyond various
individual and collective self-interests, a religion that can
serve as source for: a planetary ethic 36 The aim of her
work is to provide such an ethic, although her exposition is
largely in terms of a personal description and narrative (in the
type III mode) of various issues she regard as important to
take note of.
What she refers to as The Epic of Evolution and the
scientific, specifically bio-cultural, account of nature, is for
her: the one story, that has the potential to unite us,
because it happens to be true. 37 She explains that her goal is
to: present an accessible account of our scientific
understanding of Nature and then suggest ways that this
account can call forth appealing and abiding religious
responses - an approach that can be called religious
naturalism. 38
In almost Schweitzerian terms she goes on to share the
conviction that such a project requires that: we all
experience a solemn gratitude that we exist at all, share a
reverence for how life works, and acknowledge a deep and

66
complex imperative that life continue. 39 Clearly, for
Goodenough a deep sense of awe for and the spiritual
experience of nature is important and is also reflected in the
personal (first-person) style of her work.
She describes her book as a collection of short stories,
each followed by a religious meditation. The stories are:
walk through the Epic of Evolution: the origins of the
universe and the planet the origins of chemistry and life; the
workings of cells and organisms; the patterns of biological
evolution and the resultant biodiversity; awareness and
emotion; sex and sexuality; multicellularity and death; and
speciation. Throughout, I have done my best to bridge the
two cultures. 40
To this she adds a short religious note, about which she
states: each response is personal, describing the particular
religious emotion or mental state that is elicited in me when I
think about a particular facet of the evolutionary story. For
example, the evolution of the cosmos invokes in me a sense
of mystery. 41 It demonstrates her preference for the type III
mode of thought. Goodenough states that she wishes to:
to articulate a covenant with Mystery. 42
She describes a number of key principles (almost a credo)
in her own thinking about the relationship between science,
an evolving universe, and religion, which is worth relating in
some detail:
Gratitude: Imagine that you and some other humans
are in a spaceship, roaming around in the universe,
looking for a home. You land on a planet that proves
to be ideal in every way. It has deep forests and fleshy
fruits and surging oceans and gentle rains and
cavorting creatures and dappled sunlight and rich soil.

67
 Everything is perfect for human habitation, and
everything is astonishingly beautiful. This is how the
religious naturalist thinks of our human advent on
Earth. We arrived but a moment ago, and found it to
be perfect for us in every wayAnd then we came to
understand that it is perfect because we arose from it
and are a part of it. Hosannah! Not in the highest, but
right here, right now, this. When such gratitude flows
from our beings, it matters little whether we offer it
to God, as in this poem, or to Mystery or Coyote or
Cosmic Evolution or Mother Earth.; 43
Reverence: Our story tells us of the sacredness of life,
of the astonishing complexity of cells and organisms,
of the vast lengths of time it took to generate their
splendid diversity, of the enormous improbability that
any of it happened at all. Reverence is the religious
emotion elicited when we perceive the sacred. We are
called to revere the whole enterprise of planetary
existence, the whole and all of its myriad parts as they
catalyze and secrete and replicate and mutate and
evolve.; 44
Credo of continuation: The continuation of life
reaches around, grabs its own tail, and forms a sacred
circle that requires no further justification, no Creator,
no superordinate meaning of meaning, no purpose
other than that the continuation continue until the
sun collapses or the final meteor collides. I confess a
credo of continuation. 45
In a later publication, 46 she deals with what in the present
work is referred to as the personal-impersonal antinomy, by
attempting to accommodate both orientations, treating them,

68
however, as components of subjectivity. 47 She expresses it
as follows:
Firstly, as humans we are: material, we do emerge
from mechanism, we are primates. Our present-day
scientific understandings of molecular genetics and
physiology and neurobiology and evolution are
foundationally true; those additional discoveries that
will be made in the future will build upon and deepen
these foundations but will not overturn them.; 48
Secondly, our: subjectivity too is material. It can
be reduced to the level of neurotransmitters and ion
fluxes and synaptic transmission and action potentials,
or it can be integrated such that we speak of cortical
domains or prefrontal waystations, but it is material
all the way up and all the way down.; 49
Thirdly, Our subjectivity doesnt feel material at all. It
feels spiritual. 50
In another paper Goodenough 51 introduces the concept
of religiopoiesis or the crafting of religion which, she states,
the scientific worldview calls for. She regards the Sacred Depths
of Nature as a contribution to the project of religiopoiesis.
In the subsequent discussion she speaks of a duality of
religiopoiesis, which in the present context is interesting in
that it reflects the meta-theoretical distinction between
objectivist (the impersonal, formal) and subjectivist (the personal,
poetical) modalities of human thought. She states that: ...the
first pole can be called theology which she equates with: A
theologian, trained in philosophical discourse 52 She then
moves on to a: second pole [which] can be called
spirituality. 53 This is about: romantic adjectives:
emotional, intuitive, poetic, mystical. 54

69
 Finally, she concludes by stating that: The goal is to come
up with such a rich tapestry of meaning that we have no
choice but to believe in it. This is, to my mind, the urgent
project before us all. 55

70
 CHAPTER 6
PRAGMATIC S-R THINKERS
6.1 Philip Hefner
Philip Hefner suggests a range of criteria for the kind of
knowledge that will serve life (in his phraseology). This is
shown in Figure 6.1 below. As he states: If nature is
God's great project, then by devoting ourselves to its care and
redemption we are pouring our resources into the same effort
that God has poured the divine resources into. 1
Figure 6.1: Hefners knowledge that serves life 2
1. This knowledge will have to teach us how to talk about
ourselves as intrinsically part of the processes of nature.
2. We must understand that what we are, what we do, and
what we aim for as humans, is to be referred to the
processes of nature and to their future.
3. We must recognize that, in light of our status as a phase
of natures processes, our niche can also be understood as
one of preparing for the best possible future.
4. We must learn to discern the dimension of ultimacy in
nature's processes and how to conceptualize them.

6.2 Arthur Peacocke

Arthur Peacocke is arguably the most voluble and forthright
of the S-R writers, about the need for religion/theology to
change its ways, presenting in his work many sharp criticisms
of it. For Peacocke: Theology [is] at the crossroadsit is
now essential that the theological pier of the bridge to science
be subject to the same demands for epistemological warrant
and intellectual integrity as other disciplines, especially
science. 3 In Figure 6.2 he compares the current situation (in
his view) of theology as it is, with how it might be.

71
 Figure 6.2: Peacockes vision for theology 4
THEOLOGY AS IT IS THEOLOGY AS IT MIGHT
BE
l. Reliance on an S: the realities of the world and
authoritative book: The humanity discovered by the
Bible says.' Sciences; +
2. Reliance on an CRE: the Jewish and Christian
authoritative community: communal inheritance of
'The Church says.' claimed Revelatory Experience; +
3. Reliance on a priori RT: a radically Revised
truth. Theology.

He goes on to suggest a number of guidelines or norms

according to which the S-R community should conduct the
dialogue between science and religion, as follows: 5
1. To avoid importing spurious spiritualisations into our
discourse;
2. To be explicit when our language is metaphorical;
3. To avoid well-known fallacies: 'genetic' (explaining away
current beliefs and procedures by reference to their origins);
'naturalistic' (deriving an 'ought ' from an 'is'); and that of
'misplaced concreteness' (not all words refer to real entities -
they often refer to relations and properties);
4. To beware of marginal and speculative science (e.g.,
Hawkings' speculations, or even life on other planets);
5. Not to be selective of our science, choosing the parts
favourable to our theologies;
6. Not to overly socially contextualise science - most people
see that science works;
7. To keep a historical perspective;

72
8. To distinguish 'theology' (the study of the intellectual
content of religious beliefs) from 'religion';
9. Not to claim for theology credibility based on its long
history;
10. Not to be tempted to discern prematurely coherences and
consonances between science and theology;
11. To recognize that much religious language is functional in
society rather than referential, as it should be in theology.
Peacockes stance toward conventional (traditional)
religion is clear: it will never again in Western culture be
intellectually defensible simply to claim authority for
propositions by asserting that they are 'biblical'. 6
He asks the critical question: Can thinking hard about
religious beliefs (theology) exercise a method or procedure of
comparable reliability that can carry conviction and be heard
above the cacophony of siren calls from other sources
today? 7
His dream is for a global theology to be realized, stating
that: I am full of hope, in spite of the gargantuan task
facing a Christian theology aspiring, as we enter its third
millennium, to transmute into a global theology. 8

6.3 William Grassie

Through the online outlet and discussion forum, called
Metanexus, William Grassie has been prominent in promoting
and extending the visibility world-wide, of the S-R field. He
lists the following wrongs and character flaws of religion: 9
Intolerance,
Anti-intellectualism,
Wishful thinking,
Superstition,

73
 Tribalism,
Chauvinism
He goes on to propose the following solutions:
a global reformation of religions.; 10
A transdisciplinary approach to the unity of
knowledge...; 11
A new approach to education that emphasizes a
rigorous and comprehensive understanding of
science 12

74
 CHAPTER 7
THE FOUR TYPES OF SCIENCE-RELIGION IN
REVIEW
7.1 Type I Science-Religion
Barbour seeks an integrative, metaphysically informed
platform for the S-R field, and ends up choosing
Whiteheadian process thought. Clayton (a philosopher) also
aims at a more encompassing view, and proposes
panentheism.
Van Huyssteen attempts to split the difference between
modernism and postmodernism, and proposes a transversal,
postfoundationalist rationality, in which the difference
between scientific and theological reasoning becomes a
matter of degree, not a dualism.

7.2 Type II Science-Religion

Chapter 4 shows that Polkinghorne, Peacocke and Peterson
approach the S-R relationship from a systematic,
scientifically-oriented (type II) point of departure. They are all
critical realists, and, as such, do not believe that
postmodernism has much to offer to the S-R field. For
Polkinghorne epistemology [truth] models ontology [reality.
Peacocke is the panentheist, who insists that
religion/theology need to be radically revised, so as to
become a global theology. Peterson attempts to show that
cognitive science may have relevance for the science and
religion relationship.

7.3 Type III Science-Religion

As examples of the subjectivist-empiricist or narrative-
interpretive modality of mind, Hefner focuses on the human

75
factor, and the health of the eco-system, proposing the
concept of humans as created co-creators in an evolutionary
world. Karl Peters tells the story of the Darwinian two-step
dance in nature as the source of the sacred. Goodenough is
concerned about the sacred depths of nature.

7.4 Type IV Science-Religion

Chapter 6 briefly outlined some of the more systematic
programs of improvement, as examples of the advocacy
mode of thought. Hefner presents guidelines for the kind of
knowledge that serves life, while Peacocke proposes a
global, radically revised religion/theology.
Grassies proposes a universal religion that takes full
cognizance of science. He also suggests educational reforms
with greater emphasis on training in scientific knowledge.

7.5 Concluding comments

The following closing remarks are offered:
From a meta-theoretical stance it is not surprising to
observe that many S-R thinkers and struggle to deal
with the impersonal-personal antinomy in human
thought. The more objectivist-oriented participants
seem to either reluctantly acknowledge the personal
dimension, or relegate talk at the level of the personal
to folk psychology or poetry. The subjectivist
writers, in turn, although also admirers (or even
practitioners) of science, formulate their ideas and
thoughts in a quasi-poetical, personal manner, and
weave metaphors and descriptions of events in their
own lives into the exposition of their S-R ideas.

76
 There is much talk in the S-R literature of having
overcome the Cartesian mind-body split. Yet, this
dichotomy constantly re-surfaces in different guises,
such as in Polkinghornes dual-aspect monism, or in
the attention given to the concept emergence as
some sort of bridge between the mental and material.
The literature does contain a few contributions from
the social sciences, but these disciplines has yet to
have the kind of visibility and impact in the S-R field
that some may wish for.
Although someone like Ian Barbour explicitly noted it
early on, there has been little attention to the other
world religions in the S-R community.

77
 REFERENCES
Chapter 1: Fundamental approaches in human thought
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Cornford, F. M. (1991/1912). From Religion to Philosophy, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
2
Kirkwood, G. M. (1995). A Short Guide to Classical Mythology,
Illinois: Boldchazy-Carducci.
3
Rosenberg, D. and Baker, S. (1992). Mythology and You,
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4
Kant, I. (1934/1787). Critique of Pure Reason, translated J. M.
D. Meiklejohn. London: Dent.
5
Ibid., p483.
6
Schiller, F. (1967/1793). On the Aesthetic Education of Man,
translated E.M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby. London:
Oxford.
7
Berlin, I. (1978). Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p171.
8
Bernstein, R.J. (1983). Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science,
Hermeneutics and Praxis. Oxford: Blackwell.
9
Plato, (360 BCE). Philebus, Translated by Benjamin Jowett,
p8 [http://classics.mit.edu/Help/permissions.html].
10
Plato, (1987). The Republic. translated H.D.P. Lee. England:
Penguin Books.
11
Jones, W.T. (1970). The Classical Mind: A History of Western
Philosophy. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. p243.
12
Pietersen, H. J. (2011). The Four Types of Knowing
Metaphysical, Scientific, Narrative and Pragmatic: A Meta-
Epistemology of Mind, New York: Edwin Mellen Press.

79
13
Pietersen, H. J. (2014). The Four Archetypal Orientations of the
Mind: Foundational, Experiential, Organizational and Actional.
New York: Edwin Mellen Press.

Chapter 2: Science and Religion: A Review

1
Jaeger, W. (1947) The theology of the early Greek philosophers,
London: Oxford University Press.
2
Kant, I. (1960/1794) Religion within the limits of reason alone,
Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Theodore M
Green and Hoyt H Hudson, New York: Harper Torch. p12.
3
John Paul II (1998) Fides et Ratio, p1.
4
Jaeger, W. (1947) The theology of the early Greek philosophers,
London: Oxford University Press.
5
Ibid., p. 31.
6
Ibid., p. 12.
7
Ibid., p. 21.
8
Ibid., p. 94.
9
Ibid., p. 119.
10
Ibid., p. 137.
11
Ibid., p. 164.
12
Bacon, Roger (1268) On experimental science, From:
Oliver J. Thatcher, ed., The Library of Original Sources
(Milwaukee: University Research Extension Co., 1901), Vol.
V: The Early Medieval World, pp. 369-376., from Internet
Medieval Source Book. Paul Halsall May 1998.
p. 371.
13
Pietersen, H. J. (2011) The Four Types of Knowing
Metaphysical, Scientific, Narrative and Pragmatic: A Meta-
Epistemology of Mind, New York: Edwin Mellen Press.p. 111.
14
Drake, S (1980) Galileo, London: Oxford University Press.
p. 61.

80
15
Ibid., p. 90.
16
Kant, I. (1960/1794) Religion within the limits of reason alone,
Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Theodore M
Green and Hoyt H Hudson, New York: Harper Torch. p.
112.
17
Draper, J. W. (1881) History of the conflict between religion and
science, New York: Appleton. p. viii.
18
White, A. D. (1895) History of the warfare of science with theology
in Christendom, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
19
Draper, J. W. (1881) History of the conflict between religion and
science, New York: Appleton. p. vii.
20
Ibid., p. xii.
21
Ibid., p. xii.
22
White, A. D. (1895) History of the warfare of science with theology
in Christendom, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
23
Ibid., p. 3.
24
de Chardin, Pierre Teilhard (1959) The phenomenon of man,
New York: Harper Row. p. 258.
25
Ibid., p. 260.
26
Ibid., p. 285.
27
Copleston, F. (1974) A history of philosophy, Volume IX: French
Revolution to Sartre, Camus and Levi-Strauss, New York:
Doubleday. p. 326.
28
Smuts, J. C. (1987/1926) Holism and evolution, Cape Town:
Citadel Press. p. v.
29
Ibid., p. 87.
30
Ibid., p. 107.
31
Ibid., p. 263.
32
Ibid., p. 292.
33
Ibid., p. 335.
34
Ibid., p. 344.

81
35
Whitehead, A. W. (1926) Religion in the making, Australia:
Web Publication by Mountain Man Graphics. p. 26.
36
Ibid., p. 35.
37
Einstein, A. (1982/1954) Ideas and opinions, New York:
Crown Publishers. p. 46.
38
Ibid., p. 48.
39
Midgley, M. (1992) Science as salvation, London: Routledge. p.
2.
40
Ibid., p. 51.
41
Ibid., p. 58.
42
Midgley, M. (1995) Visions, secular and sacred, Hastings
Center Report, Vol. 25, 5, p22.
43
Brooke, J. H. (1991) Science and religion: some historical
perspectives, New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 33.
44
Ibid., p. 18.
45
Einstein, A. (1982/1954) Ideas and opinions, New York:
Crown Publishers. p. 224.
46
Pietersen, H. J. (2011) The Four Types of Knowing
Metaphysical, Scientific, Narrative and Pragmatic: A Meta-
Epistemology of Mind, New York: Edwin Mellen Press. p. 220.
47
Brooke, J. H. (1991) Science and religion: some historical
perspectives, New York: Cambridge University Press.
48
Ibid., p. 42.
49
Burhoe, R. W. (2005) True spirituality in the light of the
sciences, (paper presented in 1981), Zygon, Vol. 40, (4), p808..
50
Editor, (2005)Hello world: The first editorial, March 1966,
Zygon, vol. 40, no. 1, p247.
51
Ibid., p. 252.
52
Peters, T. (1996) Theology and science: where are we?
Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, Vol. 31, (2), p.328.
53
Ibid., p. 323.

82
54
Mooney, C. F. (1991) Theology and science: A new
commitment to dialogue, Theological Studies, Vol. 52, 2, p36.
55
Foerst, A. (1998) COG, a humanoid robot, and the
question of the image of God, Zygon, vol. 33, (1), p91.
56
Bonting, S. L. (1999) Chaos theology: A new approach to
the science-theology dialogue, Zygon, p. 323.
57
Albright, C. R. (2000) The God module and the
complexifying brain, Zygon, vol. 35, no. 4, p735.
58
Joseph, R. (2001) The limbic system and the soul: evolution
and the neuro-anatomy of religious experience, Zygon, vol. 36,
(1), p105.
59
Ruse, M. (2007) My journey in the world of religion-and-
science, Zygon, Vol. 42, no. 3, p. 579.
60
Ibid., p. 580.
61
Ibid., p. 580.
62
Ibid., p. 581.
63
Barbour, I. G. (2010) John Polkinghorne on three scientist-
theologians, Theology and Science, Vol. 8, (3), pp. 247 264.

Chapter 3: Metaphysical S-R thinkers

1
Barbour, I. (1990) Religion in an age of science, San Francisco:
Harper . p. xiii.
2
Ibid., p. 3
3
Ibid., p. 23.
4
Ibid., pp. 30 38.
5
Ibid., p. 43.
6
Ibid., pp. 43 45.
7
Ibid., pp. 189 221.
8
Ibid., p. 225.
9
Ibid., pp. 244 - 261).

83
10
Cantor, G and Kenny, C. (2001) Barbours fourfold way:
Problems with his taxonomy of science-religion relationships,
Zygon, vol. 36, no. 4,
p.765.
11
Ibid., p. 777.
12
Crain, S. D. (1997) Divine action and the natural sciences,
Zygon, vol. 32, no. 3, p426.
13
Ibid., p. 432.
14
Smedes, T. A. (2008) Beyond Barbour or back to the
basics? The future of science-and-religion and the quest for
unity, Zygon, vol. 43, no. 1, p235.
15
Ibid., p. 255.
16
Clayton, P. (1989) Explanation from physics to theology: An essay
in rationality and religion, New Haven: Yale University Press. p.
vii.
17
Ibid., p. 2.
18
Ibid., p. 5.
19
Ibid., p. 6.
20
Ibid., p. 7.
21
Ibid., p. 13.
22
Ibid., pp. 161 and 162
23
Clayton, P. (1997) God and contemporary science, Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press. p. 83.
24
Ibid., p. 88.
25
Ibid., p. 94.
26
Ibid., pp. 96 - 100.
27
Ibid., p. 117.
28
Clayton, P. (2004) Mind and emergence: from quantum to
consciousness, New York: Oxford University Press. p. 39.
29
Ibid., pp. 40 44.
30
Ibid., pp. 59 62.

84
31
Drees, W. B. (1999) God and contemporary science: Philip
Claytons defense of panentheism, Zygon, vol. 34, (3), p515.
32
Ibid., p516.
33
Puddefoot, J.C. (2000) God and contemporary science,
International Journal of Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, (2), p228.
34
van Huyssteen, W, (1989) Theology and the justification of faith:
Constructing theories in systematic theology, Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Wm Eerdmans. p 190.
35
Ibid., p xv.
36
van Huyssteen, W. (1999) The shaping of rationality: toward
interdisciplinarity in theology and science, Grand Rapids, Michigan:
William B. Eerdmans. p3.
37
Ibid., p8.
38
Ibid., p4.
39
Ibid., p174.
40
Ibid., p12.
41
Ibid., p13.
42
Murray, P. D. (2000) The shaping of rationality: toward
interdisciplinarity in theology and science, Reviews in Religion
and Theology, Vol. 7, Issue 2, p216.
43
Stone, J. A. (2000) J. Wentzel van Huyssteen: refiguring
rationality in the postmodern age, Zygon, Vol.35, (2), p424.
44
Brown, D. (2001) Public theology, academic theology:
Wentzel Van Huyssteen and the nature of theological
rationality, American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, Vol. 22,
Issue: 1, p95.
45
Peterson, G. R. (2008) Uniqueness, the image of God, and
the problem of method: Engaging van Huyssteen, Zygon, vol.
43, no. 2, p470.

85
46
Schoen, E. L. (2009) Review of Alone in the World?
Human uniqueness in science and theology, International
Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 65, p51.

Chapter 4: Scientific S-R thinkers

1
Polkinghorne, J. (1988) Science and creation: the search for
understanding, Boston: Shambala. p 69.
2
Ibid., p83.
3
Ibid., p2.
4
Ibid., p6.
5
Ibid., p22.
6
Ibid., p98.
7
Ibid., p51.
8
Ibid., p52.
9
Ibid., p53.
10
Ibid., p65.
11
Ibid., p80.
12
Ibid., p71.
13
Ibid., p83.
14
Polkinghorne, J. (1995) Serious talk: science and religion in
dialogue, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press.
15
Polkinghorne, J. (1996) Beyond science: the wider human context,
New York: Cambridge University Press. p11.
16
Polkinghorne, J (1996a) The faith of a physicist, Minneapolis:
Fortress Press. p21.
17
Ibid., p40.
18
Ibid., p42.
19
Pederson, A and Trost, L. A. (2000) John Polkinghorne and
the task of addressing a messy world, Zygon, vol. 35, no. 4,
p977.

86
20
Ibid., p980.
21
Ibid., p982.
22
Peacocke, A. (1971) Science and the Christian experiment,
London: Oxford University Press. p5.
23
Peacocke, A. (1999) Biology and a theology of evolution,
Zygon, vol. 34, no. 4. p697.
24
Peacocke, A. (1971) Science and the Christian experiment,
London: Oxford University Press. p17.
25
Ibid., p199.
26
Ibid., p197.
27
Peacocke, A. (1999) Biology and a theology of evolution,
Zygon, vol. 34, no. 4. p695.
28
Ibid., p695.
29
Ibid., p698.
30
Ibid., p701.
31
Ibid., p700.
32
Ibid., p706.
33
Ibid., p706.
34
Ibid., p707.
35
Ibid., p708.
36
Ibid., p710.
37
Peacocke, A. (2002) Paths from science towards God: the end of all
our exploring, Oxford: Oneworld. p8.
38
Ibid., p28.
39
Ibid., p41.
40
Ibid., p43.
41
Ibid., p86.
42
Ibid., pp129 130.
43
Jackelen, A. (2008) An intellectually honest theology, Zygon,
vol. 43, no. 1, p45.
44
Ibid., p50.

87
45
Peterson, G. R. (2003) Minding God: theology and the cognitive
sciences, Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
46
Ibid., p616.
47
Ibid., pp621 626.
48
Peterson, G. R. (1997a) Minds and bodies: human and
divine, Zygon, vol. 32, no. 2. p189.
49
Ibid., p189.
50
Bielfeldt, D (2004) Three questions about minding God,
Zygon, vol. 39, no. 3. p591.
51
Ibid., p601.
52
Ibid., p601.

Chapter 5: Narrative S-R thinkers

1
Hefner, P. (1993) The human factor: evolution, culture and religion,
Minneapolis: Fortress Press. p5.
2
Ibid., p277.
3
Ibid., p8.
4
Ibid., p12.
5
Ibid., p19.
5
Ibid., p19.
6
Ibid., p20.
7
Ibid., p20.
8
Ibid., p21.
9
Ibid., p21.
10
Ibid., p27.
11
Ibid., p37.
12
Ibid., p251.
13
Ibid., pp264 265.
14
Peters, K. E. (2002) Dancing with the sacred: evolution, ecology
and God, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press. pvii.
15
Ibid., pvii.

88
16
Ibid., p2.
17
Ibid., pvii.
18
Peters, K. E. (1997) Storytellers and scenario spinners:
some reflections on religion and science in light of a
pragmatic evolutionary theory of knowledge, Zygon, vol. 32,
no. 4, p484.
19
Ibid., p484.
20
Peters, K. E. (2002) Dancing with the sacred: evolution, ecology
and God, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press.p1.
21
Peters, K. E. (1997) Storytellers and scenario spinners:
some reflections on religion and science in light of a
pragmatic evolutionary theory of knowledge, Zygon, vol. 32,
no. 4, p465.
22
Ibid., p465.
23
Ibid., p483.
24
Ibid., p469.
25
Peters, K. E. (2002) Dancing with the sacred: evolution, ecology
and God, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press. pvii.
26
Ibid., pvii.
27
Ibid., pvii.
28
Ibid., p9.
29
Peters, K. E. (2005) Dancing with the sacred: excerpts,
Zygon, vol. 40, no. 3, p638.
30
Ibid., p662.
31
Ibid., p663.
32
Ibid., p663.
33
Hardwick, C. D. (2005) The power of religious naturalism
in Karl Peterss Dancing with the Sacred, Zygon, vol. 40, no.
3. p675.
34
Ibid., p676.
35
Ibid., p677.

89
36
Goodenough, U. (1998) The sacred depths of nature, New
York: Oxford University Press. pxv.
37
Ibid., pxvi.
38
Ibid., pxvii.
39
Ibid., pxvii.
40
Ibid., ppxix, xx.
41
Ibid., pxix.
42
Ibid., p167.
43
Ibid., pp168, 169.
44
Ibid., p170.
45
Ibid., p171.
46
Goodenough, U. (2000) Causality and subjectivity in the
religious quest, Zygon, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 725 734.
47
Ibid., p727.
48
Ibid., p731.
49
Ibid., p731.
50
Ibid., p731.
51
Goodenough, U. (2000 a) Religiopoiesis, Zygon, vol. 35, no.
3, p561.
52
Ibid., p564..
53
Ibid., p564.
54
Ibid., p564.
55
Ibid., p566.

Chapter 6: Pragmatic S-R thinkers

1
Hefner, P. (1993) The human factor: evolution, culture and religion,
Minneapolis: Fortress Press. p74.
2
Ibid., pp72 74.
3
Peacocke, A. (2002) Paths from science towards God: the end of all
our exploring, Oxford: Oneworld. p30.
4
Ibid., pp31- 33.

90
5
Ibid., pp34 35.
6
Ibid., p36.
7
Ibid., p417.
8
Ibid., p172.
9
Grassie, W. (2008) Metanexus 2007: The challenge ahead,
Zygon, vol. 43, no. 2. p298.
10
Ibid., p298.
11
Ibid., p301.
12
Ibid., p301.

91
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97
Four fundamental and interrelated intellectual
orientations were found to characterize the thought
of a global range of thinkers, disciplines, and cultures
(Western, Eastern and African). This volume consists
of a review of the four types in the field of science-and-
religion.

Professor Pietersen has made contributions to

philosophy, theology, sociology, psychology,
jurisprudence, and business and human resource
management.

He is the author of: The Four Types of Knowing

Metaphysical, Scientific, Narrative and Pragmatic: A Meta-
epistemology of Mind (2011) and The Four Archetypal
Orientations of the Mind: Foundational, Experiential,
Organizational and Actional (2014), both published by
Edwin Mellen, New York.

ISBN: 978-1-86922-613-8