MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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Approved by:

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, Member, Graduate Research Faculty

IVL....<---------,.Kemb..er, Graduate Research Faculty

Accepted thiB.25 cJ day of ~- 1976 b~~~

Director, Maater of Milita~Science.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual
student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental
agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing state.ent.)

ii
Acccssion Number:
ADA029460
Citation Status:
Active
Citation Classification:
Unclassified
Field(s) & Group(s):
150600 - MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS
Corporate Author:
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KANS
Unclassified Title:
The Evolution of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939.
Title Classification:
Unclassified
Descriptivc Note:
Final rep!.,
Pcrsoual Author(s):
Doughty,Robert A.
Report Date:
11 Jun 1976
Media Count:
162 Page(s)
Cost:
$14.60
Report Classification:
Unclassified
Supplemeutary Note:
Master's thesis.
Descriptors:
'MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), 'MILITARY DOCTRINE, 'FRANCE,
MILITARY OPERATIONS, WARFARE, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), THESES, HISTORY,
MILITARY PLANNING, NATIONAL DEFENSE
Abstract:
The thesis examines French military operations, warfare aud histOly of the years 1919-1939.
Abstract Classilication:
Unclassified
Distribution Limitation(s):
01 - APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
Source Serial:
F
Somce Code:
037260
Documeut Location:
DTIC
 ABSTRACT

THE EVOLUTION OF FRENCH ARMY DOCTRINE, 1919-1939

Robert A. Doughty, MMAS

1976

After the fall of France in June 1940, criticism of the French

military concentrated on their apparent lack of intellectual talent for

conceiving and fighting a modern form of war. The swift collapse of

France had all too effectively demonstrated the inadequacy of the French

doctrine and the unpreparedness of the French army. The theme of a con

genital mental defect or "sclerosis" was often repeated to describe the

underlying reason for the weakness of the High Command and the flimsiness

of the defensive effort. Many critic8 identified the prewar doctrine of

the defense, continuous front, and firepower as the most important evi
dence for demonstrating the High Command's responsibility for preparing

for the war of the past, rather than the war of the future.

Such simplistic themes of incompetence or stupidity, however, do

not adequately portray the intricate and involved process which resulted

in the doctrine of the defense, continuous front, and firepower. Numerous

problems, that sometimes are considered external to the particular con

cerns of the military, intruded to profoundly influence the formulation

of this doctrine. Some of these intervening v.riables for France from

1919-1939 were historical tradition, political restraints, and economic

geography. Other military questions such as personalities of leaders and

technological innovations (or lack thereof) also were important. Each

iii
 Iv

contributed to a situation wherein the French military found themselves

entangled in the remnants of the doctrine left over from 1918, without

the capability or even the desire to extract themselves from a concept of

war imbrued into the very soul of France. In short, the automatic assign

ment of complete responsibility to the military for the "fallacious"

methods of 1940 ignores the complexities of doctrine formulation and pre

vents many critics from understanding what actually happened to France

from 1919 to 1939, and then in 1940.

 INTRODUCTION

The swift collapse of France in 1940 before the German blitzkrieg

ushered in an intense period of recrimination and accusation among the

French. Suffering from the upheaval of the German occupation and the

bitterness of having been defeated, France zealously searched for guilty

parties and fallacious ideas. Among the identified failures was the

prewar military doctrine which had emphasized the defense, the continuous

front, and firepower. Few critics doubted the responsibility of the High

Command for conceiving and advocating this obviously fallacious doctrine,

since most believed doctrine to be the peculiar province of the military.

The German military had all too effectively demonstrated the adequacy

of their doctrine and of their High Command and the unpreparedness of the

French army. The charging panzers had seemed to herald the war of the

future, while the thinly stretched French lines were reminiscent of a

war previously fought.

The criticism of the French military concentrated on their

apparent lack of intellectual talent for conceiving and fighting the

form of war demonstrated by the Germans. For example, Marc Bloch de

scribed in his masterful 1940 work on the Fall of France, Strange Defeat,

the "curious form of mental sclerosis"l that affected the military hier

archy. He said, "Our leaders, or those who acted for them, were incapable

of thinking in terms of a new war. In other words, the German triumph

~arc Bloch, Strange Defeat, trans. Gerald Hopkins (New York:

W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1968), p. 43.

v
 vi

was, essentially, a triumph of intellect . ,,2 Bloch's criticism of

3
the military was tempered by his "examination of his conscience" and his

search for more fundamental causes, but the picture he painted of the

French military was one of a group "dominated by their memories of the

4
last war." More than fifteen years later, Jean Dutourd presented his

view of the "sclerosis" of the High Command in his sometimes humorous,

more often bitter work, The Taxis of the Marne.

And hard as I search, I can find only one reason for our defeat:
stupidity and cowardice. The generals were stupid, the men did not
want to get killed. Those two things often go together. Troops
know that an idiot has no right to ask them to get themselves killed. S

The theme of the "sclerosis" of the High Command has also been

repeated in strictly military histories. B. H. Liddell Hart announced

in his History of the Second World War, "The French commanders, trained

in the slow-motion methods of 1918, were mentally unfitted to cope with

panzer pace, and it produced a spreading paralysis among them.,,6 One of

the most damning and effective of all the attacks against the military

of France was that by Colonel Adolphe Goutard in his 1940: b! guerre des
occasions perdues. In this energetic description of how France had

missed her opportunity to win the war, Goutard exclaimed, "Our defeat may

be attributed essentially to an intellectual deficiency expressing itself

2
Ibid., p. 36.

3 Ibid., p. 126-176.

4 Ibid., p. 121.

5Jean Dutourd, The Taxis of the Marne, trans. Harold King (New

York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 8.

6
B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York:
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), p. 74.
 vii

in conservatism, conformity, preconceived ideas and unreal speculations

An unimaginative and incompetent military had ignored or

missed the opportunity to save France from the debacle of 1940.

The failure of the French military to formulate a new doctrine,

however, cannot be explained simply in terms of stupidity, or intellectual

"sclerosis." As John C. Cairns has noted, "It becomes evident that simple

formulas explaining defeat or lost opportunities for victory will not

suffice.,,8 Numerous problems, sometimes considered external to the

particular concerns of the military, intruded to profoundly influence

the formulation of a new doctrine. Some of these intervening variables

for France from 1919-1939 were historical tradition, political restraints,

and economic geography. Other military questions such as personalities

of leaders and technological innovations (or lack thereof) also were

important. Each contributed to a situation wherein the French military

found themselves entangled in the remnants of the doctrine left over from

1918, without the capability or even the desire to extract themselves

from a concept of war imbrued into the very soul of France.

The experience of France from 1919-1939 offers a valuable oppor

tunity to investigate the process by which doctrine is formulated. In a

democratic society, this process is usually not one of the military simply

deciding upon a particular method and employing it. The process is a

complicated one in which various "given" factors converge to form basic

lColonel Adolphe Goutard, 1940: La guerre des occasions perdues

(Paris: Hachette, 1956), p. 401.
8
John C. Cairns, "Along the Road Back to France 1940," American
Historical Review, LXIV, No.3 (April, 1959), p. 602. See also Cairns,
"Some Recent Historians and the 'Strange Defeat' of 1940," Journal of
Modern History, Vol. 46, No.1 (March, 1974), pp. 60-85.
 viii

ideas or approaches. These given ingredients may be political, social,

economic, historical, personal, or technological, and in a democratic

society they may be factors over which military leaders have little direct

control. The military hierarchy may bE' able to influence them in varyinr.

degrees, hut it probably cannot dictate the complete extent of their

influence on the emerging doctrine. After these variables have interacted

and formed basic concepts, the foundation of the doctrine is established.

Th(~ process becomes cyclic after the bas ic concept is formed, for

further development in such areas as budgets, political restraints, foreip,n

policy objectives, and technological innovation may overturn or force

roodification of the doctrine. Advances in technology, for example, could

result 1.n new weaponry that ultimately forces the abandonment of an old

doctrine and the reestablishment of a new one. Similarly, the doctrine may

be further developed by its application to the military needs of the

cOWltry. That is, if the doctrine evolves into a defensive concept, prob

lems such as defending critical regions may further solidify or influence

its evolution. The doctrine is eventually distilled from the interaction

of a number of elements, anyone of which may act as the catalytic agent

for the initiation of a new process. The intricate and involved process,

then, is a dynamic one, with the residue emerging as doctrine.

The purpose of this study is to investigate some of the factors

influencing French doctrine during the intenl1ar period. It is not intended

to be exhaustive; rather, the study intends to analyze some of the most

salient factors affecting the evolution of doctrine. Since it is a study

of a doctrine "gone astray," such as investigation should shed valuable

light on the nature of doctrine and on how a doctrine is formed. It also

offers the' opportunitv to grapple with the essential questions: What is

doctrine? What is the correct role of doctrine?

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION v

Chapter

I. THE PROBLEM OF DOCTRINE 1

II. THE NATION IN ARMS 20

III. THE "TYRANNY" OF MATERIEL 35

IV. THE LEGACY OF THE PAST 53

V. THE PROBLEM OF THE FRONTIERS 76

VI. INSTITUTIONS AND TECHNOLOGY . 92

VII. CONCLUSION . . .... 118

BIBLIOGRAPHY . 123

ix
 Chapter I

TIlL PROBLEJ:vl OF DOCTRINE

As with most armies between World Wars I and II, the French had

no standard definition of doctrine or of its role in defining or solving

tactical or strategic problems. When one reads the numerous military

works of the period, he frequently encounters doctrine being described

with such terms as "evangelism" or "Bible,,,l suggesting a perception of

doctrine as being somewhat analagous to words of 'ri.sdom espoused by

followers of a religious prophet. Just as there were schools of reli

gious thought, so were there schools of military thought.

Between 1871 and 1940 the role of "military prophet" was amply

filled in France by Colonel Ardant du P1cq, Colonel Loyzeaux de

Grandmaison, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, and Marshal Philippe Petain. Each

came to represent a particular "school" of doctrine. For example, Uu

Picq's arguments for the dominance of the morale factor 2 remained an

integral part of all French doctrine during this period. Grandmaison's

offensive a outrance was particularly important before World War I, but

was frequently criticized following the realities of the trenches of

lSee General Brallion, Essai sur l'instruction militaire (Paris:

Charles-Lavauzelle, 1931), pp. 59-66; and Lieutenant Colonel f1ontaigne,
Etudes sur la guerre (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1911), p. 126.
2 ~
Colonel Ardant Du Picq, Etudes sur Ie combat (Paris: R. Chapelot,
1904. See Dallas D. Irvine, '~he French Discovery of Clausewitz and
Napoleon," Journal of the American Military Institute, IV (1940), pp. 148
151.

1
 2

1914. 3 Following World War I, Marshal Petain's doctrine of the defen

sive dominated the other "schools" and came to exemplify doctrine in

the sense of prophetic revelation. For many French officers, his ideas

became the canons of a faith. While Petain's influence declined in the

late 1930's he retained the role of prophet, the man from whom the

initial ideas had flowed.

As for its function, doctrine provided a uniformity of thought

and action throughout the army and became an instrument of discipline.

General Maurice Gamelin, who was Chief of the General Staff, vice presi

dent of the Superior Council of war,4 and commander of the French army

in 1940, argued in 1935 that the military was different from other

organizations, for its many layers of "intermediaries" often caused the

leader's will to be "deformed," thus threatening the objective of the

leader and of the military. To avoid the possibility of deforming the

leader's desires and to ensure the entire effort of the military was

oriented toward a single goal, a "uniform idea" was necessary. Gamelin

concluded, "From that primordial necessity [for directing effort towards

a single goal] comes the need for a unity of organization and of doctrine

for an officer corps.uS

Marshal Philippe Petain added another dimension to this view of

doctrine by identifying technology as its basis.

3See J. Y. D'Avesnes, "De Grandmaison, penseur et ecrivain mili

taire, fut-il un chef de file?" Revue Militaire d'Information, No. 333
(December, 1961), pp. 16-22; and General Arthur Boucher, Lea doctrines
dans la preparation de 18 Grande Guerre (Paris: Berger- Levrault, 1925),
pp. 132-138.

4Consel1 Superieur de la Guerre.

5General Gamelin, "Ref1exions sur Ie chef," Revue d'Infanterie,

Vol. 86, No. 511 (April, 1935), pp. 638-642.
 3

Under the penalty of being surprised and submitting to the

system of war of an adversary, it is important henceforth to have
a doctrine. This doctrine should make a reasonable place for the
moral and intellectual factors which remain the permanent elements
of action; but it should also rest on the studies of armament, which
have always governed the forms of combat. The machinegun, the heavy
cannon, later the tank and the gas shells, have overthrown tac
tics. A doctrine of war is a continuing creation, which should
be nourished by experience and verified by a precise interpretation
of possibilities. 6

General Eugene Debeney, who served as Chief of the General S"taff

from 1923 to 1930, emphasized the need for flexibility in doctrine. He

said, "The word doctrine comes from the Latin word docere, which means to

teach. A doctrine, then, is that which one teaches; it includes the

essential ideas presiding over the training and employment of the army."l

An essential part of Debeney's acceptance of a few central ideas "pre

siding" over the army, was belief in the necessity of having leaders
8
capable of "adapting to realities to the exclusion of all dogmatism."

Another general officer succinctly described the proper priorities: tr.

for the military leader, judgment is a more precious quality than memory.,,9

6Marechal Petain, "L'Ecole de Guerre," Revue d'Infanterie, Vol. 86,

No. 512 (May, 1935), pp. 827-828.

7General Debeney, La guerre et les hommes (Paris: Librarie PIon,

1937), p. 264.
8
Ibid., p. 282.

9Brallion, L'instruction militaire, p. 63. For a variety of views

on the nature of doctrine, see: General Maurice Gamelin, Servir, I (3
Vols., Paris: PIon, 1946-1947), pp. 228-234; Marechal Petain, "Preface"
to General Narcisse Chauvineau, Une invasion, est-el1e encore possible?
(Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1939), pp. XV-XVI; Chauvineau, Vne invasion,
pp. 108, 131-146; Lieutenant Colonel ~mile ~~yer, La theorie de la guerre
at l'etude de l'art militaire (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1923), pp. 1-33;
Lieutenant Colonel Fernand Schneider, Histoire des doctrines militaires
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957); General tly , "Les lecons
qU'il faut tirer des operations de 1940," Revue de Defense National
(December, 1953), pp. 563-582; General H. Langlois, Enseignments de deux
 4

As one artillery officer affirmed, a unity of doctrine imposed

on the army "the same tactical and strategic conceptions," "the same

discipline of thought," and "the same terminology and mode of expres

sian." He declared,

[The need for a unity of doctrine] has proved to be more and

more necessary, since science multiplies and complicates the means
which are put at the disposition of the army in such a fashion
that it will soon be impossible for an officer to know all of them
well. lO
The French used the term ''harmony'' to express the purpose of a unity of

doctrine. The analogy of harmony within an orchestra seems appropriate,

fOT in the symphonic form, it represents everyone playing his instrument

differently but still following the directions of the conductor in order

for a transcendental beauty to emerge from the difference. Without the

direction of the conductor. or without a unity of doctrine, the variety

of instruments being played differently could only result in a harsh

cacophony of noise. A unity of doctrine thus theoretically harmonized

the various weapons and units in order to utilize each to its maximum

potential. In a period of increasingly complex weaponry and services,

this orchestration was essential.

French doctrine thus ensured a uniformity of effort and thought

directed toward a single goal and served as a basic guide for the con

duct of military operations. A mass army required a homogeneity of

guerres recentes: Guerre Turco-Russe et Anglo-Boer (Paris: Charles

Lavauzelle, 1903), p. 240; General Franz Halder, et. al., Analysis of
U.S. Field Service Regulations, trans. G. C. Vanderstadt (Headquarters,
United States Army, Europe, 1953)., pp. 7-8; Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet
Military Doctrine (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 25-35;
and Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, U.S. Military Doctrine: A Study and
Appraisal (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1955), pp. 3-11.

lOLeon Dumoncel, Essai de Memento Tactique: La Decision (Paris:

Charles-Lavauzelle, 1937), p. XIII.
 5

method to prevent every unit or every commander from trying to fight a

war in his own way; a common method ensured a common effort toward a

single goal. Doctrine, however, was not something that was permanent

or unchanging. Just as the weapons of war changed, so should the methods

change.

Unfortunately, French doctrine went beyond providing harmony

before World War II and became something far more than a loose body of

ideas "presiding" over the army. For example, a lecturer at the War
11
College in 1930-31 explained to an audience of reserve officers that

the fundamentals of French doctrine were contained in the manual con

cerning the tactical employment of large units. The students were then

told, "This document, which has hardly more than a hundred pages,

systematically compels every detail of execution. ,,12 Another audience

was told that French doctrine had established the need for a preponder

ance of fire as "dogma," and that since French doctrine was very near to

being the "truth," it "should only be modified with the greatest care.,,13

The clearest evidence of the intolerance of the military

hierarchy for new ideas is its energetic opposition to the ideas of

Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Charles De Gaulle, calling for a

return to the offensive, the abandonment of the continuous front, and

the creation of a professional armored corps. His book, Vers l'armee

11Eco1e Superieure de la Guerre.

12 / /

France, Ecole Superieure de/Guerre, Ecole de Perfectionnement

des Officers de Reserve du Service d'Etat Major, Le Reg1ement sur Ie
service en campagne, Annee 1930-1931, p. 1.
13 / /
France, Ecole Superieure de Guerre, Ecole de Perfectionnement
des Officers de Reserve du Service d'Etat-Major, Le Reglement de
de l'Infanterie du 1er Mars 1928, Annee 1930-1931, p. 41, 1.
 6

de metier, found little or no sympathy among the military hierarchy,

and his ideas were attacked by the top military leaders of the 1930's

and by every individual who had occupied, or was to occupy, the War

Office from 1932 through May 1940. 14 The High Command demonstrated its

intolerance of any more "new" ideas in 1935, stating that only the High

Command was qualified to define military doctrine. Thenceforth, military

writings did little more than mirror official doctrine. lS Even those

such as General Debeney, who had called for a more flexible policy,

found themselves opposing all new ideas and resisting all attacks on the

fundamental precepts of French doctrine.

By the late 1930's, French military doctrine had moved from the

ideal of being the basis of military education and approached the realm

of an unyielding dogma. Doctrine had become a rigid form of intellectual

discipline. Instead of providing the harmony that might be essential to

an orchestra or properly functioning army, rigid doctrine became analo

gous to a drummer on a parade-ground, whose drum beats kept everyone

marching in lock-step. The sound of the drum provided the cadence for

the multitudes all doing the same thing at the same time.

But the use of doctrine to emphasize a select, few ideas was

nothing new for the French military. After 1871, doctrine was disseminated

l4Richard D. Challener, The French Theory of the Nation in Arms,

1866-1939 (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1965), pp. 245-256; Philip
Charles Bankwitz, Maxine Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern
France (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 126-128; and
Captain Robert A. Doughty, "De Gaulle's Concept of a l-lobile, Professional
Army: Genesis of French Defeat?" Parameters: The Journal of the U.S.
Army War College, IV, No. 2 (1974), pp. 23-34.

l5General Andre Beaufre, "Liddell Hart and the French Army, 1919
1939," in The Theory and Practice of War, ed. Michael Howard (New York:
Praeger, 1966), p. 140; Eugene Carrias, La pensee militaire fransaise
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), pp. 317-318.
 7

by the High Command through the various instructions or regulations deal

ing with the tactical employment of large units. 16 These manuals became

the prime vehicle for inculcating the central idea of each doctrine

holding sway during the various periods from 1871 until 1940. The

evolution of French doctrine can clearly be seen in them, for each

emphasized one or more characteristics of battle. For example, the

commission responsible for writing the regulations of June 12, 1875 on

the infantry identified "as a veritable axiom, the preponderance of

fire."l7 The regulations of 1884 followed the lead of those of 1875,18

but the decree of May 28, 1895 started France on the road toward the

offensive doctrine which was to dominate the army before 1914. It

stated, "Only the offensive permits the gaining of decisive results. The

passive defense is doomed to a certain defeat; it is rejected absolutely .,19

With the publication of the October 28, 1913 regulations on the

conduct of large units,20 the doctrine of the offensive reigned supreme.

Marshal Joseph Joffre later described the regulation's purpose:

16The French instructions and regulations were essentially the

same as American field manuals. For the distinction between instructions
and regulations, see Gamelin, Servir, It p. 239.
17 ,
See France, Ecole Superieure de Guerre (Lieutenant Colonel
Touchon), Conferences d'Infanterie, Annee 1925-1926, pp. 7, 396.
18 France, Ecole
' Superieure de Guerre, Cours de Tactique Generale
et d'Etat-Major, Le Corps d'Armee, Annee 1928-1929, p. 182.

19France, Ministere de la Guerre, Decret du 28 Mai 1895 portant

re lement sur Ie service des armees en cam a ne (Paris: Berger-Levrault,
n.d.), p. 172 Hereafter abbreviated as Reglement 1895).

20France, Ministere de la guerre, Decret du 28 Octobre 1913 portant

re lement sur 18 conduite des r8ndes unites (Paris: Berger-Levrau1t,
n.d. Hereafter abbreviated as Reglement 1913).
 8

Now that our doctrine had been decided upon, it was essential
to codify it in a fundamental document intended to serve as a ~;uide
for commanders and their staffs. I hoped that all the pre
scriptions concerning the tactical employment of troops would con
verge toward a central idea, and that thus all along the hierarchy
there would be established a single body of principles which would
bring a convergence of efforts. 2l

Tbe central idea contained in this regulations was clearly the dominance

of the offensive. The'commission which wrote the new regulation attached

a report to the Minister of War explaining the rationale behind the new

manual. Its first statement dealing with doctrine was, "The conduct of

war 1s dominated by the necessity to give a vigorous offensive ~pu18e

to operations.,,22 The regulations stated, "Only the offensive leads to

positive results.,,23 As for the defense, the regulations said, "The

defense has the purpose of covering the gathering of resources before

passing into the attack, or of containing the enemy on a front with

reduced strength to make more forces available for an attack.,,24 French

doctrine from 1911 to 1914 was thus obsessed with the offense, and the

defensive was viewed as being little more than a phase permitting the
25
eventual assumption of the offensive.

21Marshal Joffre, The Personal Memoirs of Joffre, Field Marshal

of the French Army, trans. Colonel T. Bentley Mott, I (2 Vols., New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1932), pp. 33-34.
22Reg
... 1 ement 1913, p. 48.

23 Ibid ., p. 7.

24 Ibid , p. 39.

25 See Stefan T. POBBony and Etienne Mantoux, "Du Picq and Foch:
The French School," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. by Edward Mead
Earle (New York: Atheneum, 1967), pp. 206-233; Carrias, La pensee
mi1itaire, pp. 263-308; Irvine, "French Discovery," pp. 143-161; and
Schneider, Doctrines militaires, pp. 58-69.
 9

Following the terrible losses of World War I, French ardor for

the offensive was gone. The trenches had muddied the enthusiasm for

the glorious and bloody charge against the enemy's defensive position.

Doctrine clearly moved away from the philosophy of the offensive a

outrance, as enunciated by Colonel Grandmaison, and settled on the

tmportance of the defensive as articulated by Marshal petain. The

theory of the integral offense was replaced by a more mitigated theory

of the defense, emphasizing the continuous front and firepower.

As in the pre-World War I era, French doctrine continued to

emanate from concepts pertaining to the largest military units. That

is, there were two distinct levels within the French concept of doctrine:

one dealing with division and larger-size units and the other with

smaller units. The higher level might correctly be described as a

strategic doctrine (in spite of the inclusion of division-size units),

and the lower a tactical doctrine. Strategic doctrine was the founda

tion of all doctrine for the French army, and all doctrinal concepts

evolved from that foundation. Basic precepts were established for the

larger-size units, and tactical doctrine applied those basic precepts

to smaller units. Thus, tactical doctrine remained a subordinate,

though tmportant, facet of French doctrine.

The primary vehicles for disseminating strategic doctrine were

the instructions dealing with larger units. There were only two pub

lished in the interwar years, Provisional Instructions on the Tactical

EmplOyment of Large Units (1921) and Instructions on the Tactical

Employment of Large Units (1936).26 Tactical doctrine was disseminated

26France, Ministere de la guerre, Instruction provisoire sur

l'emploi tactique des grandes unites (Paris: Charles Lavauzelle, 1922)
1
 10

in the various regulations or instructions pertaining to specific arms.

For example, there were numerous regulations, each concentrating on

doctrine for .small units of the various arms. Division-size units were

often discussed, especially when the relationship of a specific arm to a

larger unit or to a large unit commander was explained. 27 Nevertheless,

the purpose of the subordinate regulations remained that of disseminating

tactical doctrine or implementing the doctrine as established in the

instructions for the tactical employment of large units. According to

General Gamelin, these subordinate regulations emphasized "procedures,"

rather than strategic doctrine. 28

The 1921 and 1936 Instructions remained the basic documents upon

which the French army's methods were based, and since the 1921 edition
, dominated French thought for most of the interwar period, it was particu

larly important. A commission of 13 officers was charged with writing

the 1921 Instructions, but they were written chiefly by Marshal Petain

and General Eugene Debeney. The necessity for eventual revision was

emphasized in the foreword of the Instructions.

The commission has sought to ascertain the conditions for the

employment of Large Units as they resulted from the experiences of
the war. It must be noted that these conditions will have to be
revised as armaments undergo important changes. 29

(Hereafter abbreviated as Instructions 1921); France, Ministere de 1a

guerre, Instructions sur l'emp10i tactique des grandes unites (Paris:
Berger-Levrault, 1937) (Hereafter abbreviated as Instructions 1936).

27See France, Ministere de la defense nationa1e et de la guerre,

Reglement de 1'infanterie: Deuxieme partie, Combat (Paris: Charles
Lavauzelle, 1939), pp. 220-223.

28Game1in, Servir, I, p. 233.

29Instructions 1921, p. 9.
 11

Thus, the desire to demonstrate the openness of the French army to new

ideas and methods led to the selection of "Provisional Instructions" for

the title of the work. As one military noted, however, "Despite this

title, it remained the Bible of our army for fourteen years."30 A revi

sion was not made until 1936.

Both the 1921 and the 1936 Instructions stressed the defense, but

neither abandoned the offensive. The 1921 Instructions discussed the

offensive and the defensive battle but hardly envisioned any methods other

than those employed from 1914 to 1918. Since the entire army would not

be available in the opening days of a war because of the time required

for mobilization, the 1921 manual recognized that a continuous front

could not be immediately established and that some maneuver would be

required in the initial battles. But the vast national armies would soon

be mobilized and the continuous front could then be established. 31 This

limited view of the offensive and maneuver dominated French doctrine from

1921 until 1936 when the new Instructions appeared. The idea of initial

maneuver being necessary, because of the possible absence of a continuous

front immediately upon mobilization, was somewhat muted after construction

of the Maginot Line was well underway.

During the fifteen year period of the Provisional Instructions,

the High Command and leading military writers emphasized that a war could

not be won solely on the defensive. For example, General Lucien Loizeau,

Director of Instruction and then Assistant Commandant at the War College

30General August M. E. Laure, et. al., Petain (Paris: Berger-Levrault,

1941), p. 268.

31Chauvineau, line invasion, pp. 138-141.

 12

from 1930-1932, described the defensive as a "necessary form of opera

tion, so long as it contributes at the least cost to the success of the

offensive. ,,32 For General Loizeau, the defensive was a means of con

tributing to the ultimate success of an offensive. On numerous occasions

French officers castigated the idea of the army being prepared solely for
the defense. For example, a July 1936 note from the chief of the military

cabinet of the War Minister labelled the charge that the army had assumed
33
a passive, defensive attitude as "nonsense." There was, nevertheless,
a certain "eclipse of the offensive sense.,,34 The "eclipse" occurred

at every level, for the offense was viewed as being simply the advancing
of fire on the battlefield. The French envisioned the offensive as the

bataille conduite: The methodical, tightly controlled movement of men

and materiel. which had been so successfully practiced by Petain in World

War I.

A conservative view of war. especially of the offensive, also

permeated the 1936 Instructions, even though some precepts of the 1921

doctrine had changed. The new manual clearly stated, "Only the offensive

32France, Ecole Superieure de Guerre (General Loizeau), La

Manoeuvre du Corps de!Armee dans l'Armee (Courbevo1e: P. Chanove; 1932),
p. 24; General L. Loizeau, Deux Manoeuvres (Paris: Berger-Levrault,
1933), p. 103.
33France, Ministere des affaires etrangeres, Commission de publica
tion des documents relatif. aux origines de la guerre, 1939-1945, Documents
dip10matiques francais, 1932--1939, 2e Serie (1936-1939) (Paris: Imprimerie
Nationale, 1963), Vol. III, No.9, 21 July 1936, p. 22 (Hereafter abbre
viated as DDF). See Chef de Batai1lon de Cugnac, "Preparons-nous la guerre
de mouveme~ou la guerre de stabilisation?" Revue militaire generale,
No. 10 (October, 1937), pp. 493-503.

34General Emile A11ehaut, Etre prets (Paris: Berger-Levrault,

1935), pp. 194-196.
 13

permits the obtaining of decisive results.,,35 The methodical approach

oowever, remained supreme, for the manual stated, "The attack is the

fire that advances [the friend], the defense is the fire that halts [the

foe].,,36 Nevertheless, the manual identified several areas containing

"new ideas:" "Fortified Fronts," "Hechanization and Motorization-Anti

tank Weapons," "Aerialc~.Forces and the Forces of Aerial Defense," and

"Communications." In 1946, General Gamelin carefully identified the

inclusion of these "new ideas: as evidence of the High Command's aware

37
ness of the changing methods of war."

The Instructions of 1936, however, readily acknowledged the

dominance of the "old" doctrine.

Without disregarding the importance of the progress realized in

this epoch [since World War I] in the means of combat and transport,
the Commission considers nevertheless that this technical
progress has not noticeably modified the tactical rules essentially
established by our predecessors. It affirms, consequently, that the
body of doctrine objectively fixed on the morrow of victory by our
eminent military leaders, who had recently exercised high command,
ought to remain the charter for the tactical emplOYment of our
Large Units. 38

Thus, the French army willingly chose to remain tied to the previous

doctrine and to build any new concepts on the foundations of the old.

General Alphonse Georges, the senior member of the commission that wrote

the 1936 Instructions, admitted in 1947 that the manual "was not a docu

ment of theoretical studies, but a practical instrument to guide the High

35Instructions 1936, p. 66.

36 Ibid ., p. 68; Instructions 1921, p. 61.

37Gamelin, Servir, I, pp. 285-288.

38Instructions 1936, p. 15.

 14

Command. The french army remained wedded to the methodical

doctrine at the past, and the High Command retained its view of war as

a long series of consuming, annihilating battles.

General Charles De Gaulle made the most widely publicized and

well-known attack on French doctrine. His call for large armored

formations represented a different concept of war, though most Frenchmen

did not recognize its potential until May-June 1940. The common French

perception of the long, stagnant, total war was personified in the doc

trine of the defense, continuous front, and firepower. In the opening

days of World War II, however, the Germans used the tank to achieve the

short, violent lightning war. They recognized that in addition to fire

power the tank furnished shock, speed, and mobility. Instead of the

continuous front, it promised large mobile armored formations, thrusting

and parrying with the enemy. And instead of the defense, the tank empha

sized the offense by employing its mobility and mass against enemy vul

nerabilities. The French, however, chose not to abandon their existing

concept of war for a new one. The French concept of war and doctrine

preceded the development of the new weaponry, which was to be methodically

molded and adapted to the prevailing concept. This adapting of new

technology to old doctrine also occurred with artillery and aircraft,

but the tank is the clearest example of the process.

The years following 1936 saw a gradual evolution of French

armored doctrine, though it never over-turned the prevailing concept

39France, Assemblee Nationale, Commission d'enquete parlementaire:

Les evenements survenus en France de 1933 a 1945. Temoignages et docu
ments recueillis par la Commission (9 Vols., Paris: Presses universitaires
de France, 1951), III, p. 632-633 (Hereafter abbreviated as Commis
sion . Temoignages).
 15

of war. In 1936 the new Instructions had declared, "At the present time,

the antitank gun confronts the tank, as during the last war, the machine

gun confronted the infantry.,,40 This threat of the antitank gun against

the tank had frequently been used to argue against large armored forma

tions, but in December 1938, when the decision was finally made by the

Superior Council of War to form two armored divisions, General Gamelin

described large armored formations as "rare and precious." 41 The French

perception had changed, but the two divisions were not scheduled to be

constituted until 1940. The High Command slowly recognized the potential

of this new weapon but still moved hesitantly before constituting a unit

unproved in war.

A new manual on the employment of the armored division appeared

in 1939,42 but it was classified and many important officers never were

exposed to or understood the new methods of employing large armored for

mations. For example, General Devaux, who had been the Chief of Staff

of the 3rd French Armored Division, stated after the war that he had
43
never received a copy. The French perception of the tank's purpose

remained one of increasing the offensive power and assisting the maneuver

of the infantry, which was the decisive arm. Of the more than two

40Instructions 1936, p. 17.

41France, Assemblee Nationale, Commission d'enquete parlementaire:

Les evenements survenus en France de 1933 a 1945. Rapport fait au nom de
la Commission par M. Charles Serre (2~Vo1s., Paris: Presses
universitaires de France, 1952), II, p. 187 (Hereafter abbreviated as
Commission Rapport).
42
For a criticism of the 1939 armor manual, see Jeffrey Johnstone
Clarke, '~Iilitary Technology in Republican France: The Evolution of the
French Armored Force, 1917-1940," unpublished dissertation, Duke
University, 1968, pp. 196-197.

43Commission Temoignages, V, p. 1362.

 16

thousand tanks available to the French on May 10, 1940, only 20% were

located in the three armored divisions, while 30% were in various

cavalry or mechanized infantry formations and 50% in infantry-supporting

battallons.
44 These statistics clearly reflect the French view of the

role of the tank. As for the employment of the armored divisions during

1940, the French dissipated most of their combat power by dispersing

their tanks into small, strong defensive points along the German penetra

tion without ever employing them in mass. Only De Gaulle's 4th Armored

Division attacked into the vulnerable enemy flanks. 45

Clearly, the new armored doctrine was hardly a new strategic

doctrine. 46 It was never completely disseminated to the army, and it

was not applied once the war started. Even then, the doctrine effec

tively tied large armored units to the task of assisting the maneuver of

corps and armies. The infantry was the queen of battle, and it was to

maintain its throne. In March 1949, General Maxime Weygand stated that

France had entered World War II with "two doctrines.,,47 This may have

been true, but one was outmoded and the other stillborn.

In Strange Defeat, Marc Bloch described how amazed he had been

in 1918 when he had seen a demonstration showing two infantry companies;

44Lieutenant Colonel Charles de Cosse-Brissac, "Cambien de chars

francais contre combien de chars allemands Ie mai 1940?" Revue de
defense nationale, V (July, 1947), pp. 76-82; Commandant A. Wauquier,
"Les forces cuirassees dans la bataille: L'emploi des chars francais,"
Revue d'histolre de la deuxieme guerre mandiale, No's. 10 and 11 (June,
1953), pp. 163-164.

45For De Gaulle's after-action report, see Jean-Raymond Tournoux,

Petain et de Gaulle (Paris: Plan, 1964), pp. 412-425.

46In his memoirs Gamelin claimed that he had attempted to revise

the 1936 Instructions through the issuance of several documents, including
the new regulation on tank units, but the July 1939 manual did not get onto
the book seller's shelves until the spring of 1940. Gamelin, Servir, I,
pp. 287-288.
47
Commission Temoignages, VI, p. 1610.
 17
one equipped, organized, and drilled as those of 1914, the other as

those of 1918. 48 If one were able to visually compare the French army

of 1918 with that of the late 1930's, the contrast would have been just

as startling. New armored vehicles and units had been introduced, the

light mechanized division created, many of the infantry divisions were

motorized, and thousands of airplanes had been incorporated into the

army structure. But while equipment and organizational changes had

modified the appearance of the army of the 1930's, the apparent differ

ence was misleading, for French doctrine remained wedded to the ideals

expressed in the 1921 Instructions.

In a briefing on October 6, 1939, for General Sir Edmund Ironside,

Britain's Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Gamelin explained

his strategy and in doing so, succinctly summarized the doctrine con

tained in the 1921 and 1936 Instructions. General Ironside described

Gamelin's main points in his diary.

The French did not intend to carry out an offensive because

France could not stand the losses, but would fight the Germans only
in previously prepared positions. He [Gamelin] hoped the German
attack when it came would smash itself on the strong Allied defenses.
When they were sufficiently weakened, he would start a counter
offensive. 49

The first armored divisions were not created until after World

War II began, and the majority of the French tanks were employed as

battalions in support of the infantry. Similarly, the French air corps

had been designed in consonance with the ideas of General Douhet, who

48Bloch, Strange Defeat, p. 120. For Gamelin's view on how the

army had been transformed in the 1930's, see uHier et Demain," Revue
militaire generale, I, No.1 (January, 1937), pp. 26-27.

49Co1 Roderick Macleod, Ed., Time Unguarded: The Ironside

Uiaries, 1937-1940 (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1962), p. 117.
 18
advocated resisting on the ground in order to destroy the war-making
50
potential of an enemy by air. Attacks on the strongly defended con

tinuous front would be too costly, but bombers could fly over these

fronts to strike the enemy's heartland and thus destroy his willpower and

war-making capability. The French air force consisted predominantly of

bombers and fighters and practically ignored the role of dive-bombers,

which were to be used with devastating results against the French in

51
1940. As for the fortified fronts, the idea of couverture, or the

establishing of covering forces along the border, had reached its zenith

with the construction of the Maginot Line. Unfortunately, the essential

nature of the line caused it to be the epitome of French doctrine and

its basic elements: the defense, the continuous front, and firepower.

The name itself, Maginot Line, became synonymous with safety and with

the defensive capability of the French army.52

In short, the bUilding of the Ma~inot Line, the introduction of

new armored vehicles, and the growth of the French air force did not

substantially modify or modernize French doctrine, even though some

improvements in organization, equipment, and doctrine had occurred.

50 See Marechal Pe tain, "P reface, II to Colone 1 P. Vauthier, La

doctrine de guerre du General Douhet (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1935),
p. XIV; Instruction 1936, pp. 135-137.

5lCo10nel P. Le Goyet, "Ev.olution de la doctrine d'emploi de

l'aviation Francaise entre 1919 et 1939," Revue d'histoire de la deuxieme
guerre mondial~, No, 73 (January, 1969), pp. 3-41. For the opposing
view, see Brereton Greenhaus, Mythology, Technology, and Aircraft in an
Anti-Armour Role before 1945 (A paper presented at the annual Conference
of the International Commission on Military History in Washington, D.C.,
13 to 19 August 1975).
52
See Vivian Rowe, The Great Wall of France (London: Putnam,
1959); Judith M. Hughes, To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French
Military Preparation in the 1920's (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1971)
 19
Deapite the change, in the 1936 InstructioDs and despite the changes
in .~ntt 1IUch remained the 8aae. The new ..chine. of war were
affectiv.ly tied to the old _thode of war.
 Chapter II

THE NATION IN ARMS

Of all the factors influencing the evolution of French doctrine,

perhaps no other one was as important as the philosophy of the nation in

arms. The military strategy of national defense based upon the citizen-

soldier became the foundation of the French perception of total war for

both the military and the civilian population. And the doctrines of

defense and the continuous front were basic ideas linked directly to the

philosophy of the armed nation. l

The concept of the nation in arms\originated in the French

Revolution with the "cannonade of Valmy" in 1792 and the levee ~ masse

in 1793. Its true spirit was reflected in the decree establishing the

levee en masse:

Henceforth, until the enemies have been driven from the territory
of the Republic, the French people are in permanent requisition for
army service. The young men shall go to battle; the married
men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make
tents and clothes, and shall serve in the hospitals; the children
shall turn old linen into lint; the old men shall repair to the
public places, to stimulate the courage of the warriors and preach
the unity of the Republic and the hatred of kings. 2

This reliance on the military potential of the citizenry became an

important part of French republican tradition. Many Frenchmen came to

lPortions of the following have previously been published in Captain

Robert A. Doughty, "De Gaulle's Concept of a Mobile, Professional Army:
Genesis of French Defeat?" Parameters: The Journal of the U.S. Army War
College, IV, No.2 (1794), pp. 23-34.

2David B. Ralston, ed., Soldiers and States: Civil Military

Relations in Modern Europe (Boston: Heath, 1966), p. 66.
20
 21
believe that when the country was 1n danger, a mass of patriotic volun

teers would rise and destroy the invading armies. The concentration of

all national energies against an enemy would be morally and militarily

sufficient to defend France. Even though she moved away from the armed

nation to a professional army for a time after the Napoleonic Wars, the

total commitment of the entire nation remained the theoretical basis of

the French nation 1n arms.

The nation in arms was not reinstituted by the French until

after the War of 1870-71, during which Germany dramatically reminded

them that wars were no longer simply quarrels between governments of

ruling families, fought by relatively small armies of professional

soldiers. 3 Wars were now conducted between entire peoples, fought Ly

armies of completely mobilized nations. From the time of that defeat,

the foundation of the French national defenses rested on the unswerving

faith in the massive mobilization of the citizenry in times of national

peril. The resulting sYmbiotic bond between army and nation was well

characterized in a 1904 report by a Chamber of Deputies Commission:

liThe modern concept of the army is that it is identical with the

nation, draws from it all i.ts resources, and has no separate and dis
4
tinct existence outside the nation.

After the First World War, the principle of the citizenry in

arms was expanded to include the notion of complete mobilization of

every possible materiel resource. The concept came to be one of total

3See J. Monteilhet, Lea institutions militaires de la France,

1814--1932 (Paris: Alcan, 1932), pp. 110-153.
4
Journal Officiel de 18 Republique Francaise: Documents Parle
mentairea (1904), p. 148.
 22

war. France was convinced that her best defense lay in committing all
5
her resources, both men and materiel, against an attackinR enemy.

Since the completely committed and mobilized nation was peace-loving, it

came to emphasize the defense rather than the offense, and the citizen-

soldier rather than the professional. For many Frenchmen the philosophy

of the nation in arms compelled the army to emphasize the defense and to

be composed predominantly of citizen-soldiers.

There was little doubt that the nation in arms was based essen

tially on a defensive principle. The most important reason for this was

the dominant role played by the citizen-soldier in the French army.

Following World War I, France maintained short-term service for the con

script and held the size of the professional component to a comparatively

low level. The term of service for the conscript was reduced from three

to two years in 1921, to 18 months in 1923, and to one year in 1928

(though later increased to two years in 1935). During the same period

the permanent component was gradually reduced to the point where it could

be spared only for a few priority roles, e.g., in the frontier fortifi

cations, the conscript training centers, and the planning staffs. The

professional army thus became the cadre for training the citizen-soldier

before returning him to civilian life. The conscripts on active duty,

and the professional soldiers, provided the umbrella of protection under

which the armed nation would be mobilized. As Marshal Petain envisioned,

"The active metropolitan army will act as the covering force; under its
6
protection, the principal mass of our forces will be mobilized."

5See Chapter III for a discussion of materiel.

~rechal Petain, "La securite de la France au cours des annees

creuses," Revue des deux mondes, XXVI (March 1, 1935), p. i.
 23

The covering force, therefore, was predominantly made up of

short-term conscripts. During the period of one year service (1928

1935), 240,000 conscripts were trained by the army each year, 120,000

being called to duty every six months. One-half underwent training,

while the other half was absorbed into the active army. By the law of

1928 on recruitme~t for the army, only 72,000 to 106,UOO career soldiers

were retained in the French army.7 Thus, the active army at all times

consisted primarily of short-term conscripts. As one scholar has noted,

"France had no army in peacetime in the old sense of the word.,,8 The

French army for all practical purposes was little more than a school for

soldiers, requiring mobilization before it could effectively defend

France.

General De Gaulle's concept of a mobile, professional army was

an attack on this method of national defense. With the increasing

complexity of war machines, Ve Gaulle perceived a "latent opposition

between mechanization and the exclusive system of numerical strength."

Since war was becoming more and more technical, he could not believe a

massively-armed populace would have great military power simply because

it was armed. He was particularly disturbed by the inadequate training

the conscript received: "Soon, someone will set up as a principle that

the less military training a nation has had, the better it fights, as

7Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise: Lois et Decrets

(1928), pp. 3808-3825 (Hereafter abbreviated as J. O. Lois et Decrets).

8
Irving M. Gibson (pseudonym), '~aginot and Liddell Hart: The
Doctrine of Defense," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed., Edward Mead Earle
(New York: Atheneum, 1967), pp. 369-370; see *** (anonymous), "Notre
reorganisation militaire," Revue politique et parlementaire (September 10,
1926), pp. 371-406.
 24

Emile acquired learning through not have studied.,,9 The increase in

the technical level of warfare, in De Gaulle's view, demanded more

highly trained troops, not simply more troops; but the short term of

service provided little opportunity for in-depth and comprehensive train

ing for the citizen-soldier.

The need for additional training of the citizen-soldier upon

mobilization was recognized by the military hierarchy. For example, the

1939 Infantry Regulations stated that even though officers of the reserve

should be trained as leaders, they also had to be trained as instructors

to facilitate their conduct of training once their units were mobilized. IO

Similarly, the need for more peacetime training for the reservists,

especially for officers and non-commissioned officers, in addition to

their active duty and reserve training sessions was also frequently noted

by military writers. ll

General Eugene Debeney praised the results of the laws of 1927

and 1928 on recruitment and organization of the army. "The metropolitan

army, the army of the French territory, organized by the laws of 1927

1928 is entirely oriented toward a realization as complete as possible

of the nation in arms.,,12 The ultimate result, however, was noted by

9Charles De Gaulle, The Army of the Future, trans. Walter Millis

(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941), pp. 58-60. The French title of De
Gaulle's book was Vers l'armee de metier, and a more correct English
title would have been Toward the Professional Army.

laFrance, Ministere de la defense nationale et de la guerre,

Reglement de l'infanterie: Deuxieme partie, Combat (Paris: Charles
Lavauzelle, 1939), pp. 25-26.
11 See Genera
...... 1 Maurin, L ,Armee
. . . mo d erne ( Paris: Flammarion, 1938) ,
pp. 192-195; and General Debeney, La guerre et les hommes (Paris: Plan,
1937), pp. 243-245.

l2General Debeney, Sur la securite militaire de la France (Paris:

Payot, 1930), p. 28.
 25
Marshal Petain when he observed that the French army was "unfi t for

beginning [a war] with a strategic offensive, but nevertheless capable

of local, tactical offensives. ,,13 In the opening days of a war, a

strategic offensive was impossible because dismantling the active army

would be necessary for the complete mobilization of the nation in arms.

It would also be impractical because the newly mobilized national army

would be characterized by inadequate training and discipline.

The system of mobilization established by the 1927 law on the

organization of the army provided for the division of the territory of

France into twenty military regions. 14 When mobilization was ordered,

each active infantry division (one from each military region) was broken

up to encadre three new divisions by transferring the greater part of its

personnel to the reserve divisions and replacing them with reservists.

Jeffrey Gunsburg has described the three new divisions.

The first [was] an "active" infantry division with one third

of its original active officers, two thirds of its enlisted cadres
and some 55% of its original active enlisted men. The second,
"series A" division had 23% active officers and 17% active NCO's
but only 2% active enlisted in the ranks of its regiments, while
the "series B" infantry division had 3 officers in each regiment
as its total active personnel--all the rest were reservists. ls

As a consequence of this mobilization system, France had to mobilize

before she could effectively repel a major enemy offensive, or before

l3Marechal Petain, "Preface" to General Narcisse Chauvineau,

Une invasion, est-el1e encore eossible? (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1939),
pp. VIII, VII.

14J o Lois et Decrets (1927), pp. 7266-7270; and General Duval,

"L'Armee francaise de1938: Sa gencse--son avenir," Revue de Paris
(August 15, 1938), p. 735.

l5Jeffrey Albert Gunsburg, "'Vaincre ou Mourir': The French High

Command and the Defeat of France, 19l9--May, 1940," unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Duke University, 1974, pp. 209-210. See General Gamelin,
Servir (3 Vols., Paris: PIon, 1946-1947), I, pp. 446-448.
 26

she could make even a limited thrust into German territory. Commjttinr,

the active cadres to an offensive operation would greatly hamper the

mobilization of the entire army, which would be needed to finish the

battle.

A strategic offensive was also impractical because of the rela

tively untrained nature of the newly mobilized units. The French

believed the offensive required a greater degree of training and dis

cipline on the part of the individual, as well as greater unit cohesive

ness, training and efficiency, than did the defensive. The 1936

Instructions stated without qualification that the offense "requires

quality troops.,,16 Since the type "A" and "B" divisions consisted almost

entirely of short-service conscripts upon mobilizati.on, and the "active"

army divisions were hardly any better with two-thirds of its officers

and non-commissioned officers and 45% of its enlisted men also reser

vists, the military hierarchy doubted the French army would be of suf

ficient "quality" for an offensive immediately upon mobilization. The

High Command felt that short-term conscripts could not acquire suffi.ci.ent

skills in their brief period of service to be prepared for an immediate

offensive.

The need for a better-trained soldier for the offensive was

especially noted by General Narcisse Chauvineau, who was known as the

"high priest of the defense." This officer saw the n;ltion in arms as

eminently appropriate for the national defense, but when he entertained

the possibility of an offensive immediately upon the beginning of

16 Instructions 1936, p. 66.

 27

hostilities, he suggested the creation of a "small, special army,"

distinctly trained for the offensive. This "special army" would rely

on servicemen with an obligation of no less than four years, rather

than on conscripts of short-term service.

17 At the Trial of Riom,

General Robert-Auguste Touchon indicated that Gamelin had often stressed

the need to fight with care in the beginning of a war, for the "army

would chiefly be composed of very nervous reservists."lB The 1936

Instructions reflected this belief and stressed the importance of the

bataille conduite in the early days of a war. It added that "youn~

troops" should only be engaged "methodically" and with the support of

all the "necessary fires.,,19 In the absence of the stiffening afforded

by long-term service, French military leaders were reluctant to commit

their army to an early offensive.

Reliance on the nation in arms thus negated any possibility of

"graduated deterrence," 20 or of a limited thrust into Germany. France

could partially or completely mobilize to protect her frontiers, but

an initial offensive was considered beyond the capability of the newly

mobilized army.

The successful remilitarization of the Rhineland by Germany was

one unfortunate result of this emphasis on a defensive nation in arms.

The failure of the French to act, and thus prevent this German coup, was

l7Chauvineau, Une invasion, pp. 149-150.

lBQuoted in Gamelin, Servir, I, p. 297. See Gamelin, III, p. 33.

19Instruction 1936, p. 97-98.

20Dona1d Cameron Watt, Too Serious a Business (Berkeley: Univer

sity of California Press, 1975), p. 95.

 28

directly linked to the philosophy of the nation in arms, the doctrine

of the defensive, and the concomitant unpreparedness of the French

21
army for the offensive. The leaders of the French army insisted that

a general French mobilization was necessary before army elements could

22
be deployed into the Rhineland. If general war erupted, the couunit

ment of the activ~~arrny into the Rhineland would seriously hamper total

mobilization. In a note sent to the Minister of War, General Gamelin

explained, "The idea of rapidly sending a French expeditionary corps

into the Rhineland, even in a more or less symbolic form, is chimerical." 23

Despite the abysmal results of March 1936, no real progress was

made in mobilization procedures. When the Permanent Committee of

National Uefense considered the possibility of intervening in March 1938

in the Spanish Civil War, the same conclusion was reached. Mobilization

of at least a million men for the covering force would be necessary, but

even this would be insufficient. As General Gamelin noted, France had

not envisioned a separate mobilization for the Spanish frontier. 24 In

August--September 1938, during the Munich crisis, France mobilized her

covering forces along the northeast frontier, but this action required

21See W. F. Knapp. "The Rhineland Crisis of ?larch 1936," in The

Decline of the Third Republic, ed., James Joll (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1959), pp. 67-85; Jean Baptiste Duroselle, "France and the
Crisis of March 1936," trans. Nancy L. Roelker, in French Society and
Culture Since the Old Regime, eds., Evelyn M. Acomb and Marvin L.
Brown (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 243-268.

22DDF , I, No. 392, 11 March 1936, p. 504; see DDF, I, No. 196
17 February 1936, pp. 290-293; and Gamelin, Servir, II, pp. 208-211.
23
DDF, I, No. 525, 28 March 1936, p. 699.

24 DDF , VIII, No. 446, 15 March 1938, pp. 827-830.

 29
calling more than 750,000 men and 25,000 officers to duty.25 The mobi

lization, however, was nothing more than a precautionary measure during

the period of tension. Thus, in the crucial instances of the remilitari

zation of the Rhineland and the Spanish Civil War, France could effec

tively respond only with a total war based on the resources of the entire

nation. Even the 'precautionary measures taken during the Munich crisis

required three-quarters of a million reservists. The chance of respond

ing to a threat with a limited military operation was no longer a possi

bility under the French concept of total war.

According to General Paul-Emile Tournoux's study of French war

plans, France had contingency plans for an offensive movement into the

Rhineland until April 1935. But with the repudiation of the clauses in

the Versailles treaty intenued to keep Germany disarmed and the subse

quent rapid build up of German armed forces, France abandoned that

possibility and offered instead what the General Staff described as "an

immoveable front" from Mezieres to Bale and "a solid front, covering the

national territory" north of Mezieres. 26

Meanwhile, the French military continued to defend its doctrine.

In the October 1936 issue of Revue des Deux Mondes, General Maxime Weygand

(then retired) attacked De Gaulle's idea of a professional armored corps

always ready for the offensive. He declared, "Nothing pertaining to

that [armored force] has to be created, for it already exists.,,27

25Gcneral Paul-Emile Tournoux, Defense des frontieres. Haut

commandement-Gouvernement, 1919-1939 (Paris: Nouvelles editions
latines, 1960), p. 299.
26 Ibid., p. 33 7 .

27General Weygand, "L'Etat militaire de 1a France," Revue des

deux mondes, XXIX (October 15, 1936), p. 727.
 30

Weygand said this even though the events of March had all too obviously

demonstrated the woeful state of the offensive in the French army. In

June 1936, the General Staff of the army reaffirmed the task of the

mobilized army as being the strengthening of the covering forces. This

included: "Assuring without withdrawing, the absolute integrity of the

fortified front which.. extends,

,
at the moment, without being interrupted

from Longuyon to Basel, as well aa in the Alps." The task also included,

"Halting the maneuver of the enemy that may be executed around the wings

of the fortified front."Z8 This mission, the Instructions of 1936, and

the philosophy of the nation in arms coincided completely. The defense

remained supreme.

The doctrine of the continuous front was also supported by the

concept of the nation in arms. In 1939 Marshal Petain observed, "The

continuous front is, in effect, an inevitable consequence of the increas

ing numbers raised by the nation in arms and by the technical charac

teristics of weapons."Z9 The idea was repeated on numerous occasions by

members of the military hierarchy,30 for the French believed that wars

were no longer fought by small armies. Instead, they were fought by

entire nations which threw all their resources in men and material into

the battle. Marshal Petain concluded, "War today is no longer only

that of professional armies, but that of entire peoples, abundant with

all their resources and with all their faith.,,3l

28
Tournoux, Defense des frontieres, p. 338.

29petain, "Preface," to Chauvineau, Une invasion, p. XI.

30 See Debeney, La guerre, p. 152.

31Marechal Petain, "Preface," to Colonel P. Vauthier, La doctrine

de guerre du General Douhet (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1935), p. XI.
 31

Tl~ French maintained that wars between entire nations would be

vast affairs, since two nations fighting a battle to the death would not

be reluctant to commit every resource available to them. Bence, enough

men and materiel would be committed to extend the battle front to the

point that it became virtually continuous or would be almost unlimited.

Thus, the continuou~ front became a logical corollary of the nation in

arms, and one military writer noted its importance. "The 'continuous

front' is alone the basis for preparation of ground warfare.,,32

Another result of the nation in arms was the need for a more

rigid doctrine. A lecturer at the War College in 1929-1930 described

the complex variance within such an army: "Since the army, that is the

nation in arms, is composed of an infinite number of means which vary in

quality and quantity, the proper organization of the army is more than

ever an absolute necessity " It was essential that subordinate

units uniformly obey the orders of the commander without "defonning" them

and that similar units be "interchangeable.,,33 In short, a clear and

coherent body of doctrine was necessary. The French military recognized

that proposing rigid solutions to every problem would "kill initiative,,,34

but there is little doubt that it opted for a rigid doctrine. No real

premium was placed on initiative or new solutions. The dilution of

quality that was inherent in any army of huge quantity required more

stringent doctrine and stronger control by the military leaders. The

32Chauvineau, Dne invasion, p. 131.

33France, Ecole Superieure de Guerre, Cours de Tactique Generale

et d'Etat-Major (Lieutenant Colonel Voisin), La Division au combat
Annee 1929-1930, pp. 7-9.

34Maurin, L'Armee moderne, p. 164.

 32

resulting rigidity ensured the continued dominance of the defense and

continuous front.

Few membedof the French military doubted the necessity of the

nation in arms, and the almost unanimous rejection of De Gaulle's call

for a professional armored corps is the clearest example of the military's

faith in the tra~itional concept of national defense. They felt a

national army was the most effective mode of defense, and that a pro

fessional army would actually detract from France's ability to defend

herself. Marshal Petain expressed the view held by the majority of the

military:

Since modern struggles naturally involve putting to work the

totality of the people's resources, our national defense should be
established on the principle of the armed nation. This conception
corresponds exactly to the political and social state of a nation
lacking all territorial ambition and having no objective other than
the safeguarding of its soil. 35

The armed nation remained the firm basis of the French military philosophy

despite the calls by De Gaulle and Paul ReYnaud for its reconsideration.

Even if the military heirarchy had objected to the philosophy of

the nation in arms, it would have had little choice but to accept that

concept. A substantial portion of the French political spectrum held the

nation in arms as a veritable creed, and believed that an army based on

conscripts and an armed nation would be totally loyal to the republican

regime and could not be used in initiating an aggressive war. According

35petain, "Annees creuses," p. VII; The laws of 1927-1928 on the

organization and recruitment of the army acted as the legal basis for the
expansion of the army from its peace-time to its war-time size. The
military hierarchy apparently supported the law, and General Debeney
(then Chief of the General Staff) later proudly acknowledged that he had
been "one of the workers" in creating "this solid infrastructure" for
the army. See Debeney, La Guerre, pp. 181-182.
 33
to the republican view, there was little likelihood that the army could

be persuaded to act against the republican regime if it consisted mostly

of conscripts. Those who supported this view had only to look back to

the professional army of Napoleon III to see the menace of such a military

force. In perceiving a professional army as being more prone to under

take international vgn.~ures, many Frenchmen agreed with their countryman

who had asserted in 1868, "When one has such fine arms, there are always

fools who are burning to try them out, [for] soldiers, like iron,
36
rust in times of peace." In contrast, an armed nation would fight only

in defense of its own territory or for essential national needs. Since

the nation in arms was composed of citizen-soldiers, it would be impossible

for France to fight an aggressive war without popular support. Further

more, the political left believed that a professional army was not neces

sarily a more effective fighting force. One observer from the left opined

that "a professional army increases, in time of peace, the chances of

war, and in times of war, . . . diminishes the chances of victory." 37

After all, a professional French army had lost the Franco-Prussian War of

1870-1871, but a nation in arms had won the First World War.

The French, then, firmly believed in the principle of an aroused

nation valiantly defending itself, this belief reaching its zenith during

the 1930's when the political left acquired its greatest power. The

principle accorded with their republican sentiments, furnished a means

of controlling the potentially reactionary military, and provided what

they considered to be the most effective national defense strategy. The

36Jules Simon, La politique radicale (Paris, 1868), p. 181.

37Monteilhet, Institutions militaires, p. xvi.

 34

army thus became a defensive force, rather than an aggressive war-making

institution.

The close relationship between the nation in arms and the army,

and its consequences were noted in the 1921 Instructions.

The very life of the citizenry is associated in an intimate fash

ion with that of the army, and thus the formula for the nation in
arms 1s realized. in every aspect (This] greatly influences the
eventualities of war and consequently the formation of strategy.38

The defense and the continuous front remained essential elements of that

strategy, which became indistinguishable from the concepts imposed upon

it by the nation in arms.

38Instruction 1921, p. 9.
 Chapter III

THE "TYRANNY" OF MATERIEL

The question of materiel was another fundamental factor molding

French doctrine fr'om 1919 to 1940 and is rivaled in importance only by

the French concept of the nation in arms. These two fundamental pre

cepts formed the basis of the French perception of total war.

If, as Petain stated, modern wars were those of "entire peoples,

abundant with all their resources and with all their faith."l mobiliza

tion required the directing of a nation's entire economic and industrial

potential to the war effort. The question of materiel soon became known

as the "tyranny of materiel,"Z for the war-time potential of France was

limited by its industrial potential. France's disadvantages relative to

Germany in critical natural resources, industrial capacity, and economic

mobilization dramatically influenced military doctrine.

There was little doubt that the industrial revolution had im

mensely affected the battlefield. The large caliber and destructiveness

of weapons, the long range of artillery, the huge number of deadly shells

IHarechal Petain, "Preface," to Colonel P. Vauthier, La doctrine

de guerre du General Douhet (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1935), p. XI.

2General Uebeney, La guerre et leg hommes (Paris: PIon, 1937),

pp. 49-98; see General Serrigny, Ref1exions sur 1'Art de 1a Guerre
(Paris: Char1es-Lavauzelle, 1930), pp. 68-90; Lieutenant Colonel Miquel,
Ensei nements strate i ues et tacti ues de 18 uerre de 1914-1918 {Paris:
Charles-Lavauzelle, 1926 , pp. 16- 9; and General Narcisse Chauvineau, Vne
invasion, est-elle encore possible? (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1939), pp-.-
123-128.

35
 36

and steel fragments sprayed over the battle area, the tremendous multi

plicity of arms, and the mind-boggling consumption of munitions had

dramatically changed the nature and lethality of the battlefield.) Wars

were no longer battles fought solely by men. The machine had arrived,
4
and the army itself was even described as a "machine of war."

Faith in mat~riel, or more precisely, faith in firepower replaced

the pre-World War I dogma of morale. 5 Before the First World War, French

doctrine had been molded predominantly by the notion of the nation in

arms and the importance of morale, and Foch's doctrine of the offensive

was based on the close association of these two. The writings of

Colonel Ardant du Picq had formed the French perception of morale, and it
,
has been said that his Etudes ~ Ie Combat was the "most widely read

book in the French trenches during the First World War.,,6 Du Picq stated,

"Dispositions of the heart are as variable as those of fortune. A man

1s discouraged and apprehends danger in every endeavor in ~lich he fore

7
sees no chance of success." Defeat was thought to threaten the anny

which no longer saw a chance of winning, and thus battle was more a

contest between two opposing wills than between two physical forces.

Colonel de Grandmaison extended this need for a belief in a chance

of success to its most extreme point in his offensive a outrance, which

)
See, for example, Miquel, Enseignements de la guerre, pp. 89-100.

4General Maurin, L'Armee moderne (Paris: Flammarion, 1938), p. 9.

5The French word moral way be translated as spirit, morale, or

moral. For clarity, I have consistently used the word morale.

6Stefan T. Possony and Etienne Mantoux, "Du Picq and Foch: The
French School," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed., Edward Head Earle
(New York: Atheneum, 1967), p. 207.
7
Colonel Ardant Du Picq, Etudes sur Ie combat (Paris: R.
Chapelot, 1904), p. 111.
 37

suggested ignoring the danger of combat. The essence of his ideas can

be captured in a few quotes, one being, "In the offensive, imprudence is

the best security." And another, "Go to the excess, and this will per-

haps not yet be enough ... B But the murderous battlefield soon revealed

that more than courage was needed. In his remarkably astute analysis of

the evolution o(_~actical ideas in France during World War I, Lieutenant

Colonel Lucas asked:

How many officers, and those not the poorest, met their death on
the first fields of battle, erect and within full view of the enemy,
in the midst of bullets and shells, under the conviction that it
would have been unworthy of them to seek cover or even to lie down
when their commands were at grips with the enemy: This is a senti
ment which does them the greatest honor; but it was a false concep
tion of the requirements of modern battle, which took time to change
and for which we had to pay too high a price. 9

The bloody price paid in those first few battles convinced the French

that materiel dominated and that imprudence was not the best security.

Morale remained important, but it was not envisioned as blind

courage in the face of the enemy.10 The French believed the commander

had to impose his will over that of the enemy, and that this could be

done on either the offensive or defensive. Once this occurred, the inl
11
tiative would be regained, and victory would not be far away. Superior

force, measured in numbers of personnel and amount of firepower, would

8General Arthur Boucher, Les doctrines dans la preparation de la

Grande Guerre (Paris: Berger-Levrau1t, 1925), pp. 136-137.

9Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Lucas, L'Evo1ution des idees tactiques

en France et en Allema ne endant la Guerre de 1914-1918 (Paris: Berger
Levrault, 1925 , p. 20.

10see General Weygand, IfL'Etat militaire de la France," Revue des

deux mondes, XXIX (October 15, 1936), pp. 735-736; Debeney, La Guerre,
pp. 113-125. Compare General Arthur Boucher, L'Infanterie sacrifiee
(Paris: Berger-Levrau1t, 1930).

11Illstructions 1936, p. 30; Debeney, La Guerre, p. 170.

 38
permit this imposition of will. In short. utilizing the materiel made

available by mobilizing the armed nation would permit the French to regain

the initiative from the Germans and impose their will on the enemy.

The immediate effect of this emphasis on materiel was its con

tribution to the continuous front. The vast amount of industrial war-

making items produced from the resources of the entire nation would permit

the great extension of the front in comparison to those of previous wars.

Just as the nation in arms had implicitly contributed to the continuous

front, so did the emphasis on materiel. Both provided every resource of

the nation to the war effort. The presence of the new machines of war

also contributed to the French faith in the continuous front. The employ

ment of automatic weapons and artillery permitted the establishment of

"curtains" of fire that could only be pierced by organized attacks. 12 The

increased firepower from the new machines of war permitted a reduction in

the number of personnel required to man a portion of the front and thus a

more extended front could be maintained with the same number of personnel.

More support and supplies may have been necessary, but at the same time

fewer men were now required along the dense, continuous front. 13 France

now saw a chance to overcome the much larger manpower advantage Germany

had possessed since 1870-1871.

The time required to mobilize the industrial resources of the

nation also contributed to France's choice of the defense, especially in

the opening days of the war. There would be a prolonged lag as industry

12Instructions 1921, p. 11.

l3France, {cole Superieure de Guerre (Lieutenant Colonel Dame).

Conferences d'Infanterie, Annee 1931-1932 (Courbevoie: P. Chanove, 1931
1932), p. 9.
 39

changed trom a peace-time to a war-time economy, which would limit the

initial amount of materiel support available for the military. This

problem was compounded by the fact that France faced an opponent of

superior industrial capability and potential, and also an opponent that

would probably be the aggressor in any war with France, who considered

herself to be a pacific, peace-loving country. An aggressor could not

only force his form of war on his opponent, but he could also have the

advantage of having begun industrial and national mobilization before the

state receiving the sudden attack became aware of the threat.

The sudden unexpected attack became known in France as the

attaque brusquee and was a common theme in military and civilian journals. 14

The threat of such an attack became a strong argument for the couverture,

or covering forces, along the northeastern frontier. IS During the late

1920's the French army persuasively argued that the lengthy and involved

mobilization of the manpower and industry of the nation necessitated the

reinforcement of the French covering forces. The reinforcements were

needed to ensure enough time was provided for complete mobilization. The

need to permanently guard the frontier eventually coalesced into the

Maginot Line, which has become infamously synonYmous with the defense in
16
historical analyses of the Fall of France.

14See *** (anonymous), "Contre l'attaque brusquee," Revue des deux

mondes, XXIV (December 15, 1934), pp. 742-764; Colonel Epailly, "La
defense contre une attaque allemande par surprise," Revue militaire generale,
I, No.5 (May, 1937), pp. 605-618; DDF, II, No. 375, 1 July 1936, p. 576;
General Gamelin, Servir (3 Vols., Paris: PIon, 1946-1947), III, pp. 523
524.

15General Debeney, "Le probleme de la couverture," Revue des deux

mondes, XXXVI (November 15, 1936), pp. 268-294.

16Richard D. Challener, The French Theory of the Nation in Arms,

1866-1939 (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1965), pp. 220-224; Enno
Kraehe, "Motives Behind the Maginot Line," Military Affairs, VIII, No.2
(1944), pp. 109-122.
 40

Since--in the French view--war potential was gravely affected by

industrial potential, certain war stocks had to be maintained to provide

the initial materiel that would be used in a war. These strategic stock

piles served the same purpose as the covering force served for the nation.

As the nation mobilized its citizen army and its industrial potential,

the covering force of the army and the stock-piles of materiel provided

the men and the resources for the beginning period of the war. The battle

along the frontiers would consume both as the nation mobilized. The two

were closely associated by the military, and General Debeney even exclaimed,

"Protect our stocks of armaments! They are the covering force of our
17
industrial mobilization."

But the cost of creating stock-piles of materiel for every possible

military need was prohibitively expensive. Constrained by limited fin

ancial credits and the drain of building the costly Maginot Line, the

French army found it more advantageous to channel its money into weapons

that could be more effectively used in the initial defensive period. Wea

pons more suitable for the offense could be manufactured as the war pro

gressed. Her rejection of armor was closely linked to this conception,

especially since large, costly armored formations were considered offensive

instruments. 18 The antitank gun, rather than the tank, was more accordant

with France's approach to national defense, since it was less expensive,

17
Debeney, La Guerre, p. 58. On the need for stock-piles of
materiel, see also General W. Sikorski, La guerre moderne (Paris: Berger
Levrault, 1935), pp. 181-182.
18Captain Robert A. Doughty, "De Gaulle's Concept of a Mobile,
Professional Army: Genesis of French Defeat?" Parameters: The Journal
of the U.S. Army War College, IV, No.2 (1974), p. 26; Jeffrey Johnstone
Clarke, "Military Technology in Republican France: The Evolution of the
French Armored Force, 1917-1940," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke
University, 1968, p. 189.
 41

was primarily a defensive weapon, and could easily be handled by the

citizen-soldier. As such, the antitank gun was the personification of

French doctrine.

The problem of weaponry was somewhat analagous to the infamous

balancing of quality and quantity.19 France had heard the argument for

decades on whether'she needed a mass citizen-army representing quantity,

or a small professional army representing quality. As for weaponry, the

antitank gun provided the crucial quality needed to counter the attaque

brusquee and could be purchased in a sufficient quantity--in the French

view--to counter this menacing threat. As one military writer pointed out,

"One shell costing 150 francs can destroy a tank which costs one

million." 20 While threatened by the offensive capability of armor,

France's emphasis had to be on quality antitank weapons of sufficient

quantity. The acceleration of industrial output that would occur as the

war progressed would permit the gradual "augmentation,,21 of France's war-

making capability, as well as her weapon inventory.

In a lecture at the War College in 1932, General Lucien Loizeau

addressed the necessity for the defense during the early phases of a war.

He noted that it would be necessary for France to initially conduct an

economy of force operation to permit the rearward concentration of war

19General Mordacq, La defense nationale en danger (Paris: Les

editions de France, 1938), p. 35. On the problem of quality versus
quantity, see General Weygandt ''L'Etat militaire de la France," Revue
des deux mondes, XXIX (October 15,1936), p. 724; and Weygand, "L'Unite
de l'armee," Revue mi1itaire generale, I (January, 1937), pp. 16, 18-19.

20Chauvineau. Une invasion, p. 93.

2lGeneral Mordacq, Les lecona de 1914 et la prochaine guerre

(Paris: Flammarion. 1934), p. 245.
 42

means. Progress in materiel and in armaments favored the assumption of

this initial attitude, for the increased capability of weapons of war

permitted a smaller force to effectively engage a larger enemy. For

those who criticized his scheme as lacking the spirit of the offensive,

General Loizeau answered,

We must win the ,first battle, and to do so it is necessary to

place the troops in a position of confidence, in a situation of
being presented in a good materiel and above all moral position on
their first battlefield. If not, what a debacle, worse than 1914: 22

While only the offensive would gain decisive results, an initial defen

sive was essential for France's mobilization of her war potential. The

question of her losing the "first battle," however, was not sufficiently

addressed until after she had lost that battle and the war.

In addition to its effects on the continuous front, another con

tribution of the French emphasis on materiel concerned the tremendously

increased lethality of the battlefield. The French saw war-making

materiel as adding markedly to the firepower of the battlefield. The

results was the oft-quoted maxim, "puissance du feu," or "firepower," and

its corollary coined by Marshal Petain, "Ie feu tue," or "fire kills." 23

In the 1921 Instructions on the employment of large units, the

report to the Minister of War by the committee charged with writing the

new manual stressed the importance of firepower. It emphasized the

crushing nature of that fire and its almost "irresistable" nature. The

22France, Ecole Superieure de Guerre (General Loizeau), La tfunoeuvre

du Corps d'Armee dans l'Armee (Courbevoie: P. Chanove, 1932), p. 9.

23 For criticism of the puissance du feu maxim, see Paul Reynaud,

In the Thick of the Fight, 1930-1945 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955),
pp. 95-98; and General Arthur Boucher, L'Infanterie sacrifiee (Paris:
Berger-Levrault, 1930), pp. 41-78.
 43

conunittee asserted, "Firepower has proved to be annihilating. ,,24 The

committee believed the basic nature of the offense and the defense had

changed because of the overwhelming power of fire on the battlefield, and

the instructions stated, "Fire [power] is the preponderant factor of

combat. 1l2S The 1913 Regulations had claimed, "Battles are above all

morale contests. 'Defeat is inevitable when hope for victory ceases. ,26

By 1921, the morale factor was no longer supreme; the French firmly

believed "Ie feu tue,lI or firepower kills. That belief differed from

that of 1913 as night from day.

The axiom of the killing power of fire became a truism piously

repeated by practically every French military writer. Again and again,

one reads, "The great lesson of the war of 1914-1918 was the preeminence

of fire." 27 One lieutenant colonel asserted, "Fire reigns, a sovereign

master, over the field of battle, from which is seems to have chased the
".

combatants. 1128 Even those such as General Emile Allehaut, who criticized

the lIeclipse of the offensive sense" because of this emphasis on fire

power, hastened to add, l~O one dreams of contesting the effects of fire,

its formidable effects, annihilating against the movement of all unprotected

24Instructions 1921, pp. 10-12.

25 Ibid., p. 6.

26Reglement 1913, p. 6.

27Maurin, L'Armee moderne, p. 151. For other versions of this

slogan, see Commandant Bouchacourt, L'Infanterie dans la Bataille (Paris:
Charles-Lavauzelle, 1927), p. 209-212; France, Ecole Superieure de Guerre,
Conferences de Tactique generale et d'Etat-Major, La Division, Annee 1932,
pp. 223-224; and France, Ecole Superieure de Guerre (Lieutenant Colonel
Touchon), Conferences d'Infanterie, Annee 1925-1926, p. 7.

28Miquel, ~nseignements de la guerre, p. 89.

 44

troops. 1129 For the French and for their doctrine, fire did reign supreme.

The immense amount of fire available on the battlefield made an

indelible impression on the military and caused the French to reach

several important conclusions. The 1921 manual reflected the common

belief that a small number of troops could occupy a considerable front,

and that the attack was favored only after the "massing of powerful

materiel means, artillery, combat tanks, munitions, etc." 30 Thus fire

power facilitated forming the continuous front and enabled the French to

envision themselves bleeding and weakening an attacking, larger enemy.

An enemy attack against a well-prepared position would deplete his morale

and permit the French commander to regain the initiative and impose his

own will over the enemy.3! The emphasis on firepower ruled against any

audacious maneuvers on the battlefield because of the difficulty in mass

ing the materiel means, and the 1936 Instructions made the remarkable

assertion, " . . audacious solutions . should be executed methodi

cally. 1132 Clearly, the batail1e conduite was a logical companion for the

axiom of Ie feu tue.

The stress on firepower greatly influenced the French perception

of combat, but it did not change the role of the infantryman. The 1921

Instructions explicitly stated

29General Emile A1lehaut, Etre prets (Paris: Berger-Levrault,

1935), p. 195.

3 0 Instructions 1921, p. 11.

31Instructions 1936, p. 30; Debeney, La guerre, p. 170.

32Instructions 1936, p. 31.

 45

The infantry is charged with the principal mission of combat.

Preceded, protected and accompanied by the fires of the artillery,
aided eventually by combat tanks and aviation, it conquers, occupies,
organizes, and secures the terrain. 33

The only change made in the 1936 Instructions was the changing of one of

the phrases to read, "eventually aided and supported by combat tanks,

aviation, etc.,,34 The infantry remained the queen of battle.

As for fires both editions agreed. In its description of fire

power as the "preponderant factor of combat," the 1936 edition repeated

verbatim the 1921 manual but added the sentence, "it [fire] destroys the

enemy or neutralizes hi~,,35 The relationship between the sources of fire

and the infantry was one of support; fires permitted the maneuver or

movement of infantry. Whether from tanks, aviation, artillery, gas

canister, or the infantry, fires assisted the infantry with the "principal

mission of combat," and thus the machines of war were the auxiliaries of

the infantryman.

The shortcoming in this thinking is perhaps best illustrated by

the tank. 36 In 1939 General Narcisse Chauvineau typified the French view

of the tank, liThe great weakness of the tank is that it is not able to

hold terrain, because [to do so] it is necessary for it to be

~obilized and as a result run the risk of being taken as a target by its

enemy, the cannon." And he added, " even though the idea of destruc

tion is the basis of military action [the tank's] power of destruction

33Instructions 1921, p. 23.

34Instructions 1936, p. 43.

35 Ibid., p. 69. Cf, Instructions 1921, p. 61.

36 Port ions of the following will be published in Major Robert A.

Doughty, "French Antitank Doctrine, 1940: The Antidote that Failed,"
Military Review (May, 1976).
 46

is very weak.,,37 This conception of the tank was repeatedly reflected in

French military journals. In 1935 a French officer wrote, "The experience

of the last war proved that tanks are not able to conquer a defensive

position without the collaboration of the infantry, and it does not appear

that technical progress has changed that.,,38 In 1937 another infantry

officer asserted, " since the enemy armored vehicle cannot occupy

terrain, there is never anything to lose, so long as the accompany

ing infantry is not on us throwing hand grenades." 39

Tanks were simply considered as blundering, almost blind bunkers

on tracks, designed only to assist the maneuver and supplement the offen

sive capability of the infantry. The fire of the tank was most important,

not its great mobility, nor its potential to rival the previously deci

sive role of the infantry. France's attention was riveted on the infantry

man and on all the external sources of firepower for him. In 1931-32

students at the War College were told, "For the foot soldier, the machine

is only a means." 40 The opposing infantry, not the tanks, was considered

the true enemy of the French infantry; to stop the enemy infantrymen was

to win the battle.

The perception of machines of war as sources of firepower for

the infantry prevailed even after the criticisms of De Gaulle and the

37Chauvineau, Vne invasion, pp. 100-101.

38Lieutenant Colonel J. Perre, "La guerre des chars," Revue

d'Infanterie, Vol. 87 (December, 1935), p. 973.

39capitaine Brouillard, "Cas concrets de defense contre les chars:

Deuxieme cas," Revue d'Infanterie, Vol. 90, No. 537 (June, 1937), p. 1201.

40France, Ecole Superieure de Guerre (Lieutenant Colonel Dame),

Conferences d'Infanterie, Annee 1931-1932 <Courbevoie: P. Chanove, 1931
1932), p. 12.
 47

French recognition of the growing armored might of Germany. According to

the French perception, technical progress had increased the lethality of

combat, but this did not require altering the doctrine established "on
41
the morrow of victory." The battle would essentially be the same, only

the lethality or the violence would be greater. This especially applied

to armored formations. The report to the Minister of War by the committee

which completed the 1936 Instructions said, "At the present time, the

antitank gun confronts the tank, as during the last war, the machinegun

confronted the infantry.,,42 Just as the machinegun had torn the shroud

of illusion from the offensive! outrance, so would the antitank gun

destroy the massed armored formations. According to the committee, tanks

could be employed only under the support and protection of the artillery,

and their massed employment would probably occur only after the initial

disorganization of the defensive position or in the exploitation.

43 The

committee concluded, "The new means have further developed the fire

power that the editors of the 1921 Instructions have already qualified as

annihilating, and which will be employed in the future over the field of
,,44
batt 1 e where it will reign as master.

As a result of the great lethality of modern weapons, the French

believed the defender had the advantage and could inflict heavy casualties

on an attacker. It was normally assumed that the attacker required a

4lInstructions 1936, p. 15. See Paul ReYnaud's vigorous attack

on what he described as the confirming of "Petain's doctrine": Reynaud,
In the Thick of the Fight, 1930-1945 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955),
pp. 158-162.
42 Instructions 1936, p. 17.

43 Ibid

44 Ibid ., p. 19.
 48
massive superiority of "three times as much infantry, six times the

artillery, and fifteen times the ammunition.,,45 This view of the defense

did not mean the French had rejected any possibility of an offensive. The

1921 and 1936 Instructions emphasized the decisive nature of the offensive

and the protective nature of the defensive. 46 The killing fires of the

defense would be used to repulse the attacks of the enemy, while the

offensive would chase the enemy from his position, rout his combat dis

positions, and destroy his combat potential.

Lectures at the War College often stressed the importance of an

47
offensive spirit, even if the initial battle were defensive. Similarly,

military writers often warned their colleagues of the importance of the

offensive; the defensive might offer many advantages but only an offen

sive would win the war. General Loizeau quoted Clausewitz to illustrate

that point. "The defensive is the strongest form with a negative obJec

tive; the offensive is the weakest form with a positive objective.,,48

The power of the defense furnished a protective shield behind which France

would bleed the attacking enemy and prepare herself for the final vic

torious offensive.

The French concept of the offensive, however, was dramatically

45Chauvineau, One invasion, p. 122.

46Instructions 1921, pp. 58-61; Instructions 1936, pp. 66-67, 99

135.

47France, Ecole Superieurc de Guerre (Lieutenant Colonel Touchon),

Conferences d'Infanterie, Annee 1925-1926, p. 13; France, fcole Superieure
de Guerre (General Loizeau), La Manoeuvre du Corps d'Armee dans 1'Armee
(Courbevoie: P. Chanove, 1932), pp. 8-10.

48 Genera
- - 1 L L i D eux Ma noeuvres (P ar~s:
0 zeau, . Berger-Levrault,
1933), p. 103.
 49

different from the blitzkrieg the Germans were to employ in 1940. 49

While one could say the attaque brusquee resembled the blitzkrieg, it

should be recognized that the two are different. The attaque brusquee

was a sudden, unexpected war thrust upon an unwary and perhaps unready

nation, while the blitzkrieg was a method of war that could be used in

an attaque brusquee. It relied on the massing of armor along a small

portion of the front, followed by a penetration of the lines and a deep

exploitation behind these lines. The battle that began on May 10, 1940,

was hardly an attaque brusquee, for the French had more than eight months

to prepare and to mobilize for war. They had prepared for the slow,

methodical war their doctrine envisioned, not the li~htning war the

Germans thrust upon them.

The inability of the French to accept the possibility of the

blitzkrieg centered on their faith in firepower, especially in their

antitank weapons, which could, in fact, defeat practically all German

armor. Their 25mm cannon was effective up to 800 meters against heavily

armored vehicles (4Omm of armor) and up to 1,500 meters against lightly

armored vehicles. The French model 1897 75mm antitank weapon was a much

older piece of equipment, but it was still effective to about 1,500

meters. 50 By 1939-1940, the old 75mm cannon was gradually being replaced

by the new 47mm cannon, which--except for the German 88--was undoubtedly

49For the opposing view, see Jeffrey Albert Gunsburg, "'Vaincre ou

Mourir': The French High Command and the Defeat of France, 1919--May,
1940," unpublished dissertation, Duke University, 1974, p. 227. Gunsburg
confuses the French chars de manoeuvre ensemble with the German blitzkrieg;
the former envisions the bataille conduite, while the latter is the embodi
ment of the lightning war.

50Conunandant Henri Laporte, "La defense antichars," Revue d'Infan

terie, Vol. 93 (December, 1938), pp. 1150-1151.
 50

the best antitank cannon employed in the battle of France. In short, the

French antitank guns could have stopped any of the German tanks used

against France with the possible exception of a few of the Mark IV's

which had been given additional armor plating. Even before the invasion

of France, the Polish campaign had revealed to the Germans, much to their
51
alarm, how effective these antitank weapons could be against their armor.

General Maurice Gamelin, Commander of the French army in May 1940, later

asserted, obviously correctly, that the antitank capability of France was

greater during 1940 than that of Germany.52

Nonetheless, French firepower was to prove illusory once the

battle began, not because the individual weapons were ineffective against

individual tanks but because individual weapons were ineffective against

large numbers of tanks. The French had equated materiel with firepower

and had misunderstood the contribution that materiel had made to mobi.lity.

This is clearly evident in their pre-war planning that trucks carrying

munitions and war materiel would consume 95% of France's gasoline, while

tanks would consume only 5%.53 Fuel would be consumed primarily along

another heavily used supply route such as the voie sacree, at Verdun in

1916, rather than by mechanized formations. Thus, the French conception

of materiel was one-dimensional, for it only foresaw an increase in the

fj.re from machines, not in vast sweeps of armored machines.

51
General Ulrich Liss, Westfront 1939/40: Erinnerungen des
Feindarbeiters im OKH (Neckargemund: Kurt Vowinckel Ver1ang, 1959), pp.
99ff; cited in Gunsburg, "The French High Command," p. 219.
52
Gamelin, Servir, I, p. 167.

53DDF , II, No. 223, 12 November 1937, pp. 413-414.

 51

The French vision was transfixed by the threat of firepower.

They believed the lethal firepower of antitank weapons would seriously

limit mobility within the armor battlefield, necessitating the shackling

of the tank units to their artillery support. Armor units would not go

beyond the effective range of their artillery, an idea clearly expressed

54
in the 1936 Instructions. Because of this view of a limited battle

field, the French simply were not trained to think of a hastily assembled,

distant armor attack. Their doctrine did not stress the decisive quali

ties of initiative, speed, and celerity; rather, it placed emphasis on

the World War I approach of carefully preparing the set-piece, closely

controlled, methodical attack--in other words, the bataille conduite.

Another fatal error was that doctrine was based on the French

conception of battle, not that of the potential enemy. The number of

antitank guns supplied the French division was based on the assumption

that no more than 50 enemy tanks would be concentrated along a kilometer

in a major attack attempting to penetrate an organized front. Based on

this assumed maximum density, the French concluded that the proper density

of antitank guns should be one gun each 100 meters, or ten per kilometer. 55

These ten guns would, of course, be arranged in depth and not stretched

III a single line across a kilometer. In contrast, some German and

Austrian thinkers anticipated as many as 100 attacking tanks per kilometer

54
Instructions 1936, p. 17.
55 Capitaine A. Goutard, "La char en face de l'arme antichar dans
1a rupture," Revue d'Infanterie, Vol. 93 (August, 1938), p. 288; Gamelin,
Servir, I, p. 166. Compare Capitaine Chazal-Martin and Capitaine Suire,
"{tude mathematique de la puissance des armes antichars," Revue d'Infan
terie, Vol. 95 (August, 1939), p. 294; and Colonel Hainie, tiL'Offensive
et la defensive avec les engins blindes," Revue militaire generale
(February, 1937), pp. 165-172.
 52
56
and called for at least eighteen antitank guns per kilometer. There was

a clear difference, then, even before the blitzkrieg was truly born, in

the German and French conceptions of what a massive armored attack would

be.

One military writer dismissed the threat of Germany massing over

100 tanks per kilometer by lamely asserting, "At the very least, this

enormous density'of [enemy] vehicles appears exceptional."

57 Much to

the peril of France, it also appeared "exceptional" to most of the French

military hierarchy. Yet, when the battle of Sedan was fought in Hay

1940, the Germans concentrated along the 8-10 kilometer front a force of

over 800 tanks from Guderian's XIXth Panzer Corps, a density 60mewhat

less than 100 tanks per kilometer. Germany took her own understanding of

the contribution of materiel to the battlefield and thrust this on France,

who found herself unable to regain the initiative and unable to impose

her will on the enemy.

~\

56Capitaine Soury, "Le combat contre les engins cuirasses, par

Ie major von Schell," Revue d'Infanterie, Vol. 91 (July, 1937), pp. 98-99;
Perre, "La guerre des chars," pp. 978-979.
57 Soury, fiLe combat contre les engins cuirasses," p. 131.