[ee | it e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e oe e Hans Westmeyer (Bditor) The Structuralist Program in Psychology: Foundations and Applications Hogrefe & Huber Publishers Seattle - Toronto - Bern - GottingenWith two exceptions (chapters 1 and 4), the articles published in this book were presented and discussed at the 4th or the Sth conference on "Psychological theories from a structuralist point of view", which were held in 1989 and 1990, respectively, at the Werner-Reimers-Foundation, Bad Homburg. At these conferences, the strucuralist reconstructions were checked by psychological experts with respect to their substantive adequacy, and by philosophers of science with regard to their formal correctness. The present’ volume shows again the fruitfulness of this kind of cooperation between experts from different disciplines Lowe thanks to the many individuals who played an important role in bringing the conferences and. this volume 0 fruition. Once agin, T would like’ to thank the Werrer-Reimers-Foundation and its director, Konrad von Krosgk, for having made poste our conferences both by provicing nancial support and a congenial setting forthe mectings. Funding for the preparation ofthis volume was provides by the Free University of Belin and the Ernst-Reuter Society, the support of Dr. Horst Hartwich was most appreciated. Special thanks are also dv to bro persons: Reiner Reena, rho, asin the previous volume, helped to render the English of my contrinitions more readable, ané Christoph Panknin, who prepared the printers copy of the book tnd cocceslly integrated -diferent formal sijls of presenting, strocturalist Tecorstrutions and constrictions. Finally, 1 would like to. thank Dr. C-Torgen Fogrefe and Dr. Peer Stein from the Hogrefe and tuber publishing house for their readiness to publish this volume Berlia, July, 1992 Hans Westmeyer Contents List of Contributors Notational Conventions 1, Introduction to the Structuralist Program in Psychology Hans Westmeyer, “The Structuralist Program as a Methodology for Theoretical Psychology Fundamental Concepts of the Structuralist Programm Applications of the Structuralist Program in Psychology Notes References 2. Structures, Links, and Holons C.Ulises Motitines Introduction Structures and models Constraints as internal bridge structures Links as external bridge structures Theoretciy Theory-holons Not 3. On Innertheoretical Conditions for Theoretical Terms Introduction ee : Flexibility of Enipirical Theories and the Role of Theoretical Terms First Condition: Underdetermination of Theoretical Terms by the Theory’s Axioms Second Condition: Theoretical Terms Can Be Determined with the Help of Axioms Plus Special Laws Innerthecretical Conditions and the Occurrence of Holistic Phenomena Necessaty or Sulficient Conditions ? ‘summary Notes References 4. The Justification of Empirical Suppositions: A Str Analysis of an Inductive Form of Scientific Reasoning . Rainer Westermar, Elke Heive and Peter Gerets Kinds of Intended Applications Justification of Empirical Suppositions 2 45Concluding Remarks Notes References Probabilistic Components of a Theory in the Structuralistic Reconstruction Reinhard Suck Introduction . General Framework for Probabilistic Components ‘The Empirical Claim of Distribution Properties Deterministic and Stochastic Race Models in the Stroop Phenomenon References: Structuralist Theory Reconstruction and Specification of Simulation Models in the Social Sciences Klaus G. Troitsch Introduction Formalization Empirical applications of ACC Notes References Anderson's ACI From the Theoret Elke Heise ‘The Theory-Net -. 020.06 ‘The Theory-Blement LISP. Empirical Content Conclusions Notes References Theory Applied to Skill Acquisitior Framework to Empirical Content (On a Structuralist Reconstruction of Latent State-Trait cory . Utrich Gahie, Wolfgang Jagodsinski and Rolf Steyer Potential Models of Latent State-Trait Theory Models of Latent State-Trait Theory Special Models: Models of Steyers Latent State-Trait Theory Special Models: Models of «,-Congeneric Variables Special Models: Models of (f,,€)-Congeneric Variables... LST-Theoreticity and Partial Potential Models of Latent State-Trait Theory Constraints of Latent State-Tvait Theory Links of Latent State-Trait Theory . Intended Applications and Theory Elemenis 10s 106 108 109 10 nl 3 4 us ns 9. Empirical Claim of Latent State-Trait Theory Concluding Remarks References A Structuralist Theory-Holon of Human Action and Action-Probing Hans Usckert Introduction Paradigmatic Example of an Intended Application of the Theory | Potential and Actual Models of Action ce Partial Potential Models of Action Constraints for Potential Models of Action Core and Intended Applications of the Theory of Action ‘Theoretical Content and Empirical Claim of the Theory of Action | Potential and Actual Models of Action-Probing é Partial Potential Models of Action-Probing Constraints for Potential Models of Action-Probing Intertheoretical Links from the Theory of Action to the Theory of Action-Probing Core and Intended Applications of the Theory of Action-Probing | ‘Theoretical Content and Empirical Claim of the Theory of Action-Probing 5 ‘The Theory-Holon of Action and Action-Probing Conclusions ‘i References Appendix 10. A Structuralist Reconstruction of Wundt's Three-Dimensional . Theory of Emotion Rainer Reisenzein Introduction Informal Description of Wundt's Theory of Emotion Formal Reconstruction of Wundt’s Theory A Sketch of the Theory-Net of Basie Emotion Theorie Notes a References A Theory of Power Wolfgang Boleer Potential Models... The Basic Model of Power Special Forms of Power ‘The Net of Power Theory Problems of Application Notes References Small Groups00000900 OOHHOOHOHHOHHOHHOHOHEEOOO 12, The Continuity Problem of Scientific Theor ‘An Example of Social-Psychological Balance Theorizing Marti Kuokkanen Introduction . ‘A Reconstruction of Global and Relative Balance Theories ‘A Reconstruction of Osgood’s and Tannenbaum's Congruity Principle of Attitude Change S 5 ‘Morrissette’s Balance Theory and its Relation to the Relative Balance Theory ane ‘An Example of Incommensurability in Social Psychology - the Relation of Congruity Theory and Morrissett's Balance Theory Conclusions F . Acknowledgements Notes References 13, Sex-Role Influences in Dyadic Interaction: ‘A Structuralist Reconstruction of W. Ickes’ Theory Hans Wesomeyer “The Theoretical Context of the Theory ‘The Conceptual Apparatus of Ickes’ Theory ‘The Substantive Assumptions of the Theory Specifie Hypotheses of the Theory Potential Models and Models of the Reconstructed Theory ‘Theorems and Corollaries 7 Partial Potential Models and Intended Applications Constraints ‘A Revised Version of Theory SRI ‘An Alternative to Theory SRic Links Conclusion Notes References Author Index. Subject Index. . 211 au 23 219 22 27 24 244 248 246 249 249 251 254 256 263 269 270 2m 28 29 280 280 280 ~ 283; . 287 List of Contributors Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Balzer; Seminar for Philosophy, Logic and Philosophy of Science; University of Munich; Ludwigstr. 31; D-8000 Manchen 22; Germany PD Dr, Ulrich Gahde; Insitute of Philosophy; Free Univesity of Berlin; Habelschwer dter Allee 30; D-1000 Berlin 33; Germany Dipl-Payeh. Peter Gerjets; Institute of Pychology; University of Gottingen; Goflerst 14; D-3400 Gottingen; Germany Dr. Elke Heise; Institute of Psychology; University of Gottingen; GoBlerstr. 14; D-3400 Gottingen; Germany Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Jagodzinski, Institute of Sociology; University of GieSen; Karl Gléckner Str. 21; D-6300 Gieden; Germany Dr. Martti Kuokkanen; Department of Philosophy; University of Helsinki; Usioninkatw 40 B; 00170 Helsinki Finland Prof, Dr, Carlos Ulises Moulines; Institute of Philosophy; Free University of Berlin; Habelschwerdter Allee 30; D-1000 Berlin 33; Germany Dr. Rainer Reisenzein; Institute of Psychology; Free University of Berlin; Habel: schwerdter Allee 45; D-1000 Berlin 33; Germany PD Dr. Rolf Steyer; Department of Psychology; University of Trier; Tarforst, Gebaude 1D; D-5500 Trier; Germany Dr. Reinhard Suck; Department of Psychology; University of Osnabrick; Heger-Tor "Wall 12; D-#500 Osnabrick; Germany Prof, Dr. Klaus G. Troitzsch; Social Sciences Informaties Institute; University of Ko bleng-Landav; Rheinau 3-4; D-5400 Koblenz; Germany Prof, Dr. Hans Ucekert; Institute of Psychology Ill; University of Hamburg; Vor-Melle- Park 5; D-2000 Hamburg 13; Germany Prof. Dr. Rainer Westermann;, Institute of Psychology; University of Géttingen; Go8- lerstr. 14; D-3400 Gottingen; Germany rr; Insitute of Psychology; Free University of Berlin; Habel 5; D-1000 Berlin 33, Germany Prof. Dr. Hans Westm schwerdter AlleeNotational Conventions ‘The authors have attempted to use the standard notation of set theory and, in some chapters, the standard symbols for connectives and quantifiers as used in symbolic logic, Besides these conventions, each chapter has its own “formal style”. {ut=) the set of .. such that e- is an element of é js not an element of ~ the union of .. and the interseetion of .. and isa subset of a proper set of the Cartesian product of .. and -- the diflerence set of .. and the power-set of . the complemenvinegation of eben “t= yy {8a function from into ~ B,C) dom(..), ie. the domain of Due) ran(.)y be. the range of i the cardinality of .» ie» the number of elements of Pol) the conditional probability of... given ~ 0 the empty set R the set of real numbers R+ the set of positive real numbers N the set of natural numbers Ae. ea and y or - = implies is equivalent to - is equivalent by definition to 3 there exist ¥ for all . is identical to ~ +- is'not identical to — = is identical by definition to itt if and only if Chapter 1 Introduction to the Structuralist Program in Psychology! Hans Westmeyer Free University of Berlin Abstract “Theoretical prychology asa scenic discipline requires 8 does anyother siemife disc plin, an adequote methodology. As a promising candidate for such a methodology the Firat program inthe pisopy of cence is proposed. Ts approach provides pow fal tools to handle many problem of interes sn theotetcal investigations of prycholgial ‘heorie Base requirement fora methodology for theoretical psychology are formulated, the entra concepts the seta program ae introduced, nd a survey ofthe curren sate ft effons to reeonsruct or const pryeholoial theories fom a structural point of view is even The Structuralist Program as a Methodology for Theoretical Psychology ndational problems that are more or less unique @ In 1951, the Psychological Review published a survey of "Theoretical psychology 1950 by Sigmund Koch, in which the objectives of a theoretical psychology were explicated in 1 way that is sill valid today (2) Bucation inthe methodology and loge of scene. @) Analysis of methodological or to poeholgy. (©) Inenal'sytematzation of suggestive, bot formally defective, theoretical form- @ (a) Intontaslton and diferental analysis of conflicting theoretical formulations. © {2 Construction of new theory e ‘These objectives were reconfirmed in the preface tothe proceedings of the founding @ conference of the International Society for Theoretical Psychology (Baker, Hyland, Van q@ Rappard, & Staats, 1987, pp. V2). But despite the fact that metatheoretical and meth- ‘odologicél analyses of psychological problems and theories have a long tradition in our iscipline, thee impact on scientific practice - especially on the clarification and testing @ Of psychological theories and the formulation of new ones - has so far been less than spectacular, Although ber of possible reasons for this, the following two @ seem to be especially important (ef. Westmeyer, 1989, p. V £) e 1, Many of the existing analyses are at best tenuous connected 10 concrete peychol fie eons, Leste dal wih hel Sbjct matey in aay hat foo abst and @ detached2 HE, Westmeyer retical psychology, as a metatheoretical discipline, i itself in need of an adequate methodology. For example, neither logic nor set theory play a role in theoretical psycho- logy comparable to that of statistics in empirical psychology. Instead, analyses of psy logical theories are usually carried out in an informal, narrative manner. Asa consequen- ce, efforts to systematically study and compare psychological theories are frequently in- compatible with one another. They are guided by criteria separately conceived of by every new author and, in this way, authors create their own “universe” of psychological theares, ystematize them, and come to a number of specific metatheoretical conclu ‘ons. All too frequently, however, these diverge from the conclusions of others. But, I suppose, there willbe agreement on the following: No scientific discipline with out «certain discipline. Science presupposes in all domains and on all level, criteria on which the members of the scientie community agree and which form the basis of uation of the success of our scientific effort. In empirical psychology, a differentiated and elaborated methodology which contains ‘ules and instructions for the design, condvet, and analysis of empirical investigation is in fact available. Something compare ble is needed for theoretical psychology, too - at least for that brand of theoretical psychology which feels obliged to the objectives formulated by Koch and which persues these objectives through the analysis of concrete psychological theories. ‘What is required, thes, is @ methodology for theoretical psychology - set of powerful tool forthe reconstruction and analysis of concrete psychological theories. To be more precise, such a methodology for theoretical psychology should be able to adequately deal With atleast the ten issues listed in Table 1 Tobie 1 ‘A Nethodology for Theoretical Psychology: What Is It Good for ? (1) Typtiation and characterization ofthe concepts of «paychologicl theory, (2) tdentieaton of those concepts of the theory that are definable by more primitive (2) Identification and precise formulation ofthe basic assumptions (laws) ofthe theory, (Derivation of other assumptions ofthe theory (ie. dheorems) from these | tase assumptions (5) Differentiation between theoretical and non-theoretial concepts ofthe theory (6) Characterization ofthe domain of intended! applications ofthe theory, (7) Tentifeation and precise formulation of assumptions which connect several dife rent applications ofthe theory (8) Reconstruction of the theoretical environment of the theory, identifica precise formulation of assimptions tht link concepts ofthe theory with concepts from other theories () —Reconstroction of the methodological em tion ofits mode of reference to its subject (20) Determination of he oe and fucion of pprosinaion an ieatzatons within ronment of the theory and characteriza The Structuralist Programm 3 To illustrate these ten goals of metatheoretical analyses of psychological theories and thereby to explicate the expectations we place on such a methodology, Ihave listed, for cach ofthese goals, several examples of typical questions we should be able to answer on the basis of an adequate methodology for theoretical psychology (see Table 2). Table 2 Examples of Typical Questions We Should Be Able to Answer on the Basis of an ‘Adequate Methodology for Theoretical Prychology (@) - What ithe conceptual apparatus ofa psychological theory ? Which concepts of the theory have the status of primitive nor-logical concepts (the so-called principal base sets), and which auary base sets ae used within the the ‘What is the status of the further concepts ofthe theory ? Which concepts are to be conceived of only as relations, which ones as functions 7 {In the ease of relations: How i each relation to be pitied and characterized ? Ist a dyad triad tetrad relation or an even more complex aplace relation ? Ta the exe of dyatie relations: Are there specific properties which canbe atributed to the relation, suchas symmety,refledvty, transtviy and so on ? In the cate of functions, which i the domain of the funetion, and which i its range of values I ita unary, binary, ternary function ora funtion with more than three srgumens ? (2) sit posible to simplify the conceptual apparatus ofthe theory ? ‘Are there concepts ofthe theory which can be explicitly defined by other concepts ofthe theory ? (2) - Which are the substantive assumptions ofthe theory, and how can they be forma ted ina precise way? ‘Age al of these assumptions basi, o st possible to derive some of them from others? (4)~ sit realy posible to derive the so-called theorems ofthe theory from the basic as sumption (axioms, ls)? Isit postibe to obtain interesting, new insights into a theory by deriving important consequences which were not previously thought of 7 (5) «Which concepts ofthe theory canbe determined independent of the theory? | 1 In which eases does the determination ofa concept in any application ofthe theory presuppose the valiiy of the substantive assumptions or laws ofthe theory ? Inthe eate of a concept whose determination involves some kind of measurement, do all methods of measurement that are available for this concept presuppose the assumptions of the theory ? (6)- What are the posible applications ofthe theory ? ‘What are its imended applications, that is, the phenomena, events or the processes the theary should deal with ? [Ate there paradigmatic examples of suecesl applications ofthe theory given by its founder(s)? Is there a sufficient degree of family resembl plications and the further intended ones ? between these paradigmatic ap (7)- Are there interconnections between dtferent applications of the theory ? ‘Ofwhat kind are these connections, ae they real or conceptual ons ?4 H. Wesmeyer (8) ~ Ate there any links berwcen the theory and other psychological theories ? Ist possible to interpret concepts af the theory onthe basis of concepts of other psychological theories? Ae some ofthe concepts ofthe theory directly imported from other psychological theories ? Ist possible to reduce the theory or pats oft to another psychologieal theory ? ‘Are there any theoretical relations between the theory and theories from other scientific disciplines ? (©) What are the methodological assumption (eg. measurement theoes,satisical ‘cores, observation theories) that have tobe used and presupposed when tying to determine certain (non-theoretcal) concepts ofthe theory? How are these determining links fom the theory to methodological theories to be precisely formulated 7 ‘What can be said about the domsins of intended applications of thes sical theories” [sit posible to construct interpreting inks from the theory to diferent competing theories for one and the same eoncept ofthe theory, and what are the consequences Of this procedure forthe empirical confirmation of the theory? (20) - How can one differentiate between data that are incompatible with the assumptions fy und data that are not fully in accordance with the theory, but can ne be regarded as success applications of it? How can one represent such notions a8 “degree of approximation’, “degree of simi larg, or ‘measure of inaccuracy” with regard tothe enies which can be described by the conceptual apparatus of the theory ? ethodalo ¢ successful in answering these types of questions fora sufficiently large variety of psychological theories will it become possible to formulate metatheoretical assumptions of a more general nature in precise way and to test these assumptions with 4 reasonable prospect for success, At this point the reader may object that to slate the properties of an adequate methodology for theoretical psychology is all very well; the really interesting question is, Whether a set of tools suited to answer, in @ precise way, questions like those listed in Table 2 exists, My answer is: Yes, here is such a set of tools. It has been made avaiable by a new approach inthe philosophy of scence, the so-called scturais view of seienific theories. This view, approach, or program offers a remedy for at least the two central problems of current theoretical psychology that I mentioned atthe beginning. It promises to allow a unified presentation of psychological theories, a precise formulation of intra and intertheoretical relations, and the investigation of these relations for con psychological theories, The Structuralst Programm ‘i 2, Fundamental Concepts of the Structuralist Programm ‘The structuralist approach was founded by Joseph D. Sneed who, in 1971, published ‘a book on "The logical structure of mathematical physis". Sneed’s work was soon taken ‘up by Wolfgang Stegmiller (1973, 1979) and his collaborators, especially Wolfgang Balzer (1982, 1985) and C. Ulises Moulines (1976, 1982). For a recent presentation of the general structuralist program in science, ee the book "The structuralist program: An architectonic for science" by Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed (1987), Inis neither possible nor necessary to presenta full introduction into the structuraist, view of scientifi theories here. A first introduction is given by Westmeyer (19896). In this article, I will only mention the most important ideas of the structuralist approach ‘and briefly indicate how these concepts can be used for the analysis of psychological the- fries, ie, when one wants to answer questions like those listed in Table 2. The fun- ‘damental concepts of the structuralist program are dealt with in much more detail by Moulines (1992, inthis volume). ‘To begin with, it should peshaps be noted that the structuralist program in the phi losophy of science has nothing to do with the psychological school of strueturalism propagated in the early days of our discipline by Wundt, Tithener, and others. Further- ‘ore, the structualst program must also be distinguished from object-related uses of th term “structuralism’ in other scientific discipline, suchas linguistics or anthropology. The strveturalist program in the philosophy of science is a variant of the model-theoretie ‘approach tothe understanding of scientific theories, and it relies extensively on logie and set theory for the reconstruction and construction of scientific theories. Thereby, it follows a recommendation made already in the late filties by Patrick Suppes (1957) who could be regarded as a-precursor of the structuralist approach. The most important concepts of the structuralist approach to scientific theories are listed and briefly ex plained in Table 3. If we ty to reconstruct a psychological theory and include in this reconstruction the connections ofthe theory to other paychologcal theories and, if necessary, ro theories of other scientific disciplines, we will end up with a very complex set theoretic structure called a theor-holon. Theory-holons aze sets of interconnected thean-clemenus. Theory clements, in turn, are the basic units for any structuralist analysis of scientific theories That is, any structuralist reconstruction of psychological theory leads to the formulation fat least one theory-element, A theory-element isa set-theoretic structure consisting of ‘wo components, a sheor-core K and a set of intended applications of K. The inclusion Of ths latter set into the definition of a theory-element is unique to the structualist approach. It is a fundamental tenet of structuralism that a theory is not universally applicable, but only to a certain set, range, or domain of intended applications. The specification of this open set is an important part of the formulation of the theory- clement, In most cases I is "anchored" in a paradigmatic subset T, which contains those successful applications of the theary-core which the founder andor influential propo- hens of the theory regard as exemplary, The other component of theory-clements, the6 Hi. Wesemeyer theory-core, is itsel which are briefly explained in Table 3. a complex set-theoretic structure consisting of five components, Table 3 Central Concepts of the Structualist Approach Theory-holon H set of inked theory-clements; a theory-olon contains, in most cases heory-lements of diferent theor-nets Theory-net N set of theory-clements partially ordered by the specialization relation Theory-lement 7 ordered pair consisting ofa theory-core K and a domain of intended applications 1 Theory-core Ki) ‘ordered quintuple consisting of 1M, (7, the class of potemil models of 7; MG), the class of models within 8, (7) M,(D) the clas of partial potential models given by M, (7) and M(T); GEC, the global constraint Belonging tM, (7) | GLCT), the global link belonging to M, (7) Class of potential models M, (7) consisting ofall structufes that canbe subsumed under the conceptual framework of T | Class of (actual) models MCT) | Set of potent models which, in addition, satisfy the substantive empirical laws and a sumptions of T ‘Cass of partial potential madelé M, (7) Set of fragments of potential model ie, structures exempliyng all and only the non- theoretical pars of the conceptual framework of T Global constraint GC(T) intersection of all constraints C(7) for M,(7); the elements of GC(T)aze set of potential ‘models which satis all the constraints of T Constraint CCT) Set af certain admisable combinations of potential models of T, ie, subset of the power fet of, (1; the function of eanstraints i o characterize the connections or relations among different applications of T Global tink GLC) intersection ofall ntertheoretcal links L(T}; the elements of GL(T) are potential models that are correctly linked to other theories Link £7) relation on the Cartesian (set-theoretic) product ofthe class of potential models of T and the clas of potential odes of another thety-clement; the function ofintertheoetical links isto characterize the essential connections between T and other theory-clement tht ate part of the theoretial environment (eutrounidng) of 7 | Domain of intended applications 1(7) fet of systems, phenomena, event, or processes T de applications have to be described by using (all and swith subset of My (intended ) the non theoretical concep of 7 The distintion between potential models and partial potential models of a theory is based on the distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical concepts of the theory. Within the move traditional sictemen? view of scientific theories, scemtfic terms are divided into theoretical versus observational ones . That is, the distinction between theoretical and non-theoretial terms coincides with the non-observational versus ob: servational dichotomy, and this dichotomy is regarded as being relatively independent of cnerete theories. In contrast, within the structuralist approach to theories the problem of theoretcity of scientific terms and the question of the observability of the entities to which they refer are regarded as separate issues, the conflation of which prevents a proper conception of theoretical terms. According to the structuralist position, theoreti city must, ist, always be relatiized; and second, this relatvization must be made, not with regard toa certain language, but with regard toa certain theory. "The exact denota tion is, therefore, not ‘theoretical’ but “T-theoretial” (Stegmiller, 1979, p. 10). The strueturalist program knows several criteria of T-theoreticiy. A somiformal one is the following by Balzer et al. (1987) ‘Concept iad theoretical eat to theory 7 (Theoretic) sand only it very determination of {in any sppeation of T presuppores the existence of ast one ats! model of T-(p. $8) ‘T-theoretical concepts can te found, for example, in many psychological theories containing latent variables. For in attempts to determine the specitic parameter valves of these latent variables fora concrete application, the validity ofthe Substantive assump: tions ofthe theory which directly or indizeetly connect latent and manifest variables have usually to be presupposed as tre. Constraints express real as well as conceptual connections between different appli cations of a theory. In the sets of potential models, actual models, and partial potential models every structure is considered by itsel. But there may be certain connections between potential models, in particular, they may in part overlap (see, for a simple example, Westmeyer, 1989, p. ). ‘The conceptual apparatus of the theory can be divided into three parts. One part consists of the T-theoretical terms that are specific to the theory T. The other part consists of T-non-theoretical teins which cannot be intesprcted Ly concepts uf uther theories. The third part contains important T-non-theoretical concepts which are, ia most cases, relations or functions and which are interpretable by concepts of other theories, Such an interpretation is expressed by intetheoreial links which import concepts from one theory to another Links connect individual theory-elements and are important tools for the recon struction of the global structure of science (see Baleer et al, 1987). "They are of fun- damental importance for the systematic treatment of intertheoretical relations in psy: chology and of the connections between a psychological theory and the structures we refer to in the course ofits empircal investigation, which include the structures appealed to in the operationalization of psychological constructs" (Westmeyer, 1989, p. 6),8 Hi, Wesemeyer Every concept mentioned in Table 3 can be precisely defined in set- theoretical terms (cf. Moulines, 1992). In a reconstruction of a concrete psychological theory, the content tof any of these concepts has to be determined. 3. Applications of the Structuralist Program in Psychology In Westmeyer (1989, p. 9), a first survey of the efforts to reconstruct or construct psychological theories within the structuralist framework is given. Table 4 presents the ‘most recent version and summarizes 37 psychological theories - or theory-elements which are parts of a theoretical or methodological environment of psychological theories «that have been reconstructed or constructed from the structuralist point of view. The headline fof Table 4 "Structuralist reconstructions and constructions of psychological theories" is ‘meant to indicate that some of the listed theories were developed and formulated from the outset in eonsideration of the struturalist conception of psychological theories, e.g. (4), (17), (23) - 23), (0), and (32). In these cases we speak of senctwalist constructions ‘of psychological theories, In most of the other cases, previously existing theories where reconstructed. An intermediate positon is exemplified by (3), (5), (16), and (31) ‘As already mentioned, "psychological theories can usually be reconstructed only as complex theory-nets or theory-holons. In the case of theories with a large domain of already established successful applications and an even larger set of intended ones, a ‘complete structuralist reconstruction amounts 10 a time consuraing enterprise which cannot be accomplished in one piece. Therefore, reconstructive efforts are often re- stricted to the reconstruction of only the basic theory-clement and/or a few theory. ‘elements which refer to certain applications of special interest. Of course, this does not yield the complete reconstruction of the theory’. (Westmeyer, 1989b, p. 8 £.) ‘Therefore, we find in Table 4 Several reconstructions which exist only ina preliminary form and/or are only concerned with the basic elements of the respective theories, e.g. @), (), (©, (49) - 2. In contrast, (4, (8), (10) - (16), (17), (18), (22), (23) (25), 26) = (5), (83), and (34) - (6) refer to differentiated and elaborated theory.nets Which permit several new important insights into the reconstructed psychological theories, thereby demonstrating the fruitfulness ofthe structuralst approach. These last-mentioned applications of the structuralist program to psychological theories have been published in the book "Psychological theories from a structuralist point of view" (Westmeyer, 1980a) or are contained in this volume. A closer look at these structuralist reconstructions and constructions of psychological ‘theories wil show that most of the questions listed in Table 2 which, as I argued at the beginning, shouldbe answerable on the bass of an adequate methodology for theoretical psychology, are in fact answered by the strucuralist analyses or could at least easily be answered on the basis of these analyses, The Siructuralist Programm Table 4 Structuralist Reconstructions and Constructions of Psychological Theories (@)_ BF. Skinner's theory of operant behavior (Kraker, 1976, 1977, 1980) (2) _S. Freud's theory of neurosis (Baler, 1982; Balzer & Marcou, 1989) @) A theory of psychophysics (Wegener, 1982) (Hi Westmeyers theory of behavior interaction (Westmeyer, ler, Winkelmann & Nel, 1982; Westmeyer, Hannemann, Nel Vekel & Winkelmann, 1987; Westmeyer & Nell, 1987; Westneyer, 1987, 1989) (6) A general psychological action theory (Birkhan & Friedrichsen, 1983) (6) Hi Lenk’s theory of action (Birkhan & Friedrchsen, 1983) (2) The theory a information processing (Uecker, 1983) (8) LFestinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance (Kuokkanen, 1986; Westermann, 1987, 198, 1985) (9) B. Cohen's theory of social conformity (Kuokkanen, 1986; Stephen, 1990) ‘A net of pycholopea iliy theories (Stephan, 1988, 1989, 190) (10) SEU-mosels (11) SEV-models (12) OBU-models (13). Kahnesiann and A. Tversy's prospec theory (14) —K Lewin’ theory of resultant valence (1S)__LW., Atkinson’ risk taking theory (15) A general theory of schievement motivation (17) 1. Hoting’s theory of behavior interruption asa condition of stress (Holling, 1988, 1b; Holing & Suck, 1989) (18) 4.R. Anderson's theory of cognitive architecture, ACT® (Hee & Westermans, 1985, 1989; Heise, 199, 1992) ‘A net of psychological attribution theories (Deblr, 1988) (19) The theory of LE. Jones (20) The theory of HH. Kelley 21) The theory of B. Weiner (2) The theory af role confit resolution poposed by N. Gross, WS. Mason, and A.W. MeBachern (Kuokkanen, 1989) Elements of the theoreticallmethodical environment ofthe theory of behavior interaction (Westmeyer, 1989) (23) Indiference structures 28) Coding strocures 3) Observation structures A net ofsotil-pychological balance theories (Kuokkanen, 1992) (25) The theory of F. Heider (See also Stephan, 1950) 21) The theory of D, Cartwright and F. Harary10 H. Westmeyer | 28) The theory of 1M | @)__ The theory of CE, Osgood and PH. Tannenbaum | (C0) #1. Uecker’ theory of action and action probing (Uecker, 1992) (G1) A theory of power in stall groups inspired by TIE. Wartenbergs conception (Baler, 1992) (2) A miniature theory of atiude change (Troitasch, 1992) (3). The latent state-rait theory of R.Steyer (Gide, Jagodsinski & Steyer, 1992) ‘A net of basic emotion theories (Reisenzen, 1992) 4) The theory of W. Wundt (35) The theory of H, Sehlosberg (26) The theory of CE. tzard (31)_W. Tekes eory of sexoleialences in dyadic interaction (Westmeyer, 1992) Notes 1 Slightly modified version o€x paper tead atthe 4th Conference of the International Socket for ‘Treoretiel Pocholy #8 Clik Univerey in Woreeer, Massacharets une 24-2, 199, References Ble, dy Hand ME, Vn Rapa & Stns, AM. (Eis) (57) Caren iss eo ane (8) Eo Perr Mee - Sree. Braschi: Vewe Bate W 8) Phe nd MB ey Bar W (99) Acs sal pe nh Wexner (The smc pope ‘sh Panaatin nts p10) Tro Hoge & Ha Bana Wt Narco CH) Acti efSgmdFeat ny ay fe won inti vestmce (8) Popa! hes fos cto po of ow py Nee Yon sping nr CU e081 (9 An ene re Te rc open ‘hme test (4) ech te Sst ee ser Bachna Pep iene fre ap. 0 Sep Hee Dei) Stade Resa er Asner In W. Se), ‘soc te er 3 Keng Desh Goi Pen ee 8 ( {cine Hope Gah Uni, We Sige, R. (97) On 2 secur eosin fat att yn Meet (5st pon pe Fotos eps © ei Eco Satna Ronny dr ACT Thea vo Aden, Far: ane Het (09) Andon AcT=sy spc en Foe eta ane cpa nent nt Weancyer (Eh cel pram pcg: Puna end ‘pron (p18) Toone Hoge & ber © se 2 Wena) Este Chee ur sbuatichen Reson von Ax @ even i en re ATi Sa (2 Be Sr The Structuralist Programm n Kong der Deuschen Geslichp fr Pychloie ix Berlin 1988. (Vol. 1,7. 398). Gottingen: Hoe. Heise, E, Westermann, R. (1989). 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In H, Westmeyer (Ed), The aucun progam in pocholog: Foundations end ‘ppleations (pp. 249-281). Toronto: Hogrle & ube. Westmeyer, H. Ey F, Wikeimaan, K€ Nell V. (1983) theory of behavior imeaction in dyads ‘Asiroctrait account. Meamediing 3, 200.23. ‘Westmeyer H Hannemana, J, Nel, V, Volkl, U, & Winkelmann, K (1987). Eine Monotheory Mul Ticthod Anahse: Ploy fr einen dedohvntnchen Malpas. Digna, 33, 27-282 ‘Westneyer, H, & NelkV. (1987), Paycholopiehe Theorie as stukturalstscer Sie. In M. Amelang (Ging), Berh ber den 3%, Kongo der Deuschen Cesolcha fir Pycholge in Heidelberg 1986 (Wot 2, pp. 1792190). Goningen: Hoge Chapter 2 Structures, Links, and Holons . Ulises Moulines Free University of Berlin Abstract 1 the ist part of ths ancl, fundamental notions of the strcurlit conception ae presented n'a te formal seing,espedally asthe concept of a mode is concerned. The Second pat deals wth intebeorecal relation in general a ddved from the novon of @ Tink. To base Hinds of ns ae disingushed entalment and interpreting nhs. They ae respon fr reduction relations tnd for slave theoretic, respectively. The atc ‘ends wth formal definitions of ete structures (holo) which may be Televan 10 the Sly ofthe global store of cence and tothe dhcuson of epiemologel aes (Goundsionalom vs eaherenon, 1, Introduction A portion of the material presented in this paper consists of a revised and generalized reformulation of notions and construction principles already exposed in W. Balzer, CU. Moulines and ID. Sneed, An Architeconic fr Science, 1987, especially in Chapters 1, 12, 1132, VIILI-, and VIIL6. They are presented here in a more streamlined way, which, [Believe is more suitable to deal with intertheoretical relations Another portion of the material introduces new ideas. This is especially true of the cexplicatons ofthe notions of substructure, fundamental law, bridge structures, and above all, the clear distinesion between several types of links (a “typology” of links), and between two kinds of relative non-theoretcity. Though global intertheoretical relations (theoretization, reduction, equivalence, approximation) are not explicitly dealt with here, the present results should be regarded as the appropriate setting to reconstruct them in future work within the strctualist program, since global intertheoretical relations are made up" of different sorts of links submitted t0 particular global conditions. For sample, theoretization essentially depend on (the partial non-existence of interpreting links (see below), whereas reduction has todo with entailment links (see below). Als0, the discussion ofthe epistemological issues of foundationaism and coherentism may benefit from the idea ofa “chain” of interpreting links, This i indicated at the end ofthis paper. To grasp the ideas presented here in the most adequate way, some knowledge of previous notions of the structualist program, and of their rationale, is advisable; howe- ver, from a formal point of view, the paper is selécontained,“ CU. Moulines 2, Structures and models The most basic unit of science according to the structuralist view is a model A model is a particular kindof structure. In order to have a precise notion of a model we therefore aged fist an appropriate notion ofa structure and for this, in turn, it i convenient to use the notion of a ppe as a construction procedure for structures. This will be the topic of this section, whichis the most formal of this paper. “The constructs successively introduced by definition may have some properties that follow directly from the definition and are worth mentioning explicitly. They are indica Sunder the label "theorem. However, these "theorems" are in general so easy to prove that I spare the proofs. Some appropriate formalization of standard set theory (eg. of the system of von Neumann-Bemays-Godel [NBG], since proper classes and operations on them are needed) should be presupposed in the following kenpes For cach k € IN @) Viskiise @) isa ktype = Po(o) is a keype G)_oyisakeype Aa, sa keype = 0, x oy a key. Echelon sets Let k € IN, fyyonty be any sets, and be a ky type 0 over fy, is recursively defined as: QO) ofywats) 2 fi if a = Hori sk (ORAL) 2: Polo Civutn) if of isa koype and o = Polo’) AOI) = oy ronta) © Onl atm) Hoy and o,aFe types, and & = 01x or ‘Then, the echelon-set oft, yafq) OF e-ppifications Let olyresty De any sets, and let @ be any K-ype. tis o-typified over fy paty if F€ Of yhm) e-npe-equivalence: Let nt be any sets; 7" any two classes of sets; o any K-type. tis o-fype-equivalent 0 1 (18) if € ofT) At" € ofT). Theorem 1 Let Fe any class of clases of sets, Then o is an equivalence relation over UT. Types isa type (Type(s) iff 3 Opry: G2 Loy 04) Q) Vil ei sn): oy is a keype. Siructures, Links, and Holons Tpifations Lathe a sequence of Set8x = @ vidsiem:b #6 QB) Ktyreaty? Dyson? by xis structure (Sita) iff 3 « (Siri) Theorem 2: Let be any class of structures. Then # isan e Base sets and constructed set: Itz Theorem 3: YeriSins) -B,# ONC. # 6 Subarus: y ina naberoeure of (9 2) iff 3 6 () Se) A 5800) Q Ham acleBA get Theorem 4: Vayry ex ~B, # OAC, # 6AStO), Theorem 5: Vay :y ex Axcy~B,=B,AC,=C ju (0.€ © 8 Unda) & Coat) ® j sm) Zoe e(yau)) AVj (1 sj sm)ai(l sism) Sb ivosDgatyyonta> and Str), then we call 2 (0 €B,), and any f, with 1 ex V £4), Abstract term: Let c@. for some x € M,. The following class of sets we call an “abstract term (For €) in M,":€ = fe! : 3x" eM,(e"@x’ Ne'ac)) Satisfaction of formulas: Let Sine) and 4 be any well-formed formula of the language of NBG. Then " f 4’ ns that x satistes 4 in the usual sense of standard formal semantics. Lawlike formula: ‘To define the notion of an (actual) mode! of an empirical theory we need the notion of 4 proper (empirical) law - as opposed to mere conceptual determinations without substantial empirical content, since what distinguishes actual models from merely potent al ones is the fact thatthe first satisfy, in addition, some lawlike formulas. Ii, however, well-nown from the methodological discussion of the last decades that the general concept of a law in science has proven to be a quite elusive one. The structuralist metatheory does not claim, atleast up to now, to be able to provide a generally satis factory explication of this concept or a general criterion of lawlikeness. So, the concept of a proper law will have to be accepted as a primitive, undefinable notion in our theory. More precisely, we assume that, for an appropriate set-theoretic recon struction of a given theory, we have a criterion that enables us to decide which of the set-theoretic formulas vali in hat theory, are to be seen as law-like. In other words, we assume that we have a criterion for the metatheoretie property ofa formula being lavlike in Some of the potential models of that theory. If4 is such a formula, we then write: "FL yo(A). (When it is clear to which class M, we refer, well just write: "FL(4)") Structures, Links, and Holons 7 Actual model: Let, be as usual. Misa clas of actual models in, iff 3. Ajay Qe, Q) vidi Zien): FL) @) Vai sis endian @ vreM3i(lsisn):x Remark: Conditions (3) and (4) together allow for the same class of actual models being deter ‘mined by different but logically equivalent formulas, 3. Constraints as internal bridge structures Te notions of constraints and links, already well-known within the structuralist program, may be introduced in a unified manner within the more general conceptual framework of abridge sructure. Tis idea goes back to some previous, sil unpublished work by U. Gahde and Th, Mormann, independently Bridge seructres: Let MM be classes of potential models. isa bridge structure over itt Gana. Q)9% BEM, x.xMp Remark: It isnot excluded that Mj = M} for i # j Novation LetZ (ej ,.t.). Then I(Z) is any permutation of the elements of Z, Consiaines (Internal bridge structures) 8) isan m-constraint in M, (Cont, (y)) if: GQ) meNAn>l @) risa bridge structure over @) VreM,: ey (feflexivin) CO) Wx pode My Vly rarty) ) is constraint in M, (Cony,() if 3 € NV: y is an n-constraint in M,. General constraint Let P= {74s 4) be a collection of given constraints in M,. We call 04) = Uy,