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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

National Capital Judicial Region


METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
Branch 47, Pasay City

MARIA LACSON,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. M-PSY-10-11546-CV
-versus- For: Unlawful Detainer with Damages

EMMA LIM AND ALL PERSONS


CLAIMING RIGHT UNDER HER,
Defendants.
x -------------------------------------------x

DECISION

Unlawful detainer proceedings are summary proceedings intended to


provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession
of property. The question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole
purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.1 In the present case,
both parties base their alleged right to possess on their right to own. Hence, there is
no error in passing upon the question of ownership to be able to determine who is
entitled to the physical possession of the disputed property.

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Maria Lacson alleged that she a is a buyer of a house and lot located
at Block 4, Lot 13, Kalayaan Village, Barangay 201, Pasay City from the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) by instalment. On May 15, 2009, the Deed of
Conditional Sale was executed by GSIS. She paid monthly amortizations to GSIS
starting April 30, 2009. The property was declared for taxation purposes in
plaintiffs name. On March 15, 2010, plaintiff formally sued the defendant Emma
Lim in the barangay to vacate the property. Since February 13, 2008, from the time
the GSIS executed the Deed of Conditional Sale to the plaintiff, defendant was
unlawfully withholding the physical possession of the property with an estimate of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5, 000.00) monthly rental. No settlement was reached in
the barangay. On April 28, 2010, a certificate to file action was issued by the
barangay. Plaintiff gave defendant final demand letter to vacate the place.

1
Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. et al. vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 151212. September 10, 2003.
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Plaintiff prayed: (1) that defendant and all persons claiming rights under her to
vacate the property at Block 4, Lot 13, Kalayaan Village, Barangay 201, Pasay City
and peacefully surrender its physical possession to the plaintiff ; (2) that defendant
and all persons claiming rights under her pay plaintiff the amount of P180,000.00
by way of rental for the use of the property from February 13, 2008 until they vacate
the property; (3) that defendant and all persons claiming rights under her pay
plaintiff P20,000.00 moral damages; (4) that defendant and all persons claiming
rights under her pay plaintiff the amount of P30,000.00 for attorneys fees; and (5)
to pay the cost of suit.

ANSWER

Defendant Emma Lim interposed the following defenses: (1) This Court lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) plaintiffs lack of valid cause of action
against the defendant to institute this unlawful detainer case; (3) Litis pendentia;
and (4) Plaintiff is guilty of forum shopping.

According to defendant there is nothing that would show in the plaintiffs


complaint as to the existence of any contract showing that the right of the
defendant to occupy the property had emanated from the plaintiff and the terms
and conditions of such right to possess have been violated by the defendant, neither
there is any that will prove that plaintiff is really the lessor of the defendant making
the latter as mere lessee of the former since it is very apparent from the complaint
itself that defendants occupation of the subject property was in the concept of
owner from the beginning being the true owner thereof. Plaintiff simply alleges
ownership using the deed and documents issued by GSIS and seeks recovery of full
possession of the subject property which is an accion reinvindicatoria not an accion
interdictal. One of the jurisdictional requirements of the unlawful detainer is the
existence of the express or implied contract between the plaintiff and defendant. In
this case, defendant is the actual and true owner and possessor of the property. She
occupied the same from the time of its construction and she was not ousted or
evicted therefrom. The subject property was not a subject of any foreclosure
proceedings. In 1988, defendant was one of the awardees of the National Housing
Authority (NHA) Metro Manila Policemen and Teachers Housing project which was
underwritten by GSIS by granting housing loan to qualified awardees. On August 31,
1988, defendants application for a housing loan was duly approved by GSIS for the
purchase of a house and lot amounting to Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00)
particularly described as Block 4, lot No. 13, Kalayaan Village, Barangay 201, Pasay
City covered by TCT No. 126579. A Conditional Deed of Sale of the said property was
executed by NHA in favor of the defendant who paid the monthly amortizations by

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way of salary deductions. Since then, defendant and her family members have been
occupying in continuous possession the subject property. No action for rescission of
defendants contract was effected by NHA or GSIS. Defendant did not receive any
notice of cancellation of her contract or any proceedings for the foreclosure of the
property. Defendant was surprised to receive a letter dated February 23, 2009,
from plaintiff who claimed that she is the new owner who is authorized by GSIS to
take possession of the subject property. Defendant has a pending case against
plaintiff and GSIS for Injunction against RTC Branch 112, Pasay City docketed as
Civil Case No. 09-0424-CFM which makes this instant case a forum shopping.
Without foreclosure proceedings or observance of the mandate of RA No. 6552 on
notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by notarial act, the right of the
defendant as real owner of the subject property remained uncontroverted thus
plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant in this case. Defendant
prayed: (1) That this complaint be dismissed; (2) that plaintiff pays the amount of
P100. 000.00 moral damages, P50 ,000.00 exemplary damages, P30,000.00
attorneys fees with P3,500.00 appearance and cost of suit.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 22, 2010, this instant case was filed. Consequently, the
corresponding summons was given issued to the defendant who received it by
substituted service per Sheriffs return dated July 1, 2010. Defendant filed her
Answer. On August 4, 2010, the preliminary conference was terminated. The
parties submitted their respective position paper.

POSITION PAPER OF THE PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff Maria Lacson reiterated the allegations in her complaint. She is a


legitimate buyer of the property. Defendant admitted that she is not paying GSIS or
anyone else since this case was filed in court. She cited Calubayan vs. Pascual 21
SCRA 146, A person who occupied the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission , without any contract between them , is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which is a summary action for
ejectment is a proper remedy. The status of defendant is analogous to that of a
lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by
tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. One whose stay

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is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he
is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, the
plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of
the possession which is later sought to be recovered(Go vs. CA 362 SCRA 755).
Defendant has been unlawfully withholding possession and use of property for Two
(2) years and Six (6 ) months.

EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF

The plaintiffs counsel Atty. Eduardo Sierra Jr. submitted the following
documentary evidence: (1) Notice of Approval as Exhibit A; (2) GSIS official
receipts as Exhibits B and B-1; (3) Deed of Conditional Sale as Exhibit C with
sub-markings; (4) GSIS Official receipts as Exhibits D to D-13; (5) Tax
Declaration Nos. B7-201-04435 and B-7-201-04436 as Exhibits E and E-1; (6)
Certificate to File Action as Exhibit G; (7) Official Receipts for filing fees as
Exhibits J and J-1; (8) Letters of demand to vacate as Exhibits H and H-1;
and (9) Judicial Affidavit as Exhibit I with sub-markings.

POSITION PAPER OF THE DEFENDANT

Defendant Emma Lim reiterated the allegations in her answer. One of the
jurisdictional requirements of action for unlawful detainer is the existence of
contract, express or implied, between the plaintiff and defendant, by virtue of which
the latter obtained or gained physical possession of the property and that the
contract had expires or defendant wantonly violated the terms and conditions
thereof. There was no such contract in this case. There is no showing that plaintiff is
the lessor of the defendant. Thus, this complaint is fatally defective. In Javier vs.
Veridiano II, Accion reinvindicatoria is an action whereby the plaintiff alleges
ownership over a parcel of land and seeks to recover its full possession. It is
different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges
proof of a better right to possess without claim of title. In Reynante vs. CA, GR No.
95907, April 8, 1992, A party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having
a better right by accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria (German
Management & Services, Inc. vs. CA, GR No. 76216, September 14, 1989). On the

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other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical possession, he has no right of
action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the
property(Lizo vs. Carandang 73 Phil 469). Nowhere in the complaint allege that
plaintiff was in a prior physical possession of the subject property since the plaintiff
has never been in possession of the subject property being occupied by the
defendant, and therefore, cannot be dispossessed of something which she has not
possessed before. Plaintiff allege ownership and right of possession of the subject
property using the deed and documents issued by GSIS, and thereafter seeks full
recovery of possession of the subject property, which is a regular action known as
accion reinvindicatoria not an accion interdictal where the only issue involved is
the better right of possession de facto sans any claim of title. De Guzman vs. CA et
al., GR No. 120941, April 18, 1997, Where the question de facto possession cannot
be determined properly without settling the de jure possession and ownership
because the latter is inseparably linked with the former, the case must be dismissed,
for the inferior court loses jurisdiction over the same. This case must be dismissed
on the ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping. The filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favourable judgment amounts to forum-
shopping. In filing two separate suits to obtain the same relief in two friendly courts,
with the end view of resolving the same issue. In litis pendentia , the elements are:
(1) identity of parties or at least such parties who represent the same interest in both
actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; (3) identity , with respect to the two preceding particulars in two
cases, is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
The barangay minutes dated April 1, 2009 stated that the parties should go to the
GSIS and verify the status of the subject property in view of the apparent conflicting
claims of the parties. This was unheeded by the plaintiff who filed another
complaint, with same action by the barangay on March 26, 2010 to thresh out their
differences with the GSIS. Plaintiff has no right to evict the defendant because the
formers transaction with the GSIS is a double sale. In the absence of the valid
cancellation or recession of defendants contract, and lack of foreclosure of the
subject property in favor of the GSIS, defendant is still the true and legal owner of
the subject property. Defendant can never be evicted and ordered to pay for the use
of the property she truly owns. NHA contract, paragraphs 2 and 9 given to the
awardees like the defendant, categorically made mention of notice by notarial act
as an indispensable requirement as to the manner how such contract shall be
cancelled or rescinded, which was not properly observed by NHA or GSIS.

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Accordingly, mere failure of defendant to update or pay her account is certainly not
the sufficient ground or validation for GSIS to alienate the subject property on its
won to the plaintiff, nor it can be considered as an automatic ground for
cancellation of the contract itself. RA No. 6552 (Realty Instalment Buyer Act),
provides the rights to buyer who has paid two (2) years of instalments. The actual
cancellation of the contract shall take place after 30 days from receipt by the buyer
of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by notarial
act and upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer. The buyer shall
have the right to sell his rights or assigns the same to another person or to reinstate
the contract by updating the account during the grace period and before actual
cancellation of the contract. Defendant paid monthly amortization by way of salary
deduction from 1988 up to the time of her retirement from the Philippine National
Police in 2007.Such payments made were more than the two (2) year reference by
law. She paid monthly amortizations for 19 years but did not receive any cash
surrender value.

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANT

The defendants counsel Atty. Roberto Santos submitted the following


documentary evidence: (1) Certified True Copy of TCT No. 126579 as Exhibit 1;
(2) Original copy of Affidavit of Fellow Awardees as Exhibit 2; (3) Original
owners copy of defendants tax declarations of subject house and lot as Exhibit 3
with sub-marking; (4) Certified copy of defendants payslips as Exhibits 4 in
series; (5) Certified copy of certificate of deductions by PNP as Exhibit 5; (6)
original copies of official receipts of defendants realty taxes as Exhibit 6; (7)
certified true copy of plaintiffs demand letter dated February 23, 2009 as Exhibit
7; (8) certified true copy of GSIS in its letter dated January 20, 2009 as Exhibit
8; (9) certified true copy of summons for barangay case no. 09-120 as Exhibit 9;
(10) certified true copy of petition for injunction with prayer for preliminary
injunction and / or temporary restraining order as Exhibit 10; (11) certified true
copy of the minutes dated April 1, 2009 as Exhibit 11; (12) original copy of the
barangay complaint dated March 15, 2010 as Exhibit 12; (13) certified true copy of
the minutes dated March 26, 2010 as Exhibit 13; (14) original copy of defendants
letter dated March 26, 2010 as Exhibit 14; (15) original copy of plaintiffs letter
dated May 17, 2010 as Exhibit 15; (16) duplicate original copy of contract of
services as Exhibit 16; (17) original copy of the registry receipt no. 511 as Exhibit
17; and (18) original copy of the registry return card as Exhibit 18.

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ISSUE

Whether or not this unlawful detainer case should prosper.

APPLICABLE LAW

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any
land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land, building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives
or assigns of any such lessor, vendor or vendee or other person, may, at any time
within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession , or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages
and costs.

RULING

This unlawful detainer case should not prosper.

Plaintiffs argument that defendants allegedly illegal occupation of the


subject property was by mere tolerance cannot be sustained because an essential
requirement in unlawful detainer cases is that plaintiffs supposed act of sufferance
or tolerance must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought
to be recovered.2 There was a failure to substantiate this case as an unlawful
detainer. Upon scrutiny, records show that there was no express or implied
contract that existed between the parties. Neither is there a mere tolerance of
defendants possession. As the bare allegation of plaintiffs tolerance of
defendants occupation of the subject property was unproven, the possession
should be deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, this case should not be unlawful
detainer.

While possession by tolerance may initially be lawful, it ceases to be so


upon the owners demand that the possessor by tolerance vacate the property. 3 To
justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been
2
Ibid.
3
Odsigue vs. CA, 233 SCRA 626, July 4, 1994.
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present at the beginning of the possession.4 Otherwise, if the possession was
unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper
remedy. Sarona vs. Villegas 131 Phil. 365, March 27, 1968 elucidates thus:

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word tolerance
confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present
right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a
cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry. Indeed, to
hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons.
First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the
inferior court provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry
is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy;
and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the
inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is
allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that
no action for forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such
defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand,
bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a
conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates
that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in
nature, and that the one year time bar to suit is but in pursuance of the
summary nature of the action.

In this case, the complaint and the position paper do not recite any
allegation to support the claim of plaintiff Maria Lacson that there was tolerance
of the occupation of the property by defendant Emma Lim. The complaint
contained only bare allegations that (1) GSIS executed in favor of the plaintiff a
Deed of Conditional Sale; (2) The property was declared for taxation in plaintiffs
name ; (3) On March 15, 2010, plaintiff formally sued the defendant in the
barangay; and (4) Demand to vacate was given to the defendant. There was absence
of the allegation of tolerance of defendant Emma Lims occupation by the plaintiff
Maria Lacson.

4
Go Jr. vs. CA.
8
Defendant Emma Lims occupation of the property was an exercise of a right
flowing from a claim of ownership, that is, as an awardee of NHA Metro Manila
Policemen and Teachers Housing Project in 1988, as this allegation was
uncontroverted by the plaintiff Maria Lacson. This determination of initial
ownership is proper because each of the parties claimed the right to possess the
disputed property because of alleged ownership of it. The resolution of the issue of
ownership is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession de facto. The
execution of Deed of Conditional Sale is not equivalent to delivery.

In a contract of sale the buyer acquires the thing sold only upon its delivery
in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501 of the New Civil Code, or in any
other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the
vendor to the vendee. With respect to incorporeal property, Article 1498 of the
New Civil Code lays down the general rule: the execution of a public instrument
shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing that is the object of the contract if,
from the deed, the contrary does not appear or cannot be clearly inferred.

However, ownership is transferred not by contract but by tradition or


delivery. Nowhere in the New Civil Code is it stated that the execution of a
Conditional Deed of Sale is a conclusive presumption of delivery of possession of an
immovable property.

The Supreme Court held that the execution of a public instrument gives
rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such presumption is destroyed
when the delivery is not effected because of a legal impediment like in this case.
Such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, was deemed
negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. 5

It is undisputed that plaintiff Maria Lacson did not occupy the property
from the time the execution of the conditional deed of sale or at any time
thereafter. Plaintiff Maria Lacson did not gain control and possession of the
property, because defendant Emma Lim had continued to exercise ownership rights
over the subject property. Defendant Emma Lim was in possession of the property,

5
Pasagui vs. Villablanc.
9
and she continued to declare it as her property for tax purposes.

While tax declarations are indicia of a valid claim of ownership, they do


not constitute conclusive evidence thereof. They are prima facie proofs of
ownership or possession of the property for which such taxes have been
paid.6 Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, however, they may
become the basis of a claim for ownership. 7 Moreover, a person who claims
ownership of real property is duty bound to clearly identify the land being claimed
in accordance with the document on which he anchors his right of ownership. Proof
of ownership together with identity of the land is the basic rule. 8 In the case at bar,
both the plaintiff Maria Lacson and defendant Emma Lim have tax declarations.
But the actual proof of possession belonged to the defendant Emma Lim. Plaintiff
Maria Lacson should have been put on guard by defendant Emma Lims
declaration of the property for tax purposes. The defendant Emma Lims tax
declaration represented an adverse claim over the unregistered property and was
inimical to the rights of plaintiff Maria Lacson.

Indeed, the above circumstances derogated plaintiff Maria Lacsons claim


of dominion and possession of the property.

Anent to the counterclaims of the defendant Emma Lim, there is no


justification for the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees
and cost of suit.

Our Supreme Court held that it is improper to award moral damages and
attorneys fees on the sole basis of an action later declared to be unfounded in the
absence of deliberate intent to cause prejudice to the other. 9 There was no evidence
introduced that the action filed by plaintiff was deliberately intended to prejudice
defendant. At the most, what the plaintiff did is a legitimate and genuine desire to
seek redress and to obtain complete relief through our justice system. In order that
moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral

6
Uriarte vs. People, GR No. 169251, December 20, 2006.
7
De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127593, September 30, 2003, 412 SCRA 282, 292.
8
Gesmundo v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil 1099 (1999).
9
Dela Pena vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 456.
10
suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. 10 While defendant alleged in his
answer with counter-claim the damages due to him, it was held that mere
allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing
proof.11

"While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages


may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it
is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of
the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to defendants acts. This is so
because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the
category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered
and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. 12

Neither is defendant entitled to exemplary damages. "If the court has no


proof or evidence upon which the claim for moral damages could be based, such
indemnity could not be awarded outright. The same holds true with respect to the
award of exemplary damages where it must be shown that the party acted in a
wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner." 13 Furthermore, this specie of damages is
allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary damages can be
awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages. The
same principle holds true with attorneys fees and ligation expenses.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered


DISMISSING this case. Likewise, the counterclaims are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Pasay City, September 8, 2010.

10
San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs. Magno, 21 SCRA 292.
11
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 136.
12
Keirulf vs. Court of Appeals 269 SCRA 433
13
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 259 SCRA 459.
11
ELIZA B. YU
Judge

Copy furnished:
Atty. Eduardo Sierra Jr.
Counsel for the Plaintiff
B25 , L20 Kalayaan Village,
Merville Access Road, Pasay City 1300

Atty. Roberto Santos


Counsel for the Defendant
SRB Law Offices
141 Talacsan, San Rafael,
Bulacan, 3008.

Maria Lacson
Plaintiff

Emma Lim
Defendant

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