NSDA Appeasement DA Edmond North

Notes
Only thing that needs to be done:

Isaac, cut UQ updates for the DA and add in any of the work youve done on this DA. This is a preliminary
file because I know you wanted to go for it, so I want you to produce the final file of this argument.
1NC
 1NC Appeasement
[Find solid UQ card and replace Etzioni]
The U.S. employs a broad-based containment strategy toward China now
Etzioni 16 (Amitai, professor of international affairs at George Washington University, The Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank: A Case Study of Multifaceted Containment, Asian Perspective, 40(2), p. 187-188)
US officials often state that the United States does not seek to contain China (Carpenter 2011). In April 2014, for example, President Obama
stated, Our goal is not to counter China. Our goal is not to contain China (Manesca 2014). Secretary of State John Kerry repeated the
sentiment a month later, stating that the U.S. does not seek to contain China (BBC News 2014a). However, there are often great
discrepancies between the statements made by top officials and the conduct of the states they speak for. The actions of the United
States reflect a containment strategy that seems to have evolvedrather than developedthrough complex interactions among
various agencies, with the Pentagon being particularly influential (Etzioni 2013). The strategys main element involves positioning US or allied
military forces along Chinas borders and in the regional areas into which China might seek to expand. Thus, the United States has announced
that it views the contested Senkaku Islands as being covered by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and
Japan; encouraged Japan to build up its military; developed military ties with Vietnam; reopened its military bases in the Philippines; provided
India with nuclear know-how and access to uranium, in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as a means of inciting India to
balance China; and moved troops and naval vessels to the Asia Pacific region. All
these moves draw a red line that, if crossed
by China, could lead to war. The so-called Asia pivot thus appears to be a thinly veiled China containment
strategy (Roach et al. 2015). John Mearsheimer has pointed out that involving regional states in various military alliances raises the risk that
the United States and China will engage in war due to reckless actions taken by one of the allies (Mearsheimer 2014). Barry Posen concurs and
points out that an alliance with the United States gives allies a false sense of security and encourages them to challenge more powerful states,
confident that Washington will save them in the end (Posen 2013). (This point also applies to China in its relations with North Korea.) At the
same time, one may argue that the most basic foundation of the international order, supported even by many who do not necessarily accept
the liberal elements of that order, is that states may not use force to change the status quo and must not invade other states. Thus, one might
argue that for the United States to position its military forces or allied forces in places into which China might expand would help stabilize the
international order. However, the same cannot be said of other elements of US policy toward China, as highlighted by the US response to the
AIIBs launch, which itself was of limited import. To proceed, I must introduce a distinction between a strategy of all-encompassing containment
and a strategy that combines some forms of containment (especially military) with competition (especially economic and ideational) and
integration (especially the governance of international institutions). To distinguish between these two kinds of containment, I refer to the first
kind as multifaceted containment and the second as aggression-limiting containment. Multifaceted containment seeks to block practically any
and all gains by another power, whether territorial, economic, or status (such as voting rights). By contrast, aggression-limiting containment
seeks to block only those advances that are made through the use of force, while granting room for competition and cooperation. It is useful to
think about aggression-limiting containment as a flashing red light in some lanes and a green one in others, as opposed to a barrier that blocks
all lanes. In a previous book I examined the ways the United States sought to contain the USSR during the Cold War and showed that the United
States practiced multifaceted containment (Etzioni 1964). Thus, if the USSR sought landing rights for its civilian aviation in Bolivia, the United
States sought to block it. If the USSR granted foreign aid to Ghana, the United States pressured Ghana to reject it. The United States sought to
suppress USSR ideological and cultural outreach. The USSR treated the United States the same, and the result was high levels of tension that led
several times to the brink of nuclear war. When President John F. Kennedy unveiled his Strategy of Peace, he scaled back these nonmilitary
forms of containment, which resulted in considerably diminished tensionsa dtente (Etzioni 2008). US efforts to contain China
have not been limited to countering Chinese aggression, such as by posting military forces, building military alliances,
conducting more military exercises, or ordering major weapons systems to respond to a possible attack from China. Instead, the United
States has also sought to block China in nonmilitary sectors. For example, the United States pressured states
on Chinas borders to resist Chinas economic overtures, blocked Chinese efforts to begin negotiations on a
free trade zone spanning the Pacific (Davis 2014), cautioned regional states against depending too strongly on China for humanitarian aid,
and pledged $187 million to Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam in an effort to decrease Chinas influence over those states (Var 2015).
The United States also seems to be diplomatically and economically working to halt the expansion of
Chinas relative influence in Africa (Sun and Olin-Ammentorp 2014) and Latin America (Noesselt and Landivar 2013)
Concessions to China signal appeasement which causes China to doubt US resolve on
containment
Glaser 15 (Charles L., Prof. at Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of PoliSci at
George Washington University, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military
Competition and Accommodation, International Security, 39(4), p.74)
The next set of potential risks concern U.S. security. The first of these involves possible reductions in Chinas assessments of the United States
resolve for protecting its interests in Northeast Asia. As discussed earlier, territorial accommodation
can lead an adversary to
doubt the states resolve to protect other interests, which is dangerous if the states concessions do not leave the adversary
fully satisfied. Two mechanisms could be at work here. One mechanism depends on China seeing a similarity across one or more features of
the potentially connected interests, including their geography, the nature and extent of the U.S. interests, and the U.S. history of involvement
with these interests. If China is uncertain about U.S. resolve to protect Taiwan and other American interests, and if China believes
that similar factors determine U.S. resolve to protect all of these interests, then accommodation on Taiwan would reduce U.S.
credibility elsewhere. The other mechanism comes into play if China believes that U.S. accommodation on Taiwan
reflects a change in a factor that also affects U.S. decisions on these other issues; in that case, U.S. credibility on
these issues would be reduced. The broad change that is currently most relevant is the shifting balance of power, specifically,
increasing Chinese military capabilities in East Asia. If Chinas leaders believe that the United States chose
accommodation on Taiwan in response to Chinas growing regional military capabilities, then they would
also reasonably conclude that the United States could be expected to make concessions on other
regional issues as well. These mechanisms are reflected in prominent arguments against accommodation of Beijing on Taiwan. For
example, Nancy Tucker and Bonnie Glaser argue that China would respond to appeasement as have virtually all
governments: It would conclude that a weaker United States lacking vision and ambition could be
pressured and manipulated. Richard Bush argues, Should the United States concede to Beijing on Taiwan, the
lessons that China would learn about the intentions of the regions dominant power would likely
discourage moderation and accommodation on other issues, like Korea or maritime East Asia. These are
powerful arguments, which the United States needs to take seriously. There is a clear similarity across the disputesthey are all located in East
Asia. Thus, China
could be expected to reason that U.S. accommodation on one of these disputes indicates
a greater willingness to make concessions on all the others. Arguably, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan might even
lead China to believe that its growing power will enable its leadership to convince the United States to fully exit East Asia. In addition, Chinas
view of the shifting balance of power could reinforce these conclusions: many Chinese officials believe that the shifting balance of power partly
reflects the failings of the U.S. domestic political system and the superiority of the Chinas model of governance and development; the result is
a new international system in which Chinas growing power should generate greater influence and the major powers should acknowledge its
rising status. Because this transformation influences all issues in East Asia, U.S. accommodation on Taiwan could validate these
expectations and put other U.S. interests at greater risk.

That undermines U.S. primacy

Tellis 14 (Ashely, Carnegie senior associate, Balancing Without Containment, 1-22,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf)

This transition will not occur automatically if Chinas GNP one day exceeds that of the United States.
Rather, the threat of supersession will be more gradual as continuing Chinese economic growthat levels
superior to the expansion occurring in the United States steadily enables Beijing to acquire all the other accoutrements that

make for comprehensive national power. On current trends, China will consistently accumulate these
capabilities over the next two decades. It certainly aims to do so, at the latest, by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Peoples Republic of China
and the date by which Chinese President Xi Jinping has declared Chinas intention to become a fully developed nation. Acquiring the appropriate foundations

of power will position China to achieve, first, strategic equivalence with the United States, thus
transforming the international system into a meaningfully bipolar order. Then, depending on Beijings
own fortunes, China may possibly surpass Washington as the center of gravity in international politics.
Irrespective of which outcome occursor wheneither eventuality would by definition signal the
demise of the primacy that the United States has enjoyed since the end of the Second World War. Even if
during this process a power transition in the strict vocabulary of realist international relations theory is avoideda possibility because Chinas per capita income will lag behind that of the

United States for a long time even if it acquires the worlds largest GNP Beijings capacity to challenge Washingtons interests in multiple
arenas, ranging from geopolitics to trade and from advancing human rights to protecting the commons,
will only increase as its power expands. In other words, China will demonstrate how a rival can, as Thomas J. Christensen phrased it, [pose] problems without
catching up.8 <end page 3> As Avery Goldstein has persuasively argued, these hazards could materialize rather quickly because China is

currently pursuing provocative policies on territorial disputes over islands in the East and South China
Seas.9 That these disputes, which a former U.S. official described as involving uninhabited and uninhabitable rocks,10 do not appear prima facie to implicate a systemic crisis should not
be reassuring to the United States because every serious contestation that occurs in future Sino-American relations will

materialize against the backdrop of a possible power transition so long as Chinas growth rateseven
when diminishingcontinue to exceed those of the United States. This dynamic, as William R. Thompson has pointed out,
can produce extended crisis slides in which even relatively trivial incidents or a string of seemingly
minor crises may suffice to escalate what was up to that point a precarious structural transformation
into full-fledged geopolitical polarization and major war.11 Since the relative disparity in Sino-American economic performance is likely to
persist for quite some time, even trifling quarrels will push bilateral ties ever more concertedly in the direction of

greater abrasion as accumulating Chinese power further constrains U.S. freedom of action. AN UNPRECEDENTED
CHALLENGE In many ways, the challenge posed by China will be more serious than that posed by the previous

American competitorthe Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union was indeed a formidable military power, its economic base was always much smaller than
that of the United States. Although insufficiently appreciated during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was actually a deformed entity: a military

giant possessing coercive capabilities that rivaled the United States but an economic midget nurturing a
productive base that was less than half the size of its avowed competitor.12 Angus Maddison, for example, has estimated that the
gross domestic product (GDP) of the Soviet Union, when at the height of its relative power in 1975, was approximately 44.4 percent of that of the United States in the same year. China

does not share this weakness, which makes the dangers posed by its ascent and the prospect that it
will one day acquire genuinely comprehensive power rivaling that of the United Statesfar more
problematic. Furthermore, Chinas central location within the larger concentration of Asian economic powerthe fastest-growing hub in the international systemendows its
growth with even greater significance. There is a risk that Beijing might someday exercise choking control over this critical geopolitical space and thereby endanger larger American and global
security.13 Today, even before China has completely risen, it is already committed to the objective of enforcing a strict hierarchy in Asia, meaning that Beijings position at the top of the

Chinese strategy for securing such primacy

continental order is acknowledged and respected by all its neighbors. As Franois Godement has pointed out,

has revolved around translating <END PAGE 4> the massive economic gains it has made in recent years into a
geopolitical approach that emphasizes coercion without force.14 Even more astutely, Christopher Ford has noted that the thorough submission of other countries that
China seeks is meant to be voluntary that is, these countries would be expected not to have to be forced to comply, but rather spontaneously to choose to take their place within the status-
hierarchy under the benevolent guidance of the virtuous leader.15 This is the only explanation that does justice to then Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechis outburst at the 2010 meeting of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations when, staring directly at Singapores then foreign minister, George Yeo, he bluntly declared that China is a big country and other countries are
small countries, and thats just a fact.16 Just in case Beijings neighbors do not get the message, however, China has begun to put in place the foundations for enforcing its own version of the
Monroe Doctrine along its various peripheries. Beginning with cartographic aggression17 through claims such as its 9-dash line in the South China Sea and its expansive assertions along
the Sino-Indian border to further efforts at national enclosure18 through its recently expanded air defense identification zone in the East China Sea to mounting the worlds biggest military

expansion 19 for several years running,China is systematically laying the foundations to ensure that its neighbors
acquiesce to its burgeoning hegemony while simultaneously ensuring their isolation vis--vis their most
important external protector, namely the United States. To be sure, China does not yet pose the kind of military threats to Asia that the Soviet
Union posed to Europe in its heyday. This condition, however, may not last for long given that Chinas relations with its neighbors are troubled in many ways. Disputes over

continental and maritime boundaries persist, status rivalries between China and its Asian peers have not
disappeared, and Beijing has, at least so far, studiously refused to renounce the use of force in resolving
geopolitical disagreements at a time when its own capacity to mount significant standoff attacks on
adjacent countries is rapidly growing. Consequently, however remote the prospect may seem at present, the United States could find itself in a conflict with
China in the future thanks to its extended deterrence obligations to various Asian nations. Conflicts between China and its neighbors that do not directly involve the United States but
nevertheless affect U.S. interests are also possible. On balance, both these contingencies have inevitably impelled China to expand and rapidly accelerate improvements in [its] military and
economic capabilities as well as increase its external influence to simultaneously establish political and economic dominance over the periphery [in order to] provide leverage against future

great power pressure.20 And these developments, all told, will almost automatically accentuate regional security dilemmas vis--vis both Chinas neighbors and the United States. The
specific location of Chinas military capabilities makes this danger to the Asian theater especially
problematic. The Soviet Unions air and land lines of communication to its Asian peripheries were long, tenuous, and relatively underdeveloped, which made the sustainability <END
PAGE 5> of Soviet military forces in the Far East a challenging proposition. Soviet combat power adjacent to the Pacific, however significant in absolute terms, was considerably weaker than its
equivalent in Europe. China, by contrast, is highly advantaged on both counts. It can threaten all the major regional states located along both its continental and maritime peripheries through
highly robust, and rapidly improving, interior lines of communication. Furthermore, the bulk of its military capabilities are either directly deployed along its eastern seaboard or can be swiftly
moved to any one of its strategic peripheries. Thus, by comparison to the Soviet Union, China can more easily overawe the major power centers in the Indo-Pacific while at the same time more

All these realitiesbeing a

effectively preventing the United States from bringing rearward reinforcements to bear in defense of its regional allies.21

continental-sized power, possessing a gigantic and technologically improving economy, enjoying

superior rates of relative economic growth, having a strategically advantageous location, and rapidly
acquiring formidable military capabilities add up quickly to make China a far more consequential rival
to the United States than any Washington has faced in the past. Although U.S. officials are bashful
about describing China plainly as a geopolitical threat, there is little doubt that they recognize the
possibility of a coming power transition, with all its attendant dangers. Because of the perennial arguments among liberals, realists,
and neoconservatives, there is no agreement in Washington about what the implications of this transition might be. Yet it is precisely this contingency that

U.S. grand strategy should aim to thwart because American primacy has been beneficial for the
international system and, even more importantly, for the United States itself. Preserving this
preeminence, accordingly, remains the central task for U.S. policymakers today. Devising a strategy that
is equal to this responsibility must begin with an acknowledgment of both the significance and the
complexity of the challenge given Chinas deep enmeshment with the world. There is no better way to
begin this assessment than by recognizing that globalization in the postwar period has spawned uneven
gains that have produced in China a new competitor to the United States. This most recent bout of
international integration has been reinvigorated and nurtured by American hegemony, understood
simply as possessing more comprehensive power than any other state and being willing to use that
power to structure the global order in certain ways. Beijings continuing ascent in these circumstances creates a difficult dilemma for Washington:
unlike previous great powers that rose largely through autarkic means, China has grown rapidly because it has benefited disproportionately from American investments in sustaining a liberal
international economic order. China, admittedly, is not alone in this regard. Many other European and Asian states have enjoyed economic revitalization in the postwar period because of their
integration into the multilateral trading system underwritten by American power. But China has experienced disproportionately greater gains than the United States and others because its
native comparative advantages have been magnified through three distinctive policies. First, Beijing has opted to maintain a domestic economy characterized by significant protectionist
components even as it has pursued an investment-driven, export-led growth strategy that exploits the free access available to the more open economies of the developed world.22 Second,
the dominant role of the Chinese state in economic decisionmaking has permitted the government to control critical factors of production, such as land and capital, maintain advantageous
exchange rates, and sustain huge state-owned enterprises, which in their totality have enabled China to advance nationalist aims beyond simply allocative efficiency and the increased welfare
of its population.23 And third, the consistent and systematic targeting of foreign intellectual property on a gigantic scale has advanced Chinas industrial policy goals, which emphasize the
speedy acquisition of advanced technologies by both legitimate and illegitimate means in order to accelerate Chinese growth vis--vis other rivals in the international system.24 All these
elements operating in unison have raised Chinas level of development, which in turn has helped increase American welfare through tradebut at the cost of embodying a rising challenge to

it is by no means inevitable that China will continue to rise to the point where it becomes a
U.S. power. However,

genuine peer competitor of the United States. Although China has experienced meteoric economic growth in recent decades, the Chinese state has
manifold weaknesses. It grapples with the prospect of adverse demographic transitions, contradictions between Beijings command polity and pseudo-liberal economy, and an unbalanced
growth strategy that emphasizes overinvestment at the cost of domestic consumption. These weaknesses may yet take their toll, leading to either a collapse of Chinas hitherto relentless
expansion or its severe moderation.25 The evidence indicates that Chinas leaders are acutely aware of the precarious character of the nations economic achievements thus far. Given their
own problematic legitimacy, there is no doubt that they are deeplyeven fearfullyconcerned about the survival of Chinas Communist regime in the context of the rising threats to domestic
stability. Given the growing internal inequalities along multiple dimensions, the rampant corruption throughout society (and especially among the elites), and the increasing individuation in
the prospering middle classes, Chinas leaders remain obsessed by the dangers of internal chaos. They understand that they might not be able to satisfy the rising expectations of their now
highly informed and restive population. The decisions reached during the recent third plenum of the 18th Party Congress indicate that the Xi Jinping regime remains intently focused on
confronting the countrys myriad economic problems head-on both in order to sustain Chinas global rise and to ward off any indigenous threats to Communist control within China.26
However, the Xi regime remains reluctant to face up to the need for constitutional political liberalization, which raises questions about whether its policies (or any similar policies followed by
its successors) will indeed satisfactorily dissipate the dangers of domestic instability. On this score, only time will tell. But the reality of Chinas internal troubleswhich undoubtedly are
considerablehas often strengthened the belief that its rise as a great power will not prove as troublesome to others as might be ordinarily expected. According to this line of thought, Chinas
domestic challenges will prevent its leaders from pursuing those self-regarding policies that have been prosecuted by all other great powers in history.27 There is no doubt that if the Chinese
economy falters badly and for a substantial period of time or the Chinese state is gripped by a cataclysmic crisisfor whatever reasonthe growing challenge to American hegemony would be
attenuated. But absent such calamitous developments, it is unlikely that the weight of Chinas internal challenges alone will prevent its leaders from pursuing those willful policies that would
seem natural to Beijing as its power continues to grow. After all, elevated levels of Chinese assertiveness, which have been on display since the 20072008 global financial crisis, have occurred
despite persistent domestic restiveness for over five years now. Moreover, internal problems have not prevented the Chinese state from successfully extracting the necessary resources to
sustain a dramatic military modernization over a long period of time. Nor have they prevented recent Chinese leaders from steadily disregarding Deng Xiaopings old counsel to hide and bide
in favor of a new belligerence that takes the form of show and go. In fact, Beijing has been able to harness popular sentiments to support its increasingly abrasive foreign policies in the Indo-

the United States cannot count on the possibility that China might stumble in any
Pacific region. Given this reality,

fundamental sense. Nor can it assume that Chinas relatively higher growth rates will naturally decay
well before Beijing acquires sufficient comprehensive power to become a consequential rival.
Washington also cannot presume that its own national capabilities writ large will always remain more
powerful or more fecund than Chinas. Still less can it count on the prospect of Chinese oppugnancy vanishing merely because Chinese growth rates threaten to
ease up somewhat in the future. After all, as Moscow did in years past, Beijing could still pose a major threat to U.S. interests despite possessing a smaller economy or experiencing slower

economic growth. Because China alone among all other emerging powers has the potential to displace the
United States at the top of the international hierarchy, Washington confronts the necessity of
consciously developing a grand strategy that limits Beijings ability to erode overall U.S. preeminence.
This corrective strategy needs to be developed now, while China is still some distance away from being
able to effectively challenge the United States, or else it risks being too late. Chinas deep integration with the international
economy, however, implies that the containment strategies that worked so effectively against the Soviet Union cannot be successfully replicated today. Consequently, if Washington

is to escape from the Scylla of paralyzing helplessness in the face of Chinas rise and the Charybdis of inveterate opposition to that ascent, it must embark on a novel

course of action that can be best described as balancing without containment. This report lays out the logic of such a strategy, focusing not so
much on the current crises enveloping China and the United States but rather on the structural quandaries created by Beijings continuing rise. It begins by reviewing why Chinas rise is unique
in modern history and examines the specific predicament posed by Chinas ascendancy to the United States. Thereafter, it elucidates the imperative of balancing China, given that other
alternatives such as containment are not options that can be easily exercised by Washington at the present time. Finally, it develops the outlines of a strategy that the United States should
pursue toward China, an approach that preserves the benefits of economic interdependence while limiting the dangers of a Chinese exploitation of its growing power.

Shifting U.S. primacy causes great power war

Cohen 13 (Elliot, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Strategic Studies program director, American Withdrawal and
Global Disorder WSJ, 3-19, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324196204578300262454939952)

In Mr. Obama's second term the limits of such withdrawal from conventional military commitments abroad will be tested. In East Asia, an
assertive China
has bullied the Philippines (with which the U.S. has a 61-year-old defense pact) over the Spratly islands, and China has pressed its claims
on Japan (a 53-year-old defense pact) over the Senkaku Islands. At stake are territorial waters and mineral resources
symbols of China's drive for hegemony and an outburst of national egotism. Yet when Shinzo Abe, the new prime
minister of an understandably anxious Japan, traveled to Washington in February, he didn't get the unambiguous White House backing of Japan's sovereignty that
an ally of long standing deserves and needs. In Europe, an
oil-rich Russia is rebuilding its conventional arsenal while
modernizing (as have China and Pakistan) its nuclear arsenal. Russia has been menacing its East European neighbors, including those, like Poland,
that have offered to host elements of a NATO missile-defense system to protect Europe. In 2012, Russia's then-chief of general staff, Gen. Nikolai Makarov,
declared: "A decision to use destructive force pre-emptively will be taken if the situation worsens." This would be the same Russia that has attempted to dismember
its neighbor Georgia and now has a docile Russophile billionaire, Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, to supplant the balky, independence-minded government loyal
to President Mikhail Saakashvili. In the Persian Gulf, American policy was laid down by Jimmy Carter in his 1980 State of the Union address with what became the
Carter Doctrine: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States
of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." America's
Gulf allies may not have treaties to rely
uponbut they do have decades of promises and the evidence of two wars that the U.S. would stand by them. Today they wait
for the long-promised (by Presidents Obama and George W. Bush) nuclear disarmament of a revolutionary Iranian government that has been relentless in its efforts
to intimidate and subvert Iran's neighbors. They may wait in vain. Americans
take for granted the world in which they grew upa world
in which, for better or worse, the U.S. was the ultimate security guarantor of scores of states, and in many ways the entire

international system. Today we are informed by many politicians and commentators that we are weary of those burdensthough what we should be
weary of, given that our children aren't conscripted and our taxes aren't being raised in order to pay for those wars, is unclear. The truth is that defense spending at
the rate of 4% of gross domestic product (less than that sustained with ease by Singapore) is eminently affordable. The arguments against far-flung American
strategic commitments take many forms. So-called foreign policy realists, particularly in the academic world, believe that the competing interests of states tend
automatically toward balance and require no statesmanlike action by the U.S. To them, the old language of force in international politics has become as obsolete as
that of the "code duello," which regulated individual honor fights through the early 19th century. We hear that international institutions and agreements can
replace national strength. It is also saidcovertly but significantlythat the U.S. is too dumb and inept to play the role of security guarantor. Perhaps the clever
political scientists, complacent humanists, Spenglerian declinists, right and left neo-isolationists, and simple doubters that the U.S. can do anything right are correct.
Perhaps the president should concentrate on nation-building at home while pressing abroad only for climate-change agreements, nuclear disarmament and an
unfettered right to pick off bad guys (including Americans) as he sees fit. But if
history is any guide, foreign policy as a political-science field
experiment or what-me-worryism will yield some ugly results. Syria is a harbinger of things to come. In that case, the
dislocation, torture and death have first afflicted the locals. But it will not end there, as incidents on Syria's borders and rumors of the movement of chemical
weapons suggest. A
world in which the U.S. abnegates its leadership will be a world of unrestricted self-help in
which China sets the rules of politics and trade in Asia, mayhem and chaos is the order of the day in the Middle
East, and timidity and appeasement paralyze the free European states. A world, in short, where the strong
do what they will, the weak suffer what they must, and those with an option hurry up and get nuclear
weapons.
2NC OVs
 2NC Top Level OV
DA outweighs and turns the case Chinese emboldment shuts off all cooperation and
causes regional instability the impact is power shifting which causes global war
regional wars take out any solvency argument and military power means cooperation
gets rolled back two reasons we outweigh:
First is timeframe and probability recent moves to delegate leadership to china
makes cooperation more competitive, appeasement tilts the totter toward more
competitive aggression which means the squo flows neg
Second is magnitude it escalates and begins with the end of regional cooperation,
japan and korea get drawn in which inserts greater powers nuclear agreesion is the
world we cant turn back from and terrorist organizations fill in which causes global
disorder only a risk the squo protects leadership better than the aff.
 2NC Link OVs
The link is perception based which means even if the aff produces cooperation, other
intervening actors perceive it as decline which causes backlash at the lack of
leadership the plan also makes markets more available which prove even if we dont
win the perception argument, the aff produces a framework for Chinese take over.
 2NC UQ Ext
[Insert extension of Isaacs cards]
2NC Links
 Link Accommodation/Bilateralism
The AFFs accommodation of china furthers their military expansion
Jackson 15
[Van, 8/6/15, Associate Professor in the College of Security Studies at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies (DKI-APCSS) in Honolulu and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New
American Security (CNAS) in Washington, The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain, Accessed June 27
2016, A.H]
A number of scholars have tried to advance the well-intentioned proposal that U.S. concessions to Chinas many concerns will somehow
facilitate a peaceful order in Asia. While I agree with the sentiment and recognize that there are areas of international life where Sino-U.S.
cooperation is essential, the
idea that U.S. accommodation of China will produce a peaceful and stable order in
Asia isnt just unrealistic; its irresponsible. Though it wasnt the first, Hugh Whites China Choice was an early and pointed call
for the United States to form a G-2 with China in which the two countries would work together to set the terms of the regional order,
requiring that the United States accommodate the demands of a rising China. Jim Steinbergs and Michael OHanlons Strategic Reassurance
and Resolve reiterates many of Whites points, but with better theoretical grounding. Lyle Goldsteins Meeting China Halfway argues far more
persuasively than many in this lineage, and some of his specific recommendations merit serious considerationnot least because they would
incur no great cost to try. But there are equally serious reasons to doubt the transformative ambitions attached to U.S. concessions. The latest
salvo in this America must accommodate China literature hails from an accomplished political scientist at George Washington University,
Charles Glaser, writing in the most recent issue of International Security. Glaser makes the sweeping and somewhat unhelpful claim that
military competition is risky and therefore undesirable. As an alternative he suggests that if only the United States would abandon
commitments to Taiwan, China would be willing to resolve its territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea, thereby sidestepping military
competition. Prior to around 2008, proposals for U.S. accommodation of a rising China made much more
sense, or at least could be taken more seriously. But times have changed. Chinas ambitions have changed. And so
has its foreign policy behavior. These contextual changes matter for whether and when accommodation can have the desired effect.
More to the point though, there are a number of problems with the grand bargain line of argumentation. First, any proposal for a
Sino-U.S. solution to regional problems is by definition taking a great power view of Asia that
marginalizes the agency and strategic relevance of U.S. allies and the regions middle powers. In the
brief period (five to ten years ago) when a G-2 concept was taken semi-seriously in Washington, allies
especially South Korea and Japanchafed. The regions middle powers would be unlikely to simply follow the joint dictates of
China and the United States without being part of it, and attempting a G-2 could ironically create a more fragmented
order as a result. Including others, at any rate, is antithetical to the concept of a Sino-U.S. G-2 arrangement. As early as the 1960s U.S.
officials tried to rely on China to deal with regional issues spanning from North Korea to Vietnam. It was almost always to no avail. Second, and
as Ive written about extensively elsewhere, Asia is rife with security concerns that have nothing to do with China directly, so any understanding
reached with China would leave unresolved many of the regions latent sources of potential conflict. Sino-U.S. grand bargain proponents forget
that China and the United States only have real conflicts of interest by proxy. Every conceivable conflict scenario involves China and some other
Asian stateTaiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Korea. The United States only becomes part of the picture because of a commitment to regional
order, including its alliance network. Third, as its recent stock market crash makes all too obvious, China
remains a fragile
superpower, to quote Susan Shirk. Many factors in its domestic political situationcorruption, growing
wealth disparities, and many forms of civil challenges to government legitimacymake it an
unpredictable player. Nor is China showing meaningful signs of political liberalization. Theres so much brewing underneath the surface
in China that dealing with China today as if it were a hegemon tomorrow assumes too much, and grants China too much credit too soon.
Fourth, theres
a defunct theory thats been smuggled into arguments about changing Chinese behavior
through U.S. accommodation. Political scientists call it neofunctionalism, a term rarely used these days, even
though its spirit is pervasive in grand bargain arguments. Neofunctionalism came about in the 1950s as a failed way to account for and push for
European integration.The basic idea involved an assumption that low level and innocuous types of
cooperation would spillover into still more and better quality cooperation. Comity among nations, it was thought,
would be the eventual outcome of mundane socioeconomic interactions. But by the 1970s, the theory had become largely
discredited. Nevertheless, echoes of neofunctionalism remain in contemporary claims that properly
calibrated restraint, accommodation, or appeasement can have a transformative effect on a
relationship. Ironically, these arguments tend to come from scholars, not policymakers. The idea that the United States can
induce China into resolving its East and South China Sea disputes by giving it Taiwan reflects
precisely this type of expectation, as do calls for the United States to make small concessions to China
in hopes that it will enable a more stable situation. None of this means that accommodative gestures or strategies should
be outright dismissed. There were numerous periods of detente with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and that rivalry was much more
confrontational. China and the United States, moreover, have a number of overlappingnot just conflictinginterests. I might even go as far as
saying that neofunctionalism has a bit of a bad rap; there are times when trivial or non-costly forms of cooperation can lead to greater and
deeper cooperation, but political scientists havent convincingly figured out what those conditions are. But grand bargains rarely
work. Theres a dangerous naivete in abandoning U.S. commitments on the hope that China will then be more willing to resolve its other
disputes. And policies of accommodation will not suspend military competition because that involves
more than present day concerns with surveillance overflight missions, territorial disputes, and current
political commitments. Regardless of the policy and crisis management decisions we make today, military competition plays out over
years and decades; it relates to force structure investment and doctrinal decisions that cant be sacrificed for political promises. Chinas
concerns will only be assuaged when the United States divests of the military force structure that makes it possible to project power globally,
uphold its commitments, and bolster the regional order. The U.S. military will be unable to pursue such a course as long as China maintains
openly expansionist geopolitical ambitions and a force structure designed to achieve it. Competition, it seems, is the logic of the situation. We
ignore that at our own peril.
 Link - Appeasement Spillsover to Other Issues
Concessions spillover to convince China that the US will back down on other important
areas of contention
Glaser 15 (Charles L., Prof. at Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of PoliSci at
George Washington University, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military
Competition and Accommodation, International Security, 39(4), p.74)

The literature is divided on how a states actions influence an adversarys assessment of its credibility. A key strand holds that a
states
credibility is connected across issues; making unmatched concessions on one issue can reduce a states
credibility for defending its other interests. Although the broadest version of this argumentconcessions on any issue
anywhere damage a states credibility on all other issues everywhereseems implausible, a more conditional argument is logically sound.
Specifically, concessions on
an issue that an adversary believes is similar along one or more dimensions to a
second issue will reduce the states credibility for defending the second issue. For a rational adversary, an
opposing states credibility is directly related to its understanding of that states interest in the specific issue. The connectedness logic requires
that the adversary be uncertain about the nature or extent of the states interest in the two issues. The
states action on the first
issue provides the adversary with information about the extent of the states interest in that issue. In addition,
because the two issues share significant similarities, the action also can provide the adversary with information about
the extent of the states interest in the second issue. The relevant dimensions along which issues can be similar include
geography; the estimated magnitude of the interest; and, related but separable, the nature of the interest (security, economic, identity, etc.).
The opposing strand of the credibility debate holds that a states past actions do not influence its credibility. According to this line of argument,
credibility depends only on an opposing states power and interests, both of which are known, not on its past behavior. This formulation,
however, mischaracterizes the issue of credibility by assuming that the adversary essentially knows the extent of the states interests.
Uncertainty about the states interests, however, lies at the core of the adversarys uncertainty about the
states credibility. This in turn creates a role for past actions to influence current assessments of
credibility. And, although the adversary may be nearly certain that the state places an extremely high
value on defending its homeland, the adversary is likely to be more uncertain about the value that the
state places on defending its allies and lesser interests. Given this uncertainty, if the adversary sees
logical similarities between the two issues, one would expect that a states policy toward a lesser (but
possibly still important) interest would enable an adversary to update its assessment of the states
interests and, in turn, of the credibility of its commitments. For example, ending an alliance could lead an adversary to
reduce its assessment of how likely the state would be to meet certain other alliance commitments. The magnitude of the change would
depend on the size of the accommodation, the extent of uncertainties about the states interests, and the similarity between the terminated
and the continuing alliances. In addition, if
the adversary believes that a structural change caused the state to
adopt accommodation, it will see a similarity across otherwise disparate issues that are affected by the
structural change and will, therefore, reduce its assessment of the states credibility on all of these
issues.
 Link Cooperation *
Obama is standing up to China now but china interprets cooperative diplomacy as
US deference to Chinese superiority in the SCS
Heydarian 2/21/16
[Richard Javad Heydarian is a specialist in Asian geopolitical/economic affairs and author of Asia's New
Battlefield: US, China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific, Aljezeera, China's aggressive posture in
South China Sea, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/02/china-aggressive-posture-
south-china-sea-160221074036883.html, Accessed June 25 2016, A.H]

The South China Sea disputes are rapidly descending into a quagmire, with potentially explosive
ramifications. Shortly after United States President Barack Obama concluded a high-profile summit with Southeast Asian leaders, China
reportedly deployed an advanced surface-to-air missile system to the Paracel chain of islands, which is also claimed by Vietnam. In response,
Hanoi immediately lodged a formal complaint at the United Nations, accusing its giant neighbour of "serious infringements of Vietnam's
sovereignty over the Paracels, threatening peace and stability in the region as well as security, safety and freedom of navigation and flight".
US Secretary of State John Kerry was emphatic, declaring that there "is every evidence, every day that
there has been an increase of militarisation [by China] of one kind or another." He vowed to hold a "very
serious conversation" with his Chinese counterparts. The US also accused China of reneging on its earlier promise,
delivered by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to the White House last year, to not militarise the disputes. Regional powers such as
Japan, which heavily relies on the South China Sea for the shipment of its energy imports, have also pitched in. Japanese Defence Minister Gen
Nakatani condemned the alleged "unilateral move by China to change the status quo," adding that it "cannot be overlooked". Chinese officials,
however, downplayed the whole affair. Foreign Minister Wang Yi tried to justify the deployment of the advanced military platforms as "limited
and necessary self-defence facilities", while the Chinese defence ministry dismissed criticisms over the issue as a Western "hype". Yet, there
is growing fear that Beijing is determined to fully dominate its adjacent waters at the expense of
freedom of navigation and overflight in arguably the world's most important waterway. Failure of
engagement Back in 2013, Obama invited his Chinese counterpart Xi for an intimate, informal summit in
Sunnylands resort in California. It was a controversial decision since such "short sleeve" meetings were usually
reserved for leaders of the US' dearest allies, such as Japan (as in former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi) and the
UK (as in Prime Minister David Cameron). US efforts at constraining China's behaviour has prompted the latter to
become even more determined to dominate adjacent waters, undermining freedom of overflight and
navigation in a waterway that is pivotal to global commerce and energy transport. Under his much-touted
Pivot to Asia doctrine, the Obama administration was determined to explore a more cooperative
relationship with China. In fact, Washington explicitly framed its ties with Beijing as "the most important
bilateral relationship in the world," reiterating the necessity for robust engagement with the rising
superpower. Xi, however, had other ideas. He interpreted the whole event as an implicit US
recognition of China as its new peer in the Asia-Pacific theatre, calling for a "new type of great power relations". In
light of China's insistence that the US should respect its "core interests" (PDF), including its territorial claims in adjacent waters, the
statement was interpreted as a thinly-veiled demand for US non-interference in the South China Sea
disputes. In the following months, China pressed ahead with massive reclamation activities across disputed
waters, transforming rocks and atolls into artificial islands and building a sprawling network of dual-
purpose facilities and airstrips in both the Paracel and the Spratly island chains. It made Obama's
engagement policy seem like an unequivocal failure. Tit-for-tat showdown Astounded by the sheer scale and speed of
China's "revanchist" activities in disputed waters, the Obama administration switched to a more muscular approach.
On one hand, it began conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the vicinity of Chinese-occupied land features in the South
China Sea. The US began to deploy destroyers and advanced aircraft to challenge China's sovereignty
claims. INTERACTIVE: Islands row around China Admiral Harry B Harris Jr, the commander of the US Pacific Command, effectively warned
China by stating that "you will see more of them [FONOPs], and you will see them increasing in complexity and scope in areas of challenge". The
latest operation was conducted in the Paracel chain of islands, which most likely prompted China to (once again) deploy the surface-to-air
missile platform to the area. The Obama administration, however, is primarily interested in mobilising a multilateral coalition against China. It
has called upon major allies and partners such as Japan, Australia and India to contribute to freedom of navigation patrols in the South China
Sea, with Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force contemplating the prospects of joint-patrols close to Chinese-occupied land features. OPINION:
A Sino-American naval showdown in the South China Sea To underscore the comprehensive nature of his engagement with Asia, Obama
recently also hosted leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at Sunnylands, where he managed to garner the support of
regional states, including staunch Chinese allies like Cambodia and Laos, to sign a joint statement that implicitly criticised China's activities in
disputed waters. Together with the European Union, the US has also called on China to respect the (likely unfavourable) outcome of the
Philippines' arbitration case against China vis-a-vis the maritime disputes. The US and its allies are optimistic that the Arbitral Tribunal at The
Hague will rule against China's sweeping claims as well as increasingly aggressive posturing in the area. The
real fear, however, is
that China will slowly move towards establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone across the whole
South China Sea by deploying surface-to-air missiles and advanced military platforms to airstrips and
facilities in the Paracels and the Spratlys. Ironically, though, US efforts at constraining China's behaviour has prompted the
latter to become even more determined to dominate adjacent waters, undermining freedom of overflight and navigation in a waterway that is
pivotal to global commerce and energy transport. Asia, the new centre of global economic gravity, seems to be sleepwalking into an all-out
conflict.

Diplomacy and cooperation leads to Chinese military aggression

Chang 11
[Gordon G Chang, lawyer and author, Cornell Law School Graduate, Biden's Trip to China Makes U.S.
Look Weak, Not Strong, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/08/18/bidens-trip-to-china-makes-us-
look-weak-not-strong.html, Accessed June 30 2016, A.H]
Fifty years from now, 100 years from now, historians and scholars will judge us based upon whether or not were able to establish a strong,
permanent and friendly working relationship, Vice President Joe Biden said today in Beijing, speaking to his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping.
Theres no more important relationship that we need to establish on the part of the United States than a close relationship with China.
Wrong on all accounts, Mr. Vice President. Historians and scholars will judge the United States on whether it was able to maintain the post-
war liberal, international system that led to global prosperity and general peace. This means the most important relationships we need to
establishat this moment and all othersare those with countries that share our goals. And, in any event,
telling the Chinese how
important they are is just feeding their already-too-big sense of self-importance. The history of the Obama
administrations relationships with China demonstrates its well-meaning diplomacy has been counterproductive. The president,
like most Americans, has assumed the Chinese reciprocate gestures of friendship, but throughout his administration they have generally
refused to do so. In fact, in the last two years Washingtons
efforts to establish cooperative ties have directly led to
Beijings belligerent acts. Lets replay the videotape. The Obama administration came into office wanting to put
relations on a better basis by placating Beijing. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton started off the effort in February 2009 by
stating that the United States would not let human rights get in the way of more important matters. Chinese leaders were reportedly overjoyed
with her remarks. As one Beijing-based analyst reported, Beijing officials were ecstatic because her comments confirmed in their
minds that America had finally succumbed to a full kowtow to China. We didnt have to wait long to see the
fundamental error of Secretary Clintons approach. In the following month, Chinese military planes and naval and
civilian craft interfered with two unarmed U.S. Navy reconnaissance vesselsthe Impeccable and the Victoriousin
international waters in the South China and Yellow Seas. In one of those incidents, the harassment was so serious that it
constituted an attack on the United Statesin other words, an act of war. Despite the provocation, all President
Obama and Secretary Clinton did was to issue mild statements when Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited Washington. Incredibly, in the
following month they sent our top naval officer and a destroyer to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese navy. That
show of friendship was another mistake. In May, the Chinese again harassed the Victorious in the Yellow Sea. The Obama administration,
unfortunately, did not learn. Just days before the presidents November 2009 trip to Beijing, Jeffrey
Bader, then the top Asia
official on the National Security Council, publicly said the United States could not solve any of the
worlds great problems without Chinas cooperation. Obamas trip to China turned out to be a debacle
because the Chinese evidently thought that, after Baders comments, they had a veto over American
foreign policy. Not surprisingly, the summit marked the beginning of a period of Beijings belligerence and hostility. During this
period, not only did Chinas civilian leaders openly work to undermine American interestssomething
they are continuing to doits flag officers and senior colonels publicly talked about fighting a war
against the United States in the near future. The ruthlessly pragmatic Chinese respect strength and
despise weakness. Biden, by going to Beijing before Xi Jinping came here, looks like a supplicant, something state media is already
playing up. Who travels first is significant in Chinese eyes. President Obama went to Beijing before President Hu Jintao visited Washington, by
the way. Although we dont realize it, the Chinese need us much more than we need them. Last year, 149.2% of Chinas overall trade surplus
related to sales to the United States. Moreover, we dont require Chinese money to finance our debt because there are already too many
lenders around the world willing to buy Treasury securities. We saw that even on the first trading day after Standard & Poors downgrade of
federal government debt, when global investors snapped up Treasuries along with gold and Swiss Francs. So
instead of going to
Beijing, we should insist on Chinese leaders coming to Washington to explain their predatory trade
tactics, their attempts to deny freedom of navigation, their proliferation of nuclear weapons technology
to Iran and North Korea, and their unprecedented cyber-attacks on our networks, among other
irresponsible acts. The Chinese just laugh at us when we talk about good relations while they engage
in unacceptable behavior. We need to think like they do and realize that less diplomacy would work better than
more diplomacy at this time.

Diplomacy sends the signal we are not willing to stand up to China

Gaffney 15
[Frank, 9/30/15, Founder and President of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C. formerly Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy during the Reagan Administration, following four years of service as the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy. Previously, he was a professional staff member on
the Senate Armed Services Committee under the chairmanship of the late Senator John Tower, and a national security
legislative aide to the late Senator Henry M. Jackson, The message Obama must send to Xi and China
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/09/30/the-message-obama-must-send-to-xi-and-china/, Accessed June 28 2016,
A.H]

Xi Jinping, the dictator of Communist China in his role as leader of its party and its military wing, the Peoples Liberation Army, is being
rewarded by President Obama this week for his escalating aggression with a state visit. Chinas state media have been full of articles, some
written by pro-Beijing American China hands, admonishing America that nothing is more important than maintaining stable bilateral
relations. In other words, we should continue to ignore the fact that Chinese goals increasingly threaten Americas interests and security.
This business uber alles approach has governed US-China relations for the last 25 years. It must stop,
unless American leaders today wish to condemn our children to future wars with China. Lets be clear:
Chinas highest priority goal is to end American political/strategic leadership in Asia and to force Asian
democracies and U.S. allies to subordinate their security to Chinese hegemony and dictates. Its specific
objectives include the termination in the near-term of democracy on Taiwan and the end of U.S. defense treaties with and presence in Japan,
South Korea, the Philippines and Australia. It is absolutely imperative that Xi comes away from his time here
convinced that the United States is not going to cede Asia, outer space or cyberspace to Chinese
dominance and will never abandon its democratic or military allies. To be sure, Communist China regularly inveighs
that it abjures hegemony. But it is unmistakably building today the forces it needs to invade Taiwan and to
prevent the United States from rendering military assistance. The Chinese are also building the political-economic basis
for extending their influence in Central Asia, Africa and Latin America. This will soon be accompanied by a global power-
projection military, allowing Beijing to advance its ambitions for domination beyond its own region,
ambitions that may be further catalyzed by the need to seize on external threats to justify continued,
and intensifying, internal repression. That is especially true insofar as the Chinese Communist Party is facing the combined
challenges of serious economic setbacks, a demographic time-bomb and growing political unrest. China is building space weapons
to control Low Earth Orbit and notwithstanding any accord it may sign with President Obama this week it seeks to dominate
cyberspace in order to threaten Americas electronic infrastructure. These are the sorts of conduct that
hostile powers engage in, not friends or even business partners worthy of the honor and
legitimization associated with a state visit to Washington. It is a serious strategic mistake to extend such a privilege to Xi
Jinping under present circumstances. It is, therefore, absolutely imperative that Xi comes away from his time here convinced that the United
States is not going to cede Asia, outer space or cyberspace to Chinese dominance and will never abandon its democratic or military allies. This
must start with continued support for Taiwans ability to defend itself from a growing Chinese threat, as it must expand military cooperation
with Japan and the Philippines to deter Beijing from imposing control over disputed maritime areas. We
have to counter the
impression of American military and geopolitical decline that is contributing to Chinas increasingly
aggressive conduct in various terrestrial, extraterrestrial and virtual domains. Furthermore, it is time for
Washington to insist that China must cease its longstanding technical and political support that has enabled Pakistan, North Korea and soon,
Iran, to become nuclear missile states. Not least, we
should be exploiting Chinas internal difficulties to weaken the
Partys hold on power and not be legitimating it, propping it up or otherwise appeasing it. A failure
to resist Chinas ambitions in Asia and beyond and its nuclear missile proliferation only serves to encourage the
Communists to redouble their bid for eventual global strategic dominance at the expense of the United
States and many other democracies. We must respond to Chinese provocations, rebuild our military to
deter Beijings aggression and counter its efforts to use our corporations understandable desire for
trade with China to undermine their own proprietary interests and the nations security and/or
economic ones. So the stakes for Americans in Xi Jinpings visit are enormous. Xis interlocutors must demonstrate that
we will resist Chinas ambitions, not accede to them. The message should be: America is committed to: free passage in the
East and South China Seas; its allies, partners and strategic interests in that region and elsewhere; and opposing the efforts of any nation to
restrict or otherwise endanger those vital interests. Our
failure to do so now will only compound the difficulty and
expense entailed in dealing with China down the road for future presidents and for our country.

Diplomacy is appeasement only encourages Chinese aggression

Goldfarb 09
[Michael, Contributing editor at the Weekly Standard with a B.A. in history from Princeton University,
10/5/9, China Appeasement Now Officially Under Way, http://www.weeklystandard.com/china-
appeasement-now-officially-under-way/article/270842, Accessed June 28 2016, A.H]

THE WEEKLY STANDARD Blog reported this three weeks ago, but today we read in the Washington Post that His Holiness the Dalai Lama has
been unceremoniously barred from the White House until President Obama travels to China in November.
Sinophiles in the White
House are in Nirvana having successfully tossed overboard criticial bilateral concerns such as forced
abortions, human rights, the treatment of political prisoners, and Chinese aggression against unarmed
U.S. naval vessels in the Western Pacific -- all this under the definition of "Strategic Reassurance," the
new euphemism for the United States doing a diplomatic bend-over and ankle grab (BOAAG). The Post's John
Pomfret writes: "The U.S. decision to postpone the meeting appears to be part of a strategy to improve ties
with China that also includes soft-pedaling criticism of China's human rights and financial policies as well
as backing efforts to elevate China's position in international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund.
Obama administration officials have termed the new policy 'strategic reassurance,' which entails the U.S. government taking steps to convince
China that it is not out to contain the emerging Asian power. "
So...what has this appeasement and "strategic
reassurance" earned the United States in the way of Chinese cooperation on critical issues? A bellwether can be
found at the U.N. where, last Friday, China killed any attempt by the U.S. and France to put Burma's military
junta on the UNSC schedule by demanding that deaths in Afghanistan by U.S. and NATO forces also be
discussed. You might recall Burma's military junta is one of the most brutal in the world and a source for regional problems such as
refugees, drugs, and the spread of infectious diseases among others. "We are not focused on that," China's Deputy Ambassador Liu Zhenmin
said according to a Bloomberg report, but civilian casualties in Afghanistan was a "good subject" for the UN's top body to discuss. It's bad
enough that the Chinese would draw a moral equivalency between civilian deaths in Afghanistan -- where U.S. and NATO forces are fighting a
war and taking unprecedented precautions to protect civilians and build a democratic society -- and civilian deaths in Burma, where the junta
targets civilians for murder and worse on a massive scale. That the White House, State, or Ambassador Rice issued nary a tweet of protest at
this outrage is a good gauge at just how far we will go to avoid provoking Red China. And for what? Nobody believes the Chinese
will consent to serious sanctions on Iran, or will bring the North Koreans to heel (Chinese premier Wen Jiabao is
right now wrapping up a three day visit to North Korea where he is celebrating "good-neighborliness and generation-after-generation
friendship between the two countries"). No one believes that the Chinese will cooperate on global warming. Or is the administration so
deluded that they think such cooperation is possible? Is
Valerie Jarrett telling the administration that, just like the IOC,
the Chinese are ready to see the light with just a few more concessions and a little more direct,
presidential diplomacy?
 Link - Diplomatic Engagement
Diplomatic engagement with China increases their economic growth and emboldens
them to takeover the SCS
Hendrix 16, (Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy Captain, a former director of the Naval History and Heritage
Command, and a senior fellow and director of the Defense Strategies and Assessments program at the
Center for a New American Security, 5/24/16, Is war with China now inevitable,

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/435749/us-china-war-obama-weakness-east-asia)

China is acting like it wants a war. It probably doesnt, but it doesnt want the United States to know
that. Chinas communist leaders know they must keep growing the economy and improving the lives of
their citizens, or risk revolution and the loss of power. They also know that they are on a clock: Within
the next ten years, Chinas recently amended one-child policy will invert the countrys economy, forcing
that one child to pay the medical and retirement costs of his two parents and four grandparents. Under
these circumstances, the state will need to begin allocating additional resources toward the care of its
citizens and away from its burgeoning national-security apparatus. China has to lock down its sphere of
influence soon, becoming great before becoming old. Its time for Chinese leaders to go big or go home,
and theyre slowly growing desperate. The United States, for its own part, has not helped ward off the
regional threat that desperation poses. Its policy of strategic patience and its prioritizing of Chinese
cooperation on nuclear issues to the exclusion of local security concerns have created an almost
palpable sense of growing confidence in the Chinese among nervous U.S. allies nearby. The lack of
credible Freedom of Navigation operations since 2012 and the Obama administrations failure to offer
any significant resistance in the face of Chinas construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea
have emboldened the Chinese to press ahead with their planned campaign to claim sovereignty over
those waters. Such claims threaten the national interests of the United States and directly impinge upon
the security of treaty allies and partners in the region. Chinas actions are representative of a new
phenomenon that is increasingly characterizing the foreign policies of authoritarian states around the
world. Like states such as North Korea, Iran, and Russia, China has recognized that America is trapped by
its doctrinal adherence to phasing, the method by which it goes to war as delineated in Joint
Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, first published in the early 1990s. As its name suggests, the method
lays out six major phases of war: phase 0 (shaping the environment), phase I (deterring the enemy),
phase II (seizing the initiative), phase III (dominating the enemy), phase IV (stabilizing the environment),
and phase V (enabling civil authority). Its a step-by-step approach that has come to dominate American
tactical and strategic thought. The problem is that when you write the book on modern warfare,
someone is going to read it, and those that seek to challenge the United States most certainly have.
They know that U.S. war planners are all focused on phase III the Dominate the Enemy phase
and treat the separation between phases as impermeable barriers. Americas concentration on phase III
has allowed rising competitors to expand their influence through maneuvers that thwart U.S. interests in
the preceding three phases, maneuvers cumulatively grouped in a category known as Hybrid warfare.
Authoritarian states have mastered the art of walking right up to the border of phase III without
penetrating it, slowly eroding American credibility without triggering a kinetic response. Nations work
out their differences through consistent and credible interactions. Exercises and real-world operations
allow states to define their interests and then defend them. Competitor nations take these
opportunities to test the will of states they are challenging. The consistency of these activities allows
tensions between states to be released at a constant rate, so that pressures never rise to dangerous
levels. But when a nation vacates the arena of competition for too long or fails to conduct credible
exercises, as the United States has done in the Western Pacific over the past five years, strains begin to
warp the fabric of the international order. Chinas construction of artificial islands as a means of
extending its claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea have left the United States with few
options. The U.S. can continue its policy of sending mixed messages, dispatching individual warships on
innocent-passage profiles that come within twelve miles of the islands while avoiding normal military
operations, but this will only play into Chinas plan to slowly boil the frog as it continues arming the
islands, establishing a new security status quo in the region. Chinas strategy mirrors Russias actions in
Georgia, the Crimea, and Ukraine. There, Russian forces operated below the U.S.s radar, conducting
phase I and II operations and standing pat in the face of international sanctions, confident that neither
the United States nor its NATO allies really wanted to risk war to re-institute the regional order that had
just been upended. China clearly feels that time is on its side so long as it only incrementally expands its
influence, avoiding direct confrontation with the United States. Such an approach will, of course, leave
the United States no choice but to suddenly and directly confront China at some critical point in the
future. Americas adherence to its founding principles of free navigation and free trade, not to mention
its belief in a free sea, will not allow it to tolerate a Chinese assertion of sovereignty over such a large
swath of heretofore-open water. Perhaps when the time comes the United States could simply land an
international force of marines on one of the artificial islands as part of an amphibious exercise. As the
islands are not Chinese sovereign territory, there is no reason not to use them as the staging ground for
an international exercise. And such an exercise would force Chinas hand, making it choose between
resisting the assembled international marines with armed force or acknowledging the illegitimacy of its
own claims. While some might view such American action as too confrontational, it was made necessary
by the Obama administrations failure to nip Chinas ambitions in the bud. America will now have to skip
a phase, taking strong and abrupt action to reset the status quo. As things stand, should China suddenly
move to militarize the Scarborough Shoals just off of the Philippines, it is unclear if the United States
would defend its ally, in keeping with its treaty commitments, or simply dispatch Secretary of State John
Kerry to insist on one thing while his bosses actions demonstrate the opposite. Such continuous,
systematic acts of accommodation as have been demonstrated with Iran, Syria, and Russia invite conflict
and ultimately lead to large-scale major war. Maintenance of a strong military and the upholding of our
founding core principles remain the surest guarantee of peace.
 Link - Economic Engagement
Facilitating economic growth in China increases competitiveness and counter-
balancing. Economic containment is preferable.
Navarro 3-16
(Peter Navarro, Peter Navarro is a Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the Paul Merage School of
Business, University of California, Irvine and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University. 3-10-
2016, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimer-on-
strangling_b_9417476.html DDI-AC)<
As part of the research for my Crouching Tiger book on the rise of Chinas military and its companion documentary film, I interviewed 35 of the
top experts in the world from all sides of the China issue. These are key edited excerpts from my sit-down at the University of Chicago with
Professor John Mearsheimer, author of the realist classic work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. My argument, in a nutshell, is that if
China continues to grow economically over the next 30 years, much the way it has over the past 30
years, that it will translate that wealth into military might. And it will try to dominate Asia, the way
the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. And my argument is that this makes good strategic sense for China. Of
course, the United States will not allow that to happen if it can. And the United States will, therefore, form a balancing
coalition in Asia, which will include most of Chinas neighbors and the United States. And they will
work overtime to try to contain China and prevent it from dominating Asia. This will lead to a very intense
security competition between the United States and Chinas neighbors on one hand, and China on the
other hand. And there will be an ever-present danger of war. Of course from this observation rises the
imperative if not to strangle Chinas economy then to certainly slow it down. Theres no question that
preventive war makes no sense at all, but a much more attractive strategy would be to do whatever we could to slow down Chinas economic
growth. Because if it doesnt grow economically, it cant turn that wealth into military might and become a
potential hegemon in Asia. I mean, what really makes China so scary today is the fact that it has so many people and its also
becoming an incredibly wealthy country. Our great fear is that China will turn into a giant Hong Kong. And if it has a per capita GNP
thats anywhere near Hong Kongs GNP, it will be one formidable military power. So the question is, Can you
prevent it from becoming a giant Hong Kong? My great hope is that Chinas economy will slow down on its own. I think its in Americas
interest, and its in the interest of Chinas neighbors to see the Chinese economy slow down in terms of its
growth rate in really significant ways in the future because if that happens, it then cant become a formidable military
power.

Economic interdependence doesnt check war containment necessary to quell

nationalism that causes war
Navarro 3-16
(Peter Navarro, Peter Navarro is a Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the Paul Merage School of
Business, University of California, Irvine and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University. 3-10-
2016, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimer-on-
strangling_b_9417476.html DDI-AC)

As for the idea that economic engagement itself is a viable peace strategy, Professor Mearsheimer sees this as
decidedly counter-historical: Many people find it hard to believe that countries that engage in security competition also continue to trade with
each other economically. But
if you look at Europe before World War I and, indeed, if you look at Europe
before World War II, what you see is that there was a great deal of economic interdependence on the
continent and with Britain before both world wars. So I believe that if China continues to grow
economically, there will still be much economic intercourse between China and its neighbors and
China and the United States. And I still think that you will have a lot of potential for trouble between these
two countries. And dont forget, even though you had all this economic intercourse between World War I and World War II, you still got
World War I and you still got World War II. If you look at Europe before World War I, there were extremely high
levels of economic interdependence between Germany and virtually all of its neighbors, certainly between
Germany and Russia, Germany and France, and Germany and Britain, these were the main players. And despite this economic
interdependence, these high levels of economic interdependence, you still got World War I. Another example would
be the period before World War II. The Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. And for the previous two years, Germany and the
Soviet Union this is Nazi Germany and Stalins Soviet Union had been close allies in Europe. In fact, in September 1939 they had invaded
Poland together and divided it up. So there
was a great deal of economic intercourse between Nazi Germany and
the Soviet Union between 1939 and 22 June, 1941. Nevertheless, that economic interdependence did not
prevent World War II from escalating into a major war between Moscow and Berlin. And, in fact, there are all
sorts of stories about the German forces invading the Soviet Union and passing trains that were going into the Soviet Union that were carrying
German goods, and trains coming from the Soviet Union towards Germany that were carrying Soviet raw materials and some Soviet goods as
well. So there was economic interdependence between Germany and the Soviet Union and yet you still
got a war. Closely related to the argument that economic engagement will prevent war between the US and China is the economic
interdependence argument. In Professor Mearsheimers world thats a dangerous gamble because politics and nationalism can
often trump economics.

US economic appeasement to China creates concessions and backlash

Segal 4 (Adam Segal, Ira A. Lipman Chair in Emerging Technologies and National Security and Director
of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program, 5/28/04, Practical Engagement: Drawing A Fine-Line For
US-China Trade http://www.cfr.org/china/practical-engagement-drawing-fine-line-us-china-
trade/p7063)

The U.S. strategy of engaging China economically has generated substantial theoretical debate about
potential security benefits and risks but a good deal less in the way of practical policy recommendations.
For proponents of economic engagement with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), trade not only is
good for its intrinsic value but also is anticipated to bring China further into the international order and
make it a more responsible actor.1 Proponents of engagement expect trade to empower more
internationalist and cooperative elements within Beijing, whereas critics fear that trade will not
moderate Chinese behavior. They warn that the proceeds that China has gained in more than 25 years
of rapid economic growth could one day be turned against the United States. The trade, investment,
and technology provided by the United States could all make China militarily more powerful than it
would otherwise be. In response to the U.S. decision to grant China permanent normal trade relations,
Representative Dan Burton (R-Ind.) may have summed up such fears most candidly: This will give them
[the Chinese] more money to buy the rope with which to hang us. They have the largest army in the
world, and its going to get bigger and were going to pay for it.2 The logic linking trade and Chinese
military modernization appears straightforward. During the Cold War, tight control over technology
transfer was considered a key part of preventing the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries from
improving their military capabilities. With the Cold War behind us, some now see China as the most
likely potential great-power competitor to the United States and thus are tempted to try to restrict the
flow of advanced commercial technologies that may improve the ability of the Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA) to threaten Taiwan or project power in Asia. Others argue more expansively that the United States
should not en-gage in any activities that help Chinas economy grow, given that increased wealth could
be used to expand Chinese military capabilities.
Economic Engagement is appeasement which weakens US policy.
Altman et al. 07 (Roger C. Altman, Council on Foreign Relations Task Force, April 2007, U.S.-China
Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course, http://www.cfr.org/china/us-china-
relations/p12985)

Today, the geopolitical terrain is shifting again, altered by the emergence of China as a major power in a
world dominated by the United States since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite the overall success
of engagement in helping to shape Chinas interests in ways desired by the U.S. government, U.S.
political support for engagement is under strain. As Chinas economic and military power grows, there is
considerable uncertainty about its future course. Chinas development has raised concerns about the
implications for Americas economic health, security, and global political influence. Many Americans are
not confident that Chinas strategic interests are still compatible with those of the United States and
argue that engagement does not sufficiently protect the United States against a China that could
emerge as a threatening adversary in the future.3 Others have concluded as Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC)
did in the late 1990s: Those who support economic engagement with China must recognize it for what
it is appeasement. . . .We must have a new approach.4

Economic Concessions to China weaken US interests in Asia.

Blackwell & Tellis 15 ( Writers for theCouncil on Foreign Relations, CFR, 3/15, Revising U.S. Grand
Strategy Toward China, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf)

Although the attractiveness, endurance, and exportability of this so-called Beijing model are suspect on multiple
grounds, the fact remains that it has more or less served China well until now.20 This model has bequeathed Beijing with huge
investible surpluses (in the form of vast foreign exchange reserves), substantially increased its technological capabilities (thanks to both
legitimate and illegitimate acquisitions of proprietary knowledge), andmost importanthas tied the wider global economy ever more tightly
to China. Although
this last development has generated wealth and welfare gains globally, it has also
produced several unnerving strategic consequences. It has made many of Chinas trading partners, especially its smaller
neighbors, asymmetrically dependent on China and thus reluctant to voice opposition even when Chinas policies leave them disadvantaged.21
Chinas economic integration has also produced higher relative gains for itself, even with its larger
trading partners, such as the United Statesnot in the narrow sense pertaining to the bilateral terms of
trade, but in the larger strategic sense that its overall growth has risen far faster than it might have had
China remained locked into the autarkic policies of the pre-reform period. U.S. support for Chinas entry into the
global trading system has thus created the awkward situation in which Washington has contributed toward hastening Beijings economic
growth and, by extension, accelerated its rise as a geopolitical rival. Furthermore, Chinas growing economic ties have nurtured and encouraged
various internal constituencies within Chinas trading partners to pursue parochial interests that often diverge from their countries larger
national interests with regard to China.22 Finally, economic integration has shaped the leadership perceptions of
many of Chinas trading partners in ways that lead them to worry about their dependence on and
vulnerability to China. Even if such worry is sometimes exaggerated, it weakens their resistance to both
Chinese blandishments and coercion.23 Given these outcomes, it should not be surprising that Beijing has
consciously sought to use Chinas growing economic power in a choking embrace designed to prevent its
Asian neighbors from challenging its geopolitical interests, including weakening the U.S. alliance system
in Asia. Beijings commitment to sustaining high economic growth through deepened international interdependence, therefore, provides it
not only with internal gainsa more pliant populace and a more powerful statebut consequential external benefits as well, in the form of a
growing military and deferential neighbors who fear the economic losses that might arise from any political opposition to China. These gains
are likely to persist even as Chinas economic growth slows down over timeas it inevitably willso long as Beijings overall material power
and its relative growth rates remain superior to those of its neighbors.24
The affs economic integration is appeasement and leads to Chinese aggression
Marston 6/30/16
Hunter, The National Interest, works in a major Washington, DC think tank and writes on Southeast Asia
and U.S. foreign policy, A wealthier Beijing can afford to take more risks
[http://nationalinterest.org/feature/more-trade-wont-stop-chinas-aggression-16587, Accessed June 30
2016, A.H]
Chinas brazen and improper airmanship, buzzing an American surveillance plane in the skies above the East China Sea last week, is but the
latest signal of Beijings proclivity for risk and willingness to undermine both its regional reputation and economic stability in order to stake
expanding claims in Asia. Western observers have not relinquished the perennial hope that Chinas global economic interconnectedness will
constrain its proclivity to military conflict. But this belief is misguided and not borne out by history. In fact, as
Chinas economic and
military power rise, it has shown an increased tolerance for risk and raised the likelihood of future war.
China has repeatedly harassed Indonesian, Vietnamese and Philippine ships in the latters territorial waters, claiming that Chinese citizens have
been fishing there since ancient times, entitling them to vast maritime sovereignty. Its island construction on top of shallow reefs is another
component in Beijings strategy to assert dominance over the South China Sea. The near-collision of the Chinese fighter jet with the U.S. spy
plane last week follows a string of gutsy, high-risk encounters. Only last month, two Chinese jets flew within fifty feet of an American EP-3
reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea. Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for
Strategic & International Studies, commented, Its clear that Chinas tolerance for risk has risen in the last several years and remains high,
though luckily below the level at which deadly force is likely. Despite high-level progress from Beijing and Washington on a Code for
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in recent years, the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) may be testing the strategic limits of the
outgoing Obama administrations patience. Poling added, What is most worrying to me is that it took less than six months for Beijing to
violate the air-to-air annex to CUES that Presidents Obama and Xi inked during the latters visit to DC. That suggests that no
matter how
hard we might try, China is not willing to have its behavior in disputed waters bound in any way,
including by bilaterally agreed-upon rules and norms. Do Chinese military forays in the East and South China Sea signal
Beijings clear quest for regional domination and the inevitable ratcheting up of tensions with other Pacific powers? Will increasingly risky
provocations lead to military conflict as China stakes its claims? Or does Chinas dependence on global trade for continued economic growth at
home preclude war in the foreseeable future? The
past has repeatedly proved wrong those who assume that a
rising powers economic connectivity obviates the inevitability of great power military conflict. Peacenik
theorists of the preWorld War I era opined that the level of interconnectivity in global markets had rendered obsolete the great-power
warfare of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Likewise, in the interbellum period before the breakout of World
War II,
advocates of appeasement wagered that a militarizing Germany would not threaten continental peace
due to its deep economic ties with the rest of Europe. Obviously, both schools of thought overestimated the ability of global
economic connectivity to deter military aggression. What makes scholars think China is different today? Of course, the scale of
interpenetration of global markets has risen and bound major powers such as China and the United States, as well as regional groupings like the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ever more tightly together. But just
as proponents of peace were proven
wrong in the twentieth century, echoes of the past are perceivable in Asia and Europe today. Despite its
dependence on the EU for revenue from gas exports, Russia invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine in
2014. Likewise, European dependence on Russian gas has not prevented the EU from leveling heavy sanctions against Russia for its
bellicosity. Nationalist impulses often trump economic considerations that would otherwise impel
autocrats toward moderation. Just as the Communist Party in Beijing is beholden to a public whose education hammered home
the lessons of a century of humiliation at the hands of Western imperialists, Russias Vladimir Putins legitimacyand mythosflows from a
narrative of western domination that has prevented Russia from attaining the greater world power that Russians feel their nation deserves.
Similarly, though Beijing is investing in massive infrastructure projects across Southeast Asia and pursuant to the
sixteen-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free-trade agreement, Beijings behavior indicates that it
will prioritize security interests over regional economic integration, peace and stability. Material facts dictate
that Chinas increasing economic wealth and concordant military might will allow Beijing to exercise
greater power in its backyard and on the world stage. These factors afford the CCP a greater ability to risk reputational and
economic costs to achieve its national security goals.
 Link Engagement
Engagement acts as appeasement decades of empirical evidence proves it increases
Chinese aggressiveness and increases the likelihood of conflict
Newsham 14
[Grant, Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, China, America and the
"Appeasement" Question, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-america-the-appeasement-
question-11226, Accessed June 25 2016, A.H]

In February 2014, Philippine President Benigno Aquino warned that failure to challenge the Peoples
Republic of Chinas (PRC) territorial seizures in the South China Sea would be repeating the 1930s era
appeasement of Hitlers Germany. The Chinese were predictably outraged while the rest of the world mostly ignored President
Aquino. Appeasement is still a dirty word. But in the 1930s, until the Nazis invaded Poland in September, 1939, European and American
elites considered appeasement to be a sophisticated, nuanced approach to dealing with increasingly powerful authoritarian regimes. To these
elites, appeasement was more than simply disarming and letting unpleasant people have their way. Appeasement actually had a coherent
logic. The elites
believed that aggressive, authoritarian regimes act the way they do out of fear, insecurity,
and at least partly legitimate grievances such as German resentment of the harsh Treaty of Versailles. Understand and address
these issue, remove their fears, and the regimes will become less aggressive and transform into responsible members of the international
community and operate under international norms. Or so the elites argued. Challenging these regimes could dangerously isolate them and
even needlessly provoke them into miscalculations. The elites thought engagement and transparency were beneficial in their own right,
as only good things could come from familiarity with one another. In the 1930s, the major Western powers all attended each others war
games. The US Marine Corps even took the German World War I fighter ace, Ernst Udet on a ride in a USMC dive bomber. This engagement
and transparency did not make the Nazis nicer, but perhaps gave them some ideas about dive bombing and Blitzkreig. Even the Soviets and
Germans had close ties with joint training, military technology development, and raw material shipments to Germany. There was also
extensive political and diplomatic interaction. Close economic ties were believed to be a further hedge against conflict breaking out, and
companies such as Ford, IBM, and many others did profitable business in Germany. The
elites believed anything was better
than war. Preserving peace, even if sacrificing principles and certain small nations was considered
wise and statesmanlike. People who criticized appeasement policy in the 1930s, most notably Winston Churchill, were ridiculed as
dolts and war mongers. We know how this turned out. Curiously, appeasement (by another name) reappeared even before the
end of the war in calls to address Stalins fears and allow him to dominate Eastern Europe. And throughout the Cold War, in Western academic
and government circles it was argued that Soviet behavior was simply a reaction to fears of Western containment. The appeasers protested the
peacetime draft as threatening the Russians. They also pushed for unilateral nuclear disarmament, and opposed the Pershing missile
deployment and the neutron bomb well into the 1980s. Even President Jimmy Carter, once he overcame his
inordinate fear of communism, tried something akin to appeasement as national policy. It was not
until the Soviets invaded Afghanistan that Carter learned his lesson. It perhaps will take another case of an
authoritarian regime rearranging its neighborhood to understand the cost of modern appeasement. US policy towards China over
the last 30 years, and particularly in recent times, seems familiar. The United States does its best to understand the
PRCs concerns and its resentments going back to the Opium Wars and the century of humiliation, to accommodate these resentments, and to
ensure China does not feel threatened. Defense and State Department officials enthusiastically seek greater transparency and openness
especially in the military realm as such openness is perceived as inherently good. In return, the PRC is expected to change, to show more
respect for human rights and international law and to become a responsible stakeholder in the international community. We
now have
several decades of empirical evidence to assess this concessionary approach. It has not resulted in
improved, less aggressive PRC behavior in the South China Sea or the East China Sea, or even in outer
space. Indeed, it seems to have encouraged Chinese assertiveness as manifest in threatening language
and behavior towards its neighbors. Nor has the PRC regime shown more respect for human rights, rule of law, consensual
government or freedom of expression for its citizens. Serial intellectual property theft continues unabated, as does support for unsavory
dictators. Nonetheless,
we invite the PRC to military exercises and repeat the engagement mantra
expecting that one day things will magically improve. Some argue that letting the PRC see US military power will dissuade it
from challenging us. Perhaps, but we are just as likely to be seen as nave or weak. From the Chinese perspective, there is no reason to change
since they have done very well without transforming and the PRC has never been stronger. Indeed, the PRC frequently claims that human
rights, democracy, and the like are outmoded Western values having nothing to do with China. This is also demoralizing our allies, who at
some point may wonder if they should cut their own deals with the PRC. Some revisionist historians argue that Neville Chamberlains 1930s
era appeasement was in fact a wise stratagem to buy time to rearm. This overlooks that even as late as 1939 when Hitler seized all of
Czechoslovakia, the Western democracies still had the military advantage. One
can appease oneself into a corner. And the
beneficiary of the appeasement usually strengthens to the point it is too hard to restrain without great
sacrifice.

Engagement is appeasement undermines containment strategy

Smith 07, Investigative Journalist (Charles R. China Killing Americans,
chinawatchcanada.blogspot.com/2013/02/charles-r-smith.html)

Engagement merely extends the life of a totalitarian state. It does not end the cruelty, make it any nicer in terms of
nationalistic aggression or for the economic plight of the masses. This extension also lengthens the time under which the people must suffer,
living in a chained society. China is a very good example where, despite the vast income, little if anything has
flowed to the massive impoverished population. It has created a very narrow middle class that would rather the masses not
have freedoms. They are living off the blood, and sweat of slave labor to buy their SUVs, stereos and TVs. They certainly do not want
that to change. The illogic of engagement with China is an extreme case of stupid. For example, the World Bank still classifies China as a
developing nation so it provides billions of dollars in low cost or free loans. Primarily the U.S finances these loans. This, of course, flies in the
face of economic reality. China currently runs the largest export deficit in history mainly due to its predatory currency policy of maintaining a
low priced Yuan. China also spends billions on advanced military hardware and is engaged in an expensive space program. Until recently,
Canada was providing billions in loans to the Chinese government based on the premise that it was still an underdeveloped nation. The
Canadians changed that because of the obvious current economic power in Beijing. This brings the question of why should we be financing
Chinese economic development when they certainly can afford to do it themselves? The answer comes in the form of corporate interests who
seek these U.S. government backed loans to provide financing of their business activities in China. In reality - We are financing the
growth of the Chinese military. The idea of funding nuclear tipped missiles pointed at America is not a pleasant notion. I would
prefer to not do it at all. In the end, engagement is appeasement. It costs money, lives, and freedom. It has not helped but
instead - hurt development and in the long run - hurt the chances of peace. The only sensible solution
is to adopt a unified containment policy. This means that India, the US, Japan, Australia, Taiwan, Korea and the Philippines are
going to have to band together and agree on joint policy, political - military - economic action toward Beijing.

Engagement will be perceived by China as appeasement reduces perception of

American resolve
Glaser 15 (Charles L., Prof. at Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of PoliSci at
George Washington University, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military
Competition and Accommodation, International Security, 39(4), p.74)

Accommodation could bring risks of its own. For example, it would jeopardize U.S. security if it were to convince China that
the United States lacked the resolve to protect its vital national interests, leading China to adopt a more
assertive foreign policy. This danger would be especially large if, instead of limited aims, China desired regional
hegemony and was determined to force the United States out of East Asia. Accommodation might also
raise serious concerns among U.S. alliesmost importantly, Japanabout the reliability of U.S. security
guarantees, thereby undermining alliances that are widely judged to be essential to the security of the United States.
Finally, ending the United States commitment to Taiwan could sacrifice important U.S. nonsecurity interests, including support for democracy
and individual liberties, with no guarantee of benefits in return.
Engagement emboldens Chinese expansionism
Smith 15 (Jeff, Director for Asian Security Programs at the American Foreign Policy Council in
Washington, DC and author of Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in the 21st Century (Lexington Books
2014,RIP: America's "Engagement" Strategy towards China?, g.1) S.J

Depending on whom you ask, these events either dislodged China from a more peaceful course, or
accelerated its path along a preordained, nationalist trajectory. Likewise, Americas engagement
strategy was either flawed from the start, or is simply proving insufficient to cope with the realities of a
neonationalist China. Whatever the case, Xis China has brought the flaws in Americas China strategy
into sharper focus. Rapid economic growth has correlated with greater repression, while efforts at
engagement and integration have been met with more brazen challenges to the status quo.
 Link Export Controls
Removing export controls is a sign of weakness and directly contributes the Chinese
military buildup
Gertz 13
Bill, 9/18/13, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon, China Seeks Weaker Export Controls on
Military Equipment, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-seeks-weaker-export-controls-on-
military-equipment/, Accessed June 26 2016, A.H
Beijing also wants the State Departments arms export control list, known as the U.S. Munitions List, downgraded and administered by the
trade-oriented Commerce Department as part of its Commerce Control List. The change would ease the export of sensitive defense technology
to China. The administration has asked agencies to discuss what to give the Chinese from the list, said one official close to the discussions.
Additionally, the Chinese list includes a request that the administration block a provision of the fiscal 2014 House appropriations bill that would
restrict exports of U.S. information technology to China. Im surprised the administration would allow the Chinese government to interfere
with the operation of the American government, said Rep. Frank Wolf (R., Va.) in an interview. He added that Chinas demand for the
administration to change the appropriations bill was very troubling. Wolf is chairman of the appropriations subcommittee for the Commerce
Department that drafted the legislation. It was approved by the committee following concerns that state-owned Chinese telecommunications
companies, like Huawei Technologies and ZTE, are engaged in illicit cyber espionage against the United States. The
Chinese also asked
the administration to allow the Commercial Aircraft Corp. of China (COMAC) to be named a validated
end-user, status that would permit easy exports of sensitive defense-related aircraft technology.
COMAC is linked to Chinas main military manufacturer, Aviation Industries Corp. of China (AVIC) that produces
fighters, nuclear-capable bombers, and 90 percent of the aviation weapon systems used by the Chinese
military. An AVIC subsidiary, China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corp., was sanctioned by the U.S. government in 2008 for illicit
arms sales to Iran and Syria. A U.S. official said granting COMAC the validated end-user status would increase
the risk that militarily significant U.S. aircraft technology will boost Chinas military buildup. The list of
export control concessions sought by Beijing was produced by Chinas Ministry of Commerce. It will be
presented formally during an upcoming meeting of the Joint Commission, to be held in Beijing in November or December. A spokeswoman for
the office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the agency that along with the Commerce Department is in charge of the U.S. side of the joint
commission, had no comment. Carol Guthrie, the spokeswoman, said no date has been set for the next commission meeting. The last joint
commission session was in December. John
Bolton, former undersecretary of state for international security, said
he opposes making concessions on export controls of high-technology trade with China. He noted Chinas
failure to cooperate with the U.S. government request to return fugitive former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, who
sought refuge first in Hong Kong before being granted asylum in Russia. I would make no concessions to China, and I would make it clear that
this is a partial repayment for their refusal to hand over Snowden to us, Bolton said in an email. Neither China nor Russia have felt any pain
for their lack of cooperation, but its never too late to start. William C. Triplett, former Republican counsel for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, said giving
in to Chinese demands to ease export controls would compound the administrations
recent mishandling of Syria policy and assist Chinas military buildup. Granting anything on this list
would cause total consternation in Tokyo, Manila, and Delhi, Triplett said. And after the events of the
past week, why would President Obama want to look weak to a Chinese communist leader who is a
throw-back to the Mao era? he asked. Chinas list asked that the administration remove sanctions on five Chinese entities that
were involved in proliferation violations. They include Poly Technologies, China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corp., Kunlun Bank, and
Zhuhai Zhenrong. China also sought to gain access to robotic fiber placement machinestechnology restricted for export because they can be
used to manufacture composite material used in radar-evading stealth weapons. Commerce Department and USTR officials met last week in
Beijing with Chinese counterparts for a mid-year review of the joint commission. The U.S. delegation was led by Wendy Cutler, acting deputy
U.S. Trade Representative, and Francisco Sanchez, undersecretary of commerce for international trade. The officials discussed strengthening
the increasingly productive trade relationship with China at the talks, according to a Commerce Department press release. The JCCT remains
an important venue for us to address concrete trade and investment issues, and we look forward to working on these issues with our Chinese
counterparts in the weeks and months ahead, Cutler said. Topics discussed in Beijing included intellectual property rights, pharmaceuticals,
government procurement, investment, services, industrial policies, regulatory obstacles, and agriculture. The statement made no mention of
Chinas request to loosen U.S. export controls on defense and dual-use technology. The Chinese government has been
pressing the Obama administration to loosen its export control policies on high-technology defense and space goods,
claiming China is unfairly treated by the trade restrictions. Sanctions imposed after the Tiananmen massacre, when Chinese military forces
were called in to disperse unarmed pro-democracy protesters from Beijings main square, cannot be lifted by the administration and would
require congressional action. However, the administration has sought to carry out a large-scale loosening of export controls as part of a reform
initiative launched two years ago. Last year, the administration notified Congress that it was granting a high-technology arms export license to
a Hong Kong satellite company with Chinese ties. The license was opposed by congressional Republicans who said it violated sanctions on
Beijing. U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke announced earlier this year that the administration planned to loosen export controls on nearly
one-third of the 141 high-technology items sought by China that now require stringent national-security export licensing. Critics of the
administrations export control reform say the new policy will boost Chinas large-scale military buildup. There is
no difference between civilian and military manufacturers in China. A joint State Department-
Pentagon report to Congress published in April warned that easing controls on U.S. satellite exports
could significantly improve the military potential of another country, believed to be a reference to
China. Space assets provide important military and intelligence capabilities ranging from strategic intelligence collection to improved
tactical communications, the report said. If they can succeed in acquiring the necessary and sufficient technology
and expertise, it could translate into a significant enhancement of that nations military.
 Link - Greentech/CCS coop.
US-China green technology research fails China has own interests in mind
Crane et al. 14 (Keith Crane et al, Director of Environment, Energy and Economic Development
Program at RAND, The Effectiveness of China's Industrial Policies in Commercial Aviation
Manufacturing, https://goo.gl/W0fglf, 57)

Joint ventures with foreign manufacturers have been an important source of technologies for their
Chinese partners. American Superconductor Corporation (ASC) accuses Sinovel, its former joint venture
partner and now one of China's three largest wind turbine manufacturers, of stealing its technologies. ASC and
Sinovel fell out in 2011, when Sinovel abruptly refused shipments of ASC's wind turbine electrical systems and control software. ASC later
discovered that one of its employees was given a $1.5 million bribe by Sinovel to share key technology secrets. The employee confessed to the
crime and is now serving time in a U.S. prison. ASC alleges that 70 percent of its business evaporated due to the theft of its intellectual property
by Sinovel, as well as Chinese government policies favoring Chinese domestic suppliers, as opposed to joint ventures. For its part, Sinovel claims
it stopped accepting components from ASC because of quality problems and has launched a countersuit." However, quality problems appear to
plague Chinese manufacturers rather than the products of their foreign counterparts. According to Thomas F. Holt Jr. who teaches
international intellectual property law at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, this case underscores the
importance for companies investing in China of protecting their intellectual property. He notes: Chinese companies, once they
acquire the needed technology, will often abandon their Western partners on the pretext the technology
or product failed to meet Chinese govern- mental regulations. This is yet another example of a Chinese
industrial policy aimed at pro- curing. by virtually any means. technology in order to provide Chinese
domestic industries with a competitive advantage.

US-Chinese business partnerships are a one-way street China steals and forces tech
transfers
Atkinson 12 (Robert D. Atkinson, President and Founder Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, The Impact
of International Technology Transfer on American Research and Development, http://www2.itif.org/2012-international-tech-
transfer-testimony.pdf, 2-3)

A nations investments in research and development (R&D) are vital to its ability to develop the next
generation technologies, products, and services that keep a country and its firms competitive in global markets. Until recently, corporate R&D
was generally not very mobile, certainly not in comparison to manufacturing. But in a flat world companies can increasingly locate R&D
activities anywhere skilled researchers are located. Moreover, as I argue in Innovation Economics: The Race for Global Advantage1 , in the last
decade many other nations have put in place a range of policies, including expanding government R&D funding, training scientists and
engineers, and expanding R&D tax incentives, to make them more attractive for global R&D investment. But many nations have also
put in place a range of bad policies, including intellectual property theft and forced joint ventures and
technology transfer that unfairly seek advantage.2 The result of these good and bad policies has been
that the United States has seen its relative competitive advantage in R&D and advanced technology
industries decline. While the United States still leads the world in aggregate R&D dollars invested, on a per-capita basis it is falling
behind. The United States now ranks just eighth among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in the
percentage of GDP devoted to R&D expenditures (2.8 percent), behind Israel (4.3 percent), Finland (4.0 percent), Sweden (3.6 percent), Korea
(3.4 percent), Japan (3.3 percent), Denmark (3.0 percent), and Switzerland (3.0 percent), with Germany and Austria close behind the United
States. In 2008, for the first time, Asian nations as a group surpassed the United States in R&D investment, investing $387 billion to the United
States $384 billion.3 As another example, business R&D expenditures by U.S. IT manufacturing and IT services industries as a share of GDP fell
substantially compared to 21 other OECD peer countries between 1997 and 2005. While at first glance the United States appears to score fairly
well on these measuresfifth in business R&D expenditures in IT manufacturing and sixth in IT servicesthe data reveal a striking decrease of
almost 50 percent in the amount of U.S. IT manufacturing industry R&D as a percentage of GDP from 1997 to 2005.4 Moreover, during this
time, businesses in IT manufacturing and services industries in countries such as Finland, Korea, Denmark, Ireland, and the Czech Republic
substantially increased their IT R&D investment.5 In the ITIF report Atlantic Century II: Benchmarking EU & U.S. Innovation and
Competitiveness, which assesses the innovation-based competitiveness of 44 nations or regions on 16 factors, including corporate R&D, the
United States ranks second to last, ahead of only Italy, in the rate of progress on these factors.6 3 The decline in Americas
innovative edge is due to a number of factors, not the least of which are failures of federal policy, such as an unwillingness
to make permanent and expand the R&D tax credit, limitations on high-skill immigration, and stagnant federal funding for R&D. But the decline
is also related to unfair
practices by other nations that collectively ITIF has termed as innovation mercantilism. Many other
nations engage in a variety of practices related to unfairly obtaining knowledge for competitive
advantage. One way is through intellectual property theft. This can take the form of cyber espionage where foreign
actors, sometimes governments themselves, hack into the computer systems of U.S. companies or government to steal intellectual property.
(In fact, one German study found a 40 percent increase in industrial espionage cases between 2009 and 2010.) 7 In other cases, nations
maintain a weak and discriminatory patent or broader IP system that allows their firms to reverse engineer U.S. technology products, even
though they are under patent protection. For example, some nations have weak protections for data related to biopharmaceutical firms (e.g.,
data exclusivity) in order to more easily transfer critical data to their domestic firms. Increasingly, state-owned or state-supported enterprises
buy U.S. technology companies and then transfer the intellectual property, including trade secrets, back to the home country and its
companies. Nations also rely on forced joint ventures, where U.S. multinationals are forced to partner with a domestic firm to gain the right
to produce in that country, with the domestic firm then using this relationship to steal the firms IP. In addition, many nations have turned to
compulsory licensing as a way to transfer knowhow and technology to their economies. This normally involves countries granting permission
to domestic companies to produce patented products from foreign companies without the permission of the patent owner. This is done often
in the case of medical drugs, where countries not only want to get drugs at a lower price without paying for the costs of drug development, but
also to support their own domestic pharmaceutical and biotech industry. For example, earlier this year the Indian government issued a
compulsory license to Natco, an Indian pharmaceutical company, enabling it to produce a cancer drug made by Bayer. A decade ago, Brazil
passed its Generics Law, which allows companies to legally produce generic drugs that are perfect copies of patented drugs. Finally,
a
growing number of nations rely on forced technology transfer where U.S. firms are pressured to transfer
technology to the host country (by opening R&D labs, sharing proprietary secrets with domestic firms, or
opening advanced production facilities) in exchange for being able to sell their products or services in
the market. While many nations practice this, China is by far the most egregious actor when it comes to forced
technology transfer. As David Joy, Chief Market Strategist for Ameriprise Financial, stated with respect to
China, To me, thats [forced technology transfer] actually the biggest issue, more even than currency valuation. Being forced to give
up technology for access to the market is essentially blackmail.8

Specifically, US-China research partnerships fail China takes technology from the US
Atkinson 12 (Robert D. Atkinson, President and Founder Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, The Impact
of International Technology Transfer on American Research and Development, http://www2.itif.org/2012-international-tech-
transfer-testimony.pdf, 3-4)

Many nations seek to engage in forced technology transfer, but no nation does it better or more than
China. This is in part because China is not a market-oriented democracy constrained by the rule of law, but also because the Chinese
economy is so large and fast growing that the country is able to get away with practices that if implemented by
a smaller nation would be rejected out of hand by multinational corporations. While the forced technology transfer practices of a nation a like
Argentina are onerous, it is small enough that many companies would rather give up on the Argentinean market than succumb to the strong
arm tactics. U.S. multinationals have much less room to maneuver with China since it is the worlds second largest economy. This is why in a
survey of U.S. executives doing business in China by the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, the majority of industry representatives
interviewed for this study clearly stated that technology transfers are required to do business in China.9 Foreign companies capitulate because
they have little choice; they either give up their technology or lose out to other competitors that are willing to make the essentially Hobsons
choice.28 Industrial organization economists refer to this type of market as monopsonistic: having one buyer that can set largely whatever
terms it wants against competitive sellers. A case in point is related to a Chinese state-owned enterprise engaged in dumping the chemicals for
a particular herbicide that a U.S. company sold (that is, selling it below what it costs to make in order to gain market share). The company told
the Chinese agricultural minister that it was planning to bring a complaint before the WTO. The minister responded that if the case were
brought, the company would lose access to the Chinese market. Needless to say, the U.S. firm did not bring the case, even as it continued to
lose global market share and jobs in the United States. Forced technology transfer is a cornerstone of Chinas economic plan. For example, in
2011, the Chinese government committed to place the strengthening of indigenous innovative capability at the core of economic
restructuring, growth model change, and national competitiveness enhancement .Indigenous innovation refers to enhancing original
innovation, integrated innovation, and re-innovation based on assimilation and absorption of imported technology, in order improve our
national innovation capability.10 As Thomas Hout and Pankaj Ghemawat describe in the Harvard Business Review, Chinas goal with these
indigenous innovation policies is no less than creating a tipping point in which multinational corporations will have to locate their most-
sophisticated R&D projects and facilities in China, enabling it to eventually catch up with the U.S. as the worlds most advanced economy.55
Figure 1 provides a framework to identify the types of innovation mercantilist practices the Chinese government engages in to directly benefit
Chinese companies at the expense of foreign companies. As it shows, forced technology transfer is just one of many tools in the intellectual
property category that the nation employs to gain unfair competitive advantage.
A principal arrow in Chinas innovation
mercantilist quiver is to force requirements on foreign companies with respect to intellectual property,
technology transfer, or domestic sourcing of production as a condition of market access. While Chinas
accession agreement to the WTO contains rules forbidding it from tying foreign direct investment to requirements to transfer technology to the
country, the rules are largely ignored.11 Because
China is still largely a technologically developing nation, forcing
companies from developed nations to transfer their technology (or, in many cases, just downright
stealing it) is a faster way to innovation success than engaging in the hard work to move up the
technology learning curve, as European and American companies have had to do. And then China uses this newfound
technological prowess to turn the tables on the developed companies, by combining their newly
acquired advanced technology with low wages (and government subsidies) to take global market share
away from them.
 Link - Human Rights
China never obeys agreements, human rights will never solve and only creates more
concession in China
Boxwell 16 (Robert Boxwell, director of the consultancy Opera Advisors, 4/5/16, South China Morning
Post, By making too many concession to China, the West has given Wings to the Tiger,
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1933643/making-too-many-concessions-china-
west-has-given-wings-tiger, date accessed: 7/16/16, BC)
In his 2011 book, On China, Henry Kissinger recounted a discussion between US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Deng Xiaoping
() in 1978 as the US and China sought to normalise relations, a rapprochement driven largely by both sides desires to check the Soviet
Union. Deng chided Brzezinski about US negotiations with the Soviets: To be candid with you, whenever you are
about to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union it is the product of [a] concession on the US side
to please the Soviet side. It was, according to Kissinger, a mocking assessment. Since Tiananmen Square,
Western business interests have hijacked politics The same could be said for practically every negotiation the West
has had with Beijing since; non-stop, predictable concessions, usually in return for promises that dont
arrive. Since Tiananmen Square, Western business interests, drooling over Chinas billion people, have
hijacked politics, ignoring inconveniences like human rights with a greed-driven insouciance. A few
months after taking office in 1993, Bill Clinton pledged to tie the annual renewal of Chinas most-
favoured-nation trading designation to improvements in human rights. The core of this policy will be a
resolute insistence upon significant progress on human rights in China, he said to an audience that
included student leaders from China alongside business leaders from the US. Whether I extend MFN
next year, however, will depend upon whether China makes significant progress in improving its human
rights record. Chinas road or the Western way: whose economic development model will prevail? Clintons resolute
insistence didnt last a year. The students left and the business leaders stayed. Human rights became just one of the
full range of US interests in China, demoted by the money to be made trading with the Tiananmen crowd and their friends. They
called it engagement. At least back then Chinas leaders played along, making vague promises about trying to improve human rights. Today
they tell the West to shut up and mind its own business. Two decades of a cheap yuan and millions of
migrant workers ballooned both Chinas trade surplus and billionaire count. Meanwhile, migrant
workers jump off the roofs of factory dormitories. Its socialism with Chinese characteristics. Watching Mark Zuckerberg
humiliate himself sucking up to Beijing is watching a rich guy give away something money cant buy Thanks to Western investment
and markets, China now has the worlds second-largest economy and largest military, yet doesnt
seem to quite like the rules that got it there. The West helped transform a China that is massively
stronger than a generation ago and appears to be less interested in human rights than ever. Watching
Facebooks Mark Zuckerberg humiliate himself sucking up to Beijing is watching a rich guy give away something money cant buy. Its
entertaining, but its also a reminder that fools with money and short-term views continue to drive the Wests politics. If you run a tech
business in Silicon Valley, you can have a state dinner with Barack Obama and Xi Jinping (). If you run a bookstore in Hong Kong, you can
have a state dinner with the guards. Facebooks Mark Zuckerberg meets Chinas propaganda chief in Beijing During Brzezinskis meeting with
Deng, foreign minister Huang Hua () summed up the situation by invoking an old Chinese proverb: Appeasement of Moscow, he said,
was like giving wings to a tiger to strengthen it. Through decades of doing just that with China, Western leaders have given plenty of wings to
the tigers in Beijing. Perhaps no promise was more hopefully accepted than that of one country, two systems. When Margaret Thatcher,
meeting Deng for the first time, indicated Britain would like to stick around in Hong Kong, the old man set the tone for negotiations by
threatening to invade. I could walk in and take the whole lot this afternoon, he told her bluntly. There is nothing I could do to stop you, she
replied, but the eyes of the world would now know what China is like. If Deng had invaded Hong Kong, or simply turned off its water, he
would have made China a pariah in the West, weakened his hand with the Soviets and aborted Chinas gestating era of economic
transformation. Yet Britain blinked rather than call his bluff, like the rest of the West since. Its hard to imagine today that Beijing could have
ever intended to honour the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Theres no way they could ever turn on democracy in Hong Kong because there is no
way they would be able to turn it off in 2047. Imagine: decades of democracy, books, media, speech freedom all gone one day without a
peep? Not likely. Beijing was never going to put itself in that position. No longer a shining example, what good is an intellectually bankrupt
Hong Kong to China? But if the democracy waffle werent proof enough that Beijing will do as it wishes with Hong Kong, the saga of the
booksellers punctuates the fruitlessness of hoping for the best. The bookseller story could have turned out just the opposite. If mainland
authorities had sent the booksellers home and made a statement that taking them was wrong, the guys who did it will be reprimanded, it wont
happen again, and the mainland respects Hong Kongs rights, they could have scored a major propaganda victory. But they didnt. And the story
just keeps growing stranger, as if someone in Beijing were having fun concocting events that will generate the biggest laugh at a humiliated
West. A smiling Lee Po, reassuring all that he is fine and, by the way, renouncing his British passport. Gui Minhai, sneaking into China from a
Pattaya condo to report to prison for an old drink-driving offence. Sure. Then Lee and two of the others slipping back into Hong Kong just to tell
the police theyre not missing before returning to the mainland. I dont know about you, but if I were under arrest on the mainland and got one
foot over the border, Id make like Usain Bolt for the nearest US embassy and try out my story on the receptionist. But five booksellers are easy
to ignore, even the two with Western passports, especially, as in Britains case, when government plans to fix an ailing economy include
investment from new BFF China. Less easy to ignore, and coming to a refugee camp near you, will be the tens of thousands of Hongkongers
who dont want to live under Beijings oppression after 2047 and want to get out before mainland agents start taking names, or worse. The US
should extend its hand to Hongkongers The US should extend its hand to these Hongkongers. This will annoy Beijing, but who cares? The
Communist Partys propaganda machine is already in overdrive on Donald Trump, calling him a racist, among other things. He could confound
them, and many of his detractors at home, by announcing hell make a path to US citizenship, now, for pre-handover Hongkongers who want to
emigrate. Hillary Clinton could announce the same and begin to wind back the human rights sell-out in which her husband participated. Bernie
Sanders needs no announcement hes the type who will let the persecuted bunk in his living room if they need temporary accommodation. As
for the rest of the relationship with Beijing, the only thing more fatuous than hoping Beijing would change a generation ago is hoping it will
now. In 20 years in Asia, Ive never heard as much talk about rethinking China as I do today. Its overdue. Though China needs all the economic
help it can get, Beijing isnt interested in playing by the Wests rules, despite those rules lifting hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty.
Thats their choice. The
Wests choice is to snap out of the combination of naivety, wilful ignorance and short-
term greed called engagement, or continue the appeasement, giving wings to the tiger. And we all know
where appeasement leads.
 Link - Inconsistencey
US is standing up to China now the plan makes the US look inconsistent which sends
the signal that the US wont challenge its power in the SCS
Branigan 15
[Tania, China Correspondent for the Guardian, March 19 2015, China crisis: west riven by age-old
question - to appease or oppose?, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/19/china-bind-is-
the-uk-accommodating-or-ceding-too-much-to-superpower, Accessed June 22 2016, A.H]

You might call it one of the irregular verbs in international diplomacy: we engage, you accommodate, they appease. US irritation over
Britains decision to sign up to a new Chinese development bank has laid bare the deep international
divisions over how to deal with the worlds newest superpower. For the Americans, as for human rights groups
and Chinese dissidents, countries like Britain are too willing to cede power to China as it grows wealthier and
more powerful. One White House official accused the UK last week of constant accommodation of
Beijing. The Foreign Office says its approach to China is consistent and it continues to raise sensitive issues, but analysts see a marked
change since Beijing punished London over David Camerons meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2012. They note a string of bilateral deals, regular
visits by government ministers to China, emollient remarks on human rights and especially the muted response to the Chinese governments
tight restrictions on voting rights in Hong Kong, which has disappointed many in Britains former colony. All
countries have of
course become more accommodating to China, says Katrin Kinzelbach of the Global Public Policy Institute, who has
researched the EU-China human rights dialogue. Cameron met the Dalai Lama, experienced a backlash and no one
stood with him It was the same when the Germans were in the same situation. Roderic Wye, associate fellow
at Chatham House and previously a China and east Asia specialist at the Foreign Office, says Europe has signally failed to
produce any consistency in policy towards China. That in itself encourages China to press hard on
issues they feel are important they think sooner or later there will be a crack. Many suggest the same is true
of Asian countries alarmed by Chinas growing military might and assertiveness, but attracted by trade with and investment from the worlds
second largest economy. Norway
is a good example. When the countrys Nobel committee awarded Chinese
dissident Liu Xiaobo the peace prize in 2010, its salmon exports plummeted. Government ministers took
note. So when the Dalai Lama visited Oslo last year, no government representatives met him. Guy de
Jonquires of the European Centre for International Political Economy suggests the costs are not terribly severe for a reasonably sized and
influential country, particularly as the Chinese economy slows and appears more precarious. China-UK trade increased by 11% in 2013, during
the Dalai Lama row, and China continued to seek cooperation at non-ministerial levels. The Chinese are intensely pragmatic and have an
awful lot of stuff they want from us, he said. He suggests the chancellor has been too quick to offer Beijing advantages such as making it
easier for Chinese banks to set up in London, loosening oversight. If all we want is to be a glorified Singapore, where making money and
exports are all that matters in foreign policy, thats fine but lets not kid ourselves if we want to be taken seriously by anyone else, he said.
The more common accusation is that European countries are not simply selling themselves too cheaply, but trading human
rights concerns for commercial interests. China assumes any accommodation from a foreign country
comes from weakness and they do not respect weakness. They will bully those who let themselves
be bullied, says Jorge Guajardo, formerly the Mexican ambassador to Beijing and now senior director at McLarty Associates in
Washington. You acquiesce on human rights and China assumes you do it for economic reasons; they
make more demands and you start acquiescing in other areas. India is probably one of the last countries to
accommodate China on anything and at the end of the day, they work very well together. Some go further, suggesting complaints about
meetings with the Dalai Lama are strategic attempts to exert power through a symbolic issue in the first place. It is easier for some countries
to take a tough stance than others. While Angela Merkel has in some ways been firmer than her predecessors, that is also possible because of
the strength of the German economy, Kinzelbach points out. If
you accept only sticks and carrots work on human rights,
what sticks and carrots can we use? We dont have any left that are attractive or impressive enough for
China any more, unfortunately, she said. She argues that the US itself has given ground on human rights issues, particularly at the
beginning of the Obama administration. There was a real desire for partnership and China didnt step up and deliver; it took advantage, said
Bonnie Glaser, an expert on Sino-US relations at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, in a more generous assessment. It was the
time of the financial crisis and China saw the US as weak. Then came the pivot, now portrayed as the strategic rebalance to Asia
welcomed by US allies but viewed by Beijing as an attempt to contain it. While many China watchers in the US question
whether the policy has been effective or even coherent, Glaser sees progress: in the joint declaration of
action on climate change and in better negotiations over issues such as North Korea and Iran. That reflected
attempts to build cooperation where the countries have common ground, while managing differences, she said. On cyber, South
China Sea, trade policy we have been very clear to the Chinese where we see our interests in
jeopardy, she added. The US is more able than other countries to challenge China, but also keener to do so; Japan
is in a similar, albeit weaker, position. The US consider they are the power in Asia-Pacific and, more than anyone
in Europe, considers Chinas rise as a losing game for them, said Feng Zhongping, an expert on Sino-European relations at
the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.
 Link INF
Note this card is not as good as the cooperation/diplomacy cards, I might read that before this card.

Nuclear deals function as appeasement China will just cheat Iran proves
Krauthammer 16
[Charles, 1/7/16, American Pulitzer Prize-winning syndicated columnist, author, political commentator,
and physician, McGill University, majoring in political science and economics, Oxford University
(Commonwealth Scholar in Politics) and Harvard (M.D. in 1975), Column: Obama's serial appeasement
has backfired, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-iran-missile-
krauthammer-putin-obama-perspec-0108-jm-20160107-story.html, Accessed July 5 2016, A.H]
If you're going to engage in a foreign policy capitulation, might as well do it when everyone is getting tanked and otherwise occupied. Say, New
Year's Eve. Here's the story. In October, Irantest-fires a nuclear-capable ballistic missile in brazen violation of
unanimous United Nations Security Council resolutions. President Barack Obama does nothing. One month later, Iran
does it again. The administration makes a few gestures at the U.N. Then nothing. Then finally, on Dec. 30, the White House
announces a few sanctions. They are weak, aimed mostly at individuals and designed essentially for show.
Amazingly, even that proves too much. By 10 p.m. that night, the administration caves. The White House sends out
an email saying that sanctions are off and the Iranian president orders the military to expedite the
missile program. Is there any red line left? First, the Syrian chemical weapons. Then the administration insistence that there
would be no nuclear deal unless Iran accounted for its past nuclear activities. (It didn't.) And unless Iran permitted inspection of its Parchin
nuclear testing facility. (It was allowed self-inspection and declared itself clean.) And now, illegal ballistic missiles. The
premise of the
nuclear deal was that it would constrain Iranian actions. It's had precisely the opposite effect. It has deterred
us from offering even the mildest pushback to any Iranian violations lest Iran walk away and leave Obama legacy-less. Just two weeks ago,
Iran's Revolutionary Guards conducted live-fire exercises near the Strait of Hormuz. It gave nearby U.S. vessels exactly 23 seconds of warning.
One rocket was launched 1,500 yards from the USS Harry S. Truman. Obama's response? None. The Gulf Arabs rich, weak and, since FDR,
dependent on America for security are bewildered. They're still reeling from the nuclear deal, which Obama declared would be unaffected by
Iranian misbehavior elsewhere. The result was to assure Tehran that it would pay no price for its aggression in Syria and Yemen, subversion in
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and support for terrorism. Obama seems not to understand that disconnecting the nuclear issue gave the mullahs
license to hunt in the region. For the Saudis, however, it's not just blundering but betrayal. From the very beginning, they've seen President
Obama tilting toward Tehran as he fancies himself Nixon in China, turning Iran into a strategic partner in managing the Middle East. This is
even scarier because it is delusional.
If anything, Obama's openhanded appeasement has encouraged Iran's
regional adventurism and intense anti-Americanism. The Saudis, sensing abandonment, are near panic. Hence the
reckless execution of the firebrand Shiite insurrectionist, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, that has brought the region to a boil. Iranians torched the Saudi
Embassy. The Saudis led other Sunni states in breaking relations with Tehran. The Saudis feel surrounded, and it's not paranoia. To their north,
Iran dominates a Shiite crescent stretching from Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to the Mediterranean. To the Saudi south, Iran has been arming
Yemen's Houthi rebels since at least 2009. The danger is rising. For years, Iran has been supporting anti-regime
agitation among Saudi Arabia's minority Shiites. The Persian Gulf is Iran's ultimate prize. The fall of the
House of Saud would make Iran the undisputed regional hegemon and an emerging global power. For
the United States, that would be the greatest geopolitical setback since China fell to communism in 1949.
Yet Obama seems oblivious. Worse, he appears inert in the face of the three great challenges to the post-Cold War American order. Iran is
only the most glaring. China is challenging the status quo in the South China Sea, just last week landing its first aircraft
on an artificial island hundreds of miles beyond the Chinese coast. We deny China's claim and declare these to be
international waters, yet last month we meekly apologized when a B-52 overflew one of the islands. We said
it was inadvertent. The world sees and takes note. As it does our response to the other great U.S. adversary Russia.
What's happened to Obama's vaunted "isolation" of Russia for its annexation of Crimea and assault on the post-Cold War European
settlement? Gone. Evaporated. Secretary of State John Kerry plays lap dog to Sergei Lavrov. Obama meets openly with Russian President
Vladimir Putin in Turkey, then in Paris. And is now practically begging him to join our side in Syria. There is no price for defying Pax
Americana not even trivial sanctions on Iranian missile-enablers. Our enemies know it. Our allies see
it and sense they're on their own, and may not survive.
 Link Korea
Removing troops signals to China we arent willing to contest their expansionism
Nichols 14
[Tom, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and an adjunct at the Harvard
Extension School, Why a Korean Pullout is a Really Bad Idea, http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/why-
a-korean-pullout-is-a-really-bad-idea/, Accessed June 28 2016, A.H]
The North Koreans, particularly the old marshals of the Korean military for whom the Korean War is still a sacred memory, would no doubt love
to see a replay of 1949, and would consider it a great victory. They would be able to gloat that they had achieved what even their big brothers
in China had been unable to do for over 60 years: a Korea whose soil is completely untainted by American boots. Moreover,
removing
American troops from Korea will signal to the Chinese that we want no further U.S. presence in their
region, and remove one more complication in any Chinese strategy of expansion or intimidation. In
sum, a pullout would raise North Koreas stature, reduce Chinas dwindling influence over its client, and
leave Pyongyang in its own eyes a peer to Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo. How is any of this a good idea? Lees proposal also takes
place in a vacuum, as though nothing else is happening in the world. By focusing on costs and planning in one part of the map, Lee treats
foreign policy as a menu from which one may pick and choose options at will, rather than as a coherent whole. American credibility is under
attack on all fronts: Russia, Syria, and Iran are but three places where perceptions of resolve matter. (Or would have mattered, had we cared
enough to insist on being more proactive two or three years ago.) What message would it send, as Ukraine is being dismembered and NATO
struggles with its responses, if the United States leaves behind an ally still in a state of war? If the only goal is to move 28,000 U.S. troops
around a map and save some money, Major Lees withdrawal looks like a terrific idea. Again, however, this is operational myopia: it may well be
that on the gaming table, the South can defeat the North without U.S. help, but this is not about operations, it is about strategy. Specifically, it
is about politics, including trying to shape the enemys perceptions and willingness to engage in risk. The
regime in Pyongyang is the
same one that attacked in 1950, and is still at war with one of our closest allies. The consequences of yet
one more American disengagement, after a string of foreign policy disasters, might well end up costing
far more than any budget-conscious planner could envision.

Removing troops makes China push hard in Asia

Kelly 09
[Robert, 12/18/09, associate professor of international relations in the Political Science and Diplomacy
Department of Pusan National University in Busan, Korea, Should the US Pull Out of South Korea (2):
No, https://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-
no/, Accessed June 28 2016, A.H]
US Sec Def Gates recently reaffirmed in very strong language the US commitment to Korean security. This served as a catalyst to extensive
discussions among my colleagues about the value of the US commitment to SK. This is part 2 of the debate. My own thinking tilts toward the
opinions in this post. So hereis why we should stay: 1. If we leave, everyone in Asia will read it as a sign that
we are weak and that we are leaving Asia generally. Yes, this is the credibility argument straight out of the Vietnam, Iraq,
and Afghanistan debates. But the world sees US power today as wavering; we are the tottering giant, especially
in Asia. If we leave during the GWoT, that image will be confirmed, and the Chinese will push hard in Asia. A
US departure will touch off an arms race as regional uncertainty rises. Asia is not where Europe or Latin America are
in terms of regional amity. The US presence is more needed in this region, and it earns the US the friendship of
the local democracies. It is hard to see how a spiraling arms race, as Japan and China openly start
competing for regional leadership, plus perhaps India and China, would help the US. The US could very
well be pulled back in later. A US departure from Korea (and Japan next?) will be read as a clear victory for
China in the Sino-US regional competition.
 Link Naval Engagement
Naval concessions to China increase risks of miscalculated conflict and marginalize US
Asian power
Kurth 12 (James, Senior Fellow at Center for the Study of America and the West, Confronting a Powerful China
with Western Characteristics, http://www.fpri.org/article/2012/01/confronting-a-powerful-china-with-western-
characteristics/) KR

If the United States adopted a policy of appeasement or accommodation toward China in the three littoral
seas and Taiwan, it would gradually but discernibly reduce both its actual naval operations and its formal
security commitments there. The pace and direction of this reduction might be understood by China to be consistent with its own
conceptions of patience and persistence. In other words, it could possibly be U.S. appeasement with Chinese
characteristics. Again, however, some Americans would still think of themselves as strong and resolute,
and they would always be contesting this policy, making its application inconsistent and confusing and
therefore again making for misconceptions and miscalculations. However, if the appeasement or accommodation
policy were carried out to its logical conclusion, there would be a massive realignment of the long-established U.S. alliance system in the
Western Pacific, i.e., involving not only the states bordering the three littoral seas and west of the First Island Chain, but also involving Japan,
which is a major component of that chain and a principal power in the region. In other words, the loss of the three littoral seas
would likely issue in the loss of the U.S. dominance in the waters that lie between the First and the
Second Island Chains. In the end, the United States could be reduced to being a secondary, or even marginalized,
power in the Western Pacific. Indeed, some Chinese military figures are beginning to raise the idea of a partitioning of the Pacific
between China and the United States, along a line roughly corresponding to the Second Island Chain. Given the economic and
military dynamics now underway in China (and the absence of such dynamics in America), it might seem
that the Chinese will inevitably displace the United States from its dominant position in the three littoral
seas and replace it with its own. The time and the way that this will happen is unknown, but the eventual
outcome can be discerned. If so, whatever might be the name, the result would be appeasement or
accommodation in this regional arena.
 Link Relations
Good relations bolster Chinese aggressiveness which makes war inevitable
Gaffney 01
[Frank J. Gaffney Jr, Founder and President of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C. formerly
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy during the Reagan Administration,
following four years of service as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms
Control Policy. Previously, he was a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee
under the chairmanship of the late Senator John Tower, and a national security legislative aide to the
late Senator Henry M. Jackson, A Deal on Chinas Hostages Then What?,
http://www.wnd.com/2001/04/8788/, Accessed June 28 2016, A.H]

Normal relations cannot and must not be maintained with a government that is as abnormal as that
of the PRC. In the years since 1972, Americans have been encouraged to avert their collective gaze from its true character and conduct.
We have increasingly ignored the systematic abuse of human rights, even though it is absurd to think the communist Chinese would care
more about other nations citizens or treat them better than they do their own. We have not allowed the PRCs aggressive
pursuit of offensive military arms, its forcible occupation of foreign territory in the Spratly Islands or
its transfer of weapons of mass destruction to our potential adversaries around the world to trouble
us, let alone to interfere with our bilateral relations. The fact that China has the worlds most active ICBM modernization program
involving weapons only needed to attack the United States is seemingly a matter of no consequence to that nations many friends in this
country. Instead, Chinas apologists and boosters encourage Americans to believe that, as long as we trade
with the communist regime and its entities, these myriad problems are irritants to be managed, rather
than indicators of fundamental and irreconcilable differences not between our two peoples but
between the United States and the odious government of China. Such shortsightedness would be troublesome even if
our balance of payments with the PRC were not running a deficit estimated to be roughly $80 billion this year. Countries do go to
war with their trading partners England and Nazi Germany were each others largest markets
before World War II and we ignore at our peril Chinas repeated description of the U.S. as its
main enemy and declarations that war between the two is inevitable. In the place of further
appeasement of the Chinese government, the United States must adopt a determined, long-term
strategy towards it akin to that employed by President Ronald Reagan to destroy another monstrous
communist regime that of the Soviet Union. This requires, among other things, calling such criminal
enterprises what they are: evil empires. Once we are clear about who we are dealing with, the rest of the steps aimed at
countering Chinas regional ambitions, growing economic power and international trouble-making become relatively straightforward, if still
very challenging, propositions. For example, a concerted effort should be made to help our countrymen understand the connection between
the myriad Chinese goods they buy and the financial wherewithal Beijing is using to purchase Russian arms designed to kill Americans. The
U.S. government must help expose attempts by the PRC and its state-owned companies to
underwrite on our capital markets activities incompatible with our values and vital national security
interests. (These include China National Petroleum Companys enabling of genocide and slave-trading in Sudan, PetroChinas participation
in the despoiling of Tibet and Great Wall Industries threatening ballistic missile programs.) And the dangerous strategic implications of sales
of U.S. supercomputers, missile-related technologies and even commercial airliners to the Peoples Liberation Army must be explained to U.S.
companies and shareholders and discouraged. Putting into place such a strategy will not be easy after the better part
of a decade of American appeasement of the Chinese communists and their political and economic inroads internationally. It will require
patience, courage, tenacity and, above all, a commitment as President Bush put it at the christening of the U.S.S.
Ronald Reagan to stand by those nations moving toward freedom [and] stand up to those nations who
deny freedom and threaten [their] neighbors or our vital interests. The good news is that today we can include
among those who are seeking freedom millions and millions among the Chinese people. Indeed, the threat this aspiration represents to their
government is one of the reasons the communist regime is engaged in ever more provocative behavior abroad; by so doing, it appeals to
nationalistic impulses and provides a pretext for intensified repression of those who dont hew to the party line. By exposing such social
engineering for what it is and by helping to empower the people of China, however, the United States has a chance of promoting a regime
change that is both in their interest and ours and the best chance of avoiding a conflict that would be hugely detrimental to the citizens of
both countries.
 Link - SCS
The plans SCS concession will be seen as appeasement
Joyner 98 (Christopher C., Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University,
12/24, The Spratly Islands Dispute in the South China Sea: Problems, Policies, and Prospects for
Diplomatic Accommodation, The Stimson Center, p. 77) MLJ
Sovereignty connotes both legal and political dimensions. For China and Vietnam especially, notions of political sovereignty are very sensitive
concerns. Any challenge to Chinas claim to the Spratlys is considered to be a challenge to Chinas
domestic sovereignty. Any concession is seen as appeasement, with adverse implications both for domestic
politics and foreign relations. This point is reinforced by the realization that nationalism and sovereignty
remain the strongest political cement holding the ideologically bankrupt Chinese Communist Party together in the
post-Cold War era. In the past, the Chinese political leadership could point to foreign intervention, the Soviet threat and irredentism to bolster
its nationalist legitimacy. Today, such appeals to nationalism by the leadership hold less political sway for challenges to Chinese claims in the
South China Sea.84 The importance of the region is viewed more in terms of geopolitical attributes, particularly
its fisheries resources, hydrocarbon potential, and commercial sea lanes. Thus, SinoVietnamese
contention over the Spratlys turns less on ideology and more on access to resources, both for
food and development. In Chinas view, then, control over the Spratlys can not be handed over
to any adversary, especially to its principal antagonist, Vietnam.

The plan disrupts successful status quo containment of China in SCS

Jin 14 (Kai, lecturer at GSIS, Yonsei University, 4/30, The US, China, and the 'Containment Trap',
http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-us-china-and-the-containment-trap/ ) MLJ

Despite U.S. assurances, in Beijings view, a number of signs indicate that the U.S. policy toward China
intends to contain rather than engage. The U.S. supports the Philippines on the South China Sea
dispute, reiterates Washingtons security commitment to Japan on the East China Sea dispute, and
has also agreed to sell more advanced arms to Taiwan. In almost every dispute that involves China, the U.S. seems
to automatically support any party that has trouble with China, either directly or indirectly. Meanwhile, the U.S.
labels Chinas overseas economic activities as neo-colonialism and calls Chinas territorial disputes with its neighbors evidence of expansionism.
The U.S. has also called China one of the biggest sources for cyber espionage activities (although Mr. Edward Snowden told the world another
story).
 Link TPP
TPP exclusion key to containment
Khong 14 (Yuen, Professor of International Relations at Oxford University, Primacy or World Order? The United
States and Chinas Rise, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00147, mitpressjournals,
p.166-167) KR

Whites approach helps us understand why, for example,the United States is so keen on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a means to
reassert its economic centrality and to counter Chinas economic primacy in Asia.21 As one analyst put it,
the TPP is an attempt by the United States to contain China [economically] by setting a high regulatory
bar.22 The fear among some in Asia is that the TPP may be too little, too late, and too exclusive. A trade pact that excludes China and
India in contemporary Asia seems out of kilter with the economic realities of the region; moreover, U.S. attempts to structure the
rules in favor of U.S. industries have slowed down the progress of the pact.23
 Link - Taiwan
There is no give on Taiwan any pro-China policy will be considered a concession and
unravel US credibility in the region
Li, Thianhok 9/18/2002 (Li Thian-hok is a freelance writer based in Pennsylvania.), Dont Appease
Chinese Expansionism, Taiwan Times. Retrieved from
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2002/09/18/0000168514/2 July 13 // DDI - CS

There are several million Chinese-Americans residing in the US and half a million Taiwanese-Americans.
The number of Chinese-Americans is growing rapidly because many Chinese graduate students manage
to remain in the US after their studies and because of the smuggling of workers from China. Although a
minority of Chinese-Americans, typically of Cantonese descent whose forebears emigrated to the US in
the 19th century, still support the ROC, a growing number of Chinese-Americans support the PRC,
particularly in regards to its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. Prominent Chinese-Americans sometimes
write opinion pieces in the US papers to support Beijing's positions. A common refrain is that the US
should promote peaceful unification of Taiwan with China, without selling out the interests of the
people of Taiwan. This is an oxymoron and an impossible task. Over 85 percent of the 23 million
Taiwanese are against unification. They prefer the status quo of a de facto independent nation. After
decades of struggle against the KMT's rule, the people of Taiwan have built a thriving free market
economy and a democracy which respects human rights. China is a repressive authoritarian state
governed by the monolithic Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For the US to pressure Taiwan to forfeit its
hard-won freedom and accept the CCP's harsh rule would violate a cardinal goal of US foreign policy --
to promote the universal values of democracy. Such perfidy would ruin US credibility, scuttle the US-
Japan security alliance, and create dangerous instability in East Asia. Another misinformed claim is that
Taiwan has historically been an integral part of China's sacred territory which should never be allowed
to split from China. To claim Taiwan is an indivisible part of China is to merely parrot Beijing's
propaganda. In the past 400 years, Taiwan was ruled by the Dutch, the Koxinga Kingdom, the Qing
Dynasty, Japan and Chiang Kai-shek's KMT, but never by the PRC. As a result of its defeat in the Sino-
Japanese War, the Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895, in perpetuity. Since 1895, Taiwan has
been ruled by a central government in China for only four years, from 1945 to 1949. In 1945, Chiang's
troops occupied Taiwan on behalf of the allied powers but the ROC never took title to Taiwan. In the
1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan merely gave up its sovereignty over Taiwan, without specifying
any beneficiary. Taiwan's history may be characterized as an incessant struggle for liberty against alien
rulers. Taiwan has been separated from China for long periods of time. The reality is that Taiwan is a
sovereign state, separate from China. To quote President Chen Shui-bian (), "only the people of
Taiwan have the right to decide the future, fate and status of Taiwan." The Taiwan Relations Act, the
basic law which governs US-Taiwan relations, says the objective of the US is to preserve and expand
the human rights of the people of Taiwan. The right to self-determination is a basic human right
enshrined in the UN Charter and in the 1966 International Covenant on Human Rights, to which both the
US and China are signatories. Chinese-Americans are fully aware of the Beijing's govern-ment's violation
of human rights. These include the killing of hun-dreds of Falun Gong practitioners through torture,
imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of dissidents in labor reform camps, mistreatment of Tibetans,
system-atic harvesting of human organs from executed prisoners for profit and the slaughter of
thousands of students at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Yet there are entirely too many unconscionable
Chinese-Americans who would be happy to have such a government imposed on the Taiwanese from
the safe perch of their far away life in the US. Still another theme is that the US should not treat China as
an enemy lest it becomes one. But the US has always been friendly and polite to China. It is China which
is baring its fangs. China's mass media is tightly controlled by the security agencies. Yet there is
widespread, virulent anti-American rhetoric. On Sept. 11 last year a group of Chinese reporters visiting
the US were overwhelmed with glee over the terrorist attacks on the US. They were promptly sent back
to China by their irate hosts. China has helped Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in building a better air
defense to shoot down US jet fighters. China's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue
states in the "axis of evil" is well documented. China is actively developing the capability to launch a
blitzkrieg against Taiwan. China is expanding the number of ICBMs targeted at the US homeland and
testing new ICBMs with multiple nuclear warheads. Should the US blithely help China build its economy
and its military power, hoping China will become a peace-loving nation? That would be a foolhardy
policy. After 150 years of humiliation by Western powers, China has a deep sense of aggrieved
nationalism, compulsively driving it to first become the hegemon of Asia and then to challenge the US
for its "rightful" place as the Middle Kingdom, to become the undisputed superpower under the
heavens. It is in the interest of the US to resolutely discourage such ambitions and to steer China
toward the path of democracy and peaceful economic development. To earn the respect so badly
coveted by the Chinese, China needs to learn to respect human rights and join the ranks of civilized
nations. Chauvinism and military aggrandizement will only lead the Chinese people to calamity. Chinese-
Americans should be careful, lest in unthinkingly supporting Beijing's belligerent expansionism, they end
up grievously harming the national interests of the US, Taiwan and yes, China.

Moving away from Taiwan is appeasing beijing convinces China US is weak

Tucker & Glaser 11 (Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, Center for Strategic International
Studies, fall 2011, Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?,
https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/19262/uploads)
Would abandoning or reducing support for Taiwan secure smoother U.S.China relations? Those in China and the United States who call for a
change in Taiwan policy insist there would be significant benefits. The decision by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to trade Taiwan for
normalization with Beijing facilitated a momentous improvement in U.S.China relations, setting a powerful precedent.2 To choose China over
Taiwan once again, it is asserted, could help Washington resolve differences with China over maritime rights, nuclear proliferation, cyber
security, and the uses of space. This line of thinking argues that even issues not directly connected with Taiwan policy could be easier to
reconcile if what China deems a core interest were satisfied. Beyond breaking the U.S.Taiwan bond, Beijing has denied any desire to push the
United States out of Asia. It has reaffirmed Deng Xiaopings injunction to hide its light and bide its time, while getting something
accomplished (taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei).3 It has repeatedly put development and peace first. However, Chinas superior economic
performance during the recession, surging global trade and investments, and developing military might led Beijing during 2010 to implement a
series of assertive initiatives which caused widespread anxiety in its neighborhood and internationally. As Chinas power grows, its allegiance to
Dengs maxim becomes more dated and stale. A
decision to jettison Taiwan, or even cut back significantly on U.S.
support, would prove to an increasingly confident China that Washington has become weak,
vacillating, and unreliable. The 2009 U.S.China Joint Statement reflected Beijings estimate that Washington could be intimidated
or misled, as it juxtaposed a reference to Taiwan as a Chinese core interest with concurrence that the two sides agreed that respecting each
others core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in U.SChina relations.4 Analysts
who argue that
Washington can safely appease Beijing because territorial concessions are not always bound to fail
are, without evidence, assuming improbably modest Chinese objectives (emphasis added).5 Relying on the
sacrifice of Taiwan to fulfill Chinese ambitions ignores more than intentions, it also overlooks internal dynamics in China. Beijing confronts
constant domestic turmoil. Corruption, income inequality, and environmental degradation have tarnished the accomplishments of the
government and party. Fears among the leadership concerning mounting social unrest, spurred by the Jasmine Revolutions in the Middle East,
produced harsh restrictions of the media and the Internet along with the imprisonment of artists, underground church members, protesting
peasants, lawyers, and human rights activists. Regaining Taiwan is unlikely to provide a broad and enduring balance
to internal unhappiness. Beijing also confronts militant nationalism which, though fostered by the government, is still difficult to
control. Any suspicion that authorities are not adequately safeguarding Chinese interests and securing international respect could threaten
regime stability. Accordingly, a
U.S. sacrifice of Taiwan, while gratifying, could not thoroughly slake a continuing
need for Beijing to demonstrate its power. Indeed, the sacrifice might promote new appetites and necessitate fresh efforts to
satisfy that need. Accommodating Chinas demands on Taiwan, moreover, would not necessarily cause
Beijing to be more pliable on other matters of importance to the United States. Beijings positions on
issues such as Korea and Iran are shaped by Chinas national interests and are not taken as favors to
Washington. Beijings determination to preserve stability in its close neighbor and ally North Korea would continue to prevent China from
increasing pressure on Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons. Resolving Chinas Taiwan problem would also not mean
greater cooperation in preventing Iran from going nuclear given Beijings almost universal opposition
to muscular sanctions, its growing energy needs, and desire to promote Chinese influence in the
Middle East.
 Link Territorial Concessions
Territorial concessions increase the likelihood of war by signaling weakness
Glaser 15 (Charles L., Prof. at Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of PoliSci at
George Washington University, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military
Competition and Accommodation, International Security, 39(4), p.74)

Second, and more complicated, instead of satisfying the adversary, territorial accommodation could
enable or encourage it to demand or forcibly pursue additional concessions. Whether these dangers
exist depends on the adversarys motives and the extent of its aims. Accommodation that might satisfy a
greedy adversary with limited aims could instead increase the probability of war if the adversary has
unlimited aims, or even limited aims that significantly exceed the scope of the concessions. The state
will almost always face some uncertainty about the nature and extent of the adversarys aims, so
accommodation will rarely be risk free. Given this uncertainty, territorial accommodation can be
dangerous if it increases the adversarys ability to launch additional challenges. Territorial concessions
can enhance the adversarys potential offensive capabilities by increasing its wealth or access to critical
resources, by providing it with territory that enhances its ability tonight on the offensive, and by freeing
up military forces that were previously committed to challenging the conceded territory. In addition,
given uncertainty about the adversarys aims, territorial accommodation can be dangerous if it
decreases the adversarys assessment of the states credibility for defending its interests, thereby
increasing the adversarys willingness to launch additional challenges.
 Link Top Shelf
US shift from engagement to balancing strategy now Plan reverses it and fuels
aggressive expansion in the East China Sea
Smith 15
[Jeff M, Director for Asian Security Programs at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC,
RIP: America's "Engagement" Strategy towards China?, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-
americas-china-strategy-should-be-13473?page=2, Accessed June 23 2016, A.H]

Since its historic rapprochement with Beijing in the 1970s, America has approached a rising China with an engagement
strategy guided by two key assumptions: first, that political liberalization would ultimately follow
economic growth; and second, that supporting Chinas integration into the global order would preempt
Beijing from forcibly challenging that order. While confidence in those assumptions has waxed and waned, never did a
consensus emerge that they were fundamentally flaweduntil now. Today, Washington is confronting
the dreadful realization that with each passing year, the goals of political liberalization and peaceful integration
appear to grow more distant, while the prospect for conflict with China draws nearer. Even advocates of
engagement, like Dr. David Shambaugh, are warning that the strategy is unraveling while domestic repression in China is the
worst it has been in the twenty-five years since Tiananmen. So what went wrong? After a decade of reaping the
benefits of a soft-power offensive, Chinas peaceful rise took an abrupt turn in the late 2000s. The country that emerged from a unique
confluence of events beginning in 2008 has proven a more assertive, authoritarian and nationalistic rising power. While the precise causes for
this shift are still being debated, we know the 2008
global financial crisis was (mis)interpreted by much of Chinas
elite as symbolic of long-term U.S. decline and retreat from the Western Pacific. For some in Beijing, the crisis
and Chinas hosting of the Olympics that yearreinforced the coalescing perception that Chinas long
wait to reclaim its position atop the Asian hierarchy had come to an end. Second, in 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia
submitted proposals to a UN commission outlining expanded sovereignty claims in the disputed South China Sea . A surge in
provocative Chinese posturing there followed, culminating most recently in an unprecedented artificial
island-building spree that is inflaming regional tensions. In 2012, China assumed an equally combative
posture in the East China Sea after Japan nationalized the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, with
Chinese naval and air forays into the territorial waters of the disputed islands now a regular
occurrence. As these events unfolded, China witnessed the precipitous rise of a new strain of nationalism, cultivated and magnified by a
new media and technology landscape. Once confined to a handful of stodgy Communist Party mouthpieces, Chinas public space has expanded
rapidly in the digital age. While liberal commentary has been heavily restricted, hawkish rhetoric and nationalist outlets like the Global Times
have been permitted to fill the void. This proliferation of nationalist discourse has partly served the Partys interests, but its also created new
pressures and incentives that reward hardline posturing and raise the political cost of concessions and compromise. Finally, the early tenure of
Chinas avowedly nationalist and politically powerful president, Xi Jinping, has produced a material rise in domestic repression and tensions
with the United States and Chinas neighbors. Xi has expanded the definition of Chinas core interests, militarized its maritime doctrine, and
overseen devastating cyberattacks against the U.S. government. At home hes adopted
a hard line on domestic dissent and
launched repeated broadsides against Western values, NGOs and civil-society groups. Depending on whom
you ask, these events either dislodged China from a more peaceful course, or accelerated its path along a preordained, nationalist trajectory.
Likewise, Americas engagement strategy was either flawed from the start, or is simply proving
insufficient to cope with the realities of a neonationalist China. Whatever the case, Xis China has brought the flaws in
Americas China strategy into sharper focus. Rapid economic growth has correlated with greater repression, while
efforts at engagement and integration have been met with more brazen challenges to the status quo.
Unsurprisingly, a growing chorus of U.S. experts is imploring Washington to abandon its informed
engagement strategy for a more muscular balancing strategy. In a recent article for the National Interest, James
Przystup and Robert Manning called for taking a page from Americas Cold War playbook, substituting containment with counterbalancing,
but maintaining an adroit and vigilant application of counterforce. Meanwhile,
an expansive 2014 report for the Council on
Foreign Relations, Balancing Without Containment, advocates for balancing the rise of Chinese
power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy by limiting Chinas capacity to misuse its
growing power. President Obama himself appears increasingly exhausted with the limitations of
engagement. Hes recently touted the virtues of a firmer approach with China because they will
push as hard as they can until they meet resistance.
 Link - Unconditional/Concessions
US Engagement with China because they are a superpower increases Chinas
aggression
Erickson & Liff 14 (Andrew and Adam are writers for foreign affairs magazine, Foreign Affairs,
10/9/14, Not-So-Empty Talk, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-10-09/not-so-
empty-talk )

Ever since his February 2012 visit to Washington, Chinese President Xi Jinping has championed his vision
for a new type of great-power relations between China and the United States. The Obama
administration, in an apparent desire to avoid conflict with a rising China, seems to have embraced Xis
formulation. In a major speech last November, U.S. National Security Adviser Susan Rice called on both
sides to operationalize the concept. And during a March 2014 summit with Xi, U.S. President Barack
Obama declared his commitment to continuing to strengthen and build a new model of relations. In
uncritically signing on to the new type of great-power relations slogan at the Obama-Xi Sunnylands
summit in June 2013, the Obama administration fell into a trap. It has what is most likely its last major
chance to dig itself out when Obama visits Beijing next month for a follow-up summit. And he should
make use of the opportunity. Although some U.S. officials dismiss rhetoric as insignificant and see this
particular formulation as innocuous, Beijing understands things very differently. At best, U.S.
acceptance of the new type of great-power relations concept offers ammunition for those in Beijing
and beyond who promote a false narrative of the United States weakness and Chinas inevitable rise.
After all, the phrasing grants China great-power status without placing any conditions on its behavior -
- behavior that has unnerved U.S. security allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific. At worst, the
formulation risks setting U.S.-Chinese relations on a dangerous course: implicitly committing
Washington to unilateral concessions that are anathema to vital and bipartisan U.S. foreign policy
values, principles, and interests. Already troubling, each additional invocation of a new type of great-
power relations grows more costly. Instead of reactively parroting this Chinese formulation,
Washington must proactively shape the narrative. It should explicitly articulate and champion its own
positive vision for U.S.-Chinese relations, which should accord China international status conditionally --
in return for Beijing abiding by twenty-first-century international norms, behaving responsibly toward its
neighbors, and contributing positively to the very international order that has enabled Chinas meteoric
rise. TROUBLING TERMINOLOGY The Obama administrations continued flirtation with the new type of
great-power relations concept appears to have been misunderstood in Beijing and beyond, and risks
being misperceived as a precipitous change in U.S. power and policy. First, the terminology paints an
absurd picture of a United States too feeble to articulate, much less defend, its own vision for promoting
peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia -- only furthering perceptions of U.S. decline in China and its
neighbors. The Obama administrations rhetoric, however well intentioned, sometimes exacerbates this
misperception. A case in point: Kerrys statement to his Chinese counterparts at the 2014 U.S.-China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue that there is no U.S. strategy to try to push back against or be in
conflict with China. The Obama administration is certainly right to try to allay concerns -- unfounded
but extremely prevalent in China -- that the United States is attempting to contain China. But it is ill
advised to do so in a manner so easily heard as an apology. Second, Beijings interpretation of new type
of great-power relations appears to be linked to an assumption that Chinas growing material power
has made a power transition inevitable, compelling Washington to accommodate Beijings claims in the
South and East China Seas now. Such arguments reveal ignorance, first, of fundamental changes to the
international order since the days of might makes right and, second, of the manifold sources of U.S.
power and preeminence. By allowing the terms great-power relations and equality to permeate
official discourse on bilateral relations, Washington risks tacitly condoning such anachronistic views of
international politics. Third, Chinas economic growth is slowing, and the countrys future is ever more
uncertain as various societal and other domestic headwinds strengthen. Decades of extraordinary
economic and military growth make many Chinese assume that the rapid increases in material power
will continue indefinitely. That is unlikely, but the consequences of such bullishness are real and
unsettling: growing expectations within China for U.S. concessions and anachronistic calls for equal
treatment and space. If that werent enough, the new type of great-power relations concept is also
unnerving to U.S. allies and partners in the region. If fears of abandonment grow, some may seek
other -- potentially more destabilizing -- options for deterring China.
2NC Impacts
 2NC Impact Calc
Magnitude Appeasement ensures the largest wars because it allows China to
develop more power
Jacobs 15 (Appeasement will only encourage China, 11/1, Bruce Jacobs: professor of Asian Languages and Studies at
Monash University, http://www.theage.com.au/comment/appeasement-will-only-encourage-expansionist-china-20151101-
gknz2l.html#ixzz4D642C1lo)

The tensions in Asia today have only one cause: China. On the basis of false "history", China claims the South
China Sea, the East China Sea and Taiwan. Yet China has no historical claims to the South and East China seas. Historically,
south-east Asian states conducted the great trade in the South China Sea. China had almost no role. Furthermore, geographically, the contested
areas are close to Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines, while they are more than 1000 kilometres south of China.
China's claims for sovereignty in these areas have no historical basis and its constructing of "islands" on
submerged reefs only demonstrates China's expansionism. Similarly, in the East China Sea, China's claims to the Senkaku
Islands (which China calls the Diaoyutai) have no historical foundation. The People's Daily of January 8, 1953, stated that the "Senkaku" Islands
belonged to the Ryukyu Archipelago, and a World Atlas published in China in 1958 showed that these islands belong to Japan. China's claims
that Taiwan belongs to it also have no historical basis. Mao Zedong, in his famous 1936 interview with Edgar Snow, stated that Taiwan should
be independent. Only in 1942 did the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) and the Chinese Communist Party separately claim that
Taiwan was Chinese. In Taiwan's history, a Han Chinese regime based in China has only controlled Taiwan for four years, from 1945 to 1949.
These four years were perhaps the saddest in all of Taiwan's history because Chiang Kai-shek's government killed tens of thousands of
Taiwanese in the infamous 2.28 (February 28, 1947) massacres. The dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek and his son and successor, Chiang Ching-
kuo, ruled Taiwan from 1945 until the latter's death in early 1988. Their rule was a Chinese colonial project that privileged Chinese who had
come with Chiang Kai-shek and systematically discriminated against native Taiwanese. Only with the accession of Lee Teng-hui to the
presidency after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 could Taiwan begin its democratisation process. Now Taiwan, a country with a
population the size of Australia, has become a democratic middle power. The so-called "one China" policy of many countries including the
United States and Australia is a relic of the old Chiang Kai-shek/Chiang Ching-kuo dictatorship, which pushed a "one China" policy without
consulting Taiwan's population. All the major Western democracies, as well as Japan and India, now have substantial if unofficial diplomatic
offices in Taiwan. And, although these nations do not publicise the point, all have de facto "One China, one Taiwan" policies. The arguments of
people such as Age columnist Hugh White are dangerous. They ignore the cause of tension in Asia and say we have to be careful about
becoming involved in a war. History
has taught us that "appeasement" of such expansionist powers as China
does not stop war. Rather, it only temporarily postpones armed conflict and ultimately leads to a much
larger war later. Appeasement of China only enhances Chinese perceptions that the US is a toothless
paper tiger. It creates a sense among China's generals and political leaders that they can pursue
expansionist policies without international protest. The pretence that Taiwan's vote for its own president and legislature can
lead to war is false. Both main candidates, Tsai Ing-wen and Eric Chu, want to maintain the status quo that Taiwan is de facto an independent
state but that it will not announce this. Australians would be appalled if we were told by a foreign power that voting for either Malcolm
Turnbull or Bill Shorten would lead to war and that we should vote accordingly. We must be clear that China is the only
country threatening anyone else in Asia. The close talks between leaders of such countries as the US, Japan, India and Australia
demonstrate that Asia's democratic countries have become aware of the risks.

Timeframe The plan creates a clear window of opportunity They incentivize

preemptive war in the short term
Haddick 14 (Robert, defense scholar, Is there a Chinese window of opportunity for attacking within
about 5 to 10 years?, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/03/is-there-a-chinese-window-of-opportunity-
for-attacking-within-about-5-to-10-years/)

However, past 2025, the new U.S. bomber will arrive. High-power directed energy defenses may also arrive at
that time, making surface forces relevant again. And investments in autonomous and low-cost long-range unmanned systems
may be a competitive U.S. advantage later next decade. On the other hand, China is leaping forward. While the
United States is fallow over the next 10 years, Chinas C4ISR networks will fill out, its Flanker inventories will continue to grow, J-20 long-range
stealthy strike-fighter regiments will arrive, and Chinas submarine fleet will grow, improve in quality, and outnumber the
U.S. Pacific submarine fleet by more than two-to-one. Most important, Chinas
land-attack and anti-ship missile forces will
continue to expand, areas where the United States has much less happening. Adding it up, the Chinese "window" may
open the widest between 2020 and 2025, after which it may begin to close. Whether Chinas leaders see
it the same way remains to be seen.

Probability Equivocation emboldens China Its the only route to escalation

Ratner 14 (Ely, CNAS Asia-Pacific security program deputy director, Roiling the Waters, 1-21,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/roiling-the-waters/)
Although officials on both sides of the Pacific are publicly loath to add fuel to the fire, it is increasingly clear that Chinas recent regional
provocations are the result of more than just knee-jerk reactions or bureaucratic malfunctions over long-forgotten borders or arcane historical
ownership. Beijings
far-reaching claims in the East and South China seas and coercive efforts to
intimidate neighbors have unsettled countries from Vietnam to the Philippines to Japan because they amount to an
expansionist strategy, with profound implications for U.S. power and regional security. Chinas latest act of revisionism, in
late November, was to declare an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) across large swaths of the East China Sea, including over the disputed
Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu by the Chinese). Americas response was twofold: The White House indicated that it would not officially
honor the ADIZ designation (a message delivered by sending unarmed B-52 bombers through the zone on what the Pentagon called a routine
and long-planned training mission), but it initially encouraged commercial airliners to comply with Beijings request to identify themselves to
Chinese air traffic control. Meanwhile, it dispatched high-level officials to calm the waters: When Vice President Joe Biden met with Chinese
leaders in early December, his mission, according to one senior administration official, was to push for "crisis management mechanisms and
confidence-building measures to lower tensions and reduce risk of escalation or miscalculation." This effort to play the role of regional
peacemaker echoes the Obama administrations approach in 2012 during the Scarborough Shoal standoff between China and the Philippines,
as well as during the row between Tokyo and Beijing after Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands. But if Chinas ends havent changed, its
means have in the past years, Beijing has stepped up efforts to achieve its long-held territorial aims. As a former Chinese ambassador told us
in December, her countrys position in the world is like that of "a new student that jumped many grades." Maybe so, but Beijings behavior
since 2009 is more akin to that of a brash adolescent both unaware and blithe to the potential consequences of adventurous behavior. U.S.
officials have been careful to avoid provoking a China that appears increasingly willing to flex its
newfound military muscle. Perhaps thats why Biden invoked his fathers advice in warning on the eve of his Beijing visit that "the only
conflict that is worse than one that is intended is one that is unintended." But an overemphasis on stability can be
dangerous. While preventing inadvertent war in Asia is obviously a worthy goal, it is just as important to
discourage China from believing that it can employ economic, military, and diplomatic coercion to settle
international disagreements without triggering a serious response. Making the risk of escalation too low
will at some point start running counter to U.S. interests. Why? Because China is taking advantage of
Washingtons risk aversion by rocking the boat, seeing what it can extract in the process, and letting the
United States worry about righting it. Beijings playbook of tailored coercion relies in part on Chinas confidence
that it can weather ephemeral international outrage while Washington takes responsibility for ensuring the
situation doesnt get out of control. This means that reducing the likelihood of escalation through high-level strategic dialogues
and military-to-military hotlines, however important, is in and of itself insufficient to curb Chinese assertiveness. History has
demonstrated the perils of focusing too much on stability at the expense of deterrence. The Cuban
missile crisis, the modern worlds closest brush with the apocalypse, was precipitated by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchevs
perception that the United States, especially President John F. Kennedy, was overly concerned about stability and cooling
tensions between the superpowers. Khrushchevs sense that America could be pushed was formed by Kennedys cautious reactions to
assertive Soviet moves toward Berlin, as well as Khrushchevs measure of Kennedy at the 1961 Vienna superpower summit as "weak" and
accommodating. Over the following year and a half, Khrushchev and the Soviet Union sought to exploit what they perceived to be shaky
American resolve, pressing in Berlin, where East Germany built a wall closing off the free part of the city, and secretly deploying nuclear-armed
missiles to Cuba. Only through a demonstrated willingness on the part of Kennedy to go to the nuclear brink with U.S. nuclear forces on high
alert and U.S. naval forces prepared to forcibly halt Soviet ships attempting to run the blockade (accompanied by a U.S. concession on missile
deployments in Turkey) was the United States able to get Moscow to back down. Needless to say, restraint and a willingness to negotiate
were elemental to a peaceful resolution of the crisis, but only in the context of a major mobilization of U.S. forces against Cuba, the elevation of
the U.S. alert level to Defcon 2 (one step short of nuclear war), and chilling threats designed to convince the Soviets that conciliation was the
only viable move. OF COURSE, CHINA IS NOT THE SOVIET UNION. And 2014 is not 1962. The point is simply that a country with the power of the
USSR or China, unsatisfied with features of the existing order, motivated to do something to change it, and skeptical of the resolve of the
United States, could well pursue a policy of coercion and brinkmanship, even under the shadow of nuclear weapons. As historian Francis Gavin
has argued, the whole history of the Cold War shows that countries
like China and, at times, the United States can bluff,
coerce, and threaten their way to geopolitical gain. The worst way to deal with such a power is to leave
it with the impression that these approaches work. Just as the United States would have been far better off if Kennedy, at
the Vienna summit, had squelched Khrushchevs doubts about his resolve to defend Berlin, it will be far better if the leadership in Beijing has
the clear sense that the United States will meet each challenge to its and its allies interests resolutely. Taking a cue from history, the
United
States needs to inject a healthy degree of risk into Beijings calculus, even as it searches for ways to cooperate
with China. This does not mean abandoning engagement or trying to contain China, let alone fomenting
conflict. But it does mean communicating that Beijing has less ability to control escalation than it seems
to think. China must understand that attempts to roil the waters could result in precisely the kinds of costs
and conflicts it seeks to avoid. To make this work, the United States should pursue policies that actually
elevate the risks political, economic, or otherwise to Beijing of acting assertively. On the high seas, the focal
point for the regions territorial disputes, China has bullied its neighbors by relying on non-military vessels. China is
using its rapidly expanding coast guard to assert its expansive sovereignty claims by harassing non-Chinese fishermen, oil companies, and
military vessels that pass through contested waters in the East and South China seas. This has the benefit of exploiting Chinas dominant
numerical advantage while keeping the U.S. Navy on the sidelines. Washington should blur the false distinction between non-military and
military ships by stating that it will respond to physical coercion and the use of force as deemed appropriate regardless of whether the
perpetrator is a white- or gray-hulled ship. Exercises that practice U.S. naval operations against aggressive non-military vessels would be a good
place to start. So would calling upon China to end its illegal occupation of the disputed Scarborough Shoal off the Philippine coast, while
contesting Chinese administration there by sending the U.S. Navy through the area to assert its right to freedom of navigation. The Chinese PLA
Navy, for its part, hasnt been shy to test the waters. In early December, the U.S. Pacific Fleet revealed that the guided-missile cruiser USS
Cowpens, while shadowing Chinas new aircraft carrier on a routine mission in international seas, was forced to take evasive action when a PLA
Navy warship attached to the carrier group approached on a collision course, literally forcing the cruiser into a game of chicken. "The Chinese
knew what they were doing," a military official told CNN. Beyond the sea, the
United States must demonstrate a willingness to
push back militarily when China attempts to coerce Americas allies and partners. To do this, the U.S.
military needs capabilities and plans that not only prepare it for major war, but that also offer plausible,
concrete options for responding to Chinese attempts to exploit Americas perceived aversion to
instability. Leaders throughout Asia will be watching. Too much caution, especially if China is clearly the initiator,
may be read as U.S. weakness, thereby perpetuating rather than diminishing Chinas incentives toward
adventurism. The United States can further raise the stakes by deepening its military ties with Japan. This year, the two countries will
rewrite the guidelines that govern the roles and responsibilities of their partnership. The result could be major steps forward in joint military
planning and interoperability. Washington can also play a key role in mending fences between Tokyo and Seoul, renewing trilateral cooperation
to address the many interests and common threats that the three countries share. Beyond Americas traditional alliances in Northeast
Asia, the Obama administration must demonstrate a concrete, long-lasting commitment to Australia, the Philippines, and Singapore in order to
provide the United States with a more diversified set of partners and forward-operating locations in Asia, as well as broader political legitimacy.
Beijings planners worry about Americas burgeoning military alliances and partnerships in Asia. Good. That
means theyll be more reluctant to start a fight if doing so means China could end up facing a multitude of the regions
powerhouses. The point, of course, is not to increase the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China. Rather, the goal is to
cultivate real, long-term stability in Asia that doesnt give China a license to push, prod, and bully. Critics might assert that
taking these steps will invite precisely the kind of Cold War-like competition that will make conflict, if not outright war,
most likely. This is a real possibility, and U.S. policymakers will have to carefully balance deterrence with engagement. But those who
are reluctant to push back need to ask themselves whether Chinas top leaders currently see a sufficient
downside in acting assertively. Clearly, they do not.
 2NC China War
Appeasement fuels Chinese regional assertiveness
Newsham 14 (China, American and the Appeasement Question. 9/8, Grant, Senior Research Fellow at the Japan
Forum for Strategic Studies, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-america-the-appeasement-question-11226)

failure to challenge the Peoples Republic of Chinas (PRC) territorial

In February 2014, Philippine President Benigno Aquino warned that

seizures in the South China Sea would be repeating the 1930s era appeasement of Hitlers Germany. The Chinese
were predictably outraged while the rest of the world mostly ignored President Aquino. Appeasement is still a dirty word. But in the 1930s, until the Nazis
invaded Poland in September, 1939, European and American elites considered appeasement to be a sophisticated, nuanced approach to dealing with increasingly
powerful authoritarian regimes. To these elites, appeasement was more than simply disarming and letting unpleasant people have their way. Appeasement actually
had a coherent logic. The elites believed that aggressive, authoritarian regimes act the way they do out of fear, insecurity, and at least partly legitimate grievances
such as German resentment of the harsh Treaty of Versailles. Understand and address these issue, remove their fears, and the regimes will become less aggressive
and transform into responsible members of the international community and operate under international norms. Or so the elites argued. Challenging these regimes
could dangerously isolate them and even needlessly provoke them into miscalculations. The elites thought engagement and transparency were beneficial in
their own right, as only good things could come from familiarity with one another. In the 1930s, the major Western powers all attended each others war games.
The US Marine Corps even took the German World War I fighter ace, Ernst Udet on a ride in a USMC dive bomber. This engagement and transparency did not
make the Nazis nicer, but perhaps gave them some ideas about dive bombing and Blitzkreig. Even the Soviets and Germans had close ties with joint training,
military technology development, and raw material shipments to Germany. There was also extensive political and diplomatic interaction. Close economic ties were
believed to be a further hedge against conflict breaking out, and companies such as Ford, IBM, and many others did profitable business in Germany. The elites
believed anything was better than war. Preserving peace, even if sacrificing principles and certain small nations was considered wise and statesmanlike. People
who criticized appeasement policy in the 1930s, most notably Winston Churchill, were ridiculed as dolts and war mongers. We know how this turned out. Curiously,
appeasement (by another name) reappeared even before the end of the war in calls to address Stalins fears and allow him to dominate Eastern Europe. And
throughout the Cold War, in Western academic and government circles it was argued that Soviet behavior was simply a reaction to fears of Western containment.
The appeasers protested the peacetime draft as threatening the Russians. They also pushed for unilateral nuclear disarmament, and opposed the Pershing missile
deployment and the neutron bomb well into the 1980s. Even President Jimmy Carter, once he overcame his inordinate fear of communism, tried something akin
to appeasement as national policy. It was not until the Soviets invaded Afghanistan that Carter learned his lesson. It perhaps will take another case of an
authoritarian regime rearranging its neighborhood to understand the cost of modern appeasement. US policy towards China over the last 30 years, and particularly
in recent times, seems familiar. The
United States does its best to understand the PRCs concerns and its
resentments going back to the Opium Wars and the century of humiliation, to accommodate these resentments, and to ensure
China does not feel threatened. Defense and State Department officials enthusiastically seek greater transparency
and openness especially in the military realm as such openness is perceived as inherently good. In return, the
PRC is expected to change, to show more respect for human rights and international law and to become a responsible stakeholder
in the international community. We now have several decades of empirical evidence to assess this concessionary approach. It has not resulted in
improved, less aggressive PRC behavior in the South China Sea or the East China Sea, or even in outer
space. Indeed, it seems to have encouraged Chinese assertiveness as manifest in threatening language and behavior
towards its neighbors. Nor has the PRC regime shown more respect for human rights, rule of law, consensual
government or freedom of expression for its citizens. Serial intellectual property theft continues unabated, as does support for unsavory
dictators. Nonetheless, we invite the PRC to military exercises and repeat the engagement mantra expecting that one day things will magically improve. Some
argue that letting the PRC see US military power will dissuade it from challenging us. Perhaps, but we are just as likely to be seen as nave or weak. From the Chinese
perspective, there is no reason to change since they have done very well without transforming and the PRC has never been stronger. Indeed, the
PRC
frequently claims that human rights, democracy, and the like are outmoded Western values having
nothing to do with China. This is also demoralizing our allies, who at some point may wonder if they should cut their own deals with the PRC. Some
revisionist historians argue that Neville Chamberlains 1930s era appeasement was in fact a wise stratagem to buy time to rearm. This overlooks that even as late as
1939 when Hitler seized all of Czechoslovakia, the Western democracies still had the military advantage. One can appease oneself into a corner. And the beneficiary
of the appeasement usually strengthens to the point it is too hard to restrain without great sacrifice. One worries that the Chinese seizure of Philippine territory at
Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and the US Governments unwillingness to even verbally challenge the PRC - might turn out to be this generations Rhineland. Had
the West resisted Hitler in 1936 when he made this first major demand, there would have been no World War II, no Holocaust, and no Cold War. Our choice
about how to deal with the PRC is not simply between either appeasement or treating China as an enemy. Our policy must accommodate
options ranging from engagement to forceful confrontation. Who would not be delighted with a China that stopped threatening its neighbors
and followed the civilized worlds rules? While ensuring we and our allies have a resolute defense both in terms of military capability and the willingness
to employ it it is important to maintain ties and dialogue with the PRC and to provide encouragement and support when it shows clear signs of transforming to a
freer, less repressive society. We
should constantly stress that China is welcome as a key player in the international
order but only under certain conditions. The US and other democratic nations have not done enough to require China to
adhere to established standards of behavior in exchange for the benefits of joining the global system that has allowed the PRC to prosper.
Human nature and history are a useful guide to where appeasement (by whatever name) leads. And they also show that a strong
defense and resolutely standing up for ones principles is more likely to preserve peace.

Appeasement foments warfighting incentives

Guangquan 13 (Wu, President of AVIC International, US Should Remember the Consequences of Appeasing Japan,
http://watchingamerica.com/WA/2013/07/24/u-s-should-remember-the-consequences-of-appeasing-japan/)

A U.S. think tank pointed out in a recent report that the rightward bent of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other politicians has caused
a significant amount of controversy. This presents an enormous barrier to peaceful cooperation within Northeast Asia.
It is not yet too
late for the U.S. to switch from condoning this to worrying about it. I think it would be extremely
beneficial for Americans to look back upon World War II and recall the valuable lesson of how
appeasement leads to war. In the early 1930s, after Hitler rose to power, he began a frenzied military expansion in
preparation for war. Under the pretext of taking so-called "living space," he brazenly fanned the flames of racial purity, making Germany
the epicenter of the war. The U.K., France and the U.S. wished to avoid war with Hitler, adopting policies of
appeasement. When German and Italian forces interfered in Spain, Britain and France adopted policies of noninterference and the U.S.
declared its neutrality; when Germany annexed Austria, Britain and France said that the Anschluss was necessary; as Czechoslovakia was
divided piecemeal, Britain and France signed the infamous Munich Agreement, selling out their ally. However, these policies of
appeasement did not win them peace in return. On Sept. 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, marking the beginning of World
War II. Japan's path to war was somewhat different than that of Germany and Italy. At the time, the strength of Japanese militarism was fast
developing and, in the end, the Ministry of War seized power over the country. Japan was always dissatisfied with its share of the spoils from
World War I and advocated for once again dividing the global pie. Meanwhile, the U.K., France and the U.S. sought to protect
their existing interests through appeasement, most particularly the U.S. with its appeasement under the
banner of "splendid isolation, which then encouraged Japan to invade and expand into other countries in Asia. This continued until
Japan launched its surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, prompting the U.S. to finally come to its senses and join the war. We should not
forget the past, but learn from it. Now let us follow the trajectory of history to gain a better view of Shinzo Abe's current conduct:
as soon as he was elected, he denied the history of Japanese invasions and crimes, including widespread massacres; he challenged the post-
World War II global order, howled about his desire to make Japan a normal country and, with complete disregard for the terms of international
treaties, made ludicrous territorial demands of neighboring countries; he was agitated by the indeterminate "definition of what constitutes an
invasion" and the legitimacy of colonial rule; he encouraged many members of parliament and his cabinet to visit the Yasukuni Shrine; he
contrived every possible means to modify Japan's peaceful constitution, expand the armed forces and change the Self-Defense Forces into an
army; and Japan's latest white paper pointed to a desire to develop its own military strength. Under the influence of Abe's antics, Japanese
society is quickly moving to the right.
 2NC - China emboldenment
Perception of weakness causes US/China war.
Christensen, Spring 2001 (Thomas professor of politics at Princeton, Posing problems without catching
up, International Security, p. ebscohost)

On the active defense side, it appears that China is attempting to import and to build indigenously a
fairly impressive layered air defense system to counter cruise missiles and advanced aircraft. In addition
to reported clandestine acquisition of Patriot technology, China has purchased and is seeking to
purchase from Russia an undisclosed number of SA-10 (S-300) and SA-15 (TOR-1) SAM systems. Some of
this Russian technology might be successfully integrated into China's own domestically produced SAM
systems, such as the HQ-9. [66] China is also working to develop antistealth and antisatellite capabilities.
Even if the Chinese programs have only limited effect against more technologically advanced foes, they
may still pose a future security challenge to Taiwan and the United States. If Beijing elites believe that
they are in a protracted war of wills over an issue that they care about much more than do the
Americans, such as Taiwan, those elites might still be emboldened by the perceived capability--
however limited--to increase costs to American and Taiwanese forces and to reduce costs to mainland
assets in such a struggle. This problem is only exacerbated by any perceptions that Chinese elites might
have about America's supposed limited willingness to fight such protracted wars and to suffer
casualties. Implications and Prescriptions for U.S. Strategy If the analysis above is correct, preventing
war across the Taiwan Strait and between the United States and China is much more difficult than a
straightforward net assessment of relative military power in the region might suggest. To deter China
from launching attacks against Taiwan and escalating crises and conflicts by attacking American assets in
the region, the United States must do more than demonstrate an ability to prevail militarily in a conflict;
it must also demonstrate American resolve and, perhaps, the ability to protect its forces not only from
defeat but also from significant harm.
 2NC - Hotspots
Loss of mission cred and effectiveness causes nuclear war in every hotspot
Kagan and OHanlon 7 Frederick, resident scholar at AEI and Michael, senior fellow in foreign policy at
Brookings, The Case for Larger Ground Forces, April 2007,
http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424_Kagan20070424.pdf

wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the
We live at a time when

current relative calm is tenuous a strategic military challenge for the U S is not to espouse a
. To view this as nited tates

specific theory of Americas role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American for eign policy makers since World War II that

overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this countrys shores basic , that the

stability of the international system is essential to American peace and that no country besides and prosperity,

the U S is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order
nited tates . Let us highlight the

threats and their consequences emphasiz those that involve key strategic regions of the
with a few concrete examples, ing

world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or threats to American security, such as the spread key potential

of nuclear weapons and Al Qaeda the strengthening of the global /jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international

Korea ripple effects are beginning

inspections. What will happen if the USor Israeligovernment becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North , of course, has already done so, and the

to spread . Japans recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that countrys constitution to support increased armed forcesand, possibly, even nuclear weapons may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia

Sino Taiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and

fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now,

Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the U S d so on. nited tates, an Meanwhile, the worlds nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe

with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will

to Americas Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet continue probably, tragically,
unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration

Sound US
might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lostbut the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing.

grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the
world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place The only , with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries.

serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting
Americas vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a
wide range of missionsincluding not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with
potential hotspots in Korea Taiwan and the Persian Gulf , the Strait, but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For todays US military, which
already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now

preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this

under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while. But

late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent . At worst, the only

Recent history shows no link between having a larger

potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money.

military and its overuse Reagans time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and
; indeed, Ronald

yet much less use of the military , an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with
OHanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to
start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.
That some heg failures are inevitable doesnt disprove the greater success of
predominance
Kagan 12 (Not Fade Away The myth of American decline. Robert Kagan senior fellow at Brookings Inst. January
11, 2012 | 5:04 pm; The New Republic, http://goo.gl/SEyOM)

IF ONE WANTED to make a case for American decline, the 1970s would have been the time to do it; and many did. The United
States, Kissinger believed, had evidently passed its historic high point like so many earlier civilizations.... Every civilization that has ever existed
has ultimately collapsed. History is a tale of efforts that failed. It was in the 1970s that the American economy lost its overwhelming
primacy, when the American trade surplus began to turn into a trade deficit, when spending on entitlements and social welfare
programs ballooned, when American gold and monetary reserves were depleted. With economic difficulties came political and strategic
insecurity. First came the belief that the tide of history was with the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders themselves believed the
correlation of forces favored communism; the American defeat and withdrawal from Vietnam led Soviet officials, for the first time, to believe
they might actually win in the long Cold War struggle. A decade later, in 1987, Paul Kennedy depicted both superpowers as suffering from
imperial overstretch, but suggested that it was entirely possible that the United States would be the first to collapse,
following a long historical tradition of exhausted and bankrupt empires. It had crippled itself by spending too much on defense and taking on
too many far-flung global responsibilities. But
within two years the Berlin Wall fell, and two years after that the Soviet
Union collapsed. The decline turned out to be taking place elsewhere. THEN THERE WAS the miracle economy of Japan. A rise of the
rest began in the late 1970s and continued over the next decade and a half, as Japan, along with the other Asian tigers, South Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan, seemed about to eclipse the United States economically. In 1989, the journalist James Fallows argued that the Japanese
state-directed economy was plainly superior to the more laissez-faire capitalism of the United States and was destined to surpass it. Japan was
to be the next superpower. While the United States had bankrupted itself fighting the Cold War, the Japanese had been busy taking all the
marbles. As the analyst Chalmers Johnson put it in 1995, The Cold War is over, and Japan won. Even as Johnson typed those words, the
Japanese economy was spiraling downward into a period of stagnation from which it has still not recovered. With the
Soviet Union gone and China yet to demonstrate the staying power of its economic boom, the United States suddenly appeared to be the
worlds sole superpower. Yet even then it was remarkable how unsuccessful the United States was in dealing with many serious global
problems. The Americans won the Gulf War, expanded NATO eastward, eventually brought peace to the Balkans, after much bloodshed, and,
through most of the 1990s, led much of the world to embrace the Washington consensus on economicsbut some of these successes
began to unravel, and were matched by equally significant failures. The Washington consensus began to collapse with the Asian financial
crisis of 1997, where American prescriptions were widely regarded as mistaken and damaging. The United States failed to stop or even
significantly to retard the nuclear weapons programs of North Korea and Iran, despite repeatedly declaring its intention to do so. The sanctions
regime imposed against Saddam Husseins Iraq was both futile and, by the end of the decade, collapsing. The United States, and the world, did
nothing to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, partly because a year earlier the United States had been driven out of Somalia after a failed
military intervention. One of the most important endeavors of the United States in the 1990s was the effort to support a transition in post-
Soviet Russia to democracy and free-market capitalism. But despite providing billions of dollars and endless amounts of advice and expertise,
the United States found events in Russia once again to be beyond its control. Nor were American
leaders, even in the supposed
heyday of global predominance, any more successful in solving the Israeli-Palestinian problem than they are
today. Even with a booming economy and a well-liked president earnestly working to achieve a settlement, the Clinton administration came up
empty-handed. As the former Middle East peace negotiator Aaron David Miller recounts, Bill Clinton cared more about and invested more
time and energy in Arab-Israeli peace over a longer period of time than any of his predecessors, and was admired and appreciated by both
Israelis and Palestiniansand yet he held three summits within six months and fail[ed] at every one. Clintons term ended with the collapse
of peace talks and the beginning of the second Palestinian intifada. Even popularity was elusive in the 1990s. In 1999, Samuel P. Huntington
labeled America the lonely superpower, widely hated across the globe for its intrusive, interventionist, exploitative, unilateralist, hegemonic,
hypocritical behavior. The French foreign minister decried the hyperpower and openly yearned for a multipolar world in which the United
States would no longer be dominant. A British diplomat told Huntington: One reads about the worlds desire for American leadership only in
the United States. Everywhere else one reads about American arrogance and unilateralism. THIS WAS NONSENSE, of course. Contrary to the
British diplomats claim, many other countriesdid look to the United States for leadership, and for protection and
support, in the 1990s and throughout the Cold War. The point is not that America always lacked global influence. From
World War II onward, the United States was indeed the predominant power in the world. It wielded enormous
influence, more than any great power since Rome, and it accomplished much. But it was not omnipotentfar
from it. If we are to gauge accurately whether the United States is currently in decline, we need to have a
reasonable baseline from which to measure. To compare American influence today with a mythical past of
overwhelming dominance can only mislead us. Today the United States lacks the ability to have its way on many
issues, but this has not prevented it from enjoying just as much success, and suffering just as much failure, as in
the past. For all the controversy, the United States has been more successful in Iraq than it was in Vietnam. It has been just as
incapable of containing Iranian nuclear ambitions as it was in the 1990s, but it has, through the efforts of two administrations, established
a more effective global counter-proliferation network. Its efforts to root out and destroy Al Qaeda have been
remarkably successful, especially when compared with the failures to destroy terrorist networks and stop terrorist attacks in the 1990s
failures that culminated in the attacks of September 11. The ability to employ drones is an advance over the types of weaponrycruise missiles
and air strikesthat were used to target terrorists and facilities in previous decades. Meanwhile Americas alliances in Europe remain
healthy; it is certainly not Americas fault that Europe itself seems weaker than it once was. American alliances in Asia
have arguably grown stronger over the past few years, and the United States has been able to strengthen relations with India that had
previously been strained. So the record is mixed, but it has always been mixed. There have been moments when the United
States was more influential than today and moments when it was less influential. The exertion of influence has always been a struggle, which
may explain why, in every single decade since the end of World War II, Americans have worried about their declining
influence and looked nervously as other powers seemed to be rising at their expense. The difficulties in shaping the international
environment in any era are immense. Few powers even attempt it, and even the strongest rarely achieve all or even most
of their goals. Foreign policy is like hitting a baseball: if you fail 70 percent of the time, you go to the Hall of Fame
 2NC - Laundry List
The perception of weakness results in proliferation, terrorism and the collapse of
alliances
Gaffney, 1/1/2000 (Frank president of the Center for Security Policy, American power for what,
Commentary, p. lexis)

Fundamentally, we agree that the main threat arises not from the United States' being too powerful but
from its being perceived abroad as weak and irresolute. That perception, alas, is generally the result of
our acting that way at home--a phenomenon all too much in evidence during the Clinton years. It is no
coincidence that during this period we have witnessed serious erosion in America's alliances, escalating
proliferation, an ominous "strategic partnership" being forged between the Russians and Chinese, and
the growing power of rogue states and terrorist organizations. These are tectonic shifts in the
geopolitical plate structure with which we will have to contend for years to come.

Alliances prevent nuclear war

Ross, Winter 1998/1999 (Douglas professor of political science at Simon Fraser University, Canadas
functional isolationism and the future of weapons of mass destruction, International Journal, p. lexis)

Thus, an easily accessible tax base has long been available for spending much more on international
security than recent governments have been willing to contemplate. Negotiating the landmines ban,
discouraging trade in small arms, promoting the United Nations arms register are all worthwhile,
popular activities that polish the national self-image. But they should all be supplements to, not
substitutes for, a proportionately equitable commitment of resources to the management and
prevention of international conflict and thus the containment of the WMD threat. Future American
governments will not police the world alone. For almost fifty years the Soviet threat compelled
disproportionate military expenditures and sacrifice by the United States. That world is gone. Only by
enmeshing the capabilities of the United States and other leading powers in a co-operative security
management regime where the burdens are widely shared does the world community have any
plausible hope of avoiding warfare involving nuclear or other WMD.

Proliferation causes nuclear war

Utgoff, Summer 2002 (Victor deputy director for strategy, forces and resources division at the
Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival, p. OUP Journals)

Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons and that
such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible
with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that
will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear "six-
shooters" on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a
while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
 2NC Rogue War
Weakened resolve invites global aggression
Silverberg, 5/31/2006 (Mark Ariel Center for Policy Research, Only resolve is respected, p.
http://www.jfednepa.org/mark%20silverberg/onlyresolve.html)
In the Arab world, only resolve is respected. Outrage can be generated against America by portraying America to the Arab masses as
a bully. But to physically attack America (as happened on 9/11), or American interests abroad (as in the cases of the embassy bombings and the
USS Cole), requires that America also be depicted as weak and vulnerable. It is this perception of America, in the eyes of the Arab world, that
represents the greatest threat to Western civilization because Arab misperceptions about America have led to wars. Acts of terrorism
are encouraged by the belief that America is essentially weak, vulnerable, and capable of being brought to its knees by a
high body-bag count before it has achieved its strategic objectives. It has been this perceived softness that has encouraged
terrorists like al Qaeda and rogue nations like Iraq, Iran and Syria to act against America and American
interests abroad. In the Middle Eastern mindset, it is fatal for any nation to be perceived as weak and vulnerable. And, in many ways, our actions and
reactions have led to their perceptions. The explosion of Islamic terror and the threats of mass destruction from an Iraqi tyrant armed with nuclear or biological
weapons could have been prevented. For example, in the 90s, the decade of denial, hesitation and prevarication, U.S. foreign policy consisted of Bill Clinton
desperately seeking a legacy, running America by opinion polls, sending cruise missiles to blow up empty tents in the Afghan desert, signing agreements with
dictators based on the belief that America would be "safe," and seeing attacks and provocations as nothing more than a series of separate and unrelated criminal
acts rather than as a sustain organized military assault on America. The assumption in those days, according to Claudia Rosett writing in the Wall Street Journal
recently, was that what we didnt acknowledge, really couldnt hurt us. As long as we got dictators to sign on the dotted line, wed be safe......protected by the
paperwork that said so. Decisions to use force were avoided to prevent a confrontation with the Arab and Islamic world, and also in the naive hope that these
threats would simply disappear. As a consequence, America focused on the arrest and trial of the criminals, protecting buildings rather than tracking down the
terrorists and neutralizing their funders, planners, organizers and commanders. Worse, America relied on metal detectors, security guards, electronic surveillance
and trials rather than ships, aircraft, soldiers and human intelligence. America studied the acts of terror as distinct from the ideology of the terrorist. It failed to
recognize that the cumulative effect of these acts against America and American interests abroad were part of a sustained assault on this country. And our

enemies perceived this as American vulnerability. The result was inevitable. This policy of "self-deception" led
to the monstrous growth of al Qaeda, the naive Oil-for-Food shell-game with Iraq, the Oslo Accords,
and the 1994 "Agreed Framework" with North Korea whereby America proclaimed peace on the Korean peninsula in return for
allowing North Korea (a soon-to-be-member of the Axis of Evil) food, oil and the wiggle-room necessary to continue making (and marketing) missiles, chemical and
biological weapons, and ultimately, its own nuclear weapon. The North Korean fiasco was not the only attempt during the Clinton era at what Charles Krauthammer
refers to as "paper diplomacy." The bloodiest farce was the Oslo "peace" Accords between Israel and the Palestinians. President Clinton insisted that it be signed on
the White House lawn under his upraised arms. He then spent the next seven years brokering one new agreement after another while declaring the peace
"irreversible." He knew it was so because Yasser Arafat had promised - in writing - an end to violence and terrorism. Then Arafat decided to start up the violence
and terrorism in September 2000, bringing on the worst Israeli-Palestinian bloodshed in decades and leaving the Clinton "paper-pushers" surprised. The absurd UN-
run Oil-for-Food program with Iraq was another piece of paper based on the false assumption that Saddam Hussein would respect the written rules crafted by the
worlds most hapless bureaucracy - the UN. Needless to say, he didnt respect the rules, used Syria and Iran to bypass them, and now, he too is on the verge of
acquiring nuclear weapons. For too long, America has deluded itself into a false sense of security based upon the written word of dictators, and this delusion has
lead to the Arab perception of American weakness. Written agreements didn't work well with Hitler or Mussolini and they still don't. Unfortunately, the Oil-for-Food
program, the Oslo Accords and the Korean Agreed Framework were not isolated incidents. The Arab states and al Qaeda took cognizance of the fact that the U.S., in
the past, also failed to respond aggressively to many terrorist attacks against its own citizens in Beirut, in Tanzania, in Kenya and in Somalia; stood by while
Americans were seized as hostages in Iran and Lebanon; let Saddam Hussein remain in power after the Gulf War (while letting the Shah fall in Iran); and pressured
Israel, its ally, to make dangerous strategic concessions while simultaneously courting Israels enemies and allowing its prized Arab-Israeli peace process to be
destroyed. This policy also led the Chinese to conclude that the United States is a superpower in decline, losing economic, political and military influence around
the world, according to the congressionally-mandated U.S.-China Security Review Commission. The Commission also noted that Chinese analysts believe that the
United States cannot and will not sustain casualties in pursuit of its vital interests. That is, America is "soft." And China is far from alone in holding this opinion.
Americas perceived decline into weakness and its questionable staying power in pursuit of its
strategic objectives has served as a call to arms to the monsters of the world. Astute Middle Eastern observers have
made much of the United States' post-Vietnam loathing for foreign adventures, and America's enemies have listened. In the 1970s, when many
Iranians worried that American power would destroy their revolution if it went too far, Khomeini told them not to worry, saying America "won't
do a damn thing." And as recently as 1998, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Khomeini's successor, insisted
there was no need to
negotiate with the U nited S tates since Tehran had shown that Washington was too weak to be feared or
heeded.
Appeasement causes global aggression and multiple scenarios for conflict.
Chapin and Hanson, 12/7/2009 (Bernard - interviewer and Victor Davis - Martin and Illie Anderson
senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Change, weakness, disaster, p.
http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/)

BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result
from President Obamas marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and
one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not
as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions,
however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the
existing landscape whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. are just
waiting to see whos going to be the first to try Obama and whether Obama really will be as tenuous
as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian
hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC:
With what country then Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. do you believe his global repositioning will
cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get
the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook
up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S.
friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while
insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian
autocratic commonwealth. Theres an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid
near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. Indias borders with both
Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows
whom it will bite or when.
 2NC - Taiwan
Appeasement emboldens Chinese invasion of Taiwan
Navarro 16 (Peter, 1/20, author of Crouching Tiger: What China's Militarism Means for the World, Ph.D. in
economics from Harvard University, Is It Time For America to Surrender Taiwan?,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/is-it-time-for-america-to-surrender-
taiwan_b_9003450.html)

Washingtons vacillations and restraint are nomystery: The US economy is heavily dependent on trade with China
- and many of Washingtons elected officials are just as heavily dependent on massive campaign
contributions from American multinational corporations that have a strong vested interest in the
growing China trade. To experts like Professor Yoshihara, however, such American restraint spells
increasing danger. He fears these signals of American indecision and appeasement may one day
embolden a rapidly militarizing China to make its final invasion push - a possibility that dramatically
increased in probability with last weeks election. So what should America do? Thats a good question not just for the White
House and Congress but also for each of the 2016 presidential candidates. In thinking about the best answer, it should be noted that
its not just that the US has significant moral and ideological stakes in Taiwans survival as a thriving
democracy committed to free and peaceful trade. There is also this cold geostrategic reality described by Heritage
Foundation scholar Dean Cheng: Taiwan is perhaps the single most developed piece of the First Island Chain
once you leave Japan and Okinawa. So to walk away from Taiwan would, in a sense, be to open the
gates for Chinas navy to be able to access the central Pacific with very little in the way of other
obstacles. To this, Yoshihara adds: If China were to ever take Taiwan either peacefully or by force, China gets
to cut that First Island Chain in half, essentially cutting in half the US forward posture in the Asia-Pacific
region. This would be unprecedented in the history of US military posture in the Asia-Pacific since the
end of World War II. While its now Beijings move, how Washington responds to any hard line will have an enormous impact on peace
and stability in the region. Let the presidential debate begin.

The impact is nuclear war

Glaser 11 (Charles, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs-George Washington
University, Will China's Rise Lead to War?, Foreign Affairs, 90(2), p80-91)
THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some
changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during
the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China
still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and
unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if
Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been
dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to
intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever
they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and
challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A
crisis over Taiwan could
fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the
actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare
independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does.
Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort
of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited
control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading
them.
 2NC TC: Heg
Accommodating China makes the US look weak overall
Dobbins et al 15 [James, RAND Corporation Senior Fellow, Richard H. Solomon, Michael S. Chase, Ryan Henry, F.
Stephen Larrabee, Robert J. Lempert, Andrew Liepman, Jeffrey Martini, David Ochmanek, Howard J. Shatz, Choices for America
in a Turbulent World: Strategic Rethink," pg. 96-97]

An approach that focuses so heavily on engagement and accommodation would expose the United
States to a number of risks. It would result in a loss of influence in this dynamic region, making it more
difficult for the United States to defend its interests there. Such an approach could intensify the
concerns of U.S. allies and partners who already worry that Beijing seeks to persuade the United States
to sacrifice their interests in pursuit of closer ties with China. The intensification of such concerns could
motivate some countries to take matters into their own hands in ways that could prove destabilizing.
Indeed, regional perceptions of a disengaged or acquiescent Washing-ton would only intensify fears
and insecurity in regional capitals and could very well increase the likelihood of an arms race,
miscalculation, and conflict. Finally, an approach that largely eschews balancing would leave the United
States poorly prepared for the possibility of a more aggressive turn by China. And it might
unintentionally encourage more-aggressive behavior if China perceived it as stemming from U.S.
weakness, distraction, or unwillingness to maintain its long-standing regional security commitments.
 2NC TC: Cooperation
US-Sino relations are in stable, competitive state. Cooperation generates rising
expectations that cause instability and future crises
Yan 14 (Xuetong, The Chinese Journal of International Politics Editor-In-Chief, 4-22, Oxford University Press, "From Keeping a
Low Profile to Striving for Achievement," http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/7/2/153.full)

Besides the relatively peaceful outcome of the ADIZ issue and the level of danger involved with military
ship collision, quantitative studies of ChinaUS relationship by Tsinghua University also demonstrate
improved stability of bilateral relations after China adopted the SFA strategy. The following graph
shows that ChinaUS relationship became less bumpy during 20122013 than during 20092011. As
seen from Figure 1, the differential in the amplitude of ChinaUS relationship is 1.7 (between 0.4 and
2.1) during 20092011, and 1.3 (between 0.8 and 2.1) during 20102011 when China adhered to the KLP
strategy, while the differential in the amplitude decreases to 0.7 (between 1.6 and 2.3) during 2012
2013 when China shifted to the SFA strategy. During the three periods, the standard deviations are
0.499, 0.471, and 0.227, respectively.74 A larger standard deviation indicates less stability. An even
more important sign is that ChinaUS relations have been improved since August of 2012. These data
may suggest that a new type of major power relationship has replaced the superficial friendship
between China and the United States. The former relationship is more stable than the latter because
these two countries admitted that the core state of their relations is competition rather than
cooperation. When one regards the other side as its competitor, their expectation for the others
favorable policy will not be high and their response to the others unfriendly behaviors becomes less
emotional.

Only containment ensures cooperation

Eisenmen 16 (Joshua, assistant professor at the University of Texas at Austin's Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs and
senior fellow for China studies at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC, Rethinking U.S. Strategy Towards China,
https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/756)

Now, however, a growing contingent in Washington and beyond is arguing that extensive U.S. engagement has failed to
prevent China from threatening other countries. One longtime proponent of engagement with China, David
M. Lampton, gave a speech in May 2015 entitled "A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us," in which he noted that,
despite the remarkable "policy continuity" of "constructive engagement" through eight U.S. and five Chinese
administrations, "today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see
China as a threat."11 Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd summarized this view: Beijing's long-term
policy is aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere of influence
spanning the region.12 Similarly, in June, former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said on PBS Newshour: "The longstanding consensus that
China's rise is good for the U.S. is beginning to break down.13 In
response to these misgivings about Beijing's intentions, there have
been calls for Washington to actively shape China's strategic choices by enhancing U.S. military
capabilities and strengthening alliances to counterbalance against its growing strength. Recent publications
reflect increasing apprehension; most argue that policymakers must avoid an enduring "structural
problem" in international relations that causes rising powers to become aggressive. Some experts, like
Princeton's Aaron Friedberg, contend that the U.S. should "maintain a margin of military advantage
sufficient to deter attempts at coercion or aggression.14 Thomas Christensen, former U.S. deputy assistant
secretary of state for East Asia, noted in June, that there are two primary questions for U.S. security vis--vis China: How to
dissuade China from using force in East Asia? How can we get China to actively contribute to stabilizing global governance? These initiatives,
Christensen noted, are based on the assumption that "whenever a country becomes a rising power, tensions with
neighbors arise.15 Christensen agrees with Bader that the U.S.' "strategic goal" vis--vis China is to "shape Beijing's choices so as to
channel China's nationalist ambitions into cooperation rather than coercion." 16 To elicit Beijing's participation U.S.
policymakers should persuade China that bullying its neighbors will backfire, while proactive
cooperation with those neighbors and the world's other great powers will accelerate China's return to
great power status.17 The U.S. should build a robust deterrence architecture to counter-balance China's
rise and push Beijing towards meaningful engagement, Christensen argues. The U.S. and its allies "need
to maintain sufficient power and resolve in East Asia to deter Beijing from choosing a path of coercion or
aggression.18 "Chinese anxiety about a U.S. containment effort could carry some benefits for the
United States: the potential for encirclement may encourage Chinese strategists to become more
accommodating," resulting in more "moderate policies." Both engagement supporters and deterrence supporters agree
that the U.S. should change China's strategic calculus in ways that increase the benefits of cooperation and the costs of aggression; where they
disagree is on how to achieve this.

Deterrence is more effective for maintaining relations

French 14 (Erick, Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum,
PhD candidate at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, analyst at Wikistrat Inc, pg. 88)

This presents immediate problems for US reassurance efforts and puts the United States at risk of falling
into an acute security dilemma with China. While Chinese policy elites are split on the threat posed by
US power, they view US intentions as threatening and will be inclined to scrutinize any signals that do
not fit with this belief. China will likely be receptive to US deterrent threats which fit with its view of the
United States as a revisionist, adversarial power, but it will be skeptical of US signals designed to
reassure it that the United States has no intention of threatening Chinas interests if it behaves as a
responsible power. This situation enables two alternative policy implications. The first is that deterrence
will prove a more effective strategy for managing US-China relations than reassurance. The second is
that deterrence will be easier and less costly than reassurance, but both strategies can be employed
simultaneously and symbiotically provided the United States dedicates extensive resources to making its
reassurance signals clear, consistent, and persistent

Deterrence solves better than reassurance

French 14 (Erick, Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum,
PhD candidate at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, analyst at Wikistrat Inc, pg. 88)

Broadly speaking, these trends in perceptions indicate that deterrence may simply be more effective
than reassurance as a strategy for handling a rising China. US deterrence attempts toward China are
likely to be effective given Chinas increasingly adversarial views of US intent. Reassurance, on the other
hand, may fall on deaf ears unless it is executed to perfection. Motivated reasoning, driven by the desire
to achieve cognitive consistency, will make Chinese leaders discount and discredit US reassurance
signals.

Realistic competitive relations are more stable

Yan 10 (Xuetong, Professor of International Relations and Director of Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University,
The Instability of ChinaUS Relations, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume: 3, p. 291-292)
Clarifying their political relationship as political competitors would avoid unexpected conflicts on bilateral or multilateral political matters. On the political level,
China and the United States have more mutually unfavourable than favourable interests that disenable the two nations from being friends. To reduce
unexpected conflicts, therefore, each should clearly define the other as political competitor. Most important is that
they need to clarify their competitiveness as that between a rising super power and one with super power status. The United States aims to maintain

its global dominance, and China to resume its world leading position. This structural conflict makes
political competition between them inevitable. As long as the Chinese economy grows faster than that of the United States, the
competition between them to offer the best development model is also inevitable. Clarifying their political relationship as competitors

would stabilize China US political relations in several respects. First, they could consider an agreement towards maintaining peaceful
political competition. Second, each could get used to the others unfavourable policy and restrict any retaliation to

within mutual expectations. Although this would not improve bilateral political relations, it would
prevent any worsening of already unfriendly political relations. A stable unfriendly political relationship would be
healthier than a fluctuating superficial friendship for both China and the United States during Chinas rise. Defining their
security relationship as military adversaries would reduce the danger of military clashes between China
and the United States and provide better conditions for preventative cooperation. China and the United States
have more mutually unfavourable interests than favourable ones as regards military security. China is still
under the sanction of the US arms embargo, a fact that signifies strong suspicions between the two countries. Defining the ChinaUS military relationship as rivalry
might be overstating the case, because Chinese military capability will be no match for that of the United States for the next 10 years. There is hence no substantial
competition between them as regards military capability. But as their military interests are mutually confrontational, both
would benefit in several
respects from acknowledging their military relationship as adversarial. First, lower expectations of
cooperation and good will would limit disappointments over one or the others unfavourable, or even
unfriendly, security policy. Second, they could establish a crisis-management mechanism to prevent
escalation of unforeseen military clashes arising from their differences. Third, taking as read one anothers military opacity
and reconnaissance would mean fewer rhetoric wars between the two countries. Fourth, the military adversary identity would amplify

the credibility of mutual military deterrence, which would help stabilize strategic relations and prevent
them from deteriorating to the point of return. Owing to the complicity of their relations, China and the United States should define
their general strategic relationship as that of positive competition and preventative cooperation. The world would benefit from competition

between China and the United States since competition is an engine for social progress. Competition
between China and the United States could provide the world with two models of development, both
constantly improving by virtue of each countrys efforts to provide a model more advanced than that of
their competitor. Competing to present the best model of development would bring benefits to the peoples of both nations and to countries that learn
from their expertise. China and the United States should compete to provide better world leadership. Expanding

their international influence by expanding economic aid and taking international responsibilities could
bring enormous global benefits, as could the two countries competitive scientific research towards
technical advances. Competition between China and the United States for the higher moral ground on
climate control would also motivate global reductions of CO2 emissions. When competition is peaceful it can be globally
beneficial rather than detrimental. And as long neither of them can win a nuclear war, their competition will not escalate into war but a

better world leadership. Preventative security cooperation between China and the United States would help
maintain world peace. As China is a rising power and the United States has super power status, their contrasting status makes it
difficult to formulate strategic cooperation mainly founded on common threats or common interests. China needs to
prevent war between itself and the United States in the interests of maintaining a durably peaceful environment in which to proceed with its economic
construction. The United States also fears war against another nuclear power. Both
sides, therefore, need to cooperate to keep conflicts
and competition at a peaceful level. Although passive, this kind of cooperation is crucial to the world. As long as China and the United States do
not go to war against each other, the world today is safe from outbreaks of major war, because other than China and Russia, all major powers are American military
allies. China and Russia are semi-allies, but as Russia has neither the real nor potential capability that China possesses to challenge US hegemony, China is the
only major power with the potentiality to challenge US global domination. World peace is thus
guaranteed if the danger of war between China and the United States can be eliminated, and peoples of the world would benefit
from the two countries preventative security cooperation.
Unrealistic expectations are worst for relations
Yan & Qi 12 (Xuetong & Haixiay, Tsinghua University Institute of Modern International Relations Dean
and Lecturer, Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: ChinaUS Intensifying Rivalry Does not
Amount to Cold War, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, 2012, 105127)

The state to which superficial friendship refers is one where neither one of two parties regards the other
as a strategic partner, but where both claim a strategic partnership. In their cooperation, each party is
solely concerned with the individual benefits to be obtained. Neither of the parties cares whether the
other gains or loses as a result of the cooperation, and might even regard achieving benefits at the
expense of the other party as reasonable. When one party cannot achieve its objectives in the course of
cooperation, it will be disappointed and express discontent, blame the other party, or retaliate by not
cooperating, causing a deterioration in relations. For example, China and the United States see one
another as trade partners, yet in the face of a trade imbalance, the United States presses China to
appreciate the Renminbi solely to enhance United States benefits with respect to employment, thus
exacerbating Chinas difficulties vis-a`-vis exports.
 2NC TC: Indo-Pak
Obama pandering makes management of the Indo-Pak-China triangle impossible. That
conflict escalates to nucler war.
Coes, 9/30/2011 (Ben former speechwriter in the George H.W> Bush administration, The Disease of a
Weak President, The Daily Caller, p. http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-
president/)

The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles heel all politicians are born with the desire to be popular. It leads
to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically,
it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike. In the case of
Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect
itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States,
in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of
ways. Despite this, I wouldnt bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces. But Obamas
weakness
could in other places have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular
plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built
upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear
weapons. If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one. Here
are a few unsettling facts to think about: First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left
the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds
of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over. Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a
question of when not if Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president.
Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a
single nuclear device. Third, China
sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically
aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets Indias natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its
way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside
world. In my book, Coup DEtat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers
have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who
then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the
Pakistani leader through a coup dtat. I wish it was that simple. The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans,
must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to
threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India. There are many threats out there
Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying
about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The
single greatest threat facing America and our allies is
a weak U.S. president. It doesnt have to be this way. President Obama could if he chose develop a backbone and lead.
Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status quo is simply not an option.
Indo-Pak war causes nuclear escalation and risks extinction
Michael OHanlon, Co-Director, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Director of Research,
Foreign Policy @ Brookings, September 5, 2015. WHAT IF A WAR BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA
WENT NUCLEAR? http://www.newsweek.com/what-if-war-between-pakistan-and-india-went-nuclear-
368799)

The scenario that Ill focus on herethough I develop more in the bookconcerns India and Pakistan and how the two countries
might come to the threshold of all-out nuclear war. It is, I fear, all too plausibleand there are ways it could unfold that
could make American ground forces nearly unavoidable. A nuclear confrontation would be devastating in South Asia,
enormously disruptive to the world economy and highly dangerous to the whole planet (particularly with the
prospect of loose nukes afterwards). An Indo-Pakistani war remains a real possibility today. There have already been three
or four, depending on whether one counts the Kargil crisis of 1999, and it is remarkable that there have not been more. If the nuclear weapons
threshold were crossed in the future, a foreign military role could become much more plausible, particularly to reinforce a ceasefire. To date,
Delhi in particular has eschewed any foreign role in diplomacy over Kashmir or related matters. But in the aftermath of the near or actual use of
nuclear weapons, calculations could change dramaticallysuch a world could be characterized by a far different political psychology than
todays. The path to war could begin, perhaps, with a more extremist leader coming to power in Pakistan. Imagine the dangers associated with
a country of 200 million with the worlds fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, hatred of India and America, numerous extremist groups and claims
on land currently controlled by India. Such an extremist state could take South Asia to the brink of nuclear war by provoking conflict with India,
perhaps through another Mumbai-like attack. Why could nuclear weapons be employed, even after 70 years of non-use globally? Even if it was
the provocateur, Pakistan could come to fear for its own survival in this type of scenario. Having aided a group like Lashkar-e-Taiba, with its
extremist anti-Indian views, Pakistan would have given India ample grounds for retaliation. Even a limited Indian conventional counterattack,
perhaps influenced by its so-called Cold Start military thinking, could quickly put Islamabad, Lahore and other Pakistani cities at risk. In such a
situation, Pakistan might well see military logic in the use of several nuclear weapons against Indian troops, facilities, or other tactical targets. It
is not even out of the question that Pakistan could conduct some attacks over its own territory. If the weapons were detonated a kilometer or
so up in the air, the effects of the explosions could be catastrophic to people and military equipment below, without creating much fallout due
to dirt and rock upheaval that would later descend on populated areas downwind. Beyond their immediate military effects, such attacks would
signal Islamabads willingness to escalate. Despite the huge risks, there would be few better ways of making a threat to attack Delhi
credible than to cross the nuclear threshold in tactical attacks. Presumably, Pakistanis would have to assume the possibility of Indian attacks
against Pakistani armed forces. But that might be a risk the countrys leadership would be willing to accept, if the alternative seemed to be
defeat and forced surrender after a conventional battle. Its not clear whether Indians would interpret such a finely graduated nuclear attack as
a demonstration of restraint, particularly if any of the Pakistani attacks went off course and caused more damage than intended. Thus, the
danger of inadvertent escalation in this kind of scenario could be quite real. It might not even take nuclear
attacks by Pakistan to cause nuclear dangers.
 2NC TC: Economy
Rogues threaten international stability --- that collapses the global economy.
Henriksen, 2/1/1999 (Thomas senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Using Power and Diplomacy to
Deal with Rogue States, Hoover Institution Monographs, p.
http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)

The increased emphasis given to global economic issues after the end of the cold war gave birth to the
fashionable notion that economic preeminence is more important than politico-military considerations
in international politics. That nostrum ignores the fundamental fact that global markets depend on a
secure international system. It is geopolitical power, of which economic well-being is one factor, that
undergirds the global system. Rogue adversaries threaten the global equilibrium on which the United
States and other nations base their commerce, access to resources and financial capital, human
interchange, and security. Rogue assaults on accepted international conduct disrupts peace and
stability. Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 went a long way toward unraveling European peace, in
large part because the League of Nations failed to rally effective opposition. Saddam Hussein's military
incursion into Kuwait likewise tossed the Persian Gulf states into turmoil and shattered the dawn of the
post-Soviet order. But unlike Italy's prewar aggression, Iraq's was met, defeated, and turned back by an
American-led coalition. This was the proper reaction to Baghdad's attack. Lawlessness feeds on itself if
allowed to spread unchecked.
2NC Uniqueness Walls
2NC Top Level
2NC [Updated: NSDA] UQ OV
2NC Answers
 AT: Engagement Rhetoric
The US is drifting towards anti-Chinese containment policies Obama claims of
engagement are a smokescreen
Anatol Lieven; 2016; British author, Orwell Prize-winning journalist, and policy analyst. He is a Senior
Researcher at the New America Foundation; Valdai Discussion Club; Obamas foreign policy doctrine.
Containment of china or pivot to Asia. Part 3; April 20th, 2016; http://valdaiclub.com/news/obama-s-
foreign-policy-doctrine-containment-of-china/ (EK)

The Pivot to Asia essentially means containing what is now probably the biggest economy and second biggest military power in the world in its own back
yard, and is drawing the USA further and further into territorial disputes involving China. Clintons own speeches and writings when Secretary of State made this abundantly clear: By
virtue of our unique geography, the United States is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power. We are proud of our European partnerships and all that they deliver. Our challenge
now is to build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific that is as durable and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we have built across
the Atlantic. That is the touchstone of our efforts in all these areas. Our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the fulcrum for our
strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific. (Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacific Century, Foreign Policy October 11th 2011) Viewed from from Chinas point of view, Americas Pacific
Century means a continued commitment to unilateral US hegemony in East Asia; working relationships means treating China not as a great power but on the same basis as Japan, Vietnam,
Philippines; Bilateral security alliances are with potential enemies of China; references to the US position in Europe suggests creation of a NATO in East Asia; democracy promotion threatens

China with same fate as USSR. The hostility to China has been made clear by subsequent US actions, especially in economic field: The Trans-
Pacific Partnership, and even more the crude and unsuccessful attempt to block Chinas creation of Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. It is true that some of Chinas actions

have been highly provocative, especially in South China Sea; but no attempt has been made by US policy under Obama to distinguish between
different Chinese claims, orto propose compromises (thus as far as I can see, China has a good claim to the whole of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, a good
claim to share the Paracels 50:50 with Vietnam, but no legitimate claim at all to the Spratlys or Scarborough Shoal). Instead, US is drifting towards

backing anti-Chinese positions in all cases. I have been appalled by two recent pieces of news in particular: The talk in the Obama administration
of getting Cam Ranh Bay from Vietnam as a US naval base which would risk tying USA inextricably to Vietnamese territorial claims; and the US proposal that India participate
in naval patrols in South China Sea. India wisely refuses because China can hit back very hard in Himalayas, and by support for Pakistan and would do so if challenged by
India in the South China Sea. Such moves may be too detailed for the President to take a personal hand but they illustrate whole tendency of US establishment to maintain
US dominance, and not to seek compromise with other powers unless absolutely unavoidable, as in Syria. In the case of China, the US may well be forced to acquiesce in
Chinese faits accompli; but may also be drawn into Vietnamese war to defend what Hanoi sees as its territory, with disastrous results for whole of mankind. Both the cases of

Ukraine and the Pivot to Asia go against the enlightened realism that Obama claims to represent. They violate the ethic
of consequences by not thinking through the likely results of US actions; they fail the fundamental realist test of accurately judging the power available to both sides and their
willingness to use it; and they fail Hans Morgenthaus test of a true statesman, which is the ability to put himself into the shoes of his opposite numbers from rival countries: not
necessarily in order to agree with them, but to judge how important a given issue is to them, and therefore what resources they will commit and how much they will risk over the
issue. In Ukraine, Russia has clearly been willing to commit far more than the USA, and the USA has only avoided a much more dangerous conflict because President Putin is
in the end a cautious and pragmatic former secret service official, not a reckless militarist. In failing to seek compromise with China, the USA may be running infinitely greater
risks. This failing however is that of the US establishment in general. US ideological nationalism (euphemistically known as Exceptionalism) means that in the end, very few
US policymakers or analysts can accord any legitimacy to views or interests that seriously conflict with those of the USA, and above all, cannot grant any real legitimacy to
political systems that are neither democracies nor subservient to US wishes). In conclusion however, it is only fair to add two things: On what Obama has called and what
obviously is - by far the biggest threat facing the USA and mankind in the foreseeable future, Obama has been entirely correct, while most of the US political establishment
(including all the Republican Party though not, it must be noted Hilary Clinton) has been wrong: this is the need to take serious action to combat climate change. Here, I think
one can say that he has gone as far as the US constitution and present political configuration will allow him to go. Tragically, that is not very far as evidenced by the
impossibility of passing legislation through Republican-dominated Congress (or even for that matter when Democrats in a majority) and latest Supreme Court decision blocking
the Presidents Clean Power plan. But at least he has tried, and tried hard. For this and other reasons, I would say that in many ways Obama is the best foreign policy president
the USA has had since George Bush senior or the Nixon-Kissinger combination (which is admittedly not saying much); but despite some of his statements in the Atlantic
Monthly, he has not been able to free himself sufficiently from the Washington foreign policy elites and the shibboleths to which they became addicted during the long years of
American global dominance, and achieve a truly realistic US world policy which corresponds to the new world and Americas new relative position in it. Then again, he has at
least tried, which is more than his likely successor Hillary Clinton has tried to do. Whoever wins in November, we are likely to look back on Obamas foreign policy with
considerable nostalgia.
 AT: Appeasement Good
Any appeasement will result in Chinese miscalculation
Chang 6/24/16
[Gordon G, National Interest, lawyer and author, Cornell Law School Graduate, America Will Decide If
There Is War in Asia, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-will-decide-if-there-war-asia-
16720?page=show, Accessed July 2 2016, A.H]

Aggressors, like China, start wars. Yet whether historys next great conflict begins in East Asia will not be determined in the
councils of a belligerent Beijing. If youre trying to set your watch to the sound of gunfire, you must, most of all,
observe Washington. The region is in seemingly never-ending crisis because Chinese leaders believe their country should be bigger
than it is today. As a result, China is pushing on boundaries to the south and east, using forceful tactics to both take territory under the control
of others and close off international water and airspace. The dynamic of aggression has started, and at this point China
will not stop until it is stopped. Unfortunately, Washington is in many ways responsible, or at least paved the way,
for the latest round of Chinese provocation. That round began in the spring of 2012. Then, Chinese and Philippine
vessels sailed in close proximity around Scarborough Shoal, in the northern portion of the South China
Sea. To avoid conflict in that critical body of water, Washington brokered an agreement between Beijing and Manila.
Both agreed to withdraw their craft, but only the Philippines honored the deal. That left China in control
of the shoal. Beijings grab was particularly audacious. Scarborough lies just 124 nautical miles from the main Philippine island of Luzon,
guarding the strategic Manila and Subic Bays. It was long thought to be part of the Philippines. The Obama administration did not
enforce the agreement it had brokered, perhaps under the belief it could thereby avoid a confrontation
with Beijing. The White Houses inaction just made the problem bigger, however. Emboldened Chinese
officials and flag officers then ramped up pressure on another Philippine featureSecond Thomas Shoal,
where Chinese vessels have regularly operatedand the Senkakus, eight specks under Japanese administration in the East China Sea. You
would have thought that Washington policymakers had learned the costly lessons of earlier eras when
Western timidity opened the door to large-scale conflicts that could have been avoided. Britain and France, for
instance, allowed the Third Reich to remilitarize the Rhineland in March 1936. That gambit secured one
of Germanys frontiers and eventually led to Hitlers annexation of Austria in March 1938 and his bold
grab of the Sudetenland the following September. Germany, after the infamous Munich pact, took the rest of
Czechoslovakia by the spring of the following year. In the first half of August 1939 Hitler did not think Britain or France would
go to war over Poland, and its not hard to see why. After all, they did nothing to stop him when they could have, in the Rhineland.
Then they meekly stood by while he marched into large parts of Europe. By the latter part of that August the
declarations of London and Paris that they would defend Polish borders sounded hollow and in any event were too late. German forces crossed
the Polish border on September 1, and London and Paris, likely to Hitlers surprise, declared war on Germany two days later. Unfortunately,
America looks like it is following in the footsteps of Britain and France. The Peoples Republic of China is not the Third
Reich, but the dynamic in the second half of the 1930s and our era looks eerily similar. Then and now, an aggressive power seized
what it wanted. Chinese leaders today, like Germanys before, believe further advances will not meet
effective resistance. Moreover, there is at this time, like there was in that decade, a momentum toward
war. Hostile elementsmany but not all of them in uniformare in control of the levels of power in Beijing, as they were in Berlin. This
month has seen those elements hit out toward their countrys south and east. To the continental south, in the Himalayas, Chinese troops
intruded into Indian-controlled territory at four separate spots in the state of Arunachal Pradesh on the ninth. To the maritime southeast, a
Chinese vessel deliberately rammed a Vietnamese fishing boat on June 16. And last week about a dozen of Chinas trawlers fished in Indonesias
Exclusive Economic Zone and confronted local patrol vessels, creating the third such incident in as many months. Moreover, to Chinas east
there was a series of incidents in the East China Sea. On June 15, a Chinese intelligence ship entered Japans territorial waters in the dark of
early morning, loitering close to two islands off the main Japanese island of Kyushu. The intrusion was the first since 2004, when a submerged
Chinese submarine transited a strait between two of Japans islands, and only the second by China since the end of the Second World War.
The incursion followed an incident on June 9 when, for the first time ever, a Chinese warship, a frigate, entered the contiguous zone off the
Senkakus. This, in turn, followed the June 7 intercept of a U.S. Air Force RC-135 reconnaissance plane over the East China Sea by two Chinese
jets. U.S. Pacific Command called the Chinese action unsafe. And
this brings us back to Scarborough, which could be as
important a turning point to our era as Sudetenland was to last century. We see some surface ship activity and those sorts of things,
survey type of activity, going on, said Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson to Reuters in the middle of March. As a result, the
shoal could end up a next possible area of reclamation. Reclamation would make
permanent Chinas seizure and
therefore constitute a game-changer if not immediately reversed. So far, the United States has sent
warnings. On April 21, four ground-attack A-10s flew what the U.S. Air Force termed an air and maritime
domain awareness mission in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal. Then this month in Singapore at the Shangri-La
Dialogue Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, in response to a question about Beijings possible reclamation of the shoal, spoke of actions
being taken both by the United States and by actions taken by others in the region which will have the effect of not only increasing tensions but
also isolating China. What actions? In late March, the New York Times reported that General Joseph Dunford was overhead at the Pentagon
asking Admiral Harry Harris, the chief of U.S. Pacific Command, the ultimate question. Would you go to war over Scarborough Shoals? the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to know. So far, very few Americans think Scarborough is worth a fight with the Chinese, and the
White House seems reluctant to start a war anywhere. Therefore, the risk of conflict over those rocks appears to be extremely low. Yet,
despite appearances, the situation could be dangerous. For one thing, the Chinese seem determined to do something provocative when the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague hands down its ruling in Republic of Philippines v. Peoples Republic of China. Beijing has refused
to participate in the case that will apply the rules of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea to South China Sea issues, and most observers
expect a decision favoring Manila in the next month or so. Chinese
leaders could simply decide to show the Philippines
whos boss by ignoring the decision, defying U.S. warnings, and building an artificial island over the
contested Scarborough. Beijing might think it can get away with such an act, but authoritarian leaders
do not have a good track record in reading American intentions. Kim Il Sung was sure Washington
would not come to the aid of beleaguered South Korea in June 1950. And at the time it looked like he had correctly
read the Truman administration. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in his January 1950 speech at the National Press Club in Washington, left
South Korea outside Americas announced defensive perimeter. His language, whatever he intended, appears to have convinced Mao Zedong
and Josef Stalin, Kims backers, that the North Korean was correct in his assessment that the United States would not fight. In June, Kim
attacked in full force, and, despite everything, an unprepared, outgunned America went to war. Saddam
Hussein made a similar
error. In July 1990, April Glaspie, the American ambassador to Iraq, indicated to him that Washington had little
interest in Arab-Arab conflicts, words he interpreted to mean the U.S. would not stop him from taking
over neighboring Kuwait. The Bush administration could have prevented a generation of tragedy by making a firm declaration of
resolve during that pivotal conversation. Instead, Saddam invaded and America had to create a multi-nation coalition and lead a full-scale
invasion to free the oil-rich emirate. Today, it would be hard for China to predict what would happen if it started to
reclaim Scarborough, in large part because it is not clear that Washington policymakers themselves know what they would do.
America is now showing resolve in the South China Sea, but its unlikely that, after the feeble response in the first
half of 2012, U.S. officials have impressed their Chinese counterparts with the depth of their concern.
That makes the situation at this moment extraordinarily dangerous
 AT: Strength Bad
Strength is key to reassuring regional allies and preventing an arms race
Moriarty 14
[Thomas, Writer living in NYU, China's Rise is America's Opportunity,
http://www.hudson.org/research/10753-china-s-rise-is-america-s-opportunity, Accessed July 4 2016,
A.H]
Since ISIL has captured Americas attention by its rapid conquest of much of Iraq and Syria, it has been the focus of American diplomacy, if
American diplomacy can be said to have a focus. But given Americas ties with East Asia, events in East Asia pose a greater threat, and provide a
greater opportunity. America should build up naval strength so as to retain its position as the key diplomatic player in the
region. Arecent poll of Chinese and Japanese citizens by Genron/China Daily finds that 53% of the Chinese
respondents and 29% of Japanese respondents expect a war between China and Japan. . The poll also
finds that 93% of Japanese respondents have a negative view of China and that 87% of Chinese
respondents have a negative view of Japan Tensions in the region are high, and a war would have severe
economic ramifications around the world. This tension arises from Chinas economic, military and diplomatic rise,
and the aggressive way the Chinese have exercised this newfound clout. The Chinese are well aware that their
economy is growing much faster than Americas and that America has chosen to decrease its defense, particularly naval, spending, at the same
time as Chinese military, particularly naval,
spending is rapidly increasing. As a result of this confidence, China is asserting
its territorial and geopolitical ambitions, including in many cases through the unapologetic display of
naval power. Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and even Indonesia have faced Chinese escalation of nautical territorial disputes; India and
China continue to dispute the ownership of Arunchal Pradesh/South Tibet; and China continues to claim the entire nation of Taiwan as Chinese
territory. Increasing Chinese naval power and geopolitical ambition present a major and destabilizing threat. As is wont to happen when a
country accrues power and uses it against its neighbors, neighboring states have moved to resist. Unsurprisingly, a
regional naval arms race is underway. China and India are both developing aircraft carrier fleets;
Vietnam is upgrading its navy and other states in the region are purchasing boats and modernizing their
fleets. Most states concerned by Chinese aggression have moved to increase their naval strength. Australia has built a new type of LHD
(Landing Helicopter Dock) ship, and Japan has built a flat-topped destroyer that some speculate could be used to launch aircraft. Japan,
Australia and India have also increased their military cooperation with each other and their naval aid to less powerful states such as Vietnam
and the Philippines. Especially notable are the recent Japanese agreements with India regarding economic, diplomatic and nuclear
cooperation. We now come to the opportunity. Allthe regional powers know that America has significant economic
and diplomatic interests in the region which are best served by regional peace and stability. The countries under
Chinese threat would be reassured by an increased American military presence in the region. This would
represent a credible commitment by America to the safety and security of countries under Chinese
threat. The Obama administrations rebalance to Asia might have had this effect but deep defense budget cuts have neutralized it. Taken
together, America and those countries under American protection from China would be vastly more
powerful than China. Without American protection, however, states in the region would be less powerful than China. They thus need
American diplomatic and military support. Critically, though, America would not be entering into an anti-China coalition analogous to the Cold
War containment of the Soviet Union. America has deep, long-standing and extremely important interests in its relationship with China as well.
Rather, America would re-establish itself as an influential arbiter of regional disputes. Since American strength would be necessary to prevent
China from attaining its goals in regional disputes, America, by either supporting or not supporting Chinas adversary in the dispute, could
choose whether China would or would not attain its ends. Thus, China would also come to depend on America in securing its interests in the
region. Such a solution would not be new. When Egypt attacked Israel in 1973, America made itself necessary to the security and interests of
both Egypt and Israel, first by resupplying Israel, thus preventing an Egyptian victory, and then by using Israels resultant position of
dependence on the United States to make Israel cease its counteroffensive, which threatened the survival of the Egyptian military. America
thereby became the arbiter of disputes in the region, sidelining the Soviet Union. America
can strengthen its position as the
arbiter of disputes in East Asia with naval power. Aside from the territorial conflict with India, all the potential
disputes are on the water and a naval arms race is underway. America has the most skilled and powerful
navy in the world, with unparalleled experience dealing with operations involving multiple militaries,
including those of some nations potentially in conflict with China. America thus has the capability to create the
necessary balance of power to become the arbiter of disputes. For America to regain this position, the American commitment
must be credible. While the United States Navy is currently much more powerful in the Pacific than the Chinese Navy, China is rapidly
arming to close the gap, while the United States is allowing its navy to wither away at an alarming rate, from 594 ships in 1987 to 289 today,
reducing our ability to dispatch forces where they are needed around the globe. Until America reverses that erosion, our naval power will be
unreliable, and insufficient to enable America to settle regional disputes. In
the absence of credible American naval force,
American statements about events in East Asia have as much credibility as the bark of a toothless dog.
To be relevant, we must have teeth.
 AT Not Aggressive
Recent evidence proves China is aggressive and wants to undermine US superiority
Gaffney 6/22/16
[Frank J, Founder and President of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C. formerly Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy during the Reagan Administration, following four years of service as the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy. Previously, he was a professional staff member on the Senate Armed
Services Committee under the chairmanship of the late Senator John Tower, and a national security legislative aide to the late
Senator Henry M. Jackson, China Is Preparing for Conflictand Why We Must Do the Same, http://www.aim.org/guest-
column/china-is-preparing-for-conflict-and-why-we-must-do-the-same/, Accessed July 2 2016, A.H]

Ever since Richard Nixon opened relations with Communist China in 1972, Chinese intentions have been a matter of incessant and often
fevered speculation in this country. In particular, national security and regional experts, non-governmental organizations and office-holders
alike, have endlessly debated whether the Peoples Republic of China could be brought into a U.S.-dominated international order and world
economy in a manner consistent with American interests and, better yet, as a partner in opposition to mutual adversaries (e.g., the Soviet
Union, North Korea, and the global jihad movement). Regrettably, this controversy over Chinas intentions has now been
largely settled by actions of the Chinese government and a rapid militarization. Under successive regimes and
most especially that of the incumbent Chinese ruler, Xi Jinping the Chinese have relentlessly and unmistakably striven
to put themselves in a position to challenge, and ultimately to displace, the post-World War II Pax Americana with a
new order. This position would return China to what its leaders consider to be Chinas rightful place as the Middle Kingdom, the
preeminent global power strategically and economically. At this critical juncture, it is both foolhardy and irresponsible for
America and its allies to continue to construe Chinas conduct as non-threatening. That conclusion is
powerfully articulated by eight essays featured in a book just released by the Center for Security Policy, entitled Warning Order: China Prepares
for Conflict and Why We Must Do the Same. (A video introduction is here.) A Warning Order is a technique long used by the U.S. military to
put its units on notice of an impending danger that requires countervailing action. The draft Secretary of Defense directive that briefly
summarizes and suggests how to operationalize the findings of the contributors to this new volume former U.S. Senator Jim Talent, former
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet Admiral James Ace Lyons, China and national security experts Dr. Peter Navarro, Gordon Chang, Dean
Cheng, Kevin Freeman and Lindsey Neas and journalist Bill Gertz reads as follows: WARNING ORDER: Required Preparations for Conflict with
China Situation. ThePeoples Republic of China is incrementally, but relentlessly, putting into place in its own
region (notably, the East and South China Seas) and elsewhere around the world the capabilities required to engage
decisively in military conflict with the United States and its allies. Chinas preparations include: The
acquisition and deployment both at home and increasingly in global choke points of advanced air, sea, land and
space systems and asymmetric capabilities that appear designed to: 1) interdict allied forces, 2) deny them access to and the
ability to operate in strategically important areas and 3) otherwise achieve the destruction and defeat of the U.S. and/or its allies; The fielding
of sufficient numbers of modern aircraft, ships, missiles, space weapons and nuclear forces to secure for China quantitative and, in some areas,
qualitative superiority, at least regionally; Peoples Liberation Army cyber warfare operations that are intensifying in sophistication,
aggressiveness and effectiveness against both official and private sector targets; A variety of means of challenging and
undermining the United States economic security, including by threatening: the dollars reserve currency status, Wall Street and
other financial operations, and U.S. access to and relations with key trading partners; High-intensity intelligence, information and influence
operations against the United States and its allies; and Amassing the dedicated military and dual-use industrial capabilities necessary rapidly
and substantially to expand, and/or recover from battle-damage to, the PRCs current conventional and nuclear arsenals. It is not possible at
this time to ascertain Chinese intentions or whether, if they do seek to precipitate a conflict, when and where it might begin. Our posture must
not be based on assessments of such intentions, however, but be rooted in a clear-eyed, capabilities-driven threat analysis. Tasking. All DOD
agencies, military services and combatant commands are hereby ordered to take such steps as are required to achieve at the earliest possible
moment levels of readiness and power-projection needed to deter and, if necessary, to defeat any Chinese aggression. U.S.
capabilities
required to perform such missions over the longer term are to be identified and acquired at the earliest
possible time. Wherever practical, useful and consistent with operational security considerations, the
support and assistance of allied militaries should be obtained for this purpose. Warning Order is
intended to move our nation past a now-irrelevant debate about Chinese intentions and onto a far firmer footing, rooted
in a focus on Chinas capabilities one that enables us to deter the PRCs future use of existing, and
anticipated, threats to our security and vital interests. It should be required reading for both prospective Commanders-in-
Chief and those whose safety they will be responsible for safeguarding..
 AT: US deterrence Solves
Even if we maintain deterrence, the plan tanks credibility, which results in Chinese
miscalc
Chen 14
[John, Dec 01 2014, M.A. candidate at Georgetown University, studying international security with an
emphasis on East Asian security issues. His research is currently focused on weapons technology
proliferation in East Asia. Prior to graduate school, he studied government at Dartmouth College,
Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Is Dispersal Enough?,
http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2014/12/01/deterrence-in-the-taiwan-strait-is-dispersal-
enough/, Accessed July 7 2016, A.H]
While US dispersal strategy might preserve warfighting capability (at least until the PLA develops and fields more MRBMs), the dispersal component of AirSea
Battle does little to enhance US deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, and may in fact weaken it. Deterrence
theory dictates that deterrence is
strongest when nations demonstrate both the capability and the resolve to carry out the deterrent
threat that is, a nation must be able to carry out a threat and credibly demonstrate that it will do so if
the status quo is violated.[5] All deterring powers have trouble convincing the opponent that they have
the will to act a credible commitment problem but Thomas Schelling presents several possible methods to increase credibility.
Schelling writes that incurring commitment either by inducing a nations political involvement, honor, obligation, and diplo matic reputation in the response, or by
laying a trip-wirethat is manifestly connected up with the machinery of war can help increase credibility of the threat.[6] Dispersal alone checks none of these
boxes. It does not commit US reputation to the defense of Taiwan, and does not guarantee an automatic US response if Taiwan is attacked. Worse, the
redeployment of US aircraft to bases outside the range of Chinese forces could signal to China a manifest unwillingness to bear the cost of defending Taiwan.
Dispersal may increase the US ability to defend Taiwan, but there is a chance it could weaken deterrence. Even the perception of a weakened
US commitment could have serious consequences for security in the Western Pacific. Taiwan could be
forced to adopt riskier defense methods, including developing offensive missiles[7] and investing in base
hardening that forces China to initiate hostilities at a high level of violence[8], thereby increasing the
chances of US intervention in a war. Taiwan could seek even closer ties to China if an effective defense of
the island appears infeasible and US support appears unlikely, which could signal to other states that
bandwagoning with China might be safer than relying on a distant U.S military for security. A weakened
US deterrent not only risks letting Taiwan slip away, but also weakens US interests in the Western Pacific
at large. In light of the importance of maintaining a credible deterrent, the United States should carefully examine dispersal and explore other methods that
both increase warfighting capability and strengthen deterrence. Alternative methods could allow US forces to better withstand an initial Chinese blow while still
demonstrating US commitment to a military presence in the Western Pacific. For instance, base hardening, though expensive, would signal that the US is willing to
continue to bear the costs of maintaining a military presence in the region. The use of decoys and deception could greatly complicate Chinese military planning by
forcing Chinese targeters to account for more US military assets[9], while dispersal of military assets to a number of different countries still in range of Chinese
SRBMs would show US commitment and raise the costs of war for Chinese leaders by horizontal escalation. All measures should achieve the dual goals of enhancing
or preserving both deterrence and US warfighting capability. There are points of nuance in this discussion. The United States may be reluctant to fully commit to
defending Taiwan for fear of getting drawn into an unwanted war in the Taiwan Strait, and dispersal reduces the temptation for a Chinese first strike on US military
assets, thereby reducing the possibility of an outright war. But if US strategy in the Western Pacific continues to include deterrence against the Chinese use of force
in the Taiwan Strait, US planners must account not only for US capability to deter, but also the US willingness to
deter. The dispersal component of AirSea Battle will not suffice if implemented on its own.
 AT: Aff Isnt Appeasement
Even advocates of engagement believe unconditional concessions are appeasement
Sutter 95 (Robert, Senior Specialist in International Politics at Office of Senior Specialists, China in World Affairs
-- U.S. Policy Choices, Congressional Report, http://fas.org/man/crs/95-265.htm)
The foreign powers around China's periphery and those who have an important role to play regarding Chinese interests in international
organizations, trade and global issue could influence the course of Chinese foreign policy in several ways. Some may adopt policies on issues
sensitive to Beijing that would prompt Chinese leaders to subordinate pragmatic interests for the sake of protecting Chinese territorial or other
national claims. Most notable in this regard are outside challenges to China's claims to disputed territories. In the case of Taiwan, for example,
if the leaders in Taipei were to formally declare independence from the mainland, Beijing might be hard put not to follow through on its
repeated pledge to use force to stop such a development. And in the case of disputed claims to islets in the South China Sea, Chinese naval
forces could be expected to respond promptly to any effort by Vietnam or others to expand their territorial holdings by force. On global
economic issues, there is uncertainty as to how far the Chinese government will go in compromising with or retaliating against the U.S. and
others unless China is allowed expeditiously to enter the WTO.((17)) What is clear, however, is that a major shift toward protectionism among
the developed countries would clearly undermine the basis of China's export-led growth. It could lead to a major shift in China's foreign policy,
away from continued cooperation with the developed countries. By the same token, if foreign powers were to appear to "gang up" against
China and impose sanctions because of PRC arms exports, human rights or other policies, this too might prompt a serious Chinese reevaluation
of the costs and benefits of cooperation with the international status quo. In
contrast to those who argue against heavy or
provocative external pressure on China are those who argue against the dangers of appeasement or
weakness in the face of China's growing strength. Even those who want foreign countries to "engage"
closely with China often add that this must be done from a firm position. As a recent Trilateral
Commission Study concluded "a cooperative approach may not elicit a constructive Chinese response...
the strength and prosperity of the Trilateral Countries -- not their weakness -- generate Chinese respect. Such classic
considerations as balance of power, realism and a keen sense of Trilateral interests must also govern Western and Japanese thinking about
China."
 AT: Engagement Solves
No turns - US-China strategic dialogue increasing Solves miscalculation
Dunn 15 [Lewis A., United States Air Force Academy Professor, Aug, The Future Nuclear Arms Control
Agenda and Its Potential Implications for the Air Force, USAF Academy, pages 11-12]

Through this process, a fairly robust process of military-to-military dialogue and interaction has now emerged,
including senior-level visits, observation of military exercises, and some joint exercises. As discussed below,
agreement also has been reached on steps to reduce the risk of military incidents. The conversations on
strategic issues in other forums have been institutionalized and deepened in recent years. At the same time, China has resisted U.S.
proposals, first made in the 2010 NPR, for beginning an official dialogue about U.S.-China strategic stability. Nonetheless, there is every reason to

expect these U.S.- China processes of strategic dialogue will strengthen in the closing years of the Obama Administration and
persist under its successor whether with a Democrat or Republican president. A Future Process of Strategic ConfidenceBuilding,
Reassurance, and Predictability. Perhaps more important, across the dialogues, American participants have made specific proposals

that could lead to a broader process of U.S.-China confidencebuilding, reassurance, and strategic
predictability. For example, U.S. participants in the military-to-military exchanges have proposed agreements to reduce the risk of military incidents at sea
or in the air as well as for mutual notification of missile launches. Similarly, in the semi-official Track 1.5 U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dialogue and the non-official
Track 2 U.S.- China Strategic Dialogue a broad range of such measures has been proposed. Specific
activities envisaged in these
confidence-building and reassurance measures, as set out in the accompanying text box, include joint
policy studies, joint threat and technical assessments, table-top exercises, and technical monitoring activities.8 The more
immediate purpose of the military-to-military measures is to reduce the risk of incidents involving the
U.S. and Chinese militaries that could lead to an unintended U.S.-China crisis or escalating confrontation.
More broadly, the goal of confidence-building, reassurance, and mutual predictability measures is to address and to the extent possible reduce uncertainties and
suspicions in both countries about the other countries intentions, plans, and programs across the areas of nuclear offense, missile defenses, conventional prompt
global strike, cyber, and space. Over the longer-term, this
process aims to build habits of cooperation between the militaries
and officials of the United States and China. There has been progress in pursuit of military-to-military measures to avoid incidents and build
confidence. Thus, at the November 2014 meeting between President Obama and President Xi, the two countries announced their agreement to Memos of
Understanding for confidence-building mechanisms in two areas: Notification of Major Military Activities, with annexes on notification of policy and strategy
developments and Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Maritime and Air Encounters, with annexes and terms of reference and rules of behavior for encounters
between naval surface vessels.9 At the time of the Obama-Xi meeting, as the language makes clear, more detailed procedures only had been reached on maritime
encounters. Since then, agreement on comparable rules for air-to-air encounters, as called for in the basic agreement, has apparently proved elusive.10
Progress has been made to reach agreement on notification of ballistic missile launches but agreement
still needs to be concluded.11 With regard to the discussion of broader confidence-building, reassurance, and strategic predictability measures,
Chinese participants in semi-official forums have shown interest in some of the specific proposals. They also have been
prepared to explore the pros and cons of different measures as well as possible next steps. There also have been some recent steps forward at the Track 2 level,
e.g., a recent decision to carry-out a table-top exercise involving U.S. and Chinese responses to a nuclear terrorist incident. Overall, however, the
Chinese
side still is moving very cautiously in this broader domain. On balance, it is reasonable to assume that this
overall process of confidence-building, reassurance, and predictability between China and the United
States also very likely will continue to expand during the closing years of the Obama Administration and into the next administration. The
November Obama-Xi agreements were a breakthrough and have likely created an important precedent,
particularly for China which had long been skeptical of such measures as Cold War actions. The specifics still remain to be determined of what additional strategic
confidence-building, reassurance, and predictability measures will be explored and eventually adopted. What is clear is that whatever measures the United States
and China take, they will do so without labeling those steps as arms control.

China wont reciprocate engagement

Ford 12 [Christopher Ford, formerly Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Technology and Global Security at Hudson Institute,
Challenges of Regional Peace and Stability in East Asia, http://www.hudson.org/research/9308-challenges-of-regional-peace-and-stability-in-
east-asia]

These four factors represent the conventional wisdom about the causes of the recent inflammation of tensions in the SCS and ECS, and I think
there is much truth in analyses that emphasize such factors. Id like, however, to suggest an additional factor one that also has to do with
internal PRC political dynamics, but which isnt likely to go away after the 18th Party Congress in November 2012. For the last two decades,
the CCP regime has invested political capital in cultivating anti-foreign nationalism as a basis for the Partys
legitimacy narrative, and this nationalism has indeed become a potent force. As another part of its effort to develop a post-
Marxist ideology to sustain one-party rule, the Chinese Party-State has also been developing a discourse of
quasi-Confucian domestic politics and international relations doctrine. Together, these two themes of the modern CCP
legitimacy narrative call it Confucio-nationalism, if you will have an impact upon Chinese policy. They have helped make China
more moralistically confrontational in its foreign relations and more inclined to press its neighbors into patterns
of deference to Beijing than at any other point since the era of reform and opening took off under Deng Xiaoping more than three
decades ago. This just isnt a pre-Party-Congress pose, in other words, but in fact an important part of the new normal in 21st-Century China.
Though adopted, in the first instance, for domestic political reasons tied to the Partys desire to cling to power, these themes essentially
demand confrontational foreign postures and efforts to nudge East Asia, at the very least, into more Sinocentric forms of interstate order.
Significantly, moreover, Beijing today feels freer to act upon such thinking than at any time since the death of
Mao Zedong. Let me explain a little more about what I think has happened. After Tiananmen, Deng is said to have articulated a pithy
phrase about the importance of biding ones time and hiding ones capabilities, which encapsulated important conclusions about Chinas
interest in strategic caution. This did not amount to any relinquishment of the dream of national rejuvenation and return that so many
Chinese have shared since the Qing Dynasty was first humbled by Western power in the 19th Century, but it was a clear policy of tactical
postponement of the kind of self-assertion implied by the countrys destined return. China, it was said, needed breathing space in which to
build up its strength, and to this end should carefully keep a low profile and adopt a relatively non-provocative posture. This approach of
Dengist time-biding, which some scholars have referred to as Taoist Nationalism, became the foundation of Chinas foreign relations for
many years. As Chinas strength and confidence have grown in the international arena, however and as the CCP has invested more and more
political capital in Sino-nationalist legitimacy strategies that encourage both revanchiste posturing against an outside world felt to have
humiliated China and quasi-Confucian notions of the desirability of a Sinocentric global order such time-biding has come increasingly under
pressure. A dynamic that I think has been particularly important recently, however and which is probably a major factor behind Chinas recent
moves to escalate tensions in the SCS and the ECS is Beijings perception that America is enfeebled, weary of foreign commitments, and in a
precipitous decline. Why is that? Taoist Nationalism based its strategic logic on two main assumptions. First, it was felt that in order to gain
the strength necessary to effect its return to glory, China needed to learn modernity from the West, particularly from the iconic modern state
and the most powerful of the Western polities: the United States. This required congenial engagement in which China could engage in export-
driven growth, acquire technology and modern know-how from the West, and have the breathing space necessary for its development. Second,
it was recognized that the outside world and the Americans in particular were still powerful enough to be able to impose huge costs on the PRC
if sufficiently threatened or provoked. Accordingly, great care should be taken not to provoke them, at least until China was strong enough to
handle the consequences. The strategic caution of Taoist Nationalism thus rested upon the presumed great benefits of friendly engagement
and high costs of confrontation. To my eye, however, this balance was destabilized by the U.S. financial crisis and our present indebtedness and
we no longer appear an attractive teacher or model of
ineffective political leadership. In Chinese eyes, I think
modernity, which reduces the benefits of friendly engagement side of the equation. Our continuing politico-
economic woes have also encouraged Beijing to think we are on a steep downhill slope in what Chinese strategists call comprehensive national
power, thus also reducing the costs of confrontation element. As a result, it is presumably harder than ever in Beijing to argue for a
continuation of Taoist Nationalism, and more confrontational sentiments are gradually coming to predominate. Even as the CCP regime has
staked its political legitimacy on anti-foreign nationalism and increasingly Sinocentric pretensions of global return, in other words, the
confrontational postures encouraged by such thinking have seemed more feasible than ever. To my eye, there is little chance in the near term
of conclusively resolving the disputes in question. One could argue all day about the relative legal merits of the various competing claims and
lots of people do but whatever their merits, I think it is unlikely that well see the issues resolved any time soon. It is thus the challenge of
diplomacy and statesmanship to defer the issue peacefully and manage the situation so as to keep things from getting out of hand. Near-term
crisis management will be important in this work, as will trying to persuade all participants to avoid provocative actions, and doing everything
possible to reaffirm freedom-of-navigation rights in the region. In order to reduce the sting of resource competition in the SCS, and indeed to
give parties some incentive to cooperate with each other, some observers have also suggested that a moratorium on oil and gas drilling should
be imposed until all agree upon a formula for resource-sharing. Much discussion in the SCS, at least, has referred to the importance of
establishing a good code of conduct for regional interactions. I dont disagree, but so far, this
hasnt amounted to much and
what preliminary agreement has already materialized clearly hasnt restrained anybody. I think the
problem lies deeper than simply a lack of clarity about how one should approach interactions; the real
problem seems to have more to do with whether parties want to interact peaceably. Fundamentally, most
current proposals for managing these problems fail to address one of the key factors that I believe is contributing to these problems: the
destabilizing effect of Chinas growth combined with its increasing willingness to take confrontationally self-assertive positions vis--vis its
neighbors. The problem with Chinese behavior goes beyond simply taking positions playing to nationalist sentiments prior to the 18th Party
Congress. The deeper difficulty is due to the Party-States adoption of legitimacy narratives that encourage and to some extent require foreign
affairs positions that are increasingly confrontational. If what Ive suggested about the internal debate between low-profile strategic caution
and more self-assertively confrontation is true, however, it is possible that we can still influence Chinas decision-making for the better even if
they do continue to perceive us as being in decline. As noted, strategic
caution is losing ground in Beijing because China
feels it now has less to gain from congenial engagement and less to lose from confrontation.

China sees engagement as weakness

Branigan 15 [Tania, China correspondent for the Guardian, Mar 19, The Guardian, China crisis: west riven by age-old
question - to appease or oppose?, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/19/china-bind-is-the-uk-accommodating-
or-ceding-too-much-to-superpower]

China assumes any accommodation from a foreign country comes from weakness and they do not
respect weakness. They will bully those who let themselves be bullied, says Jorge Guajardo, formerly
the Mexican ambassador to Beijing and now senior director at McLarty Associates in Washington. You
acquiesce on human rights and China assumes you do it for economic reasons; they make more
demands and you start acquiescing in other areas. India is probably one of the last countries to
accommodate China on anything and at the end of the day, they work very well together. Some go
further, suggesting complaints about meetings with the Dalai Lama are strategic attempts to exert
power through a symbolic issue in the first place. It is easier for some countries to take a tough stance
than others. While Angela Merkel has in some ways been firmer than her predecessors, that is also
possible because of the strength of the German economy, Kinzelbach points out If you accept only
sticks and carrots work on human rights, what sticks and carrots can we use? We dont have any left
that are attractive or impressive enough for China any more, unfortunately, she said. She argues that
the US itself has given ground on human rights issues, particularly at the beginning of the Obama
administration. There was a real desire for partnership and China didnt step up and deliver; it took
advantage, said Bonnie Glaser, an expert on Sino-US relations at the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, in a more generous assessment. It was the time of the financial crisis and China
saw the US as weak. Then came the pivot, now portrayed as the strategic rebalance to Asia
welcomed by US allies but viewed by Beijing as an attempt to contain it.

Competition is the paradigm for relations Concessions embolden China

Jackson 15 [Van, Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Associate Professor, 8-6, Diplomat "The Myth of
a US-China Grand Bargain," http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-myth-of-a-us-china-grand-bargain/]

A number of scholars have tried to advance the well-intentioned proposal that U.S. concessions to Chinas many
concerns will somehow facilitate a peaceful order in Asia. While I agree with the sentiment and recognize that there are areas of
international life where Sino-U.S. cooperation is essential, the idea that U.S. accommodation of China will produce a peaceful

and stable order in Asia isnt just unrealistic; its irresponsible. Though it wasnt the first, Hugh Whites China Choice was an
early and pointed call for the United States to form a G-2 with China in which the two countries would work together to set the terms of the regional order,
requiring that the United States accommodate the demands of a rising China. Jim Steinbergs and Michael OHanlons Strategic Reassurance and Resolve reiterates
many of Whites points, but with better theoretical grounding. Lyle Goldsteins Meeting China Halfway argues far more persuasively than many in this lineage, and
some of his specific recommendations merit serious considerationnot least because they would incur no great cost to try. But there
are equally serious
reasons to doubt the transformative ambitions attached to U.S. concessions. The latest salvo in this America must
accommodate China literature hails from an accomplished political scientist at George Washington University, Charles Glaser, writing in the most recent issue of
International Security. Glaser makes the sweeping and somewhat unhelpful claim that military competition is risky and therefore undesirable. As an alternative he
suggests that if only the United States would abandon commitments to Taiwan, China would be willing to resolve its territorial disputes in the East and South China
Sea, thereby sidestepping military competition. Prior
to around 2008, proposals for U.S. accommodation of a rising China
made much more sense, or at least could be taken more seriously. But times have changed. Chinas ambitions have changed. And so has
its foreign policy behavior. These contextual changes matter for whether and when accommodation can have the desired effect. More to the point though, there
are a number of problems with the grand bargain line of argumentation. First, any
proposal for a Sino-U.S. solution to regional
problems is by definition taking a great power view of Asia that marginalizes the agency and strategic
relevance of U.S. allies and the regions middle powers. In the brief period (five to ten years ago) when a G-2 concept was taken
semi-seriously in Washington, alliesespecially South Korea and Japanchafed. The regions middle powers would be unlikely to simply follow the joint dictates of
China and the United States without being part of it, and attempting a G-2 could ironically create a more fragmented order as a result. Including others, at any rate,
is antithetical to the concept of a Sino-U.S. G-2 arrangement. As early as the 1960s U.S. officials tried to rely on China to deal with regional issues spanning from
North Korea to Vietnam. It was almost always to no avail. Second, and as Ive written about extensively elsewhere, Asia
is rife with security
concerns that have nothing to do with China directly, so any understanding reached with China would
leave unresolved many of the regions latent sources of potential conflict. Sino-U.S. grand bargain proponents forget
that China and the United States only have real conflicts of interest by proxy. Every conceivable conflict scenario involves China and

some other Asian stateTaiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Korea. The United States only becomes part of
the picture because of a commitment to regional order, including its alliance network. Third, as its recent stock
market crash makes all too obvious, China remains a fragile superpower, to quote Susan Shirk. Many factors in its domestic political situation

corruption, growing wealth disparities, and many forms of civil challenges to government legitimacymake it an unpredictable player. Nor is
China showing meaningful signs of political liberalization. Theres so much brewing underneath the surface in China that dealing with China today as if it were a
hegemon tomorrow assumes too much, and grants China too much credit too soon. Fourth, theres a defunct theory thats been smuggled into arguments about
changing Chinese behavior through U.S. accommodation. Political scientists call it neofunctionalism, a term rarely used these days, even though its spirit is
pervasive in grand bargain arguments. Neofunctionalism came about in the 1950s as a failed way to account for and push for European integration.The basic idea
involved an assumption that low level and innocuous types of cooperation would spillover into still more and better quality cooperation. Comity among nations, it
was thought, would be the eventual outcome of mundane socioeconomic interactions. But by the 1970s, the theory had become largely discredited. Nevertheless,
echoes of neofunctionalism remain in contemporary claims that properly calibrated restraint, accommodation, or appeasement can have a transformative effect on
a relationship. Ironically, these arguments tend to come from scholars, not policymakers. The idea that the United States can induce China into resolving its East and
South China Sea disputes by giving it Taiwan reflects precisely this type of expectation, as do calls for the United States to make small concessions to China in
hopes that it will enable a more stable situation. None of this means that accommodative gestures or strategies should be outright dismissed. There were numerous
periods of detente with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and that rivalry was much more confrontational. China and the United States, moreover, have a
number of overlappingnot just conflictinginterests. I might even go as far as saying that neofunctionalism has a bit of a bad rap; there are times when trivial or
non-costly forms of cooperation can lead to greater and deeper cooperation, but political scientists havent convincingly figured out what those conditions are. But
grand bargains rarely work. Theres a dangerous naivete in abandoning U.S. commitments on the hope
that China will then be more willing to resolve its other disputes. And policies of accommodation will not suspend military
competition because that involves more than present day concerns with surveillance overflight missions, territorial disputes, and current political commitments.
Regardless of the policy and crisis management decisions we make today, military competition plays out over years and decades; it relates to force structure
investment and doctrinal decisions that cant be sacrificed for political promises. Chinas concerns will only be assuaged when the United States divests of the
military force structure that makes it possible to project power globally, uphold its commitments, and bolster the regional order. The
U.S. military will
be unable to pursue such a course as long as China maintains openly expansionist geopolitical ambitions
and a force structure designed to achieve it. Competition, it seems, is the logic of the situation. We ignore
that at our own peril.
 AT: Containment = War
They cant win offense Perceived failure is inevitable & ensures crisis-driven
containment
Lumbers 15 (Michael, Emerging Security NATO Association of Canada, program director, Wither the Pivot?
Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to Chinas Rise, Comparative Strategy, 34.4, proquest)

Containment and Engagement The

policy of choice for the great majority of China watchers, the foreign policy establishment at large, and U.S.
policymakers for more than 40 years, containment and engagement draws on a long heritage of essentially liberal ideas
about international order. As with confrontation and enhanced balancing, the objective of containment and engagement is perpetuating American preeminence in
the AsiaPacific. It aims
to do so, however, by supplementing politico-military pressure to check Chinese ambitions with
an interlocking, mutually beneficial web of economic, institutional, and cultural links that incentivizes
China to cooperate with the global order rather than challenge it: sticks and carrots. An underlying assumption of this approach is that
reliance on overtly hostile measures to ensure Chinese compliance with international norms will only confirm the mainland's worst assumptions of U.S. intentions
and turn it into an enemy with a revisionist agenda. Aside from being provocative, most containers and engagers deem such measures unnecessary. China does not
pose a threat to America's vital security interests today, tomorrow or at any time in the near future, Robert Ross concludes in a typical assessment. In stark
contrast to confrontationists and enhanced balancers, these observers draw attention to a myriad of deep-seated economic and demographic problems in China
that they see as constraining its development and likely to divert resources needed for an assertive foreign policy, problems that afford some latitude for modulated
containment and the pursuit of initiatives aimed at muting the more corrosive elements of the Sino-American rivalry. A defensive, risk-averse foreign policy would
seem to be a logical course for a country consumed with implementing much-needed economic reform, meeting the growing demands of a restless populace, and
hemmed in on all sides by vigilant regional actors wary of its expanding influence. In fact, this is exactly how containers and engagers interpret Chinese grand
strategy in the postCold War era. China's overriding priority is to sustain the remarkable economic growth of the past 30 years, which its leaders regard as key to
maintaining political and social stability among a populace that can no longer be swayed by appeals to ideology. A stable international environment is conducive to
this focus. While Beijing chafes at America's military presence in the region, particularly its informal commitment to the defense of Taiwan, and longs for a transition
to a multipolar world where U.S. power is constrained, it recognizes both the need for avoiding confrontation and advancing its economic and security interests
through constructive relations with Washington. While cautioning against overreacting to a threat that has been exaggerated in some quarters, containers and
engagers do not take a cooperative, peaceful China for granted. According to their logic, the Chinese government's acute sense of aggrievement over historical
episodes of international humiliation and its responsiveness to a pugnacious streak of nationalism among its people is worrisome, as are its uncertain long-term
intentions, at best shaky commitment to the liberal global order, and rapid military modernization. As a hedge against China's rise veering off in an antagonistic
direction, they call for preserving the U.S.-led hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia. To Beijing's great irritation, this policy also entails maintaining the flow of
arms to Taiwan to uphold the credibility of America's security commitments throughout the region, as well as holding the Chinese government's feet to the fire for
human rights violations and pressing it to make itself more accountable to the population, the long-held assumption being that a more democratic China will be less
prone to aggression. The great appeal of containment and engagement for U.S. decision makers is that, more than any other choice of strategy toward China, it
preserves the greatest number of options and has hitherto proven sufficiently flexible to accommodate evolving conditions in the Sino-American relationship. Most
importantly, this blend of deterrence and conciliation has largely succeeded in keeping a lid on tensions between China and its neighbors in a region rife with
flashpoints and has made some progress in integrating the PRC into the existing international order. It seems well suited for today's challenging strategic
environment, in which the United States is buffeted by resource constraints, extensive global commitments, and anti-interventionist popular sentiment as it looks to
preserve its leadership role in Asia by means short of confrontation. Yet over the coming years, this longstanding policy,
which has worked well
while China has remained relatively weak and preoccupied with internal development, will be subjected to
unprecedented strains. Whether it seeks to translate its growing power into increased regional clout or attempts to outwardly deflect domestic
discontent through aggressive posturing, acting out of strength or weakness, the PRC is likely to present new security challenges that

will test the support of voters and policy elites alike for engagement. If moderate efforts to encourage
China's further adjustment to U.S. preferences in the realms of security, trade, and global governance are seen as falling
short or, even worse, displaying timidity in the face of Chinese assertiveness, a stronger emphasis on
containment will surely result.

But this is still unique offense for us - Delaying a managed transition to balancing
increases the risk of major war
Friedberg 11 (Aaron, Princeton international affairs professor, A Contest for Supremacy: China,
America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 265)
Regardless of how wide the gap between their military capabilities is at present, the combination of Chinese momentum and American restraint cannot help but
accelerate the pace at which the divide narrows. If the optimists are wrong, and the balance is already dose or, regardless of the objective reality, if China's leaders
believe it to be, then unilateral
restraint could turn out to be a very dangerous policy indeed. While most advocates
of enhanced engagement pay lip service to the importance of preserving a favorable military balance, their
reading of the current situation, combined with their strong desire to avoid antagonizing Beijing, inclines them toward
inaction rather than action. When the time comes to make decisions, they are likely to be wary of deploying additional forces to the Western Pacific,
developing new weapons specifically designed for a possible conflict with China, going "too far" in tightening defense ties with U.S. friends and allies, or creating
new multilateral mechanisms to enhance strategic cooperation among Asia's democracies. If their arguments carry the day, the shift in the regional balance of
military power toward China will accelerate. There are several dangers here. Because
of the long lead times involved in designing,
building, and deploying new capabilities, it is hard to quickly reverse unfavorable trends in the balance
of military power. If today's leaders fail to make sound decisions when conditions are reasonably
tranquil, their successors may find it very difficult to respond in a timely fashion in the future if the
Sino-American relationship unravels or if China becomes unstable and unexpectedly aggressive. An
unduly muted reaction to China's ongoing buildup could also increase the risk of misperception,
miscalculation, and unintended conflict. Washington's seeming passivity could be taken, not as a sign of self-confidence, but as an indication
of a waning commitment to some or all of its longtime friends and allies in Asia. Depending on how they assess the military balance, planners in the People's
Liberation Army may already be more optimistic about their capabilities than outsiders realize. Even if they are not, absent a vigorous American response, their
sense of assurance can only grow with time. In some future showdown with a third party, Beijing might assume that Washington was disinterested, deterred, or
both, only to find out too late that it was neither. The fact that the U.S. government has a history of not always being dear, even in its own collective mind, about
how it would respond until confronted by aggression makes this an even more plausible, and worrisome, scenario.l7 As it works to reassure Beijing by not
overreacting to its initiatives, the United States may also succeed, albeit inadvertently, in demoralizing its own friends. There are already signs of anxiety emanating
from some Asian capitals about America's willingness and ability in the long run to maintain its position of regional military preponderance. What seems like a
prudent, measured response could appear from the other side of the Pacific as an indication of resignation and the start of a slow retreat. Overreaction

doubtless has its dangers,

but underreaction could wind up triggering a cascade of appeasement that will
hasten the very outcome that American strategists are now trying to prevent.

Balancing gives China no choice but to cooperate They wont like it, but theyll lack
the capability to breakout
Tellis & Blackwill 15 (Ashley & David, CFR fellow and Carnegie senior associate, U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, 4-
13, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf)

Finally, the question arises regarding how China will respond to the U.S. grand strategy recommended
here. Are not the risks of pursuing this grand strategy too great? One could certainly expect a strong
Chinese reaction and a sustained chill in the bilateral relationship, including fewer meetings among
senior officials, little progress on bilateral economic issues, less opportunities for American business in
China, reduced military-to-military interaction, a reduction in societal interchange, and perhaps fewer
Chinese students in American universities. (We dismiss the likelihood that China would respond to the
measures recommended in this report by selling off its U.S. bond holdings because of the consequential
reduction in their value.) These steps by Beijing would not be trivial but also would not threaten vital
U.S. national interests. If China went further in its policy as opposed to reacting rhetorically, the more
aggressive Beijings policy response and the more coercive its actions, the more likely that Americas
friends and allies in Asia would move even closer to Washington. We do not think that China will find an
easy solution to this dilemma. Moreover, it is likely that Beijing would continue to cooperate with the
United States in areas that it thinks serve Chinas national interestson the global economy,
international trade, climate change, counterterrorism, the Iranian nuclear weapons program, North
Korea, and post-2016 Afghanistan. Put differently, we do not think the Chinese leadership in a fit of
piquehardly in Chinas strategic tradition would act in ways that damage its policy purposes and its
reputation around Asia. In short, this strategic course correction in U.S. policy toward China would
certainly trigger a torrent of criticism from Beijing because it would begin to systemically address Chinas
goal of dominating Asia and produce a more cantankerous PRC in the UN Security Council, but it would
not end many aspects of U.S.-China international collaboration based on compatible national interests.
Although there are risks in following the course proposed here, as with most fundamental policy
departures, such risks are substantially smaller than those that are increasing because of an inadequate
U.S. strategic response to the rise of Chinese power.

China perceives the plan as just as hostile as containment which makes confrontation
inevitable
Lumbers 15 (Michael, Emerging Security NATO Association of Canada, program director, Wither the Pivot?
Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to Chinas Rise, Comparative Strategy, 34.4, proquest)

There were strong overtones of an integrationist strategy toward China during the early phases of
Barack Obama's presidency. Hobbled by soaring budget deficits and a slow recovery from a crippling
financial crisis, preoccupied with bringing America's external commitments into closer alignment with its
finite resources after a decade of military entanglement in the Middle East, and pessimistic about the
constraints on U.S. power, the administration was intrigued by the idea of recruiting Chinese
cooperation in addressing a host of transnational challenges, such as recovery from the global financial
crisis, climate change, and reining in North Korea's nuclear weapons program. To incentivize such
assistance, Washington made a concerted attempt to recognize Beijing's increased international stature
and accord it with more influence in global deliberations; the G-20 was formally upgraded as the
premier forum for guiding the world economy, and the bilateral Strategic Economic Dialogue initiated by
the preceding Bush administration was expanded to a Strategic and Economic Dialogue to foster
interaction between the two countries across a wider spectrum of issues. Yet Obama officials also
viewed efforts to encourage China to assume additional burdens in global governance as extending U.S.
hegemony by increasing the PRC's stake in upholding the American-led liberal order, thereby ensuring
that its rise occurred within the confines of U.S.-inspired norms. Beijing suspected as much, thinking the
Obama administration's call for it to make a greater contribution to the management of global order
was an ill-concealed scheme to contain China's rise by burdening it with additional responsibilities that
would divert resources from economic development at home. If pursued with the tenacity
recommended by its advocates, integration, in its universalistic assumption that what's good for the
United States is good for others, could prove as provocative to China as any other strategy. Though
craving the respect typically enjoyed by a great power, many Chinese commentators are deeply
skeptical of Western calls for it to assume the responsibilities of one, thinking it a devious ploy to tie
down China. While unlikely or unable to overturn the liberal international system, it is entirely
conceivable that China, with deeply embedded ideas of how to manage domestic and international
order that sharply diverge from the West's, could pursue a separate path to security and prosperity.
Alternatively, the PRC might eventually reassess its present policy of economic engagement with the
Western order if its stratospheric growth rates, the primary means by which the government appeals for
support from its people, are no longer sustained.
 AT: Containment Inevitable - US Forces/Nukes/Allies
Credibility, not capability, is key The plan undermines the signal of US resolve in
containing China
Mandelbaum 15 (Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins, Nov/Dec, Michael, How to
Prevent an Iranian Bomb: The Case for Deterrence, Foreign Affairs)
Deterring Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons by promising to prevent it with military action, if necessary, is justified, feasible, and indeed
crucial to protect vital U.S. interests. To be effective, a policy of deterrence will require clarity and credibility, with
the Iranian regime knowing just what acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will follow through on its
threats. During the Cold War, the United States was successful in deterring a Soviet attack on its European
allies but not in preventing a broader range of communist initiatives. In 1954, for example, the Eisenhower
administration announced a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations,
including costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea, by promising an overpowering response. But the doctrine
lacked the credibility needed to be effective, and a decade later, the United States found itself
embroiled in another, similar war in Vietnam. In the case of Iran, the aim of deterrence would be specific and limited:
preventing Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons. Still, a policy of deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties. One is the likelihood of
Iranian salami tacticssmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction
seeming dangerous enough to trigger a severe response. The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such violations. The Soviet Union
could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on Western Europe, but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of doing so), and the loopholes in the agreements
inspection provisions suggest that keeping track of all of Irans bomb-related activities will be difficult. As for credibilitythat is, persuading
the target that force really will be used in the event of a violationthis posed
a major challenge to the United States during
the Cold War. It was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America, but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands of miles away,
even though in that case, retaliation would have risked provoking a Soviet strike on the American
homeland. Even some American allies, such as French President Charles de Gaulle, expressed skepticism that the
United States would go to war to defend Europe. The American government therefore went to
considerable lengths to ensure that North America and Western Europe were coupled in both Soviet
and Western European eyes, repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and stationing both troops and
nuclear weapons there to trigger U.S. involvement in any European conflict. In some ways, credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier. Iran may have duplicated, dispersed, and hidden the various parts of its nuclear program, and Russia may sell Tehran
advanced air defense systems, but the U.S. military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause enough damage to
lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years, even without the use of any ground troops. The Iranians might retaliate against
Saudi Arabia or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah), or attack American military forces, or sponsor acts of anti-
American terrorism. But such responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishment. The
problems with
deterring Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and psychological. Having watched
American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an Iranian bomb over the years, and then observed the Obama administrations avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program, Irans ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a
threat to punish Iranian cheating. U.S. President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position that Iran should not be
permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale, then abandoned it. He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime
would suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons. He made it the core argument in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is
war, implying that American military action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs. Moreover, neither he nor his
predecessor responded to Irans meddling in Iraq over the past decade, even though Tehrans support for Shiite militias there helped kill
hundreds of U.S. troops. The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States, particularly during this presidency, to be a serial bluffer
DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in order to keep Iran from going nuclear, the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an explicit, credible
threat of military action. To be credible, such a threat must be publicly articulated and resolutely communicated. The Obama administration
should declare such a policy itself, as should future administrations, and Congress should enshrine such a policy in formal resolutions passed
with robust bipartisan support. The administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of U.S. naval and
air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies. As in
Europe during the Cold War, the goal of U.S. policy should be to eliminate all doubts, on all sides, that
the United States will uphold its commitments

Signals of resolve are key

French 14 (Erick, Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum,
PhD candidate at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, analyst at Wikistrat Inc, pg. 72)

To understand how the United States can successfully communicate deterrence threats and
reassurances to Chinas leadership, we must have a firm grasp of the psychological biases that undergird
how leaders interpret and process incoming information. In particular, we must acknowledge the role
misperception can play in both impeding and facilitating deterrence and reassurance. This article
investigates the role of motivated reasoning (also known as motivated bias) in Chinese decision
making, focusing in particular on confirmation-motivated reasoning. First, it presents a general overview
of motivated reasoning as discussed by psychologists and political scientists. Then it illustrates the
importance of this psychological dynamic by tracing its involvement in three major historical crises
involving the United States and China: (1) the US reassurance attempt during the Korean War, (2) the US
deterrence attempt during the 1950 blockade of the Taiwan Strait, and (3) the US deterrence attempt
during the 1958 Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Next, it examines an instance in which the United States
overcame Chinese skepticism to reassure China and reduce strategic distrust: Pres. Richard Nixons
rapprochement with China in the 1970s. Finally, it considers how US policymakers and strategists should
cope with motivated reasoning in Chinese decision making. In particular, a tailored approach to
deterrence and reassurance emphasizes the need to gauge Chinas preconceptions about US strength,
resolve, and intent and to adjust signals accordingly.
 AT: China Not a Threat
Hostile rise is inevitable Offensive realism is the dominant Chinese IR paradigm and
Xi embraced the prospect of an inevitable confrontation with the US
Topping 15 [Vincent, University of Calgary masters thesis, Tracing a Line in the Water: Chinas Anti-Access/Area-Denial
Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region and its Implications for the United States, University of Calgary, p. 22,
http://theses.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/11023/2602/4/ucalgary_2015_topping_vincent.pdf]

For decades, China has kept the same discourse: it is seeking peaceful development, it will never seek hegemony, and security alliances in Asia
are a relic of the Cold War that should be discarded. Nonetheless, in recent years (and especially since the arrival of Xi Jinping as the President
of the PRC), there has been an increasingly severe dichotomy between words and actions. Whereas the official Chinese discourse had long been
that China was still a developing country that should not be pushed too hard otherwise it could destroy its social cohesion and enhance the
pressure on its domestic tensions,39 and whereas China had for decades kept Deng Xiaopings motto of keeping a low profile and never seek
leadership, now China wants to be recognized as a leading power in the world and is striving for
achievements. Chinese international relations expert and Dean of the International Relations department at Tsinghua University Yan
Xuetong had been preaching since at least 2010 that China and the United States should drop the pretense that they
are partners in this new century and accept that they are competitors that will more often than not have
divergent and conflicting interests.40 After all, according to Yan, Chinas endeavour to regain its historical place
as a world leading power and the United States refusal to relinquish its sole superpower status
constitutes their greatest political conflict. 41 In the words of Alastair Iain Johnston, this is quite an admission about Chinas
interests as it goes against every single policy statement and declaratory policy that China has issued over thirty years.42 This could be
disregarded as a Chinese realists perspective who is trying to further his point of view and agenda. However, when
Xi Jinping came to
power, he projected his vision of China for the future, which entailed that the country needed to undergo a
national rejuvenation (fuxing zhi lu, ). According to Yan, this is a phrase that literally refers to resuming Chinas historical
international status as the worlds most advanced state in early Tang Dynasty (618-917 AD). Today this phrase specifically refers to
Chinas efforts to catch up with the United States in terms of comprehensive national power [] the competition for
international leadership between China and the United States will be inevitable (emphasis added).43 This
also points out to one inconvenient truth about Chinese politics, one that will definitely leave a bitter taste for American policymakers that have
been working tirelessly to socialize China in the international system and who thought liberalism would convert China to the benefits of the
current international order: not only realist (along with ultra-nationalist) thinkers in China are not on the fringe
of Chinese politics, they are very much in the mainstream. 44 International relations theory is still somewhat of a new
phenomenon in China, but Chinese experts have quickly appropriated realism (and especially John J. Mearsheimers version
of offensive realism) as one of their own.45 It is now, and has been for a while, the most dominant paradigm of
international relations in China.46 Some theorists in China like Wang Jisi, Dean of the International Relations department at the
prestigious Peking University, have been trying for years to strike a conciliatory note to reconcile differences and bridge the
gap between China and the U.S., but his attempt (and those of likeminded colleagues) to do so is mostly the exception, not
the rule.47

The autocratic nature of the Chinese regime ensures a desire for expansionism and
opposition to US goals
Khong 14 (Yuen, Professor of International Relations at Oxford University, Primacy or World Order? The United
States and Chinas Rise, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00147, mitpressjournals,
p.164-165)

The debate over what to do about Chinas rise and aspirations is not just about military and economic
power. For Friedberg, the identity of the potential challenger matters greatly. In fact, it is decisive. He would
be less worried if it were Japan or Australia, but that fact that it is Chinaan illiberal and autocratic
regimemakes it worrisome. An unrepresentative government responsible for crushing the
Tiananmen Square protests, denying religious freedom, suppressing political dissent, and oppressing
minorities to use Hugh Whites words (p. 167) is, in the end, not a government that the United States can treat as a
political equal, accommodate, or cooperate with (p. 167). The crux of the matter, for Friedberg, is the nature
of Chinas political regime: autocratic governance is anathema to the American political credo;
moreover, there is also a link between autocracies and their propensity to resort to military force
externally (pp. 4245, 159163). In a revealing passage, Friedberg stipulates the conditions under which the United States may be willing to
share or even cede power to China: In the long run, the United States can learn to live with a democratic China as the preponderant power in
East Asia, much as Great Britain came to accept America as the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere.... Having kept the peace,
encouraged the transition of all the major regional players from authoritarianism to democracy, and overseen the re-emergence of Asia as a
leading center of world wealth and peace, Washington will be free to call home its legions (pp. 251252).

China is pursuing regional hegemony to supplant US primary

Blackwill 16(Robert, Former Ambassador to India & Senior fellow @ CFR, Chinas Strategy: Asia Maximizes power balance to replace
America, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-strategy-asia-maximize-power-replace-america-16359)

Chinas primary strategic goal in contemporary times has been the accumulation of comprehensive national
power. This pursuit of power in all its dimensionseconomic, military, technological and diplomaticis driven by the
conviction that China, a great civilization undone by the hostility of others, could never attain its destiny
unless it amassed the power necessary to ward off the hostility of those opposed to this quest. This
vision of strengthening the Chinese state while recovering Chinas centrality in international politicsboth objectives requiring the
accumulation of comprehensive national powersuggests that the aims of Beijings grand strategy both implicate

and transcend the United States and Chinas other Asian rivals, to replace U.S. primacy in Asia writ large .
For China, which is simultaneously an ancient civilization and a modern polity, grand strategic objectives are not simply
about desirable rank orderings in international politics but rather about fundamental conceptions of
order.

China will never accept the US as a partner Challenges are inevitable

Blackwill & Tellis 15 (Robert, , Senior Fellow @ CFR, Former Ambassador to India, Ashley, PhD senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy
Toward China, March)

The profound test that the rise of Chinese power represents for the United States is likely to last for decades. It
is unrealistic to imagine that
Chinas grand strategy toward the United States will evolve in a wayat least in the next ten yearsthat accepts
American power and influence as linchpins of Asian peace and security, rather than seeks to systematically diminish them.
Thus, the central question concerning the future of Asia is whether the United States will have the political

will; the geoeconomic, military, and diplomatic capabilities; and, crucially, the right grand strategy to deal with China to protect
vital U.S. national interests.(39)

Dont believe Chinese officials Their motivation is regional control

Blackwill & Tellis 15 (Robert, , Senior Fellow @ CFR, Former Ambassador to India, Ashley, PhD senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy
Toward China, March)

Policy experts critical of the grand strategy toward China proposed in this report will likely fall into at least six categories. First, some will argue that China has no
grand strategy. Although there may be those in Beijing who disagree with Chinas current strategic approach, its dominating elements are not a mystery.
Chinese officials insistently argue that the U.S. alliance system in Asia is a product of the Cold War and
should be dismantled; that the United States Asian allies and friends should loosen their U.S. ties and that
failure to do so will inevitably produce a negative PRC reaction; that U.S. efforts to maintain its current presence and power in Asia are
dimensions of an American attempt to contain China and therefore must be condemned and resisted; that U.S. military power projection in the

region is dangerous and should be reduced (even as the PLA continues to build up its military capabilities with the clear objective of
reducing U.S. military options in the context of a U.S.-China confrontation); and that the U.S. economic model is fundamentally

exploitative and should have no application in Asia. To not take seriously official Chinese government statements
along these lines is to not take China seriously. That Beijing does not hope to realize these policy goals in the short term does not
reduce their potential undermining effect in the decades ahead. In short, if China were to achieve the policy objectives contained

in these official statements, it would clearly replace the United States as Asias leading power. If that does not represent a
PRC grand strategy, what would? (34)

Chinas rise is not peaceful Predatory nature proves

Mulgan 16 [Aurelia George, University of New South Wales Japanese Politics Professor, 3-9, Diplomat, "Chinas
Rise as a Predator State,"http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/chinas-rise-as-a-predator-state/]

Chinas land grab and subsequent militarization of islands in the South China Sea have finally dispelled
the myth that its rise will be peaceful. Indeed, these developments point to an unwelcome fact that
China has become a predator state. Rands Michael Mazarr wrote about predator states in the late
1990s. He argues that what distinguishes a predator state above all is territorial aggression the
predisposition to grab territory and resources. China is one of two contemporary examples; the other is
Russia in Europe. The best historical examples are Napoleonic France, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan,
and more recently Iraq under Saddam Hussein. These examples teach us that predator states cause
wars. Predator states are buoyed by an expansionist ideology the active promotion of the idea that
neighbouring territories (both land and maritime) belong by rights to the predator. Such states often
possess a sense of historical grievance or victimization that can only be righted by territorial grabs.
Indeed, a Mazarr contends, the politics of memory operates powerfullycausing [predator states] to
react by forming aggressive, predatory instincts. Besides territorial aggression, predator states exhibit
several other distinguishing features. First, national policy demonstrates very high levels of
militarization. Predator states divert large quantities of national resources into military expansion for
purposes of power projection. The emphasis in military planning and weapons acquisitions is inherently
offensive rather than defensive and is geared to intimidating potential adversaries and winning offensive
wars. The flipside domestically is, as Mazarr writes, that military, nationalistic, and territorial issues
continue to play a large role in domestic politics and in the states approach to the world. In Chinas
case, nationalism has overtaken Marxism and more recently developmentalism as state ideology.
Second, predator states adopt a strongly strategic perspective on national advancement and display an
associated willingness to use all the institutions and instruments of the state over which they maintain
control economic, cultural, military, technological, resource, trade, legal, media in the pursuit of this
overwhelming important strategic objective. China, for example, deployed a broad range of retaliatory
instruments against Japan over the Senkaku Islands affair in 2010, including restricting the export of rare
earth metals. The use of such strategic instruments extends beyond such punitive acts of state
retaliation to a whole range of long-term, so-called market-based investments. These include foreign
acquisitions in strategically important and sensitive areas such as land, resource and water assets and
critical infrastructure as well as inprivate-sector developments and industries. The strategic element
cannot be discounted in these acquisitions because the line between private enterprise and state-
owned enterprises in the Chinese case is imprecise given the complex interweaving of business and
state actors. In the end, everything becomes strategic in the sense of supporting national
advancement and security. Third, predator states are not democracies where there exist checks and
balances and other moderating influences that negate the potential for predation against other states.
Predator states have authoritarian governments with low levels of accountability. Political leaders are
only answerable to other power cliques and display a willingness to engage in political repression,
including imprisonment and even murder of their opponents. In such states, there is no real separation
of the executive from the judiciary and, in that sense, no rule of law. Levels of domestic lawlessness are
matched by international lawlessness. Predator states do not respond to appeals to international laws
or norms because they are inherently lawless themselves they understand and respect only power in
international affairs. Chinas actions in the South China Sea clearly demonstrate that it does not support
a rules-based regional or global order; nor does it believe that you can fight power with rules as other
states are attempting to do in dealing with this issue. Finally, predator states show a predisposition to
act unilaterally rather than multilaterally. Multilateral cooperation is entertained only where it fits with
the long-term strategic interests of the state. Moreover, there is little willingness to trade off state
interests for larger collective interests in the international community. In that sense, predator states are
not interested in providing international public goods and should not be considered as potentially
benign hegemons. How should other states deal effectively with predator states? First of all, they need
to recognize what they are dealing with and react accordingly. Predator states demand tough
responses starting with vigilance, deterrence and containment. At the very least there must be
reinforcement of surveillance regimes, the formation of counterbalancing coalitions, and a willingness to
act across a whole range of spheres military, economic, financial, trade and diplomatic so that
predator states actions are not cost-free. Other states must also accept that doing nothing is not an
option. This only invites further provocation, which increases the risk of serious conflict.
 AT: Cooperation Overwhelms Perception
Chinas rise is aggressive, even if motivated by some US history. Chinese perception
cant be undone and moved toward peace.
Navarro 3-16 (Peter Navarro, Peter Navarro is a Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the Paul
Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard
University. 3-10-2016, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-
autry/mearsheimer-on-strangling_b_9417476.html DDI-AC)

Many Chinese believe that there will not be trouble in Asia because China is a Confucian culture. This is
what I called the Confucian Pacifism argument; and the argument is that China has historically not behaved in an
aggressive way towards its neighbors. Its behaved in a Confucian way, which is to say that it has behaved very defensively. Its
not been aggressive at all; and to the extent that China has been involved in wars, its due to aggression on the part of its neighbors. In other
words, China is always the good guy, and its adversaries in wars are always the bad guys. This is a lot like American Exceptionalism, right?
Americans believe that theyre almost always the good guy, and its the other side that is the bad guy. We tend to see the world in very black
and white terms, where were the white hats and the other side is the black hats. The same thing is true with Confucian Pacifism. Its basically a
story that says, you know, the Chinese are thewhite hats. The fact is if you look at Chinese history, what you see is that the
Chinese have
behaved, over time, much like the European great powers, the United States, and the Japanese. They have behaved very aggressively
whenever they can; and when they have not behaved aggressively, its largely because they didnt have the
military capability to behave aggressively. But the idea that China is a country that has not acted according to the dictates of realpolitik
and has always been the victim, not the victimizer, is clearly contradicted by the historical record. China is like everybody else. As hard as
Professor Mearsheimer is on Chinas hegemonic intentions, he is equally critical of an American pattern of aggression that has, in his view,
helped give rise to Chinas own increasingly militaristic behavior. Many
Americans think that because the United States is
a democracy and it is a hegemon, that it is a benign hegemon. And those same Americans think that the rest of the world should
view the Americans in those terms. They should see us as a benign hegemon. But thats not the way most other countries around the
world see us, and its certainly not the way the Chinese see us. The United States has fought six separate wars
since the Cold War ended in 1989, the first of which was against Saddam Husseins Iraq in 1991. Then we fought against Serbia over
Bosnia in 1995, and again, in 1999 against Serbia, but this time over Kosovo. And then we went to war against Afghanistan in the wake of
September 11th, and then in 2003, March 2003, we invaded Iraq. And in 2011 we went to war against Libya. So anyone who makes the
argument that the United States is a peaceful country because its democratic, right, is confronted immediately with evidence that contradicts
that basic claim. Its not an exaggeration to say that the United States is addicted to war. We are not reluctant at all to reach for our six-shooter.
And countries like China understand this. And when countries like China see the United States pivoting
to Asia, and they see what our record looks like in terms of using military force since 1989. And when they think
about the history of US-Chinese relations, when they think about the Open Door policy and how we exploited China in the early
part of the 20th century. And when they think about the Korean War - most Americans dont realize this, but we were not fighting
the North Koreans during the Korean War, we were fighting the Chinese from 1950 to 1953. We had a major war, not with the Soviet
Union during the Cold War, but with China. China remembers all these things. So they do not view the United States as
a benign hegemon. They view the United States as a very dangerous foe that is moving more and more
forces to Asia and is forming close alliances with Chinas neighbors. From Beijings point of view, this is a terrible
situation.