Atty.

Rabuya: Civil Law Review 1 Week 1 Case Digests

CIR v.Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007

FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He
claimed that they are entitled for a refund because they suffered losses that year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc.
However, despite the losses, they still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR.
Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit additional documents
to which Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon which prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000.
CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec 229 of
NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown filed its final adjustment
return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence,
beyond the reglementary period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period

HELD: The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return. 24 But how should the two-year
prescriptive period be computed?

As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days.
In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap
year.26

However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific
calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four
hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain." 28 It is the "period of time running
from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a
sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month."29 To illustrate, one calendar month from
December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008
until February 29, 2008.30

A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the
provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with the previous one). 31Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 states:

Sec. 27. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.

A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the laws to be
abolished.32 Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is
whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.33

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter
the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987,
the number of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of
1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori. We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the
last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.
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Atty. Rabuya: Civil Law Review 1 Week 1 Case Digests

CIR v. AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC.

Doctrine: As between the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following
the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Facts:

Petitioner filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat in relation to its zero-rated sales from July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. The CTA 2nd
Division partially granted respondents claim for refund/credit.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period
to claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the
filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004. He cited
as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code, which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner
argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC. According to the
petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a condition precedent before a judicial claim can be filed.

The CTA denied the MPR thus the case was elevated to the CTA En Banc for review. The decision was affirmed. Thus the case was elevated to
the Supreme Court.

Respondent contends that the non-observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D)
is not fatal because what is important is that both claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period. In support thereof, respondent cited
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. [130 Phil 12 (1968)] where it was ruled that if the CIR takes time in deciding the
claim, and the period of two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the CTA before the end of the two-year period
without awaiting the decision of the CIR.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the claim for refund was filed within the prescribed period

Held:

The pivotal question of when to reckon the running of the two-year prescriptive period, however, has already been resolved
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation,44 where we ruled that Section 112(A) of the NIRC is the
applicable provision in determining the start of the two-year period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, and
that Sections 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC are inapplicable as "both provisions apply only to instances of erroneous payment
or illegal collection of internal revenue taxes."

1. Yes. As ruled in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008), the
two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made.

Bearing this in mind, we shall now proceed to determine whether the administrative claim was timely filed.

Relying on Article 13 of the Civil Code,47 which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and taking into account the
fact that the year 2004 was a leap year, petitioner submits that the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/ credit for the
period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on September 29, 2004.48

We do not agree. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc (G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA
436), we said that as between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which
states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex
posteriori derogat priori. Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 deal with the same subject matter the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365
days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12
calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant. Thus, applying
this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on
September 30, 2004. Hence, respondents administrative claim was timely filed.

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Atty. Rabuya: Civil Law Review 1 Week 1 Case Digests

CO VS. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS

FACTS:

Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private complainant in Criminal Case for Violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner William Co (Co). In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally
dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court.7 Uy received a copy of the June9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a
day after.8

On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases which was granted on motion on October 14, 2004 and denied Cos
motion for reconsideration.10 When Co moved for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself from handling the criminal cases. 11The cases were, thereafter,
raffled to the MeTC Caloocan City. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases. 12 It was,
however, dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005.13 Cos motion for reconsideration was, subsequently, denied on December 16, 2005.14 Co then
filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 171096. 15 We dismissed the petition
per Resolution dated February 13, 2006.16There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006.17

Before the court where Criminal Case were re-raffled after the inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" on July 13,
2006.18 Uy opposed the motion, contending that the motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality by the SC. In spite of this, Judge
Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated September 4, 2006 granting Cos motion. 20 When the court subsequently denied Uys motion for
reconsideration on November 16, 2006,21 Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion
G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16,
2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases.22 Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, as
aforesaid, dismissed the petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.

In Cos defense, assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such dismissal
became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended party. He also
insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial courts issuance of the order granting the revival must be within
the one-year period. Lastly, even assuming that the one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003
when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap
year.

ISSUE:

ASSUMING that CASES WERE ONLY PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED:

a. WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR TIMEBAR OF THEIR REVIVAL IS COMPUTED FROM ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER OF PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL;

b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN A YEAR IS THE BASIS FOR COMPUTING THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR;

HELD:

The fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uys motion to revive the criminal cases. What is material
instead is Cos categorical admission that Uy is represented by a private counsel who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 3, 2003.
Therefore, the motion was not belatedly filed on July 2, 2004. Since the period for filing a motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel's receipt
of the order of provisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for the permanent dismissal is likewise the private counsel's date of
receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.

Granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into account 2004 as a leap year and that the one-year period to revive the case should be
reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy, We still hold that the motion to revive the criminal cases against Co was
timely filed. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. 39 Equally so, under the Administrative Code of
1987, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. The number of days is irrelevant. This was our ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Primetown Property Group, Inc.,40 which was subsequently reiterated in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia,
Inc.,41 thus:

x x x [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:

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Atty. Rabuya: Civil Law Review 1 Week 1 Case Digests

Sec. 31.Legal Periods.- "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in
which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from
sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain." It is the "period of time running from the
beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number
of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month." To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from
January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.42

LAVADIA VS. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA

FACTS:

Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot seven children, including Gregorio. After two
decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and his wife agreed to live separately as husband and wife, and executed an Agreement For Separation and
Property Settlement whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their conjugal property. On January 2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a
divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the Dominican Republic. On the same day, he married Soledad.

In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several other lawyers. The new law office thru Atty. Luna obtained a condominium unit which
they bought on an installment basis. After full payment, the condominium title was registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-indivisio
shares. When the law office was dissolved, the condominium title was still registered in the names of the owners, with Atty. Lunas share fixed at
25/100. Atty. Luna established a new law firm with Atty. Dela Cruz. After Atty. Lunas death in 1997, his share in the condominium unit, his law
books and furniture were taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first marriage. His 25/100 share in the condominium was also rented out to Atty.
Dela Cruz.

Soledad, the second wife, then filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to her, the properties were acquired by Atty. Luna and
her during their marriage, and because they had no children, 3/4 of the property became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and the
other half bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of Atty. Luna. The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the properties to the heirs of
Atty. Luna from the first marriage, except for the foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to her.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by awarding all the properties, including the
law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage.

In her petition before the Supreme Court, Soledad alleged that the CA erred in holding that the Agreement For Separation and Property
Settlement between Atty. Luna and Eugenia (the first wife) is ineffectual, hence the conjugal property was not dissolved.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce decree between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will decide who among the contending parties were
entitled to the properties left behind by Atty. Luna.

HELD:

The Supreme Court:

The divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void:

From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has
not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code,
even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have been the
void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the
marriage and the annulment of the marriage.

BAYOT VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage
Certificate[6] identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen [7] born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American

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Atty. Rabuya: Civil Law Review 1 Week 1 Case Digests

Vicente and Rebeccas marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in
the Dominican Republic. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,[8] ordering the dissolution of the couples
marriage and leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements.

Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage [16] on the ground of
Vicentes alleged psychological incapacity. Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss[17] on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for
support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each
other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and
concubinage

RTC denied the motion of Vicente. CA granted the petition of Vicente and granted a writ for preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce is valid.

RULING:

Yes. Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later
recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before,
during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as
an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees. Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of
the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated
through their Agreement[38] executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly
affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the
divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.[39] Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly
an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, [40] the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious
result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the
bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally
pronounced

ORION SAVINGS BANK vs. SHIGEKANE SUZUKI

Facts:
Respondent Shigekane Suzuki, a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking
slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang, a Korean national.
Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 18186] and Parking Slot No. 42
[covered by CCT No. 9118] were for sale. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were clean.
After payment of the price of the unit and parking slot, Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. Suzuki took possession of the
condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior of the condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in
possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orions Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver
the documents.
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Atty. Rabuya: Civil Law Review 1 Week 1 Case Digests

Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the properties. He learned that CCT No.
9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland
Pioneer. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.
Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles. Orion, through Perez, however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to
consult Orions legal counsel as its reason.

Issue: Whether or not Korean Law should be applied in conveying the conjugal property of spouses Kang?

Ruling:
In the present case, the Korean law should not be applied. It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively
subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal property are determined
by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title canpass from one person to another, or by which
an interest therein can be gained or lost.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party
invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded
and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.
Matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal
nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership ofproperty. It merely attached
a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient
proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a
foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In
other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that
he is married to Hyun Sook Jung. There is no reason to declare as invalid Kangs conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of
spousal consent.
It is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of the Dacion en Pago on February 2, 2003, Kang remained in
possession of the condominium unit. In fact, nothing in the records shows that Orion even bothered to take possession of the property even six
(6) months after the supposed date of execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang was even able to transfer possession of the condominium unit to
Suzuki, who then made immediate improvements thereon.

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM v. ERNST JOHAN
BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM

Foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her
son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the
arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of
R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien

ISSUE: Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law?

RULING:

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Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine
law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean
that Ernst is not obliged to support Normas son altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law
of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as
regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the
same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ALFREDO ONG, Respondent.

Facts :

On March 18, 1996, spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy secured a loan from Land Bank Legazpi City in the amount of PhP 16 million. The
loan was secured by three (3) residential lots, five (5) cargo trucks, and a warehouse. Under the loan agreement, PhP 6 million of the loan would
be short-term and would mature on February 28, 1997, while the balance of PhP 10 million would be payable in seven (7) years. The Spouses
Sy could no longer pay their loan which resulted to the sale of three (3) of their mortgaged parcels of land for PhP 150,000 to Angelina Gloria
Ong, Evangelines mother, under a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.

Evangelines father, petitioner Alfredo Ong, later went to Land Bank to inform them about the sale and assumption of mortgage. Land Bank
Banch Head told Alfredo that there was nothing wrong with agreement with the Spouses Sy and provided him requirements for the assumption
of mortgage. Alfredo later found out that his application for assumption of mortgage was not approved by Land Bank. On December 12, 1997,
Alfredo initiated an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against Land Bank, as Alfredos payment was not returned by Land Bank.
Alfredo said that Land Banks foreclosure without informing him of the denial of his assumption of the mortgage was done in bad faith and that
he was made to believed that P750,000 would cause Land Bank to approve his assumption to the mortgage.6 He also claimed incurring
expenses for attorneys fees of PhP 150,000, filing fee of PhP 15,000, and PhP 250,000 in moral damages.7 This prompted Alfredo to file a
case with RTC against Land Bank.

On its decision to the case, RTC held that the contract approving the assumption of mortgage was not perfected as a result of the credit
investigation conducted on Alfredo where he was disapproved.

. As such, it ruled that it would be incorrect to consider Alfredo a third person with no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation under Article 1236
of the Civil Code. Although Land Bank was not bound by the Deed between Alfredo and the Spouses Sy, the appellate court found that Alfredo
and Land Banks active preparations for Alfredos assumption of mortgage essentially novated the agreement.

Issues :

Whether Land Bank maintains that the trial court erroneously applied the principle of equity and justice in ordering it to return the PhP 750,000
paid by Alfredo.

Ruling :

We rule that Land Bank is still liable for the return of the PhP 750,000 based on the principle of unjust enrichment.. We turn then on the principle
upon which Land Bank must return Alfredos payment. Unjust enrichment exists when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or
when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.[18] There is
unjust enrichment under Art. 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or
with damages to another.[19]

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Additionally, unjust enrichment has been applied to actions called accion in rem verso. In order that the accion in rem verso may prosper, the
following conditions must concur: (1) that the defendant has been enriched; (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss; (3) that the enrichment of the
defendant is without just or legal ground; and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-
delict.[20] The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the
payment has no right to receive it.[21]

The principle applies to the parties in the instant case, as, Alfredo, having been deemed disqualified from assuming the loan, had no duty to pay
petitioner bank and the latter had no right to receive it.

Moreover, the Civil Code likewise requires under Art. 19 that [e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Land Bank, however, did not even bother to inform Alfredo
that it was no longer approving his assumption of the Spouses Sys mortgage. Yet it acknowledged his interest in the loan when the branch head
of the bank wrote to tell him that his daughters loan had not been paid.[22] Land Bank made Alfredo believe that with the payment of PhP
750,000, he would be able to assume the mortgage of the Spouses Sy. The act of receiving payment without returning it when demanded is
contrary to the adage of giving someone what is due to him. The outcome of the application would have been different had Land Bank first
conducted the credit investigation before accepting Alfredos payment. He would have been notified that his assumption of mortgage had been
disapproved; and he would not have taken the futile action of paying PhP 750,000. The procedure Land Bank took in acting on Alfredos
application cannot be said to have been fair and proper.

As to the claim that the trial court erred in applying equity to Alfredos case, we hold that Alfredo had no other remedy to recover from Land Bank
and the lower court properly exercised its equity jurisdiction in resolving the collection suit. As we have held in one case:

Equity, as the complement of legal jurisdiction, seeks to reach and complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and
want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so. Equity regards the spirit and not the
letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.[23]

UP vs. PHILAB Industries

Unjust Enrichment

Facts: In 1979, UP decided to construct an integrated system of research organization known as the Research Complex. As part of the project,
laboratory equipment and furniture were purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP
Los Banos Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came forward and agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory
furniture, including the fabrication thereof.

Dr. William Padolina, the Executive Deputy Director of BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine Laboratory Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the
laboratory furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project, to be paid by FEMF. Padolina assured Lirio,
Executive Assistant of FEMF, that the contract would be prepared as soon as possible before the issuance of the purchase orders and the down
payment for the goods, and would be transmitted to the FEMF as soon as possible. Despite the absence of any sample contracts, PHILAB made
partial deliveries of office and laboratory furniture to BIOTECH after having been duly inspected by their representatives and FEMF Executive
Assistant Lirio. Moreover, in 1982, FEMF proceeded to remit various sums of money to PHILAB as part of the downpayment, for which the latter
issued official receipts. Later in the year 1982, a Memorandum of Agreement between FEMF and UP was executed which affirms FEMFs
obligation to grant financial support and donate sums of money to the Research Complex as may be necessary.

A year later, Navasero, the President of PHILAB, promised to submit the contract for the installation of lab furniture to BIOTECH by January 12,
1983. PHILAB failed to do so. In response to repeated requests for a sample contract, PHILAB just sent accomplishment reports and asked for
payment, to which FEMF obliged. For the last instalment payment, FEMF failed to remit the required sum of money despite repeated demands
from PHILAB. FEMF never responded to the demands of PHILAB. As one of its remedies, PHILAB sought payment from BIOTECH, even if the
same was to be paid in installment basis. As its final recourse, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP. In its
answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had no cause of action against it because it was merely the donee/beneficiary of the
laboratory furniture in the BIOTECH; and that the FEMF, which funded the project, was liable to the PHILAB for the purchase price of the
laboratory furniture. UP specifically denied obliging itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by PHILAB. The CA ruled that UP is liable
under the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

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Issues: Whether or not the CA erred in basing its judgment on the doctrine of unjust enrichment

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court rejected the ruling of the CA based on unjust enrichment. In order that accion in rem verso (action based on
unjust enrichment) may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has
suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict. The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do not obtain in this
case. The respondent had a remedy against the FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its
claim. The petitioner legally acquired the laboratory furniture under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts:

Jesichris Manufacturing Company the respondent filed this present complaint for damages for unfair competition with prayer for permanent
injunction to enjoin Willaware Products Corporation the petitioner from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to
Jesichris Manufacturing Company. The respondent, alleged that it is a duly registered partnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution
of plastic and metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992, Jesichris
Manufacturing Company has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive
parts. Willaware Products Corporation, on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of
plastic and metal has its office near that of the Jesichris Manufacturing Company. Respondent further alleged that in view of the physical
proximity of petitioners office to respondents office, and in view of the fact that some of the respondents employees had transferred to
petitioner, petitioner had developed familiarity with respondents products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts. That sometime in
November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly
similar design, same material and colors but was selling these products at a lower price as [respondents] plastic-made automotive parts and to
the same customers.

Respondent alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture of automotive under chassis parts such as
spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorber bushing, center bearing cushions, among others. [Petitioners] manufacture of the same
automotive parts with plastic material was taken from respondents idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately
copied [respondents] products all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy
and have caused [respondent] damages in terms of lost and unrealized profits in the amount of 2,000,000 as of the date of respondents
complaint.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code

Held: We find the petition bereft of merit.

Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of
force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person
who thereby suffers damage."

In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it
must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the
language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public
injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means. 9

Here, both characteristics are present.

First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the acts of
the petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted having employed respondents former employees, deliberately
copied respondents products and even went to the extent of selling these products to respondents customers. 10

To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioners hiring of the former employees of respondent and petitioners act of copying
the subject plastic parts of respondent were tantamount to unfair competition, viz.:

The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was in bad faith in competing with the business of [respondent].1wphi1 [Petitioners]
acts can be characterized as executed with mischievous subtle calculation. To illustrate, in addition to the findings of the RTC, the Court
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observes that [petitioner] is engaged in the production of plastic kitchenware previous to its manufacturing of plastic automotive spare parts, it
engaged the services of the then mold setter and maintenance operator of [respondent], De Guzman, while he was employed by the latter. De
Guzman was hired by [petitioner] in order to adjust its machinery since quality plastic automotive spare parts were not being made. It baffles the
Court why [petitioner] cannot rely on its own mold setter and maintenance operator to remedy its problem. [Petitioners] engagement of De
Guzman indicates that it is banking on his experience gained from working for [respondent].

Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a warehouse and delivery man of [respondent], was fired because he was blamed of
spying in favor of [petitioner]. Despite this accusation, he did not get angry. Later on, he applied for and was hired by [petitioner] for the same
position he occupied with [respondent]. These sequence of events relating to his employment by [petitioner] is suspect too like the situation with
De Guzman.11

Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his business from manufacturing
kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the
trade secrets of the respondent.

VINZONS-CHATO VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO

FACTS: This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed
at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to
effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands
were already covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation
of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93
in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic
and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation
of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise
even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the
functions of his/her office

Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code

HELD: On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just
performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of
the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the
Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from
damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the
mantle of immunity for official. actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part
of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of
another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act" that may give
rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article
32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable

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acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the
Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a
public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers.
Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the
performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case
precisely filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional rights.

The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and malice are
not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to
failure to state a cause of action. The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the
performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer
violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission
of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in
which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are
circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good
motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is,
liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION VS VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN MONTAO

FACTS:
In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the death of their unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with
the collective bargaining agreement, then filed death benefits claim from his employer, the Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation which
denied the claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration and both parties agreed to have Atty. Allan Montao act as the
arbitrator. Montao ruled that Hortillano is entitled to his claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Montao.
On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the CBA, death benefits are awarded if an employees
legitimate dependent has died; but that in this case, no death has occurred because the fetus died inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus
has no juridical personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code which provides a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born; that the fetus was not born hence it is not a legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer
death as contemplated under civil laws.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent? 2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die?
HELD:
1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put in question, hence they are presumed to be married.
Second, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate
dependent the moment it was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg cell).
2. No. Death is defined as cessation of life. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is no need to discuss whether or not the unborn child
acquired juridical personality that is not the issue here. But nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the
Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have
acquired juridical personality could die. In this case, Hortillanos fetus had had life inside the womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to
life for 38 weeks before the unfortunate miscarriage. Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an employee is entitled to death
benefit claims as provided for in their CBA.

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