EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION

Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE
GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the Commission
on Elections, respondents.
G.R. No. 149036
April 2, 2002
EN BANC

FACTS:

On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID.
On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner
as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman together with other commisioners in
an ad interim appointment.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11, 2001
addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID,
designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department.
COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioners reassignment in a
Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the COMELEC en banc. Specifically, Commissioner
Sadain questioned Benipayos failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the
reassignment of petitioner.
Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment
to the Law Department.
Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001,
reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the
election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo denied her request for
reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000,
Exempting the Comelec from the coverage of the said memo circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc in a
Memorandum dated April 23, 2001. Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with
the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the
Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence
of the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:

We find petitioners argument without merit.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (and
other consolidated cases)

I. THE FACTS

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national
emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers,
leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to
unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and
take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.
 Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their
way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-
Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the
premises in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building
were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers,
cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential
Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her
constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices conducted pursuant
to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were
NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly
issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner
Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP
880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing
t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Now and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was
the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt
and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices conducted
pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
 [T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4
requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other
premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless
the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be
inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG
operatives.

IBP vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284 G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000.

Facts: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking to nullity on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the
Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis. Formulated Letter
of Instruction 02/2000 1 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols,
called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. 2 Task Force Tulungan was placed under the
leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or
eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates
whose members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former
PNP/Military personnel.

Issue:
1. Whether the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement is in derogation of Article 2, Section 3 of
the Constitution;
2. Whether the deployment constitutes incursion in a civilian function of law enforcement;
3. Whether the deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian
functions of the government
4. Whether the deployment gives more power to the military than what it should be under the
Constitution.

The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2)
Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review, and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in
joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP.

Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Ratio: The question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same
involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which
feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the
civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

In view of standing
Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi The
mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly
true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.

National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution
authorizing him to file the present action. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly
represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols.

Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases
brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court
hesitates to rule on are ''political questions." The reason is that political questions are concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed.
Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not
normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for
the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.

In view of abuse of discretion

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Calling the armed forces is
not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues
which are beyond the review powers of this Court.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. When the President calls the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom.

In view of burden of proof on factual basis

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no
evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was
exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the
military.

The present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will gain
ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Indeed, whether it is the calling out of the
armed forces alone in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion or also the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law (in case of invasion or
rebellion), the exercise of the President's powers as commander-in-chief, requires proof not mere
assertion. 4 As has been pointed out, "Standing is not 'an ingenious academic exercise in the
conceivable' . . . but requires . . . a factual showing of perceptible harm."

Because of the absence of such record evidence, we are left to guess or even speculate on these
questions. Thus, at one point, the majority opinion says that what is involved here is not even the
calling out of the armed forces but only the use of marines for law enforcement. We need to have
evidence on these questions because, under the Constitution, the President's power to call out the armed
forces in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion is subject to the limitation that the
exercise of this power is required in the interest of public safety.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there
must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not
required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it
becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in
the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.

In view of the Courts concurrence

We do not doubt the veracity of the President's assessment of the situation, especially in the light of
present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless
elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of
deployment described in the LOI 2000. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of
the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or
orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. 38 It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the Marines.

Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in
conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no "insidious incursion" of the military in civilian affairs
nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

Political questions are defined as "those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." 2 They have two aspects: (1) those
matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity and (2) matters which
have been specifically delegated to some other department or particular office of the government, with
discretionary power to act. 3 The exercise of the discretionary power of the legislative or executive
branch of government was often the area where the Court had to wrestle with the political question
doctrine.

Gudani vs. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and
the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her
consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col.
Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the
two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the
two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time
honoured principle of the Chain of Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the
General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing
them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it
of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel
such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled
to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by
judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the
law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on
executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the
Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege
must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent
military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed
forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations
as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislatures
functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President
to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to
pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the
Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior
consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of
the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of
officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply
with the final orders of the courts.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19,

1999.
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo
Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary
assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated
the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive
to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the
finality of judgment has already been rendered that by granting the TRO, the
Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of
an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the
three branches of our government.
Fabian vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998.
Facts: Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and
President of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation which
was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor
Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering
District. PROMAT participated in the bidding for government
construction projects, and private respondent, reportedly taking
advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous
relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which,
private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and
interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. When
petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent
refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts
of harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed an
administrative complaint against private respondent.

Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out

the penalty of suspension without pay for 1 year. After private respondent
moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the private
respondents new counsel had been his classmate and close associate, hence,
he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy
Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from the administrative
charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in

administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the
SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid
Held: The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for
review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts
enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of
quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a
verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43
which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of
appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.

Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from

decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the
SC.

Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 [1993].

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner
Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have
been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before
January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered
in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that
petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the
SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts
Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative
duties.

In Re: Manzano, 166 SCRA 246.

In Re: Rodolfo Manzano

Posted on
Facts:
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor
Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a
Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to
an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region
and as a member of judiciary.
Issue:
What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are
concerned?
Ruling:
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any
agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the
work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of
parties within its jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct &
affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence.
Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments executive machinery and its
performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of
executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an
element of positive action, of supervision or control.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry
out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic
law of its existence we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice
would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the
Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its
work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the
administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy
disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the
expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted
or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in
their implementation.

People vs. Mateo, G.R. No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004.

G.R. No. 147678-87 July 7 2004 [Judicial Power]

FACTS:
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape
and to indemnify the complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the CA. Solicitor
General assailed the factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal of appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of express
provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or death.

RULING:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving
offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the
more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is
imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it
does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding
an intermediate appeal or review in favour of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence
of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that
the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of
acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and
appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic
review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review
factual issues.