CRUZ VS GRUSPE

FACTS:
The claim arose from an accident that occurred when the mini bus owned and operated by Cruz collided
with the Toyota Corolla car of Gruspe; Gruspes car was a total wreck. The next day, Cruz, along with
Ibias went to Gruspes office, apologized for the incident, and executed a Joint Affidavit of
Undertaking promising jointly and severally to replace the Gruspes damaged car in 20 days, or until
November 15, 1999or alternatively, they would pay the cost of Gruspes car amounting to P350,000.00,
with interest at 12% per month for any delayed payment after November 15, 1999, until fully paid.
When Cruz and Leonardo failed to comply with their undertaking, Gruspe filed a complaint for collection
of sum of money against them before the RTC.

Petitioners claim that prior to the filing of the complaint for sum of money, Gruspe did not make any
demand upon them. Hence, pursuant to Article 1169 of the Civil Code, they could not be considered in
default. Without this demand, Cruz and Esperanza contend that Gruspe could not yet take any action.

RTC: In favor of Gruspe and ordered Cruz and Leonardo to pay P220,000.00,plus 15% per
annum from November 15, 1999 until fully paid, and the cost of suit.

CA: Affirmed RTC but reduced interest to 12% per annum

ISSUE: WON petitioners are at default

RULING: NO

In the absence of a finding by the lower courts that Gruspe made a demand prior to the filing of the
complaint, the interest cannot be computed from November 15, 1999 because until a demand has been
made, Cruz and Leonardo could not be said to be in default.

In order that the debtor may be in default, it is necessary that the following requisites be present:

(1) that the obligation be demandable and already liquidated; (2) that the debtor delays performance; and
(3) that the creditor requires the performance judicially and extrajudicially. Default generally begins from
the moment the creditor demands the performance of the obligation. In this case, demand could be
considered to have been made upon the filing of the complaint on November 19, 1999, and it is only from
this date that the interest should be computed.

RCBC VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Private respondent Atty. Lustre purchased a Toyota Corolla from Toyota
Shaw for which he made a down payment of P164,620.00, the balance
of the purchase price to be paid in 24 equal monthly installments. Private
respondent thus issued 24 postdated checks for the amountThe first was
dated April 10, 1991; subsequent checks were dated every 10 day of th

each succeeding month.

To secure the balance, private respondent executed a promissory
note and a contract of chattel mortgage over the vehicle. Toyota Shaw,
Inc. assigned all its rights and interests in the chattel mortgage to
petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC).
All the checks dated April 10, 1991 to January 10, 1993 were
thereafter encashed and debited by RCBC from private respondent's
account, except for one representing the payment for August 10, 1991,
which was unsigned.

Previously, the amount represented by RCBC Check No. 279805 was

debited from private respondent's account but was later recalled and re-
credited to him. Because of the recall, the last two checks were no longer
presented for payment.
On the theory that respondent defaulted in his payments, the check
representing the payment for August 10, 1991 being unsigned, petitioner
demanded from private respondent the payment of the balance of the
debt, including liquidated damages. The latter refused, prompting
petitioner to file an action.
RTC: In favor of LUSTRE, let RCBC accept payment without interest and to pay damages in
favor of respondent

CA: AFFIRMED RTC

ISSUE: WON ATTY LUSTRE is in Delay

HELD: NO

Petitionersimputationofdefaulttodefendantappelleerestedsolelyon
thefactthatthe5thcheckissuedbyappelleewasrecalledforlackof
signature.However,thecheckwasrecalledonlyaftertheamount
coveredtherebyhadbeendeductedfromdefendantappellee'saccount,
The"default"wasthereforenotacaseoffailuretopay,thecheckbeing
sufficientlyfunded,andwhichamountwasinfactalreadydebittedfrom
appellee'saccountbytheappellantbankwhichsubsequentlyrecredited
theamounttodefendantappellee'saccountforlackofsignature.
Notably,alltheotherchecksissuedbytheappelleedatedsubsequentto
August10,1991anddatedearlierthanthedemandletter,wereduly
encashed.Thisfactshouldhavealreadypromptedtheappellantbankto
reviewitsactionrelativetotheunsignedcheck

Petitioner claims that private respondent's check representing the

fifth installment was "not encashed, such that the installment for August
1991 was not paid. Petitioner submits that it "was justified in treating the
entire balance of the obligation as due and demandable. Despite demand
by petitioner, however, private respondent refused to pay the balance of
the debt. Petitioner, in sum, imputes delay on the part of private
respondent.

We do not subscribe to petitioner's theory.

Article 1170 of the Civil Code states that those who in the performance
of their obligations are guilty of delay are liable for damages. The delay
in the performance of the obligation, however, must be either malicious
or negligent. Thus, assuming that private respondent was guilty of delay
in the payment of the value of the unsigned check, private respondent
cannot be held liable for damages. There is no imputation, much less
evidence, that private respondent acted with malice or negligence in
failing to sign the check. Indeed, we agree with the Court of Appeals'
finding that such omission was mere "inadvertence" on the part of
private respondent.