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Ministry of Defence
Defence Standard 59-114

Issue 1 Publication Date 13th January 2012
Safety Principles for Electrical Circuits in

Systems Incorporating Explosive Components
Part 2
Electro-Explosive Devices and their
Characterization
DEF STAN 59-114 Part 2 Issue 1
Contents
Foreword ..........................................................................................................................................................vi
0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................vii
1 Scope ....................................................................................................................................................1
2 Warning.................................................................................................................................................1
3 Normative References .........................................................................................................................1
4 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................2
5 Types of EED ........................................................................................................................................4
5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................4
5.2 Low Voltage EED .............................................................................................................................4
5.3 High Voltage EED ..........................................................................................................................10
5.3.1 Exploding Bridge-Wire EED.......................................................................................................10
5.3.2 Exploding Foil Initiator (EFI) ......................................................................................................11
5.4 EED Sensitivity Data......................................................................................................................12
6 EED Characterization ........................................................................................................................14
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................14
6.2 Design Assessment.......................................................................................................................16
6.3 Qualification of Explosives...........................................................................................................16
6.4 EED Characterization Tests..........................................................................................................16
6.4.1 Environmental Trials ..................................................................................................................16
6.4.2 Electrical Characterization.........................................................................................................17
Annex A Known EED Characterization Data................................................................................................19
Annex B Test/Assessment of Explosives for Use in Electro-Explosive Devices ....................................28
B.1 Qualification ...................................................................................................................................28
B.2 Evidence/Tests...............................................................................................................................28
Annex C Environmental Testing of Electro-Explosive Devices.................................................................29
C.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................29
C.2 Information .....................................................................................................................................29
C.2.1 General.........................................................................................................................................29
C.2.2 Trials Programme........................................................................................................................29
Annex D Low Voltage EED Electrical Characterization ..............................................................................30
D.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................30
D.2 Test Procedure...............................................................................................................................31
D.2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................31
D.2.2 Radiographic and/or Visual Inspection ....................................................................................31
D.2.3 Initial Assessment ......................................................................................................................31
D.2.4 Power Threshold (Pth) Assessment...........................................................................................31
D.2.5 Energy Threshold Assessment for RADHAZ Trials ................................................................31
ii
D.2.6 Determine Thermal Time Constant ...........................................................................................32

D.3 Test Equipment..............................................................................................................................35
D.3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................35
D.3.2 Constant Power Source .............................................................................................................35
D.3.3 Alternative Sources ....................................................................................................................35
D.3.4 Digital Storage Oscilloscope .....................................................................................................36
D.3.5 Safety Ohmmeter (SOM).............................................................................................................36
D.3.6 Isolation Switch/Safety Interlocks.............................................................................................36
D.4 Test Method....................................................................................................................................39
D.4.1 Bridge-Wire and Insulation Resistance ....................................................................................39
D.4.2 Resistance Measuring Procedure .............................................................................................39
D.4.3 Firing Properties Test.................................................................................................................40
D.4.4 The Wind-Up Test .......................................................................................................................40
D.4.5 Bruceton Test ..............................................................................................................................40
D.4.6 The Probit Transformation or Rundown Test ..........................................................................42
D.5 Calculation Of NFT/AFT Using Probit Transformation Method ................................................43
D.6 Radio Frequency Characterization ..............................................................................................53
D.6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................53
D.6.1.3 Test Equipment .........................................................................................................................53
D.6.2 Test Method .................................................................................................................................53
D.7 Electrostatic Discharge.................................................................................................................61
D.7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................61
D.7.2 Procedure ....................................................................................................................................61
Annex E Characterization of High Voltage Electro-Explosive Devices (EFI and EBW) ..........................65
E.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................................65
E.2 Electrical Characterization ...........................................................................................................65
E.2.1 Visual Inspection ........................................................................................................................65
E.2.2 Resistance and Insulation Resistance .....................................................................................65
E.2.3 Firing Properties .........................................................................................................................67
E.2.4 Malfunction Threshold (MFT).....................................................................................................67
E.2.5 Thermal Time Constant ..............................................................................................................68
E.2.6 Static Discharge (25 kV) .............................................................................................................68
E.2.7 Non-interrupted Explosive Train Requirement ........................................................................69
E.2.8 Low Power Non-Functioning Test (for EBW). ..........................................................................70
E.3 Environmental Tests .....................................................................................................................70
E.3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................70
E.3.2 Vibration.......................................................................................................................................71
E.3.3 Thermal Shock ............................................................................................................................71
E.3.4 Humidity.......................................................................................................................................71
E.3.5 Leakage........................................................................................................................................71
E.3.6 1.5 m Drop....................................................................................................................................71
E.3.7 Shock ...........................................................................................................................................72
iii
E.3.8 Thermal Cook Off ........................................................................................................................72

E.3.10 Performance Tests......................................................................................................................72
E.3.11 High Voltage ................................................................................................................................72
Annex F Glossary of terms and abbreviations............................................................................................73
Figures
Figure 1 Sketch of Low Voltage Electric Fuzehead ....................................................................................4

Figure 2 Typical Bridge-Wire EED ................................................................................................................5
Figure 3 Typical Film Bridge EED.................................................................................................................5
Figure 4 Typical Conducting Composition EED .........................................................................................6
Figure 5 Threshold Firing Data for Typical Bridge-Wire Device................................................................7
Figure 6 An EBW Detonator Layout ...........................................................................................................11
Figure 7 An EBW Igniter Layout .................................................................................................................11
Figure 8 Basic EFI ........................................................................................................................................13
Figure 9 Sequence of EFI Detonation ........................................................................................................13
Figure D.1 Threshold Firing Data for Typical Bridge-Wire Device...................................................30
Figure D.2 EED Threshold Characterization ......................................................................................33
Figure D.3 The Rundown Test .............................................................................................................34
Figure D.4 Typical DC Firing Circuit....................................................................................................37
Figure D.5 Power Level against Probability of Fire 500ms Pulse width.......................................51
Figure D.6 RF Firing Circuit .................................................................................................................55
Figure D.7 Typical Impedance Measuring Jig ....................................................................................56
Figure D.8 Typical Matching Network (Cross Section) .....................................................................57
Figure D.9 Double Slug Fine Tuner .....................................................................................................58
Figure D.10 Loss In Fine Tuner - Attenuation v VSWR .......................................................................59
Figure D.11 ESD Equivalent Circuit.......................................................................................................61
Figure D.12 ESD Unit ..............................................................................................................................63
Tables
Table 1 STANAG 4560 Electrical and Environmental Characterization Tests......................................15

Table A.1 Fuzeheads, Electric, Bridge-Wire ................................................................................................19
Table A.2 Caps, Primers, Electric, Bridge-Wire...........................................................................................21
Table A.3 Detonators, Cartridges, Electric, Bridge-Wire............................................................................22
Table A.4 Igniters, Electric, Bridge-Wire......................................................................................................23
Table A.5 EED, Conducting Composition....................................................................................................25
Table A.6 Detonator, Exploding Bridge-Wire & Exploding Foil Initiator ..................................................26
Table A.7 Primers & Cartridges, Carbon & Film Bridge .............................................................................26
Table D.1 Bruceton Test Results of a BW Igniter........................................................................................45
Table D.2 Evaluation of 500 Millisecond Pulse Bruceton Test ..................................................................46
Table D.3 Millisecond Pulse Bruceton Test..............................................................................................47
iv
Table D.4 Evaluation of 1 Millisecond Pulse Bruceton Test ......................................................................47

Table D.5 Rundown Data 500ms Pulse (1 of 4) ........................................................................................48
Table D.9 Summary of Rundown Results ....................................................................................................49
Table D.10 Probit Analysis of Rundown Results ...............................................................................50
v
Foreword
AMENDMENT RECORD
Amd No Date Text Affected Signature and Date
REVISION NOTE
This standard is introduced at Issue 1.
HISTORICAL RECORD
The standard comprises 3 parts and supersedes the following:
Ordnance Board Pillar Proceedings P101(2) Dated 29 Apr 1997 (covered in parts 1 and 3) and P112(2)
Dated 29 Aug 2000 (covered in Part 2).
a) This standard provides requirements for the design and assessment of electrical circuits incorporating
explosive components.
b) This standard has been produced on behalf of the Defence Material Standardization Committee (DMSC)
by the Defence Ordnance Safety Group (DOSG).
c) This standard has been agreed by the authorities concerned with its use and is intended to be used
whenever relevant in all future designs, contracts, orders etc. and whenever practicable by amendment to
those already in existence. If any difficulty arises which prevents application of the Defence Standard, UK
Defence Standardization (DStan) shall be informed so that a remedy may be sought.
d) Any enquiries regarding this standard in relation to an invitation to tender or a contract in which it is
incorporated are to be addressed to the responsible technical or supervising authority named in the invitation
to tender or contract.
e) Compliance with this Defence Standard shall not in itself relieve any person from any legal obligations
imposed upon them.
f) This standard has been devised solely for the use of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and its contractors
in the execution of contracts for the MOD. To the extent permitted by law, the MOD hereby excludes all
liability whatsoever and howsoever arising (including, but without limitation, liability resulting from
negligence) for any loss or damage however caused when the standard is used for any other purpose.
vi
0 Introduction
0.1 Pillar Proc 101(2) was published in April 1997 superseding P101(1) and OB Proc 42413. These
documents, sponsored by the Ordnance Boards Electrical/Explosives Hazards Committee (E/EHC), set out
the principles of design, use, assessment and test for electrical circuits incorporating electro-explosive
devices (EED). Pillar Proc P112(2) contained the requirements for characterising Electro-Explosive Devices
to enable their no-fire threshold characteristics to be established in a statistically significant manner.
0.2 To align with MOD policy to eliminate or reduce the number of departmental standards and to provide
up to date requirements and guidance it has been decided to combine the Pillar Proceedings into a single
Defence Standard and as part of that process to include any additional requirements previously covered by
Def Stans 21-3 [11] (ex NES 1003) and 08-124 [12] (ex Def Stan 21-6 and NES 1006) which will be
cancelled on publication of this standard. The publication of this standard along with the update to chapter 24
of JSP 482 [13] (already completed) [26] will also enable JSP 412 to be cancelled
0.3 With the increase in use of more sensitive electronic and microprocessor components in munitions and
as more knowledge has been gained of the test and assessment requirements related to electrostatic
discharge and lightning hazards a review of the above documents identified a number of detailed
amendments that were required either as a result of a greater understanding of the issues, or the publication
of new Defence Standards and STANAGs. The use of high power and more low power portable radiation
sources, both military and civil has also grown, so increasing the electromagnetic environment and the
probability of an inadvertent initiation of a weapon system from such a source.
0.4 A new Defence Standard has therefore been produced to replace all the above standards without
changing the fundamental design or assessment requirements of the original Ordnance Board Pillar
Proceedings.
0.5 The Defence Standard has been divided into three Parts:
Part 1: Principles, Design Recommendations and Electrical/Electromagnetic Environments.
Part 2: Electro-Explosive Devices and their Characterization.
Part 3: Assessment, Safety Margins and Trials.
vii
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Safety Principles for Electrical Circuits in Systems

Incorporating Explosive Components
Part 2 Electro-Explosive Devices and their Characterization
1 Scope
1.1 In this Defence Standard the DOSG publish the principles that they recommend for the design and
use of electrical circuits and software in systems which incorporate or control explosive components and
against which they will assess designs. They also publish the methods and techniques that they will use
when assessing the safety of such circuits and software and make recommendations on safety margins and
trials factors that should be used. They also identify the electrical and electromagnetic environments and the
nature of the problems involved in the design and operation of systems with Electro-explosive Devices
(EED).
1.2 This part identifies those types of EED currently used in service, their characteristics and methods of
determining their electrical parameters and characteristics.
2 Warning
The Ministry of Defence (MOD), like its contractors, is subject to both United Kingdom and European laws
regarding Health and Safety at Work. All Defence Standards either directly or indirectly invoke the use of
processes and procedures that could be injurious to health if adequate precautions are not taken. Defence
Standards or their use in no way absolves users from complying with statutory and legal requirements
relating to Health and Safety at Work.
3 Normative References
3.1 The publications shown below are referred to in the text of this standard. Publications are grouped and
listed in alpha-numeric order.
[1] EMTAP Manual of Tests

[2] AECTP 250 Electrostatic Discharge Environment
Leaflet 253
[3] AECTP 500 Electrostatic Discharge, Munitions Test Procedures
Leaflet 508/2
[4] AOP 43 Electro-Explosive Devices Assessment And Test Methods For Characterization
Guidelines For STANAG 4560
[5] AOP 20 Manual of Tests for the Safety Qualification of Fuzing Systems
[6] Def Stan 07-14 Fuzeheads, Wirebridge
[7] Def Stan 07-85 Design Requirements for Weapons and Associated Systems
[8] Spare
[9] Def Stan 00-35 Environmental Handbook for Defence Materiel
[10] Def Stan 13-129 Requirements for Explosive Hazard Data Sheets for MOD Use
1
[11] Def Stan 21-3 The Requirement for Assessing Transient Coupled Energy Into Stores
Containing Electro-Explosive Devices
[12] Def Stan 08-124 Radio Frequency Environment and Acceptance Criteria for Naval Stores
Containing Electro-Explosive Devices (Cat 1)
[13] JSP 482 MOD Explosive Regulations
[14] MIL-STD-202 Test Method Standard, Electronic and Electrical Component Parts
[15] MIL-STD-331 Environmental and Performance Tests for Fuze and Fuze Components. One
Test A4 and Half Metre (Five Foot) Drop Test
[16] Probit Analysis D.J. Finney. Cambridge University Press, London, 1962
[17] RARDE Technical Design and Performance Data for RARDE Explosive Devices, dated April 1982
Report No. 13/81
[18] STANAG 4157 Fuzing Systems: Test Requirements for the Assessment of Safety and
Suitability for Service
[19] STANAG 4170 Principles and Methodology for the Qualification of Explosive Materials for
Military use
[20] STANAG 4370 Environmental Testing
[21] STANAG 4560 Electro-Explosive Devices Assessment and Test Methods for the
Characterization
[22] Thales Report EED Characterization Statistics
RHD 2002 An Investigation into the Effect of Sample Size on Accuracy in Historical
Characterization Reports dated April 2004.
[23] Thorn EMI Report E Type Fuzehead Firing Sensitivity at Frequencies up to 10 GHz dated May
DMP 4844 1976
[24] Thorn EMI Report The DC and RF Characterization of the Cap Conducting Composition dated
DMP 5336 August 1979
[25] Thorn EMI Report Reports on the Electrical Characterization and RF Modelling of Electro-
DMP 5357 explosive Devices, Page 22 and Figure 29 dated October 1981
[26] Thorn EMI Report The Response of an EED to Complex Modulation dated 15 Sep 87
DMP 11526
[27] Thorn EMI Report Issue 1 dated March 1993
DMP 15644
3.2 Reference in this Standard to any normative references means in any Invitation to Tender or contract
the edition and all amendments current at the date of such tender or contract unless a specific edition is
indicated.
3.3 In consideration of clause 3.2 above, users shall be fully aware of the issue and amendment status of
all normative references, particularly when forming part of an Invitation to Tender or contract. Responsibility
for the correct application of standards rests with users.
3.4 DStan can advise regarding where normative references documents are obtained from. Requests for
such information can be made to the DStan Helpdesk. How to contact the helpdesk is shown on the outside
rear cover of Def Stans.
4 Introduction
4.1 EED are one shot explosive devices used widely within military systems to perform a variety of roles,
such as the initiating component in explosive trains, as gas generators, as sources of heat or mechanical
energy and to perform other munition system functions. They are defined as a one shot explosive or
pyrotechnic device used as the initiating element in an explosive train and which is activated by the
application of electrical energy.
2
4.2 An explosive reaction process occurs in an EED when the temperature of a small amount of explosive
is raised beyond its ignition temperature due to the heat generated by the input of electrical energy.
Alternatively the explosion of a wire or copper bridge on receipt of an electrical pulse may cause a
detonation directly or when the explosive is struck by a flyer released by the explosion.
4.3 In general, varying types of reaction can occur during the ignition and functioning of an explosive
composition ranging from burning to full detonation. The reaction will depend upon the type and state of the
explosive, the rate of energy input and the degree of confinement. When the rate of advance of the shock
wave exceeds the velocity of sound in the explosive material, the output is said to be detonative and EED
giving this type of output are referred to as detonators. When the rate of burning is less than the velocity of
sound in the products, the explosive filling deflagrates and EED giving this type of output are referred to as
igniters. A variety of other names such as caps, fuzeheads and squibs, are also commonly used.
4.4 Primary and secondary explosives, propellants and pyrotechnics may all be used in EED. Generally
the primary and secondary explosives will function in a detonation mode whilst propellants and pyrotechnics
produce a burning reaction. However, under certain conditions primary and secondary explosives can burn
and some propellants can detonate.
4.5 EED can form a component part of a munition system or subsystems having no separate existence
save during manufacture, refurbishment or disposal in the munition life cycle. Alternatively they may be fitted
into a munition system late in the deployment phase such as when used for demolition purposes. In the latter
case, the EED will usually experience a more severe overall environment than those that are handled in the
potentially benign environment of a manufacturing facility or installed within munitions.
4.6 EED are designed to be initiated by the application of suitable electrical stimuli but unintentional
initiation may occur if the EED or its associated circuitry is exposed to electromagnetic radiation. The
electrical input needed to initiate the EED can be obtained either from sources installed within a munition or
from external sources in, say a demolition firing unit or a launching platform connected to the munition
through an umbilical cable. Unintentional initiation can also occur if any electrically charged body is allowed
to discharge through the EED.
4.7 EED applications are likely to fall into one of the following categories:
4.7.1 Non-installed, normally covering 2 scenarios:
a) EED containing small (mg) quantities of primary explosive which are transported and handled prior to
being installed into a sub-system/system.
b) Detonator devices whose whole life cycle is independent of the receptor explosive charge until the last
moment.
4.7.2 Installed covering the following scenarios:
a) EED within a Safe Arm Functioning Unit (SAFU) or Ignition Safety Device (ISD) which use a primary
explosive. The EED is isolated from the explosive train by a mechanism (e.g. shutter) which would
prevent a hazard should the EED inadvertently initiate,
b) EED that are in line with the explosive train and inadvertent initiation could cause a hazard e.g. rocket
motor, disrupters.
c) EED where non-operation of the EED could cause a hazardous event e.g. failure of flight termination
equipment, failure of ejection seat operation.
4.8 The electrical input needed to initiate the EED can be obtained either from sources installed within a
munition or from external sources in, say a demolition firing unit or a launching platform connected to the
munition through an umbilical cable.
4.9 The output from an EED lags the input by a time dependent upon the physics and chemistry of the
active components of the device. This is often called the reaction time; the time taken from application of the
stimulus to achievement of the measured output.
3
5 Types of EED
5.1 Introduction
Those EED in current and envisaged service use can be divided into 2 groups: those that are initiated by
voltages in the order of 10s of volts (termed low voltage devices) and those that require a fireset of greater
than 500 V (termed high voltage devices).
5.2 Low Voltage EED
5.2.1 Bridge-wire (BW) and Film Bridge (FB) EED. A BW EED is an EED where the power dissipated by
the passage of current through a resistive wire is used to initiate by heating a primary explosive in intimate
contact with the wire. These devices are activated by passing a current through a resistive bridge (wire, film
or tape) which is in close thermal contact with an explosive charge. Power dissipation in the bridge produces
a temperature rise at the explosive, which if high enough will lead to a self-sustaining thermal reaction,
causing initiation. Reaction times for these devices vary from a few microseconds for the faster FB devices to
milliseconds for typical BW EED. The application of current at levels less than the specified no-fire threshold
(NFT) value can result in BW EED being de-sensitised and thus requiring more current than normal to make
them function. The level of current necessary to cause de-sensitisation is very dependent upon the particular
EED.
5.2.2 A foil or FB in contact with a substrate having high thermal conductivity can be used to increase the
required firing power. When rapid functioning is required from a low energy source, vacuum deposited FB of
very small dimensions and low thermal mass can provide increased sensitivity to input energy. Figure 1 and
Figure 2 show typical BW EED, and a representative FB configuration is given in Figure 3.
Figure 1 Sketch of Low Voltage Electric Fuzehead
4
Figure 2 Typical Bridge-Wire EED
Figure 3 Typical Film Bridge EED
5.2.3 Conducting Composition (CC) EED. A CC EED is an EED where the primary explosive is intimately
mixed with a small quantity of conducting material (example graphite and powered metals), which, when
placed in a suitable container, allows the flow of an electrical current between two electrodes. As the current
flows, sufficient heat is generated to function the composition. The conducting composition of a CC EED
consists of a primary explosive mixed with a small proportion of finely divided graphite which forms a number
of conducting chains. Application of a voltage across these chains leads to power concentrations at one or
more critical graphite-graphite junctions and the sputtering of graphite on to neighbouring explosive crystals
causes them to ignite.
5.2.4 Figure 4 illustrates a layout typical of CC devices, which are always of the single-pole body return
configuration. As with BW and FB EED an igniferous or detonative output can be produced by a suitable
choice of explosives. CC devices would normally be chosen for applications where rapid functioning from a
low energy source is required.
5
Figure 4 Typical Conducting Composition EED
5.2.5 Semiconductor Bridge (SCB) or Initiator (SCI). The SCB/SCI is an EED containing a heavily doped
polysilicon bridge, which when subjected to a pulse of electrical energy produces a plasma discharge
initiating an explosive with which it is in contact. It comprises a p-n-p junction semiconductor chip,
sandwiched between metallic terminal surfaces. The junctions form a pair of diodes, connected anode to
anode. Doping levels and geometry are chosen to ascribe markedly different reverse breakdown
characteristics to the two diodes.
5.2.6 The initiation process results from the sudden disintegration of the diode adjacent to the explosive
charge when subjected to a large electrical pulse of appropriate polarity. The electrical stimulus must be
suitable both in magnitude and polarity and normally provides a high degree of immunity to alternating/rf
signals. SCB/SCI devices have been known about for some time but to date none have been introduced into
UK military service.
5.2.7 Detailed Descriptions of Low Voltage EED Response
5.2.7.1 The generalised response of an EED when subjected to an electrical stimulus has been derived
from an empirical study of the behaviour of BW devices but the principle can be applied to other types of
EED.
5.2.7.2 When electrical power is dissipated in a resistive wire the temperature distribution in the wire and
surrounding explosive will depend on a number of electrical and thermal parameters which are difficult to
quantify. These parameters control the rate at which the BW responds thermally to the applied power. On
the application of a step function of power the BW temperature approaches an equilibrium value almost
exponentially. This rise may be characterised by a parameter called the thermal time constant (), which is
related to the thermal response time of the EED. This is distinct from the Committal time, which is defined as
the time taken from application of the stimulus to when the irreversible chemical reaction commences.
5.2.7.3 When power is dissipated for a time significantly longer than , the power required to raise the BW
to an initiation temperature is independent of pulse width. When power is dissipated for a time shorter than
as a result of reducing the pulse width, heating becomes increasingly adiabatic, that is electrical energy is
employed more effectively as heat losses reduce. At a pulse width of approximately 0.1 a constant energy
region is approached where the energy required for ignition tends to a constant value as pulse width (with
increasing power levels) tends to zero. Figure 5 shows the relationship between threshold energy and pulse
width for a typical BW EED.
6
Figure 5 Threshold Firing Data for Typical Bridge-Wire Device
5.2.8 No-Fire Threshold (NFT) Sensitivities
5.2.8.1 It is impractical to attempt to define uniquely the stimulus level at which none of a particular batch
of EED will fire. The threshold sensitivity of the EED is usually derived from statistical measurements, an
assumption being made that the probability distribution of sensitivity obeys a normal law, when the logarithm
of the applied stimulus is taken as the independent variable. The NFT is defined in terms of the level at
which 0.1% of the devices will fire. Due allowance is made for sampling errors by using the single-sided
lower 95% confidence limit for the 0.1% probability of firing.
5.2.8.2 The NFT as defined is for use in assessments relating to non-hazardous failures. A safety factor is
applied to the NFT for assessments relating to hazardous failures (see Part 3, Annex B, sub-clause 7.2 on
safe margins).
5.2.8.2.1 No-Fire Threshold Power. The threshold power of an EED is defined as the power required to
produce a 0.1% probability of fire at the 95% single-sided lower confidence limit when applied to the EED for
a time which is long compared with the thermal time constant of the device, i.e. >10 .
5.2.8.2.2 No-Fire Threshold Energy. The threshold energy is defined as the energy which would produce a
0.1% probability of fire at the 95% single-sided lower confidence limit if applied to the EED for a time which is
short compared with the thermal time constant of the device, i.e. < 0.1 .
5.2.9 Pulse Thresholds
5.2.9.1 Knowledge of the pulse response is important in RF trials where a distinction is required between
the responses to Pulse and Continuous Wave (CW) excitation. From analysis of EED sensitivity results, the
constant energy and the constant power lines obtained from a graph similar to Figure 5, are extrapolated
linearly until they intercept. This occurs at a point of the pulse width axis equivalent to the ratio on the no-fire
threshold energy and no-fire threshold power, and defines the thermal time constant, .
5.2.9.2 In the transition region between constant power and constant energy behaviour, the linear
extrapolation gives poor correlation with empirical data. For a typical BW device, a simple exponential
relationship has been found to correlate well with the empirical firing data, as described by the following
relationship.
7
PTH t1
E(t1 ) = (1)
t
1 exp 1

where: E(t1) = energy to give 0.1% probability of fire when applied in time t1.
PTH = NFT power.
t1 = pulse width.
= thermal time constant.
5.2.9.3 This relationship gives better agreement with empirical data than the simple extrapolation shown
by the chain-dotted line in Figure 5.
5.2.9.4 Equation (1) can be written in terms of a power threshold for a single pulse:
PTH
Pt = (2)
1
t
1 exp 1

or in terms of repetitive pulses:
t
PTH 1 exp 2

P(t1 ,t2 ) = (3)
t
1 exp 1

or in terms of the mean power in the repetitive pulsed waveform:
t
PTH 1 exp 2 t1

P(t1 ,t2 ) = (4)
t1
1 exp t 2

Where: P(t1 ) = (peak) pulse power threshold for single pulse.
t1 = pulse width.
t2 = pulse repetition period.
P(t1 ,t2 ) = peak power threshold for repetitive pulse stimulus.
P(t1 ,t2 ) = mean power threshold for repetitive pulse stimulus.
5.2.9.5 This general treatment has been tested against the measured performance of EED other than BW
types. Its application is appropriate to devices that have thermal time constants comparable with typical
radar pulse duration. Such devices include the range of CC and some FB EED, with TC in the range 0.1 to
200 s.
5.2.9.6 The physical interpretation of the heating phenomena associated with FB and CC devices is not as
straight forward as for BW EED. Nevertheless in the limit both energy and power zones would be expected
to apply. Measurements have shown that to a first approximation the behaviour of these devices agrees with
the law described by Equation (1) and as with BW devices differences exist between experimental results
and the single exponential law exist around the transition region. Also, in the case of FB devices the
8
extremely good thermal contact between the FB and its substrate modifies heat transport to the extent that,
even under extremely short pulse conditions the characteristic constant energy behaviour is not well defined.
A slight positive slope in the energy versus pulse width relationship exists even for sub-microsecond pulse
duration. However, for practical trials use, these differences are sufficiently small to be neglected and the
behaviour described by Equations (3) and (4) is regarded as acceptable.
5.2.9.7 Thermal time constants for less energy sensitive BW EED are typically in excess of 10 ms and
consequently much longer than the t1 and t2, associated with pulsed radar. Under these circumstances
Equation (4) approximates to:
P(t1 ,t2 ) = PTH (5)
as
t1 t2
0 and 0

5.2.9.8 Very fast responding devices such as CC detonators can have sub-microsecond time constants
and when << t1 << t2 Equation (4) approximates to:
t1
P(t1 ,t 2 ) = PTH (6)
t2
5.2.9.9 These devices would respond fully within the duration of a single pulse in a repetitive pulsed
stimulus where the peak pulse power is related to mean power by the duty cycle.
5.2.9.10 Equation (5) could be used for the majority of BW devices with long thermal constants but few
EED satisfy the requirements of Equation (6). For devices with thermal time constants comparable with the
pulse width Equation (6) would result in over-pessimism. Under these circumstances Equation (4) could be
approximated to:
PTH t1
P(t1 ,t 2 ) = (7)
t1
1 exp t2

5.2.9.11 Hence the mean power threshold would show a level of dependence on the duty cycle of the
waveform. For more complex waveforms, particularly those involving complex modulations and a mix of
pulse widths/intervals (see Thorn EMI Report No. DMP 11526 [26]).
5.2.10 Low Voltage EED Electrical Sensitivity
5.2.10.1 There is a general trend towards achieving power thresholds in excess of 1 W although some
EED in present use have power sensitivities quoted below 10 mW. In a particular device, low power and
energy sensitivity are not always linked. For example some CC and FB EED have power thresholds in
excess of 1 W yet energy threshold less than 50 J. This feature has definite advantages in particular
designs for system applications where fast response and low energy sensitivity are design requirements, but
is to be avoided where RF or transient susceptibility is likely to be a relevant factor. Some general notes
dealing with the application of EED are given in Part 1, Annex C.
5.2.10.2 Power thresholds are used to assess the behaviour of EED in CW RF environments where EED
time constants are of little consequence. However, in an RF pulsed environment, susceptibility levels change
significantly depending on radar pulse parameters and EED time constants can be of major importance.
Peak powers in a pulsed radar environment could be more than 1000 times the equivalent mean power and
knowledge of the response to the short duration peaks is essential. This is obtained from Equation (4) which
gives mean power sensitivity in the pulsed environment.
5.2.10.3 The majority of experience to date on EED sensitivity behaviour is related to that described in the
previous section, where energy and power are the controlling parameters. Detailed analytical studies have
been carried out to determine the nature of the bridge heating phenomena in conventional types of BW and
9
FB EED. This work has been extended to cover electrical heating effects in the explosive components of
both CC and metal cased BW devices. Over the frequency range dc to over 10 GHz CW, it has been
demonstrated by the use of experimentation and theoretical modelling that, for a normal mode of initiation,
sensitivity is a decreasing function of frequency (see Thorn EMI Report Nos. DMP 4844 [22] and
DMP 5336 [23]).
5.2.10.4 As the majority of BW EED have long thermal time constants and initiation is mean power
dependent, bridge heating is the only form of initiation which can occur in a CW RF environment. However,
in a pulsed radar environment, a pin-to-case mode of initiation could assume major significance with metal
cased EED.
5.2.10.5 Factors that have to be taken into account when considering the importance of pin-to-case
breakdown phenomena are:
a) The EED response time compared with radar pulse duration.
b) The magnitude of peak pulse power with respect to equivalent mean power.
c) The larger RF capture area generally associated with common mode pick-up from a monopole type
pick-up mechanism (see Part 3, Annex C).
5.2.10.6 These effects, which are clearly frequency related, should be assessed in the light of overall
system performance.
5.3 High Voltage EED
5.3.1 Exploding Bridge-Wire EED
5.3.1.1 An EBW is defined as an EED which, when subjected to a high energy, short duration electrical
pulse heats up rapidly, partially sublimes and then explodes, projecting high energy particles, causing
detonation in a relatively insensitive explosive, which is in direct contact with the bridge-wire. The difference
between an exploding bridge-wire (EBW) and a Bridge-wire used in a low voltage EED does not necessarily
lie in the physical shape and geometry of the wire. The difference is the reaction to application of energy.
EBW detonators require the dissipation of 0.25 J or more in a low resistance BW in a period of less than a
microsecond to cause initiation. Due to the small cross section of the wire, the current heats the wire material
through the melting, boiling and vaporisation phases. The high instantaneous power results in the explosion
of the BW, inducing detonation in a relatively insensitive secondary explosive that in turn initiates an output
pellet. Reaction times in the microsecond region are found for this type of EED. A typical plug-in EBW can be
of the ceramic-metal type illustrated in Figure 6 or can have a completely plastic case. In addition they can
have co-axial, tri-axial or flying lead input arrangements.
5.3.1.2 The application of electrical inputs of significantly lower voltage and longer duration than the
specified all-fire threshold can result in dudding or deflagration but should not result in detonation if the
device is to be categorised as suitable for in-line application. Such inputs can be capable of being regarded
as a reliability rather than a safety hazard. Dudding is the result of BW heating raising the temperature of the
explosive in contact with the wire to a level where its physical condition is modified and the EBW will not
function as intended on receipt of its specified input stimulus. Sufficient energy to melt the BW would not
initiate the filling.
5.3.1.3 Some EBW detonator designs incorporate a spark gap in one of the input leads designed to
breakdown at about 500 V. This lessens the chance of application of low dudding voltages to the bridge but
does not provide any protection against dudding by the ingress of RF power above UHF.
10
Figure 6 An EBW Detonator Layout
5.3.1.4 Figure 7 illustrates the features of an EBW igniter in which the detonation induced in a low-density
secondary explosive ruptures a metal diaphragm and results in the ignition of a pyrotechnic output charge.
Such an arrangement retains the main safety characteristics inherent in the EBW concept, in that it requires
the high and rapid energy input from a specialised power source in order to function.
Figure 7 An EBW Igniter Layout
5.3.1.5 Conventional low voltage EED converted to high voltage EBW functioning by incorporation of a
spark gap in one of the leads are likely to be susceptible to resonances due to the gap capacitance and the
bridge-wire inductance, which will allow the coupling of RF energy to the EED. If the circuit is exposed to an
RF environment dudding or even premature functioning of the device could result.
5.3.2 Exploding Foil Initiator (EFI)
5.3.2.1 An EED with a low resistance bridge which when subjected to a high energy, short duration
electrical pulse, converts electrical energy into kinetic energy to project a high velocity flyer plate which, on
impact, causes a detonation in a relatively insensitive explosive which is not in direct contact with the bridge
11
is known as an EFI (also known as a slapper detonator). Applying a high-energy impulse to a foil or film
bridge causes it to explode. This punches a small segment (a flyer) from the centre of a plastic disc and
propels it along a short barrel section to impact a secondary explosive charge thereby causing detonation.
Figure 8 provides an exploded view of the component parts of a slapper detonator and its sequence of
initiation Figure 9.
5.3.2.2 EFI are similar to EBW in terms of their sensitivity and reaction times but the separation of the
explosive charge from the bridge prevents low level currents in the bridge causing thermal degradation of the
explosive material. However dudding can occur at an energy level below that required to melt the bridge,
since degradation of the flyer may prevent correct functioning on receipt of a fire pulse. These devices
provide an increasingly used alternative to EBW particularly in high temperature and high shock applications.
5.3.2.3 From an application standpoint it is important to note that the amount of energy applied to the foil
which results in acceleration of the flyer is functionally dependent upon not only the quantity of energy but
also the rate at which it is applied. This provides added safety because more than just energy is required but
when considering this initiation concept, the entire system, including the fire set, connecting cables (strip
line) and the initiator, must be evaluated.
5.3.2.4 Unlike low voltage EED, where the NFT is not very different from the all-fire threshold (AFT), the
EFI has a much wider discrimination between the energy that will cause initial visible damage or measurable
degradation of the bridge and the detonation of the pellet. The electrical pulse having defined characteristics
to produce a flyer, with the correct velocity to cause detonation, is unlikely to be generated by external
influences. However, sufficient electrical energy could be generated within the system to cause damage to
the bridge, which may or may not cause film shear to occur, and which does not result in initiation of the
explosive. Although such a situation would not lead to inadvertent initiation the system may be incapable of
correct operation when a valid pulse is received. Therefore a malfunction threshold must be determined and
is presently defined as the energy or power which would produce a 0.1% probability of fire at the 95%
single-sided lower confidence limit when visible damage (physical) or measurable change in electrical
(resistance) parameters is produced'. Where visibility of the bridge is not appropriate the malfunction
threshold is defined using a Bruceton test and the inability of the EFI to initiate when subject to a correct
firing pulse.
5.4 EED Sensitivity Data
5.4.1 Sensitivity information is available for a large number of UK EED and overseas manufactured
devices (Annex A). This is not a comprehensive listing of all in-service EED as it lists only those items for
which statistical data has been derived. It will be updated as new information is made available. Where
information is not available or is considered inadequate, then EED characterization will need to be carried
out before system RF susceptibility assessments are possible.
5.4.2 All the information detailed in Annex A relates to dc sensitivity except for the N1 Mk 1 EBW that
provides data of a proof capacitor discharge test. The dc NFT is generally acceptable for RF trials
assessment on systems containing BW EED where measurements of hazard levels relate directly to BW
temperature which is essentially independent of frequency. Due to the nature of CC EED it is not practicable
to use temperature as a measurement parameter and special instrumentation was developed to measure RF
power at the EED input. The sensitivity of all CC EED falls with frequency, and may be up to 10 dB less at
10 GHz than at dc (Ref [23]). This reduction in sensitivity is not normally allowed for in either theoretical
assessments or trials.
NOTE also that the reduction in sensitivity with frequency of BW EED is not allowed for in theoretical
assessments.
12
Figure 8 Basic EFI
Figure 9 Sequence of EFI Detonation
13
5.4.3 Environmental criteria may dictate the selection of a particular EED to suit a given task. Def Stan
07-14 [6] contains data for a range of electric BW fuzeheads. Historic information on environmental
capabilities can be found in the RARDE Technical Report No. 13/81 [17] but for most EEDs information
should be sought from the design authority. The methods used to characterize all BW and FB devices
involve applying fixed levels of power and fixed levels of energy to the EED. The methods used to
characterize all BW and FB devices involve applying constant power levels at a range of pulse widths to the
EED. This characterization should be performed using test methods, firing strategies and facilities described
in Annex D and Annex E.
5.4.4 In testing CC devices a voltage stimulus has been found to be more appropriate than power in
obtaining long pulse thresholds with maximum statistical confidence. The power threshold can be deduced
by dividing the square of the threshold voltage by the geometric mean of the dynamic resistance of all EED
tested during the threshold measurement. The dynamic resistance of each EED is calculated from the ratio
of voltage and current during the application of a firing stimulus. This is necessary because the dc resistance
of most CC EED is known to be a voltage sensitive parameter, exhibiting rapid variation with voltage up to
firing threshold levels, but with a tendency to saturate at higher levels (see Thorn EMI Report No.
DMP 5357 [24]).
5.4.5 For HV EED (EFI and EBW) NFT power values are not relevant since the devices require a fast
rising HV pulse to initiate. The data provided is therefore a power malfunction threshold level which is the
parameter recommended for use in RADHAZ assessments/trials. A No-fire threshold in terms of voltage on
the firing capacitor should still be determined to enable assessments of the suitability of the device and
fireset for use in in-line systems to be determined. (See Annex E for more detail).
6 EED Characterization
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 In support of the Defence Ordnance Safety Groups task to provide an impartial appraisal of the
safety and suitability for service of weapons and those parts of weapon systems and stores in which EED
are used, assessment and characterization of the EED is required. It is emphasised that characterization is
not Qualification but only the data to assist in the overall Qualification assessment. The assessment should
cover design and manufacture, including explosive content, initiation and output over all expected conditions
of use.
6.1.2 Over the past 35 years the characterization of BW, FB and CC devices have been carried out using
separate national test procedures. These procedures, though different, have normally been considered
adequate tests providing the National Safety Approving Authority (NSAA) or other appropriate authority, to
which the test data should be provided, monitors them. With more reliance on manufacturers doing the tests
and the need to provide data to other nations when considering overseas sales, it has been considered
appropriate to consolidate these tests to provide a single guidance for national defence agencies and
contractors.
6.1.3 Over a number of years AC/326 Sub Group 2 has, through an expert-working group, produced a
STANAG on EED characterization, STANAG 4560 [20] and Allied Ordnance Publication (AOP) 43 [4]. This
STANAG and AOP provide advice on the various approaches open to national representatives to
characterize EED but gives latitude for each nation to identify specific methodologies.
6.1.4 An EED will normally be characterised as a separate item, except for those characteristics that may
be more appropriately derived at system or sub-system level when agreed by the NSAA. The
characterization test programme for an EED will consist of a series of electrical tests to establish its electrical
parameters and environmental tests that reflect a typical life cycle of an EED as related to its mode of
application. Table 1 shows the recommended tests from Ref [20] for individual EED.
6.1.5 DOSG has been an active participant in the working group and endorses the approach described in
the documents and this Defence Standard is the UK implementation for the STANAG. The STANAG states
that the requirement to carry out some tests and the numbers of EEDs required for tests must be agreed by
the NSAA. The UK interpretation of these issues/tests is given in section 6.4 and in the Annexes of this
standard.
14
Table 1 STANAG 4560 Electrical and Environmental Characterization Tests
Series Devices
Test
Number
BW, FB, CC, SCB EFI EBW
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
1 Radiographic and/or Visual Inspection X X X
Electrical Tests
2 Resistance X X X
3 Insulation Resistance X X X
4 Firing Properties Test X X X
5 Malfunction Threshold X X
6 MAEST(3) X X
7 Thermal Time Constant(1) X X X

Non-Interrupted Explosive Train
8 X X
Requirement
9 Electrostatic Discharge X X X
10 Low Power Non-Functioning Test X
Environmental Tests
11 Vibration(4) X X X
12 Thermal Shock(4) X X X
13 Humidity(4) X X X
14 Leakage X X X
15 1.5 m Drop(4) X X X
16 Mechanical Shock(4) X X X
17 Thermal Cook-Off(1) (4) X X X
18 High Temperature(1) (4) X
Function Tests
19 Performance Tests(2) X X X
Post Environment Firing Properties
20 X X
Test
21 High Voltage X X
Notes: (1) May not be considered mandatory by the NSAA
(2) Functioned at Cold, Ambient, and Hot
(3) MAEST not considered mandatory by UK see sub-clause 6.4.2.4.2
(4) See discussion at clause 6.4.1 and Annex C for UK requirements
15
6.2 Design Assessment
6.2.1 In assessing an EED, the following design aims will need to be addressed:
a) It should provide the desired response when supplied with the specified electrical input.
b) It should not function inadvertently or be unacceptably degraded under any normal or abnormal
environments likely to be encountered throughout its manufacture to target or disposal sequence
(MTDS).
c) It should be reliable, effective, safe to assemble and easy to use.
d) Where the conditions under which an EED is to be installed in a munition are known, their potential
interaction with the EED should be taken into account in the choice of EED type, its construction and its
characteristics, thereby achieving risk reduction.
6.2.2 Where component parts of the EED, or where test equipment utilising components used in the
munition tactical firing unit are modified/changed, e.g. the fire set of an EFI, the characterization data will
require re-assessment to confirm its validity.
6.2.3 The design assessment for an EED will be based upon documented evidence, which will assist
verification of the aims given in sub-clause 6.2.1. The following information will be required:
a) Production standard drawings.
b) Materials used together with physical and chemical attributes likely to be relevant, such as strength,
stability, compatibility etc.
c) Tolerances and fit of components.
d) Quality procedures.
e) Information on component failure.
6.2.4 Where an EED is to be handled and transported in service as an independent device, an EED
hazard assessment will be required. Systematic errors arising from, for example, design or manufacturing
errors as well as random failure should be considered. The measures taken to reduce risk from inadvertent
initiation should be stated, where appropriate. For an EED installed into a munition throughout its service life,
the system level hazard assessment should include all potential failure modes of the EED. For both
situations the assessment should include consideration of all stages in the life cycle including effects of the
environment and handling operations/procedures.
6.3 Qualification of Explosives
6.3.1 The explosives should be Qualified in accordance with the principles and methodology given in
STANAG 4170 [18]. The UK Qualification tests will encompass those tests associated with Def Stan 13-129
'Requirements for Explosive Hazard Data Sheets for MOD Use' [10] and are detailed in Annex B.
6.3.2 Compatibility
Within EED, explosive compounds are in intimate contact with both metallic and other materials and need to
be compatible with them (Def Stan 07-85 [7]). Examination of compatibility data may allow the particular
interfaces to be assessed as safe and suitable from previous knowledge. The use of new combinations of
materials will entail a programme of testing being arranged (Annex B) so that interaction between materials
can be assessed.
6.4 EED Characterization Tests
6.4.1 Environmental Trials
6.4.1.1 The trials programme should cover two aspects:
16
6.4.1.1.1 For installed EED, an environmental trials programme dedicated to the EED may not be required
if manufacturers tests have demonstrated robustness in the environments which cover manufacture, general
handling, storage and transportation to the place of installation. A limited amount of testing will also be
covered during the Hazard Classification of the EED. Further environmental testing on the EED alone may
not be needed if it will never be used in-service separated from its parent sub-assembly/system and its
robustness is proven at that level. Such testing will, however, be needed in specific cases such as if EED
were to be replaced in a munition in the field or is used as, say, an EOD detonator. There are also instances
where a new design EED is being produced where an environmental trials programme is necessary as a risk
reduction exercise to ensure issues will not be raised during system testing. These tests can be related only
to a general coverage of climatic, mechanical and electrical environments.
6.4.1.1.2 For EED, which retain independence for most of their life, it is normally appropriate to conduct
environment trials based on the MTDS. The trials programme can be prepared in sequential and non-
sequential phases. The period of each test should be sufficient to enable estimation of the component life.
The table in Annex C reflects a typical MTDS for an EED used for demolition purposes.
6.4.2 Electrical Characterization
6.4.2.1 It is important to know for both safety and suitability for service reasons the level of energy or
power at which the EED will or will not be initiated. Generally the probability of initiation by the electrical input
is assumed to be according to a normal or log normal law.
6.4.2.2 Firing Properties - All-fire and No-fire Thresholds (Power and Energy)
6.4.2.2.1 These thresholds are obtained from statistical test data and are usually given at a specified
confidence level. Nevertheless, in order to allow the predicted input level corresponding to any probability (or
vice versa) the results details include test method, number of samples and shot results with, as a minimum,
the mean value and the standard deviation.
a) The All-Fire Threshold (AFT), the level at which 999 in 1000 EED fire.
b) The No-Fire Threshold (NFT), the level at which only 1 in 1000 EED fire.
6.4.2.2.2 Each of these threshold levels has associated with it a confidence level of 95%. The upper
single-sided confidence limit is used for the AFT, and the lower single-sided confidence limit is used for the
NFT. The AFT is important, as the power source must be capable of supplying this power or energy over the
specified life cycle of the system. The NFT is important as a measure of the energy or power that, if
inadvertently induced in a firing circuit, may cause un-commanded initiation of the EED.
6.4.2.2.3 The procedures used to determine the electrical parameters of low voltage EED are detailed in
Annex D and high voltage EED at Annex E
6.4.2.3 EED Resistance and Insulation Resistance
For bridge resistance either the range or geometric mean of the sample tested is to be measured and
reported. Insulation resistance tests should also be conducted and results reported where the EED has an
insulated case.
6.4.2.4 Malfunction Threshold and Maximum Allowable Electrical Sensitivity Test (MAEST)
6.4.2.4.1 Malfunction Threshold (Also known as Maximum No Damage Current). Unlike BW, FBW and CC
devices, EFI and EBW devices require an electrical pulse having a well-defined characteristic to produce a
flyer with the correct velocity and size to cause detonation. This is unlikely to be generated by external
influences. However, sufficient electrical energy could be generated within the system to cause damage to
the bridge or flyer or in an EBW desensitise the surrounding explosive, without causing an initiation.
Although such a situation would not lead to inadvertent initiation, the system may be incapable of correct
operation, when a valid firing pulse is received. Therefore it is more relevant to define a malfunction
threshold (MFT) which can be used for RADHAZ assessments.
6.4.2.4.2 The need to determine MAEST should be discussed with DOSG and will depend on the range
of applications intended for the device and the design of the firesets to be used compared to the standard
fireset defined in AOP43 [4].
17
6.4.2.5 Thermal Time Constant
In order to determine whether an EED will be susceptible to the energy of a pulsed environment the thermal
time constant is required to be assessed. In the UK this test is considered mandatory.
6.4.2.6 Electro-static Discharge
This test confirms minimum acceptable design safety and reliability characteristics of the EED with respect to
inadvertent ESD inputs. There are two ways an EED can be damaged by ESD, each case could influence
device reliability and/or safety. The first way an EED can be damaged by ESD is when the damage occurs
by a breakdown of the EED insulation when potential is developed between the pin and case of the EED.
The pin to case test with the 5000 ohm resistor in series with the EED may be more severe than when the
500 is in series because the length of time the potential is maintained increases the probability of a
breakdown even though less potential is developed. Therefore, pins to case tests with each resistor in series
with the EED are required. The second way an EED can be damaged by ESD is when the bridge is heated
by potential between the EED pins. The energy delivered through a 500 resistor to the bridgewire is
greater than that delivered through a 5 k resistor. If the device passes the test with a 500 resistor, it will
also pass with a 5 k resistor. Therefore, pin-to-pin tests with the 500 resistor only in series with the EED
are required. It is unlikely to expect any damage, much less a reaction in the pin-to-pin mode for EFIs.
Simple calculation shows that the maximum current into a typical EFI from a capacitor charged to 25k Volts
through a 500 resistor is 50 Amps, or almost 2 orders of magnitude less than a typical EFI burst current.
Since the RC time constant is around 0.25 microseconds, the current drops off to nothing in a few hundred
microseconds. The total energy in the capacitor is 156 mJ. For a typical bridge of 50 m resistance, only
1/10,000 of the energy is deposited in the bridge because the 500 resistor in series absorbs most of the
energy. Thus, the total energy that can ever be deposited in the bridge is on the order of 16 J. Over time, as
EFI are tested pin to pin without damage, the pin to pin testing requirement may be eliminated, once enough
confidence is developed that they are immune from pin to pin ESD.
6.4.2.7 Non-Interrupted Explosive Train Requirement
These tests are defined in STANAG 4560 [21]. Some but not necessarily all the tests and are required by
some Nations where the EBW or EFI is to be used for initiating a warhead or rocket motor in a non-
interrupted configuration. The AC test (as defined in Annex E) is not considered mandatory by UK for most
applications but if the risk of exposure to the AC voltage is significant the test should be performed. The 28V
DC test should normally be conducted unless agreed otherwise by DOSG. The Maximum Allowable
Electrical Sensitivity Test (MAEST) would normally only be conducted where doubt existed on the intended
fireset and it was not available for use during characterization.
6.4.2.8 Low Power Non-Functioning Test
Experience has shown that it is feasible for some devices defined as an EBW to detonate when exposed to
DC voltages for a sustained period. This test shall therefore be conducted as described in STANAG 4560
[21] for all EBWs
6.4.2.9 General Guidance
Guidance on the conduct of all tests is given in AOP43 [4].
18
Annex A
Known EED Characterization Data 1
Note 1: If required DOSG ST3 can be consulted to check if additional items have been characterized since publication
Table A.1 Fuzeheads, Electric, Bridge-Wire

NFT
Item
No. Name Resistance Power Energy T/C Source Date Remarks
(Ohms) (mW) (mJ) (ms)
1 Fuzehead Type A 0.9 - 1.6 130 2.3 18 See item No 8 Similar to Type E Fuzehead. Used in F53, F92, F103 & F111 EED
2 Fuzehead Type B 10 - 16 26 0.2 8 RARDE (XM3) Estimate - Power calculated from Current and RGM. Used in F120 EED
3 Fuzehead Type C 0.9 - 1.6 130 2.3 18 See item No 8 RARDE specification similar to Type E Fuzehead. Used in F121 EED.
4 Fuzehead Type D 0.9 - 1.6 130 2.3 18 See item No 8 RARDE specification similar to Type E Fuzehead. Used in F122 EED.
(1)
5 Fuzehead Type E 0.9 - 1.6 130 2.3 18 DMP11004, July 1982 Used in F123, N4 Mk1 & N12 Mk1 EED.
6 Fuzehead Type F 6-8 69 0.46 7 RARDE (XM3) Estimate - Power calculated from Current and RGM. Used in F124 EED
7 Fuzehead Type G 8 - 14 4.2 0.07 17 RARDE (XM3) Estimate - Power calculated from Current and RGM. Believed not to
have entered production.
8 Fuzehead Type H 10 - 16 26 0.2 8 RARDE (XM3) Estimate - Power calculated from Current and RGM. Used in F126 EED
9 Fuzehead Type J 10 - 16 26 0.2 8 RARDE (XM3) Estimate - Power calculated from Current and RGM. Used in F127 EED
10 Fuzehead Type K 0.9 - 1.6 130 2.3 18 Item No 8 RARDE specification similar to Type E F/H. Used in F128 EED
11 Fuzehead Type L 0.9 - 1.6 240 7 29 RARDE (XM3) Estimate - Power calculated from Current and RGM. Used in F129 EED
12 Fuzehead Type M 10 - 16 26 0.2 8 RARDE (XM3) Estimate - Power calculated from Current and RGM. Used in F130 EED
13 Fuzehead Type N 10 - 16 26 0.2 8 RARDE (XM3) Estimate - Power calculated from Current and RGM. Used in F131 EED
14 Fuzehead Type P 0.9 - 1.6 132 3.3 25 DMP 12022 February 1991 Estimate - Power calculated from Current and RGM.
Modified Fuzehead 1.09 1.63 Thales Rpt New manufacture by Chemring. P type figures can be used as worst
14a 155 3.8 24.2 Feb 2011
Type P GM 1.28 1012276 U3898 case if both types in a single weapon design.
19
NFT
Item
No. Name Resistance Power Energy T/C Source Date Remarks
15 Fuzehead Type R 0.9 - 1.6 130 2.3 18 See item No 8 RARDE specification similar to Type E fuzehead
16 Fuzehead Type S 0.9 - 1.6 130 2.3 18 See item No 8 RARDE specification similar to Type E Fuzehead. Obsolescent.
17 Fuzehead Type T 10 - 16 26 0.2 8 RARDE (XM3) Estimate - Power calculated from Current and RGM.
18 f/h Min. No. 1 0.9 - 1.6 108 - - Nobel Explosives
19 f/h Min. No. 2 0.15 - 0.3 172 - - Nobel Explosives
20 f/h Min. No. 3 10 - 16 32 - - Nobel Explosives
21 f/h Min. PVA 10 - 16 38 - - RARDE (XM3)
22 XL1/E1/156GF 0.7 - 1.1 790 12 15 DMP11344 February 1985
23 Mark 17 Mod 0 1.1 114 1.4 12 DMP11794 March 1989
24 DR4002/C1 1.3 185 4.4 24 DMP11945 April 1990
25 DR2055 3.8 48.3 0.44 9 DMP15643 February 1993
26 Low Cost f/h 1.93 458 0.2 0.437 DMP15741 July 1995
27 MIZA (Schaffler) 1.48 67 0.67 10 DMP15744 September

1995
28 Mini Fuzehead PVA 14.6 43.2 0.157 3.5 DMP 12456 January 1998
29 Davey Bickford N38 0.841-0.963 133.2 1.71 12.8 DMP 12489 December
Fuzehead GM =0.9 1998
30 Vulcan Electric 0.918-1.617 186 2.7 14.5 DMP 12509 April 2000
Fuse GM =1.2
31 Davey Bickford 0.443-0.534 271 3.58 13.2 DMP 12534 February 2002
PM55TH GM = 0.486
32 Nobel FH3 10.0115.42 69 0.335 4.8 RHD 2004 August 2006
Fuzehead GM = 11.77
20
Table A.2 Caps, Primers, Electric, Bridge-Wire

Item NFT
No. Name Type Resistance Power Energy T/C Source Date Remarks
2A. Caps
1 No. 1 Mark 1 & Mark 2 - 0.4 - 0.6 340 7.5 22 RARDE (XM3) Estimated values
2 No. 2 Mark 1 - 0.4 - 0.6 300 6 20 RARDE (XM3) Estimated values
3 No. 4 Mark 1 - 0.4 - 0.6 340 7.5 22 RARDE (XM3) Estimated values
4 ARD 446 B/W Primer 1.0 320 9.4 29 DMP5822 May 1981
5 ARD446/1 B/W Cap 0.953 1000 38.9 38.9 DMP12374 February 1996
6 No 6 Mk1 B/W Cap 1.09 1700 24.3 14.3 RHD3006 March 2009 Resistance Range: 0.965 1.24. ESD insensitive.
2B. Primers
1 No. 48 Mark 2 - 0.9 - 1.6 240 7 29 RARDE (XM3) Estimated values
No. 50 Mark 1
No 57 Mark 1
No. 55 Mark 1
4 14564-1 B/W Primer 0.062 900 - - DMP11296 June 1984
5 Davey Bickford B/W Primer 1.4 - 1.7 84 0.84 10 DMP11253 April 1984 Also applicable to N28TH
SA2000B/N28B
6 Davey Bickford B/W Primer 1.82 83 0.7 8 TME Letter Report November 1982
SA2030A/N26B 43100/NJO/MAC
7 1DT182 B/W Primer 8 - 14 54 0.037 0.685 DMP11466 September 1985
8 DR 7025 B/W Primer 8 - 14 54 0.037 0.685 Item 12 RARDE electrical specification similar to Type E fuzehead
9 P65 B/W Primer 1.6 - 2.4 75 0.75 10 TME Letter Report January 1983
10 DR9018 B/W Primer 0.5 830 3.3 4 DMP11855 September 1989
11 M106 & M106A B/W Squib 0.95 1.45 1100 11.3 9.3 DMP 12482 September 1998 M106 made by Pains Wessex. Repeat characterization done on
GM ~1.1 DMP 12507 January 2000 batch made in 2000. Levels are lowest from the 2 reports.
Energy cannot be derived from power and time constant. Meets
25kV ESD tests.
12 M106 (Armtec) B/W Squib 1.094 1330 13.0 9.8 RHD 3019 July 2010 Armtec device. Meets 25 kV ESD tests.
13 Davey Bickford N28TH B/W Primer 1.4 - 1.7 84 0.84 10 DMP11253 April 1984 Read across from N28B.
14 CCU43/B B/W Primer 0.95 - 1.25 2800 - - TME Letter Report January 1983 Note 1: Threshold values are 50% levels from Bruceton Firings
Note (1) 43200/NJO/LMP
15 KCA cap B/W Primer 1.8 - 2.7 300 3.3 11 TME Letter Report May 1979 Note 1: Threshold values are 50% levels from Bruceton Firings
Note (1) Note (1) 43200/NJO/LMP
16 P68H B/W Primer 0.115 - 0.170 440 7.2 16 TME Letter Report July 1980 Note 1: Threshold values are 50% levels from Bruceton Firings
Note (1) Note (1) 43200/NJO/LMP
21
Table A.3 Detonators, Cartridges, Electric, Bridge-Wire

Item NFT
3A. Detonators
1 No. 108 Mark3 Det. (f/h E) 0.9 - 1.6 130 2.3 18 From Table 1, Item 8
4 No. 111 Mark1 Det. (f/h K) 0.9 - 1.6 130 2.3 18 From Table 1, Item 8 RARDE electrical specification similar to Type E fuzehead
7 No. 119 Mark 3 Det. (f/h H) 10 - 16 26 0.2 8 RARDE (XM3) Estimated - Power calculated from Current and Geometric mean resistance
8 No. 119 Mark 4 Det. (f/h N) 10 - 16 26 0.2 8 RARDE (XM3) Estimated - Power calculated from Current and Geometric mean resistance
9 No. 120 Mark 3 Det. (f/h M) 10 - 16 26 0.2 8 RARDE (XM3) Estimated - Power calculated from Current and Geometric mean resistance
(1) (1) (1)
10 No. 121 Det. (IEBW 292) 0.4 - 0.6 340 7.5 22 RARDE (XM3) Estimated values
(1) (1) (1) (1)
11 No. N16 Mark 1 Det. (IEBW 302) 0.1 - 0.16 631 30 48 RARDE (XM3) Estimated values
12 No. LEN6 Mk. 2 Det. (f/h H) 10 - 16 26 0.2 8 RARDE (XM3) Estimated - Power calculated from Current and Geometric mean resistance
13 L2A1 B/W Det 0.9 - 1.6 130 2.3 18 From Table 1, Item 8 July 1982
14 FH2 - 0.15 - 0.25 194 - - Nobel Explosives Co.
15 M100 B/W Det 4.45 29.7 0.0195 0.657 DMP12110 March 1992
16 1DT160 B/W Det 4.45 29.7 0.0195 0.657 From Item No 16
17 ZP71-1 55/60 Detonator 13.8 353 0.265 1 DMP15710 August 1994
(MECAR)
18 Mark 71 Mod 1 B/W Det 4.08-6.60 57.5 0.108 1.88 DMP 12513 April 2000
GM 5.19
19 Carrick R B/W Det 1.11 127 3.75 29.4 DMP 2440 June 1997
20 M6 B/W Det 1.19 83.4 1.3 21.4 RHD 2025 October 2007 Based on a limited sample not a full characterization.
3B. Cartridges
1 P/N 1720428 B/W Cartridge 0.06 1200 112 93 TME Letter Report June 1982
43110/NJO/mac
2 P/N 96713 B/W Cartridge 5.6 630 1890 3000 DMP11252 April 1984
3 BBU36B & B/W Cartridge 1.1 2150 37 17 DMP11512 January 1986
BBU35B
4 M796 B/W Cartridge 1.1 2150 37 17 Item No 3
5 No. 1 Mk 1 B/W Cartridge 1.0 3700 52 14 DMP11936 March 1990
6 PW11 Impulse Cart 0.846-2.02 2050 23.4 11.4 DMP12475 June 1998 There are four known types of PW11: PW11 Mk1, Mk1 HV, Mk2 and Mk2a.
GM 0.98 All have the same electrical characteristics but different explosive outputs.
7 3654-0 B/W cartridge 0.989 1216 23.8 19.5 RHD1959 Nov 2004 Made by HEKO Drg WV15249 Mk 1 Wallop name is Cartridge Impulse
Spectral No 1 Mk1
8 PW21 Impulse Cart 2050 23.4 11.4 Item 6 above. There are two known types of PW21: PW21 Mk1 and PW21 Mk2. Both types
have the same electrical characteristics but different explosive outputs.
22
Item NFT
9 CBC Igniter to Cartridge igniter 0.846-2.02 2050 23.4 11.4 DMP12475 June 1998 Read across from PW11.
PWE drg D4601-01 GM 0.98
10 3661 B/W Cartridge 0.9 1.526 1370 31.6 23.1 RHD2031 June 2008 Bruceton Firings - Threshold values are 50% levels. NFT power was
GM 1.132 estimated to be around 850mW but this was not confirmed.
12 3661-0-C-WDSL B/W Cartridge 0.99 1.32 1990 42.1 21.1 RHD3007 April 2009 Redesign of 3661 to achieve better NFT. Used for Aircraft Flare.
GM 1.101 Alternative to PW11.
Table A.4 Igniters, Electric, Bridge-Wire

Item NFT
(1) (1) (1)
1 201 2.0 - 2.6 225 1.6 7 RARDE Report 13/81 Estimated values
(1) (1) (1)
3 203 0.1 - 0.16 631 30 48 RARDE Report 13/81
4 204 2.0 - 2.6 123 1.6 13 RARDE Report 13/81
(1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1)
6 206 0.10 - 0.16 417 30 72 RARDE Report 13/81 Estimated values
(1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1) (1)
13 222 2.0 - 2.6 225 1.6 7 RARDE Report 13/81 Estimated values. Drawing number: X2/L3/3501/GF/51
14 227 0.1 - 0.16 631 30 48 RARDE Report 13/81
(1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1)
(1) (1)
(1) (1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1)
(1)
(1) (1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1)
23
Item NFT
(1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1) (1)
33 Type 100 f/h (E) Igniter 0.9 - 1.6 130 2.3 18 From Table 1, Item 8 RARDE electrical specification similar to Type E fuzehead
34 15 sec Delay B/W Igniter 0.9 - 1.6 130 2.3 18 From Table 1, Item 8 RARDE electrical specification similar to Type E fuzehead
35 Pyro-fuze - 0.2 - 0.4 6100 - - RARDE Report 13/81
36 DR9008 B/W Igniter 1.14 1740 31 18 DMP11719 June 1988
37 DR1000/SA/7 B/W Igniter 0.8 2100 34 16 DMP11773 January 1989 Also known as DR2063
38 RO.100 B/W Igniter 0.9 2700 27 10 DMP12005 November
1990
39 DR9020 B/W Igniter 0.8 2100 34 16 Item No 37
40 B15446-Iss A B/W Igniter 1.13 110 0.99 9 RAD/1185/001/TR July 1993 f/h used in Igniter = Davey Bickford TESA2154/A06 N32B
(TESA2154/A06
N32B)
41 DD2257/PR/A02 B/W (x2) Igniter 0.214 401 9.9 25 DMP12292 October 1994 Uses a Davey Bickford PM80TH igniter
(PM80TH)
42 TESA2152/A13/N80 B/W Igniter 0.214 401 9.9 25 DMP12292 October 1994
TH
43 Mk-1 Mod 0 B/W Igniter 1.06 86.2 1.08 12.5 DMP15725 February 1995
44 SA2154/A11/N55B B/W Igniter 0.49 204.6 3.38 16.5 DMP15745 September Contains Davey Bickford N55B fuzehead
1995
45 SN 3B or T15 B/W Igniter 0.204 393.1 20.2 51.3 DMP12403 October 1996
46 EP-376 B/W Igniter 0.98 354 1.86 5.3 DMP12404 October 1996
47 C92-110 Protractor B/W Igniter 0.971 2170 3.04 1.4 DMP15748 January 1996 Contains Leafield 1A/1W device B92-110/3
48 MD7 or B/W igniter 9.1 54.20 0.158 2.92 DMP 12528 April 2001 Nobel Drg DR1000/SA/19 Iss A.
DR1000/SA/19 Iss A
49 T14 A1 B/W Igniter 1.085 120.6 3.78 30.92 Dynamit Nobel Report Jan 02 Tested iaw P112. Not ESD sensitive (p-p & p-c).
17/1/02
50 B91-260-2 B/W Igniter 10.55 54.20 <0.158 <2.92 RHD 1906 Feb 2003 Leafield igniter/protractor as alternative to MD7. Only a comparison exercise
with few samples done.
51 W-4408-2 B/W Igniter 0.974 2740 28.5 10.4 RHD 2021 August 2007
52 EPX-4-S-1 B/W Igniter 0.273 559 28 51 RHD 3009 May 09 German manufacture
24
Table A.5 EED, Conducting Composition

Item NFT
5A. Caps, Electric
1 30 mm (CC) Cap, electric 15 - 250 1800 0.054 0.030 DMP5357 October 1981 Drawing Number: EMI/2176/GF. Trials of a newer batch has concluded that
the power can be increased a little, and the resistance range can be changed
to 16 60 Ohms, however it is safe to continue using the old values given in
the table. Source RHD2027.
2 CC Cap Cap, electric 15 - 50 750 0.026 0.035 DMP5336 August 1979 Drawing number: QX239AF, recent retesting has concluded these values to
Conducting still be an accurate representation of this devices characterization. Source:
(L10 Primer) RHD2017. Used in L10A1 electric Detonator.
3 18 Volt 20 - 250 230 a 0.002 b 0.009 b RARDE (XM3) c
4 Acheson Naval 20 - 250 230 a 0.001 b 0.004 b RARDE (XM3) c
5 M52A-3B1 Cap, electric 1k - 1.2M 14 0.0022 0.157 TME Letter Report November 1981
43110/NJO/IAJ
6 PA520 Cap, electric 44.3 376 217 0.0124 0.0572 DMP 12510 April 2000
GM 129.1
5B. Igniters, Electric

1 N8 Mark 2 500 - 2000 16 c 0.001 b 0.063 b RARDE (XM3)
2 Nos 1, 2 and 3 20 - 60 460 c 0.015 b 0.033 b RARDE (XM3) Drawing number NOD 9039/SF
3 No. 4 300 - 1000 29 c 0.001 b 0.034 b RARDE (XM3)
4 TVE L4A2 23.2 234 750 0.026 0.035 RHD2009 December 2006 Drawing Number QX 540GF. The T/C could not be found by trials, but was
GM 60.0 concluded to be comparable to the CC Cap Conducting. The NFT power and
Energy have historically been used from the CC Cap Conducting and
RHD2009 concluded it is reasonable to continue using those values.
5C. Detonators, Electric

1 No. 1 Mk1 (CC) Det, Electric 10 - 30 840 0.00026 0.00031 IMP FS2-1993 June 1981
2 No. 2 Mark 1 Det, Electric 40 - 60 330 a 0.001 b 0.003 b RARDE (XM3)
5 NBC Det, Electric 10 - 30 840 0.00026 0.00031 Item No 1
a Power Threshold calculated from measured Voltage Threshold and Geometric Mean.
b Estimated Value.
c Calculated using specification resistance range (i.e. not from dynamic resistance), hence could be pessimistic. This would also influence the estimated time constant.
25
Table A.6 Detonator, Exploding Bridge-Wire & Exploding Foil Initiator

Item Threshold
See remarks column
for threshold used
(1) (1)
1 No.1 Mark1 EBW Det 25 - 35 - 62.5 - RARDE (XM3) Energy derived from 0.5F capacitor charged to 500 Volts
( i.e. Proof no-fire level not true NFT)
2 Reynolds RP 97 EFI 0.027 0.033 2240 1.66 0.741 DMP 12530 Aug 2001 Values are 50% probability no damage levels. Lowest damage current seen
2
GM 0.0296 was 4.58Amps (~ 627 mW using I R calculation).
3 EIS 201 EFI 0.0016 980 0.47 0.475 DMP 12386 May 1996 Values are 0.1% no-damage levels. Energy threshold calculated from power
(short strip line) DMP 12483 Oct 1998 threshold and thermal time constant. The no-damage power threshold can be
used for all EFIs using the same bridge design. 0.1% NFT 50% confidence
from 0.1F capacitor is 1160V.
4 EIS 201a EFI 0.0017 980 0.54 0.548 DMP 12386 May 1996 Values are 0.1% no-damage levels. Energy threshold calculated from power
(long strip line) DMP 12483 Oct 1998 threshold and thermal time constant. The no-damage power threshold can be
5 EIS 204B EFI 0.033 1072 0.54 0.506 RHD 1907, March 2003 Values are 0.1% no-damage levels. Energy threshold calculated from power
e2v 2002/076 threshold and thermal time constant. The no-damage power threshold can be
6 EIS 207, 210, 221, EFI 0.02 1072 0.54 0.506 E2v reports Values are 0.1% no-damage levels. Energy threshold calculated from power
215 2007/044,2003/176, threshold and thermal time constant. The no-damage power threshold can be
2007/011,2011/106, used for all EFIs using the same bridge design. 0.1% NFT 50% confidence
2011/092 from 0.1F capacitor varies by type from 1397 to 1992.
7 Reynolds RP 80 EBW 0.0618 460 7.6 16.6 RHD 1993 Dec 2005 Values are 0.1% no-damage levels Energy threshold derived from power
threshold and time constant.
8 Reynolds RP800 EBW 0.0566 631 7.3 11.6 RHD 1997 Feb 2006 Values are 0.1% no-damage levels Energy threshold derived from power
threshold and time constant.
Table A.7 Primers & Cartridges, Carbon & Film Bridge

Item Threshold
NB:- The data below was obtained from Bruceton firings - THE THRESHOLD VALUES QUOTED ARE THE 50% FIRING LEVELS
7A. Primers &

Cartridges
26
Item Threshold
1 DM1071 Film Bridge Primer 0.9 - 1.4 2400 0.110 0.046 TME Letter Report July 1980 Bruceton Firings - Threshold values are 50% levels
Note 1 Note 1 43200/NJO/LMP
2 DM1071-A1 Film Bridge Primer 0.9 - 1.4 1800 0.130 0.072 TME Letter Report July 1980 Bruceton Firings - Threshold values are 50% levels
3 DM1072 Film Bridge Primer 0.9 - 1.4 1800 0.110 0.061 TME Letter Report July 1980 Bruceton Firings - Threshold values are 50% levels
4 M48 Carbon Bridge 1.7k - 18.3k 19.6 0.00026 0.013 DMP12104 February 1992
5 CX33 Film Bridge 4.81 21.2 1038 9.9 9.5 DMP 12505 Iss 2 April 2000 ESD sensitive
6 EL 37 Film Bridge Primer 0.7 - 1.7 1000 0.03 0.030 DMP5043 April 1977
7 EIW 97 Film Bridge Cap 832.9 3.25 3.9 DMP 12451 Dec 1997 Threshold values are 50% levels.
Note 1 Note 1
Note 1: these are 50% fire values and characterization report should be consulted to determine figure to be used in any RADHAZ assessments..
27
Annex B
Test/Assessment of Explosives for Use in Electro-Explosive Devices
B.1 Qualification
B.1.1 An explosive material is termed Qualified when it has been assessed to have successfully
completed the Qualification Process of a National Authority (The UK National for Qualification of Explosive
Materials is the DOSG). Where carried out, this assessment is performed in accordance with STANAG 4170
[19] to determine whether it possesses' properties which make it safe and suitable for consideration for use
in its intended role. Qualification is intended as an initial risk reduction stage where a material may be used
in a number of applications/munitions. Type Qualification relates to the use of the explosive material in a
specific application or munition and is dependent on the explosive material being tested, its form,
confinement and expected life cycle/environment. Testing and assessment is carried out part of the overall
introduction into service of that munition.
B.1.2 It should be noted that Qualification of an explosive material relates to a defined specification from
a particular manufacturer and manufacturing location and using a particular manufacturing process. Where
there is a change to the specification; the source of raw materials; the manufacturing process; the
manufacturer or manufacturing location or there has been a loss of manufacturing know-how, guidance can
be sought from DOSG.
B.2 Evidence/Tests
B.2.1 Although usually used in small quantities, evidence of the safety and suitability of the explosives
used in EED is required to meet statutory requirements and to allow judgements on suitability to be made.
The explosives material(s) used in the various types of EED may include primary explosive compositions in
contact with the bridge-wire in low voltage detonators, pyrotechnic compositions for use in match head
applications and conducting composition (primary explosive mixed with graphite) in various primers.
Secondary explosives tend to be used for Exploding Bridge-wire (EBW) and Exploding Foil Initiator (EFI)
applications.
B.2.2 The extent of testing/evidence required may range from limited tests carried out in order to comply
with Defence Standard 13-129 [10] to a full range of Qualification tests. Advice on the extent of testing and
the data required should be sought from DOSG at the earliest opportunity. The information requirements
concerning the material properties of the composition are listed in Ref [19]. The general data section deals
with information regarding the composition, its intended role, the form in which it will be used, and its
similarity and relationship to other compositions in UK service use. The physical properties cover the
likelihood of powdering or cracking etc. of the compositions. This property is of particular importance for EED
compositions having intimate contact with the bridge-wire. Any loss of strength, dimensional changes or
movement away from the bridge-wire could lead to functional failures. The chemical properties include the
stability and compatibility of the composition and any toxicological hazards arising from the composition or its
reaction products.
B.2.3 Ref [19] identifies tests relating to the physical, mechanical/rheological, chemical, sensitiveness and
explosiveness characteristics of the explosive material used in the EED. These tests include small-scale
characterization tests that are included in the mandatory requirements of Ref [10]. This document defines
the principles and the content of the Explosive Hazard Data Sheet (EHDS) for use by MOD to ensure that all
explosives can be safely manufactured, handled, stored, transported and disposed. A number of the
characterization tests may need to be repeated after the composition has been stored at 60oC for 3 and 6
months. This is in order to assess whether any sensitiveness changes occur on ageing. The sensitiveness
tests are fully described in Ref [19] and EMTAP Manual of Tests [1].
28
Annex C
Environmental Testing of Electro-Explosive Devices
C.1 Introduction
Electro-explosive devices (EED) are required to be tested or assessed to establish whether they are likely to
be capable of withstanding the different climatic and mechanical environments encountered during service
life.
C.2 Information
C.2.1 General
EED are used in a variety of ways and any test programme must therefore be specific to that particular
situation. Each application will attract different environmental stresses and the trials programme and item
level at which it should be carried out must be tailored to reflect this. This issue is discussed at clause 6.4.1
of the main part of this standard. Where an EED may be used in a number of applications or where the
design is new and therefore carries higher risk, it is strongly advised that these tests are undertaken prior to
full lifecycle tests of a complete munition. The minimum set of stresses that EED should be able to withstand
to provide a degree of confidence that they can be used either as non-installed items or installed in a
weapon/stores system are shown in STANAG 4560[20].
C.2.2 Trials Programme
C.2.2.1 The trials programme will consist of a series of environmental tests which will result in a
demonstration that the EED is suitably robust. A typical set of robustness tests are those shown in Table 1 of
the main part of this standard. Test levels and numbers of EED required are to be agreed with DOSG based
on the guidance given in Annex C or Annex D of Ref [20] for low voltage and high voltage devices
respectively. Trials programmes that are designed to assure safety in service demand greater supporting
evidence than those that address suitability alone. The larger the number of specimens available for the
trials programme, the greater is the confidence in the results obtained.
C.2.2.2 Performance trials should be carried out at the anticipated extremes of temperature in order to
provide confidence that the unit will fully meet its functioning requirements. It is important to note however
that thermal over-stressing may produce unrepresentative failure. On completion of the trials programme, the
condition of the EED may be assessed either by breakdown of the weapon/store or sub-system to allow
visual and other non-destructive examination and/or by performance testing of the complete weapon/store or
sub-system
29
Annex D
Low Voltage EED Electrical Characterization
D.1 Introduction
D.1.1 Generally all low voltage EED follow similar patterns of behaviour in that the thermal time constant
() marks the transition between the constant energy and constant power regions. An example of the
relationship between firing energy and applied pulse width is shown graphically in Figure D.1. The direct
current (dc) characterization of an EED is the determination of these properties in absolute terms. The test
stimulus may be defined in terms of power or energy, depending on whether its pulse duration is much less
or much more than .
Figure D.1 Threshold Firing Data for Typical Bridge-Wire Device
D.1.2 The statistical techniques described here are valid only for those EED whose sensitivity can be
approximated by a normal or log-normal distribution. In most instances, conventional low-voltage EED are
go/no go devices whose responses are adequately described by a log-normal distribution. Since the all-fire
and no-fire levels required are at the tails of the distribution, the cost of large numbers of EED prohibit
direct determination of these values; extrapolation from a smaller number of experimental results nearer the
middle of the distribution is necessary.
D.1.3 A very robust statistical methodology for performing this extrapolation was previously described in
Ordnance Board Pillar Proceeding P112. Many years of experience have shown that this method produces
highly accurate values for the firing thresholds. The study in the Thales Report RHD2002 [21] showed that
for a typical EED where there is good foreknowledge of its likely characteristics then the P112 procedure
produced a degree of accuracy whose cost was not justified when considering the additional safety margins
used in RADHAZ assessments. Ref [21] suggested a methodology for determining the threshold
characteristics using fewer EED and this is presented in Clause D.2. This methodology has been adopted as
guidance in STANAG 4560 [20] and has been repeated and expanded in this section. Attention is drawn to
the fact that where there is little foreknowledge of the likely characteristics or the device proves to be atypical
during testing, more than the recommended number of EED may be required.
30
D.2 Test Procedure
D.2.1 Introduction
A strategy designed to characterize an EED is shown in Figure D.2 and Figure D.3. The procedure may be
used for obtaining the NFT and/or the AFT and can be divided into four stages:
D.2.2 Radiographic and/or Visual Inspection
Examination of all initiators shall be made according to the manufacturing inspection criteria and only those
meeting the inspection requirements shall be used for the following tests. When considered appropriate by
the NSAA each device shall be subjected to radiographic examination such as X-ray, neutron bombardment,
gamma rays etc. Radiographic plates and examination acceptance reports shall be identified by date, EED
part, lot and serial number.
D.2.3 Initial Assessment
D.2.3.1 During this stage estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the EED power threshold are
measured for a range of pulse widths, from which a working value of t can be derived. At each pulse width, a
wind-up test will be performed on five devices. This will be followed by a Bruceton test performed on a
minimum of 20 devices or until a Zone of Mixed Results is achieved. Where manufacturers data and/or
experience of a device is available, it is usually possible to perform this procedure only twice; once at a pulse
width at least 10 times greater than (constant power region) and again at a pulse width at least 10 times
less than (constant energy region). Completing this procedure twice will require approximately 50 devices.
Where this information is not available, it will be necessary to perform the procedure up to a maximum of
5 times, aiming to determine pulse widths 10 times greater and 10 times less than . Here approximately 125
devices would be necessary for these tests.
D.2.3.2 When plotted, the results from each of the Bruceton Tests should follow the curve for a typical
EED threshold response as shown in Figure D.1 and described by the equations of sub-clause 5.2.9 of the
main section. This information is used to estimate suitable test levels for each Bruceton Test. The ratio of the
50% firing level (E50) measured at the pulse width much less than estimated to the 50% firing level (P50)
measured at the pulse width much greater than estimated is used as the working value of the thermal time
constant for the subsequent tests.
D.2.4 Power Threshold (Pth) Assessment
During this stage the value of the No-Fire Threshold Power Pth is evaluated. 10 20 further EED are added
to the Bruceton Test at a pulse width greater than 10 times the value of . This is to improve the estimate of
the standard deviation, and enable initial predictions for the Rundown test levels. The Rundown Test is
performed as per Figure D.3 with the data analysed using the Probit Transformation technique. The
Rundown test requires approximately 80 EED. The test stimulus pulse duration is set to a value much
greater than the initial estimate of .
D.2.4.1 If the Thermal Time Constant is long, i.e. the estimate of from the Bruceton tests is much greater
than the pulse width and interval of typical pulsed RF emitters, then no further measurements are necessary.
The energy threshold (Eth) can be derived from the knowledge of the Power Threshold Pth and Thermal
Time Constant .
D.2.4.2 Where the Thermal Time Constant is short, i.e. is comparable to, or less than, the pulse width
and/or interval of radar emitters, or a more accurate assessment of the transient response is required, two
further stages are necessary. These are outlined in sub-clause D.2.5 and D.2.6
D.2.5 Energy Threshold Assessment for RADHAZ Trials
Evaluate Eth by performing a further Rundown test. Start by adding a further 10 20 EED to the Bruceton
performed at the shortest pulse width. This is to improve the estimate of the standard deviation, and enable
prediction of the initial Rundown test levels. The Rundown Test is performed as per Figure D.3 with the data
analysed using the Probit Transformation technique. The Rundown test requires approximately 80 EED. The
test stimulus pulse duration is set to a value much less than the estimate of .
31
D.2.6 Determine Thermal Time Constant
If both the energy and power thresholds have been determined experimentally then evaluate the thermal
time constant by dividing Pth into Eth from sub-clauses D.2.3 and D.2.4 respectively. If the working value of
the thermal time constant was large such that only the power threshold assessment has been carried out
then the thermal time constant should be derive from the best available data. This will be the 50% Power
level (P50) from the power threshold assessment and the 50% Energy level (E50) from the Bruceton at the
shortest pulse width. Evaluate thermal time constant by dividing P50 into E50.
32
Figure D.2 EED Threshold Characterization
33
Figure D.3 The Rundown Test
34
D.3 Test Equipment
D.3.1 Introduction
A block schematic diagram of a typical dc firing circuit is shown in Figure D.4. A brief description of the
equipment is as follows:
D.3.2 Constant Power Source
A source is required to provide known levels of power/energy to an EED over a wide time span from ns
impulses to 5 min duration. This capability does not have to be performed by one unit and is dependent on
the EED under test. In order to apply known levels of energy to an EED it is necessary to apply constant
power for a preset time i.e. a known pulse width (energy = power x time). For a fixed resistor applying a
known voltage for a given time could do this. However, the resistance of EED can vary quite considerably
from each other and can change significantly during the application of power and energy. The unit should
monitor the voltage across, and the current through the EED to provide analogue or real-time feedback to
compensate for the changing resistance. This should maintain the power level within 0.05 dB of the intended
test level.
D.3.3 Alternative Sources
D.3.3.1 It is not always possible to characterize an EED using a single source and additional units have to
be utilised to complete the task, such as:
D.3.3.1.1 Constant Voltage Pulse Generator and Resistance Network. The constant voltage pulse
generator can be set to any level between 1 and 60 V. It has an additional facility for varying the output in
typically 0.5 dB steps up to a maximum of 3.5 dB. The unit should provide accurate pre-set, rectangular
pulses from 10 s to 500 ms in x2 and x5 steps, with a maximum current capability of at least 5 A. To limit
the adjustment necessary due to the spread of resistance of the EED, a resistance network is placed in the
output of the source to convert its output impedance, Ro, to the geometric mean of the EED resistance
range. A dummy load equal to Ro can be used to set up the calibration power level, Pc. The power Pd,
delivered to an EED of resistance Re is then given by:
4.R0 .Re
Pd = Pc
(R0 + Re )2
D.3.3.1.2 Thus for an EED in the range of 0.9 to 1.6 (with a geometric mean resistance of 1.3 ) the
uncertainty of power level can be restricted to + 0.09 dB. The above equation does not take into account the
change of resistance during the application of the stimulus.
D.3.3.2 Capacitance Discharge Source
This is used as an extension to the rectangular pulse method where very fast energy transients are required.
If the duration of the applied stimulus is very short compared with the thermal time constant of the EED, the
EED will respond to the energy impulse irrespective of its shape. It is important when using capacitor
discharge that a system of monitoring is used which is capable of measuring the energy delivered to the
EED.
D.3.3.3 Constant Voltage Source
In instances where an EED resistance changes considerably with applied stimulus and where the response
is very fast and unpredictable, as in the case of conducting composition (CC) devices, firing tests are carried
out by applying constant voltage pulses of known amplitude and width to samples of EED. Current and
voltage are monitored to enable calculation of the resistance of the EED during the pulse (i.e. the dynamic
resistance) and power applied so that the analysis of ESD sensitivity may be done using the required
parameters.
35
D.3.4 Digital Storage Oscilloscope
As most tests consist of brief single shot applications of firing energy it is necessary to include a means of
monitoring and/or measuring the stimulus. This becomes essential when the efficiency of energy transfer is
uncertain, (e.g. capacitance discharge), or where the EED characteristics are likely to change during the
application of a pulse. The fundamental quantities, which the oscilloscope is required to monitor, are the
voltage across, and the current through, the EED. The oscilloscope should include mathematical functions
for trace manipulation. Using the mathematical functions the product of the voltage and current can be
calculated to give power further integrated to give the energy or the ratio calculated to give the dynamic
resistance during test.
D.3.5 Safety Ohmmeter (SOM)
A low-voltage, low-current resistance meter specifically designed for use with EED.
D.3.6 Isolation Switch/Safety Interlocks
To ensure that the EED cannot be attached to any power source whilst the chamber door is open. It should
also switch the SOM out of circuit during firing.
36
Figure D.4 Typical DC Firing Circuit
37
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK
38
D.4 Test Method
D.4.1 Bridge-Wire and Insulation Resistance
D.4.1.1 The purpose of this test is to measure the resistive element of the Electro-Explosive Device (EED).
The resistance of each EED can be measured by using an approved low voltage, low current resistance
meter e.g. safety ohmmeter operating at less than the No-Fire Threshold (NFT) power of the EED under
examination (to < 10% of the NFT expected).
D.4.1.2 A conventional multimeter measures resistance by passing a known current through the item
under test (IUT) and measuring the voltage produced by this current. Measurements of resistance in this
manner are subject to 3 sources of error, which are more significant when measuring lower values (<1).
These are:
a) Resistance of test leads. If the measurement is made on the resistance range of a multimeter, the result
will include the resistance of the test leads. A correction can be made for this resistance but there will be
a loss of accuracy.
b) Contact Resistance of Test Probes. Connection of the measuring instrument to the IUT will introduce
contact resistance at each end of both of the test leads. These resistances are random, variable and
difficult to control. As they cannot be quantified, corrections for them cannot be made.
c) Thermo-electric Potentials. The test circuit is likely to include contact between dissimilar metals. If these
contacts are at different temperatures, thermo-electric voltages will be generated. These may be large
enough to cause significant errors, particularly if the measuring instrument is passing a current of 1 mA
or less through the IUT.
D.4.1.3 Errors from the above sources can be minimised by correct use of a four terminal measuring
instrument. This will have separate terminals for its current source and voltmeter. The current source drives
the correct value of current through the IUT regardless of stray resistance in test leads or connections. The
voltage terminals of the instrument must be connected separately to the IUT. The voltage reading will then
not be affected by any reasonable value of resistance in the test leads or contacts. Errors from effects a) and
b) are thus kept to a minimum. To reduce possible errors from c), higher values of test current should be
used, e.g. 10 mA to 100 mA, (with due consideration of inadvertent initiation or damage to the EED) so that
the voltage produced across the IUT is large compared with any thermo-electric potentials (usually tens of
microvolts).
D.4.2 Resistance Measuring Procedure
D.4.2.1 Using the firing circuit as shown in Figure D.4 the EED can be measured in situ prior to initiation.
The resistance for each EED shall be recorded to determine the spread and the geometric mean (Rgm) i.e.
R gm = n R1 xR2 ...Rn
Where: n is the overall number of EED in the sample
D.4.2.2 To check whether there are still errors from this source, the connections of the voltage measuring
probes to the IUT can be interchanged. If the positive and negative voltage readings are different, an
average of the two magnitudes will give a more accurate result, e.g. if a 10 mA current source produces
readings of +190 V and 210 V across the IUT, its resistance should be taken as (190 V + 210 V)/(2 x
10 mA) = 20 m.
D.4.2.3 The resistance should be quoted as either the maximum and minimum of the range of devices or
the geometric mean of all devices measured during the test. The GM value is used since the power
threshold is generally considered to have a log normal characteristic
D.4.2.4 Dynamic Resistance. During application of a stimulus the resistance of the EED bridge can
change. For a wire bridge its resistance will typically increase due to the rise in temperature by around 15%.
Other types of bridge e.g. carbon film may decrease in resistance or change by a much larger amount. By
monitoring the voltage across and the current through the EED during the application of the pulse, the
39
change in resistance can be measured. Measuring the dynamic resistance is important in assessing the
threat from ESD and also when using a constant voltage source instead of a constant power source.
D.4.2.5 The resistance at the start of a pulse should closely match the direct current (dc) resistance as
measured using the SOM. The dynamic resistance should be measured as the resistance at the end of the
pulse. In cases where the device initiates before the end of the pulse the dynamic resistance should be
measured immediately prior to the point of initiation. Both of these values should be recorded for each EED
under test.
D.4.2.6 Use of Dynamic Resistance. The assessment of the pin-to-pin ESD threat requires the use of the
Dynamic Resistance Factor. An individual factor can be calculated for each EED under test by taking the
ratio of the dynamic resistance (measured at the end of the pulse) to the DC resistance (at the start of the
pulse). The Dynamic Resistance Factor should be calculated as the mean of the individual factors.
D.4.2.7 When using a constant voltage source to perform a characterization it is necessary to know the
resistance of the EED bridge during the pulse to convert the applied voltage to power or energy for analysis.
Where the resistance of the bridge changes during the application of the test stimuli then the resistance to be
used in the subsequent analysis should be the mean dynamic resistance during the pulse. Most modern
Digital Storage Oscilloscopes have a function that can be used to calculate the mean resistance during the
pulse. If such a function is not available then the mean dynamic resistance factor should be calculated as the
mean of the dynamic resistance (measured at the end of the pulse) to the dc resistance (at the start of the
pulse).
D.4.2.8 Insulation Resistance. Where agreed by DOSG to be required the insulation resistance of EEDs
with an insulating case or where both poles are insulated from the case should be measured using a suitable
megohm meter using a 500V test voltage. Suitable precautions to protect against inadvertent initiation
should be taken when undertaking the tests.
D.4.3 Firing Properties Test
D.4.3.1 Prior to starting the electrical firing properties testing, it is necessary to estimate the value of for
the EED. This can usually be made on the basis of the EED construction (e.g. conducting composition, thin-
film BW - tens of microseconds, thin BW - hundreds of microseconds or conventional BW - tens of
milliseconds).
D.4.3.2 The mean firing level and standard deviation of the firing power should be estimated for the EED
sample under test (at the pulse width at which the Bruceton Test will be performed). If this information is not
readily available then a wind-up test should be performed to produce these initial estimates.
D.4.4 The Wind-Up Test
D.4.4.1 A small sample, no more than five devices, will be selected at random and each one subjected to
a gradually increasing stimulus until it fires. This may be done by repeated pulsing at increasing levels or by
applying a ramp stimulus. The Geomean, M1 of the wind-up test levels is used as the initial firing level for the
subsequent Bruceton tests. For the Bruceton test to have the maximum accuracy the interval, , between the
Bruceton test levels should be equal to the standard deviation of the batch. The accuracy is not significantly
reduced if the interval is not greater than twice the standard deviation (SD). Based on the initial estimate of
the standard deviation from the wind-up test (calculated from the logarithm of the stimulus) a convenient test
interval can be chosen to be between 1 and 2 SD.
D.4.4.2 Note, this is the only occasion when EED are subjected to more than one pulse. As the basic
sensitivity may be affected by repeated stimuli, these results are not included in the final analysis. If more
than 10 pulses are required to fire an EED (or the increase in stimulus is 10dB or more) then experience
indicates that the EED will be significantly de-sensitized, resulting in the initial estimate of the mean being
too high. This often only becomes apparent when starting the Bruceton test, for example Table D.1. The
estimate of the mean can be improved by suitable choice of starting stimulus and step-size so that fewer
than 10 pulses are required to fire the EED.
D.4.5 Bruceton Test
D.4.5.1 Carry out Bruceton tests:
40
a) Select an EED at random from the overall population and apply a stimulus equal to the best estimate of
the mean (M1) obtained from previous knowledge and the wind-up test.
b) As the logarithm of the applied stimulus is assumed to be normally distributed, the logarithmic test levels
will be equally spaced at intervals . Thus, if the normalised initial level is x (where x = log (M1)), the
normalised test levels will occur at x , x 2 , x 3 etc.
D.4.5.2 If the first EED in the Bruceton test fires, the next EED will be tested at the next lower level (the
mean less an estimated , x1 = x - ).
D.4.5.3 If the first EED in the Bruceton test does not fire, the next EED will be tested at the next higher
level (the mean plus an estimated , x1 = x + ).
D.4.5.4 This sequence is repeated until a Zone of Mixed Results is achieved. A minimum of 20 EED
should be tested when the Bruceton is to provide data to establish the Thermal Time Constant . 30 - 40
EED should be tested when the Bruceton is to provide initial data to the Rundown Test.
D.4.5.5 An example of data sheet for a BW igniter is shown in Table D.1. In addition to the firing test
results, the information should also include the name and batch or lot number of the EED, dc resistance,
dynamic resistance, the type of test and the estimated mean and standard deviation derived from the
Bruceton test.
NOTE 1 A Zone of Mixed Results is where the Bruceton has two consecutive columns containing a mixture of both
FIRES and NO-FIRES. An ideal Bruceton test will have 4 columns; one containing all NO-FIRES, two containing a mix of
FIRES and NO-FIRES and one containing all FIRES. Too few columns (i.e. less than 4) indicates that the initial estimate
for the SD is too large. Too many columns (i.e. more than 5) indicates that the initial estimate for the SD is too small.
Particularly, when you have only allocated 20 EED to the Bruceton it is important to detect a poor estimate of SD early
on, and if necessary re-estimate the SD, resample the existing data and continue the test with a new value for .
NOTE 2 Only one stimulus is applied to each EED for test purposes. When an EED does not fire during a test, it is
destroyed by increasing the stimulus level until it fires. If it is not possible to destroy it in this manner then it is disposed of
safely.
D.4.5.6 Analysis of the Bruceton Test
D.4.5.6.1 In the Bruceton test the total number of successes (or fires) will be about equal to the total
number of failures (or no-fires). In the analysis either the fires or no-fires are used, depending on which
has the smaller total. However, where the no-fires equals the number of fires then either total can be used
in the calculation.
D.4.5.6.2 If N denotes the smaller total and no, n1, n2 ............. nk denote the frequencies at each test level
where:
no = the lowest level for the less frequent event, and
nk = the highest level on which the event occurs,
then ni = N (where i = 0,1,2,3....................k)
D.4.5.6.3 As the EED are assumed to have a log normal distribution and the intervals between stimuli are
kept constant, the simple method of analysis given below can be applied to the Bruceton test.
D.4.5.6.4 Estimate of sample mean, m, is given by:
A 1
m = x0 + (1)
N 2
Where: Xo is the normalised stimulus corresponding to the lowest level on which the least frequent
event occurs.
The + (plus) sign is used when the analysis is based on no-fires and the - (minus) sign when it
is based on fires.
41
D.4.5.6.5 The sample standard deviation, s, is given empirically by:
NB A 2
s = 1.62 2
+ 0.029 (2)
N
NB A 2
For this equation to be sufficiently accurate, must be greater than 0.3
N2
D.4.5.6.6 A and B in formulas (1) and (2) are as follows:
A = ini B = i2ni
D.4.5.6.7 Evaluation of the results from Table D.1 are summarised in Table D.2 analysing no-fires, then
11 1
m = 0.255 + 0.006 +
14 2
D.4.5.6.8 As m is in normalised units, the actual stimulus required for the 50% probability of fire, M50, is the
antilogarithm of m:
i.e. M50 = Antilog 0.3293
= 2.134 W
D.4.5.6.9 To calculate standard deviation:
(14 x15) 112

s = 1.62 x0.06 x 2
+ 0.029
14
= 0.0470
= 0.47 dB
D.4.5.6.10 For a typical bridge-wire EED one Bruceton will be performed at 500 ms pulse width to give an
estimate for P50 (Table D.2).
D.4.5.6.11 A further wind up test and Bruceton will be performed at 1 ms pulse width to evaluate E50
(Table D.3).
D.4.6 The Probit Transformation or Rundown Test
D.4.6.1 This technique involves testing samples of EED at up to 4 stimulus levels between the no-fire and
all-fire limits, in the probability range 5 to 95%. These stimuli are calculated, progressively, from available
estimates of mean and SD. The percentage of devices fired at each stimulus level is recorded and analysed
using the Probit transformation method (see Probit Analysis [16]). The Bruceton test is a robust methodology
for establishing the mean firing level of a sample; consequently, the stimulus levels used tend to be centred
around the mean. With the Rundown Test, many EED are tested at stimulus levels remote from the mean,
thus reducing the required extrapolation. This allows prediction with tighter confidence limits of no-fire/all-fire
levels but does require the expenditure of more devices. The choice of stimulus levels indicated below are
recommendations, rather than requirements; more appropriate levels may become obvious during the
testing. In all case, the following two golden rules should be followed:
a) As each sample of EED is tested, the knowledge about the tails of the distribution is increased; and with
increasing confidence move the next test level closer to the tails.
b) Test few devices near to the centre of the distribution; test many devices at the tails
D.4.6.2 The Probit analysis is greatly facilitated by computer assistance. Using a sample from a single
batch of EED (typically 80 devices) selected at random, carry out the following steps:
42
a) Take the data from the Bruceton Test of 30 - 40 EED and either from the mean and SD or by re-
analysing the data using the Probit Transformation Method make an initial estimate for the distribution.
b) If in the Bruceton, FIRES were the least frequent event then estimate the 75% probability of fire level
and test a minimum of 10 EED at that level.
c) OTHERWISE, where NO-FIRES were the least frequent event, estimate the 25% probability of fire and
test a minimum of 10 devices at that level.
d) Using all previous results in a Probit analysis, (including the Bruceton test but not the Wind-Up Test),
update the prediction for the distribution.
e) If Step b) was used test a further 10 EED (minimum) at predicted 85% probability of fire,
f) Otherwise where Step c) was used test a further 10 EED (minimum) at the predicted 15% level.
g) Using all previous results in a Probit analysis, (including the Bruceton test but not the Wind-Up Test),
update the prediction for the distribution.
h) If Step e) was used test a further 20 EED (minimum) at the predicted 10% probability of fire.
i) Otherwise where Step f) was used test a further 20 EED (minimum) at the predicted 90% probability of
fire.
D.4.6.3 Using all previous results in a Probit analysis, (including the Bruceton test but not the wind-up
test), update the prediction for the distribution.
a) Test a final sample of 40 EED at either the predicted 95% or 5% probability of fire, (following Steps h) or
i) above respectively).
b) If the results of this stage are unacceptable, (e.g. too many all-fire and/or no-fire results, crossovers,
excessively wide confidence limits, etc.) then testing should continue with more devices from the same
batch.
D.4.6.4 Using all previous results in a Probit analysis, except those from the Wind-Up Test, update the
prediction of the distribution. The NFT/AFT can be extracted from the results. For all typical bridgewire
devices 150 EED should be adequate to establish a threshold value.
NOTE The importance of previous experience in testing EED should not be underestimated, especially the ability to
detect a bad choice of stimulus level at an early stage. Whilst following the above strategy will produce the required
information, its intelligent use as a guide will reduce the chance of needing to expend excessive numbers of EED. The
suggested stimulus levels should be treated as recommendations and not requirements; more appropriate levels may
become apparent as the testing proceeds, for example to avoid a cross over. Table D.9 contains an example of a
crossover. The stimulus level of 2.016 W produced a result of 20% fired; but the lower stimulus level of 1.903 from the
Rundown Test produced a result of 25% firing. Small crossovers like this are accommodated by the Probit
Transformation Method but there can be benefit in avoiding them by choosing to select stimulus levels further apart or by
adding later firings to existing test levels.
D.4.6.5 Unknown or Atypical EED
Where there is little foreknowledge of the EED to be tested or experience has shown that that a particular
type of EED is more difficult to characterize then it is beneficial to test more devices as part of the
characterization. In this case, the number of EED tested under sub-clause D.4.6.2 should be doubled at
each step. At sub-clause D.4.6.3, test a sample of 40 EED at the predicted 95% probability of fire and 40
EED at the 5% probability of fire. Consequently, the typical number of EED required will rise to 230 devices.
D.5 Calculation Of NFT/AFT Using Probit Transformation Method
D.5.1 A computer program has been written (based on Ref [15]) to enable the application of the Probit
transformation method. The program may be used on data from normal or log-normal distributions.
43
D.5.2 Data produced at each successive level of a Probit test for a BW igniter are given in Table D.5 to
Table D.8. These were combined with the results from the Bruceton test of Table D.1 and Table D.3 for final
analysis, a summary of which is shown in Table D.9. More figures are retained than are warranted by the
accuracy of the quantities on which they are based but this does not help to avoid the accumulation of
rounding-off errors.
D.5.3 The printout provides a permanent record of stimulus, sample size, response, percentage response
and corresponding empirical Probit. In the case of the log-normal distribution, log (stimulus) is also given.
The number of cycles of the iterative process necessary to achieve the best line fit is indicated by LINE FIT
1, 2, 3 etc. followed by a print-out of the corresponding slope and intercept. Mean stimulus, Variance of
Mean, Standard Error of Mean, Variance of Slope, Standard Error of Slope, Reciprocal of Slope (i.e.
Standard Deviation of Distribution) and Chi Squared Value with appropriate degrees of freedom are also
calculated and printed out.
D.5.4 In addition, 95% and 90% G values for the normal distribution are given, plus upper and lower 95%
and 97.5% confidence limits for the stimuli corresponding to percentage responses of 0.1, 1, 5, 10, 20, 50,
80, 90, 95, 99 and 99.9. The G values are printed for information only and when they approach unity, are
indicative of wide confidence limits.
D.5.5 This information is maintained for future review and the summary and analysis tabulated in the
report. Therefore in this example (Table D.10) the NFT can be taken as 1.216 W and the AFT as 3.749 W.
44
Table D.1 Bruceton Test Results of a BW Igniter
DC Dynamic Power (W)

EED Resistance Resistance
No. () Factor 1.8 2.067 2.373 2.724 3.128
1 1.030 1.0176 9
2 0.993 1.0162 9
3 1.012 1.0172 O
4 0.978 1.0166 9
5 1.012 1.0178 9
6 1.032 1.0120 O
7 1.013 1.0165 9
8 1.005 1.0171 9
9 0.913 1.0176 O
10 0.960 1.0160 9
11 1.037 1.0132 O
12 1.013 1.0166 O
13 0.937 1.0154 9
14 1.019 1.0157 9
15 0.982 1.0167 O
16 1.030 1.0135 9
17 1.031 1.0135 O
18 1.048 1.0170 O
19 0.973 1.0143 9
20 1.056 1.0183 O
21 1.001 1.0120 9
22 0.912 1.0163 O
23 1.155 1.0140 O
24 0.922 1.0180 9
25 0.980 1.0143 9
26 1.128 1.0166 9
27 1.098 1.0167 O
28 1.088 1.0152 O
29 0.986 1.0148 9
30 1.169 1.0126 O
Number Fired 0 5 7 3
Number Tested 5 12 9 3
Percent Fired 0% 41.66% 77.77% 100%
50% FIRING LEVEL = 2.134 W Sample SD = 0.470 dB
9 = FIRE O = NO-FIRE
45
Table D.2 Evaluation of 500 Millisecond Pulse Bruceton Test

2
Stimulus Log Stimulus Fire No-fire i i.ni i .ni
(W) (9) (O) (o) (o)
2.724 3 0
2.373 7 2 2 4 8
2.067 5 7 1 7 7
1.80 0.255 0 5 0 0 0
M X N(9) = 15 N(0) =14 A = 11 B = 15
The smallest value of N, i.e. the least frequent event is N(0) = 14; consequently, we analyse NO-FIRES.
The index i starts at the lowest level of the least frequent event.
A 1
Median m = X + +
N 2
Where: = 0.06 (power increment = 0.6 dB)
then m = 0.3293
As m is in normalized units, the actual stimulus required for 50% Probability of fire, M50 in the anti logarithm
of m.
M50 = Antilog (m) = 2.134 W
Sample Standard Deviation
N .B A 2
s = 1.62d 2
+ 0.029
N
= 0.0470
N .B A 2
NOTE Factor = 0.454 > 0.3, therefore s will be accurate on this sample of data.
N2
46
Table D.3 Millisecond Pulse Bruceton Test
DC Dynamic Energy (mJ)

EED Resistance Resistance
No. () Factor 36.1 38.68 41.45 44.41 47.59
1 1.080 1.0178 O
2 0.950 1.0171 9
3 1.117 1.0182 9
4 1.095 1.0138 O
5 1.002 1.0118 O
6 0.868 1.0149 9
7 0.990 1.0129 9
8 1.157 1.0147 O
9 0.955 1.0171 O
10 1.006 1.0162 O
11 1.064 1.0127 9
12 1.076 1.0173 O
13 1.110 1.0163 9
14 1.114 1.0160 9
151 1.052 1.0137 O
16 1.091 1.0133 9
17 0.953 1.0139 9
18 1.061 1.0144 O
19 1.082 1.0122 O
20 1.065 1.0110 O
Number Fired 0 3 4 2
Number Tested 3 8 7 2
Percent Fired 0% 37.5% 57.1% 100%
50% FIRING LEVEL = 42.58 mJ Sample SD = 0.28 dB
Table D.4 Evaluation of 1 Millisecond Pulse Bruceton Test

2
Stimulus Log Stimulus Fire No-fire i i.ni(9) i .ni(9)
(mJ) (9) (O)
47.59 2 0 2 4 8
44.41 4 3 1 4 4
41.45 1.6175 3 5 0 0 0
38.68 0 3
M X N(9) = 9 N(0) =11 A=8 B = 12
The smallest value of N, i.e. the least frequent event is N() = 9; consequently, we analyse FIRES.
The index i starts at the lowest level of the least frequent event.
A 1
Median, m = X +
N 2
47
Where: = 0.03 (energy increment = 0.3 dB)
Then m = 1.6292
As m is in normalized units, the actual stimulus required for 50% Probability of fire, M50 in the anti logarithm
of m.
M = Antilog (m) = 42.58 mJ
Value used to calculate Thermal Time Constant
Sample Standard Deviation
s = 1.62d
(
N .B A 2)
+ 0.029
2
N
= 0.0280
N .B A 2
NOTE Factor =0.543 > 0.3, therefore s will be accurate on this sample of data.
N2
Table D.5 Rundown Data 500ms Pulse (1 of 4)
Stimulus = 2.106 W Percent Fire = 20 %

EED No Resistance () Fire/No-Fire EED No. Resistance () Fire/No-Fire
1 1.1 9 6 1.2 O
2 1.1 O 7 1.2 O
3 1.2 O 8 1.2 O
4 1.1 O 9 1.2 O
5 1.2 O 10 1.15 9
Stimulus = 2.373 W Percent Fire = 70 %

9= FIRE O = NO-FIRE
EED No Resistance () Fire/No-Fire EED No Resistance () Fire/No-Fire
1 1.1 O 6 1.15 O
2 1.15 9 7 1.4 9
3 1.05 9 8 1.1 9
4 1.1 9 9 1.2 9
5 1.2 9 10 1.15 O
Stimulus = 1.903 mW Percent Fire = 25%

48

1 1.071 O 11 1.142 O
2 1.140 O 12 1.027 O
3 0.915 O 13 1.004 9
4 1.020 O 14 1.022 O
5 1.101 O 15 0.966 9
6 0.934 O 16 0.983 9
7 1.100 9 17 1.140 O
8 0.965 9 18 1.047 O
9 1.009 O 19 1.131 O
10 0.917 O 20 0.978 O
Stimulus = 2.69 W Percent Fire = 95%

1 1.087 9 21 1.132 9
2 1.081 9 22 0.999 9
3 1.042 9 23 0.969 9
4 1.086 9 24 1.005 9
5 0.915 9 25 1.111 9
6 1.000 9 26 0.908 9
7 1.019 9 27 1.001 9
8 0.925 9 28 1.108 O
9 1.018 9 29 1.064 9
10 0.972 9 30 1.076 9
11 1.034 9 31 1.014 9
12 1.136 O 32 1.093 9
13 1.049 9 33 1.050 9
14 0.980 9 34 1.064 9
15 0.943 9 35 1.049 9
16 1.087 9 36 0.975 9
17 1.014 9 37 0.961 9
18 1.055 9 38 1.062 9
19 1.022 9 39 0.978 9
20 1.160 9 40 1.080 9
Table D.9 Summary of Rundown Results

NOTE Includes valid results from the 500 ms Bruceton test.
49
Stimulus Sample Size Number Fired Percentage Fired

(mW)
2.724 4 4 100
2.686 40 38 95
2.365 19 14 74
2.067 12 5 42
2.016 10 2 20
1.903 20 5 25
1.810 5 0 0
Table D.10 Probit Analysis of Rundown Results
Confidence Limits (%)

Probability Stimulus Lower 97.5% Upper 97.5% Lower 95% Upper 95%
(%) (mW)
.0001 1.13 0.848 1.324 0.902 1.297
.1 1.42 1.167 1.577 1.216 b 1.555
1 1.57 1.350 1.710 1.394 1.691
5 1.72 1.535 1.841 1.573 1.825
10 1.81 1.643 1.916 1.676 1.901
20 1.92 1.781 2.014 1.808 2.000
50 2.15 a 2.057 2.239 2.074 2.225
80 2.41 2.310 2.560 2.324 2.530
90 2.56 2.434 2.769 2.451 2.725
95 2.69 2.535 2.961 2.555 2.902
99 2.95 2.731 3.365 2.759 3.272
99.9 3.27 2.964 3.891 3.001 3.749c
a Value used to determine Thermal Time Constant
b No-Fire Threshold Power.
c. All-Fire Threshold Power
50
NFT
Figure D.5 Power Level against Probability of Fire 500ms Pulse width
51
52
D.6 Radio Frequency Characterization
D.6.1 Introduction
D.6.1.1 The sensitivity of conventional electro-explosive devices (EED) has been shown to decrease with
increasing frequency so that the dc sensitivity is generally used in electrical assessments, being the worst-
case condition for the No-Fire Threshold (NFT). However, where the resulting clearance is too restrictive or
where non-conventional devices are used and there is reason to believe the radio frequencies (RF)
sensitivity may be higher.
D.6.1.2 The strategy used is the same as for dc characterization (sub-clause D.4.3 to D.4.6.) This test will
complement the dc characterization test and only will be required when a more accurate knowledge of the
EED sensitivity in the RF environment is needed. It is impractical to complete this assessment across the
frequency spectrum therefore the 1 or 2 frequencies used must be agreed with the safety authority.
D.6.1.3 Test Equipment
A block schematic diagram of an RF firing circuit is shown in Figure D.6. A brief description of the equipment
is as follows:
D.6.1.3.1 Impedance Measuring Jig. This unit is not itemised in the block schematic diagram as it is an
integral part of the matching network. A jig is necessary for connecting an EED to standard RF measuring
equipment and a typical example is shown in Figure D.7. It is of coaxial construction with a characteristic
impedance of 50 throughout. The EED is mounted at the left-hand end and held in position by a collar. The
other end is terminated with a conventional RF connector. It is used for the impedance measurement of
several EED so that the average impedance may be taken for the design of a matching network.
D.6.1.3.2 Matching Network. The matching network is designed to make the system more power transfer
efficient and easier for setting up known stimulus levels into the EED. The end that supports the EED must
be the same configuration as the measuring jig to maintain a constant impedance. The network consists of
the EED at one end and an RF connector at the other linked by a quarter wavelength slug that converts the
average impedance of the EED to 50 . A cross-sectional drawing of a matching network is shown in
Figure D.8. As it is being used for firing tests it must also be able to withstand the explosive blast of an
ignited EED.
D.6.1.3.3 Fine Tuner. The fine tuner is designed to trim out any residual mismatch for individual devices
ensuring that the RF system is working into 50 . It consists of a length of coaxial transmission line
terminated at each end by precision connectors and containing two adjustable quarter wavelength slugs.
Each slug acts as a transformer and the unit is capable of matching loads having VSWRs up to 16:1. A
sketch of the arrangement is shown in Figure D.9.
D.6.2 Test Method
D.6.2.1 See Figure D.6. A continuous wave (CW) or pulsed RF is fed from the Travelling Wave Tube
(TWT) amplifier via the circulator and 20 dB directional coupler to a coaxial switch. It is then fed via a
reflector test unit to a second coaxial switch which can select either:
a) The calibration circuit containing a calibrated attenuator and power meter, or
b) The fine tuner, matching network and EED.
D.6.2.2 The RF Peak Power Meter is permanently connected to the forward coupled port of the directional
coupler via the buffer attenuator and is used to monitor the power to the EED after the initial calibration.
D.6.2.3 At this stage the calibration circuit may be replaced with a matched load. The matching network is
designed to convert the average EED impedance to 50 . The fine tuner is used to trim out any residual
mismatch for individual devices thus ensuring the coaxial switches operate into 50 . The degree of
mismatch is observed on a double-beamed storage oscilloscope.
53
D.6.2.4 Microwave detectors are connected to the two ports of the reflection test unit via variable
attenuators. The attenuators are used to adjust the level fed to the detectors. They also provide some
sensitivity control. The two outputs are than a measure of the forward and reflected powers in the main line.
The fine tuner is used to obtain zero reflected power.
D.6.2.5 The oscilloscope, which is triggered from the pulse generator, can also record any changes in
impedance of an EED under firing test conditions and appropriate action may be taken.
D.6.2.6 When trimming the match of an EED using the fine tuner the power is derived from the same
power source used for firing but attenuated to an acceptable level that will not initiate the EED nor affect its
sensitivity.
D.6.2.7 The first coaxial switch in the system is used for the measurement of resistance of the EED using
the safety ohmmeter. This provides a means of eliminating contact problems as the EED resistance is
compared with that already measured earlier when loaded into the matching network.
D.6.2.8 The interconnections between the various units are made with low loss, semi-rigid coaxial cable
terminated in Type N connectors. Variations in power are kept to a minimum as all of these remain
connected throughout, except that between the fine tuner and the matching network. Allowance is made for
the losses in the fine tuner and matching network to ascertain the power received by the EED. Losses in the
fine-tuner may be measured and a typical curve of Attenuation versus Voltage Standing Wave Ratio (VSWR)
is shown in Figure D.10. Direct measurement of loss in the matching network is very difficult because of the
high VSWRs involved but the total loss in the matching can be obtained by adding up the transmission
efficiency (in dB) of each part (see Thorn EMI Report No. DMP 15644 [26]).
D.6.2.9 Due to the complexity of making these measurements they should only be done where an
unacceptable operational restriction will result by using the dc characterization figure or where there is a
reason to believe that the RF sensitivity may be greater than that at dc.
54
Figure D.6 RF Firing Circuit
55
Figure D.7 Typical Impedance Measuring Jig
56
Figure D.8 Typical Matching Network (Cross Section)
57
Figure D.9 Double Slug Fine Tuner
58
Figure D.10 Loss In Fine Tuner - Attenuation v VSWR
59
60
D.7 Electrostatic Discharge
D.7.1 Introduction
D.7.1.1 Through a normal logistic cycle weapons undergo various phases of handling such as packing,
unpacking, wrapping in protective plastic or other covering, assembling, transporting, testing, loading and
unloading, etc. During these processes an electrostatic charge may be developed on the handlers, transfer
equipment, packaging, shipping container, the munition or weapon system itself or any other ungrounded
object.
D.7.1.2 The charge, if transferred into an electro-explosive device (EED), may be sufficient to produce a
dud or exceed the threshold level for firing the EED resulting in a catastrophic ignition of the propellant or
other explosive depending on the design of the system.
D.7.1.3 AECTP 250 Leaflet 253 [2] defines the worst case human and helicopter electrostatic
environments (charge/discharge levels) likely to be encountered by EED and munition/weapon systems
during handling, transportation and deployment. The electrostatic discharge (ESD) environment given in Ref
[2] for personnel level ESD testing is 25 kV ( 5%) in a 500 pF ( 5%) capacitor discharged via a 500
resistor. For ESD testing of EED the equivalent circuit shown below is given.
D.7.1.4 The helicopter discharge environment is not considered relevant at EED level and need only be
addressed at whole system level. The remaining part of this Section therefore addresses the human ESD
risk only. If a particular EED is likely to meet a higher ESD threat during its life then this higher level should
be used.
Figure D.11 ESD Equivalent Circuit
D.7.1.5 Where the EED has an external metal case isolated from its firing leads (double pole) its ESD
sensitiveness has to be assessed in both pin-to-case and pin-to-pin modes. Where the EED either has an
insulating case or has a case forming one of its contacts (single pole) it need only be assessed in the pin-to-
pin mode.
D.7.1.6 The value of the charging resistor Rc is chosen to minimise the risk of any sustained discharge
directly from the high voltage source when the discharge switch S1 is operated, and has a value in excess of
100 M. The series resistor Rs, 500 , represents the resistance of the human body. Depending on the test
mode (pin-case or pin-pin) the EED under test may present either a near open-circuit or a relatively low value
load resistance Rb.
D.7.2 Procedure
D.7.2.1 The assessment of the ESD susceptibility of an EED, munition and /or associated system should
be conducted in accordance with AECTP 500 Leaflet 508/2 [3] . On the basis of information from previous
tests on similar system and/or the EED in isolation, the MoD Weapon Safety Advisor (WSA) may waive the
need for full testing of an EED upon approval.
61
D.7.2.2 Pin-to-Pin
D.7.2.2.1 Evaluation of the sensitivity in this mode of excitation is necessary for all EED, whether or not
they have an isolated electrically conducting case. The requirement for ESD testing, however, will depend on
the type of EED and the sensitivity data derived from its direct current (dc) characterization.
D.7.2.2.2 Pin-to-Pin ESD testing may not be necessary for a BW EED having a relatively low resistance
across its firing leads (typically ranging from 0.1 to 5), and which has been dc characterised according to
the procedures of Clause D.4.3 It is permissible to evaluate the potential susceptibility of such an EED by
reference to its dynamic resistance and Threshold Energy.
D.7.2.2.3 During a discharge the energy stored will be shared between the EED and the ESD source
according to:
C.V 2 Rb
Maximum Energy Delivered to EED =
2 (Rb + Rs )
where:
C = Capacitance of Discharge Capacitor (500 pF)
V = Voltage across Discharge Capacitor (25 kV)
Rs = The source series resistance (500)
Rb = EED Bridgewire resistance during excitation (Dynamic Resistance)
D.7.2.2.4 Note that for the majority of EED, the bridgewire resistance Rb can increase substantially during
initiation with a very brief stimulus, and allowance must be made for this phenomenon by monitoring the
dynamic resistance in accordance with sub-clause D.4.1 and D.4.2.
D.7.2.2.5 The maximum energy delivered to the EED may be estimated provided that the following
conditions are met:
a) The EED Threshold Energy has been determined either directly or derived from the Threshold Power
and Thermal Time Constant using the procedures of sub-clause D.2.5 and D.2.6.
b) The EED Bridgewire resistance, Rb, used for the calculation is the highest dynamic resistance value
witnessed during EED short-pulse Bruceton or Rundown characterization tests.
D.7.2.2.6 If the dynamic resistance value has not been measured directly the upper limit of the
manufacturers specification multiplied by a factor of 2 may be substituted for Rb.
D.7.2.2.7 Where the Maximum Energy Delivered is less than half (-3 dB), relative to the measured No-Fire
Threshold Energy (NFTE), or lower than -5 dB, relative to the derived NFTE, it may be concluded that the
BW EED would not be susceptible to pin-pin ESD excitation.
D.7.2.2.8 Any BW EED not meeting the above criteria should be tested in accordance with Ref [3]. Other
types of EED (CC, carbon bridge etc) and some varieties of BW EED having relatively high resistance are
unlikely to meet the criteria for evaluation by calculation, and resort to testing to Ref [3] will be required.
D.7.2.3 Pin-to-Case
D.7.2.3.1 This mode of excitation applies only to:
a) EED having an isolated electrically-conducting case which does not form part of the normal initiation
circuit.
b) EED where the insulation properties of the case are likely to break down at voltages < 25 kV.
62
D.7.2.3.2 Proof tests should be conducted on all such EED in accordance with Ref [3], with the ESD
discharge circuit connected between both firing leads and the case.
D.7.2.3.3 Selection of the location of the test points for discharge testing shall be based on those points
assessed to be potentially susceptible to either direct penetration or excitation of the structure and
subsequent internal transfer of the energy.
D.7.2.4 ESD Tests
D.7.2.4.1 Since ESD testing is go/no go in nature the number of test samples used is critical. By utilising a
number of non-fired EED from other tests to determine the most hazardous mode and consequently testing
all the new EED in this single configuration permits maximum information to be obtained with minimum time
and expense. The minimum number of devices tested shall be agreed with the National Authority but should
not be less than 20 in each mode.
D.7.2.4.2 Where devices fail the level given in Ref [2] the threshold level of failure shall be determined.
D.7.2.4.3 A typical block schematic diagram of a test system is shown in Figure D.11. The 500pF
capacitor is charged to the required voltage level (VMAX = 25kV) via a 220 M charging resistor. The energy
in the capacitor is then switched by a high voltage relay through a 500 or 5000 resistor into the EED by
means of a control unit. The control unit provides the necessary HV and explosive safety when providing the
250 V ac to operate the relay combined with a number of interlocks, one being key operated.
Figure D.12 ESD Unit
D.7.2.5 Reports
D.7.2.5.1 Reports should be fully documented and contain test results and statistical analysis. The
information required from a characterization test is as follows:
a) The resistance range or geometric mean resistance of the EED in .
b) The long pulse NFT i.e. the no-fire power threshold (Pth), in watts.
c) The short pulse NFT i.e. the no-fire energy threshold (Eth), in joules.
d) The thermal time constant (), in seconds.

63
e) The AFT, in watts.
f) ESD results.
D.7.2.5.2 When is much longer than the duration and the interval between pulses of pulsed emitters, Eth
is not relevant to RADHAZ assessment/trials but may be required for an ESD assessment.
D.7.2.5.3 Typical tables and figures that should be included are:
a) Tables:
Bruceton Test Results of a BW Igniter.
Evaluation of Bruceton Test.
Bruceton Test Results of a BW Igniter.
Evaluation of Bruceton Test.
Data From 500 ms Rundown Test (1 of 5).
Summary of BW Igniter Test Results (Inc Bruceton) for 500 ms Firing.
Analysed Results - 500 ms Pulse - Sensitivity Test.
b) Figures:
Threshold Data for a Typical BW Device.
Strategy for EED Electrical Characterization.
EED DC Firing Circuit.
64
Annex E
Characterization of High Voltage Electro-Explosive Devices (EFI and
EBW)
E.1 Introduction
E.1.1 STANAG 4560 [20] includes characterization tests for EFI and EBW. The UK position on the
guidance given in the STANAG and supporting AOP [4] are given in this Annex.
E.1.2 These tests furnish characterization data of electric initiators that are often used in-line for the
initiation of safety critical applications. The purpose of the testing program is to establish key initiator
characteristics such as the electrical characteristics, soundness of mechanical design, output, basic safety
properties and resistance to adverse service environments.
E.1.3 The proposed test sequence with numbers of EEDs required as given in reference [20] is repeated
in Table E.1. The test requirements of reference [20] are repeated here with, where relevant, UK
interpretation or modification of the requirement for the test and test numbers.
E.2 Electrical Characterization
E.2.1 Visual Inspection
Examination of all initiators shall be made according to the manufacturing inspection criteria and only those
meeting the inspection requirements shall be used for the following tests.
E.2.2 Resistance and Insulation Resistance
E.2.2.1 EBW/EFI having continuous (un-gapped) bridge circuits shall have their resistance measured
before the Firing Properties Test is carried out. The resistance of every initiator shall be measured in
accordance with the following:
E.2.2.1.1 An approved low voltage, low current resistance meter is to be used operating at less than 10%
of the designed No Damage or NFT current whichever is the lower.
E.2.2.1.2 These tests are conducted using the DC resistance method. Measurements shall be recorded
and then corrected to ambient temperature (23oC)
E.2.2.1.3 Measuring the initiator bridge resistance or continuity shall not adversely affect the initiator or
cause it to dud or fire. In order to reduce errors it is recommended that a four terminal measurement method
be used.
E.2.2.1.4 These tests are to be conducted in accordance with the dc resistance method of
MIL-STD-202 [14] or a national equivalent. Measurements shall be recorded and then corrected to nominal
ambient temperature (23C).
E.2.2.1.5 Insulation Resistance. For EBW/EFI that are housed in an insulated package the resistance
offered by the insulating members of a component part to an impressed direct voltage shall be measured
where agreed by DOSG to be required.
a. Insulation resistance measurements shall be made on an apparatus suitable for the

characteristics of the component to be measured.
b. For EBW/EFI with 2 firing leads that are housed in an insulated package some nations require a
test ensure that if 500 V is present anywhere near the initiator it cannot inadvertently cause an
unacceptable function. For UK use where an EED is to be installed in a system for all its service life
and maintenance is to be conducted in an approved licensed facility the necessity for such a test
65
can generally be waived. Where required a test at 500 V dc for 60 s between the shorted initiator
input leads and the case of the initiator should be carried. The item under test shall not be
damaged, be safe for use and have a leakage current not to exceed 2 A.
Table E.1 STANAG 4560 Minimum Test Sequence for EFI and EBW Initiator Characterization
MINIMUM QUANTITIES
Para 90 40 30 5 25 30 10 50 50 50 50 50 50 5
Ref in
REQUIREMENT 535
this A B C D E F G H I J K L M N
Annex
Radiographic and/or 535

E.2.1 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Visual Inspection
535
Resistance E.2.2 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
535
Insulation Resistance E.2.2 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
90
Firing Properties E.2.3 X
30
Malfunction Threshold E.2.4 X
EBW Low Power 5
E.2.8 X
Non-Functioning Test
40
Thermal Time Constant (1) E.2.5 X
25
Electrostatic Discharge E.2.6 X
Non-Interrupted Explosive E.2.7 30
X
Train Requirement
150
Vibration(2) E.3.2 X X X
150
Thermal Shock(2) E.3.3 X X X
150
Temperature-Humidity(2) E.3.4 X X X
150
Mechanical Shock(2) E.3.7 X X X
150
1.5 Meter Drop(2) E.3.6 X X X
150
Leakage(2) E.3.5 X X X
10
Thermal Cook-Off (1) E.3.8 X
Post-Environment Firing 30
E.3.9 X X X
Properties
90
Performance Test, Amb E.3.10 X X
90
Performance Test, Cold E.3.10 X X
90
Performance Test, Hot E.3.10 X X
5
High Firing Voltage E.3.11 X
Notes: (1) May not be considered mandatory by NSAA
(2) See paragraph 13 of STANAG 4560
66
E.2.3 Firing Properties
E.2.3.1 An EBW/EFI operates by application of energy from a dedicated external source and it is
necessary to establish the electrical parameters of the source which directly influence the likelihood of
initiation. The most significant parameters are those which establish the electrical conditions at which the
initiator can and cannot be initiated. The firing properties (mean firing stimulus (voltage/energy), standard
deviation, minimum all-fire stimulus (voltage/energy), the maximum no-fire stimulus (voltage/energy)) shall
be determined by statistical tests. Where required for use in hazard analyses the Maximum Allowable Safe
Stimulus (MASS) shall also be determined (note this is derived from the same set of tests via statistical
analysis.
E.2.3.1.1 DOSG shall approve the test procedures and methods of statistical analysis used. Known
procedures including Bruceton, Langlie, Neyer, Probit or One Shot, are to be employed.
E.2.3.1.2 These tests are not to be confused with the Performance Tests. Testing the firing properties
determines the electrical sensitivity for safety and projected reliability, and provides the user with data to
estimate/establish the all-fire/no-fire thresholds/MASS.
E.2.3.1.3 The test firing unit shall use the same circuit components as those used in the intended
munitions tactical firing unit (Fire Set). Due to the possible degradation of the firing pulse caused by
deterioration of the triggering device and/or firing capacitor, each Fire Set should be triggered no more than
half its projected number of reliable firings.
E.2.3.1.4 To assure the discharge properties (ring downs) are acceptable, firing units should be calibrated
before the first test and on completion, and the subsequent discharges monitored for changes, such as
deterioration of components within the firing unit.
E.2.3.1.5 The test shall be carried out at different temperatures and on a minimum sample size for each
temperature. Tests shall be completed at cold, ambient and hot temperatures directed by the possible
intended use of the EFI/EBW and Fire Set (default values of -54, 23 and 71C 2 C shall be used for
generic applications). The sample size shall be such that the following two conditions are met:
E.2.3.1.6 Not less than 30 initiators shall be tested at each temperature.
E.2.3.1.7 The ratio between the standard deviation and the mean value of the firing voltage (derived from
the statistical analysis) shall be not more than 30%.
E.2.3.2 Statistical analysis of the firing properties data shall be used to predict the minimum All-Fire
Threshold Voltage (AFTV) and the maximum No-Fire Threshold Voltage (NFTV) of the EFI/EBW having
combined the data from all three temperatures. Where required the MASS should also be determined. Both
NFTV and MASS should be greater than 500V.
E.2.4 Malfunction Threshold (MFT)
E.2.4.1 Tests are needed to determine the current or power that would be required to cause a malfunction
if induced by external effects, such as electromagnetic radiation. A sample of initiators (minimum of 30) shall
be subjected to tests at ambient temperature on a functional or inspection basis as outlined below. The
results should specify by which test procedure MFT was determined. Currently in the UK it is believed that
this test is applicable to both EFI and EBW. Tests should be conducted in accordance with one or more of
the following procedures:
E.2.4.2 Maximum No-damage Current (Functional Approach)
a) Where manufacturers data is not available a small sample, no more than 10 devices (not part of the
sample size), will be selected and each device subjected to a current to determine a mean malfunction
current/power level to start the statistical test.
b) Using the manufacturers malfunction level, or that established above, as a starting point, the EFI strip
line/leads shall be subjected to dc levels in accordance with an acceptable statistical method similar to that
used for the firing properties test (Bruceton, Langley, or Neyer).
67
c) The dc current/power that will cause damage is normally evaluated by applying a test stimulus whose
duration is set to be much greater than the time constant but to ensure prolonged exposure is not an issue
the current pulse should be applied for >1 minute.
d) The applied dc shall not over shoot the intended test dc level by more than 5%.
e) The determination of damage or no-damage after each test shall be determined by the application of the
operational voltage from the intended fireset. Failure to detonate shall be considered evidence of damage
and detonation shall be considered evidence of no-damage.
f) If the operational voltage is not known or undefined the 99.9% AFTV level determined in the firing
properties test shall be used.
g) The MFT, mean and standard deviation shall be reported.
E.2.4.3 Maximum No-damage Current (Inspection Approach)
The following test can only be used where the bridge is visible for microscopic examination. For an EFI, due
to its relative simplicity this test is preferred to the test above whenever visible access to the bridge is
practical. This test would normally be carried out without the explosive pellet present:
a) A dc test current shall be applied to the input leads of the initiator increasing linearly in amplitude until
either a visible change (physical) or measurable change in electrical (resistance) parameters is observed.
This will normally be carried out in the absence of any explosive.
b) The lowest current or power amplitude (MFT worst case) that damages the initiator shall be reported to
the MoD.
E.2.5 Thermal Time Constant
E.2.5.1 The thermal time constant () is the ratio of the electrical energy to the electrical power which
causes the same type and intensity of damage to the EFI bridge as the MFT. For assessment of RF hazard,
it is important to distinguish between EED responses to pulse RF environments (energy) and Continuous
Wave (CW) RF environments (power). Knowledge of the pulse environment and for the EED is therefore
important in RF trials where a distinction has to be made between the responses to pulse and CW excitation.
E.2.5.2 Perform a wind-up test on a sample of 5 10 EFI starting at a level where no damage is expected
and using a pulse width significantly shorter (typically 50-75 s) than the expected . Increase the pulse
amplitude (energy level) in steps until damage meeting the MFT criterion is observed. The pulse energy is
obtained from the product of voltage, current and pulse width. The mean and standard deviation of the
energy to cause a malfunction from the wind-up test indicate the initial level for the following Bruceton test.
E.2.5.3 A minimum sample of 20 EFI shall be used for both the short and long pulse Bruceton test. Test
the EFI to the level indicated by the wind-up test (short pulse). Dependent upon whether a malfunction is
observed either increase or decrease the energy level by 0.125 dB. Repeat for all EFI in sample.
E.2.5.4 Repeat E.2.5.2 and E.2.5.3 for the long pulse starting the wind-up test at a level significantly
longer (typically 7.5 ms) than the expected . Dependent on the observed result of malfunction increase or
decrease the level by 0.25 dB. For long pulse measurements the power is calculated from the energy
recorded divided by the pulse width.
E.2.5.5 From the Bruceton results determine the 50% MFT energy (short pulse) and power (long pulse)
and calculate from the ratio of 50% energy and 50% power levels.
E.2.6 Static Discharge (25 kV)
E.2.6.1 AECTP 250 leaflet 253 [2] defines the maximum human electrostatic discharge environment likely
to be encountered by EED and munition weapon systems containing EED during handling and deployment.
The test is to be carried out according to the following:
68
a) The EFI/EBW shall not function when subjected to the simulated human electrostatic discharge and
shall be capable of functioning as designed after having been subjected to the discharge.
b) The test and assessment of the electrostatic discharge susceptibility of the EBW/EFI should be
conducted in accordance with AECTP 500 Leaflet 508/2 [3]. Tests to EED shall always use the contact
discharge method.
c) The minimum number of devices tested should be agreed with DOSG but shall not be less than 20.
d) Selection of discharge locations should include points assessed potentially to allow transfer of the
energy to the bridge or directly to energetic material (e.g. firing lead to firing lead, firing leads to case,
etc.).
E.2.6.2 Where devices fail the test at the 25 kV level, additional testing shall be performed to determine
the maximum pass voltage level.
E.2.7 Non-interrupted Explosive Train Requirement
E.2.7.1 Where a munition system assembly (such as the warhead section of a missile) contains an EED
mounted in a non-interrupted explosive train (e.g. in accordance with STANAG 4187), it is necessary to
ensure with a very high degree of certainty it cannot be inadvertently detonated by external influences. A
number of additional tests have therefore been defined and the NSAA of the relevant nation must agree
which tests are required for any application. The UK interpretation of the requirement for these tests is
shown under each test heading below.
E.2.7.2 Electric Cook-Off. As discussed in clause 6.4.2.7 the AC portion of this test will only be required
where a risk assessment shows there is a significant risk of exposure to such voltages. In general the DC
test should be carried out unless agreed otherwise by DOSG. Details of both test methods are included here
for completeness. The initiator shall not exhibit a functional explosive reaction (including deflagration) from
exposure to sources up to 500 volts switched directly across the input leads of the device.
E.2.7.3 AC Test. The reaction of the bare EBW/EFI to exposure to common AC sources of 440V volts
shall be determined. An EBW/EFI will not be considered for qualification for non-interrupted explosive train
use if the reaction is a detonation. If the device is intended for use in a standalone configuration, or an
application in which its leads may be externally exposed or accessible, the initiator shall not exhibit a
functional explosive reaction (deflagration, explosion, or detonation) during this test.
E.2.7.3.1 A special test set is required. The test set must be capable of being controlled to RMS output
potential of 440 VAC; further, the test set must be capable of delivering current without throwing the circuit
breaker during the course of the test sustaining a short circuit current for five minutes. The output of the
tester must be controlled to switch voltage on within 10% of the peak voltage value, with a controlled turn on
transient.
E.2.7.3.2 The input to the device shall be energized from a 50 to 60 Hz AC source at 440V (rms). The
power source, including cabling, must be capable of sustaining a minimum short circuit current of 20
amperes. The minimum open circuit voltage of the source shall be adjusted to within -5 to +15 percent of the
required value. EBW/EFI used for this test shall be temperature conditioned at ambient
E.2.7.3.4 Five EFI shall be exposed to the 440 volts RMS for five minutes without additional output
impedance being included in the circuit.
E.2.7.3.5 The radial confinement used shall be a right circular cylinder constructed from steel. The outside
of the cylinder shall have a radius that is at least 50% larger than the radius of the EFI being tested.
Additionally the cylinder shall have a centre hole to accommodate the EFI whose radius is sized such that
there is a maximum radial gap of 0.0018 between the outside surface of the EFI and the inside surface of
the hole. The radially confined EFI shall be mechanically anchored to the dent block to prevent movement
should a reaction occur.
E.2.7.3.6 For the test, the input voltage shall be switched on either mechanically or electronically, and the
onset of voltage shall be controlled. Means of switching power shall be capable of a rise time of
1 microsecond, maximum, to full voltage, with the rise time occurring while the amplitude of the applied
voltage is within 10% of the peak value. The reaction of each device shall be documented. Video or high-
69
speed optical recordings shall be used, along with the dent block condition, to capture response
characteristics.
E.2.7.4 DC Test. The input to the EFI shall be energised from a DC source at 28 VDC; the power source
must be capable of sustaining a minimum short circuit current of 10 amperes:
a) Five initiators shall be tested, each for 5 minutes.
b) The means of switching power shall be capable of a rise time of 1 microsecond, or less, to full voltage.
c) The reaction of the device including the occurrence of dudding is to be reported.
d) The EED will be confined as described in the AC test.
E.2.7.5 Maximum Allowable Electrical Sensitivity (for EFI). In the UK this test would only be required
where the fire-set lo be used in an application is not known/available or possibly where a range of firesets
are to be used in multiple applications. The test uses a defined "Standard" fireset (see Ref [3]) that can be
used for all EFI to establish the maximum allowable electrical sensitivity threshold level. The "Standard"
fireset is not related to the intended-use fireset, and is to be used for this test only. If the intended fireset
produces a stimulus that envelops or exceeds that of the Standard fireset, it may be possible to consider
that the MASS determined in the firing properties test can be used instead of the MAES.
E.2.8 Low Power Non-Functioning Test (for EBW).
It has been suggested that a poorly designed EBW may function when exposed to a long-term constant
current/power. Tests are necessary to demonstrate that this cannot occur. During the course of these tests,
only functionality that would initiate the explosive train constitutes a failure. A device that is only damaged is
not a failure. If the device does function in such a way that would initiate the explosive train, then it needs to
be characterised as per a normal, low voltage EED. This test should always be conducted for EBW to be
used in UK service.
Using 20 devices, inject a constant power into the bridgewire for at least 10 minutes or until the device is
either damaged or functions. If the current/temperature is shown to have stabilised within 1-minute and no
damage or detonation occurs after 10 minutes, the test can be halted. The initial current level to be injected
shall be at 90% of the no-damage threshold. This can be determined from manufacturers data, or shall be
determined from a small (extra) sample of up to 10 devices (as per Para E.2.4 above). During the test, the
resistance and hence the temperature of the device shall be monitored to determine whether the bridgewire
has reached a constant temperature. If an increase is indicated, the injection shall be continued until it
stabilises, or damage or detonation occurs. If the EBW is not damaged and does not detonate, the test shall
be repeated with an increased injection level. If damage occurs, or the device detonates, the test shall be
repeated with the injection level decreased. Regardless of whether the device survives the test, each device
shall only be tested once. Any malfunction during this test shall be recorded and the data shall be used to
help define the malfunction level required by paragraph E.2.4 above.
Any detonation or explosive reaction shall be deemed a failure and the device shall not be used in an in-line
configuration in fuzes or rocket motors. If a reaction occurs the test shall be repeated on further batches of 5
EBW at a reduced DC level until a threshold value at which no reaction occurs is determined.
E.3 Environmental Tests
E.3.1 Introduction
As discussed in clause 6.4 of this standard and in Annex C the scope, sequence and numbers required for
environmental tests (as defined in Table E.1) should be discussed and agreed with DOSG prior to
establishing a test programme. STANAG 4560 [21] notes that some safety authorities accept only 30
devices. Where some or all of such tests are required they shall be carried out as described below.
70
E.3.2 Vibration
E.3.2.1 This test is applicable in order to obtain characterization data about EFI/EBW to adequately
demonstrate their ability to resist a typical environment without unacceptable degradation:
a) The EED initiator or EED initiator sub-assembly shall be subjected to the vibration test as described in
as described in STANAG 4157 [18] AOP-20 [5], test B1. Alternatively STANAG 4370 [19] AECTP 400
Method 401 Procedure 3 (material installed in missiles) may be used.
b) Tests shall be carried out at the hot, ambient and cold temperatures as relevant to the application.
c) At least ten (10) devices shall be tested at each temperature.
d) On completion of the test the performance of the EFI/EBW or sub assembly shall be checked for
changes in the following:
1) Physical condition (By Visual Inspection).
2) Electrical parameters (bridge resistance, Insulation resistance etc.).
E.3.3 Thermal Shock
The objective of the thermal shock test is to determine if a EFI/EBW is affected as a result of exposure to
sudden extreme changes in temperature. The EFI/EBW shall be tested to the requirements of
STANAG 4370 [20] AECTP 300 Method 304 or if the EED is to be used in fuzes then the test in STANAG
4157 [18] / AOP 20 [5] shall be used:
a) After being subjected to the thermal shock test, the initiator shall meet the operational performance
requirements when fired.
E.3.4 Humidity
The combined effects of humidity and temperature can cause degradation due to the performance and
safety of the device due to corrosion, decomposition of organic materials and changes in electrical
properties. The EFI/EBW shall be tested in accordance with STANAG 4157 [18], AOP-20 [5], test C1 or
STANAG 4370 [20] AECTP 300 Method 306.
a) Any evidence of degradation that prevents the EED or subsystem from meeting the safety or
performance requirements shall be considered a failure.
b) Relative humidity (rh) may have a significant influence on some materials during the thermal shock test.
Where this is considered appropriate the test procedure can be combined with the thermal shock test.
E.3.5 Leakage
The initiator shall be tested in accordance with AOP 20 Test C8. This is specifically for hermetically sealed
initiators, which shall be tested in accordance with the Fine Leak Test. They are not to exhibit a leak rate in
excess of 10-5 cm3/s of air at a pressure differential of 0.1 0.01 MPa.
E.3.6 1.5 m Drop
This test simulates severe shocks encountered during accidental mishandling in manufacture, transportation
or service use:
a) Drop test for munitions are covered by AECTP 414 but may be covered by a test in accordance with any
national or international procedure e.g. AOP 20 [5], MIL STD 331 [15] Test A4, Def Stan 00-35 [9] Test
M5, GAM - EG13.
b) The initiator or EED initiator assembly shall remain safe and serviceable when dropped from a height of
1.5 m onto a smooth hard surface, such as a 25 mm thick steel plate floated on a concrete base. Nose
up, nose down and horizontal orientations shall be used.
71
c) After being subjected to the drop test the initiator shall meet the operating performance when fired.
E.3.7 Shock
E.3.7.1 Where appropriate the initiator or initiator sub-assembly shall be tested to determine if the initiator
or sub-assembly meets the shock requirements of STANAG 4157 [18], AOP-20 [5], test A1 (Jolt) or
STANAG 4370 [20] AECTP 400 Method 403:
a) The degree of support afforded to the device during the test shall be the same as for the intended
application.
b) The pulse shape (typically half-sine), amplitude and duration shall be stipulated in the tests instruction
and report.
E.3.7.2 After being subjected to the shock test, the initiator assembly shall be free from visible damage
and perform according to the operational performance requirements when fired.
E.3.8 Thermal Cook Off
The maximum temperature to which an initiator can be exposed for a period of one hour without cook-off
shall be established (within 10 C).
a) Using an appropriate pre-test (e.g. using single EED samples), determine the minimum temperature
within 10C at which cook-off occurs within 1 hour.
b) Five initiators shall be placed in an oven preheated to 10C below the minimum temperature determined
in the pre-test. If cook-off occurs, the temperature shall be decreased 10C and the test repeated with new
initiators. The test shall be repeated in 10C decrements until cook-off does not occur within a 1-hour period.
c) The thermal cook-off threshold for a component is the maximum temperature where no cook-off reaction
occurs when exposed for a one hour period.
E.3.9 Post Environmental Properties Test
In order to confirm that the environmental tests have not compromised the electrical characteristics of the
device, it may be required for the firing properties test to be repeated at ambient temperature.
E.3.10 Performance Tests
The EED initiator or EED initiator assembly shall fire and produce the correct output when functioned at the
minimum firing voltage for an intended application while temperature conditioned:
a) Tests shall be completed at the agreed hot, cold and ambient temperatures.
b) This should be performed on initiators previously stressed during environmental tests.
c) The output characteristics can be determined by tests that reflect the purpose for which the device will
be used.
E.3.11 High Voltage
E.3.11.1 It has been shown that not all EFI are reliable when exposed to an increased firing voltage.
Excessive energy at the bridge of an EFI can cause an incorrect flyer to be released which will not impart
enough energy to cause detonation. This test is to assure that the chosen initiator has a reasonable margin
over the design firing voltage and that the firing system can operate:
The firing unit shall use the same circuit components as used in the munitions firing circuit (Fireset).
E.3.11.2 The initiator shall meet the functional requirements when initiated by a firing potential at the limits
of the capability of the firing system or 150% of the application specific design firing voltage, whichever is
less.
72
Annex F
Glossary of terms and abbreviations
A glossary of terms and abbreviations used in all parts of Def Stan 59-114 is given in Appendix I to Part 1 of
this standard.
73
Crown Copyright 2012
Copying Only as Agreed with DStan
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Internet e-mail enquiries@dstan.mod.uk
File Reference
The DStan file reference relating to work on this standard is D/DSTAN/59/114/2.
Contract Requirements
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Defence Standard does not in itself confer immunity from legal obligations.
Revision of Defence Standards
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users of Defence Standards should ascertain that they are in possession of the latest issue or
amendment. Information on all Defence Standards is contained in Def Stan 00-00 Standards for
Defence Part 3 Index of Standards for Defence Procurement Section 4 'Index of Defence
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Standard encounters an inaccuracy or ambiguity is requested to notify the Directorate of
Standardization (DStan) without delay on order that the matter may be investigated and
appropriate action taken.

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Ministry of Defence

Defence Standard 59-114

Safety Principles for Electrical Circuits in

D.2.6 Determine Thermal Time Constant ...........................................................................................32

E.3.8 Thermal Cook Off ........................................................................................................................72

Figure 1 Sketch of Low Voltage Electric Fuzehead ....................................................................................4

Table 1 STANAG 4560 Electrical and Environmental Characterization Tests......................................15

Table D.4 Evaluation of 1 Millisecond Pulse Bruceton Test ......................................................................47

Amd No Date Text Affected Signature and Date

This standard is introduced at Issue 1.

The standard comprises 3 parts and supersedes the following:

Part 1: Principles, Design Recommendations and Electrical/Electromagnetic Environments.

Part 2: Electro-Explosive Devices and their Characterization.

Part 3: Assessment, Safety Margins and Trials.

Safety Principles for Electrical Circuits in Systems

Part 2 Electro-Explosive Devices and their Characterization

[1] EMTAP Manual of Tests

4.7.1 Non-installed, normally covering 2 scenarios:

4.7.2 Installed covering the following scenarios:

5.2 Low Voltage EED

Figure 1 Sketch of Low Voltage Electric Fuzehead

Figure 2 Typical Bridge-Wire EED

Figure 3 Typical Film Bridge EED

Figure 4 Typical Conducting Composition EED

5.2.7 Detailed Descriptions of Low Voltage EED Response

Figure 5 Threshold Firing Data for Typical Bridge-Wire Device

5.2.8 No-Fire Threshold (NFT) Sensitivities

5.2.9 Pulse Thresholds

PTH = NFT power.

= thermal time constant.

or in terms of repetitive pulses:

or in terms of the mean power in the repetitive pulsed waveform:

Where: P(t1 ) = (peak) pulse power threshold for single pulse.

t2 = pulse repetition period.

P(t1 ,t2 ) = peak power threshold for repetitive pulse stimulus.

P(t1 ,t2 ) = mean power threshold for repetitive pulse stimulus.

P(t1 ,t2 ) = PTH (5)

5.2.10 Low Voltage EED Electrical Sensitivity

a) The EED response time compared with radar pulse duration.

5.3 High Voltage EED

5.3.1 Exploding Bridge-Wire EED

Figure 6 An EBW Detonator Layout

Figure 7 An EBW Igniter Layout

5.3.2 Exploding Foil Initiator (EFI)

5.4 EED Sensitivity Data

Figure 8 Basic EFI

Figure 9 Sequence of EFI Detonation

Table 1 STANAG 4560 Electrical and Environmental Characterization Tests

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

1 Radiographic and/or Visual Inspection X X X

4 Firing Properties Test X X X

7 Thermal Time Constant(1) X X X

10 Low Power Non-Functioning Test X

17 Thermal Cook-Off(1) (4) X X X

18 High Temperature(1) (4) X

6.2 Design Assessment

c) It should be reliable, effective, safe to assemble and easy to use.

a) Production standard drawings.

c) Tolerances and fit of components.

e) Information on component failure.

6.3 Qualification of Explosives

6.4 EED Characterization Tests

6.4.1 Environmental Trials