Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
*
G.R. No. 115455. August 25, 1994.
*
G.R. No. 115543. August 25, 1994.
_______________
* EN BANC.
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note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced.
To insist that a revenue statuteand not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the lawmust
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates
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must come from the House of Representatives and that it does not prohibit
the ling in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
bill from the House.Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the
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initiative for ling revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase
of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come
from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are
from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators,
who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from
the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the ling in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt
of the House bill.
Same; Same; Presidential certication on urgency of a bill dispenses
with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days.The presidential certication dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate
days. The phrase except when the President certies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc. in Art. VI, 26(2) qualies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its nal form and
distributed three days before it is nally approved. In other words, the
unless clause must be read in relation to the except clause, because the
two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the
except clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the
unless clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before nal
approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate
the very premise of the except clause: the necessity of securing the
immediate enactment of a bill which is certied in order to meet a public
calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by
presidential certication, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of
any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether
doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill
three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law
in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for
President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is required
to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency
session.
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Same; Same; Judicial Review; While the sufciency of the factual basis
of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law
is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at
hazard, the factual basis of presidential certication of bills, which involves
doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are
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which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House
and Senate bills.
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Same; Same; Same; The report of the conference committee needs the
approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the
legislative department.Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the
power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new
provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the
committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions,
there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively
considered as an amendment in the nature of a substitute, so long as such
amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee.
After all, its report was not nal but needed the approval of both houses of
Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge
that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative
chamber is thus without any basis.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It is common place in
Congress that conference committee reports include new matters which,
though germane, have not been committed to the committee, and if a change
is desired in the practice, it must be sought in Congress since this question
is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of
each house.To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee
to a consideration of conicting provisions. But Rule XLIV, 112 of the
Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that If there is no Rule applicable
to a specic case the precedents of the Legislative Department of the
Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules
contained in Jeffersons Manual. The following is then quoted from the
Jeffersons Manual: The managers of a conference must conne themselves
to the differences committed to them . . . and may not include subjects not
within disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue. Note
that, according to Rule XLIX, 112, in case there is no specic rule
applicable, resort must be to the legislative practice. The Jeffersons Manual
is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in Congress that
conference committee reports include new matters which, though germane,
have not been committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by
Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the oral
argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jeffersons
Manual must be considered to have been modied by the legislative
practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought in Congress
since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only
an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI,
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16(3) of the Constitution provides that Each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings . . . .
Same; Same; Same; Same; Bill-Drafting; The use of brackets and
capital letters to indicate changes is a standard practice in bill-drafting;
The Supreme Courts concern is with the procedural requirements of the
Constitution for the enactment of laws, not the enforcement of internal Rules
of Congress since parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with
their observance the courts have no concern.This observation applies to
the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise
disregarded in the preparation of the Conference Committee Report because
the Report did not contain a detailed and sufciently explicit statement of
changes in, or amendments to, the subject measure. The Report used
brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard
practice in bill-drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and
symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and the House.
Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these
internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, parliamentary
rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern. Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the
Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are
concerned, we are satised that they have been faithfully observed in these
cases.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The three-reading requirement refers only
to bills introduced for the rst time in either house of Congress, not to the
conference committee report.Art. VI, 26(2) must, therefore, be
construed as referring only to bills introduced for the rst time in either
house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the
purpose of requiring three readings is to give members of Congress time to
study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House
after three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on rst reading and
then referred to a committee of that body; that although the Senate
committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a version (S. No.
1630) which it had prepared by taking into consideration the House bill;
that for its part the Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and
prepared a compromise version; that the Conference Committee Report was
thereafter approved by the House and the Senate, presumably after
appropriate study by their members. We cannot say that, as a matter of fact,
the members of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of the
bill. The allegation that the Conference Committee usurped the legislative
power of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.
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mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to 103 of the NIRC, in which
it is specically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should
be a complete index of its content. The constitutional requirement that every
bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of
Congress and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if they
wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did
not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of
any defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes,
although published, pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls
attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not
any more general than the title of PALs own franchise under P.D. No. 1590,
and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption.
Same; Same; Same; The trend is to construe the constitutional
requirement in such a manner that courts do not unduly interfere with the
enactment of necessary legislation.The trend in our cases is to construe
the constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts do not unduly
interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation and to consider it
sufcient if the title expresses the general subject of the statute and all its
provisions are germane to the general subject thus expressed.
Same; Same; Public Utilities; Franchises; The grant of a franchise for
the operation of a public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or
repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.In contrast, in the
case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PALs franchise (P.D.
No. 1590) by specically excepting from the grant of exemptions from the
VAT PALs exemption under P.D. No. 1590. This is within the power of
Congress to do under Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution, which provides that
the grant of a franchise for the operation of a public utility is subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the common good so
requires.
Same; Taxation; Expanded Value Added Tax Law; Bill of Rights;
Freedom of Expression; Even with due recognition of its high estate and its
importance in a democratic society, the press is not immune from general
regulation by the State.To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute
that on its face operates in the area of press freedom. The PPIs claim is
simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom. Even
with due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic
society, however, the press is not immune from general regulation by the
State.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; The VAT
law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the
only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press.What it
contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print
media transactions involving printing, publication, importation or sale of
newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out the press for
discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass media the law
discriminates against print media by giving broadcast media favored
treatment. We have carefully examined this argument, but we are unable to
nd a differential treatment of the press by the law, much less any censorial
motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to pay a value-
added tax on its transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much
less targeted, for special treatment but only because of the removal of the
exemption previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption is
all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions, likewise previously
granted exemption, have been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the
base and the scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to
the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had
been that granted to the press. But that is not the case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There is a reasonable basis
for the classication and different treatment between print media and
broadcast media.Nor is impermissible motive shown by the fact that print
media and broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed on its
transactions involving printing and publication, which are different from the
transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable basis for the
classication.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Religion; The Free Exercise of
Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and
use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization.What
has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the
removal of the exemption of printing, publication or importation of books
and religious articles, as well as their printing and publication, likewise
violates freedom of thought and of conscience. For as the U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization, the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit
imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious
materials by a religious organization.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The VAT registration fee is a mere
administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less
a constitutional right.In this case, the fee in 107, although a
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xed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege but
only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The
registration requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is
designed to provide a record of tax credits because any person who is
subject to the payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an
output tax on sales made or services rendered. The registration fee is thus a
mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege,
much less a constitutional right.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Hierarchy of Values; When
freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a
momentum of respect and when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers
judgment that commands respect.There is basis for passing upon claims
that on its face the statute violates the guarantees of freedom of speech,
press and religion. The possible chilling effect which it may have on the
essential freedom of the mind and conscience and the need to assure that the
channels of communication are open and operating importunately demand
the exercise of this Courts power of review. There is, however, no
justication for passing upon the claims that the law also violates the rule
that taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners right to due
process and the equal protection of the laws. The reason for this different
treatment has been cogently stated by an eminent authority on constitutional
law thus: [W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom
that commands a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled it is the
lawmakers judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not
precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases,
but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process
clause.
Same; Same; Same; The legislature is not required to adhere to a
policy of all or none in choosing the subject of taxation.On the other
hand, the CUPs contention that Congress withdrawal of exemption of
producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service cooperatives,
while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes
against the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as instruments of
social justice (Art. XII, 15) but also denies such cooperatives the equal
protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The legislature is not
required to adhere to a policy of all or none in choosing the subject of
taxation.
Same; Same; Same; Regressivity is not a negative standard for courts
to enforce since what Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to
evolve a progressive system of taxation.Indeed, regressivity
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concrete record. We accept that this Court does not only adjudicate private
cases; that public actions by non-Hohfeldian or ideological plaintiffs are
now cognizable provided they meet the standing requirement of the
Constitution; that under Art. VIII, 1, 2 the Court has a special function
of vindicating constitutional rights. Nonetheless the feeling cannot be
escaped that we do not have before us in these cases a fully developed
factual record that alone can impart to our adjudication the impact of
actuality to insure that decision-making is informed and well grounded.
Needless to say, we do not have power to render advisory opinions or even
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect we are being
asked to do what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of having
done in these casesto sit as a third legislative chamber to review
legislation.
Same; Same; The duty of the Court to exercise its power of judicial
review must still be performed in the context of a concrete case or
controversy; That the other departments of the government may have
committed a grave abuse of discretion is not an independent ground for
exercising the Courts power.It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke
this duty to justify this Courts intervention in what is essentially a case
that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be performed in
the context of a concrete case or controversy, as Art. VIII, 5(2) clearly
denes our jurisdiction in terms of cases, and nothing but cases. That
the other departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse
of discretion is not an independent ground for exercising our power.
Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy
requirement can in the long run only result in undermining our authority as a
court of law. For, as judges, what we are called upon to render is judgment
according to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion of the
day.
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pointed out, there is no proof worthy of the name of any facts to justify its
reexamination and, possibly, disregard.
Same; Same; Bicameral Conference Committee; Both chambers of
Congress entrust the function of reconciling the bills to their delegates at a
conference committee with full awareness, and tacit consent, that new
provisions may be included even if not within the disagreeing
provisions.The fact is that conference committees only take up bills
which have already been freely and fully discussed in both chambers of the
legislature, but as to which there is need of reconciliation in view of
disagreeing provisions between them; and both chambers entrust the
function of reconciling the bills to their delegates at a conference committee
with full awareness, and tacit consent, that conformably with established
practice unquestioningly observed over many years, new provisions may be
included even if not within the disagreeing provisions but of which,
together with other changes, they will be given detailed and sufciently
explicit information prior to voting on the conference committee version.
Same; Same; Same; It is an unacceptable theorization that when the
BCC report and its proposed bill were submitted to the Senate and the
House, and the members thereof did not bother to read, or what is worse,
having read did not understand, what was before them.In any case, all the
changes and revisions, and deletions, made by the conference committee
were all subsequently considered by and approved by both the Senate and
the House, meeting and voting separately. It is an unacceptable theorization,
to repeat, that when the BCC report and its proposed bill were submitted to
the Senate and the House, and the members thereof did not bother to read,
or what is worse, having read did not understand, what was before them, or
did not realize that there were new provisions in the reconciled version
unrelated to any disagreeing provisions, or that said new provisions or
revisions were effectively concealed from them. Moreover, it certainly was
entirely within the power and prerogative of either legislative chamber to
reject the BCC bill and require the organization of a new bicameral
conference committee. That this option was not exercised by either house
only proves that the BCC measure was found to be acceptable as in fact it
was approved and adopted by both chambers.
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amendments that would have been incorporated in House Bill No. 11197. Its
participation was in originating its own Senate Bill No. 1630, which was
not embodied in but merged with House Bill No. 11197. Senate Bill No.
1630 was not even an amendment by substitution, assuming this was
permissible. To substitute means to take the place of; to put or use in
place of another. Senate Bill No. 1630 did not, upon its approval, replace
(and thus eliminate) House Bill No. 11197. Both bills retained their separate
identities until they were joined or united into what became the enrolled bill
and ultimately R.A. No. 7716.
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 1994 649
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Constitutional Law; Expanded VAT Law; R.A. 7716 did not originate
exclusively in the House.Since R.A. No. 7716 is a revenue measure, it
must originate exclusively in the Housenot in the Senate. As correctly
asserted by petitioner Tolentino, on the face of the enrolled copy of R.A.
No. 7716, it is a CONSOLIDATION OF HOUSE BILL NO. 11197 AND
SENATE BILL NO. 1630. In short, it is an illicit marriage of a bill which
originated in the House and a bill which originated in the Senate. Therefore,
R.A. No. 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House.
Same; Same; Origin of Revenue Bills; The Senate cannot amend by
substitution with an entirely new bill of its own any bill covered by Section
24 of Article VI which the House transmitted to it because such substitution
would indirectly violate Section 24.Since the origination is not exclusively
vested in the House of Representatives of the United States, the Senates
authority to propose or concur with amendments is necessarily broader. That
broader authority is further conrmed by the phrase as on other Bills, i.e.,
its power to propose or concur with amendments thereon is the same as in
ordinary bills. The absence of this phrase in our Constitution was clearly
intended to restrict or limit the Philippine Senates power to propose or
concur with amendments. In the light of the exclusivity of origination and
the absence of the phrase as on other Bills, the Philippine Senate cannot
amend by substitution with an entirely new bill of its own any bill covered
by Section 24 of Article VI which the House of Representatives transmitted
to it because such substitution would indirectly violate Section 24.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Certication of Bills; The only
revenue bill which could be properly certied on permissible constitutional
grounds is the bill that was introduced in the House.I submit, however,
that the Presidential certication is void ab initio not necessarily for the
reason adduced by petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc., but because it was addressed
to the Senate for a bill which is prohibited from originating therein. The
only bill which could be properly certied on permissible
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process of legislation, and HB No. 11197 was not likewise passed by the
Senate on second and third readings, neither the Senate nor the House could
validly approve the bicameral conference committee report and the
proposed bill.
Same; Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; Invocation of the enrolled
bill doctrine is misplaced.The majority opinion, however, invokes the
enrolled bill doctrine and wants this Court to desist from looking behind the
copy of the assailed measure as certied by the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House. I respectfully submit that the invocation is misplaced.
First, as to the issue of origination, the certication in this case explicitly
states that R.A. No. 7716 is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and
Senate Bill No. 1630. This is conclusive evidence that the measure did not
originate exclusively in the House. Second, the enrolled bill doctrine is of
American origin, and unquestioned fealty to it may no longer be justied in
view of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Section 1, Article VIII
of our Constitution. Third, even under the regime of the 1935 Constitution
which did not contain the above provision, this Court, through Mr. Chief
Justice Makalintal, in Astorga vs. Villegas, declared that it cannot be truly
said that Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito has laid to rest the question of whether the
enrolled bill doctrine or the journal entry rule should be adhered to in this
jurisdiction. Fourth, even in the United States, the enrolled bill doctrine has
been substantially undercut. This is shown in the disquisitions of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno in his dissenting opinion, citing Sutherland, Statutory
Construction.
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circumstances in those cases were exactly the same as the ones at bench,
then the subject revenue or tariff bill may be upheld in this jurisdiction on
the principle of substantial compliance, as they were in the United States,
except possibly in instances where the House bill undergoes what is now
referred to as amendment by substitutionn, for that would be in derogation
of our Constitution which vests solely in the House of Representatives the
power to initiate revenue bills. A Senate amendment by substitution simply
means that the bill in question did not in effect originate from the lower
chamber but from the upper chamber and now disguises itself as a mere
amendment of the House version.
Same; Judicial Review; Courts will not decline the exercise of
jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political
agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals.The rule is
xed that the duty in a proper case to declare a law unconstitutional cannot
be declined and must be performed in accordance with the deliberate
judgment of the tribunal before which the validity of the enactment is
directly drawn into question. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the
authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the
courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shirk from it
without violating their oaths of ofce. This duty of the courts to maintain
the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and
unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshal said, whenever a statute is in
violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby
give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the
destruction of the Constitutionn. Since the question as to the
constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline
the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken
by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals.
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their stance is categorically repudiated by the rules of both the Senate and
the House of Representatives which dene with precision the parameters of
power of a Bicameral Conference Committee.
Same; Same; Same; The thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee
can wield ex post veto power wages war against our settled ideals of
representative democracy.But the thesis that a Bicameral Conference
Committee can wield ex post veto power does not only contravene the rules
of both the Senate and the House. It wages war againt our settled ideals of
representative democracy. For the inevitable, catastrophic effect of the thesis
is to install a Bicameral Conference Committee as the Third Chamber of our
Congress, similarly vested with the power to make laws but with the
dissimilarity that its laws are not the subject of a free and full discussion of
both Houses of Congress. With such a vagrant power, a Bicameral
Conference Com-mittee acting as a Third Chamber will be a constitutional
monstrosity.
Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; The enrolled bill theory is a historical
relic that should not continuously rule us from the fossilized past.
Respondents seek sanctuary in the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to bar
any judicial inquiry on whether Congress observed our constitutional
procedure in the passage of R.A. No. 7716. The enrolled bill theory is a
historical relic that should not continuously rule us from the fossilized past.
It should be immediately emphasized that the enrolled bill theory originated
in England where there is no written constitution and where Parliament is
supreme. In this jurisdiction, we have a written constitution and the
legislature is a body of limited powers. Likewise, it must be pointed out that
starting from the decade of the 40s, even American courts have veered
away from the regidity and unrealism of the conclusiveness of an enrolled
bill.
Same; Same; The previous rulings of the Supreme Court on the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill are no longer good law.I am not
unaware that this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled
bill as enunciated in the 1947 lead case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, and
reiterated in subsequent cases. With due respect, I submit that these rulings
are no longer good law. Sufce to state that section 313 of the Old Code of
Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 is no longer in our statute
books. It has long been repealed by the Rules of Court. Mabanag also relied
on jurisprudence and authorities in the United States which are under severe
criticisms by modern scholars. Hence, even in the United States the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill has been junked by most of the States.
657
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MENDOZA, J.:
I. Procedural Issues:
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A. Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of Rights
(Art. III)?
1. 1
2. 4
3. 5
4. 10
These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As
will presently be explained not all of these questions are judicially
cognizable, because not all provisions of the Constitution are self
executing and, therefore, judicially enforceable. The other
departments of the government are equally charged with the
enforcement of the Constitution, especially the provisions relating to
them.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
659
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Art. VI, 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.
Id., 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
nal form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of
a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
It appears that on various 1 dates between July 22, 1992 and August
31, 1993, several bills were introduced in the House of
Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. These
bills were referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which
recommended for approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197,
entitled
The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting
November 6, 1993 and, on November 17, 1993, it was approved by
the House of Representatives after third and nal reading.
________________
1 H. Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297, 10012 and 10100.
(Respondents Consolidated Memorandum, Annexes 3-12).
660
It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by
that body to its Committee on Ways and Means.
On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report
recommending approval of S. No. 1630, entitled
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661
its implementation was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow time
for the registration of business entities. It would have been enforced
on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped because the Court,
by the vote of 11 to 4 of its members, granted a temporary
restraining order on June 30, 1994.
First. Petitioners contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did
not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the
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________________
2 U.S. CONST., Art. 1, 7, cl. 1: All bills for raising revenue shall originate in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments, as on other bills.
662
3
for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power and thereby
equalize its powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that
the powers being compared are different. We are dealing here with
the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in
any particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, 4
consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The
exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of
legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive
power. There is, therefore, no justication for comparing the
legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the
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________________
663
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664
Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power
of the Senate to propose S. No. 1630. We now pass to the next
argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings
8
on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second
and third readings were done on the same9 day, March 24, 1994. But
this was
10
because on February 24, 1994 and again on March 22,
1994, the President had certied S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certication dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase
except when the President certies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc. in Art. VI, 26(2) qualies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed
three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its nal
form and distributed three days before it is nally approved.
In other words, the unless clause must be read in relation to the
except clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the
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_______________
8 Although the 1935 Constitution did not expressly require that bills must pass
three readings in each House, this was clearly implied from its Art. VI, 21(2) so that
the two Houses by their rules prescribed three readings for the passage of bills. Later
the requirement was expressly provided in the 1973 Constitution from which Art. VI,
26(2) was taken. Art. VIII, 19(2) of the 1973 document provided: No bill shall
become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its nal form have been distributed to the Members three days before its
passage, except when the Prime Minister certies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
9 Respondents Consolidated Reply, Annex 14.
10 Memorandum of Petitioner Arturo M. Tolentino, Supplement C.
665
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________________
11 Art. VII, 10 provides: The Congress shall, at ten oclock in the morning of
the third day after the vacancy in the ofces of the President and Vice-President
occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven
days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President
to be held not earlier than forty-ve days nor later than sixty days from the time of
such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certied under
paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its
approval on third reading by the Congress. Appro-priations for the special election
shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the
requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The
convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed.
No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months
before the date of the next presidential election.
12 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SIXTH CONGRESS,
FOURTH SESSION 398-399 (1968).
666
667
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new provisions. But this is a difcult provision to enforce. Note the problem
when one house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking
out everything following the enacting clause and substituting provisions
which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether
different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill .
15
...
________________
668
________________
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669
Rule XII:
26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of
Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the
differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which
shall meet within ten days after their composition.
The President shall designate the members of the conference committee
in accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 3 of Rule III.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and
sufciently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject
measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report
has been led with the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof have been
distributed to the Members.
(Emphasis added)
Rule XIV:
85. Conference Committee Reports.In the event that the House does
not agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or
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________________
actually by conference committee. Any remedy found will probably take the form of
reducing the need for using conference committees at all; and the principal suggestion to that
end is that bills and resolutions be referred, not, as now, to separate committees of the two
houses, but to joint committees, which not only would hold single sets of hearings, but might
deliberate and report back bills to the two houses in such agreed form that further signicant
differences would not be likely to develop. Arrangements of this nature yield excellent results
in the legislature of Massachusetts. But there are obstacles to adoption of the plan for Congress,
not the least of them being a natural aversion of House members to joint committees in which
senators seem likely to dominate; and, as indicated below, the outlook for the reform is
problematical. F.A. OGG AND P.O. RAY, supra note 7 at 310-311.
670
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671
This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the
two chambers were likewise disregarded in the preparation of the
Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a
detailed and sufciently explicit statement of changes in, or
amendments to, the subject measure. The Report used brackets and
capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in
bill-drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols
the Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and the House.
Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of
these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled,
parliamentary rules are merely procedural 19
and with their
observance the courts have no concern. Our concern is with the
procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of
laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satised
that they have been faithfully observed in these cases.
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committees Report
in these cases must have undergone three readings in each of the two
houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation
since each house may seek modications of the compromise bill.
The nature of the bill, therefore, requires that it be acted upon by
each house on a take it or leave it basis, with the only alternative
that if it is not approved by both houses, another conference
committee must be appointed. But then again the result would still
be a compromise measure that may not be wholly satisfying to both
houses.
Art. VI, 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to
bills introduced for the rst time in either house of Congress, not to
the conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring
three readings is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it
cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House after
three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on rst reading
and then referred to a committee of that body; that although the
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Senate committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a
version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by taking into
consideration the House bill; that for its part the Conference
Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a
_________________
672
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20 E.g., Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947); Casco (Phil.) Inc. v. Gimenez, 7
SCRA 347 (1963); Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969).
21 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, supra note 20.
22 Morales v. Subido, supra note 20.
23 Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).
673
Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those of PAL
because it was exempted under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from
the payment of all other taxes . . . now or in the near future, in
consideration of the payment by it either of the corporate income tax
or a franchise tax of 2%.
As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, 103 of
the NIRC now provides:
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....
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those
granted under Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .
674
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24 See, e.g., Alalayan v. National Power Corp., 24 SCRA 172 (1968); Cordero v.
Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962); Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288 (1941).
675
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25 40 Phil. 224 (1919).
676
Republic Act No. 7716 amended 103 by deleting (f) with the
result that print media became subject to the VAT with respect to all
aspects of their operations. Later, however, based on a memorandum
of the Secretary of Justice, respondent Secretary of Finance issued
Revenue Regulations No. 11-94, dated June 27, 1994, exempting the
circulation income of print media pursuant to 4 Article III of the
1987 Philippine Constitution guaranteeing against abridgment of
freedom of the press, among others. The exemption of circulation
income has left income from advertisements still subject to the
VAT.
It is unnecessary to pass upon the contention that the exemption
granted is beyond the authority of the Secretary of Finance to
________________
26 Art. VI, 28(4) provides: No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed
without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
677
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give, in view of PPIs contention that even with the exemption of the
circulation revenue of print media there is still an unconstitutional
abridgment of press freedom because of the imposition of the VAT
on the gross receipts of newspapers from advertisements and on
their acquisition of paper, ink and services for publication. Even on
the assumption that no exemption has effectively been granted to
print media transactions, we nd no violation of press freedom in
these cases.
To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face
operates in the area of press freedom. The PPIs claim is simply that,
as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom. Even with
due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic
society, however, the press is not immune from general regulation by
the State. It has been held:
_______________
27 Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132, 81 L.Ed. 953, 961 (1937).
678
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scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The
law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment
if the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press.
But that is not the case.
The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those
cited by the PPI in support of its claim that Republic Act No. 7716
subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases cited, the
discriminatory purpose was clear either from the background of the
law or from28
its operation. For example, in Grosjean v. American
Press Co., the law imposed a license tax equivalent to 2% of the
gross receipts derived from advertisements only on newspapers
which had a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week.
Because the tax was not based on the volume of advertisement alone
but was measured by the extent of its circulation as well, the law
applied only to the thirteen large newspapers in Louisiana, leaving
untaxed four papers with circulation of only slightly less than 20,000
copies a week and 120 weekly newspapers which were in serious
competition with the thirteen newspapers in question. It was well
known that the thirteen newspapers had been critical of Senator
Huey Long, and the Long-dominated legislature of Louisiana
responded by taxing what Long described as the lying newspapers
by imposing on them a tax on lying. The effect of the tax was to
curtail both their revenue and their circulation. As the U.S. Supreme
Court noted, the tax was a deliberate and calculated device in the
guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which 29
the
public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. The
case is a classic illustration of the warning that the power to tax is
the power to destroy.30
In the other case invoked by the PPI, the press was also found
to have been singled out because everything was exempt from the
use tax on ink and paper, except the press. Minnesota imposed a
tax on the sales of goods in that state. To protect the sales tax, it
enacted a complementary tax on the privilege of using, storing or
consuming in that state tangible personal
_______________
679
________________
680
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without merit since it has not been shown that as a result the class
subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this
limitation does not apply to the press alone but to all sales. Nor is
impermissible motive shown by the fact that print media and
broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed on its
transactions involving printing and publication, which are different
from the transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable
basis for the classication.
The cases canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew any suggestion
that owners of newspapers are immune from any forms of ordinary
taxation. The license tax in the Grosjean case was declared invalid
because it was one single in kind, with a 34long history of hostile
misuse against the freedom of the press. On the other hand,
Minneapolis Star acknowledged that The First Amendment does
not prohibit all regulation of the press [and that] the States and the
Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally applicable35
economic regulations without creating constitutional problems.
What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the
PBS that the removal of the exemption of printing, publication or
importation of books and religious articles, as well as their printing
and publication, likewise violates freedom of thought and of
conscience. For as the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously 36
held in
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, the Free
Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally
applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a
religious organization.
This brings
37
us to the question whether the registration provision
of the law, although of general applicability, nonetheless is
_________________
by the Secretary of Finance which shall not be less than Four hundred eighty
thousand pesos (P480,000.00) or more than Seven hundred twenty thousand pesos
(P720,000.00) subject to tax under Section 112 of this Code.
34 297 U.S. at 250, 80 L.Ed. at 668.
35 460 U.S. at 581, 75 L.Ed.2d at 302.
36 493 U.S. 378, 107 L.Ed.2d 796 (1990).
37 107 of the NIRC provides: Any person subject to a value added tax under
Sections 100 and 102 of this Code shall register with the appropriate Revenue District
Ofcer and pay an annual registration
681
________________
fee in the amount of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for every separate or distinct
establishment or place of business and every year thereafter on or before the last day
of January. Any person just commencing a business subject to the value-added tax
must pay the fee before engaging therein . . .
38 101 Phil. 386 (1957).
39 319 U.S. 105, 113, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943).
40 319 U.S. at 114, 87 L.Ed. 1292 at 1298. For the same reason, in People v.
Korins, 385 N.Y.S. 2d 474 (1976) a decision of the city court of Utica, Oneida County
held that to apply an ordinance requiring a business license to be obtained before a
person could sell newspapers in the streets would be to impose a prior restraint on
press freedom because a newspaper is not in the same category as pineapple or a
soap powder or a pair of shoes whose sale may be conditioned on the possession of a
business license.
682
________________
683
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_________________
42 Art. VI, 28(1). Related to this argument is the claim that Republic Act No.
7716 likewise infringes the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Bill of
Rights, Art. III, 1(1).
684
regressive in the sense that it will hit the poor and middle-income
group in society harder than it will the rich, as the Cooperative
Union of the Philippines (CUP) claims in G.R. No. 115873, is
largely an academic exercise. On the other hand, the CUPs
contention that Congress withdrawal of exemption of producers
cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service cooperatives,
while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only
goes against the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as
instruments of social justice (Art. XII, 15) but also denies such
cooperatives the equal protection of the law is actually a policy
argument. The legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of all
44
or none in choosing the subject of taxation.
Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association (CREBA), petitioner in G.R. 115754, that the VAT will
reduce the mark up of its members by as much as 85% to 90% any
more concrete. It is a mere allegation. On the other hand, the claim
of the Philippine Press Institute, petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, that
the VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation because
their prots from advertisements will not be enough to pay for their
tax liability, while purporting to be based on the nancial statements
of the newspapers in question, still falls short of the establishment of
facts by evidence so necessary for adjudicating the question whether
the tax is oppressive and conscatory.
Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to
enforce. What Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to
_______________
685
_________________
686
________________
687
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
This 52
conception of the judicial power has been afrmed in several
cases of this Court following Angara.
_______________
688
____________________________________
689
SEPARATE OPINION
NARVASA, C.J.:
I fully concur with the conclusions set forth in the scholarly opinion
of my learned colleague, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza. I write
this separate opinion to express my own views relative to the
procedural issues raised by the various petitions and dealt with by
some other Members of the Court in their separate opinions.
By their very nature, it would seem, discussions of constitutional
issues prove fertile ground for a not uncommon phenomenon: debate
marked by passionate partisanship amounting sometimes to
impatience with adverse views, an eagerness on the part of the
proponents on each side to assume the role of, or be perceived as,
staunch defenders of constitutional principles, manifesting itself in
ights of rhetoric, even hyperbole. The peril in this, obviously, is a
diminution of objectivitythat quality which, on the part of those
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690
In the matter now before the Court, and whatever reservations some
people may entertain about their intellectual limitations or moral
scruples, I cannot bring myself to accept the thesis which necessarily
implies that the members of our august Congress, in enacting the
expanded VAT law, exposed their ignorance, or indifference to the
observance, of the rules of procedure set down by the Constitution
or by their respective chambers, or what is worse, deliberately
ignored those rules for some yet undiscovered purpose nefarious in
nature, or at least some purpose other than the public weal; or that a
few of their fellows, acting as a bicameral conference committee, by
devious schemes and cunning maneuvers, and in conspiracy with
ofcials of the Executive Department and others, succeeded in
pulling the wool over the eyes of all their other colleagues and
foisting on them a bill containing provisions that neither chamber of
our bicameral legislature conceived or contemplated. This is the
thesis that the petitioners would have this Court approve. It is a
thesis I consider bereft of any factual or logical foundation.
Other than the bare declarations of some of the petitioners, or
arguments from the use and import of the language employed in the
relevant documents and records, there is no evidence before the
Court adequate to support a nding that the legislators concerned,
whether of the upper or lower chamber, acted otherwise than in good
faith, in the honest discharge of their functions, in the sincere belief
that the established procedures were being regularly observed or, at
least, that there occurred no serious or fatal deviation therefrom.
There is no evidence on which reasonably to rest a conclusion that
any executive or other ofcial took part in or unduly inuenced the
proceedings before the bicameral conference committee, or that the
members of the latter were motivated by a desire to surreptitiously
introduce improper revisions in the bills which they were required to
reconcile, or that after agreement had been reached on the mode and
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691
692
reading transmits its bill to the Senate, there is origination by (or in)
the House within the contemplation of the Constitution.
So it is entirely possible, as intimated, that in expectation of the
receipt of a revenue or tax bill from the House of Representatives,
the Senate commences deliberations on its own concept of such a
legislative measure. This, possibly to save time, so that when the
House bill reaches it, its thoughts and views on the matter are
already formed and even reduced to writing in the form of a draft
statute. This should not be thought illegal, as interdicted by the
Constitution. What the Constitution prohibits is for the Senate to
begin the legislative process rst, by sending its own revenue bill to
the House of Representatives for its consideration and action. This is
the initiation that is prohibited to the Senate.
But petitioners claim that this last was what in fact happened, that
the bill that went through the legislative mill and was nally
approved as R.A. No. 7716, was the Senate version, SB 1630. This
is disputed by the respondents. They claim it was House Bill 11197
that, after being transmitted to the Senate, was referred after rst
reading to its Committee on Ways and Means; was reported out by
said Committee; underwent second and third readings, was sent to
the bicameral conference committee and then, after appropriate
proceedings therein culminating in extensive amendments thereof,
was nally approved by both Houses and became the Expanded VAT
Law.
On whose side does the truth lie? If it is not possible to make that
determination from the pleadings and records before this Court, shall
it require evidence to be presented? No, on both law and principle.
The Court will reject a case where the legal issues raised, whatever
they may be, depend for their resolution on still unsettled questions
of fact. Petitioners may not, by raising what are concededly novel
and weighty constitutional questions, compel the Court to assume
the role of a trier of facts. It is on the contrary their obligation,
before raising those questions to this Court, to see to it that all issues
of fact are settled in accordance with the procedures laid down by
law for proof of facts. Failing this, petitioners would have only
themselves to blame for a peremptory dismissal.
Now, what is really proven about what happened to HB 11197
after it was transmitted to the Senate? It seems to be admitted on
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693
all sides that after going through rst reading, HB 11197 was
referred to the Committee on Ways and Means chaired by Senator
Ernesto Herrera.
It is however surmised that after this initial step, HB 11197 was
never afterwards deliberated on in the Senate, that it was there given
nothing more than a passing glance, and that it never went through
a proper second and third reading. There is no competent proof to
substantiate this claim. What is certain is that on February 7, 1994,
the Senate Committee on Ways and Means submitted its Report (No.
349) stating that HB 11197 was considered, and recommending that
SB 1630 be approved in substitution
1
of S.B. No. 1129, taking into
consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197. This Report
made known to the Senate, and clearly indicates, that H.B. No.
11197 was indeed deliberated on by the Committee; in truth, as
Senator Herrera pointed out, the BCC later agreed to adopt (a
broader coverage of the VAT) which is closely adhering to the
Senate version ** ** with some new provisions or amendments.
The plain implication is that the Senate Committee had indeed
discussed HB 11197 in comparison with the inconsistent parts of SB
1129 and afterwards proposed amendments to the former in the form
of a new bill (No. 1630) more closely akin to the Senate bill (No.
1129).
And it is as reasonable to suppose as not that later, during the
second and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senators,
assembled as a body, had before them copies of HB 11197 and SB
1129, as well as of the Committees new SB 1630 that had been
recommended for their approval, or at the very least were otherwise
perfectly aware that they were considering the particular provisions
of these bills. That there was such a deliberation in the Senate on HB
11197 in light of inconsistent portions of SB 1630, may further be
necessarily inferred from the request, made by the Senate on the
same day, March 24, 1994, for the convocation of a bicameral
conference committee to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of
said bill (SB 1630) and House Bill No. 11197, a
________________
1 Resolution Urging the Senate Committee on Ways and Means to Study the
Proposal to Exempt Local Movie Producers from the Payment of the Value-Added
Tax as an Incentive to the Production of Quality and Wholesome Filipino Movies
Whenever they Feature an All-Filipino Cast of Actors and Actresses.
694
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request that could not have been made had not the Senators more or
less closely examined the provisions of HB 11197 and compared
them with those of the counterpart Senate measures.
Were the proceedings before the bicameral conference committee
fatally awed? The afrmative is suggested because the committee
allegedly overlooked or ignored the fact that SB 1630 could not
validly originate in the Senate, and that HB 11197 and SB 1630
never properly passed both chambers. The untenability of these
contentions has already been demonstrated. Now, demonstration of
the indefensibility of other arguments purporting to establish the
impropriety of the BCC proceedings will be attempted.
There is the argument, for instance, that the conference
committee never used HB 11197 even as frame of reference
because it does not appear that the suggestion therefor (made by
House Panel Chairman Exequiel Javier at the bicameral conference
committees meeting on April 19, 1994, with the concurrence of
Senator Maceda) was ever resolved, the minutes being regrettably
vague as to what occurred after that suggestion was made. It is,
however, as reasonable to assume that it was, as it was not, given the
vagueness of the minutes already alluded to. In fact, a reading of the
BCC Report persuasively demonstrates that HB 11197 was not only
utilized as a frame of reference but actually discussed and
deliberated on.
2
Said BCC Report pertinently states:
________________
2 Italics supplied.
695
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696
other words, that the latter chamber should have refused the Senate
request for a bicameral conference committee to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of both bills, and should have required that
SB 1630 be rst transmitted to it. This, seemingly, is nit-picking
given the urgency of the proposed legislation as certied by the
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697
_________________
698
699
700
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be
limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the
conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom
severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the
conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected
results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules
impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic
of the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and
Process: In A Nutshell, 1987 Ed., p. 81).
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To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when
they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the
letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government
was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers
and functions of the Legislature. Applying these principles, we shall decline
to look into the petitioners
701
charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its nal form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and
the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution. We are bound
by such ofcial assurances from a coordinate department of the government,
to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
properties, SB 1630 does not. The change also merely claries the
provision by providing that the contemplated taxpayers includes
importers. The revision as regards the amendment to Section 100,
NIRC, is also simple reconciliation, being nothing more than the
adoption by the BCC of the provision in HB 11197 governing the
sale of gold to Bangko Sentral, in contrast to SB 1630 containing no
such provision. Similarly, only simple reconciliation was involved as
regards approval by the BCC of a provision declaring as not exempt,
the sale of real properties primarily held for sale to customers or
held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business, which
provision is found in HB 11197 but not in SB 1630; as regards the
adoption by the BCC of a provision on life insurance business,
contained in SB 1630 but not found in HB 11197; as regards
adoption by the BCC of the provision in SB 1630 for deferment of
tax on certain goods and services for no longer than 3 years, as to
which there was no counterpart provision in SB 11197; and as
regards the xing of a
702
703
from them.
Moreover, it certainly was entirely within the power and
prerogative of either legislative chamber to reject the BCC bill and
require the organization of a new bicameral conference committee.
That this option was not exercised by either house only proves that
the BCC measure was found to be acceptable as in fact it was
approved and adopted by both chambers.
I vote to DISMISS the petitions for lack of merit.
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ, J.:
matters relating to the passage of the bill (or bills) that eventually
became R.A. No. 7716.
In effect, the petitioners would have us disregard the time-
honored inhibitions laid down by the Court upon itself in the
landmark case of U.S. v. Pons (34 Phil. 725), where it refused to
consider extraneous evidence to disprove the recitals in the journals
of the Philippine Legislature that it had adjourned sine die at
midnight of February 28, 1914. Although it was generally known
then that the special session had actually exceeded the deadline xed
by the Governor-General in his proclamation, the Court chose to be
guided solely by the legislative journals, holding signicantly as
follows:
704
* * * From their very nature and object, the records of the legislature are as
important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legis-lature, when they are, as we have said, clear
and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Govern-ment, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But
counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assemblys
clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the
determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words,
the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect
an adjournment apparently within the xed time by the Governors
proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as
here suggested, the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of
altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making
the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to
loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of
memory.
* * * The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on
February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in
declining to go beyond the journals.
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705
706
adventures in the byways of the law. The answer we seek, as I see it,
is not far aeld. It seems to me that it can be found through a study
of the enrolled bill alone and that we do not have to go beyond that
measure to ascertain if R.A. No. 7716 has been validly enacted.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in case of conict between the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals, it is the former that should
prevail except only as to matters that the Constitution requires to be
entered in the journals. (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1). These
are the yeas and nays on the nal reading of a bill or on any question
at the request of at least one-fth of the members of the House
(Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 16 [4]), the objections of the President to
a vetoed bill or item (Ibid, Sec. 27 [1]), and the names of the
members voting for or against the overriding of his veto (Id. Section
27 [1]). The origin of a bill is not specically required by the
Constitution to be entered in the journals. Hence, on this particular
matter, it is the recitals in the enrolled bill and not in the journals
that must control.
Article VI, Section 24, of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill
No. 1630 was nally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate
on April 27, 1994, and May 2, 1994.
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707
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until they were joined or united into what became the enrolled bill
and ultimately R.A. No. 7716.
708
The certication in the enrolled bill says it all. It is clear that R.A.
No. 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives.
To go back to my earlier observations, this conclusion does not
require the reversal of U.S. vs. Pons and an inquiry by this Court
into the proceedings of the legislature beyond the recitals of its
journals. All we need to do is consider the certication in the
enrolled bill and, without entering the precincts of Congress, declare
that by its own admission it has, indeed, not complied with the
Constitution.
While this Court respects the prerogatives of the other
departments, it will not hesitate to rise to its higher duty to require
from them, if they go astray, full and strict compliance with the
fundamental law. Our delity to it must be total. There is no loftier
principle in our democracy than the supremacy of the Constitution,
to which all must submit.
I vote to invalidate R.A. No. 7716 for violation of Article VI,
Sec. 24, of the Constitution.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
_________________
709
________________
2 Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, 13 April 1989, 172 SCRA 160.
3 Kapatiran, supra at 385.
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710
II
The procedure followed in the approval of Rep. Act No. 7716
Petitioners however posit that the present case raises a far-reaching
constitutional question which the Court is duty-bound4 to decide
under its expanded jurisdiction in the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners
more specically question and impugn the manner by which the
expanded VAT law (Rep. Act No. 7716) was approved by Congress.
They contend that it was approved in violation of the Constitution
from which fact it follows, as a consequence, that the law is null and
void. Main reliance of the petitioners in their assault is Section 24,
Art. VI of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bill of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
________________
711
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712
SEC. 26. x x x
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its nal
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of
a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
in that, when Senate Bill No. 1630 (the Senate counterpart of House
Bill No. 11197) was approved by the Senate, after it had been
reported out by the Senate Committee on Ways and Means, the bill
went through second and third readings on the same day (not
separate days) and printed copies thereof in its nal form were not
distributed to the members of the Senate at least three (3) days
before its passage by the Senate. But we are told by the respondents
that the reason for this short cut was that the President had
certied to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment to meet
an emergencya certication that, by leave of the same
constitutional provision, dispensed with the second and third
readings on separate days and the printed form at least three (3) days
before its passage.
We have here then a situation where the President did certify to
the necessity of Senate Bill No. 1630s immediate enactment to meet
an emergency and the Senate responded accordingly. While I would
be the last to say that this Court cannot review the exercise of such
power by the President in appropriate cases ripe for judicial review, I
am not prepared however to say that the President gravely abused
his discretion in the exercise of such power as to require that this
Court overturn his action. We have
713
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A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be
limited to resolving the precise differences
_______________
714
between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited
in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new
subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference
committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These
excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference
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This Act (Rep. Act No. 7716) is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197
and Senate Bill No. 1630 (w)as nally passed by the House of
Representatives and the Senate on April 27, 1994 and May 2, 1994
respectively.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire
beyond the certication of the approval of a bill from the presiding ofcers
of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez6
_______________
6 7 SCRA 347.
715
laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary
(except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and
7
nays on the nal reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also
binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of
8
U.S. vs. Pons, where we explained the reason thus:
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To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit
of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence,
to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
III
Press Freedom and Religious Freedom and Rep. Act No. 7716
_______________
716
regulation cannot amend the law (Rep. Act No. 7716). Only
legislation (as distinguished from administration regulation) can
amend an existing law.
Freedom of the press was virtually unknown in the Philippines
before 1900. In fact, a prime cause of the revolution against Spain at
the turn of the 19th century was the repression of the freedom of
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speech and expression and of the press. No less than our national
hero, Dr. Jose P. Rizal, in Filipinas Despues de Cien Anos (The
Philippines a Century Hence) describing the reforms sine quibus non
which the Filipinos were insisting upon, stated: The minister x x x
who wants his reforms to be reforms, 10
must begin by declaring the
press in the Philippines free x x x.
Press freedom in the Philippines has met repressions, most
notable of which was the closure of almost all forms of existing
mass media upon the imposition of martial law on 21 September
1972.
Section 4, Art. III of the Constitution maybe traced to the United
States Federal Constitution. The guarantee of freedom of expression
was planted in the Philippines by President McKinley in the Magna
Carta of Philippine Liberty, Instructions to the Second Philippine
Commission on 7 April 1900.
The present constitutional provision which reads:
________________
717
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danger 13of a substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent.
In the present case, the tax imposed on circulation and
advertising income of newspaper publishers is in the nature of a
prior restraint on circulation and free expression and, absent a clear
showing that the requisite for prior restraint is present, the
constitutional aw in the law is at once apparent and should not be
allowed to proliferate.
Similarly, the imposition of the VAT on the sale and distribution
of religious articles must be struck down for being contrary to Sec.
5, Art. III of the Constitution which provides:
IV
Petitions of CREBA and PAL and Rep. Act No. 7716
_______________
718
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719
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(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those
granted under Presidential Decrees No. 66 , 529, 972, 1491, 1590, x x x
(emphasis supplied)
720
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
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721
in its nal form, has received the ultimate approval of both houses of
Congress. The nest rhetoric, indeed fashionable in the early part of
this closing century, would still be a poor substitute for tangibility. I
join, nonetheless, some of my colleagues in respectfully inviting the
kind attention of the honorable members of our Congress in the
suggested circumspect observance of their own rules.
A nal remark. I should like to make it clear that this opinion
does not necessarily foreclose the right, peculiar to any taxpayer
adversely affected, to pursue at the proper time, in appropriate
proceedings, and in proper fora, the specic remedies prescribed
therefor by the National Internal Revenue Code, Republic Act 1125,
and other laws, as well as rules of procedure, such as may be
pertinent. Some petitions led with this Court are, in essence,
although styled differently, in the nature of declaratory relief over
which this Court is bereft of original jurisdiction.
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DISSENTING OPINION
REGALADO, J.:
722
1
passed House Bill No. 11197 on third reading on November 17,
1993 and, the following day, it transmitted the same to the Senate for
concurrence. On its part, the Senate approved Senate Bill No. 1630
on second and third readings on March 24, 1994. It is important to
note in this regard that on March 22, 1994, said S.B. No. 1630 had
been certied by President Fidel V. Ramos for immediate enactment
to meet a public emergency, that is, a growing budgetary decit.
There was no such certication for H.B. No. 11197 although it was
the initiating revenue bill.
It is, therefore, not only a curious fact but, more importantly, an
invalid procedure since that Presidential certication was
erroneously made for and conned to S.B. No. 1630 which was
indisputably a tax bill and, under the Constitution, could not validly
originate in the Senate. Whatever is claimed in favor of S.B. No.
1630 under the blessings of that certication, such as its alleged
exemption from the three separate readings requirement, is
accordingly negated and rendered inutile by the inefcacious nature
of said certication as it could lawfully have been issued only for a
revenue measure originating exclusively from the lower House. To
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_______________
1 In substitution of H.B. Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297,
10012 and 10100 which were led over the period from July 22, 1992 to August 3,
1993.
2 P.S. Res. No. 734 had earlier been led in the Senate on September 10, 1992,
while S.B. No. 1129 was led on March 1, 1993.
723
_______________
724
the oral argument held in these cases, the attention of the Solicitor
General was called to the fact that the amendment in Flint consisted
only of a single item, that is, the substitution of a corporate tax for an
inheritance tax proposed in a general revenue bill; and that the text
of the decision therein nowhere contained the supposed doctrines he
quoted and ascribed to the court, as those were merely summations
of arguments of counsel therein. It is indeed a source of
disappointment for us, but an admission of desperation on his part,
that, instead of making a clarication or a defense of his contention,
5
the Solicitor General merely reproduced all over again the same
quotations as they appeared in his original consolidated comment,
without venturing any explanation or justication.
The aforestated dissemblance, thus unmasked, has further
undesirable implications on the contentions advanced by
respondents in their defense. For, even indulging respondents ex
gratia argumenti in their pretension that S.B. No. 1630 substituted
or replaced H.B. No. 11197, aside from muddling the issue of the
true origination of the disputed law, this would further enmesh
respondents in a hopeless contradiction.
In a publication authorized by the Senate and from which the
Solicitor General has liberally quoted, it is reported as an accepted
rule therein that (a)n amendment by substitution when approved6
takes the place of the principal bill. C.R. March 19, 1963, p. 943.
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________________
725
_______________
7 Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. (1951), 381, citing Fairview vs. Durham, 45
Iowa 56.
726
________________
727
15
Daza vs. Singson, et al., on the other, to know which would be
applicable to the present controversy and which should be rejected.
But, rst, a positional exordium. The writer of this opinion would
be among the rst to acknowledge and enjoin not only courtesy to,
but respect for, the ofcial acts of the Executive and Legislative
departments, but only so long as the same are in accordance with or
are defensible under the fundamental charter and the statutory law.
He would readily be numbered in the ranks of those who would
preach a reasoned sermon on the separation of powers, but with the
qualication that the same are not contained in tripartite
compartments separated by imper-meable membranes. He also
ascribes to the general validity of American constitutional doctrines
as a matter of historical and legal necessity, but not to the extent of
being oblivious to political changes or unmindful of the fallacy of
undue generalization arising from myopic disregard of the factual
setting of each particular case.
These ruminations have likewise been articulated and dissected
by my colleagues, hence it is felt that the only issue which must be
set aright in this dissenting opinion is the so-called enrolled bill
doctrine to which we are urged to cling with reptilian tenacity. It will
be preliminarily noted that the ofcial certication appearing right
on the face of Republic Act No. 7716 would even render
unnecessary any further judicial inquiry into the proceedings which
transpired in the two legislative chambers and, on a parody of
tricameralism, in the bicameral conference committee. Moreover, we
have the excellent dissertations of some of my colleagues on these
matters, but respondents insist en contra that the congressional
proceedings cannot properly be inquired into by this Court. Such
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728
729
(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the
legislative ofcers and led with the secretary of state, is the bill as it
passed, yet this presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown from
the legislative journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and signed
by the legislative ofcers, contains provisions that have not passed both
houses, such provisions will be held spurious and not a part of the law. As
was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber
Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:
This Court is rmly committed to the holding that when the journals speak they
control, and against such proof the enrolled bill is not conclusive.
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_______________
17 Brailsford vs. Walker, 31 S.E. 2d 385, 387, 388, 205 S.C. 228.
18 110 So. 343, 346.
19 602 South Western Reporter, 2d Series, 402-425, jointly deciding Carrollton
Wholesale Tobaccos, Inc. et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al., and Bluegrass
Provisions Co., Inc., et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al.
730
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The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however, and it has not
been without its critics. From an examination of cases and treaties, we can
summarize the criticisms as follows: (1) Articial presumptions, especially
conclusive ones, are not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the
present case) produces results which do not accord with facts or
constitutional provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery,
corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and electronic
record-keeping devices now used by legislatures
731
remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5) The rule disregards the
primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to provide a remedy
for a wrong committed by any branch of government. In light of these
considerations, we are convinced that the time has come to re-examine the
enrolled bill doctrine.
[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of
stare decisis. The maxim is Stare decisis et non quieta movere, which
simply suggests that we stand by precedents and not disturb settled points of
law. Yet, this rule is not inexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require
perpetuation of error or logic. As we stated in Daniels Admr v. Hoofnel,
287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941) (citations omitted):
The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be decided and the
extent of the disturbance of rights and practices which a change in the interpretation
of the law or the course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations are
whether there is clear error and urgent reasons for neither justice nor wisdom
requires a court to go from one doubtful rule to another, and whether or not the evils
of the principle that has been followed will be more injurious than can possibly
result from a change.
complexities should not deter this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or
presumption that so provides.
Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches
of government requires that we shut our eyes to constitutional failings and
other errors of our coparceners in government. We simply do not agree.
Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that any
732
Undeniably, the value-added tax system may have its own merits to
commend its continued adoption, and the proposed widening of its
base could achieve laudable governmental objectives if properly
formulated and conscientiously implemented. We would like to
believe, however, that ours is not only an enlightened democracy
nurtured by a policy of transparency but one where the edicts of the
fundamental law are sacrosanct for all, barring none. While the
realization of the lofty ends of this administration should indeed be
the devout wish of all, likewise barring none, it can never be
justied by methods which, even if unintended, are suggestive of
Machiavellism.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the instant petitions and to invalidate
Republic Act No. 7716 for having been enacted in violation of
Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution.
DISSENTING OPINION
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733
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its nal form
have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
SEC. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
1
Websters Third New International Dictionary denes originate as
follows:
________________
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1 1971 ed., 1592.
734
Apart from all others; only; solely; substantially all or for the greater part.
To the exclusion of all others; without admission of others to participation;
in a manner to exclude.
3
In City Mayor vs. The Chief of Philippine Constabulary, this Court
said:
The term exclusive in its usual and generally accepted sense, means
possessed to the exclusion of others; appertaining to the subject alone, not
including, admitting or pertaining to another or others, undivided, sole. (15
Words and Phrases, p. 510, citing Mitchel v. Tulsa Water, Light, Heat and
Power Co., 95 P. 961, 21 Okl. 243; and p. 513, citing Commonwealth v.
Superintendent of House of Correction, 64 Pa. Super. 613, 615).
Indisputably then, only the House can cause the beginning or initiate
the passage of any appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, any bill
increasing the public debt, any bill of local application, or any
private bill. The Senate can only propose or concur with
amendments.
Under the Rules of the Senate, the rst reading is the reading of
the title of the bill and its referral to the corresponding committee;
the second reading consists of the reading of the bill in the form
recommended by the corresponding committee; and the third
reading is the reading
4
of the bill in the form it will be after approval
on second reading. During the second reading, the following takes
place:
_______________
2 Sixth Edition (1990), 565, citing Standard Oil Co. of Texas vs. State, Tex. Civ.
App., 142 S.W.2d 519, 521, 522, 523.
3 21 SCRA 665, 673 [1967].
4 Sections 52 and 53, Rule XXIII.
735
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(3) If a debate ensues, turns for and against the bill shall be
taken alternately;
(4) The sponsor of the bill closes the debate;
(5) After the close of the debate, the period of amendments
follows;
(6) Then, after the period of amendments
5
is closed, the voting
on the bill on second reading.
At the third reading, the votes shall11 be taken immediately and the
yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
_______________
736
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Clearly, whether in the Senate or in the House, every bill must pass
the three readings on separate days, except when the bill is certied.
Amendments 12
to the bill on third reading are constitutionally
prohibited.
After its passage by one chamber, the bill should then be
transmitted to the other chamber for its concurrence. Section 83,
Rule XIV of the Rules of the House expressly provides:
(a) Upon its approval by the House, the bill shall be transmitted
to the Senate;
(b) The Senate may approve it with or without amendments;
(c) The Senate returns the bill to the House;
(d) The House may accept the Senate amendments; if it does
not, the Secretary General shall notify the Senate of that
action. As hereinafter be shown, a request for conference
shall then be in order.
The transmitted bill shall then pass three readings in the other
chamber on separate days. Section 84, Rule XIV of the
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737
and Section 51, Rule XXIII of the Rules of the Senate provides:
SEC. 51. Prior to their nal approval, bills and joint resolutions shall be
read at least three times.
SEC. 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of
Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the
differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which
shall meet within ten days after its composition.
and Section 85, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House which reads:
SEC. 85. Conference Committee Reports.In the event that the House
does not agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint
resolution, the differences may be settled by conference committees of both
Chambers.
_________________
13 Volume I, Eight Edition, Chapter VI, 267. See Miller vs. Mardo, 2 SCRA 898
[1961]; Everlasting Pictures, Inc. vs. Fuentes, 3 SCRA 539 [1961].
738
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and Means in substitution of House Bills Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033,
8086,9030, 9210, 9397, 10012,14
and 10100, and covered by its
Committee Report No. 367, 15 was approved on third reading16 by the
House on 17 November 1993. Interestingly, HB No. 9210, which
was led by Representative Exequiel B. Javier on 19 May 1993, was
certied by the President
17
in his letter to Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr.
of 1 June 1993. Yet, HB No. 11197, which substituted HB No.
9210 and the others abovestated, was not. Its certication seemed to
have been entirely forgotten.
On 18 November 1993, the Secretary-General of the House,
pursuant to Section 83, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House,
transmitted to the President of the Senate HB18 No. 11197 and
requested the concurrence of the Senate therewith.
However, HB No. 11197 had passed only its rst reading in the
Senate by its referral to its Committee on Ways and Means. That
Committee never deliberated on HB No. 11197 19
as it should have. It
acted only on Senate Bill (SB) No. 1129 introduced by Senator
Ernesto F. Herrera on 1 March 1993. It then prepared and 20
proposed
SB No. 1630, and in its Committee Report21No. 349 which was
submitted to the Senate on 7 February 1994, it recommended that
SB No. 1630 be approved in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, 22
taking
into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197. It must
be carefully noted that SB No. 1630 was proposed and submitted for
approval by the Senate in SUBSTITUTION of SB No. 1129, and not
HB No. 11197. Obviously, the principal measure which the
Committee deliberated
________________
740
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on and acted upon was SB No. 1129 and not HB No. 11197. The
latter, instead of being the only measure to be taken up, deliberated
upon, and reported back to the Senate for its consideration on second
reading and, eventually, on third reading, was, at the most, merely
given by the Committee a passing glance.
This specic unequivocal action of the Senate Committee on
Ways and Means, i.e., proposing and recommending approval of SB
No. 1630 as a substitute for or in substitution of SB No. 1129
demolishes at once the thesis of the Solicitor General that:
because, according to him, (a) Section 68, Rule XXIX of the Rules
of the Senate authorizes an amendment by substitution and the only
condition required is that the text thereof is submitted in writing;
and (b) [I]n Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co. (220 U.S. 107) the United
States Supreme Court, interpreting the provision in the United States
Constitution similar to Section 24, Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution, stated that the power of the Senate to amend a revenue
bill includes substitution of an entirely new measure23for the one
originally proposed by the House of Representatives.
This thesis is utterly without merit. In the rst place, it reads into
the Committee Report something which it had not contemplated,
that is, to propose SB No. 1630 in substitution of HB No. 11197; or
speculates that the Committee may have committed an error in
stating that it is SB No. 1129, and not HB No. 11197, which is to be
substituted by SB No. 1630. Either, of course, is unwarranted
because the words of the Report, solemnly signed by the Chairman,
Vice-Chairman
24
(who dissented), seven members, and three ex-ofcio
members, leave no room for doubt that although SB No. 1129, P.S.
Res No. 734, and HB No. 11197 were referred to and considered by
the Committee, it had prepared the attached SB No. 1630 which it
recommends for approval in
________________
741
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substitution of S.B. No. 11197, taking into consideration P.S. No. 734
and H.B. No. 11197 with Senators Herrera, Angara, Romulo, Sotto,
Ople and Shahani as authors. To do as suggested would be to
substitute the judgment of the Committee with another that is
completely inconsistent with it, or, simply, to capriciously ignore the
facts.
In the second place, the Ofce of the Solicitor General
intentionally made it appear, to mislead
25
rather than to persuade us,
that in Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co. the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, as
quoted by26
it in the Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, as
follows:
The Senate has the power to amend a revenue bill. This power to amend is
not conned to the elimination of provisions contained in the original act,
but embraces as well the addition of such provisions thereto as may render
the original act satisfactory to the body which is called upon to support it. It
has, in fact, been held that the substitution of an entirely new measure for
the one originally proposed can be supported as a valid amendment.
x x x x x x x x x
It is contended in the rst place that this section of the act is
unconstitutional, because it is a revenue measure, and originated in the
Senate in violation of section 7 of article 1 of the Constitution, providing
that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with the
amendments, as on other bills.
The rst part is not a statement of the Court, but a summary of the
arguments of counsel in one of the companion cases (No. 425,
entitled, Gay vs. Baltic Mining Co.). The second part is the
second paragraph of the opinion of the Court delivered by Mr.
Justice Day. The misrepresentation that the rst part is a statement of
the Court is highly contemptuous. To show such deliberate
misrepresentation, it is well to quote what actually are found in 55
L.Ed. 408, 410, to wit:
Messrs. Charles A. Snow and Joseph H. Knight led a brief for appellees
in No. 425:
_______________
742
xxx
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The Senate has the power to amend a revenue bill. This power to amend
is not conned to the elimination of provisions contained in the original act,
but embraces as well the addition of such provisions thereto as may render
the original act satisfactory to the body which is called upon to support it. It
has, in fact, been held that the substitution of an entirely new measure for
the one originally proposed can be supported as a valid amendment.
Brake v. Collison, 122 Fed. 722.
Mr. James L. Quackenbush led a statement for appellees in No. 442.
Solicitor General Lehmann (by special leave) argued the cause for the
United States on reargument.
Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:
743
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Note that in the former the word exclusively does not appear. And, in
the latter, the phrase as on other Bills, which is found in the
former, does not appear. These are very signicant in determining
the authority of the upper chamber over the bills enumerated in
Section 24. Since the origination is not exclusively vested in the
House of Representatives of the United States, the Senates authority
to propose or concur with amendments is necessarily broader. That
broader authority is further conrmed by the phrase as on other
Bills, i.e., its power to propose or concur with amendments thereon
is the same as in ordinary bills. The absence of this phrase in our
Constitution was clearly intended to restrict or limit the Philippine
Senates power to
744
itself to be misled
27
by Flint vs. Stone nor be awed by28Rainey vs.
United States and the opinion of Messrs. Ogg and Ray which the
majority cites to support the view that the power of the U.S. Senate
to amend a revenue measure is unlimited. Rainey concerns the Tariff
Act of 1909 of the United States of America and specically
involved was its Section 37 which was an amendment introduced by
the U.S. Senate. It was claimed by the petitioners that the said
section is a revenue measure which should originate in the House of
Representatives. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, adopted and
approved the nding of the court a quo that:
the section in question is not void as a bill for raising revenue originating
in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives. It appears that the
section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising
revenue which originated in the House. That is sufcient.
Any bill may make its rst appearance in either house, except only that
bills for raising revenue are required by the constitution to originate in the
House of Representatives. Indeed, through its right to amend revenue bills,
even to the extent of substituting new ones, the
________________
745
29
Senate may, in effect, originate them also.
_______________
29 At 317.
746
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747
_______________
748
83, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House, it is only when the Senate
shall have approved with amendments HB No. 11197 and the House
declines to accept the amendments after having been notied thereof
that the request for a conference may be made by the House, not by
the Senate. Conversely, the Senates request for a conference would
only be proper if, following the transmittal of SB No. 1630 to the
House, it was approved by the latter with amendments but the
Senate rejected the amendments.
Indisputably then, when the request for a bicameral conference
was made by the Senate, SB No. 1630 was not yet transmitted to the
House for consideration on three readings and HB No. 11197 was
still in the Senate awaiting consideration on second and third
readings. Their referral to the bicameral conference committee was
palpably premature and, in so doing, both the Senate and the House
acted without authority or with grave abuse of discretion. Nothing,
and absolutely nothing, could have been validly acted upon by the
bicameral conference committee.
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749
Yes. Thats true for every revenue measure. Theres no other way.
The House Bill has got to be the base. Of course, for the record,
we know that this is an administration; this is certied by the
President and I was about to put into the recordsas I am saying
now that your problem about the impact on prices on the people
was already decided when the President and the administration
sent this to us and certied it. They have already gotten over that
political implication of this bill and the economic impact on
prices.
CHAIRMAN JAVIER.
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Yes. Thats true for every revenue measure. Theres no other way.
The House Bill has got to be the base. Of course, for the record,
we know that this is an administration; this is certied by the
President and I was about to put into the recordsas I am saying
now that your problem about the impact on prices on the people
was already decided when the President and the administration
sent this to us and certied it. They have already gotten over that
political implication of this bill and the economic impact on
prices.
First of all, what would be the basis, no, or framework para huwag
naman mawala yung personality namin dito sa bicameral, no,
because the bill originates from the House because this is a
revenue bill, so we would just want to ask, we make the House Bill
as the frame of reference, and then everything will just be
inserted?
HON. MACEDA.
CHAIRMAN HERRERA.
Yung concern mo about the bill as the reference in this discussion
is something that we can just . . .
CHAIRMAN JAVIER.
We will just . . . all the amendments will be coming from the
Senate.
(BICAMERAL CONFERENCE ON MAJOR DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN HB NO. 11197 AND SB NO. 1630 [Cte. on Ways &
Means] APRIL 19, 1994, II-6 and II-7; italics supplied)
_______________
34 Page 22.
750
in fact withdrew the former suggestion and agreed that SB No. 1630,
which is the Senate version of the Value Added Tax (VAT) measure,
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should be the frame of reference. But then SB No. 1630 was never
transmitted to the House for the latters concurrence. Hence, it
cannot serve as the frame of reference or as the basis for
deliberation. The posture taken by Representative Javier also
indicates that SB No. 1630 should be taken as the amendment to HB
No. 11197. This, too, is unfounded because SB No. 1630 was not
proposed in substitution of HB No. 11197.
Since SB No. 1630 did not pass three readings in the House and
HB No. 11197 did not pass second and third readings in the Senate,
it logically follows that no disagreeing provisions had as yet arisen.
The bicameral conference committee erroneously assumed the
contrary.
Even granting arguendo that both HB No. 11197 and SB No.
1630 had been validly approved by both chambers of Congress and
validly referred to the bicameral conference committee, the latter
had very limited authority thereon. It was
35
created in view of the
disagreeing provisions of the two bills. Its duty was limited to the
reconciliation of disagreeing provisions or the resolution of
differences or inconsistencies. The committee recognized 36
that
limited authority in the opening paragraph of its Report when it
said:
Under such limited authority, it could only either (a) restore, wholly
or partly, the specic provisions of HB No. 11197 amended by SB
No. 1630, (b) sustain, wholly or partly, the Senates amendments, or
(c) by way of a compromise, to agree that neither provisions in HB
No. 11197 amended by the Senate nor the latters amendments
thereto be carried into the nal form of the former.
But as pointed out by petitioners Senator Raul Roco and
Kilosbayan, Inc., the bicameral conference committee not only
_______________
751
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SB No. 1630 were still half-cooked in the legislative vat, and were
not ready for referral to a conference, the bicameral conference
committee clearly acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it consolidated both into one bill which became
R.A. No. 7716.
I cannot agree with the suggestion that since both the Senate and the
House had approved the bicameral conference committee report and
the bill proposed by it in substitution of HB No. 11197 and SB No.
1630, whatever inrmities may have been committed by it were
cured by ratication. This doctrine of ratication may apply to
minor procedural aws or tolerable breaches of the parameters of the
bicameral conference committees limited powers but never to
violations of the Constitution. Congress is not above the
Constitution. In the instant case, since SB No. 1630 was introduced
in violation of Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, was passed
in the Senate in violation of the three readings rule, and was not
transmitted to the House for the completion of the constitutional
process of legislation, and HB No. 11197 was not likewise passed by
the Senate on second and third readings, neither the Senate nor the
House could validly approve the bicameral conference committee
report and the proposed bill.
In view of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that for
non-compliance with mandatory provisions of the Constitution and
of the Rules of the Senate and of the House on the enactment of
laws, R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void. A discussion then of the intrinsic validity of some of its
provisions would be unnecessary.
The majority opinion, however, invokes the enrolled bill doctrine
and wants this Court to desist from looking behind the copy of the
assailed measure as certied by the Senate President and the
752
Third, even under the regime of the 1935 Constitution which did not
contain the above provision, this Court,
38
through Mr. Chief Justice
Makalintal, in Astorga vs. Villegas,39 declared that it cannot be truly
said that Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito has laid to rest the question of
whether the enrolled bill doctrine or the journal entry rule should be
adhered to in this jurisdiction, and stated:
_______________
37 ISAGANI A. CRUZ, Philippine Political Law, 1991 ed., 226; Daza vs. Singson, 180
SCRA 496 [1989]; Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191
SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon
Com- mittee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991]; Oposa vs. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 [1993].
38 56 SCRA 714, 719, 723 [1974].
39 78 Phil. 1 [1947].
753
State Constitution, said that the same makes it clear that the indispensable
step in the passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a
law, is not attested by the presiding ofcer, other proof that it has passed
both houses will satisfy the constitutional requirement.
Fourth, even in the United States, the enrolled bill doctrine has been
substantially undercut. This is shown in the disquisitions of Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno in his dissenting opinion, citing Sutherland,
Statutory Construction.
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DISSENTING OPINION
ROMERO, J.:
Few issues brought before this Court for resolution have roiled the
citizenry as much as the instant case brought by nine petitioners
which challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 (to
be referred to herein as the Expanded Value Added Tax or EVAT
law to distinguish it from Executive Order No. 273 which is the VAT
law proper) that was enacted on May 5, 1994. A visceral issue, it has
galvanized the populace into mass action and strident protest even as
the EVAT proponents have taken to podia and media in a post facto
information campaign.
________________
754
_______________
755
_______________
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 L-81311, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 371 with Justice Teodoro R. Padilla as
ponente.
756
5
Constitution. In dismissing the consolidated petitions, this Court
stated:
_______________
5 Ibid at 378.
6 Ibid at 385.
7 Senate Resolution No. 734 led on September 10, 1992 was entitled Resolution
Urging the House Committee on Ways and Means to Study the Proposal to Exempt
Local Movie Producers from the Payment of the Value-Added Tax as an Incentive to
the Production of Quality and Wholesome Filipino Movies, Whenever They Feature
an All-Filipino Cast of Actors and Actresses.
8 SB No. 1129 sought to include under the VAT Law such items as lease of real
properties, excluding agricultural lands and residential properties with monthly
rentals of less than P10,000.00; hotels; restaurants, eating places, caterers; services by
persons in the exercise of their professions; actors, actresses, talents, singers and
professional athletes; and lawyers, accountants, doctors and other professionals
registered with the Philippine Regulatory Commission.
757
9
HB No. 9210 May 19,
1993
HB No. 9297 May 25,
1993
HB No. 10012 July 28,
1993
HB No. 10100 August 3,
1993
HB No. 11197 in substitution of HB Nos. 253, 771, November
2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297, 10012 and 5, 1993
10
10100
We now trace the course taken by H.B. No. 11197 and S.B. No.
1129.
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HB/SB No.
HB No. 11197 was approved in the Lower House on November
second reading 11, 1993
HB No. 11197 was approved in the Lower House on November
third reading and voted upon with 114 Yeas and 12 17, 1993
Nays
November
18, 1993
HB No. 11197 was transmitted to the Senate Senate February
Committee on Ways and Means submitted Com. 7, 1994
Report No. 349 recommending for approval SB No.
1630 in substitution of SB No. 1129, taking into
11
consideration PS Res. No. 734 and HB No. 11197
_______________
758
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Republic Act No. 7716 merely expanded the base of the VAT law
even as the tax retained its multi-stage character.
At the oral hearing held on July 7, 1994, this Court delimited
petitioners arguments to the following issues culled from their
respective petitions.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Does Republic13
Act No. 7716 violate Article VI, Section 24, of the
Constitution?
________________
12 Republic Act No. 7716 is entitled An Act Restructuring The Value-Added Tax
(VAT) System, Widening Its Tax Base And Enhancing Its Administration, And For
These Purposes Amending And Repealing The Relevant Provisions Of The National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and for other purposes.
13 Article VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
759
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Does the law violate the following provisions in Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the Constitution:
15
1. Section 1
16
2. Section 4
17
3. Section 5
18
4. Section 10
_______________
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
14 Article VI, Section 26, paragraph 2: No bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its nal form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the president certies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
15 Article III, Section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
16 Article III, Section 4: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.
17 Article III, Section 5: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
18 Article III, Section 10: No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
760
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19 Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1: The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
20 Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 3: Charitable institutions, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-prot cemeteries, and all
lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
21 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.
761
22
by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
In the instant petitions, this Court is called upon, not so much to
exercise its traditional power of judicial review as to determine
whether or not there has indeed been a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Legislature amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Where there are grounds to resolve a case without touching on its
constitutionality, the Court will do so with utmost alacrity in due
deference to the doctrine of separation of powers anchored on the
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762
(a) The bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. The
Senate, after receiving H.B. No. 11197, submitted its own
bill, S.B. No. 1630, and proceeded to vote and approve the
same after second and third readings.
(b) The Senate exceeded its authority to propose or concur
with amendments when it submitted its own bill, S.B. No.
1630, recommending its approval in substitution of S.B.
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No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and
H.B. No. 11197.
(c) H.B. No. 11197 was not deliberated upon by the Senate.
Neither was it voted upon by the Senate on second and third
readings, as what was voted upon was S.B. No. 1630.
Article VI, Section 24 is taken word for word from Article VI,
Section 18 of the 1935 Constitution which was, in turn, patterned
after Article I, Section 7 (1) of the Constitution of the United States,
which states:
All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.
The constitutional requirement that all bills for raising revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives stemmed from a remedial
outgrowth of the historic conict between Parliament (i.e., Commons) and
the Crown, whose ability to dominate the monarchially appointive and
hereditary Lords was patent. See 1 Story, Constitution, S 875 et seq., 5th
Ed.; 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 267, 268, 8th Ed., 1
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, S 806, 3d Ed. There was a measure of
like justication for the insertion of the provision of articles I, S 7, cl. 1, of
the Federal Constitution. At that time (1787) and thereafter until the
adoption (in 1913) of the Seventeenth Amendment providing for the direct
election of senators, the members of the United States Senate were elected
for each state by the joint vote of both houses of the Legislature of the
respective states, and hence, were removed from the people. x x x
________________
763
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All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments. In case of disapproval by the Senate of any
such bills, the Assembly may repass the same by a two-thirds vote of all its
members, and thereupon, the bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted and may be
submitted to the President for corresponding action. In the event that the Senate
should fail to nally act on any such bills, the Assembly may, after thirty days from
the opening of the next regular sessions of the same legislative term, reapprove the
same with a vote of two-thirds of all the members of the Assembly. And upon such
reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to the president
for corresponding action.
764
25
38 and later of Resolution No. 73. (Italics supplied)
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________________
765
_______________
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766
has this denition: apart from all others; only; solely; substantially
all or for the greater part. To the exclusion of all others; without
admission of others to participation; in a manner to exclude.
Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. State, Tex. Civ. App., 142 S.W. 2d 519,
521, 522, 523.
This Court had occasion to dene the term exclusive as
follows:
. . . In its usual and generally accepted sense, the term means possessed to
the exclusion of others; appertaining to the subject alone; not including,
28
admitting or pertaining to another or others; undivided, sole.
When this writer, during the oral argument of July 7, 1994, asked the
petitioner in G.R. No. 115455 whether he considers the
________________
The youth sector embraces persons not more than twenty-ve years of age.
(Volume Two, CONCOM RECORD, p. 564).
28 City Mayor, et al. v. The Chief, Philippine Constabulary and Col. Nicanor
Garcia, L-20346, October 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 673.
767
word exclusively
29
to be synonymous with solely, he replied in
the afrmative.
A careful examination of the legislative history traced earlier in
this decision shows that the original VAT law, Executive Order No.
273, was sought to be amended by ten House bills which nally
culminated in House Bill No. 11197, as well as two Senate bills. It is
to be noted that the rst House Bill No. 253 was led on July 22,
1992, and two other House bills followed in quick succession on
August 10 and September 9, 1992 before a Senate Resolution,
namely, Senate Res. No. 734, was led on September 10, 1992 and
much later, a Senate Bill proper, viz., Senate Bill No. 1129 on March
1, 1993. Undoubtedly, therefore, these bills originated or had their
start in the House and before any Senate bill amending the VAT law
was led. In point of time and venue, the conclusion is ineluctable
that Republic Act No. 7716, which is indisputably a revenue
measure, originated in the House of Representatives in the form of
House Bill No. 253, the rst EVAT bill.
Additionally, the content and substance of the ten amendatory
House Bills led over the roughly one-year period from July 1992 to
August 1993 reenforce the position that these revenue bills,
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________________
When you say that according to the Constitution such Revenue Bills should originate
exclusively from the House. In this instance, did it not originally originate exclusively from the
House?
The word used was not solely; if there were Bills later also introduced, let us say in the
Senate, but the House Bill came ahead.
So, are you using the two (2) words originate exclusively and solely synonymously?
SENATOR TOLENTINO:
AThe verb originate remains the same, Your Honor, but the word exclusively, as I
said, means solely. x x x
768
House Bill Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297,
10012 and 10100 were intended to restructure the VAT system by
exempting or imposing the tax on certain items or30 otherwise
introducing reforms in the mechanics of implementation. Of these,
House Bill No. 9210 was favored with a Presidential certication on
the need for its immediate enactment to meet a public emergency.
Easily the most comprehensive, it noted that the revenue
performance of the VAT, being far from satisfactory since the
collections have always fallen short of projections, the system is
rendered inefcient, inequitable and less comprehensive. Hence,
the Bill proposed several amendments designed 31
to widen the tax
base of the VAT and enhance its administration.
That House Bill No. 11197 being a revenue bill, originated from
the Lower House was acknowledged, in fact was virtually taken for
granted, by the Chairmen of the Committee on Ways and Means of
both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Consequently, at
the April 19, 1994 meeting of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
the Members agreed to make the House Bill as the frame of
reference or base of the discussions of the Bicameral Conference
Committee with
32
the amendments or insertions to emanate from
the Senate.
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________________
30 H.B. 771exempting the sale of copra from VAT coverage; H.B. 2450
exempting the lessors or distributors of cinematographic lms from paying the VAT;
H.B. 7033amending Sec. 103 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended
by EO 273; H.B. 8086exempting packaging materials of export products from the
VAT; H.B. 9030amending Sec. 120 of the NIRC, as renumbered by EO 273; H.B.
9210amending Title IV and Sections 237 and 238 of the NIRC; H.B. 9297
restructuring the VAT system by expanding its tax base, and amending Sections 99,
100 (A), 102 (A), 103, 113, 114, 115 and 116 of the NIRC; H.B. 10012reducing the
rate of VAT imposed on sale and importation of goods, and sale of services; H.B.
10100amending certain provisions of the NIRC on VAT.
31 Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 9210.
32 Excerpts from the April 19, 1994 meeting of the Bicameral Conference
Committee: CHAIRMAN Javier. First of all, what would be the basis, no, or
framework para huwag naman mawala yung personality namin dito sa bicameral, no,
because the bill originates from the House because this is a revenue bill, so we would
just want to ask, we make the House Bill as the frame of reference, and then
769
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HON. MACEDA. Yes, Thats true for every revenue measure. Theres no
other way. The House Bill has got to be the base. Of course, for the record, we
know that this is an administration bill; this is certied by the president and I was
about to put into the records as I am saying now that your problem about the
impact on prices on the people was already decided when the President and the
administration sent this to us and certied it. They have already gotten over that
political implication of this bill and the economic impact on prices.
CHAIRMAN HERRERA. Yung concern mo about the bill as the reference in
this discussion is something that we can just. . . .
CHAIRMAN JAVIER. We will just . . . all the amendments will be coming
from the Senate.
770
remained, therefore, was no longer House Bill No. 11197 but Senate
Bill No. 1630. Thence, the Senate, instead of transmitting the bill to
the Lower House for its concurrence and amendments, if any, took a
shortcut, bypassed the Lower House and instead, approved Senate
Bill No. 1630 on both second and third readings on the same day,
March 24, 1994.
The rst irregularity, that is, the failure to return Senate Bill No.
1630 to the Lower House for its approval is fatal inasmuch as the
other chamber of legislature was not afforded the opportunity to
deliberate and make known its views. It is no idle dictum that no less
than the Constitution ordains: The legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines33which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives ... (Italics supplied)
It is to be pointed out too, that inasmuch as Senate Bill No. 1630
which had taken into consideration House Bill No. 11197 was not
returned to the Lower House for deliberation, the latter Chamber had
no opportunity at all to express its views thereon or to introduce any
amendment. The customary practice is, after the Senate has
considered the Lower House Bill, it returns the same to the House of
origin with its amendments. In the event that there may be any
differences between the two, the same shall then be referred to a
Conference Committee composed of members from both Chambers
which shall then proceed to reconcile said differences.
In the instant case, the Senate transmitted to the Lower House on
March 24, 1994, a letter informing the latter that it had passed S.
No. 1630 entitled . . . (and) in view of the disagreeing provisions of
said bill and House Bill No. 11197, entitled . . . the Senate requests a
conference . . . This, in spite of the fact that Com. Report No. 349
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771
________________
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I thought, as a matter of fact, that was the one way of correcting this procedural
error, but I was only one (1), or two (2), or three (3) of us only, then we were defeated
in the voting, if Your Honor please.
Justice Romero: Q: You mean you were outvoted?
Senator Tolentino: A: Yes, Your Honor; we were actually slaughtered in the
voting, so to speak, if Your Honor please.
35 The certication states: This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No.
11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 was nally passed by the House of Representatives
and the Senate on April 7, 1994 and May 2, 1994, respectively.
772
disclose that the law was passed in accordance with what was
certied to by their respective presiding ofcers and the President.
Or that certain constitutional requirements regarding its passage
were not observed, as in the instant case.
_______________
773
Each house shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect
national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request
of one-fth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings. (Italics
supplied)
The rationale behind the above provision and of the journal entry
rule is as follows:
_______________
774
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775
Passing over the question of whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published
by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was
passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative
journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such
43
journals are clear and explicit.
It is to be noted from the above that the Court passed over the
probative value to be accorded to the enrolled bill. Opting for the
journals, the Court proceeded to explain:
________________
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776
From their very nature and object, the records of the Legislature are as
important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said clear
and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to
44
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
_______________
44 Ibid at 733-734.
45 Ibid at 735.
46 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
47 Ibid at 3.
777
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48 Ibid at 18.
49 117 Phil. 363 (1963).
778
50
Sherlock Holmes. The alleged omission of a phrase in the nal
Act was made, not at any stage of the legislative proceedings, but
only in the course of the engrossment of the bill, more specically in
the proofreading thereof.
But the Court did include a caveat that qualied the absoluteness
of the enrolled bill rule stating:
More recently,
52
in the 1993 case of Philippine Judges Association v.
Prado, this Court, in ruling on the unconstitutionality of Section 35
of Republic Act No. 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from
the entire hierarchy of courts, did not so much adhere to the enrolled
bill rule alone as to both enrolled bill and legislative journals.
Through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, we stated: Both the enrolled
bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted, i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such ofcial assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the
very least, a becoming courtesy.
Aware of the shifting sands on which the validity and continuing
relevance of the enrolled bill theory rests, I have taken pains to
trace the history of its applicability in this jurisdiction, as inuenced
in varying degrees by different Federal rulings.
As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or
not the procedural irregularities that attended the passage of House
Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the
_______________
779
Congress violated Section 26, par. 2, Article VI (of the 1987 Constitution)
when it approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report which
embodied, in violation of Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate, a radically
altered tax measure containing provisions not reported out or discussed in
either House as well as provisions on which
_______________
780
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there was no disagreement between the House and the Senate and, worse,
provisions contrary to what the House and the Senate had approved after
54
three separate readings.
and
________________
781
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SEC. 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of
Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the
differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which
shall meet within ten days after their composition.
The President shall designate the members of the conference committee
in accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 8 of Rule III.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and
sufciently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the
subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report
has been led with the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof have been
distributed to the Members.
SEC. 85. Conference Committee Reports.In the event that the House
does not agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint
resolution, the differences may be settled by conference committee of both
Chambers.
The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in
order, except when the journal is being read, while the roll is being called or
the House is dividing on any question. Each of the pages of such reports
shall contain a detailed, sufciently explicit statement of the changes in or
amendments to the subject measure.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies
thereof are distributed to the Members: Provided, That in the last fteen
days of each session period it shall be deemed sufcient that three copies of
the report, signed as above provided, are deposited in the ofce of the
Secretary General.
782
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58 Page 261.
59 Page 268.
60 Davies, supra, at 65.
61 Sec. 764, p. 541.
62 Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, p. 71.
783
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Their power lies chiey in the fact that reports of conference committees
must be accepted without amendment or else rejected in toto. The impulse is
to get done with the matters and so the motion to accept has undue
advantage, for some members are sure to prefer swallowing unpalatable
provisions rather than prolong controversy. This is the more likely if the
report comes in the rush of business toward the end of a session, when to
seek further conference might result in the loss of the measure altogether. At
any time in the session there is some risk of such a result following the
rejection of a conference report, for it may not be possible to secure a
second conference, or delay may give opposition to the main proposal
chance to develop more strength.
x x x x x x x x x
Entangled in a network of rule and custom, the Representative who
resents and would resist this theft of his rights, nds himself helpless.
Rarely can he vote, rarely can he voice his mind, in the matter of any
fraction of the bill. Usually he cannot even record himself as protesting
against some one feature while accepting the measure as whole. Worst of
all, he cannot by argument or suggested change, try to improve what the
other branch has done.
This means more than the subversion of individual rights. It means to a
degree the abandonment of whatever advantage the bicameral system may
have. By so much it in effect transfers the lawmaking power to a small
group of members who work out in private a decision that almost always
prevails. What is worse, these men are not chosen in a way to ensure the
wisest choice. It has become the practice to name as conferees the ranking
members of the committee, so that the accident of seniority determines.
Exceptions are made, but in general it is not a question of who are most
competent to serve. Chance governs, sometimes giving way to favor, rarely
to merit.
x x x x x x x x x
Speaking broadly, the system of legislating by conference committee is
unscientic and therefore defective. Usually it forfeits the benet of scrutiny
and judgment by all the wisdom available. Uncontrolled, it is inferior to that
process by which every amendment is secured independent discussion and
63
vote. x x x. (Italics supplied)
________________
784
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(1) Under the HB, this section includes any person who, in the
course of trade or business, sells, barters or exchanges
goods OR PROPERTIES and any person who LEASES
PERSONAL PROPERTIES.
(2) The SB completely changed the said section and dened a
number of words and phrases. Also, Section 99-A was
added which included one who sells, exchanges, barters
PROPERTIES and one who imports PROPERTIES.
(3) The BICAM version makes LESSORS of goods OR
PROPERTIES and importers of goods LIABLE to VAT
(subject of petition in G.R. No. 115754).
________________
785
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3. Section 102
786
5. Section 104
787
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in Section 104 (A) (1) (B), thus excluding from creditable input tax
packaging materials and the phrase ON WHICH A VALUE-
ADDED TAX HAS BEEN ACTUALLY PAID in Section 104 (A)
(2).
6. Section 107
Both House and Senate Bills provide for the payment of P500.00
VAT registration fee but this was increased by BICAM to P1,000.00.
7. Section 112
8. Section 115
9. Section 117
(a) The BICAM defers for only 2 years the VAT on services of
actors and actresses, although the SB defers it for 3 years.
(b) The BICAM uses the word EXCLUDE in the section on
deferment of VAT collection on certain goods and services.
The HB does not contain any counterpart provision and SB
only allows deferment for no longer than 3 years.
788
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________________
65 See: 18 Words and Phrases 482 citing Kennedy v. Truss, Del. Super., 13 A. 2nd
431, 435, 1 Terry 424 (1940).
66 United States Gypsum Co. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 110 N.W. 2d 698, 71,
363, Mich. 548 (1961).
789
was not the subject of a disagreement between the Senate and the
House, it should be deemed an extraneous matter or even a rider
which should never be considered legally passed for not having
undergone the three-day reading requirement. Insertion of new
matter on the part of the BICAM is, therefore, an ultra vires act
which makes the same void.
The determination of what is germane and what is not may
appear to be a difcult task but the Congress, having been
confronted with the problem before, resolved it in accordance with
the rules. In that case, the Congress approved a Conference
Committees insertion of new provisions that were not contemplated
in any of the provisions in question between the Houses simply
because of the provision in Jeffersons Manual that conferees may
report matters which are germane modications of subjects 68
in
disagreement between the Houses and the committee. In other
words, the matter was germane to the points of disagreement
between the House and the Senate.
As regards inserted amendments in the BICAM, therefore, the
task of determining what is germane to a bill is simplied, thus: If
the amendments are not circumscribed by the subjects of
disagreement between the two Houses, then they are not germane to
the purpose of the bill.
In the instant case before us, the insertions and deletions made do
not merely spell an effort at settling conicting provisions but have
materially altered the bill, thus giving rise to the instant petitions on
the part of those who were caught unawares by the legislative
legerdemain that took place. Going by the denition of the word
amendment in Blacks Law Dictionary,
_________________
67 BLACKs DICTIONARY, 6th ed., p. 687 citing State ex. rel. Riley v. District
Court of Second Judicial Dist. in and for Silver Bow County, 103 Mont. 576, 64 P. 2d
115, 119 (1937).
68 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 3, 1952, p. 885 cited in Orquiola,
Annotated Rules of the Senate, 1991 ed., pp. 40-41.
790
5th Ed., 1979, which means to change or modify for the better; to
alter by modication, deletion, or addition, said insertions and
deletions constitute amendments. Consequently, these violated
Article VI, Section 26 (2) which provides inter alia: Upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed . . . This
proscription is intended to subject all bills and their amendments to
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791
________________
792
_______________
793
broadened the scope of judicial inquiry. This Court can now safely
fulll its mandate of delimiting the powers of co-equal departments
like the Congress, its ofcers or its committees which may have no
compunctions about exercising legislative powers in full.
Thirdly, dare we close our eyes to the presumptuous assumption
by a runaway committee of its progenitors legislative powers in
derogation of the rights of the people, in the process, subverting the
democratic principles we all are sworn to uphold, when a proper
case is made out for our intervention? The answers to the above
queries are self-evident.
I call to mind this exhortation: We are sworn to see that
violations of the constitutionby any person, corporation, state
agency or branch of governmentare brought to light and corrected.
To countenance an articial rule of law that silences our voices when
confronted 72with violations of our Constitution is not acceptable to
this Court.
I am not unaware that a rather recent decision of ours brushed
aside an argument that a provision in subject law regarding the
withdrawal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this
Court itself, not having been included in the original version
_______________
794
of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200 but only in the
Conference Committee Report, was violative of Article VI, Section
26 (2) of the Constitution. Likewise, that said Section 35, never
having been a subject of disagreement between both Houses, could
not have been validly added as an amendment before the Conference
Committee.
The majority opinion in said case explained:
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism
for compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it
is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function
is described thus:
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mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict
limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the
authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and
73
Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81). (Italics supplied)
At the risk of being repetitious, I wish to point out that the general
rule, as quoted above, is: Even where the conference committee is
not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely
limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted
into the conference bill. What follows, that is, occasionally a
conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond
its mandate . . . is the exception. Then it concludes with a
declaration that: This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee. Are we about to reinstall another institution
that smacks of authoritarianism which, after our past experience, has
become anathema to the Filipino people?
The ruling above can hardly be cited in support of the proposition
that a provision in a BICAM report which was not
________________
73 The Philippine Judges Association v. Hon. Pete Prado, G.R. No. 105371,
November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 703, 709.
795
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_________________
74 In Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, (109 Phil. 863 [1960]), the Court held that
parliamentary rules are merely procedural and they may be waived or disregarded by
the legislative body. Hence, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action taken by a deliberative body when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.
75 State v. Essling, 128 N.W. 2d 307, 316 (1964).
796
That these practices have remained unchallenged in the past does not
justify our closing our eyes and turning a deaf ear to them. Writ
large is the spectacle of a mechanism ensconced in the very heart of
the peoples legislative halls, that now stands indicted with the
charge of arrogating legislative powers unto itself through the use of
dubious shortcuts. Here, for the people to judge, is the mother of
all shortcuts.
In the petitions at bench, we are confronted with the enactment of
a tax law which was designed to broaden the tax base. It is rote
learning for any law student that as an attribute of sovereignty, the 76
power to tax is the strongest of all the powers of government.
Admittedly, for all its 77plenitude, the power to tax is not unconned.
There are restrictions. Were there none, then the oft-quoted 1803
dictum of Chief Justice
78
Marshall that the power to tax involves the
power to destroy would be a truism. Happily, we can concur with,
and the people can nd comfort in, the reassuring words of Mr.
Justice Holmes:79The power to tax is not the power to destroy while
this Court sits.
Manakanak, mayrong dumudulg dito sa Ktaastaasang
Hukuman na may kamangha-manghng hinang. Angkp na
halimbaw ay ang mga petisyng iniharp ngayn sa amin.
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________________
797
798
DISSENTING OPINION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
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799
Representatives.
Since the term exclusively has already been adequately dened
in the various opinions, as to which there seems to be no dispute, I
shall no longer offer my own denition.
Verily, the provision in our Constitution requiring that all revenue
bills shall originate exclusively from the Lower House is mandatory.
The word exclusively is an exclusive word, 1
which is indicative
of an intent that the provision is mandatory. Hence, all American
authorities expounding on the meaning and application of Sec. 7,
par. (1), Art. I, of the U.S. Constitution cannot be used in the
interpretation of Sec. 24, Art. VI, of our 1987 Constitution which
has a distinct feature of exclusiveness all its own. Thus, when our
Constitution absolutely requiresas it is mandatorythat a
particular bill should exclusively emanate from the Lower House,
there is no alternative to the requirement that the bill to become
valid law must originate exclusively from that House.
In the interpretation of constitutions, questions frequently arise as
to whether particular sections are mandatory or directory. The courts
usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision is directory
merely in view of the tendency of the legislature to disregard
provisions which are not said to be mandatory. Accordingly, it is the
general rule to regard constitutional provisions as mandatory, and
not to leave any discretion to the will of the legislature to obey or
disregard them. This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually
followed unless it is unmistakably manifest that the provisions are
intended to be merely directory. So strong is the inclination in favor
of giving obligatory force to the terms of the organic law that it has
even been said that neither by the courts nor by any other
department of the government may any provision of the Constitution
be regarded as merely directory, but that each and everyone of its
provisions should be treated as imperative and mandatory, without
reference to the rules and
2
distinguishing between the directory and
the mandatory statutes.
The framers of our 1987 Constitution could not have used the
term exclusively if they only meant to replicate and adopt in
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_______________
800
Thus in 1883 the upper house struck out everything after the enacting clause
of a tariff bill and wrote its own measure, which the House eventually felt
obliged to accept. It likewise added 847 amendments to the Payne-Aldrich
tariff act of 1909, dictated the schedules of the emergency tariff act of 1921,
rewrote an extensive tax revision bill in the same year, and recast most of
the permanent tariff
________________
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3 See Majority Opinion, p. 15, citing Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S., 309, 58 Law Ed.
617.
801
4
bill of 1922
which in fact suggests, very clearly, that the subject revenue bill
actually originated from the Lower House and was only amended,
perhaps considerably, by the Senate after it was passed by the
former and transmitted to the latter.
In the cases cited, where the statutes passed by the U.S. Congress
were upheld, the revenue bills did not actually originate from the
Senate but, in fact, from the Lower House. Thus, the Supreme Court
of the United States,
5
speaking through Chief Justice White in Rainey
v. United States upheld the revenue bill passed by Congress and
adopted the ruling of the lower court that
_______________
4 Id., citing F.A. Ogg and P.O. Ray, Introduction to American Government, 302, n.
2 (1945).
5 See Note 3.
6 22 U.S. 107.
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802
803
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_______________
804
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
805
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_______________
806
The Report was approved by the House on April 27, 1994. The
Senate approved it on May 2, 1994. On May 5, 1994, the President
signed the bill into law as R.A. No. 7716.
There is no question that the Bicameral Conference Committee
did more than reconcile differences between House Bill No. 11197
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and Senate Bill No. 1630. In several instances, it either added new
provisions or deleted provisions already approved in House Bill No.
11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630. These insertions/dele-tions
numbering twenty four (24) are specied in detail by petitioner
2
Tolentino as follows:
A. The H.B., S.B., and the BCC (R.A. 7716) all included sale of
PROPERTIES as subject to VAT.
The term GOODS or PROPERTIES includes the following:
________________
807
B. The HB and the BCC Bills has each a provision which includes
THE SALE OF GOLD TO BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
as falling under the term Export Sales, hence subject to 0% VAT.
The Senate Bill does not contain such provision (See Section 102-
A thereof).
This section was amended to include as subject to a 10% VAT the gross
receipts derived from THE SALE OR EXCHANGE OF SERVICES,
INCLUDING THE USE OR LEASE OF PROPERTIES.
The SB, HB, and BCC have the same provisions on this.
However, on what are included in the term SALE OR EXCHANGE OF
SERVICES, the BCC included/inserted the following (not found in either
the House or Senate Bills):
808
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The BCC deleted subsection (f) in its entirety, despite its retention in both
the House and Senate Bills, thus under RA 7716, the printing, publication,
importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine, review, or
bulletin which appears at regular intervals with xed prices for subscription
and sale and which is not devoted principally to the publication of
advertisements is subject to VAT.
Subsection (g) was amended by the BCC (both Senate and House Bills
did not) by changing the word TEN to FIVE, thus: Importation of
passenger and/or cargo vessel of more than ve thousand ton to ocean
going, including engine and spare parts of said vessel to be used by the
importer himself as operator thereof. In short, importation of vessels with
tonnage of more than 5 thousand is VAT exempt.
Subsection L, was amended by the BCC by adding the qualifying phrase:
EXCEPT THOSE RENDERED BY PROFESSIONALS.
Subsection U which exempts from VAT Transactions which are exempt
under special laws, was amended by BCC by adding the phrase: EXCEPT
THOSE GRANTED UNDER PD Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, and 1590, and
NON-ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES under RA 6938. This is the reason
why cooperatives are now subject to VAT.
While the SALE OF REAL PROPERTIES was included in the exempt
transactions under the House Bill, the BCC made a qualication by stating:
809
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V On Section 104
VI On Section 107
Both House and Senate Bills provide for the payment of P500.00 VAT
registration fee. The BCC provides for P1,000.00 VAT fee.
While both the Senate and House Bills provide that a person whose sales
or receipts and are exempt under Section 103[w] of the Code, and who are
not VAT registered shall pay a tax equivalent to THREE (3) PERCENT of
his gross quarterly sales or receipts, the BCC inserted the phrase: THREE
PERCENT UPON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT AND FOUR
PERCENT (4%) TWO YEARS THEREAFTER.
810
IX On Section 117
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This Section has not been touched by either Senate and House Bills. But
the BCC amended it by subjecting franchises on ELECTRIC, GAS and
WATER UTILITIES A TAX OF TWO PERCENT (2%) ON GROSS
RECEIPTS DERIVED x x x.
X On Section 121
XI Others
A) The House Bill does not contain any provision on the deferment of
VAT collection on Certain Goods and Services as does the Senate
Bill (Section 19, SB 1630). But although the Senate Bill authorizes
the deferment on certain goods and services for no longer than 3
years, there is no specic provision that authorizes the President to
EXCLUDE from VAT any of these. The BCC uses the word
EXCLUDE.
B) Moreover, the Senate Bill defers the VAT on services of actors and
actresses etc. for 3 years but the BCC defers it for only 2 years.
C) Section 18 of the BCC Bill (RA 7716) is an entirely new provision
not contained in the House/Senate Bills.
D) The period within which to promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations is within 60 days under SB 1630; No specic period
under the House Bill, within 90 days under RA 7716 (BCC).
E) The House Bill provides for a general repealing clause i.e., all
inconsistent laws etc. are repealed. Section 16 of the Senate Bill
expressly repeals Sections 113, 114, 116, 119 and 120 of the code.
The same Senate Bill however contains a general repealing clause
in Sec. 21
811
thereof.
RA 7716 (BCCs Bill) expressly repeals Sections 113, 114 and 116 of the
NIRC; Article 39 (c) (d) and (e) of EO 226 and provides the repeal of Sec.
119 and 120 of the NIRC upon the expiration of two (2) years unless
otherwise excluded by the President.
post veto power or a veto after the fact of approval of the bill by
both Houses; (2) the bill prepared by the Bicameral Conference
Committee, with its additions and deletions, was anyway approved
by both Houses; (3) it was the practice in past Congresses for
conference committees to insert in bills approved by the two Houses
new provisions that were not originally contemplated by them; and
(4) the enrolled bill doctrine precludes inquiry into the regularity of
the proceedings that led to the enactment of R.A. 7716.
With due respect, I reject these contentions which will cave in on
closer examination.
First. There is absolutely no legal warrant for the bold
submission that a Bicameral Conference Committee possesses the
power to add/delete provisions in bills already approved on third
reading by both Houses or an ex post veto power. To support this
postulate that can enfeeble Congress itself, respondents cite no
3
constitutional provision, no law, not even any rule or regulation.
Worse, their stance is categorically repudiated by the rules of both
the Senate and the House of Representatives which dene with
precision the parameters of power of a Bicameral Conference
Committee.
Thus, Section 209, Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate provides:
In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of
Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the
differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses
_______________
3 See p. 66 of the Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents where they refer to certain
statements from Canlan, Weightson and Beam but without citing their specic book or article.
812
In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the
amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by
a conference committee of both chambers.
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This rule of antiquity has been honed and honored in practice by the
Congress of the United States. Thus, it is chronicled by Floyd 6
Biddick, Parliamentarian Emeritus of the United States Senate, viz:
________________
813
Senate and the House. It wages war against our settled ideals of
representative democracy. For the inevitable, catastrophic effect of
the thesis is to install a Bicameral Conference Committee as the
Third Chamber of our Congress, similarly vested with the power to
make laws but with the dissimilarity that its laws are not the subject
of a free and full discussion of both Houses of Congress. With such
a vagrant power, a Bicameral Conference Committee acting as a
Third Chamber will be a constitutional monstrosity.
It needs no omniscience to perceive that our Constitution did not
provide for a Congress composed of three chambers. On the
contrary, section 1, Article VI of the Constitution provides in clear
and certain language: The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives . . . . Note that in vesting legislative
power exclusively to the Senate and the House, the Constitution
used the word shall. Its command for a Congress of two houses is
mandatory. It is not mandatory sometimes.
In vesting legislative power to the Senate, the Constitution means
the Senate . . . composed of twenty-four Senators x x x7 elected at
large by the qualied voters of the Philippines . . . . Similarly,
when the Constitution vested the legislative power to
________________
814
the House, it means the House . . . composed of not more than two
hundred and fty members x x x who shall be elected from
legislative districts x x x and those who x x x shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered
8
national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations. The Constitution thus, did not
vest on a Bicameral Conference Committee with an ad hoc
membership the power to legislate for it exclusively vested
legislative power to the Senate and the House as co-equal bodies. To
be sure, the Constitution does not mention the Bicameral Conference
Committees of Congress. No constitutional status is accorded to
them. They are not even statutory creations. They owe their
existence from the internal rules of the two Houses of Congress. Yet,
respondents peddle the disconcerting idea that they should be
recognized as a Third Chamber of Congress and with ex post veto
power at that.
The thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee can exercise
law making power with ex post veto power is freighted with
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mischief. Law making his a power that can be used for good or for
ill, hence, our Constitution carefully laid out a plan and a procedure
for its exercise. Firstly, it vouchsafed that the power to make laws
should be exercised by no other body except the Senate and the
House. It ought to be indubitable that what is contemplated is the
Senate acting as a full Senate and the House acting as a full House.
It is only when the Senate and the House act as whole bodies that
they truly represent the people. And it is only when they represent
the people that they can legitimately pass laws. Laws that are not
enacted by the peoples rightful representatives subvert the peoples
sovereignty. Bicameral Conference Committees, with their ad hoc
character and limited membership, cannot pass laws for they do not
represent the people. The Constitution does not allow the tyranny of
the majority. Yet, the respondents will impose the worst kind of
tyrannythe tyranny of the minority over the majority. Secondly,
the Constitution delineated in deft strokes the steps to be followed in
making laws. The overriding purpose of these procedural rules is to
assure that only bills that successfully survive the searching scrutiny
of the proper committees of Congress and the full and
________________
815
cannot be, for Article II, section 28 of the Constitution mandates the
State to adopt and implement a policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest. The Constitution could
not have contemplated a Congress of invisible and unaccountable
John and Mary Does. A law whose rationale is a riddle and whose
authorship is obscure cannot bind the people.
All these notwithstanding, respondents resort to the legal
cosmetology that these additions and deletions should govern the
people as laws because the Bicameral Conference Committee Report
was anyway submitted to and approved by the Senate and the House
of Representatives. The submission may have some merit with
respect to provisions agreed upon by the Committee in the process
of reconciling conicts between S.B. No. 1630 and H.B. No. 11197.
In these instances, the conicting provisions had been previously
screened by the proper committees, deliberated upon by both Houses
and approved by them. It is, however, a different matter with respect
to additions and deletions
________________
816
which were entirely new and which were made not to reconcile
inconsistencies between S.B. No. 1630 and H.B. No. 11197. The
members of the Bicameral Conference Committee did not have any
authority to add new provisions or delete provisions already
approved by both Houses as it was not necessary to discharge their
limited task of reconciling differences in bills. At that late stage of
law making, the Conference Committee cannot add/ delete
provisions which can become laws without undergoing the study and
deliberation of both chambers given to bills on 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
readings. Even the Senate and the House cannot enact a law which
will not undergo these mandatory three (3) readings required by the
Constitution. If the Senate and the House cannot enact such a law,
neither can the lesser Bicameral Conference Committee.
Moreover, the so-called choice given to the members of both
Houses to either approve or disapprove the said additions and
deletions is more of an optical illusion. These additions and
deletions are not submitted separately for approval. They are tucked
to the entire bill. The vote is on the bill as a package, i.e., together
with the insertions and deletions. And the vote is either aye or
nay, without any further debate and deliberation. Quite often,
legislators vote yes because they approve of the bill as a whole
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Their power lies chiey in the fact that reports of conference committees
must be accepted without amendment or else rejected in toto. The impulse is
to get done with the matter and so the motion to accept has undue
advantage, for some members are sure to prefer swallowing unpalatable
provisions rather than prolong controversy. This is the more likely if the
report comes in the rush of business toward the end of a session, when to
seek further conference might result in the loss of the measure altogether. At
any time in the session there is some risk of such a result following the
rejection of a conference report, for it may not be possible to secure a
second conference, or delay may give opposition to the main proposal
chance to develop more strength.
________________
817
x x x
a. Constitutional rules.
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2. The rules from the different sources take precedence in the order
listed above except that judicial decisions, since they are
interpretations of rules from one of the other sources, take the same
precedence as the source interpreted. Thus, for example, an
interpretation of a constitutional provision takes precedence over a
statute.
3. Whenever there is conict between rules from these sources the rule
from the source listed earlier prevails over the rule from the source
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11 Legislative Law and Process in a Nut Shell, West Publishing Co., 1986 ed., p. 81.
12 Ibid.
13 Manual of Legislative Procedure for Legislative and other Governmental Bodies,
McGraw Hill Co., Inc., 1953 ed., pp. 32-33.
818
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x x x.
Where the failure of constitutional compliance in the enactment of
statutes is not discoverable from the face of the act itself but may be
demonstrated by recourse to the legislative journals, debates, committee
reports or papers of the governor, courts have used several conicting
theories with which to dispose of the issue. They have held: (1) that the
enrolled bill is conclusive and like the sheriffs return cannot be attacked;
(2) that the enrolled bill is prima facie correct and only in case the
legislative journal shows afrmative contradiction of the constitutional
requirement will the bill be held invalid, (3) that although the enrolled bill is
prima facie correct, evidence from the journals, or other extrinsic sources is
admissible to strike the bill down; (4) that the legislative journal is
conclusive and the enrolled bill is valid only if it
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14 82 CJS 136.
15 Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., Vol. I., p. 223.
819
accords with the recital in the journal and the constitutional procedure.
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820
x x x.
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our
law making body, we choose to follow the rule. Section 313 of the old Code
of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: Ofcial
documents may be proved as follows: * * * (2) the proceedings of the
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________________
16 Op. cit., pp. 224-225 citing Barndall Rening v. Welsh, 64 S.D. 647, 269 N.W.
853, 859 [1936]. Jones, Constitutional Provisions Regulating the Mechanics of
Enactment in Iowa (1935), 21 Iowa Law Rev. 79, Charlton, Constitutional Regulation
of Legislative Procedure (1936), 21 Iowa Law Rev. 538; Note (1936) 21 Iowa Law
Rev. 573.
17 See Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. Rep. 1 [1947]; Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez, L-17931, February 28, 1963; Morales v. Subido, No. L-29658, February 27,
1969, 27 SCRA 131; Phil. Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November
11, 1993.
821
Sufce to state that section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure
as amended by Act No. 2210 is no longer in our statute books. It has
long been repealed by the Rules of Court. Mabanag also relied on
jurisprudence and authorities in the United States which are under
severe criticisms by modern scholars. Hence, even in the United
States the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill has been junked by
most of the States. It is also true that as late as last year, in the case
of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, op. cit., this Court still
relied on the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill as it refused to
invalidate a provision of law on the ground that it was merely
inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses.
Prado, however, is distinguishable. In Prado, the alleged insertion
of the second paragraph of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 repealing
the franking privilege of the judiciary does not appear to be an
uncontested fact. In the case at bench, the numerous
additions/deletions made by the Bicameral Conference Committee
as detailed by petitioners Tolentino and Salonga are not disputed by
the respondents. In Prado, the Court was not also confronted with
the argument that it can no longer rely on the conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill in light of the new provision in the Constitution
dening judicial power. More specically, section 1 of Article VIII
now provides:
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Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
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x x x.
x x x In other words, the judiciary is the nal arbiter on the question of
whether or not a branch of government or any of its ofcials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the
courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute political question. (Emphasis ours)
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22
screening the list of prospective appointees to the judiciary. The
power of conrming 23appointments to the judiciary was also taken
away from Congress. The President was likewise given a specic
time to ll up vacancies in the judiciaryninety (90) days 24
from the
occurrence of the vacancy in case of the Supreme Court and ninety
(90) days from the submission of the list of recommendees by the 25
Judicial and Bar Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts.
To further insulate appointments in the judiciary from the virus of
politics, the Supreme Court was given the power to appoint all
ofcials and employees
26
of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. And to make the separation of the judiciary from the
other branches of government more watertight, it prohibited
members of the judiciary to be . . . designated to 27any agency
performing quasi judicial or administrative functions. While the
Constitution strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it
reduced the powers of the two other branches of government,
especially the Executive. Notable of the powers of the President
clipped by the Constitution is his power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. The exercise of this
power is now subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise, the
sufciency of the factual basis for the exercise of said power may be
reviewed28
by this Court in an appropriate proceeding led by any
citizen.
The provision dening judicial power as including the duty of
the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
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824
825
o0o
826
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