FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 160054-55. July 21, 2004]

MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the March 26, 2003 Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 90, which denied petitioners (1) motion to quash the information; and (2)
motion for reconsideration of the August 9, 2002 Order denying his motion to suspend the
arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. Petitioner also
questioned its August 5, 2003 Order[2] which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts show that on March 7, 2002, two informations for unfair competition under
Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No.
8293), similarly worded save for the dates and places of commission, were filed against petitioner
Manolo P. Samson, the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. The accusatory portion of said
informations read:
That on or about the first week of November 1999 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation located at
Robinsons Galleria, EDSA corner Ortigas Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR products such as
footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories and paraphernalia which are closely identical to
and/or colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks,
symbols and/or designs as would cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying
public to the damage and prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and owner
of the following internationally: CATERPILLAR, CAT, CATERPILLAR & DESIGN, CAT AND
DESIGN, WALKING MACHINES and TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
On April 19, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in view
of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 for
unfair competition pending with the same branch; and also in view of the pendency of a petition
for review filed with the Secretary of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutors resolution
finding probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair competition. In an Order dated August 9,
2002, the trial court denied the motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings.
On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the informations and motion for
reconsideration of the order denying motion to suspend, this time challenging the jurisdiction of
the trial court over the offense charged. He contended that since under Section 170 of R.A. No.
8293, the penalty5 of imprisonment for unfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense
is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A. No.
7691.
In its assailed March 26, 2003 Order, the trial court denied petitioners twin motions.6 A motion
for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on August 5, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the assailed orders.
The issues posed for resolution are (1) Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
for violation of intellectual property rights? (2) Did the respondent Judge gravely abuse his
discretion in refusing to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos.
Q-02-108043-44 on the ground of (a) the existence of a prejudicial question; and (b) the pendency
of a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice on the finding of probable cause for unfair
competition?
Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the criminal penalty
for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false
description or representation, is imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty
Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, to wit:
SEC. 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a
criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), shall be imposed on
any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155
[Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair Competition] and Section 169.1 [False Designation of Origin
and False Description or Representation].
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including criminal and civil) under
Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before the proper courts with
appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws, thus
SEC. 163. Jurisdiction of Court. All actions under Sections 150, 155, 164 and 166 to 169 shall be
brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. (Emphasis
supplied)
The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 (The
Trademark Law) which provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks,
unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is lodged
with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
SEC. 27. Jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. All actions under this Chapter [V Infringement]
and Chapters VI [Unfair Competition] and VII [False Designation of Origin and False Description
or Representation], hereof shall be brought before the Court of First Instance.
We find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was expressly repealed by R.A. No.
8293. The repealing clause of R.A. No. 8293, reads
SEC. 239. Repeals. 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly
Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189
of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as
amended, are hereby repealed. (Emphasis added)
Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A. No. 166 in its entirety, otherwise, it
would not have used the phrases parts of Acts and inconsistent herewith; and it would have simply
stated Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188
and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No.
285, as amended are hereby repealed. It would have removed all doubts that said specific laws had
been rendered without force and effect. The use of the phrases parts of Acts and inconsistent
herewith only means that the repeal pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not
susceptible of harmonization with R.A. No. 8293.7 Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is
consistent and in harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest
jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it
would have expressly stated so under Section 163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict between a general law
and a special law, the latter must prevail. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional Trial
Courts must prevail over that granted by a general law to Municipal Trial Courts.8
In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws9 conferring jurisdiction over
violations of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial Court. They should therefore prevail
over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law.10 Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case
for unfair competition is properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor
is imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from P50,000.00 to
P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations of intellectual
property rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19,
2002 designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual Property Courts. On June 17, 2003,
the Court further issued a Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide Intellectual
Property Code and Securities and Exchange Commission cases in specific Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Commercial Courts.
The case of Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals,11 invoked by petitioner finds no application in the present
case. Nowhere in Mirpuri did we state that Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 was repealed by R.A. No.
8293. Neither did we make a categorical ruling therein that jurisdiction over cases for violation of
intellectual property rights is lodged with the Municipal Trial Courts. The passing remark in
Mirpuri on the repeal of R.A. No. 166 by R.A. No. 8293 was merely a backgrounder to the
enactment of the present Intellectual Property Code and cannot thus be construed as a jurisdictional
pronouncement in cases for violation of intellectual property rights.
Anent the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a prejudicial
question. In his petition, he prayed for the reversal of the March 26, 2003 order which sustained
the denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-
02-108043-44. For unknown reasons, however, he made no discussion in support of said prayer in
his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-00-41446 nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a prejudicial question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each other.12 Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under Section
168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud.13 Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation,
fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which
as admitted14 by private respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.
Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases
xxxxxxxxx
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of
Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed
sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from
the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of
said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish that respondent Judge abused his discretion in
denying his motion to suspend. His pleadings and annexes submitted before the Court do not show
the date of filing of the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.15 Moreover, the Order
dated August 9, 2002 denying his motion to suspend was not appended to the petition. He thus
failed to discharge the burden of proving that he was entitled to a suspension of his arraignment
and that the questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who alleges must prove his
allegations.
In sum, the dismissal of the petition is proper considering that petitioner has not established that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. So also, his failure to attach documents relevant
to his allegations warrants the dismissal of the petition, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, which states:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The petition
shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise
statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon
for the relief prayed for.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the
respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and
shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment,
order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to
therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto.
xxxxxxxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 165751. April 12, 2005]
DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM, petitioner, vs. THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure assailing
the resolutions[1] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26381, admitting the Amended
Information[2] and denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration,[3] dated 12 January 2004 and
03 November 2004, respectively.
An information dated 15 November 2004 was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner
Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib A. Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga and Naimah Unte
with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for their alleged illegal and
unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Esmael A.
Ebrahim, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil. The
accusatory portion of the information reads:
That from the period January 1998 to June 1999, in Cotabato City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused ARMM Vice-Governor and Regional Secretary, DAR, DATU
GUIMID MATALAM, a high ranking public official, HABIB A. BAJUNAID, ANSARI M.
LAWI, MUSLIMIN UNGA and NAIMAH UNTE, all low-ranking public officials, committing
the offense while in the performance of their official duties and taking advantage of their public
position, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did there and then, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, cause undue injury to several employees of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, cotabato City, thru evident bad faith in the performance of their official duties to wit: by
illegally and unjustifiably refusing to pay the monetary claims of the complaining DAR employees
namely: KASAN I. AYUNAN, ABDUL E. ZAILON, ESMAEL A. EBRAHIM, ANNABELLE
ZAILON, PENDATUN MAMBATAWAN, HYRIA MASTURA and FAIZAL I. HADIL, for the
period of January 1998 to June 1999 amounting to P1,606,788.50 as contained in Civil Service
Resolutions Nos. 982027 and 990415 in the nature of unpaid salaries during the period when they
have been illegally terminated, including salary differentials and other benefits.[4]
On 14 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.
Per order of the court, a reinvestigation of the case was conducted where petitioner filed his
Counter-Affidavit.[5]
After the reinvestigation, the public prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion to Admit
Amended Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid Matalam[6] to
which petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to the Motion to Admit the Alleged
Amended Information Against the Accused Guimid P. Matalam.[7] Thereafter, the public
prosecutor filed his Reply[8] to which petitioner filed a Rejoinder.
The Amended Information reads:
That on December 16, 1997 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in cotabato City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused a public officer being
then the ARMM Vice-Governor and Regional Secretary DAR, committing the offense while in
the performance of his official duties and thru evident bad faith and manifest partiality did there
and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause undue injury by illegally dismissing from the
service complaining DAR-Maguindanao employees, cotabato City, namely: Kasan I. Ayunan,
Abdul E. Zailon, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatum Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil,
to their damage and prejudice amounting to P1,606,788.50 by way of unpaid salaries during the
period when they have been illegally terminated including salary differentials and other
benefits.[9]
In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that the amended information charges an entirely new
cause of action. The corpus delicti of the amended information is no longer his alleged refusal to
pay the backwages ordered by the Civil Service Commission, but the alleged willful, unlawful and
illegal dismissal from the service of the complaining witnesses. He insists that the amended
information charging a separate and entirely different offense cannot be admitted because there
would be a serious violation of due process of law. He claims he is entitled to a preliminary
investigation since he was not informed that he is being charged for the alleged dismissal of the
complaining witnesses and that he was not given the opportunity to explain.
On 12 January 2004, the Sandiganbayan granted the Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid P. Matalam. It admitted
the Amended Information charging solely petitioner for Violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019. The court a quo ruled:
What seems to be more crucial here is, whether the amendments made are not prejudicial to the
rights of the accused and are considered as a matter of form only, so that, if the Amended
Information is admitted, there would be no need to require the Public Prosecutor to conduct another
preliminary investigation in the observance of the rights of the accused to due process. On the
other hand, if the amendment would be substantial, necessarily, another preliminary investigation
should be accorded to the accused. Distinction of the two is thus imperative.
...
The Amended Information charges essentially the same offense as that charged in the original
Information which is a Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Theoretically, therefore, the
amendment is a matter of form only.
Interestingly, however, the change in the recital of cause of action in the Amended Information is
very much noticeable. As correctly pointed out by accused Matalam, the corpus delicti in the
original Information was the alleged willful and confederated refusal of the accused to pay the
backwages of the complaining witnesses. The corpus delicti in the Amended Information is now
altered into the alleged illegal dismissal of the complainants from their service by accused Matalam.
Certainly, the two causes of action differ differently from each other.
Following the aforementioned principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the amendments seem
to be substantial considering that the main defense of all the accused in the original information
the lack of a corresponding appropriation for the payment of the monetary claims of the
complaining witnesses would not, in itself alone, stands [sic] as a defense for accused Matalam in
the Amended Information anymore. In the same manner, the evidence that accused Matalam would
have to present in the original Information, had it not been found to be without prima facie evidence,
will not be equally available to bail him out in the Amended Information anymore. And further,
although the nature of the offense charged has not changed, the theory of the case as against
accused Matalam is now deemed to have been changed because the cause of action now varies and
therefore, he would have to formulate another defense again.
However, after making a meticulous and independent assessment on the evidence obtaining on
record, this Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the Public Prosecutor that the
real and exact issue in this case is actually the alleged illegal dismissal of the complaining
witnesses. The issue of non-payment of their backwages is merely incidental because had it not
been for the alleged illegal dismissal, their demand for monetary claims should have not arisen.
Put in another perspective, the surrounding circumstances that brought about the issue of the
alleged illegal dismissal were actually the ones that spewed the issue of unpaid backwages.
Furthermore, as correctly observed by the Public Prosecutor, the change in the recital of the cause
of action does not conceivably come as a surprise to the accused. In fact, in his counter-affidavit
submitted before the Public Prosecutor, accused Matalam already took the occasion to elaborate
his version on the surrounding circumstances that brought about the alleged illegal dismissal of
the complaining witnesses. And these chain of circumstances, actually, were the very preceding
circumstances as to why the complaining witnesses had suffered their alleged injury. The need for
another preliminary investigation is therefore not necessary.
Given the foregoing factual milieu, the rights of accused Matalam are not, after all, in any way
prejudiced because an inquiry to the allegations in the original cause of action would certainly and
necessarily elicit substantially the same facts to the inquiry of the allegations in the new cause of
action contained in the Amended Information.
To remand this case again to the Public Prosecutor would certainly be a waste of time considering
that accused, in his counter-affidavit, had already explained extensively his defense on the new
allegations contained in the Amended Information sought to be admitted. And definitely, his
projected defense would be the same assuming that another preliminary investigation be conducted
and that he would be required to submit another counter-affidavit again.[10]
On 11 February 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[11] which the prosecution
opposed.[12] On 03 November 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion.[13] It explained:
While it is true that accused-movants defense in the original information could not by itself stand
alone as his defense to the amended one, however, the same would still be available for the latter
because although the two questioned causes of action literally varied, they are nonetheless
interrelated with each other. The essential ingredients of the amended information are actually
identical with those constituting the original, such that, the inquiry into one would elicit
substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal. And since these two causes
of action had emanated from the same set of factual settings, the evidence that accused-movant
might have under the original information would still be available and applicable to the amended
one.
Be it noted that the private complainants lodged their complaint due to the alleged injury they
suffered as a consequence of the alleged refusal of the accused-movant to pay them of their
backwages. And notably, based on the affidavit that the accused-movant had submitted, his
defense to this was due to the lack of funds appropriated for the said purpose. But why was there
no appropriation? Because, allegedly, the private complainants were illegally dismissed from their
service and as a result thereof, their names were subsequently stricken off from the roster of
employees in the government agency where they were connected.
Culled from these factual settings, the root cause of the alleged injury suffered by the private
complainants would therefore be their alleged illegal dismissal from the service. Otherwise, their
names would not have been stricken off from the roster of employees in the agency which they
were connected with and the appropriation for the payment of their salaries would have been
continuously made.
Thus, from the foregoing, although there was a change in the recital of the cause of action (from
non-payment of backwages into illegal dismissal), the amendment of the information did not
however affect or alter the nature of the offense that was originally charged. Neither did it change
the basic theory of the prosecution since this remained to be a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019
on account of the alleged injury caused to the private complainants. And even if the prosecutions
theory would now be premised on the new cause of action (illegal dismissal), this would not
however cause surprise to the accused-movant nor would require him to undergo a material change
or modification in his defense because in presenting his defense, he still has to commence from
the very same set of factual settings that preceded the original cause of action. And evidently, this
is the reason why in the affidavit he submitted during the reinvestigation, his discussions therein
consisted not only of his defense to the original information but also included an extensive
discussion regarding his defense to the amended one.
This being so, the outright admission of the amended information even without affording the
accused-movant a new preliminary investigation did not amount to a violation of his rights. To
afford him another process of preliminary investigation would no longer serve him and this court
any better considering that he had already explained in the said affidavit his defense to the amended
information. Otherwise, if he is allowed to submit another one, he is likely to elaborate again the
very same arguments that he had already invoked in his previous affidavit.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 12 January 2004 and 03
November 2004 admitting the Amended Information charging a new offense without conducting
a preliminary investigation were issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of jurisdiction
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
From the arguments raised by petitioner, the issue boils down to whether or not petitioner was
deprived of due process of law when the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information
without conducting another or new preliminary investigation. Firstly, petitioner maintains that a
new preliminary investigation should have been ordered because the corpus delicti in the Amended
Information is the termination of services of the complaining witnesses, while the corpus delicti
in the Original Information is the alleged refusal to pay the backwages of the complaining
witnesses. In other words, there being a new and distinct offense, he should be entitled to a new
preliminary investigation. Secondly, he contends he was denied due process when the
Sandiganbayan ruled that if he were allowed to submit another counter-affidavit, he is likely to
elaborate again the very same argument that he had invoked in his previous affidavit considering
that he would have pointed out certain facts not contained in his counter-affidavit. He added that
despite the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the theory of the case against him changed because
the cause of action varies, and that he would have to formulate another defense, the Sandiganbayan
did not remand the case to the public prosecutor for preliminary investigation because it was a
waste of time since he had already explained extensively in his counter-affidavit his defense on
the new allegations contained in the Amended Information. Thirdly, he asserts he was not given
the opportunity to show that he did not act with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the
dismissal of the seven employees inasmuch as there are other factors and circumstances that would
support his posture.
In its Comment, respondent People of the Philippines, thru the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
stated that the admission of the Amended Information without another preliminary investigation
would not violate petitioners right to due process on the ground that the amendment is merely
formal, and to require another preliminary investigation would not be in obedience to, but in
disregard of, the prime purpose for which a preliminary investigation is ordained by law and
jurisprudence. It maintains that petitioner acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in
illegally terminating the complainants from service.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner filed his Reply.[14]
The initial question to be resolved is what kind of amendment was made in the Information?
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its
reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the
offended party.
Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal
amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the
accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial
to the accused.[15]
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.[16]
The following have been held to be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate
only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as
to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused;[17] (5) an
amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to
introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for
the crime charged.[18]
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment has been said to be whether a
defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is
made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause
surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to
be one of form and not of substance.[19]
In the case at bar, the amendment was indeed substantial. The recital of facts constituting the
offense charged was definitely altered. In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly
committed by petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of the
private complainants, while in the amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from the service
of the private complainants. However, it cannot be denied that the alleged illegal and unjustifiable
refusal to pay monetary claims is related to, and arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the
service of the private complainants.
According to Retired Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, before the plea is taken, the
information may be amended in substance and/or form, without leave of court; but if amended in
substance, the accused is entitled to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended charge
is related to or is included in the original charge.[20]
Thus, the rule is: Before or after a plea, a substantial amendment in an information entitles an
accused to another preliminary investigation. However, if the amended information contains a
charge related to or is included in the original information, a new preliminary investigation is not
required.
The Sandiganbayan and the public prosecutor maintain that petitioner is not entitled to a new
preliminary investigation because the charges in the original information and amended information
are related and the latter has already presented his defense on the amended charge. Further,
remanding the case to the Public Prosecutor for another preliminary investigation would be a waste
of time considering that petitioner had already explained extensively his defense on the new
allegations contained in the Amended Information, that is, the accused already elaborated his
version on the surrounding circumstances that brought about the alleged dismissal of the
complaining witnesses. It added that the change in the recital of the cause of action will not come
as a surprise to the accused because the causes of action, though different, are nonetheless
interrelated, and that the rights of the accused will not be prejudiced since the inquiry to the
allegations in the original information will certainly and necessarily elicit substantially the same
facts to the inquiry of the allegations in the Amended Information.
On the other hand, petitioner insists he should be given a new preliminary investigation because
he was not, among other things, given the opportunity to show that he did not act with manifest
partiality and evident bad faith in the dismissal of the private complainants.
While it is true that the charges in the original and amended informations are related, i.e., an inquiry
into one would have elicited substantially, if not precisely, the same facts that an inquiry into the
other would have brought into light,[21] this fact should not necessarily deprive an accused to his
right to a new preliminary investigation. As above-stated, the rule is that a new preliminary
investigation is needed if there is a substantial amendment. The exception, i.e., charge is related or
included in the original information, should not be applied automatically. The circumstances in
every case must be taken into consideration before the accused is deprived of another preliminary
investigation.
The following indispensable elements must be established to constitute a violation of Section 3(e)
of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private persons
charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty in
relation to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the government or any private party, or gave any party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.[22]
The third element of the offense states that the public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in committing the prohibited act. Admittedly, the alleged
illegal dismissal contained in the amended charge gave rise to the original charge of failure to pay
the monetary claims of private complainants. It cannot be disputed that petitioner already discussed
circumstances surrounding the termination of services of the private complainants in his counter-
affidavit. However, we find nothing therein that would show that he had already touched the issue
of evident bad faith or manifest partiality. As can be gathered from the counter-affidavit, there
were arguments tending to counter the presence of evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross
inexcusable negligence, but the same refer to the allegation of failure to pay the monetary claims
and not to the alleged illegal dismissal. Although one allegation stemmed from the other, the court
a quo and the public prosecutor cannot say the element of evident bad faith, manifest partiality or
gross inexcusable negligence is the same in both. This being an element of the offense charged,
petitioner should be given the opportunity to thoroughly adduce evidence on the matter.
If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the amended charge, his right
will definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his right to present evidence to show or
rebut evidence regarding the element of evident bad faith and manifest partiality on the alleged
dismissal. He will be denied due process.
A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and
substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process.[23]
Our rulings in the cases of People v. Magpale[24] and Lava v. Gonzales[25] where no new
preliminary investigation was given because the charges in the amended informations were related
to, or included in, the original charges cannot apply in the case at bar. The factual milieu in those
cases is different from the case before us.
In Magpale, the accused was charged with violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code for
illegal possession of iron brand, and making or ordering the making thereof. In the notices sent to
the accused in connection with the preliminary investigation of the complaint, the accused was
informed not of one but of both. He was given the chance, and was placed on guard, to defend
himself for both charges. Moreover, the right of the accused to have another preliminary
investigation was waived when he went forward with the trial.
In Lava, the accused was charged with Complex Rebellion but the charge was later amended to
Simple Rebellion. This court held that a new preliminary investigation was not necessary there
being no change in the nature of the crime charged, and that accused failed to ask for a
reinvestigation upon learning of the amended information.
In the case of petitioner herein, although the charge remained the same (Violation of Section 3(e),
Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended), the prohibited act allegedly committed changed, that is, failure
to pay monetary claims to illegal dismissal, and he was not given the opportunity to submit his
evidence on the absence or presence of evident bad faith and manifest partiality as to the illegal
dismissal. Petitioner has not waived his right to a new preliminary investigation and, instead, is
asking for one.
It is settled that the preliminary investigation proper, i.e., the determination of whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, is the function of the prosecution.[26]
Our ruling in this case does not in any way divest the public prosecutor of its duty under the Rules.
This Court is not determining if petitioner should or should not be brought to trial. What we are
looking into is whether or not petitioner was given all the opportunity to present countervailing
evidence on the amended charge. Accordingly, finding that petitioner was not given the chance to
fully present his evidence on the amended information which contained a substantial amendment,
a new preliminary investigation is in order.
As to statement of the court a quo that the conduct of another preliminary investigation would be
merely a waste of time, it must be emphasized that though the conduct thereof will hold back the
progress of the case, the same is necessary in order that the accused may be afforded his right to a
preliminary investigation. The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation should never be
compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
Finally, as to petitioners prayer that the Amended Information be quashed and dismissed, the same
cannot be ordered. The absence[27] or incompleteness[28] of a preliminary investigation does not
warrant the quashal or dismissal of the information. Neither does it affect the courts jurisdiction
over the case or impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. The court
shall hold in abeyance the proceedings on such information and order the remand of the case for
preliminary investigation or completion thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Respondent courts resolutions
dated 12 January 2004 and 03 November 2004 in Criminal Case No. 26381 are REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. Respondent court is directed to order the Office of the Ombudsman to forthwith
conduct a preliminary investigation of the charge embodied in the Amended Information filed
against petitioner. It is further directed to suspend the proceedings in the said case pending
termination of the preliminary investigation, and thereafter to take such action on petitioners case
as may be warranted by the results of said preliminary investigation.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-53373

MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF
LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case
filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was
elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the
merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena
City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set
for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding
judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the
order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18,
1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed
by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order
of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the
Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the
judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the
Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. 7
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the
fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with
the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order
of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto.10 On
November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised on
insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from
Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for
dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the payment of a
pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on
evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter
that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's
independence and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and therefore hereby
DENIED.
 WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00
o'clock in the moming.
SO ORDERED. 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of
Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order
was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until
further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration
of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that
said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing
his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring
the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to
dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to
the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss,
within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends
that the petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed
his reply to the comment and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition be
dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to
transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc
resolved to give due course to the petition.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be
reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal
action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or
information, follow or not fonow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the
evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. 18 The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the
fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be
controlled by the complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not
only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence
received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction
of their office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation
they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
22
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence
of a puma facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with
the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible
for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an
information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24
Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a
certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal
prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence
has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-
investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either
that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27
In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between
the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28
On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be
issued by the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is
necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of
the strong arm of the law in an op pressive and vindictive manner. 30
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same
is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case
maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm,
modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may
direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed
in Court. 31
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When
after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by
the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested,
the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a
prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of
the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in
motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been
brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action
of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the People to
due process of law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the
fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the
Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that
the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal
upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state
prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does
not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the
prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple.1wphi1 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that
justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts.
Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the
presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own
independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal
should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under
such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands
of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the
fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the
presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny
the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that
the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter
should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26734 September 5, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PANFILO PADERNAL, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Benjamin Pongas for defendant-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The present case is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision acquitting the accused. At issue
is the purely legal question of whether the principle of double jeopardy bars this appeal.
The facts are fully and well recounted in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of September 13,
1966, certifying the appeal to us, as follows:
On January 4, 1961, Panfilo Padernal was charged by Asst. Provincial Fiscal Eleodoro G.
Alvero in the CFI of Ormoc City with the crime of homicide in connection with the death
of Brigido Rodila thru stabbing which took place in the Municipality of Kananga, Province
of Leyte, on December 3, 1960. The witnesses listed in the Information are: (1) Felicidad
Rodila, sister of the deceased; (2) Nemesio Ouano, Municipal Policeman of Kananga; (3)
Sanitary Inspector Joaquin Demillo; and (4) Municipal Judge Demetrio D. Sarit of
Kananga. On January 12, 1961, the CFI presided over by Hon. Numeriano G. Estenzo
reduced the bail of accused Panfilo Padernal to P8,000.00 and set the arraignment and trial
for January 26, 1961 at 7:30 A.M. with notice to Fiscal Eleodoro G. Alvero and to defense
counsel Atty. Benjamin T. Pongos (See Minutes, Roll 6).
When the case was called for arraignment and trial on January 26, 1961, the transcript
shows the following incidents:
"Atty. Pongos (defense counsel):
The accused in this case, Your Honor, is willing to enter the plea of guilty to the
crime charged in the Information.
"Court:
"Arraign the accused.
(The Court interpreter, Mr. Edilberto Maglasang, read the information to the
accused).
"Court Interpreter: (To the accused)
"Q Are you guilty or not guilty?
"Accused:
"I plead guilty, Your Honor.
"Atty. Pongos (defense counsel):
"Your Honor, please, before the imposition of the penalty, I invoke the presence of
the following mitigating circumstances in favor of the accused for the imposition
of the penalty, to wit: (1) Incomplete self-defense; (2) lack of education and
instruction; (3) voluntary surrender; and (4) spontaneous plea of guilty.
 "The accused, Your Honor was wounded in the right arm and in the head by the
bolo belonging to the deceased and this occurred during the scuffle in order to wrest
the bolo that was in the possession of the deceased who was responsible for the
unlawful aggression. When the accused wrested the bolo from the deceased, Your
Honor, and in order to defend himself, he struck the deceased who was then
advancing notwithstanding the fact that the bolo was already in the possession of
the accused. So, we pray that the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense be considered in favor of the accused for the imposition of the penalty.
"Court:
"What do you say fiscal?
"Fiscal:
"As regards the voluntary surrender, Your Honor, there is a warrant of arrest issued
without any showing that the accused surrendered voluntarily. The record does not
indubitably show there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.
"Court:
(To Atty. Pongos)
"You present your evidence to prove the mitigating circumstances of incomplete
self-defense and voluntary surrender. (tsn 1-3)."
xxx xxx xxx
Thereupon in compliance with the trial court's directive, defense counsel put on the witness stand
on January 26, 1961, Municipal Policeman Nemesio Ouano, whose name is listed in the
Information as a prosecution witness and whose brief testimony was to the effect "that this accused
killed Brigido Rodila" and "he surrendered to the Police Department of Kananga, Leyte, on the
very night of the incident" (tsn 3-4). Evidently, the purpose of defense counsel was to prove
voluntary surrender. After the defense was through with the testimony of Policeman Nemesio
Ouano, the prosecution placed on the witness-box Felicidad Rodila, sister of the deceased Brigido,
who testified that her brother was stabbed three times by accused Panfilo Padernal with a bolo at
about 7:30 in the evening (tsn 4-6). Asked whether the deceased was armed, Felicidad replied she
could not tell, her exact testimony being "I do not know whether he had a weapon, but at the time
of his death I was present" (tsn 7). She further testified she did not know the cause of the fight and
who provoked it (tsn 8). After Felicidad Rodila as prosecution witness had testified, the trial Court
(addressing the defense counsel) said: "You present the accused" (tsn 9). As a result, accused
Panfilo Padernal took the stand and testified as follows to quote:
(1) "I betted with Brigido Rodila in the amount of P.50 in the hantak game. When I won I
asked from him the money, but immediately hacked me" (tsn 10).
(2) "At first I was hit on the head; he stabbed me again and I was hit on my right forearm"
(tsn 10).
(3) "I took hold of his bolo and I was able to wrest it from him" (tsn 10).
(4) "I did not run, because I was close to the fence of the house" (tsn 10).
 (5) "I have no more chance of running away because I was already close to the fence" (tsn
12).
(6) "That is the bolo I wrested and I used in killing the deceased" (tsn 13).
(7) "I was squatting when the victim slashed me" (tsn 13).
(8) "Because I exerted efforts to wrest the bolo from his possession because I was already
hit" (tsn 15).
From the above quotations taken from the transcript, it will be noted that on January 26, 1961, the
trial (which was for the purpose of proving incomplete self-defense) started with the testimony of
Policeman Nemesio Ouano, as a defense witness, followed by Felicidad Rodila as a prosecution
witness, and ended with the testimony of accused Panfilo Padernal. For lack of time, however, the
trial was reset for the following day, January 27, 1961, at 7:30 with notice to Atty. B. Pongos and
Fiscal Alvero in open court (See Minutes, Roll 4). When the case was called for continuation on
January 27, 1961, upon realizing from accused's testimony given on the day before, January 26,
1961, that he (accused) was invoking complete self-defense, what the trial Judge did was to make
the following order:
"Let a plea of not guilty be entered by the accused and let it be tried on the merits on
January 31, 1961 at 8:30 A.M. with notice to Atty. B. Pongos and Fiscal Alvero and also
Sgt. Nemesio Ouano, in open court (See Minutes on January 27, 1961, Roll 5)."
As directed by the trial court, the case was called for trial on the merits on January 31, 1961, with
the same appearance (tsn 16). The transcript discloses the following:
"Court:
"Do you submit the case?
"Fiscal Alvero:
"We will submit the case, Your Honor, without presenting any further evidence.
"Atty. Pongos (defense counsel):
"We submit, Your Honor, the case.
"Court:
"The evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense during the time the case was
heard for the purpose of determining presence of incomplete self-defense shall be
considered as evidence for the purpose of determining the guilt of the accused, by virtue
of which this case shall be deemed submitted for decision." (tsn 16-17).
"Atty. Pongos (defense):
"We submit, Your Honor. We adopt the testimony of the accused.
"Fiscal Alvero:
"We submit, Your Honor. (tsn 17)."
Right after the above statements had been given by the prosecution and the defense, the trial Judge
dictated in open court on January 31, 1961, a decision acquitting accused Panfilo Padernal of the
crime of homicide with which he was charged "on the ground of reasonable doubt" (tsn 17-19).
Thereafter, Fiscal Alvero verbally moved for a reconsideration alleging that the accused has
entered a plea of guilty which is "sufficient to sustain conviction of the offense charged in the
Information without the introduction of further evidence, the accused himself has supplied the
necessary proof of his guilt and which closes the right of the accused to defend himself and leaves
the Court with no alternative but to impose the penalty prescribed by law" (tsn 19-20). The defense
counsel, on the other hand, argued "there was a trial on the merits in this case, Your Honor, the
evidence presented in the previous hearing to prove the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense was the same evidence that were presented during the trial on the merits"
(tsn 20). In denying the prosecution's oral motion for reconsideration, the trial Judge draws
attention to the fact that "a plea of not guilty has been ordered entered for the accused and that this
cases be tried on the merits. Assistant Provincial Fiscal Alvero petitioned this Court for the
postponement of the trial of this case until today (Jan. 31, 1961). Said motion for postponement
was granted by the Court. When this case was called for hearing today (Jan. 31, 1961), both parties
submitted that whatever evidence had been presented by both the prosecution and the defense
during the hearing on January 27, 1961 (sic Jan. 26) would be considered in the decision of this
case, to avoid any repetition" (see Denial Order, tsn 21). The trial Judge also invoked double
jeopardy, "if the decision will be modified or amended" (tsn 22).
Appellants' contention is that defendant, having pleaded guilty, cannot be acquitted and that there
was no trial on the merits but only a hearing to establish mitigating circumstances. In People v.
Balisacan, L-26376, August 31, 1966, this Court ruled that where the accused pleads guilty and
proceeds, in a hearing to prove mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, to state facts
constituting full and complete self-defense, the trial judge should declare his plea of guilty thereby
withdrawn, order that a plea of not guilty be entered and proceed to trial on the merits. For failure,
in the Balisacan case, to follow this procedure, We ruled therein that there was deprivation of day
in court against the prosecution. An acquittal on the merits thus made without the requisite trial
providing sufficient opportunity to the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused, was held improper. And in said Balisacan case, We held that the right to appeal existed
in favor of the prosecution because there was in effect no plea, since the testimony of the defendant
operated to withdraw his plea of guilty and the trial court failed to order that a plea of not guilty
be entered in its place; and because there was no due process in proceeding to dispose of the case
on the merits without trial on the merits. And thus, without a standing plea, and without due process,
double jeopardy was not attendant to bar the appeal therein.
Not so are the facts in this case. As stated, the court a quo caused a plea of not guilty to be entered
in place of the plea of guilty considered withdrawn by the exculpatory testimony of the accused.
And the trial judge re-set the case for hearing on the merits four days thereafter, giving the
prosecution and the defense sufficient opportunity to prepare for such trial on the merits. The fact
that on the date of the trial itself, the prosecution and the defense chose to adopt the testimonies
adduced during the previous hearing as their evidence on the merits, to save the trouble of re-
taking them, does not mean there was no trial on the merits. The prosecution and the defense
simply adopted the testimonies already taken as the testimonies for the trial on the merits. Due
process of law was observed and both parties were given full and adequate opportunity to prove
their respective case. Accordingly, the case was duly submitted for decision upon evidence on the
merits after the requisite trial providing fair opportunity to the prosecution and the defense to
adduce evidence in chief and rebuttal evidence. The decision of acquittal, therefore, can no longer
be reviewed herein, since the appeal is barred by the principle of double jeopardy, the requisites,
among others, of a plea and due process, not to mention trial on the merits, being attendant herein.
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is hereby dismissed for being barred by the principle of double
jeopardy. No costs. So ordered.