US v.

De Guzman "highly technical" is, we believe, employed in the

Case No. 297
G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915)
Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote No.95
FACTS:
Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was
convicted of asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Defendant was discharged before he pleaded
on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a
witness for the Government against his co-accused. Upon
reaching the witness stand, Defendant denied all knowledge of
the murder. He denied ever saying anything that implicated his
co-accused and swore that statements made by him were made
in fear of the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks for
the discharge of the Respondent though it may result in a
palpable miscarriage of justice, nevertheless, the law provides
for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution.
ISSUE:
W/N Defendant should be discharged.
HELD:
Sec. 19 and 20 are constitutional. There is no provision for
perjury should the Defendant fail to comply with the
agreement with the State. However, looking at the legislative
history of the statute, it can be gleaned that faithful
performance is necessary to avail of the bar to criminal
prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to
faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as
witness and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused
deprived him of the right to plead
his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Finally,
discharge cannot be an acquittal since it was made prior to his
trial.
De Los Santos vs. Mallare
G.R. No. L-3881, August 31, 1950
Tuason, J.
FACTS: Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner was appointed
City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the President,
appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments on August 6, and on the 23 rd of that month, he
qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of
the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an
ad interim appointment by the President to the same position,
after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department
of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to
report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment.
Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor
and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants
ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the
position, he commenced these proceedings.
Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the
classified civil service whose technical competence is not
lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the
duties of a city engineer are eminently administrative in
character and could very well be discharged by non-technical
men possessing executive ability. Nevertheless, the President
may not remove the city engineer at pleasure as Section 2545
of the Revised Administrative Code which authorized the
same was repealed when the Constitution took effect.
Salaria v. Buenviaje
Case No. 267
G.R. No. L-45642 (February 28, 1978)
FACTS:
Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the
latter sold the said land to Private Respondent Mendiola. A
formal letter of demand to vacate the premises was sent by
Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. A complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria.
After the trial, the City Court ordered Petitioner to vacate the
leased premises. On appeal, the CFI through Respondent
Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior court.
Thus, a petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot.
HELD:
No. Memorandum Circular No. 970 was issued by the
President stating that except for the causes for judicial
ejectment of lessees bona fide tenants of dwelling places
covered by said decree are not subject to eviction, particularly
if the only cause of action thereon is personal use of the
property by the owners or their families. Construction by
Executive Branch of Government of a particular law
although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the
construction comes from that branch called upon to implement
the law. The ground relied upon by the lessor in this case,
namely, personal use of property by the owner or lessors or
their families is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of
lessees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President may remove a city

engineer, a position that is neither confidential, policy
determining nor highly technical at pleasure.

HELD: No. Every appointment implies confidence, but much

more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a
position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase
denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee
for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city
engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not
formulate a method of action for the government or any its
subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With
specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers
and duties are carefully laid down for him be section 2557 of
the Revised Administrative Code and are essentially
ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is
technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor
is he supposed to possess a technical skill or training in the
supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which
REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN
Posted by bestre on Wednesday, September 17, 2008
(GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008)
This could be the first case that was decided under Philippine
jurisprudence with such unique facts. The author first heard it
in the news and decided to make a digested case of the same.
However, the Philippine Supreme Court has no complete
record of the case yet online. Despite that the author made use
of available online facts provided by the Supreme Court and
made it possible to come up with the case digest below.
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female
to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering
from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical
condition where afflicted persons possess both male and
female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate
evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition,
explained that "Cagandahan genetically is female but because
her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not
develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female."
The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the
Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking
that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the
local civil registrar.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It
held that, in deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered
the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to
outright denial. The Supreme Court made use of the available
evidence presented in court including the fact that private
respondent thinks ofhimself as a male and as to the statement
made by the doctor that Cagandahan's body produces high
levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male.
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1)
the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with
what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court
respects the respondents congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter
of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of
the reasons and the consequences that will follow.
G.R. No. 198780 : OCTOBER 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
v.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
FACTS:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and
Albios were married, as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed
with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Fringer, alleging that immediately
after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had
any intention of entering into a married state or complying
with any of their essential marital obligations. Fringer did not
file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion
to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After
the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor
appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being
duly notified of the schedule.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC
opined that the parties married each other for convenience
only. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship and
that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00
because the latter never processed her petition for citizenship.
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the
RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent
was lacking.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship void ab initio on the ground of
lack of consent?
HELD:
The marriage between the parties is valid
CIVIL LAW: validity of marriage
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration
cases. It ruled that a marriage is a sham if the bride and groom
did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were
married. This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA),
which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States. The focus, thus, shifted
from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It must
be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for
immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule
on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.In the 1969
case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to
the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be
avoided merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose.The 1980 immigration case of Matter of
McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage
was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it
must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A freely given consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent
under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud,
force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios
and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood
the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that
they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so
as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for
citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of
the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was
that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their
goal. Petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs Republic of the
Philippines
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. Hes a
biological male who feels trapped in a male body. Being that,
he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The
procedure was successful he (she) now has a female body.
Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the change of his
first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female)
in his birth certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila
RTC. He wanted to make these changes, among others, so that
he can marry his American fianc.
The RTC granted Silverios petition. The RTC ruled that it
should be granted based on equity; that Silverios misfortune
to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should
not be in any way taken against him; that there was no
opposition to his petition (even the OSG did not make any
basis for opposition at this point); that no harm, injury or
prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in
granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition
would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of
Silverio and [her] fianc and the realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the
CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first
name in the birth certificate may be changed on the ground of
gender re-assignment.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such
entries finds no support in existing legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE
CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE
CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR
CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE
CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL
ORDER) was passed. This law provides that it should be the
local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in petitions for the
change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the
petition of Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned is
procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the petition filed
properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon
which it is based(gender re-assignment) is not one of those
provided for by the law. Under the law, a change of name may
only be grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he
merely alleged gender re-assignment as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the
regular courts or a petition for the local civil registry. Not with
the courts because there is no law to support it. And not with
the civil registry because there is no clerical error involved.
Silverio was born a male hence it was just but right that the
entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a male. The
sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons
sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation.
To grant the changes sought by Silverio will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man
who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which
apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the
Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under
the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship
in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
among others. These laws underscore the public policy in
relation to women which could be substantially affected if
Silverios petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: If the legislature intends to confer on
a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to
change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it
has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.
Silverio v. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, (2007)
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and
sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila by reason of sex alteration or sex reassignment. He
alleged that he is a male transsexual. He underwent sex
reassignment surgery on January 27, 2001 in Bangkok,
Thailand. From then on, he lived as a female and was in fact
engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely,
and his sex from male to female. On June 4, 2003, the
trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, stating
that the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. On August 18, 2003, the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging
that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, CA rendered a decision in favor of the
Republic, ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal
basis. Petition was moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of the petitioners first name and
sex in his birth certificate are allowed?
HELD:
Petition DENIED. Lack of Merit.
RATIO:
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed.
RA 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first name
may be allowed:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion. RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and the public
interest.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate
As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment.
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or
typographical error" is. Clerical or typographical error"
refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the
civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can
be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing
record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must
involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner.
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. On
the other hand, Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the
entry in the civil registry of certain acts, and judicial decrees.
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal
consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are
expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in
Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by
any law, expressly or impliedly. Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides that All other matters pertaining to the registration
of civil status shall be governed by special laws. But there is
no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. While petitioner may have
succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Neither
May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex
Be Changed on the Ground of Equity. The changes sought by
petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public
policy consequences. To grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union
of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
There are various laws which apply particularly to women
such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule
131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could
be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be
granted. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates
that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law."
However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial
legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the
law, not to make or amend it. It might be theoretically possible
for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However,
this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or
on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-
equal branch of government, Congress.
LUCIO MORIGO V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in
Bohol.They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card
from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became
sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to
Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in
Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married
Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage
ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved
for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending
posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo
pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was
void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second
marriage in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of
his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order
to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering
that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just
merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not
need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he
contracted his second marriage with Lumbago.Hence, he did
not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE
NATIONAL TREASURER, Petitioner,
vs.
CARLITO LACAP, doing business under the name and
style CARWIN CONSTRUCTION AND
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision1
dated April 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 56345 which affirmed with modification the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, San
Fernando, Pampanga (RTC) in Civil Case No. 10538, granting
the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages filed by
Carlito Lacap (respondent) against the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner).
The factual background of the case is as follows:
The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published
an "Invitation To Bid" dated January 27, 1992. Respondent,
doing business under the name and style Carwin Construction
and Construction Supply (Carwin Construction), was pre-
qualified together with two other contractors. Since
respondent submitted the lowest bid, he was awarded the
contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.3 On
November 4, 1992, a Contract Agreement was executed by
respondent and petitioner.4 On September 25, 1992, District
Engineer Rafael S. Ponio issued a Notice to Proceed with the
concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.5 Accordingly, respondent
undertook the works, made advances for the purchase of the
materials and payment for labor costs.6
On October 29, 1992, personnel of the Office of the District
Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga conducted a final
inspection of the project and found it 100% completed in
accordance with the approved plans and specifications.
Accordingly, the Office of the District Engineer issued
Certificates of Final Inspection and Final Acceptance.7
Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for the
completed project.8 The DPWH prepared the Disbursement
Voucher in favor of petitioner.9 However, the DPWH withheld
payment from respondent after the District Auditor of the
Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of
funds on the ground that the contractors license of respondent
had expired at the time of the execution of the contract. The
District Engineer sought the opinion of the DPWH Legal
Department on whether the contracts of Carwin Construction
for various Mount Pinatubo rehabilitation projects were valid
and effective although its contractors license had already
expired when the projects were contracted.10
In a Letter-Reply dated September 1, 1993, Cesar D. Mejia,
Director III of the DPWH Legal Department opined that since
Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566), otherwise known as
the Contractors License Law, does not provide that a contract
entered into after the license has expired is void and there is
no law which expressly prohibits or declares void such
contract, the contract is enforceable and payment may be paid,
without prejudice to any appropriate administrative liability
action that may be imposed on the contractor and the
government officials or employees concerned.11
In a Letter dated July 4, 1994, the District Engineer requested
clarification from the DPWH Legal Department on whether
Carwin Construction should be paid for works accomplished
despite an expired contractors license at the time the contracts
were executed.12
In a First Indorsement dated July 20, 1994, Cesar D. Mejia,
Director III of the Legal Department, recommended that
payment should be made to Carwin Construction, reiterating
his earlier legal opinion.13 Despite such recommendation for
payment, no payment was made to respondent.
Thus, on July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for
Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before
the RTC.14
On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of
action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of
the action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the
decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim. 15
Following the submission of respondents Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss,16 the RTC issued an Order dated March
11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss.17 The OSG filed a
Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the
RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.19
On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the
defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
doctrine of non-suability of the State.20
Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, ordering the latter, thru its District
Engineer at Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, to pay the
following:
a) P457,000.00 representing the contract for the concreting
project of Sitio 5 road, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga plus
interest at 12% from demand until fully paid; and
b) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC held that petitioner must be required to pay the
contract price since it has accepted the completed project and
enjoyed the benefits thereof; to hold otherwise would be to
overrun the long standing and consistent pronouncement
against enriching oneself at the expense of another.22
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.23 On April
28, 2003, the CA rendered its Decision sustaining the Decision
of the RTC. It held that since the case involves the application
of the principle of estoppel against the government which is a
purely legal question, then the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply; that by its actions the
government is estopped from questioning the validity and
binding effect of the Contract Agreement with the respondent;
that denial of payment to respondent on purely technical
grounds after successful completion of the project is not
countenanced either by justice or equity.
The CA rendered herein the assailed Decision dated April 28,
2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby
AFFIRMED with modification in that the interest shall be six
percent (6%) per annum computed from June 21, 1995.
SO ORDERED.24
Hence, the present petition on the following ground:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST PETITIONER, CONSIDERING THAT:
(a) RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; AND
(b) IT IS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT WHICH HAS
THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE
RESPONDENTS MONEY CLAIM AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT.25
Petitioner contends that respondents recourse to judicial
action was premature since the proper remedy was to appeal
the District Auditors disapproval of payment to the COA,
pursuant to Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1445 (P.D.
No. 1445), otherwise known as the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines; that the COA has primary jurisdiction
to resolve respondents money claim against the government
under Section 2(1),26 Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 2627 of P.D. No. 1445; that non-observance of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
principle of primary jurisdiction results in a lack of cause of
action.
Respondent, on the other hand, in his Memorandum28 limited
his discussion to Civil Code provisions relating to human
relations. He submits that equity demands that he be paid for
the work performed; otherwise, the mandate of the Civil Code
provisions relating to human relations would be rendered
nugatory if the State itself is allowed to ignore and circumvent
the standard of behavior it sets for its inhabitants.
The present petition is bereft of merit.
The general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means
afforded him by administrative processes.29 The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be
summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without
first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to
dispose of the same after due deliberation.30
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.31
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
which are based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many
accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on
the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or
official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small
so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where
the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have
to be decided by the courts of justice;32 (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause
great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts
violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot;33 (j) when
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when
strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto
proceedings.34 Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to the
present case.
Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal
Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that payment to a
contractor with an expired contractors license is proper,
respondent remained unpaid for the completed work despite
repeated demands. Clearly, there was unreasonable delay and
official inaction to the great prejudice of respondent.
Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired license at
the time of the execution of its contract is entitled to be paid
for completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law. It
does not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties. There is a question of law
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of
alleged facts.35 Said question at best could be resolved only
tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision
on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because
nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. 36
The issue does not require technical knowledge and
experience but one that would involve the interpretation and
application of law.
Thus, while it is undisputed that the District Auditor of the
COA disapproved respondents claim against the Government,
and, under Section 4837 of P.D. No. 1445, the administrative
remedy available to respondent is an appeal of the denial of
his claim by the District Auditor to the COA itself, the Court
holds that, in view of exceptions (c) and (e) narrated above,
the complaint for specific performance and damages was not
prematurely filed and within the jurisdiction of the RTC to
resolve, despite the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
As the Court aptly stated in Rocamora v. RTC-Cebu (Branch
VIII):38
The plaintiffs were not supposed to hold their breath and wait
until the Commission on Audit and the Ministry of Public
Highways had acted on the claims for compensation for the
lands appropriated by the government. The road had been
completed; the Pope had come and gone; but the plaintiffs had
yet to be paid for the properties taken from them. Given this
official indifference, which apparently would continue
indefinitely, the private respondents had to act to assert and
protect their interests.39
On the question of whether a contractor with an expired
license is entitled to be paid for completed projects, Section 35
of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price,
commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid
to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or
assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction
work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a
license to engage in the business of contracting in this country;
or who shall present or file the license certificate of another,
give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member
thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate
another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license,
shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon
conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five
hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos.
(Emphasis supplied)
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory
construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without interpretation.40 This rule derived from the maxim
Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests
on the valid presumption that the words employed by the
legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will
and preclude the court from construing it differently. The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to
have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by
use of such words as are found in the statute.41 Verba legis non
est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be
no departure.42
The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare,
expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a
contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless,
such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed
therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he
completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to
the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.
Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the
maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no
man ought to be made rich out of anothers injury) states:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as "basic
principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between
human beings and for the stability of the social order, x x x
designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience, x x x guides human conduct
[that] should run as golden threads through society to the end
that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and
dominance of justice."43 The rules thereon apply equally well
to the Government.44 Since respondent had rendered services
to the full satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner, then the
former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to
acquire the finished project at no cost would undoubtedly
constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice
of respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
April 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Rural Bank of San Miguel vs. MB BSP and PDIC
Facts:
1. Petitioner Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. (RBSM) was a
domestic corporation engaged in banking. PetitionerHilario P.
Soriano claims to be the majority stockholder of its
outstanding shares of stock.
2. RBSM declared a bank holiday. RBSM and all of its 15
branches were closed from doing business.
Alarmed and disturbed by the unilateral declaration of bank
holiday, [BSP] wanted to examine the books and records of
RBSM but encountered problems.
3. petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 22 to
nullify and set aside Resolution No. 105.7 However, on
February 7, 2000, petitioners filed a notice of withdrawal in
the RTC and, on the same day, filed a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition in the CA. On February 8, 2000, the
RTC dismissed the case pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court.
4. respondent Monetary Board (MB), the governing board of
respondent Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), issued
Resolution No. 105 prohibiting RBSM from doing business in
the Philippines, placing it under receivership and designating
respondent Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC)
as receiver.
1. Thereafter, PDIC implemented the closure order and took
over the management of RBSMs assets and affairs.
2. In their petition before the CA, petitioners claimed
that respondents MB and BSP committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing Resolution No. 105. The petition was
dismissed by the CA on March 28, 2000. It held, among
others, that the decision of the MB to issue Resolution No. 105
was based on the findings and recommendations of the
Department of Rural Banks Supervision and Examination
Sector, the comptroller reports as of October 31, 1999 and
December 31, 1999 and the declaration of a bank holiday.
Such could be considered as substantial evidence.
3. On the basis of reports prepared by PDIC stating that
RBSM could not resume business with sufficient assurance of
protecting the interest of its depositors, creditors and the
general public, the MB passed Resolution No. 966 directing
PDIC to proceed with the liquidation of RBSM under Section
30 of RA 7653.
Issue: WON the absence of examination by the BSP
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
In RA 7653, only a "report of the head of the supervising or
examining department" is necessary. It is an established rule in
statutory construction that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
departure.
The word "report" has a definite and unambiguous meaning
which is clearly different from "examination." A report, as a
noun, may be defined as "something that gives information" or
"a usually detailed account or statement." On the other hand,
an examination is "a search, investigation or scrutiny."
This Court cannot look for or impose another meaning on the
term "report" or to construe it as synonymous with
"examination." From the words used in Section 30, it is clear
that RA 7653 no longer requires that an examination be made
before the MB can issue a closure order. We cannot make it a
requirement in the absence of legal basis.
In short MB and BSP complied with all the requirements of
RA 7653. By relying on a report before placing a bank under
receivership, the MB and BSP did not only follow the letter of
the law, they were also faithful to its spirit, which was to act
expeditiously. Accordingly, the issuance of Resolution No.
105 was untainted with arbitrariness.
[G.R. No. 138496. February 23, 2004]
HUBERT TAN CO and ARLENE TAN CO, petitioners, vs.
THE CIVIL REGISTER OF MANILA and any person
having or claiming an interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed
by Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co seeking to reverse and
set aside the Order1[1] dated September 23, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, dismissing their
petition for correction of entries in the Civil Register.
Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the Order dated
April 27, 1999 of the court a quo denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the said order.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Hubert Tan Co was born on March 23, 1974. His sister,
Arlene Tan Co, was born on May 19, 1975. In their respective
certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents Co Boon
Peng and Lourdes Vihong K. Tan are Chinese citizens.
Thereafter, Co Boon Peng filed an application for his
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special
Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction (LOI)
No. 270. His application was granted and he was conferred
Philippine citizenship under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1055. The Chairman of the Committee issued on February 15,
1977 Certificate of Naturalization No. 020778 in his favor.
Thus, on February 15, 1977, Co Boon Peng took his oath as a
Philippine citizen. In the meantime, Hubert and Arlene Co
finished college and earned their respective degrees in
architecture and accountancy in Philippine schools.
On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for
correction of entries in their certificates of birth. The case was
docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. 98-90470. They alleged, inter
alia, in their petition that:
(3) They were born in the Philippines and the legitimate
children of CO BOON PENG;
(4) Co Boon Peng, who is formerly a citizen of China, was
conferred Philippine citizenship by naturalization under
Presidential Decree No. 1055 and had taken his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 15 th February,
1977 in the City of Manila;
(5) At the time of birth of [the] petitioners, their father CO
BOON PENG was still a Chinese citizen that is why entry in
their respective birth certificates as to their fathers citizenship
was Chinese;
(6) Upon granting of Philippine citizenship by naturalization
to Co Boon Peng in 1977, [the] petitioners who were born in
the Philippines and still minors at that time became Filipino
citizens through the derivative mode of naturalization. Our
Naturalization Law, specifically Section 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535
which provides:
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have
been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens
thereof;
(7) The naturalization of petitioners father in 1977 was an act
or event affecting and concerning their civil status that must
be recorded in the Civil Register, Article 407 of the New Civil
Code of the Philippines which provides:
Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the Civil Register.2[2]
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, the trial
court render judgment correcting and changing the entries in
their respective birth certificates as to the citizenship of their
father Co Boon Peng, from Chinese to Filipino.3[3]
On September 23, 1998, the court a quo issued an order
dismissing the petition outright on the ground that the petition
was insufficient, solely because the petitioners father Co Boon
Peng applied for naturalization under LOI No. 270 and was
conferred Philippine citizenship by naturalization under PD
No. 1055 and not under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473.
4[4]
The petitioners sought the reconsideration of the assailed order
arguing that LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 were designed to
grant citizenship to deserving aliens; hence, should be
construed together. They averred that the benefit of Section 15
of CA No. 473 should also be granted to the petitioners whose
father was granted naturalization under LOI No. 270.
However, the RTC issued an Order on April 27, 1999, denying
their motion for reconsideration for the following reasons: (a)
although Commonwealth Act No. 473 and Letter of
Instructions No. 270 are statutes relating to the same subject
matter, they do not provide the same beneficial effects with
respect to the minor children of the applicant. Section 15 of
CA No. 473 expressly provides for the effect of the
naturalization on the wife and children of the applicant while
LOI No. 270 does not have any proviso to that effect; (b) LOI
No. 270 clearly refers to qualified individuals only. The rules
and regulations promulgated by the Committee established
pursuant to LOI No. 270 and the amendments issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (LOI Nos. 292 and 491)
clearly speak of qualified individuals only; no proviso therein
referred to its effect on the wife and children of the individual;
(c) Section 15 of CA No. 473 should not be deemed and
incorporated in and applied to LOI No. 270; and, (d) the
application of the so-called pari materia rule of construction
made by the petitioners is misplaced, as what should be
applied in the instant case is the rule on strict construction of
legislative grants or franchise. The court a quo stressed that
legislative grants, whether they be of property, rights or
privileges, whether granted to corporations or individuals,
must be strictly construed against the grantee and in favor of
the grantor.
Aggrieved, the petitioners now come to this Court assailing
the court a quos Order dismissing their petition outright and
its Order denying their motion for the reconsideration of the
same.
The petitioners contend that the trial court erred in holding
that their petition was insufficient. They assert that contrary to
the ruling of the trial court, they are qualified to claim the
benefit of Section 15 of CA No. 473, which provides that
minor children of persons naturalized thereunder who were
born in the Philippines shall likewise be considered citizens
thereof. They contend that although LOI No. 270, under which
the petitioners father was naturalized does not contain a
provision similar to Section 15 of CA No. 473, the latter
provision should be deemed incorporated therein. They point
out that both laws have the same purpose and objective, i.e., to
grant Philippine citizenship to qualified aliens permanently
residing in the Philippines. The petitioners invoke the rule that
statutes in pari materia are to be read together.5[5] They posit
that CA No. 473 and LOI No. 270 should be harmonized and
reconciled since all statutes relating to the same subject, or
having the same general purpose, should be read in connection
with it, and should be construed together as they constitute one
law.6[6]
The petitioners maintain that the letter and spirit of LOI No.
270 was to grant the privilege of Philippine citizenship not
only to qualified aliens but also to their minor children who
were born in the country. They assert that this is apparent from
paragraph 4-A thereof, which extends the option to adopt
Filipino names not only to qualified applicants for
naturalization but also to their wives and minor children. They
submit that when then President Ferdinand E. Marcos enacted
LOI No. 270, he must be presumed to have been acquainted
with the provisions of CA No. 473 and did not intend to
abrogate and discontinue the beneficial effects of Section 15
thereof; otherwise, Pres. Marcos would have expressly
repealed Section 15 of CA No. 473 in relation to LOI No. 270.
Thus, according to the petitioners, the naturalization of their
father during their minority is an act or event affecting their
civil status that must be recorded in the Civil Register
pursuant to Article 407 of the Civil Code.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that the court
a quo did not err in issuing the assailed orders. Contrary to the
petitioners theory, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are separate
and distinct laws; therefore, are not in pari materia. He points
out that although LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 both govern
the naturalization of aliens, CA No. 473 deals with the
requirements and procedure for naturalization by judicial
decree; LOI No. 270, on the other hand, deals with the
requirements and procedure for naturalization by presidential
decree.
The Solicitor General further asserts that the petitioners
contention that the naturalization of their father is an event
affecting and concerning their civil status envisaged in Article
407 of the Civil Code has no legal basis. The correction
sought and allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court must
be one that reflects a fact existing before or at the time of
birth. In the petitioners case, the naturalization of their father
in 1977 took place long after they were born. Moreover,
according to the Solicitor General, under LOI No. 270 and its
amendatory laws, the naturalization of a father did not ipso
facto render his children also naturalized. The petitioners thus
cannot invoke Article 407 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court to avoid strict compliance with the
naturalization laws.
The petition is meritorious.
The rule on statutory construction provides that:
Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together
because enactments of the same legislature on the same
subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system; later
statutes are supplementary or complimentary (sic) to the
earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature
is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the
subject and to have enacted its new act with reference
thereto.7[7]
Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain
the purpose of an expressed national policy, thus:
On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a
provision it has in mind the previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter, it is held that in the absence of any
express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision was
enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those
prior statutes, and they all should be construed together.
Provisions in an act which are omitted in another act relating
to the same subject matter will be applied in a proceeding
under the other act, when not inconsistent with its purpose.
Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be
compared with the new provisions; and if possible by
reasonable construction, both are to be construed that effect is
given to every provision of each. Statutes in pari materia,
although in apparent conflict, are so far as reasonably possible
construed to be in harmony with each other.8[8]
LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the
naturalization of qualified aliens residing in the Philippines.
While they provide for different procedures, CA No. 473
governs naturalization by judicial decree while LOI No. 270
governs naturalization by presidential decree; both statutes
have the same purpose and objective: to enable aliens
permanently residing in the Philippines, who, having
demonstrated and developed love for and loyalty to the
Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture, tradition and
ideals of the Filipino people, and contributed to the economic,
social and cultural development of our country, to be
integrated into the national fabric by being granted Filipino
citizenship. Under the LOI, the procedure for the acquisition
of citizenship by naturalization is more expeditious, less
cumbersome and less expensive. The sooner qualified aliens
are naturalized, the faster they are able to integrate themselves
into the national fabric, and are thus able to contribute to the
cultural, social and political well- being of the country and its
people.
Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners
correctly posit, statutes in pari materia. Absent any express
repeal of Section 15 of CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said
provision should be read into the latter law as an integral part
thereof, not being inconsistent with its purpose. Thus, Section
15 of CA No. 473,9[9] which extends the grant of Philippine
citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized
thereunder, should be similarly applied to the minor children
of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in
this case.
It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the
certificate of naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng, and
of his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to
entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise
mandated to prove the following material allegations in their
petition: (a) that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon
Peng; (b) that they were born in the Philippines; and, (c) that
they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as
a Filipino citizen;
The petitioners recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, is appropriate. Under Article 412 of the New Civil
Code, no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order. The law does not provide for a
specific procedure of law to be followed. But the Court
approved Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to provide for a
procedure to implement the law.10[10] The entries envisaged
in Article 412 of the New Civil Code are those provided in
Articles 407 and 408 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) Marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
Specific matters covered by the said provision include not
only status but also nationality.11[11] The acts, events or
factual errors envisaged in Article 407 of the New Civil Code
include even those that occur after the birth of the petitioner.
However, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth
will not be corrected or changed. The decision of the court
granting the petition shall be annotated in the certificates of
birth and shall form part of the civil register in the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar.12[12]
To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove the
faults or error from. To change means to replace something
with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the New Civil Code does
not qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected
or distinguished on the basis of the effect that the correction or
change may be.13[13] Such entries include not only those
clerical in nature but also substantial errors. After all, the role
of the Court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to
ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein.14[14]
The proceedings in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
summary if the entries in the civil register sought to be
corrected are clerical or innocuous in nature. However, where
such entries sought to be corrected or changed are substantial:
i.e., the status and nationality of the petitioners or the
citizenship of their parents,15[15] the proceedings are
adversarial in nature as defined by this Court in Republic v.
Valencia, thus:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from
an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief
has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the
latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption
proceeding.16[16]

In such a proceeding, the parties to be impleaded as respective

defendants are (a) the local civil registrar; and, (b) all persons
who have claims any interest which would be affected
thereby.17[17]

In this case, the petitioners alleged in their petition that they

are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng, who was
naturalized as a Filipino citizen, but that their certificates of
birth still indicate that he is a Chinese national. In view of
their fathers naturalization, they pray that the entries in their
certificates of birth relating to the citizenship of their father be
changed from Chinese to Filipino.

The petitioners recourse to the procedure in Rule 108 of the

Rules of Court, as amended, being appropriate, it behooved
the trial court to do its duty under Section 4, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, namely:

Sec. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition,

the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the person named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.

After hearing, the court shall issue an order either dismissing

the petition or issue an order granting the same. In either case,
a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil
registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in the
certificates of birth of the petitioners. The judgment of the
court shall form part of the records of the local civil
register.18[18]

In this case, the trial court dismissed the petition outright in

violation of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Patently, then, the
trial court erred in so doing.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is

GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 26, are SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The
trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the petition in Special
Proceedings NO. 98-90470 in the court docket, and
ORDERED to continue with the proceedings in the said case
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

SO ORDERED.