1. Miranda vs.

Tuliao

FACTS:

On March 8, 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later
identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao. On June 29,
2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or
quash he warrants of arrest. However, the petition was denied by Judge Tumaliuan on the ground of the absence of
petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners on their petition to cancel the warrant
of arrest?

RULING:

Yes. As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. As we held in the past decisions of the Supreme Court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes
voluntary appearance.

After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant
prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant
of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, x x x prudence dictates and because of comity, a
deferment of the proceedings is but proper. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and
oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the
future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed
before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the
prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.

2. Crespo vs. Mogul

FACTS:

Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estaga
against Mario Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment the accused
filed a motion to deter arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of
Justice of the resolution of the office of provincial Fiscal.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the
motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits?

RULING:

YES. The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
 3. Honasan vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors

FACTS:

An offense of coup detat was filed against Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan and others after the incident
in Oakwood Hotel. The affidavit0-complaint is docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1120 and the Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors of the Department of Justice sent a subpoena to petitioner for preliminary investigation. On August 27,
2003, petitioner Senator Honasan, together with his counsel, appeared at the DOJ. He filed a Motion for
Clarification questioning DOJs jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the imputed acts were committed in
relation to his public office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the
corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge be filed in court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not the
regular courts, that can legally take cognizance of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Office of Ombudsman should deputie the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the
preliminary investigation?

RULING:

NO. Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference
between the two, aside from the category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as
distinguished from the authority to prosecute. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the
Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because it is within the DOJ's
scope of authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes
under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation
to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary
jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.

4. Sanchez vs. Demetriou

FACTS:

Information was filed against several people including the petitioner in relation with the rape-slay of Mary
Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Sanchez has brought the petition to challenge the order of the
respondent judge denying his motion to quash the information for rape with homicide filed against him and six
other persons on the ground he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons.
The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are absurd because the two
victims in these cases could not have died seven times.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court acted properly on denying the petition of Sanchez to quash on the grounds that
he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons.

RULING:

YES. The court ruled that where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed
on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape
with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed. In
effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus,
homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes
a new character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance. The separate informations filed against each of them
allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated
by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven
accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
 5. Chan vs. Secretary of Justice

FACTS:
An Information for illegal selling of prohibited drugs was filed against Petitioner Juanito Chan before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. Chan, on the other hand, filed a Petition for Review with the Secretary
of Justice. The petition was dismissed on the ground that there is no reversible error on the findings State
Prosecutor Pablo C. Formaran III. A Petition for Certiorari was thereafter filed before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The appellate court dismissed the petition in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Crespo v. Mogul which
provides that once a case or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests on the discretion of the
court. It further ruled that a Petition for Certiorari cannot be availed for Chan has other existing remedies such as
a Motion to Quash or Dismiss.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying the doctrine laid down in Crespo v. Mogul

RULING:

NO. Contrary to petitioners view, Crespo subsists and was not superseded by Allado. In Crespo, the Court
laid down the rule that once an Information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests on the sound
discretion of the court. In subsequent cases, the Court clarified that Crespo does not bar the Justice Secretary
from reviewing the findings of the investigating prosecutor in the exercise of his power of control over his
subordinates. Allado, which was punctuated by inordinate eagerness in the gathering of evidence and in the
preliminary investigation, serves as an exception and may not be invoked unless similar circumstances are clearly
shown to exist. No such circumstances were established in the present case.

6. Disini vs. Secretary of Justice

FACTS
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime
law carry with them the requirement of presumed malice even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it
with the higher standard of actual malice as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring presumed
malice from the accuseds defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel affected the requirement of
actual malice as opposed to presumed malice as basis for conviction of libel.

RULING:
IT DEPENDS. The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where
such element is required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns
out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez
(a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since
the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes
that these laws imply a stricter standard of malice to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the
offended party is a public figure. Societys interest and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove
the presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of
the assailed statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory
statement even if it was in fact true.
 7. Serana vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

Herein petitioner Hannah Serana, charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a student
regent of the University of the Philippines. While in the performance of her official functions, she represented to
former President Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall and for which purpose accused requested the amount of P15,000,000.00.
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person because as a UP student regent, she
did not receive and compensation which makes her not a public officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged and over Serana

RULING :

YES. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charge and over Serena, The Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the offense charge because estafa is one of those felonies within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin requirements that: 1) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD No. 1606, as amended, and that; 2) The offense is committed in relation to their
office. Petitioner, as a member of the Board Of Regents is a public officer, since she had the general powers of
administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP. Compensation is not an essential element of public office.
At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Delegation of sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.

8. Allado vs. Diokno

FACTS:

Petitioners, Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, were both implicated as the masterminds of
the kidnapping and murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twist.An information for the said crime was filed against the
petitioners primarily on the strength of a sworn statement by Escolastico Umbal, who admitted that he was among
those who kidnapped and killed the victim upon the orders of the petitioners. Thereafter, respondent judge, Roberto
C. Diokno, ordered the arrest of the petitioners and no bail was recommended. Petitioners, contending that their
arrests was effected whimsically as there is no probable cause, questioned their arrests.

ISSUE:

Whether or not probable cause is present to warrant the order of arrest against the petitioners.

HELD:

NO. Probable cause do not exist to merit the order of arrest against the petitioners. For sure, the credibility
of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the State invokes its inherent right to prosecute,
are insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that matter. More importantly, the PACC
operatives who applied for a warrant to search the dwellings of Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact they
claimed that according to Umbal, it was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair. While
there may be bits of evidence against petitioners' co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of
Santiago, these do not in the least prove petitioners' complicity in the crime charged. Based on the evidence thus far
submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand
trial and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately exacts much more to
sustain a warrant for their arrest facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that
they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.