CHAPTER - 6

IHL PRINCIPLES UNDER THE INDIAN

CONSTITUTION AND DOMESTIC
LEGISLATION

6.1 IHL under Indian Constitution

The Indian Constitution does not contain any specific provision which
obliges the State to enforce or implement international treaties and conventions
including implementation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). It,
however, enjoins the State to foster respect for international law and treaty
obligations..."1 and empowers Parliament "to make laws ... for implementing
any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries...2 In
addition, Entry 14 in the Union List confers on the Parliament exclusive power
to make laws with respect to "entering into treaties and agreements with foreign
countries and implementing treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign
countries." A joint reading of all these provisions as well as-an analysis of the
case law on the subject shows that international treaties, covenants, conventions
and agreements can become part of the domestic law (municipal law) in India
only if they are specifically incorporated in the law of the land. In other words,
they are not self-operating in India; they have to be internalised and specifically
made part of the domestic law. As aptly put by Justice Krishna Iyer,

1 Article 51 (c),Indian Constitution

2 Article 253, Indian Constitution

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"International conventional law must go through the process of transformation
into municipal law before the international treaty could become an internal
law."3

A detailed analysis of the constitutional provisions and their judicial

interpretations may lead one to draw the following conclusions:4

Art. 51 which enjoins the State to foster respect for international law
and treaty obligations, does not deal with the enforcement or
implementation of treaties.
Art. 253 make it clear that treaties and covenants are not self -
operating in India. They have to be incorporated in the domestic law
for implementation.
Indian courts will not enforce the terms of a treaty or covenant unless
Parliament makes a law incorporating its provisions.
Respect for international law is displayed by a State by observing the
principles of the law in domestic law (municipal law). The courts
may apply those principles on the theory of implied adoption,
provided such principles are not inconsistent with the Constitution
and the national legislation.
If there is a conflict between international law and domestic law,
courts are bound to follow the domestic law.
In interpreting a statute, the courts would construe it in such a way as
to avoid conflict with the principles of international law. In other
words, if there is no conflict between international law and domestic

3 Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin, AIR 1980 SC 470. See also Maganbhai v. Union of India,
AIR 1969 SC 783; Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Del. 74; Gramophone Company
ofIndia Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey, AIR 1984 SC 667; Civil Rights Vigilance Committee, SLRC
College of Law, Bangalore v. Union of India, AIR 1983 Kant. 85.
4 M. K. Balachandran (Executive Director, ICHLR, New Delhi), Bulletin on IHL & Refugee Law [Vol.
1, No. 1], 1996,pp.67

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 law or where two constructions of the domestic law are possible,
Indian courts can give effect to international law by a harmonious
construction.
If the rights of the citizens or others are not affected, no legislative
measure is needed to give effect to the agreement or treaty, but
making of law is necessary when the treaty or agreement operates to
restrict the rights of citizens or others or modifies the laws of the
State.

The Constitution, however, guarantees certain fundamental human rights

to citizens as well as non-citizens, such as right to life and personal liberty,
right to equality and right against exploitation which ensure protection against
crimes against humanity, but not 'war crimes' or 'grave breaches' of the Geneva
Conventions, in the strict sense of the term. It also empowers Parliament to
make an Act of indemnity to cover illegalities committed by any person in the
service of the Union or of a State or any other person during the operation of
martial law.5 Martial law is not defined under the Constitution but its ordinary
meaning is "Rule by military authorities imposed upon a civilian population in
time of war or when civil authority is considered to be functioning inad
equately". Thus, the Article provides for indemnifying the members of the
armed forces or others connected with the maintenance or restoration of order
(civil authorities or police) within India for all acts done - any sentence passed,
punishment inflicted forfeiture ordered - within an area where martial law is in
force. An Act of Indemnity, thus passed by Parliament cannot be challenged on
the ground that it violates fundamental rights.6

Is this provision not inconsistent with the basic principles of Inter

5 Article 34. Indian Constitution

6 M. K. Balachandran, Bulletin on IHL & Refugee Law [Vol. 1, No.l],1996,pp.67

203
national Humanitarian Law? Does it not confer a license on the armed forces to
commit even: 'grave breaches' of the Conventions without being subject to any
penal sanctions?

It is, however, interesting to note that there are a few provisions in the
Constitution which have some bearing on IHL principles. The Preamble to the
Constitution which declares the general purposes for which the several
provisions in the Constitution have been made, assures "the dignity of the
individual" which is the basic objective of the IHL. Similarly, the right to life
and personal liberty, the right to equality and the right against exploitation
which are guaranteed under the Constitution to 'any person which expression
includes citizens as well as non-citizens - have close resemblance to the IHL
principles. Thus, Art. 21 of the Constitution which proclaims that "No person
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law", is a guarantee against' grave breaches' of the Conventions.
The' right to life' under this Article has been given an expansive interpretation
by the judiciary by declaring that it means something more than mere animal
existence. It would include 'right to live with human dignity'. As applied to a
prisoner this would include the right to the bare necessities of life such as
adequate nutrition, clothing, shelter, facilities for reading, writing, interviews
with members of his family and friends, subject of course to prison regulations,
if any.7 It casts an obligation upon the State to preserve the life of every person
by offering immediate medical aid to every patient, regardless of whether he is
innocent or guilty8 and to provide humane conditions in prison.9 The right to
personal liberty has been interpreted to include, inter alia, the right against

7 Francis v. Union Territory, AIR 1981 SC 746.

8 Paramanand v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 2039.
9 Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 465. See also Charles Sobraj v. Superintendent, Central
Jail, Tihar, AIR 1978 SC 1514.

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custodial violence including mental torture, psychic pressure and physical
infliction, right against handcuffing and the rights of children in jail to special
treatment. The cumulative effect of these wide interpretations is the recognition
of the prisoner's right to remain as a human being notwithstanding his
imprisonment and his entitlements to the minimum human rights. Apart from
these, the right to equality (Art. 14) and the right against exploitation (Art.
23(1)) which rights are guaranteed to all persons including non-citizens are
reflections of IHL principles in the Indian Constitution.

The principles of equality, non-discrimination and absence of arbitrari

ness in Art. 14 of the Constitution, are a clear replica of the principles of IHL
incorporated in the various Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols.10
Art. 23 of the Constitution prohibits 'traffic in human beings' and 'begar' and
other forms of 'forced labour'. These expressions have been interpreted by the
judiciary to cover various types of exploitation of the weaker sections of the
society including women and children. Thus, the expression traffic in human
beings' includes traffic in women and children for immoral or other purposes;
begar means labour or service exacted by government or a person in power
without giving any remuneration for it and 'forced labour' would include
compelling a person to give his labour or service, even when remuneration is
paid for it or is paid less than the minimum wages prescribed by law.*11

Yet another constitutional provision which has some relevance to IHL

principles is the one contained in Art. 20 which deal with certain safeguards
and protection to persons accused of crimes. This Article prohibits against
retrospective criminal law, double jeopardy and self incrimination. Some of

10 Article. 16 of the Third Geneva Convention dealing with prisoners of war.

11 Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1473, (Asiad's Case)

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these principles can be found in the Geneva Conventions also.12 Similarly, the
principles laid down in Art. 22 of the Constitution dealing with protection
against arrest and detention in certain cases are also found in some of the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions.13

Thus, even though the Constitution does not directly provide for the
implementation of IHL principles, the constitutional obligation of the judiciary
to enforce these fundamental human rights may indirectly uphold the principles
of IHL enshrined in the Geneva' Conventions.

6.2 The Geneva Conventions Act, 1960

Among the domestic legislation, the only law that directly deals with the
principles of IHL is the Geneva Conventions Act of 1960. This Act was
enacted by the Indian Parliament in view of the constitutional requirement as
well as the obligation cast by the Geneva Conventions upon the High
Contracting Parties to enact legislation necessary to provide effective penal
sanctions for persons committing or ordering to be committed any of the grave
breaches" of the Conventions as defined under them14 and "to enable effect to
be given to certain International Conventions done at Geneva on the twelfth of
August, 1949"15 under Art. 253 read with Entry 13 and 14 of List 1 of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. 'Grave breaches' are defined under each
of the Conventions 16and they include generally such acts as wilful killing,
torture or inhuman-treatment including biological experiments, wilfully causing

12 Article 99 of the Third Geneva Convention.

13 Arts. 16 and 19 cf the First and Second Geneva Conventions and Article 122 of the Third Geneva
Convention.
14 Article 49 of the First Convention, Article 50 of the Second, Article 129 of the Third and Article 146
of the Fourth Convention.
13 Preamble to the Act.
16 Article 50 of the First Convention, Article 51 of the Second, Article 130 of the Third and Article 147
of the Fourth Convention. See also Article 11 and 85 of Additional Protocol I.

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great suffering or serious'injury to body or health, extensive destruction and
appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly if committed against persons or property protected by
the Convention.17 They also include compelling a prisoner of war to serve in
the forces of the hostile power or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the Convention,18 unlawful
deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person and
taking them as hostages.19

The Act seeks to implement the Conventions so far as it is necessary so

to do and at the same time consolidates the law on the subject by repealing the
U.K. Act of 1911 (the Geneva Convention Act, 1911) in its application to India
and the Central Act of 1936 (the Geneva Convention Implementing Act, 1936)
and incorporating their provisions in the present Act. The Statement of Objects
and Reasons specifies the matters which require to be implemented by the
legislation as follows:

punishment of "grave breaches" referred to in Art. 50 of the First

Convention and equivalent articles of the succeeding Conventions;
conferment of jurisdiction on our courts to try offences under these
Conventions, even when committed by foreigners outside India;
extension of the protection given under the existing law to the Red
Cross and Geneva Cross, to two new emblems, namely, the Red
Crescent on a white ground and the Red Lion and Sun on a white
ground;
Procedural matters relating to legal representation, appeal etc.

17 Article 50 of the first Convention and Article 51 of the Second Convention.

18 Article 130 of the Third Convention.
19 Article 147 of the Fourth Convention.

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 Thus, the main objectives of the Act are to implement the provisions of
the 1949 Conventions relating to punishment for grave breaches and to prevent
and punish abuse of the Red Cross and other emblems.

The Provisions of the Act

The Act is divided into five chapters:

Chapter I deals with the title, extent and commencement of the Act and
defines certain key words such as 'Conventions', 'protected internee', 'protecting
power' and 'protected prisoner of war'.20

Chapter II provides for punishment of offenders committing grave breaches

of the Conventions21 and the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the
breaches.22 The punishment prescribed under the Act ranges from death or life
imprisonment for wilful killing of a person protected by the Conventions to
imprisonment for fourteen years for other offences.23 The jurisdiction to try the
offences is vested with the court of a Chief Presidency Magistrate (now Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate) or a Court of Sessions.24 The jurisdiction of courts-
martial under the Army Act, the Air Force Act and the Navy Act are
specifically excluded from the purview of the Act.25

Chapter III lays down the procedure of trial of protected persons and certain
Other persons and provides for giving of notice and legal representation to

20 Section 2
21 Section 3
22 Section 5
23 Section 3
24 Section 5
25 Section 7

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them.26

Chapter IV seeks to prevent the abuse of the Red Cross and other emblems
by prohibiting their use by any person without the approval of the Central
Government and provides for penalties for such abuses.27

Chapter V deals with cognizance of offences under the Act and the powers
of the central government to make rules. Section 17 of the Act specifically
prohibits the courts from taking cognizance of any offence under the Act except
on a complaint by the Government or of an officer designated by the Central
Government by notification in the official gazette.28

By section 20 of the Act, the existing law on the subject viz., the Geneva
Convention Implementing Act of 1936 was repealed and the U.K. Geneva
Convention Act of 1911 as applied to India, eased to have effect as part of the
law of India.

Analysis of the Provisions

A careful scrutiny of the provisions of the Act will reveal the fact that
the Act does not give any specific right to any person to approach the court
against violations of the Conventions; nor does it prescribe any method which
an aggrieved party must adopt to move the Municipal Court. It only deals with
punishment for grave breaches and the jurisdiction of the court to deal with
such breaches. Moreover, section 17 imposes a blanket ban on the courts from
entertaining any complaint unless it is filed by the government or an officer of
the government specified by notification, indicating thereby that an aggrieved

26 Section 8
27 Section 12 to 16
28 Section 17

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party can approach the court only through the government for enforcing the
provisions of the Act. Thus, if the violator is an agency of the government (as is
generally the case) like military or army personnel, it is most unlikely that the
government will make a complaint to the court against such violations.

This may be substantiated by quoting the case from Chile where the
soldiers who were involved in wilful killing of the supporters of the former
President, thus committing a grave breach of the Convention, were given
amnesty by the military government. In this case, however, the Appeal Court in
the country struck down the amnesty by observing that "if the country was at
war, then the regime was bound by the Geneva Conventions which was written
into the Constitution in 1989... II the Geneva Conventions superseded the
domestic laws, the court held. All the cases are reported to have been reopened
and investigations are going on.30

It is highly unsatisfactory that an aggrieved individual is prevented from

approaching the court directly or through his representatives to enforce the
provisions of the Conventions which secure certain rights and protections to
them.

The Apex Courts Observations

In the first (and probably the only) case31 that came up before the Indian
Supreme Court for the interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Act, 1960, the
court made the following observations about the efficacy of the Act:

29 M. K. Balachandran (Executive Director, ICHLR, New Delhi), Bulletin on IHL & Refugee Law [Vol.
1, No.l],1996,pp.366
30 ibid
31 Rev. Mons. Sebastian Francisco Zavier Dos Remedious Monterio v. The State of Goa, AIR 1970 SC
329 Decided on 26.3.1969

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 "... the Act by itself does not give any special remedy. It does give
indirect protection by providing for breaches of Conventions. The
Conventions are not made enforceable by the government against
itself nor does the Act give a cause of action to any party for the
enforcement of the Conventions. Thus, there is only an obligation
undertaken by the Government of India to respect the Conventions
regarding the treatment of civilian population, but there is no right
created in respect of protected persons which the court has been
asked to enforce."

The court declared:

"If there is no provision of law which the courts can enforce, the
court may be powerless and the court may have to leave the matter to
what Westlake aptly described as indignation ofmankind."

The judgment is a pointer to the need for a through revision of the

Geneva Conventions Act.

Problems of Implementation

The implementation of the Act is vested with the ordinary criminal courts
in the country. Of course, the Conventions require the High Contracting Parties
to bring the violations before their own courts for trial but since the procedure
before the ordinary criminal courts in the country is tardy and time consuming,
it is quite unlikely that the implementation will be effective if left to the
ordinary courts. This point has been very well brought out by the Supreme
Court in one of its recent pronouncements, where the court observed:

"It is common knowledge that currently in our country criminal courts

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 excel in slow motion. The procedure is dilatory, the dockets are heavy,
even the service of the process is delayed and still more exasperating,
there are appeals upon appeals and revisions and supervisory juris
dictions, baffling and baulking speedy termination of prosecutions...
And if ever the case reaches the stage of trial after all these
interruptions, the time would have taken its own toll: the witnesses are
won over; evidence disappears; the prosecution loses its interest"32

If such is the track-record of the criminal courts in the country, no

purpose will be served by vesting the trial of offences in such courts. It is
imperative, therefore, that the trial of offences under the Act should be
entrusted with specialised tribunals/courts for speedy disposal. The suggestion
is to suitably amend the Geneva Conventions Act, to provide for such a
tribunal. In this context, it may be noted that the Protection of Human Rights
Act, 1993 provides for the establishment of a Human Rights Court "for the
purpose of providing speedy trial of offences arising out of violation of human
right.33 Similar provisions can be made in the Geneva Conventions Act also.

Under the Conventions, the contracting parties are not only required to
take necessary legislative action to prevent or repress violations, but are also
obliged "to search for persons alleged to have committed or to have ordered to
have committed such grave breaches and to bring them to trial".34 It is,
therefore, suggested that an institution like the Human Rights Commission or a
separate investigating agency may be provided to be set up to undertake the
task of searching and prosecuting guilty parties. Here also, the example of the
provision in the Protection of Human Rights Act providing for the constitution

32 The Hindustan times, April 21, 195.

33 See section 30 of the Protection ofHuman Rights Act, 1993.
34 Article 49. of the First Convention and the equivalent Articles of the subsequent Conventions.

212
of special investigation teams "for purposes of investigation and prosecution of
offences arising out of violations of human rights"35 may be followed.

It is further suggested that section 17 of the Act may be suitably

amended so as to confer the right to make a complaint before the court to
private individuals or their representatives or to impartial international
organisations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to
bring to the notice of the proposed Commission such cases of grave breaches in
matters relating to international conflicts. In this context, an analogy may be
drawn from the comparable development in the field of human rights
culminating in. Article 26 of the European Convention giving private
individuals the right of appealing to the International Commission on Human
Rights in cases of human rights violations. Back home, the Protection of
Human Rights Act, 1993 empowers the Human rights Commission established
under the Act "to inquire suo motu or on a petition presented to it by a victim or
any person on his behalf into a complaint of violation of human rights.1,36

The Geneva Conventions Act and the Army Act

Under Section 7 of the Geneva Conventions Act, the jurisdiction of the

courts-martial under the Army Act of 1950, the Air-Force Act of 1950 and the
Navy Act of 1957 are specifically excluded from its purview.

What are its implications? This necessitates a detailed, analysis of the

relevant provisions of the Army Act. Under Section 69 of the Army Act, any
person who is subject to its provisions and who commits any civil offence
under any other law in force shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against
that Act and if charged with such offence, shall be liable to be tried by a court-

35 Section 37.
36 Section 12.

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martial and punished as provided in the section.37

The Act is applicable not only to those army personnel who are on active
service, but also to camp followers like carpenters, tailors, cooks etc. who are
required to follow or accompany armed personnel who are on active service in
camp, on the march or at any frontier post38 Civil offence is defined under the
Act to mean an offence which is triable by a criminal court and a criminal
court' means a court of ordinary criminal justice in any part of India.

Since grave breaches of the Conventions are civil offences triable by an

ordinary criminal court and since the persons who are likely to commit the
grave breaches' are those subject to the Army Act, such offences will squarely
fall within the ambit of section 69 of the Army Act. Thus, a person who is
subject to the Army Act, if guilty of committing any of the grave breaches of
the Conventions, he is to be tried by court-martial and not by the ordinary
criminal court as envisaged under the Geneva Conventions Act and punished
accordingly. In the ultimate analysis, therefore, it may appear that although the
jurisdiction to try offences of grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions
Act is vested with the ordinary criminal courts in the country, such offences are
likely to be tried only by court-martial and not by ordinary courts, in view of
section 69 of the Army Act. However, it need not necessarily be so, because
section 69 has to be read along with sections 125 and 126 of the Act and a
combined reading of these three sections will make the legal position clear.
Under the scheme of these sections, when a criminal court and court-martial
has concurrent jurisdiction in respect of an offence, in the first instance it is left
to the discretion of the army authority under section 125 to decide whether the

37 The corresponding provisions in other legislation are: Section 71 of the Air Force Act, Sections 77 and
78(1) of the Navy Act, Section 46 of the BSF Act and Section 49 of the Coast Guards Act.
38 Gopal Upadhyaya v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 413.

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accused should be tried by a criminal court or court-martial and if the authority
decides that he should be tried before a court-martial, the accused is to be
detained in military custody.

However, when a criminal court having jurisdiction is of opinion that the

proceedings shall be instituted before itself, it can by written notice require the
concerned military authority either to deliver over the offender to the nearest
Magistrate to be proceeded against according to law or to postpone proceedings
pending a reference to the Central Government. On receipt of such a requisition
from a criminal court, the authority is required to exercise his option and in
case he decides to make a reference to the Central Government as to the court
before which the proceedings are to be instituted, the order of the Central
Government shall be final.39

The Supreme Court while interpreting these provisions in the Army Act,
bas categorically declared that "it (the Army Act) does not bar the jurisdiction
of criminal courts in respect of acts or omissions punishable under any other
law in force in India, nor is it possible to infer any prohibition by necessary
implication"40

Under Section 475(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the central

government has framed 'the Criminal Courts and Court-Martial (Adjustment of
jurisdiction) Rules, 1978. These rules prescribe the procedure to be followed by
a Magistrate when a person subject to the military, naval, air force or coast
guard law or any other law relating to the Armed Forces of the Union is
brought before him and charged with an offence for which both the criminal

39 Section 126 (1)

40 Major E. G, Barsay v. State ofBombay, AIR 1961 SC 1762.

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court as well the court martial have concurrent jurisdiction.41

The combined effect of the statutory provisions under sections 125 and
126 of the Army Act and the rules framed under the Criminal Procedure Code
may be summed up as follows:42

If a person commits an offence for which he could be tried under the

Criminal Procedure Code and also by a court-martial, it will be for
the military authority to decide whether he should be tried by a court-
martial or a criminal court.
If the authority decides that he should be tried by a court-martial, the
magistrate on an application to him, must deliver the accused, if he is
brought before him, for being tried by a court-martial.
When the criminal court is of opinion that the offender should be
tried before it, it can make a written request to the military authority
to hand over the offender to it for trial.
When the military authorities do not wish to hand over the offender
to the criminal court, they should make a reference to the central
government whose decision shall be final and binding on both the
parties.
Once the accused is handed over to military authority for trial, the
rules provide that the accused must either be tried by a court martial
or some other effectual proceedings must be taken against him.
To ensure that effectual proceedings are taken against the accused,
the rules require the military authority to inform the magistrate of
what proceedings have been taken against the accused.

41
M. K. Balachandran, Bulletin on IHL & Refugee Law [Vol. 1, No.l],1996,pp.97
42
ibid

216
 If no effectual proceedings are taken by the military authority within
a reasonable time, the Magistrate is required to report the
circumstances to the state government which may in consultation
with the central government take appropriate steps to ensure that the
accused The constitutional validity of Section 125 of the Army Act
was challenged before the Supreme Court on the ground that its
provisions are discriminatory and are violative of Art. 14 of the
Constitution in as much as it is left to the unguided discretion of the
military authority to decide whether the accused should be tried by a
court-martial or criminal court. The court rejected the contention and
upheld the validity of the section by holding that the discretion was
not unguided.

The Manual of Military Law published by the government of India has

laid down some guidelines or principles on which the military authority is
required to exercise the discretion vested in it under section 125 of the Act.43

It may, therefore, be seen that the offences of grave breaches under the
Geneva Conventions Act if committed by persons subject to the Army Act may
fall within the scope of section 69 of the Army Act, to be tried by court-martial;
but it does not bar the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal court to try such
offences as envisaged under the Geneva Conventions Act, if the required
procedure laid down under section 125 and 126 as well as the rules under the
Criminal Courts and Court-Martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1978
are followed. It may also be seen that the provisions in the rules which require
the Military authority to inform the magistrate of the action taken against the
accused and the duty of the Magistrate to report to the state government if no

43 Manual of Military Law, Vol.l (1983) pp.87-88.

217
effectual proceedings are taken against the accused will have a "compelling
effect on the military authority to try the accused or take effectual proceedings
against him. This might ensure effective action against offenders of grave
breaches' of the Geneva Conventions also, whether they are tried by a court-
martial or by an ordinary criminal court as envisaged under the Geneva
Conventions Act, 1960.

6.3 Other Legislation

The Indian Penal Code provides penal sanctions for a large number of
offences against persons and property committed by individuals but there is no
reference to armed conflicts in relation to any such offences. They include
crimes against humanity, infringement of human rights and-those offences
relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force44, but do not deal with' grave
breaches' mentioned in the Geneva Conventions. Some of the offences,
however, resemble the grave breaches' as defined in the Conventions, such as
culpable homicide causing death by doing an act with the intention of causing
death (wilful killing under the Convention) or grievous hurt voluntarily
causing grievous hurt (torture under the Conventions), but since they relate to
offences committed by individuals without reference to war crimes, they may
not fit under the category of violations of International Humanitarian Law.

44 Section 131-140 ofIPC.

218