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Uson v. Del Rosario
Law in force at time of decedents death determines who
the heirs should be. - Maria Unson was the legal wife of
Faustino Nebrada. Faustino died in 1945 leaving 5 parcels
of land with no other heir except his legal wife.
- However, it was the common-life, Maria del Rosario who
took possession of the lands, depriving Unson the
enjoyment and possession of the same.
- Thus, the legal wife filed a case for recovery of ownership
and possession of the said parcels of land against del
Rosario.
- Maria de Rosario contended that Unson and Faustino
agreed to separate some time in 1931. Unson was given a
parcel of land as alimony on the condition that the latter will Under Art. 776, inheritance includes all the property, rights,
renounce her right to inherit any property that may be left by and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
the husband upon his death.
- Whether or not Unson is entitled to recover the parcels of
land in question.
- The SC held for Maria Unson.
- The Civil Code provides that the inheritance of a person is on the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise
transmitted to another at the moment of his death.
- Accordingly, the Supreme Court said that the parcels of
land of Faustino passed from the moment of his death to
his only heir, Maria Unson.
- The contention that Unson and Faustino agreed that the
former would NOT inherit anything from the latter cannot
be made effectual. Future inheritance cannot be validly
made the subject of any contract nor can it be renounced.
- Del Rosario also argued that her illegitimate children with
Faustino have the right to inherit by virtue of the provision
of the new Civil Code granting successional rights to
illegitimate children.
- Said argument is untenable. It is true that the new Civil
Code grants successional rights to illegitimate children and After the death of Lorenza, Feliciano Sr. cohabited with Paz
that this right shall be given retroactive effect even though
the event which gave rise to said right may have occurred
under the former legislation. (Faustino died in 1945, The
NCC took effect in 1950).
- However, according to the NCC, this new right must not
prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right.
- In this case, and as already explained, the right over the
parcels of land vested upon Unson from the moment of
death of Faustino. Thus, the new right cannot be enforced
w/out prejudice to Unsons vested right over the properties.
- Rights over the inheritance of a person are transmitted
upon his death to another.
- The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of death
of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same
before his death.
Ledesma v. McLachlin
FACTS: A has a child B who has a child C. B is indebted
to a stranger, but dies before he pays the same. A then
died, leaving C as heir. In As intestate proceedings, the
stranger presents his claim for the credit. Question: Is C
bound to pay for the debt, or will As estate answer, or will
no one be held responsible?
HELD: Neither As estate nor C is liable, for neither
contracted the debt, nor may it be said that C is inheriting
from B for the truth is, C in the case presented, is
inheriting only from A. Therefore, the creditor-stranger must
shoulder the loss himself.
Rabadilla v. CA
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by
virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs,
at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent, corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil
transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
COJA VS CA
Facts: Luz Aquillo Victor (hereafter Luz) and Feliciano
Aquillo, Jr. (hereafter Feliciano Jr.), both deceased, were
the legitimate children of the late spouses Feliciano Aquillo,
Sr. (hereafter Feliciano Sr.) and Lorenza Mangarin Aquillo
(hereafter Lorenza). During their marriage, Feliciano Sr.
and Lorenza acquired a 120-square meter lot located at
Poblacion, Mandaon, Masbate, upon which they built their
conjugal home. The subject lot was covered by Tax
Declaration issued in the name of Feliciano Sr.
Lachica and lived at the aforesaid house. However, after
Lorenzas death, her heirs failed to partition their hereditary
shares in their inheritance.
On February 27, 1960, while Lorenza was cohabiting with
Feliciano Sr., Paz Lachica purchased a 192-square meter
lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 02115 from the heirs of
Juan Rivas. She later sold 40.10 square meters of the
property to Isabel L. de Real leaving her with only 151.9
square meters.
On July 7, 1965, or two (2) days before he died, Feliciano
Sr. married Paz Lachica. After Feliciano Sr. died, his heirs
also failed to partition among themselves their hereditary
shares in their inheritance.
On December 18, 1986, Paz Lachica and herein
petitioners, Spouses Charlito Coja and Annie Mesa Coja,

executed a Deed of Absolute Sale wherein the former sold
the 336-square meter parcel of land to the latter. Charlito
Coja filed an application for the issuance of title with the
Regional Trial Court Luz, being one of the heirs of Feliciano
Sr., opposed the application for registration. During the
pendency of the case, Luz died. She was substituted by her
spouse, Quinciano Victor, Sr., and her children, Lorna,
Antonio, Quinciano Jr., and Susana, all surnamed Victor.
On November 3, 1989, respondents filed an action for
recovery of possession and ownership with damages
against the petitioners and Paz Lachica.
Issue: WON TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION IS NOT
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY OF THE
COUPLE, THE LATE SPOUSES FELICIANO AQUILLO
AND LORENZA MANGARIN.
Ruling: Article 160 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
All properties acquired during the marriage are thus
disputably presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
As a condition for the operation of above article, in favor of
the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the
presumption must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage.
Under Article 996 of the Civil Code, upon the death of
Lorenza Mangarin, one-half of said property, or 60 square
meters, is transmitted to her heirs, namely: Feliciano
Aquillo, Sr., Feliciano Aquillo, Jr., and Luz Aquillo, at 20
square meters each, while the remaining one-half is
transmitted to Feliciano Aquillo, Sr. Upon the death of
Feliciano Aquillo, Sr., his rights over the property, consisting
of the 20 square meter-inheritance from his late wife and
his 60 square meter-share in the conjugal partnership, or a
total of 80 square meters were transmitted to his heirs,
namely: Feliciano Aquillo, Jr., Luz Aquillo, and his widow,
Paz Lachica. The surviving spouse is entitled to the same
share as that of the legitimate children, to the portion of
one-third each or 26.6666 square meters each x x x. Thus,
as a result of the death of Feliciano Aquillo, Sr., a regime of
co-ownership exists among Feliciano, Jr., Luz Aquillo, and
Paz Lachica, with respect to the undivided 80 square
meters of the property covered by Tax Declaration No.
1151.
The 120 square meters less the hereditary share of Paz
Lachica which is 26.6666 square meters, or the 93.3333
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square meters of the property covered by Tax Declaration
No. 1151, belong to the appellants, being the heirs of the
late Feliciano Aquillo, Jr. and Luz Aquillo. Considering that
Paz Lachica owns only 26.6666 square meters of the 120-
square meter property and the remaining 93.3333-square
meter portion thereof is owned by the respondents, the
former could only validly sell the portion which rightfully
belonged to her. However, considering that Paz Lachica,
the predecessor-in-interest of the Spouses Coja, was a co-
owner of the subject 120-square meter property; and
considering further that partition of the property is wanting,
this Court is precluded from directing the Spouses Coja to
return specific portions of the property to respondents.
REYES ET AL VS CA
Facts: On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his
last will and testament declaring therein in part, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion "Oning" R.
Reyes the following properties to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting
among others of jewelries, coins, antiques, statues,
tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all
the real estates I own in common with my brother Jose,
situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog,
Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camigiun; real estates in Lunao,
Gingoog, Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc,
Kinoguitan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Talisay, all in the province
of Misamis Oriental.
Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private
respondent filed a petition for probate of the will. On July
21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato
Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and
Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the deceased's natural
children with Celsa Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape,
filed an opposition with the following allegations: a) that the
last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and
attested in accordance with the formalities of law; and b)
that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper
influence upon the testator at the time of the execution of
the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was
never married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes,
the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the
latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then
alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus,
Asuncion can not be a compulsory heir for her open
cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals.

Issue: WON the testators invalid marriage which was not
expressly provided in the will, will affect the validity of his
last will.
Ruling: In the elegant language of Justice Moreland written
decades ago, he
said A will is the testator speaking after death. Its
provisions have substantially the same force and effect in
the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in
full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they
appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law
in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and
testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and
the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them
to do so. . . . All doubts must be resolved in favor of the
testator's having meant just what he said. (Santos vs.
Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he
was bequeathing some of his personal and real properties
to his wife, Asuncion "Oning" Reyes. There was never an
open admission of any illicit relationship. The trial court
relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that
Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the time
she cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of the
witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to
the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed
husband of Asuncion.
8. NEPOMUCENO VS CA
Facts: Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein
he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only
executor. It was also provided therein that he was married
to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.
Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal
wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was
procured through improper and undue influence and that
there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.
The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the
testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will
invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held
that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the
petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and
1028.
Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic
validity of a will
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RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that
the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This
general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself
admitted on its face the relationship between the testator
and the petitioner.
The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the
court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the
nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only
since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily
look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a
donation made between persons guilty of
adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under
Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.
9. ENRIQUEZ VS ABADIA
Facts: Andres Enriquez, as one of the legatees in a
document purporting to be the last will and testament of
Father Sancho Abadia, which was executed on September
6, 1923, filed a petition for its probate. Some cousins and
nephews of the deceased, who would inherit his estate if he
left no will, filed opposition. The trial court ruled in favor of
Enriquez, stating that even if the said document is a
holographic will, one which is not permitted by law at the
time it was executed and at the time of the testators death,
such form of a will is already allowed at the time of the
hearing of the case since the new Civil Code is already
enforced, and that to carry out the intention of the testator
which according to the trial court is the controlling factor
and may override any defect in form. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the reckoning period in deciding the validity
of the holographic will of Rev. Sanchio, the time of the
hearing of the case shall be considered and not the time of
its execution.
Ruling: No. The validity of a will is to be judged not by the
law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time
the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when
the petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was execute, as supported by Art. 795 of the
new Civil Code. One reason in support of the rule is that
although the will operates upon and after the death of the
testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of
his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given

solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in
reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed
act. When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to
observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its
execution then upon his death he should be regarded and
declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then
inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with
more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such
requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate
a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested
rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general
rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills. Hence,
the trial courts decision was reversed.
10. JIMENEZ VS FERNANDEZ
Facts: The land in question (2, 932 sqm) formerly belonged
to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez had 2 sons, Carlos and
Fortunato. Fortunato predeceased Fermin leaving behind a
daughter, Sulpicia. After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the
entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the
name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and
niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso. Carlos Jimenez died on
July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia
Cayabyab, also known as Melecia Jimenez, took
possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting
of 436 square meters. Melecia Jimenez sold said 436
square meter-portion of the property to Edilberto Cagampan
and defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled
"Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the former
transferred said 436 square meter-portion to the latter, who
has been in occupation since August 1969 -- PET executed
an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of the
property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon
manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased
uncle. A TCT was then issued in petitioner's name alone
over the entire 2,932 square meter property. PET, joined by
her husband, instituted the present action for the recovery
of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436
square meters occupied by defendant Teodora Grado and
her son.
Issue: WON Melecia Cayabyab had any right over the
eastern part of the property she took possession of and
later sold.
Ruling: Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos
Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the property in
question. Respondents failed to present concrete evidence
to prove that Melecia Cayabyab was really the daughter of
Carlos Jimenez. Assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was the
illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no
question that Melecia Cayabyab had no right to succeed to
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the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly
acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that
portion of the property subject of this petition.
AZNAR VS GARCIA
Facts:
Helen Christensen Garcia filed a petition for review to the
Supreme Court the decision of the lower court in Davao
declaring that Maria Lucy Christensen is the sole heir of
testator Edward Christensen. Facts of the case are as
follows:
1. Edward Christensen was born in New York but he
migrated to California where he resided for a period
of 9 years.
2. He came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until his death.
3. In his will, he declared to have only one child
(natural daughter) Maria Lucy Christensen as his
only heir
4. However, he left a sum of money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia, an acknowledged natural child,
though not in any way related to the deceased.
5. Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of
the Civil Code, California law should be applied;
that under California law, the matter is referred
back to the law of the domicile.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be
applied in determining the successional rights of his heirs.
HELD:
Yes. Article 16 of the Civil Code states that succesional
rights are determined by the national law of the country
where the deceased is a citizen hence the internal law of
California since it was ruled that Edward Christensen is a
citizen of California.
Said internal law distinguishes the rule to be applied to
Californians domiciled in California and for Californians
domiciled outside of California. For Californians residing in
other jurisdiction, the law of said country must apply.
Edward Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the
law of his domicile must be followed. The case was
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the
determination of the successional rights under Philippine
law only.
MICIANO V. BRIMO
- The subject of this case is the partition of the estate of the
late Joseph Brimo.
- Miciano, the appointed judicial administrator, filed a
partition scheme.
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- Andre Brimo, one of Josephs borthers, opposed stating counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce
that the partition was not in accordance with Turkish laws, became final.
Jospeh being a Turkish citizen.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo
- Andre contends that this was void because the Civil Code
married Alicia Fortuno. They had three children.
states that legal and testamentary successions shall be
governed by the national law of the person whose In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where
succession is in question. he left all his estate to Alicia and their children (nothing for
Paula). In 1983, he went to court for the wills probate and
- Andre was excluded from as a legatee because of a to have Alicia as the administratrix of his property. In 1985,
clause in the will where Joseph wished that his property be before the probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo
distributed in accordance with Philippine laws, and any died. Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration
legatee who fails to comply with this would be prevented over Lorenzos estate.
from receiving his legacy. The trial court ruled that Lorenzos marriage with Alicia is
void because the divorce he obtained abroad is void. The
- Since the institution of legatees was conditioned upon trial court ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a Filipino hence
Josephs wish, it is claimed that Andre is excluded by divorce is not applicable to him. The Court of Appeals
questioning the validity of applying Philippine laws in the affirmed the trial court.
partition of the estate (which was against his brothers
wish). ISSUES: Whether or not Lorenzos divorce abroad should
be recognized.
WON Andre Brimo can be validly excluded as a legatee. HELD: Yes. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo
became an American citizen in 1943. Hence, when he
- NO. The condition imposed by the will of the testator is obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an
contrary to law because it ignores the testators national American citizen. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:
law, when according to the Civil Code, such national law of
the testator is to govern his testamentary dispositions. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
- As such, the condition is considered unwritten and the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
institution of legatees in the will is unconditional and Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philipine laws
consequently valid and effective even as to Andre. relating to family rights, duties, or status are no longer
applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he
- The remaining clauses of the will are valid despite the obtained abroad must be respected. The rule is: aliens may
nullity of the clause stating that the testators testamentary obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to
dispositions be governed by Philippine laws. their national law.
However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so
- Art. 792, (Old) Civil Code: Impossible conditions and those
as for the latter to determine the effects of the divorce as to
contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
the successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise Anent the issue on Lorenzos last will and testament, it must
provide. be respected. He is an alien and is not covered by our laws
on succession. However, since the will was submitted to
LLORENTE VS CA our courts for probate, then the case was remanded to the
lower court where the foreign law must be alleged in order
In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in to prove the validity of the will.
the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and Paula Llorente got married
in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American
citizen. Nepomuceno v. CA
In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. FACTS:
He discovered that Paula was already living illicitly with Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last
Ceferino Llorente (brother of Lorenzo). Ceferino and Paula Will and Testament before he died. Petitioner was named
even had a son. as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was
Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had
give her monetary support. Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula two legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his
agreed in writing Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the
if the latter agrees to waive all monetary support from petitioner were married despite the subsisting first marriage.
Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the United States. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to
petitioner. On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition
In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula
for probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her
in California. Paula was represented by an American
children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper

influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the
execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and
that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage
with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on
the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to
cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On
June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of
the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid
except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and
void.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after
declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased
Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision.
HELD:
No. The respondent court acted within its
jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn,
it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and
declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's
area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of
the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not
inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the
Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v.
Nuguid)
The Will is void under Article 739. The following
donations shall be void: (1) Those made between persons
who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned
in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply
to testamentary provisions.
There is no question from the records about the
fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed
his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
Reyes v. CA
281 SCRA 277 | Tan
FACTS:
This case involves a 383 sq.m. parcel of land
owned by pettitioners and respondents father. Petitioner
alleges that a Deed of Exrajudicial Partition (Deed) was
entered into between him and the respondents. Petitioner
managed to register 335 sq.m. of the land under his name;
while 50 sq.m. of the land was registered under the name of
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his sister, Paula (one of the respondents). After discovering
the registration of the Deed, respondents denied having
knowledge of its execution and disclaimed having signed
the same; nor did they ever waive their rights, shares and
interest in the subject parcel of land. According to
respondents, subject Deed was fraudulently prepared by
petitioner and that their signatures thereon were forged.
They also assert that one Atty. Jose Villena, the Notary
Public who notarized the said Deed was not even
registered in the list of accredited Notaries Public of Pasay
City.
Thereafter, petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale selling 240 square meters of the land to his children.
After the property was partitioned, petitioner, his children
and private respondent Paula allegedly executed a Deed of
Co-owners' Partition dividing the property among
themselves. This led the respondents to file a Complaint for
"Annulment of Sale and Damages With Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order" before the RTC,
which ruled that private respondents' signatures on the
questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement
were indeed forged and simulated. The CA affirmed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Deed was forged.
2. Whether petitioner(s) had become absolute owners of
the subject property by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
RULING:
1. YES. Petitioner(s) cast doubt on the findings of the
lower court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
regarding the existence of forgery. Factual findings of
the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal. Petitioners' ludicrous claim that
private respondents imputed no deception on his part
but only forgery of the subject Deed and the simulation
of their signatures is nothing short of being oxymoronic.
For what is forgery and simulation of signatures if not
arrant deception! The allegation made by petitioner that
the execution of a public document ratified before a
notary public cannot be impugned by the mere denial of
the signatory is baseless. It should be noted that there
was a finding that the subject Deed was notarized by
one Atty. Villena who at that time was not
commissioned as a notary in Pasay City.
2. NO. Petitioners cannot justify their ownership and
possession of the subject parcel of land since they
could not ave been possessors in good faith of the
subject parcel of land considering the finding that at the
very inception they forged the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition and Settlement which they claim to be the
basis for their just title. Having forged the Deed and
simulated the signatures of private respondents,
petitioners, in fact, are in bad faith. The forged Deed
containing private respondents' simulated signatures is
a nullity and cannot serve as a just title. There can be
no acquisitive prescription considering that the parcel of
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land in dispute is titled property, i.e., titled in the name Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired
of the late Bernardino Reyes, the father of both Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which,
petitioner Florentino and the private respondents. Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses that the document is her last will and testament.
Dorotheo v. CA She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said
document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1,
FACTS: 2 and 4 thereof.
Private respondents were the legitimate children of
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia
1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa
thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, and his wife Corazon Laza and their children Luna and
petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew whom she
before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know
the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued and treated Paciencia as his own mother.
an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private
respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they
filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981),
trial court granted the motion and issued an order. Paciencia left for USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo and
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In the interim, the
she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they
were not married to each other.
More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr.
Later on, Judge Zain B. Angas set aside the final
27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua,
and executory Order, as well as the Order directing the
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for
issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the
the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.
order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in
character.
On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed
ISSUE: an opposition to Lorenzos petition. Antonio averred that the
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but properties subject of Paciencias Will belong to Nicomeda
declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia
and executory still be given effect? had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. Also, one of the
petitioners, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the
HELD: state of being mangulyan or forgetful making her unfit for
No. A final and executory decision or order can no executing a will and that the execution of the will had been
longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it procured by undue and improper pressure and influence.
may be. In setting aside the Order that has attained finality,
the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made
by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of
cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a Administration in Lorenzos favor arguing that Lorenzo was
superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and
of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of
ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.
erroneous, is binding on the whole world.

Dorotheo v. CA
Due execution of a will includes a determination of whether
the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time
of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and
was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue
influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that
he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a
person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.
Baltazar vs. Laxa
FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made
her last will and testament in the Pampango dialect on
RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and
concluded that when Paciencia signed the will, she was no
longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of
mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA
reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the probate
of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a petition for
review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the
will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for
probate.

HELD: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will
shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by
law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all
present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation
clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and
subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of
one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the
signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although
they question of her state of mind when she signed the
same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at
the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of
the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA
that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a
person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of
unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the NCC states: To be
of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in
full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind
be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was
able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty,
and the character of the testamentary act.
AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS and CASTILLO
FACTS: On 10 April 1984, petitioner Felix Azuela (son of
the cousin of the decedent) fi led a petition to probate the
notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila. The will, consisting of two (2) pages
and written in the vernacular Pilipino, was witnessed by
three witnesses who affi xed their signatures on the left-
hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom
of the attestation clause. The petition was opposed by
Geralda Castillo who represented herself as the attorney-in-
fact of the 12 legitimate heirs of the decedent.
Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery, and that
the true purpose of its emergence was so it could be
utilized as a defense in the case fi led by oppositor against
petitioner for forcible entry and usurpation of real property,
all centering on petitioners right to occupy the properties of
the decedent. Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that
the will was not executed and attested to in accordance
with law. She pointed out that decedents signature did not
appear on the second page of the will, and the will was
not properly acknowledged.
ISSUE: Was the will fatally defective since the attestation
clause did not state the number of pages of the will and that
is was signed by the witnesses on the left margin?
HELD: Yes, the will is fatally defective. Re Number of
Pages: The attestation clause failed to state the number of
pages of the will. As held in Uy Coque v. Navas L.
8
Sioca (43 Phil., 405), the Court noted that among the
defects of the will in question was the failure of the
attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in
the will. In ruling that the will could not be admitted to
probate, the Court said: The purpose of requiring the
number of sheets to be stated in the attestation
clause is obvious; the document might easily be so
prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely
change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the
absence of a statement of the total number of sheets, such
removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and
changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets or
pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets
is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the
document will involve the inserting of new pages and the
forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the
margin, a matter attended with much greater diffi culty.
The case of Taboada v. Hon. Rosal wherein the Court
allowed the will to probate despite the fact that the
attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the
will is not applicable. This is so because although the
attestation in the subject Will did not state the number of
pages used in the will, the same was found in the last part
of the body of the Will. The attestation clause must
contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages
composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it
will have the effect of invalidating the will if the defi ciency
cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a
consideration or examination of the will itself.
The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the
number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard
against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of
its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the
pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates
with the absence of an averment on the part of the
instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted
the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just
witnessed and subscribed to.
Re Signature of Witnesses: While the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of
the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation
clause. Cagro v. Cagro is applicable in this case. While
three (3) Justices considered the signature requirement had
been substantially complied with, a majority of six (6),
speaking through Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the
attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering
the will fatally defective. There is no question that the
signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear
at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page
containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-
hand margin. The attestation clause is a memorandum of
the facts attending the execution of the will required by law
to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must
necessarily bear their signatures. The string of mortal
defects which the will in question suffers from makes the
probate denial inexorable.

ORTEGA V. VALMONTE
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the
United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who
was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of
wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last
will and testament written in English and consisting of 2
pages, and dated 15 June 1983but acknowledged only on
9 August 1983. The allowance to probate of this will was
opposed by Leticia, Placidos sister. According to the notary
public who notarized the testators will, after the testator
instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on
the will, the notary public told them to come back on 15
August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator and
his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary
public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to
come back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution was
actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no longer
changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he
did not like the document to appear dirty.
Petitioners argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido
was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound
mind.
2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3
attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it.
Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of
the execution and the attestation of the will.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he
allegedly executed the will.
2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by
fraud or trickery.
HELD:
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to
identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the
extent of his shares in them and even their location. As
regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was
sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary.
The omission of some relatives from the will did not
affect its formal validity. There being no showing of
fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes
irrelevant.
2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or
pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may
be of such character that the testator is misled or
deceived as to the nature or contents of the document
which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic
fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which
the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for
fraud, he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of
proving the existence of fraud at the time of its
execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the
9
proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible
evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due
execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the
dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the
document, because the law does not even require
that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged
on the same occasion. The variance in the dates of
the will as to its supposed execution and attestation
was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the
notary public and instrumental witnesses.
JABONETA VS. GUSTILO
In these proceedings, the will of Mario Jaboneta was
denied probate by the lower court on the ground that
Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not attach his
signature thereto in the presence of Jena, another of the
witnesses. It is admitted that after the testator and the
witnesses Jalbuena and Jena had signed the will and all
of the pages thereof, the latter stood up and left the room
just as the third witness Javellana was signing the will
and all of the pages thereof. The question now is did
Javellana sign his name in the presence of Jena as
Required by law?
According to the Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Carson:
We cannot agree with so much of the above fi nding of
the facts as holds that the signature of Javellana was not
signed in the presence of Jena. The fact that Jena was
still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand
and pen in the act of affi xing his signature to the will,
taken together with the testimony of the remaining
witnesses, which shows that Javellana did in fact there
and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the
signature was affi xed in the presence of Jena. The fact
that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was
turned, while a portion of the name of the witness was
being written is of no importance. He, with the other
witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the
purpose of executing the testament, and were together in
the same room for that purpose and at the moment
when the witness, Javellana signed the document he was
actually and physically present and in such position with
relation to Javellana that he could see everything which
took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper
direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent
his doing so, therefore, we are of the opinion that the
document was in fact signed before he fi nally left the
room. This conclusion is in accordance with American
authorities which hold that the true test of presence of the
testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not
whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether
they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to
do so, considering their mental and physical condition
and position with relation to each other at the moment of
inscription of each signature.

CANEDA V. CA
- On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower
without any children and already in the twilight years of his
life, executed a last will and testament at his residence
before 3 witnesses.
- He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.
- In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by
way of legacies and devises his real and personal
properties to several people all of whom do not appear to
be related to the testator.
- 4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case
seeking the probate of his last will and testament, but
numerous postponements pushed back the initial hearing
of the probate court regarding the will.
- On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his
petition could finally be heard by the probate court.
- Thereafter one of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought
his appointment as special administrator of the testators
estate.
- Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and
nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition for
intestate proceedings. They also opposed the probate of
the testators will and the appointment of a special
administrator for his estate.
- Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William
Cabrera as special administrator and gave an order that the
testate proceedings for the probate of the will had to be
heard and resolved first.
- In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to
the allowance of the testators will on the ground that on
the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already
in poor state of health such that he could not have possibly
executed the same. Also the genuineness of the signature
of the testator is in doubt.
- On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the
notary public testified that the testator executed the will in
question in their presence while he was of sound and
disposing mind and that the testator was in good health
and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution
of his will.
- Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will
in question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo
Caballero.
- CA affirmed the probate courts decision stating that it
substantially complies with Article 805. Hence this appeal.
WON, the attestation clause in the will of the testator is
fatally defective or can be cured under the art. 809.
- No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law.
10
- Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to
809. The will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the attesting witnesses. The attestation
clause need not be written in a language known to the
testator or even to the attesting witnesses.
- It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts
surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by
the witnesses it gives affirmation to the fact that
compliance with the essential formalities required by law
has been observed.
- The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal
guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the
authenticity thereof.
- It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in
the will failed to specifically state the fact that the attesting
witnesses witnessed the testator sign the will and all its
pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses,
likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other. And the Court
agrees.
- The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the
circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their
respective signatures to the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
- The phrase, and he has signed the same and every page
thereof, on the space provided for his signature and on the
left hand margin, obviously refers to the testator and not
the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded
by the words as his last will and testament.
- Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed
the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. That the absence of the
statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection
which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will
that is here sought to be probated.
- Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because
the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the
attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will
in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
defect in this case is not only with respect to the form or
the language of the attestation clause. The defects must
be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself
which is clearly lacking in this case.
- Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case
for the intestate proceedings shall be revived.
- Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will
when it does not pertain to the form or language of the will.
This is because there is not substantial compliance with
Article 805.

ECHAVEZ VS DOZEN CONSTRUCTION
FACTS
Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of the
subject lots donated to petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel)
through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa, sans attestation
clause, acknowledged before a notary public. Manuel
accepted the donation. Vicente sold the same lots in favor
of Dozen Construction and Development Corporation
(Dozen Corporation). Manuel filed a petition to approve
Vicentes donation mortis causa in his favor and an action
to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of
Dozen Corporation.
ISSUE Whether or not the donation mortis causa is valid
despite the non-conformity with the formalities of a will.
RULING
NO. A donation mortis causa must comply with the
formalities prescribed by law for the validity of
wills, otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no
effect. Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code should have
been applied. Although the witnesses in the present case
acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis
Causa before the notary public, this is not the avowal the
law requires from the instrumental witnesses to the
execution of a decedents will. Hence, the donation is void,
while the sale to Dozen Construction is valid.
CRUZ V. VILLASOR
FACTS:
The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of Valente Z.
Cruzs last will and testament. His surviving spouse,
Agapita Cruz, opposed the allowance of the will alleging it
was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and
undue influence; that the said instrument was execute
without the testator having been fully informed of the
content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was
disposing and that the supposed last will and testament
was not executed in accordance with law. Agapita appealed
the allowance of the will by certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the will was executed in accordance with law
(particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the NCC, the first
requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and
subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator
and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary
public.).
HELD:
NO. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will,
one of them (Atty. Teves) is at the same time the Notary
Public before whom the will was supposed to have been
acknowledged. The notary public before whom the will was
11
acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before
himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before
means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma; Castro v. Castro); to
own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in
front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if
the third witness were the notary public himself, he would
have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in
front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot
split his personality into two so that one will appear before
the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of
the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be
sanctioning a sheer absurdity. Furthermore, the function of
a notary public is, among others, to guard against any
illegal or immoral arrangement (Balinon v. De Leon). That
function would defeated if the notary public were one of the
attesting instrumental witnesses. It would place him in
inconsistent position and the very purpose of
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be
thwarted.
Admittedly, there are American precedents holding
that notary public may, in addition, act as a witness to the
executive of the document he has notarized. There are
others holding that his signing merely as notary in a will
nonetheless makes him a witness thereon. But these
authorities do not serve the purpose of the law in this
jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein because
the notaries public and witnesses referred to in these cases
merely acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting
witnesses, and not as acknowledging witnesses. Here, the
notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also
acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article
805-06. Probate of will set aside.
Alvarado v. Gaviola
226 SCRA 347 | JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWER
FACTS:
On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado
executed a notarial will entitled Huling Habilin wherein he
disinherited an illegitimate son, petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and
expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the
time awaiting probate before the RTC of Laguna.
According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he
was present when the said notarial will was executed, together
with three instrumental witnesses and the notary public, where
the testator did not read the will himself, suffering as he did
from glaucoma.
Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and
read the same aloud before the testator, the three instrumental
witnesses and the notary public, the latter four following the
reading with their own respective copies previously furnished
them.
Thereafter, a codicil entitled Kasulatan ng Pagbabago
ng Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa
Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado was executed changing

some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the
testators eye operation.
Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado
and was read in the same manner as with the previously
executed will.
When the notarial will was submitted to the court for
probate, Cesar Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the
will was not executed and attested as required by law; that the
testator was insane or mentally incapacitated due to senility and
old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of
fear or threats; that it was procured by undue pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiary; and that the signature of
the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
ISSUE:
W/N notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to
probate despite allegations of defects in the execution and
attestation thereof as testator was allegedly blind at the time of
execution and the double-reading requirement under Art. 808 of
the NCC was not complied with.
HELD:
YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the
letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with
the substantial requirements of law in order to insure the
authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be
brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which,
when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will.
Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father
was not totally blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will
and codicil were executed, but he can be so considered for
purposes of Art. 808.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.
However, in the case at bar, there was substantial
compliance where the purpose of the law has been satisfied:
that of making the provisions known to the testator who is blind
or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate)
and enabling him to object if they do not accord with his wishes.
Rino read the testators will and codicil aloud in the
presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and
the notary public.
Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed,
upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his
instructions.
Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take
place.
There is no evidence that the contents of the will and
the codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated
to the testator.
With four persons, mostly known to the testator,
following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can
be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured
that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on
the typewritten documents.
12
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the
will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will
to himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they
are not in accordance with his wishes.
Although there should be strict compliance with the
substantial requirements of law in order to insure the
authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be
brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which,
when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will.
DE LA CERNA V. POTOT
-
Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca,
executed a joint last will ad testament where they willed
that their 2 parcels of land be given to Manuela Rebaca,
their niece and that while each of them are living, he/she
will continue to enjoy the fruits of the lands mentioned.
-
Bernabe died. Gervasia submitted the will for probated.
By order of Oct. 31, 1939, the Court admitted for probate
the said will but only for the part of Bernabe.
-
When Gervasia died, another petition for probate was
instituted by Manuela, but because she and her attorney
failed to appear in court, the petition was dismissed.
-
When the same was heard, the CFI declared the will void
for being executed contrary to the prohibition on joint wills.
On appeal, the order was reversed.
Whether or not the will may be probated
-
Admittedly the probate of the will in 1939 was erroneous,
however, because it was probated by a court of competent
jurisdiction it has conclusive effect and a final judgment
rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding
upon the whole world. However, this is only with respect to
the estate of the husband but cannot affect the estate of
the wife; considering that a joint will is a separate will of
each testator.
-
The joint will being prohibited by law, its validity, in so far
as the estate of the wife is concerned, must be reexamine
and adjudicated de novo.
-
The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon her
death to her intestate heirs and not to the testamentary
heir. Thus as to the disposition of the wife, the will cannot
be given effect.
-
A decree of probate decree is conclusive on the due
execution and the formal validity of the will subject to such
probate.
AJERO V CA
-
The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for
probate.
-
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds
that: neither the testaments body nor the signature therein
was in decedents handwriting; it contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and,
the will was procured by petitioners through improper
 13

pressure and undue influence. o

- whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedents last
The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect will and testament;
to the disposition in the will of a house and lot. He claimed o
that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities
entirety, as she was not its sole owner. prescribed by law;
- o
However, the trial court still admitted the decedents whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at
holographic will to probate. the time the will was executed; and
- o
The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary
the identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary acts of the decedent.
capacity of the testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of -
the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is
law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix. to close the door against bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on
- this subject should be interpreted to attain these primordial ends.
On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the -
decedent did not comply with Articles 313 and 314 of the In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the
NCC. It found that certain dispositions in the will were requirement that they be totally authographic or handwritten by the
either unsigned or undated, or signed by not dated. It also testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will no
found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
made had not been authenticated by decedent. unquestionable handwritten by
- the testator.
Hence, this appeal.
Whether the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of KALAW V. RELOVA
the NCC were not complies with. -
- Natividad Kalaw left a holographic will. It is not contested
YES. The SC reversed the decision of CA. that the will was in her handwriting as certified by the NBI.
- The will however has alterations/insertions. The will
A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects originally named Rosa, the decedents sister as her sole
the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic heir and administrator, but this was crossed out and
will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date changed to her brother Gregorio. Such alteration was
some of the dispositions, the result is that these however not authenticated by the full signature of the
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, decedent.
does not render the whole testament void. -
- Hence, the will was denied probate by the trial court
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate Whether the will is valid or not.
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of -
Article 814. It is invalid. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures,
- corrections and interlineations made by the testator in a
Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or holographic sill have not been noted under his signature,
insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or the will in not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most
on testators signature, their presence does not invalidate only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or
the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in interline.
disallowance of such changes. -
- However, in this case, the will in dispute had only one
It is also proper to note that he requirements of substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the
authentication of changes and signing and dating Of ispositions original heir with another, but which alteration did not have
appear in provisions (Article 813 and 814) the signature of the testator, the effect must be that the
entire will is voided for the reason that nothing remains in
separate from that which provides for the necessary the will after that which could remain valid.
conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article -
810). To state that the will as first written should be given
- efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the
This separation and distinction adds support to the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given
interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner
the NCC and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 required by law by affixing her full signature.
are essential to the probate of a holographic will. -
- When a number of unauthenticated erasures, corrections
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of and interlineations are made by the testator in a
the Civil Code enumerate the grounds for disallowance of holographic will, the same is not thereby invalidated as a
wills. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve whole, but at most only as respects the particular words
to disallow a will. erased, corrected or interlined.
-
In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to Except however, if after all the alterations were voided, nothing
be resolved are: remains in the will. Comments The holding that the insertion of the
name of Gregorio cannot be given effect for not having been done in
 14

accordance with the requirement of Art814 is beyond question. the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the
Why, however, was the cancellation of the original testamentary idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing
institution given effect? That cancellation was not done in the
way mandated by the article.
the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek
To say, as the decision does, that to state that the will as first to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a
written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming public duty, most especially when the public right involved
change of mind of the testatrix, is no argument, because it is not is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision
enough that the testator manifest his intent he must manifest in instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation,
a manner required by law.
board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station.
UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an
Facts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus
official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it
with damages against his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein
is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to
petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to
which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to
produce the holographic will of his father so that probate
enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which
proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted.
a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere
Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and
technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear
liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal
and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not
heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to
lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that
do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that
the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action
she was in custody of the original holographic will and that
is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case.
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
After the presentation and formal offer of respondents
office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board,
evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son
or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the
failed to prove that she had in her custody the original
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is
holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to
entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the
evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioners
issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear
motion for reconsideration. Respondents motion for
legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence, the
imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.
petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought
review from the appellate court. The CA initially denied the
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that
appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for
mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual
reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set
obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce
aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the
purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an
production of the will and the payment of attorneys fees. It
individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or
ruled this time that respondent was able to show by
quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to
testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession
enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ of
the holographic will. Dissatisfied with this turn of events,
mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate
otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly,
court denied this motion. Left with no other recourse,
issues only in cases relating to the public and to the
petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending
government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To
in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper
preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used
remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the
for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters
appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.
relating to the public.
Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of
the respondent.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of
the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and
Held: The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than
writ.
the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words,
mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of
modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to
competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy,
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board,
mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is
or to some corporation or person requiring the performance
generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the
of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results
grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of
from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
the court.
directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes
 15

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily appeared in the latters application for pasture permit.
ascertaining whether the obligation involved herethe -
production of the original holographic willis in the nature The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay , claimed that she had
of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of lived with the deceased since birth where she had
become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on
mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee the will was genuine.
because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate -
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that Codoy and Ramonals demurrer to evidence was granted by the
respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals
the production of the original for purposes of probate. The which granted the probate.
Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from
instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at
whether the same is in his possession or not. least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in a
contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is
mandatory or directory.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the -
ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, YES. The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative
the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that
state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is
petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer. mandatory.
-
CODOY V. CALUGAY In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give
- effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit
and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. De Ramonal, filed a -
petition for probate of the said will.- The paramount consideration in the present petition is to
They attested to the genuineness and due execution of the determine the true intent of the deceased.
will on 30 August 1978.
- Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their authenticity and due execution of the deceaseds holographic
opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that the will.
same is even illegible. -
- NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in
They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the handwriting of the deceased.
the will after every disposition, calling the same out of the -
ordinary. - The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly
If the will was in the handwriting of the deceased, it was that the signature appearing in the holographic will was
improperly procured.- that of the deceased.
Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and -
various documentary evidence. The election registrar was not able to produce the voters
- affidavit for verification as it was no longer available.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate -
court who produced and identified the records of the case The deceaseds niece saw pre-prepared receipts and
bearing the signature of the deceased. letters of the deceased and did not declare that she saw
- the deceased sign a document or write a note.
The second witness was election registrar who was made to -
produce and identify the voters affidavit, but failed to as the same The will was not found in the personal belongings of the
was already destroyed and no longer available. deceased but was in the possession of the said niece, who
- kept the fact about the will from the children of the
The third, the deceaseds niece , claimed that she had acquired deceased, putting in issue her motive.
familiarity with the deceaseds signature and handwriting as she -
used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the
tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued decreased write a note or sign a document.
receipts. -
- The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to
The niece also testified that the deceased left a holographic will the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
entirely written, dated and signed by said deceased. -
- (As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness
The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the requirement was not complied with.)
intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that the -
signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that
he can not be sure. the strokes are different when compared with other
- documents written by the testator.
The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that -
she was familiar with the signature of the deceased which
 16

The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce First, the motion to reopen the proceedings has been filed
evidence in support of their opposition. out of time.
- -
The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills Second, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate
is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid estate proceeding that the discovered will has been
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their revoked.
truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject -
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these The more appropriate remedy for them is to initiate a
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will.
lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to -
restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will. In this view, the order in the prior special proceeding is not
- a bar for the filing of a petition for the probate of the will of
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false Adriana Maloto.
document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which -
is why if the holographic will is contested, the law requires It is not proper to make a finding in an intestate proceeding
three witnesses to declare that the will was in the that a discovered will has been revoked. A separate
handwriting of the deceased. petition for probate of the alleged will should be ordered
- filed.
Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: In the probate of a
holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one MOLO V. MOLO
witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the -
testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are Mariano Molo died and was survived by his herein
in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at petitioner wife and his herein oppositors nieces and
least three of such witnesses shall be required. nephews. He left two wills one dated 1918 and the other
- 1939. The 2 will contains a clause which expressly
nd

The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an revokes the former will.
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of -
discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, Upon death, his wife filed a petition for probate of the 1939
when used in a statute, is mandatory. will which was later on admitted. However, oppositors
eventually filed a petition which resulted to the denial of
TESTATE ESTATE OF ADRIANA MALOTO V. CA probate of the said will. Petitioner wife then filed a petition
- for probate of the 1918 will, which was likewise denied by
The nieces and nephews of Adriana Maloto, including the oppositors in this case.
Constancio Maloto and Aldina Casiano, thought that the
latter died intestate. Whether or not petitioner voluntarily and deliberately
- frustrated the probate of the 1939 will.
Thus they filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement -
of the decedents estate. SC held that she did not because if it was indeed her
- intention, she could have accomplished her desire by
In the course of the proceeding, the said relatives executed merely suppressing the will or tearing or destroying it, and
an extrajudicial petition of the estate, where they then take steps in leading to the probate of the 1918 will.
adjudicated among themselves the properties in the ratio -
of each. Had the oppositors in this case not filed an opposition and
- had limited their objection to the intrinsic validity of the will,
Three years after, a document was delivered to the same their plan to defeat the will and secure the intestacy of the
court, which was believed to be the last will and testament deceased would have been accomplished.
of Adriana Maloto. -
- If the said will was denied probate, it is due to oppositors
In the said will, Aldina and Constancio have shares that fault and is unfair to impute bad faith to petitioner simply
are bigger, different and more valuable than the one because she exerted effort to protect her own interest and
obtained by them in the extrajudicial partition. There were prevent the intestacy of the deceased.
also other legatees named in the will. WON, notwithstanding the disallowance of the 1939 will, the
- revocatory clause is valid and still nullifies the 1918 will.
Thus, Casiano and Aldina filed a petition for the allowance -
of the will in the Special Proceeding initially filed by them. SC held that the clause is likewise void because:
- -
The CFI denied the motion to reopen the proceedings on The Court held in Samson v. Naval that it cannot produce
the ground that it has been filed out of time. the effect of annulling the previous will since said
Whether or Not the CFI correctly dismissed the petition. revocatory clause is void.
- -
SC held in the affirmative. If it was really the intention of the deceased to revoke the
- first will, with the assumption that he in fact destroyed the
The probate court has no jurisdiction to entertain the original copy of the 1918 will since it cannot be found at
petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto present, he should also destroyed the duplicate copy of the
in the prior Intestate Proceeding. said will which he had given to his wife. But he did not do
- so. Hence, it is possible that because of the long lapse of

21 yrs since the 1 st will was executed, the original will had
been misplaced or lost and forgetting there was a copy, he
deemed it wise to execute another.
- consistent with our statutory law, having in view that needed
Granting that he did destroy the 1 will, the 1918 will can
st
still be admitted under the principle of dependent relative
revocation, which is predicated on the theory that the
testator did not intend to die intestate.
-
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is established where
the act of destruction is connected with the making of another will
so as fairly to raise the inference mthat the testator meant the
revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new
disposition intended to e substituted, the revocation will be
conditinal and dependent upon the efficacy of the nw disposition;
and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a
substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will
remains in full force.
Read dependent relative revocation p45
MERCADO V. SANTOS
FACTS: 16 months after final judgment on the pro-
bate and approval of a will, the proponent was prosecuted
for allegedly having presented a forged will. He was thus
accused of forgery. May he be convicted, granting that he
really had forged the duly probated will?
HELD:
No more, since the probate of the will rendered
conclusive its due execution and therefore conclusive as to
the fact that the will was genuine and not a forgery.
MERCADO VS. SANTOS
The records show that the petitioner had presented a will
purporting to be the last will and testament of his deceased
wife for probate. The will was admitted to probate without any
opposition. Sixteen months after the allowance of the will, a
complaint for forgery of the probated will was instituted by the
brothers and sisters of the deceased against the petitioner. The
latter moved to dismiss claiming that the will alleged to have
been forged had already been probated and that the order of
allowance is conclusive as to its due execution. The motion was
overruled. Whereupon the petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. As
a result, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court for review
by certiorari
. The question to be resolved, therefore, is whether or not the probate public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to
of the will is a bar to the subsequent crimi-nal prosecution of the
petitioner for the alleged forgery of the said will. After citing the
pertinent provision of the Code of Civil Procedure (all of which are
reproduced in the Rules of Court, and now crystallized in the
provision of the last paragraph of Art. 838) and examining all of the
authorities and sources of the laws cited, the Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Laurel, held:American and English cases
show a conflict of authori-ties on the question as to whether or not
the probate of a will bars criminal prosecution of the alleged forger of
the probated will. We have examined some important cases and have
come to the conclusion that no fixed standard may be adopted or
17
drawn therefrom, in view of the conflict no less than of diversity of
stat-utory provisions obtaining in different jurisdictions. It behooves
us, therefore, as the court of last resort, to choose that rule most
stability of property rights and the public interest in general.
To be sure, we have seriously reflected upon the dangers of eva-
sion from punishment of culprits deserving of the severity of the
law in case where, as here, forgery is discovered after the pro-
bate of the will and the prosecution is had before the prescrip-
tion of the offense. By and large, however, the balance seems
inclined in favor of the view that we have taken. Not only does
the law surround the execution of the will with the necessary
formalities and require probate to be made after an elaborate
judicial proceeding, but it provides for an adequate remedy to
any party who might have been adversely affected by the pro-
bate of a forged will, much in the same way as other parties
against whom a judgment is rendered under the same or simi-
lar circumstances. The aggrieved party may file an application
for relief with the proper court within a reasonable time, but in
no case exceeding six months after said court has rendered the
judgment of probate, on the ground of mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect. An appeal lies to review the action
of a court of first instance when that court refuses to grant relief.
After a judgment allowing a will to be probated has become
final and unappealable, and after the period fixed by law has
expired, the law as an expression of the legislative wisdom goes no
fur-ther and the case ends there.
We hold, therefore, that criminal action will not lie in this
jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been duly ad-
mitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.
ORTEGA V. VALMONTE
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United
States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28
years old. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss,
Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament
written in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June
1983but acknowledged only on 9 August 1983. The allowance to
probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placidos sister.
According to the notary public who notarized the testators will,
after the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions
he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back
on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator and
his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary
come back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution was actually
on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed the
typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he did not like the
document to appear dirty.
Petitioners argument:
3. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was
already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.
4. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting
witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is
 18

allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition
the attestation of the will. for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all
ISSUE: surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition claiming among
3. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he others that Segundo left a holographic will, dated September
allegedly executed the will. 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo
4. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by Seangio, for cause. Petitioners averred that the intestate
fraud or trickery. proceedings should be automatically suspended and replaced
by the proceedings for the probate of the will. Sometime in
HELD: 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of
3. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify Segundo was filed by petitioners before the RTC.
accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his Subsequently, the probate and the intestate cases were
shares in them and even their location. As regards the consolidated. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of
proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the
identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo
relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased
being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article
disposition becomes irrelevant. 783 of the Civil Code.

4. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or
pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of
such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to
the nature or contents of the document which he executes,
or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the
deception regarding which the testator is led to make a
certain will which, but for fraud, he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of
proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution.
The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the
will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due
execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the
dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the
document, because the law does not even require that a
notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same
occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to its
supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and
persuasively explained by the notary public and
instrumental witnesses.
SEANGIO V. REYES
ISSUE: For disinheritance to be valid, what does Art. 916
of the new Civil Code requires?
HELD:
That the same must be effected thru a will wherein the legal
cause therefor shall be specified. In the case at bar,
maltreatment of a parent by a child presents a sufficient
cause for the disinheritance of the latter
SEANGIO v. REYES
FA C T S :
According to private respondents, the will only shows an
alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son,
Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were
not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence,
there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being
the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the
extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into
the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of
the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear
that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of
the decedent.
On August 10, 1999, the RTC dismissed the petition for
probate proceedings stating among others that there was
preterition. Hence, a petition for certiorariwas filed seeking the
nullification of such order.
ISSUE:
Whether the document was indeed a will. Whether
there was preterition.
RULING:
Re the Will: The holographic will does not contain any in-
stitution of an heir but simply contains a disinheritance of a
com-pulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the
decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not
intrinsically void. The purported holographic will of Segundo
was dated, signed and written by him in his own handwriting.
Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did
not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code
requires that the same must be ef-fected through a will with a
valid cause specified in the will.
The Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be
consid-ered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son,
Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the

disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919. The
critical issue to be determined is whether the document
executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
Segundos document, although
it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by
Article 810. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly
de-
duced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
make an affi
rmative disposition of the latters property, the disin-
heritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in
itself.
In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even
if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana,was intended
by Se-gundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed
by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic
will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be
given effect.
Re Preterition: The Court believes that the compulsory heirs in
the direct line were not preterited in the will. Segundo did not
institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs.
The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the
universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to
the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
Considering that the questioned document is Segundos
holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over
intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with in
accordance with Article 838 of the Civil Code. The
continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work
injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the
disinheritance of Alfredo.The Supreme Court set aside the
Orders of the RTC and directed Respondent judge to reinstate
and continue the proceed-ings for the allowance of the
holographic will of Segundo Sean-gio. The intestate case was
suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate
proceedings.
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO
APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH
PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS,
This case is about the probate before Philippine court
of a will executed abroad by a foreigner although it has not been
probated in its place of execution.
The Facts and the Case
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas
(Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States
19
(U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and
testament she executed in California, she designated her brother,
Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she
had left properties in the Philippines and in theU.S.
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas
(Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of
Rupertas will and for his appointment as special administrator of
her estate.[1] On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel
Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas
(Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the
ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in
the Philippines but in the U.S.where she executed it. Manuel and
Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated
in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been
executed under duress and without the testators full
understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they
claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings,
Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate occasions in
the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion
with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it
granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit
their memorandum on the issue of whether or not
Rupertas U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in
the Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:[2] (a)
admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b) appointing respondent
Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-
based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters
of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews
Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA),[3] arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American
citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in
the Philippines.
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a
decision,[4] affirming the assailed order of the RTC,[5] holding that
the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to
respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of
the documents specified in the order and his posting of required
bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in
the country of its execution, before it can be probated in
the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from
reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed
abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or
procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin
came to this Court.
The Issue Presented
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not
a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in
the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and
allowed in the country where it was executed.
The Courts Ruling
 20

Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills pass either real or personal property unless the will has been
executed by foreigners abroad must first be probated and allowed proved and allowed by the proper court.[8]
in the country of its execution before it can be probated
here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal
formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that local
courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is
that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign nothing more than an initial ruling that the court can take
country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas will and that, in
laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator
(d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due
of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for execution of the will, i.e. the testators state of mind at the time of
the valid execution of a will. the execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills
by the laws of California. This explains the trial courts directive
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Rupertas will
executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of
been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A Will of California.
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article
816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition
produces effect in thePhilippines if made in accordance with the and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or 83564 dated July 29, 2005.
according to the formalities observed in his country.[6]
PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC v. BELINA RIGOR,
inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he
has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such FA C T S :
estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, Father Rigor died and left a will which was probated
devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person in 1935. In his will, he named as devisees his sisters and a
interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the cousin. A devise of ricelands was also made in favor of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or testators nearest male relative who shall take the priesthood,
destroyed. and in the meantime, the ricelands would be administered by
the Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria,
Our rules require merely that the petition for the Tarlac. A project of partition providing for the delivery to the
allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: devisees of their respective shares of the estate was approved
(a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of but the devise regarding the ricelands was not implemented as
the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) no male relative of the testator claimed the same. Several years
the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d)
the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the after approval of the project of partition, the parish priest of
will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person Victoria filed a petition in the testate proceedings for delivery
having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the ricelands to the church as trustee thereof. The heirs of
of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the Father Rigor opposed said petition and prayed that the said
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant bequest be declared inoperative as no nearest male relative of
of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.[7] The the testator had ever studied for the priesthood.
rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been
allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
The lower courts order in favor of the Parish Priest of
In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first Victoria was reversed by the Court of Appeals on its ruling
probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel that the trust in favor of the nearest male relative could only
and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for exist for 20 years because to enforce it beyond that period
the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re- would violate the rule against perpetuities, and since no
authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign
legatee claimed the ricelands within 20 years from the death of
country is different from that probate where the will is presented
for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is the testator, said properties should pass to his legal heirs.
specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary
to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to ISSUE:
reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present What was the intention of the testator regarding the bequest of
case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the ricelands to his nearest male relative who will take the
findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over
priesthood and how can this intention be ascertained?
the matter can be established.

Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with HELD:

impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go The will of the testator is the first and principal law
abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them in the matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly and
outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with

the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may
clearly appear that his intention was different from that
literally expressed. The testators intention is to be ascertained
from the words of the will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made.
From the testamentary provisions of Father Rigors will, it
may be deduced that the testator intended to devise the
ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a
priest, and that the parish priest of Victoria would administer
the ricelands during the interval of time that no nearest male
relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood. What is
not clear is how long after the testators death would it be
determined that he had a nephew who would pursue the
ecclesiastical vocation.
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testators nearest
male
relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefi
nite
time thereafter. In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir,
devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession
opens. The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or
reasonably construed. To construe them as referring to the
testators nearest male relative at anytime after his death Adopted kids p59
would render the provisions difficult to apply and create
uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate.
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew
who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the
bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore,
the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of
Victoria, as envisaged in the will, was likewise inoperative.
NUGUID V. NUGUID
- his brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition
Rosario Nuguid died, single without descendants but was
survived by her legitimate parents and 6 legitimate siblings.
- deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
One of which was instituted as the universal heir and he
filed an action for probate of the decedents will which was
opposed by her parents on the ground that they were
preterited and thus the institution of the universal heir is
void.
Whether or not the will is void.
- Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongsons petition
YES. SC held that it is because: The will completely omits
the parents; thus, depriving them of their legitime. This is a
clear case of preterition.
- Court.
Petitioner herein was instituted as the universal heir and no
specific legacies or bequests are provided for; hence,
nullity of the will is complete.
-
Even if Art. 1854 provides that notwithstanding the
annulment, the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar
as they are not officious, the will is inexistent since there
was no testamentary disposition separate from the nullified
institution of the heir. Hence, intestate succession ensues.
- instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the
This is a case of preterition and not disinheritance since
21
the will does not expressly disinherits the forced heirs. It
simply omits their names.
-
To consider the institution of an heir to be the same as
legacy will defeat the purpose of Art. 854 on total or partial
nullity.
-
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of
the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they
are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited."
Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime
for a cause authorized by law."
-
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat,
"shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is
intoto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary
dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same
Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution
of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited", which last phrase was omitted/in the case of
preterition. Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is
limitedto that portion of the estate of which the disinherited
heirs have been illegally deprived.
Constantino C. ACAIN, petitioner vs.
Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition
for the probate of the will of his late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the
premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and
was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and
Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the
that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow
and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was
denied as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate
and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the
will. Due to the denial of Acains motion for reconsideration, he
then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
ISSUE:Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson
have been pretirited.
RULING:Article 854 of the Civil Code:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither
widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not
 22

ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a -

compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the Third, the fact alone that the two deeds were registered only five
legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known (5) years after their execution would not affect their validity or point
as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the to fraud.
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a Whether or not there was preterition in the deed of extrajudicial
legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally settlement with respect to the retardate Delia Viado.
omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child -
and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can YES. The exclusion of Delia Viado has the effect of preterition.
it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this -
is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of fraud
and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on the new title.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers -
and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally Article 1104 provides the remedy: where the preterition is not
abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be
universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the
will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. share pertaining to her.
-
NON V. CA Article 1104 provides: where the preterition is not attended by bad
- faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the
Deceased spouses Julian and Virginia Viado ownedseveral preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to
properties, among them a house and lot located atIsarog St., La her.
Loma, Quezon City; they had four children.
- Ramirez p69
Leah Viado Jacobs and Nilo Viado both died in 1987, withNilo VDA. DE KILAYKO vs. JUDGE TENGCO
leaving behind his wife, Alicia, and two children, herein
respondents. FACTS:
- In the settlement of the estate of Lizares, a project
The other two siblings, Rebecca Viado-Non and Delia partition was submitted. In accordance with the said project
Viado are the petitioners in this case.
of partition, the heirs executed an agreement of partition
-
As the two parties lived in the Isarog property, Alicia and and subdivision. Later, a motion was filed to reopen the
her two children demanded Rebecca and Delia to vacate; testate estate proceedings of Lizares.
Rebecca and Delia raised co-ownership as a defense.
- HELD:
Alicia claimed absolute ownership as evinced by a The testate proceedings cannot anymore be reopened
deed ofdonation in which the late Julian Viado donated his because the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of
conjugal share of the property to Alicias deceased partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped
husband. the fruits thereof. Hence, they are now precluded from
-
attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the
There was also a deed of extrajudicial settlement where
Rebecca Viado-Nonand the late Leah Viado(without guise of a complaint for reconveyance. In testate uccession,
Delia Viados participation) waived their rights and interests there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after
over their share of the property inherited from their mother the will has been probated
Virginia.
- . A project partition is merely a proposal for the distribution
Thus, the property was titled in the name of the heirs of of the hereditary estate which the court may accept or
Nilo Viado. reject. It is the court that makes that distribution of the
- estate and determines the persons entitled thereto. It
An action for partition was brought by Rebecca Viado-Non
cannot be denied that when they moved for the reopening
and Delia Viado in which the court ruled in favor of Alice
and her children.Whether or not the deeds were valid despite of the testate estate proceedings of Maria, the judicial
allegations of fraud, forgery and undue influence. decree of partition and the order of closure of such
- proceedings was already final and executor.
YES, on account of the following:
-
First, Nieva vs alcala p94
while asserting the employment of fraud, forgery and undue Sumaya vs iac p97
influence in procuring the signatures of the parties to the deeds of
donation and of extrajudicial settlement, Rebecca Viado-Non and
Delia Viado are vague on how and in what manner those
Mendoza v Delos Santos (Succession)
supposed vices occurred.
- FACTS:
Second, there no proof shown as to why Julian Viado should be The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels
held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan are presently in the
rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado.
name of respondent Julia Delos Santos (respondent). Lot
 23

No. 1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the name of Code

respondent but co- owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to
bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria assure the return of a reservable property to the third
Mendoza and her siblings. degree relatives belonging to the line from which the
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into
and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Petitioners alleged that and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.
the properties were part of Placido and Domingas
properties that were subject of an oral partition and
subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiels
death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only
daughter, Gregoria. After Leonors death, her share went to
Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without
issue. They claimed that after Gregorias death,
respondent, who is Leonors sister, adjudicated unto herself
all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and
Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties
should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties
and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of
should be reckoned only from Exequiels as he is the
the Civil Code on reserva troncal.
ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or
from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister
(1) RTC: granted their action for Recovery of Possession by
in determining the lineal character of the property. It was
Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance.
also immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel
(2) CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria
dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. CA also denied
predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel
their motion for reconsideration.
owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom
Issues: the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the
other hand, is the descendant who received the properties
a. The honorable [ca] grievously erred in holding that the
from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
subject properties are not reservable properties, coming as
Article 891 simply requires that the property should have
they do from the family line of the petitioners mendozas.
been acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an
B. The honorable [ca] grievously erred in holding that the
ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is
petitioners mendozas do not have a right to the subject
gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not
properties by virtue of the law on reserva troncal.
give anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what
was clearly established in this case is that the properties in
APPLICABLE LAW:
dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the
the Civil Code: properties as inheritance.
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the
any property which the latter may have acquired by property should be an ascendant (also known as the
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia,
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have however, is not Gregorias ascendant; rather, she is
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who Gregorias collateral relative.
are within the third degree and belong to the line from which
said property came. (Emphasis ours) II. Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios
as they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria
RULING: from whom the properties came. The person from whom
No, CA is correct. the degree should be reckoned is the
I. Reserva troncal is not applicable. descendant/prepositusthe one at the end of the line from
Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the which the property came and upon whom the property last
other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners

are Gregorias fourth degree relatives, being her first
cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree
relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their
predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a
personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the
third degree from whom the reservable properties came.
The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews
and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to
represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are
the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within
the third degree.
OTHER NOTES:
1. three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first
transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or
donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant
called the prepositus. The second transmission is by
operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant
or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last
transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or
reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree
from which the property came.
2. The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by lucrative or
gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received
the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who
obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of
law; and (4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the
third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the
(linea o tronco) from which the property came and for whom
the property should be reserved by the reservor.
3. Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be
either direct or collateral. A direct line is that constituted by
the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees
among persons who are not ascendants and descendants,
but who come from a common ancestor.
4. Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased
in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the
whole blood.
24
5. Reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the
reservable character of the property on the title. In reserva
troncal, the reservista who inherits from a prepositus,
whether by the latters wish or by operation of law, acquires
the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring
absolute ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong
to him exclusively.
MORENTE V. DE LA SANTA
FACTS:
In her will, a wife provided as follows:
1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to
me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa;
2. That my said husband shall not leave my sisters after
my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should my
husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any
portion of the property left by me, except the one-third
part thereof and the two-thirds remaining shall be and
remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he
have any;
3. After my death, I direct my husband to dwell in the
ca-marin in which the bakery is located, which is one of the
properties belonging to me.
Questions:
(a) If the husband marries again, will he forfeit the devise?
(b) If the husband leaves the sisters of the wife, will he
forfeit the devise?
(c) If the husband does not live in the camarin, will he forfeit
the devise?
(d) if the husband has childrenby anyone, will he forfeit a
part of the devise?
HELD:
(a), (b), and (c)
No. Reason: The happening of these events should not be
considered as the fulfillment of conditions which would
annul or revoke the devise. They were mere orders
and there was no condition or statement that if he should
not comply with the wishes of the testatrix he would lose the
devise given him. The condition should have been xpressly
provided. It was not.
(d) In this case, he would lose two-thirds of the devise.
Reason:
There was a statement that should he have children by
anyone, the forfeiture would take place. Here the condition
was expressly provided.
NOBLE v. NOBLE
ISSUE:
What is necessary to establish before an illegitimate not
natural child can be entitled to successional rights the fact
of his bare filiation or a filiation acknowledged by the
putative parent?
RULING:

There are cogent reasons to require that the
acknowledgement of the putative parent is required to
establish
filiation. A mere claim of continuous possession of the
status of a child is not sufficient inasmuch as the same is
only a ground for an action for recognition.
Noble v. Noble
FACTS:
A person claiming to be an illegitimate child wanted to
intervene in the probate proceedings. She alleged that she
enjoyed the status of a child of the deceased and that
she had evidence indicating that the decedent was her
father.
Should she be allowed to intervene and thus inherit?
HELD:
Generally, she should not be allowed. Mere proof
of filiation is not enough. What is important is
recognition of that filiation. [NOTE: If the claimant was a
minor at the time of the fathers death, she can ask that she
be recognized if she has a ground to compel recognition.
This move for compulsory recognition must be done within
four years after attaining majority. (See Art. 286, Civil
Code).]
VIZCONDE VS CA
Collation does not impose any lien on the property
or the subject matter of collationable donation. What
is brought to collation is not the property donated
itself, but rather the value of such property at the
time it was donated, the rationale being that the
donation is a real alienation which conveys
ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase
in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the
account of the heir or donee. [Vizconde v CA]
VIZCONDE v. COURT OF APPEALS
FA C T S :
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz., Carmela and
Jennifer. Petitioners wife, Estrellita, is one of the fi
ve siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-
Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio
Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and
Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his
parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and
their four children. In 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael
a parcel of land (hereafter Valenzuela property) for One
Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00).
Sometime in 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to
Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three
Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve
Pesos (P3,405,612.00). In June of the same year, Estrellita
bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with
improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, araaque
25
(hereafter Paraaque property) using a portion of the
proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela property.
Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer,
were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident popularly known
as the Vizconde Massacre. The findings of the
nvestigation conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died
ahead of her daughters. Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and
herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the
subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner was
left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless,
petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver
of Shares, with Rafael and Salud, Estrellitas parents. The
extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the
properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between
petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The Paraaque
property and the car were also given to petitioner with
Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims, rights, ownership
and participation as heirs in the said properties.
In 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita
instituted an intestate estate proceeding listing as heirs
Salud, Ramon, Ricardo, and the wife (Zenaida) and
children of Antonio. Teresita sought to be appointed as
guardian ad litem of Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her
incompetent brother. Herein private respondent Ramon fi
led an opposition praying to be appointed instead as Salud
and Ricardos guardian. Barely three weeks passed,
Ramon filed another opposition alleging, among others,
that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael
which she sold for not less than Six Million Pesos
(P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon
pleaded for the courts intervention to determine the
legality and validity of the intervivos distribution made by
deceased Rafael to his children, Estrellita included.
On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition entitled In
The Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and
Ricardo G. Nicolas and averred that their legitime should
come from the collation of all the properties distributed to
his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon stated that
herein petitioner is one of Rafaels children by right of
representation as the widower of deceased legitimate
daughter of Estrellita.
Ramon moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate
proceeding and asked that the Paraaque property, as well
as the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of
the Valenzuela property, be collated. Such motion was
granted on the basis that spouses Vizconde were then
financially incapable of having purchased or acquired for a
valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela from the
deceased Rafael Nicolas.To dispute the contention that the
spouses Vizconde were financially incapable to buy the
property from the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde
claims that they have been engaged in business venture
such as taxi business, canteen concessions and garment
manufacturing.

Since no competent evidence was submitted to support
such business undertakings, the court declared that the
transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita
by her father was gratuitous and the Paraaque property is
subject to collation.
The Court of Appeals also ruled against Vizconde stressing
that the RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the title
of the Valenzuela property as the jurisdiction of the probate
court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the
exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement
of the estate of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether the Valenzuela property is subject to
collation inasmuch as the Court nullifi
ed the transfer of the
Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita.
RULING:
No. The attendant facts herein do not make a case
of collation. We fi
nd that the probate court, as well as respondent
Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of
petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a
son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafaels compulsory
heirs as provided in Article 887 of the Civil Code. With
respect to Rafaels estate, Vizconde who was not even
shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third
person or a stranger.
Second: The probate court went beyond the scope of its
jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of
the sale of the Valenzuela property and ruled that the
transfer of the subject property was gratuitous. The
interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the
contracting parties are matters outside the probate courts
jurisdiction.
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Para-
aque property to collation is premature since there was no
indi-cation that the legitime of any of Rafaels heirs has
been impaired to warrant collation. Fourth: Even on the
assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the
probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in
ordering collation of the Paraaque property. We note
that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of
sale, is the Valenzuela property. The obligation to collate is
lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner
who does not have any interest in Rafaels estate. As it
stands, collation of the Paraaque property is improper for,
to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given
by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain
whether or not the Valenzuela property may be brought to
colla-tion. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of
Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an
amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property.
Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be
collated, collation may not be al-lowed as the value of the
26
Valenzuela property has long been re-turned to the estate
of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate
court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.
ARELLANO VS. PASCUAL Digest
FACTS:
Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as
heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia who is
represented by her daughters Agnes and Nona, and
respondents Francisco and Miguel.
In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and
Issuance of Letters of Administration, , respondents alleged
that a parcel of land (donated property) located in Makati, ,
transferred by the decedent to petitioner, "may be
considered as an advancelegitime" of petitioner.
The probate court provisionally passed upon the validity of
the donation then further held that the land in contention is
subject to collation following Art. 1061 of the New Civil
Code. On appeal, the CA sustained the probate courts
ruling that the property donated to petitioner is subject to
collation.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the property donated to petitioner is
subject to collation.
II. Whether or not the property of the estate should have
been ordered equally distributed among the parties.
HELD: Petition is GRANTED.
CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; COLLATION
First Issue; Collation takes place when there are
compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine
the legitime and the free portion.
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a
mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of
donations made by the testator to the value of the
hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the
hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by
the testator during his lifetime. The purposes of collation are
to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as
is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding
the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary,
secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only

survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and,
therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the
testators property which he cannot dispose of because the
law has reserved it for compulsory heirs. The decedent not
having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even
if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to
inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was
valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger,"
chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There
being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is
not subject to collation.
CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; DETERMINATION OF
ESTATE
Second Issue; The decedents remaining estate should thus
be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral
relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code (Arts. 1003 & 1004).
CA Decision ordering the collation of the property donated
to Amelia, to the estate of the deceased is SET ASIDE and
the records of the cases is REMANDED to the court of
origin for further proceedings in the case for the purpose of
determining what finally forms part of the estate, and
thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among
the parties.
PECSON V MEDIAVILLO (G.R. NO. 7890)
Facts:
The last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was
presented to the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law,
opposed the legislation of the will on the ground that it had
not been authorized nor signed by the deceased. After
hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir
(judge) found that the will had been signed and executed in
accordance with the provisions of law, and denied the
opposition .
Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario
Mediavillo, presented a motion averring:
That Rosario is and Joaquin was the grandchild of the
testator, Florencio Pecson That Rosario, was disinherited
by Florencio, according to clause 3 of the will, because she
failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion
raised her hand against himParagraph 3 of the will
disinherited Rosario Mediavillo states:
27
I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now
deceased, left a legitimate daughter named Rosario
Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit my granddaughter,
Rosario, because she was grossly disrespectful to me and
because on one occasion, when it was I do not remember,
she raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is my will that
the said Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my
property.
That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if
perhaps she did, it was due to the derangement of her
mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from
which she now suffers in periodical attacks.
It also appears from the evidence that Teresa (daughter of
Florencio, mother of Rosario) also died. Her son Joaquin
died, unmarried and childless, before the death of the
testator.
The lower court found out that the evidence shows that
Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva
Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it
was previous to this date that she disobeyed her
grandfather and raised her hand against him. But since she
was 14 years old, and shortly afterwards became insane,
she was not responsible for her acts and should not have
been disinherited by her grandfather.
The court therefore decreed that clause 3 of the will is
contrary to law and is set aside for being of no force or
value whatever.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts, when a parent disinherits his
children, may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance
and decide that there was or was not ground for such
disinheritance.
Held:
Yes. The Civil Code (Art. 848) provides that disinheritance
shall only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed
by law. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the
disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in
which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for
such disinheritance. The right of the courts to inquire into
the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the
disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express
provisions of the Civil Code. Disinheritance made without
statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if
contradicted, should not be proven shall annul the
designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person
disinherited.
In the case, It appears from the record that when Rosario
Mediavillo was about 14 years of age, she had received
some attentions from a young man that she had received
a letter from him and that her grandfather, Florencio, took
occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and

the said young man. It was upon that occasion when the
disobedience and disrespect were shown to her
grandfather, and that was the cause for her disinheritance
by her grandfather. The record shows that after said event,
she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has
never regained them, except for very brief periods, up to the
present time.
The lower court is correct in taking into consideration her
tender years, that she was probably not responsible for the
disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in
the year 1894 or 1895.
SAYSON VS SAYSON
FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children,
namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela
on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel
Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years
later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the
possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed
Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and
Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, an American citizen by marriage, no formal deed
filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate ofconveyance was executed in her favor. When the case
estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial
Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo
and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the Issue: Whether or not the partition inter vivos of the
disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their
own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of
the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against
the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay,
Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they
raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and
Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they
were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents'
estate by right of representation.
ISSUE: Is there right of representation?
HELD:
Yes. as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and
thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a
right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of
the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981,
she is entitled to the share her father would have directly
inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the
shares of her grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of
Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total
strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as
the latter, these rights do not include the right of
28
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is
between only the adopting parents and the adopted child
and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and
Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista,
are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to
share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The
Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only
Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of
her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private
respondents being only the adoptive children of the
deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against the petitioners.
Zaragosa vs ca p149
Facts: Decedent left parcels of land and 4 children.
Respondent (daughter) filed a complaint against petitioners
(son with his wife) for the delivery of her inheritance share
consisting of 2 lots. She alleged that their shares were
given to them in advance but because she became
went to the CA, the court ruled for respondent, holding that
the 2 lots were part of her inheritance.
decedent is valid
Held: Yes. SC ruled that Art. 1080 allows partition inter
vivos as long as legitimes are not impaired. However, since
not all the heirs were impleaded in this case,
the petition must necessarily fail without prejudice to a new
proceeding where all indispensable parties are impleaded
to determine whether or not their legitimes wereimpaired.
de Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Dizon
FACTS:Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got
married in August 1964. It was during this marriage that
Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de
Jesus, herein petitioners, were born. In a notarized
document, dated June 7, 1991, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his
own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan
died intestate in March 1992, leaving behind considerable
assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations
and some real property. It was on the strength of his
notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed
a complaint for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of
the Dizon estate with the RTC.

Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of
the decedent, including the corporations of which the
deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated
as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for
altering the status of petitioners from being
the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo and Carolina
de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased
Juan Dizon.
ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners are illegitimate children of
decedent Juan Dizon entitled to inherit from him
RULING:No. A scrutiny of the records would show that
petitioners were born during the valid marriage of their
parents Danilo and Carolina. The certificates of birth
also identified Danilo de Jesus as their father. There is a
presumption in law that children born in wedlock
are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of
the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b)
the fact the husband and wife are living separately in such a
way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious
illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the
periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article
171,of the Family Code (which took effect on August 3,
1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would
no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late
Juan, petitioners, in effect, would impugn
their legitimate status as being children of Danilo and
Carolina de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because
the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The
presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child
born in wedlock, and only the father, or
in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of
the husband can be rejected.
CASE TITLE: Adlawan vs. Adlawan,
PRINCIPLE: Co-Ownership
FACTS:
1. The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the
parties dispute over Lot 7226 and the house built
thereon, registered in the name of the late
DominadorAdlawan and located at Barrio Lipata,
Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu. In his complaint,
29
Arnelito claimed that he is an acknowledged
illegitimate child6 of Dominador who died on May
28, 1987 without any other issue. Claiming to be
the sole heir of Dominador, he executed an affidavit
adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house built
thereon. Out of respect and generosity to Emeterio
and NarcisaAdlawan who are the siblings of his
father, he granted their plea to occupy the subject
property provided they would vacate the same
should his need for the property arise. Sometime in
January 1999, he verbally requested respondents
to vacate the house and lot, but they refused and
filed instead an action for quieting of title with the
RTC. Finally, upon respondents refusal to heed the
last demand letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000,
petitioner filed the instant case on August 9, 2000.
2. On the other hand, respondents Narcisa and
Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age,
respectively,denied that they begged Arnelito to
allow them to stay on the questioned property and
stressed that they have been occupying Lot 7226
and the house standing thereon since birth. They
alleged that Lot7226 was originally registered in the
name of their deceased father, Ramon Adlawan
and the ancestral house standing thereon was
owned by Ramon and their mother,
OligiaMaacapAdlawan. The spouses had nine
children including the late Dominador and herein
surviving respondents Emeterio and Narcisa.
During the lifetime of their parents and deceased
siblings, all of them lived on the said property.
Dominador and his wife, GracianaRamasAdlawan,
who died without issue, also occupied the same.
PetitionerArnelito, on the other hand, is a stranger
who never had possession of Lot 7226.
3. Sometime in 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia
needed money to finance the renovation of their
house. Since they were not qualified to obtain a
loan, they transferred ownership of Lot 7226 in the
name of their son Dominador who was the only one
in the family who had a college education. By virtue
of a January 31, 1962 simulated deed of sale, a title
was issued to Dominador which enabled him to
secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral.
Notwithstanding the execution of the simulated
deed, Dominador, then single, never disputed his
parents ownership of the lot. He and his wife,
Graciana, did not disturb respondents possession
of the property until they died on May 28, 1987 and
May 6, 1997, respectively.
4. Respondents also contended that Dominadors
signature at the back of petitioners birth certificate
was forged, hence, the latter is not an heir of
Dominador and has no right to claim ownership of
Lot 7226.15 They argued that even if petitioner is
indeed Dominadors acknowledged illegitimate son,
 30

his rightto succeed is doubtful because Dominador owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to
was survived by his wife, Graciana. have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners;
However, if the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff
alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to
DECISIOPN OF LOWER COURTS the possession of the litigated property, the action
MTC:dismissed the complaint holding that the should be dismissed.Petitioner contends that even
establishment of Petitioner Arnelitoss filiation and the granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226, he can on
settlement of the estate of Dominador are conditions his own file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the
precedent to the accrual of petitioners action for ejectment. Civil Code which provides: ART. 487. Any one of the co-
It added that since Dominador was survived by his wife, owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers
Graciana, who died 10 years thereafter, her legal heirs are all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article
also entitled to their share in Lot 7226. 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer
RTC:reversed the decision of the MTC holding that the title (accioninterdictal), recovery of possession
of Dominador over Lot 7226 cannot be collaterally attacked. (accionpubliciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de
It thus ordered respondents to turn over possession of the reivindicacion). A co-owner may bring such an action
controverted lot to petitioner and to pay compensation for without the necessity of joining all the other coowners as
the use and occupation of the premises. co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed
Court of Appeals:set aside the decision of the RTC and to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however,
reinstated the judgment of the MTC. It ratiocinated that that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone
petitioner and the heirs of Graciana are co-owners of Lot who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the
7226. As such, petitioner cannot eject respondents from the possession of the litigated property, the action should be
property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name dismissed. The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M.
and as the sole owner of the property. Tolentino, explained. . . A co-owner may bring such an
action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-
RATIO DECIDENDI OF SUPREME COURT owners as coplaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit
Wills and Succession; Illegitimate Children; The death of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for
of the father of an allegedly acknowledged illegitimate himself and not for the coownership, the action will not
son did not make said son the absolute owner of a prosper.
parcel of land owned by the decedent and his legal
wife, and the subsequent death of the latter did not Wills and Succession; Intestate Succession; Escheat;
make said illegitimate son the absolute owner of the lot In default of the heirs of the decedent, the State will
because the share of the deceased wife passed to her inherit the decedents share and will thus be a co-
relatives by consanguinity and not her husbands petitioner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the
illegitimate child with whom she had no blood property.In the same vein, there is no merit in
relations.Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged petitioners claim that he has the legal personality to file the
illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador. He in fact present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of
executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the respondents would benefit not only him but also his alleged
controverted property. In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC co-owners. However, petitioner forgets that he filed the
held that the questioned January 31, 1962 deed of sale instant case to acquire possession of the property and to
validly transferred title to Dominador and that petitioner is recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession
his acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited ownership of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of
of the questioned lot. The Court notes, however, that the damages to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. Hence,
RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged
invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not benefit to his co-owners. Incidentally, it should be pointed
the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador out that in default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom
was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal petitioner labeled as fictitious heirs, the State will inherit
wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of her share and will thus be petitioners co-owner entitled to
Dominador on May 28, 1987. By intestate succession, possession and enjoyment of the property.
Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226.
The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make ROLANDO SANTOS vs. CONSTANCIA SANTOS ALANA
petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the
share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity
and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations.
FACTS: Rolando Santos and Constancia Santos Alana are
The Court of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has
half-blood siblings both asserting their claim over a 39-
no authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner
square meter lot in Manila. It was registered in the name of
of Lot 7226.
their father who died intestate in 1986. During his lifetime,
Actions; Parties; Ejectment; Co-Ownership; A co-owner
Gregorio donated the lot to Rolando which the latter
may bring such actions for recovery of possession
accepted. By virtue of the deed of donation annotated on
without the necessity of joining all of the other co-
Gregorio's title, a transfer certificate of title was issued in

Rolando's name. In 1991 Constancia Santos filed with the
RTC of Manila a complaint for partition and reconveyance
against Rolando alleging that during the lifetime of their
father, he denied having sold the subject lot to petitioner;
that she learned of the donation in 1978; and that the
donation is inofficious as she was deprived of her legitime.
Rolando countered that respondent's suit is barred by
prescription considering that she is aware of his possession
of the lot as owner for more than ten (10) years; and that
the lot was sold to him by Gregorio. Hence, respondent can
no longer claim her legitime. Affirmed on appeal are the
findings of the trial court which declared as invalid contract
the Deed of Absolute Sale since it was not signed by the
parties nor registered in the Registry of Deeds and
sustained as valid the deed of donation as it was duly
executed by the parties and registered.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the donation is inofficious
(2) Whether or not action of respondent is barred
by prescription
RULING: (1) Yes. Pursuant to Article 752 of the Civil Code,
a donation is inofficious if it exceeds this limitation - no
person may give or receive, by way of donation, more
than he may give or receive by will. Gregorio could not
donate more than he may give by will. At the time of his
death, he left no property other than the entire lot he
donated to petitioner and that the deceased made no
reservation for the legitime of respondent, his daughter and
compulsory heir. The donation is therefore inofficious as it
impairs respondent's legitime which, under Article 888 of
the Civil Code, consists of one-half (1/2) of the hereditary
estate of the father and the mother. Since the parents of
both parties are already dead, they will inherit the entire lot,
each being entitled to one-half (1/2) thereof.
(2) No. "Donations, the reduction of which hinges upon the
allegation of impairment oflegitime (as in this case), are not
controlled by a particular prescriptive period, as held
in Imperial vs. Court of Appeals but by ordinary rules of
prescription. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions
upon an obligation created by law must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus,
the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to
reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of
the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of
compulsory heirs. The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, which
involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a
donationpropter nuptias, recognized that the cause of
action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the
donor-decedent, since it is only then that the net estate may
be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be
determined. Since Gregorio died in 1986, respondent had
until 1996 within which to file the action. She filed her suit in
1992, well within the prescriptive period.
31
PIULAPIL VS HEIORS OF BRIONBES
FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones.
Respondents are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones. Maximino
was married to Donata but their union did not produce any
children. In 1952, Maximino died, Donata instituted intestate
proceedings to settle her husbands estate with the CFI Cebu City.
CFI issued a Letters of Administration in favor of Donata who
submitted an inventory of Maximinos properties included the
disputed land. In same year 1952, CFI issued order awarding
ownership to Donata. In 1960, such order was recorded in
Register of Deeds and by virtue thereof, a new TCT was issued in
her name. In 1977, Donata died. Her niece, Erlinda, one of the
Petitioners, instituted with the RTC a Petiton for Administration of
the Intestate Estate of Donata. RTC appointed her and her
husband Gregorio as Administrators of Donatoas estate. In 1985,
Silverio, Maximinos nephew, one of the Respondents, filed with
the RTC for Letters of Administration for the Intestate Estate of
Maximino which initially granted ordering him to collect rentals
from Maximinos properties. But Gregorio filed a motion to set
aside the Order claiming that said properties were already under
his and his wifes administration as part of intestate estate of
Donata. Hence, Silverios Letters of Administration was
subsequently set aside. In 1987, Respondents filed a complaint
with RTC against Petitioners for Annulment/Recovery of
possession of real property. In 1992, Respondents amended their
complaint alleging that Donata, as Administrarix of Maximinos
Estate, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust,
and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in
registering in her name the real properties belonging to the
Intestate Estate of Maximino. RTC favored Respondents and
Ordered Petitioners to reconvey subject properties and render
Accounting to the former. Petitioners appealed to CA but the CA
affirmed the RTC, hence, they petitioned to SC.
ISSUE 1: Whether Respondents have rightful claim to recover
their share from Maximinos Estate based on the alleged
misrepresentation of Donata that eventually resulted to her being
registered the disputed estate properties?
HELD: No. Because Respondents cause of action had already
been prescribed.
Assuming that Donata had employed misrepresentations that
constitute fraud on her part that resulted to her successful
registration of the estate properties under her name, such act
would necessarily result to an imposition of an implied trust upon
her provided under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code.
There are two kinds of implied trusts. One is the resulting trust and
the other one is the constructive trust. Both are created by
operation of law. But the latter is not created by any words, either
expressly or impliedly, evidencing a direct intention to create a
trust, but only by construction of equity in order to satisfy the
demands of justice, as contradistinguished from the former which
is always presumed to have been contemplated by the parties and
their intention thereto is traceable in their transaction but not
however expressed in any deed or instrument of conveyance and
may be proven by parole evidence as opposed to that of
expressed trust (a trust relation created by express of intention of
the parties thereto).
The rule that an action to compel a trustee to convey property
registered in his name in trust for the benefit of the cestui que

trust does not prescribe, only applies to express trust. Basis: the
possession of the trustee is not adverse. It may also apply to
resulting trust so long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust.
But with respect to constructive trust, the rule is different,
prescriptibility applies.
While Respondents right to inheritance was transferred or vested
upon them at the time of Maximinos death, their enforcement of
said right by appropriate legal action may be barred by
prescription of action.
Art. 1144 of the Civil Code provides that actions must be brought
within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues:
Upon written contract;
Upon an obligation created by law;
Upon a judgment.
Since implied trust is an obligation created by law (Art. 1456 CC),
then, Respondents had ten (10) years within which to bring an
action for reconveyance of their shares in Maximinos estate.
ISSUE 2: When the ten (10) year period begins?
HELD: Reconveyance of real property based on an implied trust
prescribes in ten (10) years from registration and/or issuance of
title to the property, not only because Torrens System is a
constructive notice to title to the whole world, but also because by
registering the disputed properties exclusively in her name,
Donata in effect had already unequivocally repudiated any other
claim to the same.
Donata registered and secured TCT over disputed properties in
her name on June 27, 1960, but Respondents filed their complaint
Reconveyance and Annulment only on March 3, 1987, or almost
27 years after the registration of said properties in the name of
Donata. Hence, there actions had already been prescribed.
While the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe
so long as co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized (Art.
494 CC), but Donata had never recognized respondents as co-
owners or co-heirs either expressly or impliedly, as she asserted
to be the sole heir of Maximino necessarily excludes
Respondents.
ISSUE 3: What is the effect if Donata has indeed employed fraud
and misrepresentation in registering the disputed property by
claiming that she was the sole and the only heir of Maximino when
in truth and in fact, she was not?
HELD: Donatas fraud and misrepresentation may render CFIs
Order in 1960 as voidable, but not void on its face, because, it was
rendered by the court in regular exercise of its jurisdiction, hence,
it cannot be subject to collateral attack as respondents did in this
case.
ISSUE:
ISSUE 4: Is the action to Annul CFIs Order based on fraud had Whether or not the oppositor brothers may claim to
also been prescribed? be heirs of their legitimate sister.
HELD:
HELD: Yes. Action to annul an order or judgment based on fraud No. They were not for at the time of her death,Silvinas
must be brought within four (4) from discovery of fraud. illegitimate son, Francisco, was her intestate heir, to the
32
In this case, Respondents discovered Donatas fraudulent acts
only in 1985, hence, their right to file an action to annul CFIs
Order issued in 1960 likewise prescribed as they filed their
amended complaint for Annulment based on fraud only in 1992, or
7 years from date of discovery thereof.
ISSUE 5: What is the quantum of evidence required to prove fraud
in a case where the principal actors had already been dead?
HELD: Proof beyond reasonable doubt. Reason: Fraud in breach
of trust is not lightly imputed to the living; for the legal presumption
is the other way, as to the dead who are not here to answer for
themselves, it would be the height of injustice and cruelty to
disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless
the evidence of fraud is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE 6: Can Respondents validly assail the courts decision
vesting title to the disputed property in favor of Donata to be not
binding upon them on the ground that they were not made a party
to the proceeding thereon?
HELD: No. While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that
Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court was not able
to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the
intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the
settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a
proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of
the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of
the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the
whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing
on the date and time indicated in the publication. The publication
requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the
purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the
deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most
especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the
petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or
involuntarily made.
Diaz vs iac p126
CACHO v. UDAN
FA C T S :Silvina Udan, single, died leaving a purported will
naming her illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, and one
Wenceslao Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share alike.
Wencesla filed a petition for probate, but this was opposed
by Rustico Udan, legitimate brother of the testatrix. But as
Francisco himself filed his own opposition, Rustico withdrew
his. During the probate proceedings, Francisco died. After
Franciscos death, John Udan and Rustico Udan, both
legitimate brothers of the testatrix, filed their respective
oppositions to the probate of the will. The court dismissed
these two oppositions for lack of interest in the estate,
and directed the fiscal to study the advisability of filing
escheat proceedings.

exclusion of her brothers. This is clear from Article 988,
which provides that (i)n the absence of legitimate
descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased, and Article
1003 which states that (i)f there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased... These legal provisions decree that collateral
relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the
absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate
children.
Albeit the brothers and sister can concur with the widow or
widower, they do not concur, but are excluded by the
surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate (Article 1003).
To be able to have standing to intervene in a settlement
proceeding, the person must have a pecuniary interest in
the distribution of the hereditary estate, either because he is
a beneficiary by will or a beneficiary by law, or because he
has a money claim which shall survive the death of the
testator. In the case at bar, the son died after the mother.
Therefore, between an illegitimate child who has passed
away and the legitimate brothers or sisters of the deceased,
the illegitimate child is preferred, provided, he dies after the
death of the testatrix. Because having survived the testatrix,
successional rights vested precisely upon the momnt of
death. Furthermore, the brothers and sisters cannot inherit
from the deceased child because of the prohibition under
Article 992.
In the Matter of the Intestate Estates of the Deceased
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Delgado, Heirs of Luis
DELGADO, petitioners vs. Heirs of Marciana RUSTIA,
FACTS:
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will.
The claimants of their estates may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting
of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces,
and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged
heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his
nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de facto
adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa
Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five
other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario,
Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed
Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio
Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all
natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo
was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life.
Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
Luis Delgado. widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of
the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children
The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado to the other one-half.
Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but
whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. Several 2.
33
circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot
be doubted.
The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into
their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and
Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the
couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-
ampunan. During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo
Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the
intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo
Sagarbarria.
ISSUES:
1. Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado?
2. Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces
of Josefa Delgado can inherit by right of representation?
3. Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia?
RULING:
1. The Lawful Heirs of Josefa Delgado
It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa
Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio
Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario,
Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent
Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.
The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related
to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother.
Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may
inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled
to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
However, the petitioners in this case are already the
nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of
Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code,
the right of representation in the collateral line takes place
only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters
(nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be
exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore,
the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are
entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers
and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time
of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested
right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being
clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine
who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their
children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death.
Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit
from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the
new Civil Code:
The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia.
As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only
upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She
failed to present authentic proof of recognition. Together
with Guillermina Rustia Rustia, they were held legal
strangers to the deceased spouses and therefore not
entitled to inherit from them ab intestato.
Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of
Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of
his sisters, nieces and nephews.
Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall
inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The
remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of
Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of
any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have
predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death.
Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are
excluded from her estate. The trial court is hereby ordered
to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of
Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose
respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of
the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia
and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes).
Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective
shares shall pertain to their estates.
Santiillon Miranda p128
CALISTERIO vs. CALISTERIO
FACTS:
Teodorico died intestate and was survived by his
wife, Marietta. Teodorico was the 2ndhusband of Marietta
who had been previously married to James, who
disappeared without a trace. Teodorico and Marietta
were married without having secured a court declaration
that James was presumptively dead. Antonia, surviving
sister of Teodorico, claiming to be sole surviving heir of
Teodorico, alleged that the marriage between Teodorico
and Marieta was bigamous and thus, null and void.
HELD:
The 2ndmarriage, having been contracted during the
regime of the Civil Code, is valid notwithstanding the
absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
James.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no
evidence having been adduced to indicate another
property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in
common. Upon the dissolution with the death of
34
Teodorico, the property should be divided into 2 equal
portions: one portion to the surviving spouse and the
other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The
successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over
the net estate of the deceased, concurring with the
legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces
(the latter by right of representation), is of the
inheritance, the brother and sisters or nephews and
nieces, being entitled to the other half. Brothers and
sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in
representation by the latter of their parents who
predeceased or are incapacitated to succeed
MANG-OY VS CA
FACTS:Old Tumpao begot 3 children (respondents) with his
first wife. Upon her death, he took himself a second wife but
without issues. However she had adopted 2 children
according to the practice of Igorots. On September 4, 1937,
Old Tumpao executed what he called last will and
testament which were read to and thumb mark affixed by all
of the beneficiaries who at the time were already occupying
the portions respectively allotted to them. After the death of
Old Tumpao, the parties remained to be in possession of
the lots assign to them which was in accordance of the
wishes of old Tumpao which was also agreed upon by the
parties in a public document.
On November 4, 1960, respondents executed an extra-
judicial partition in which they divided the property of Old
Tumpao among the three of them only. Petitioners sued for
reconveyance , sustained by trial court but reversed by CA.
ISSUE:Whether or not the will and testament of Old
Tumpao be duly allowed even without being proved in the
court
RULING:In accordance with the rules of court, no will shall
pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or
allowed in court.
However the document maybe sustained by art 1056 of the
Old Civil Code which was the law in force at the time the
document was made. The law says: If the testator should
make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivors, or
by will such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
Such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or
donation inter vivos, which is a consequence of its special
nature. Thus, the last will and testament of Old Tumpao is
sustained by the provision of Art 1056, Old Civil Code,
which became a binding law when the beneficiaries, parties
herein, agreed and confirmed with the disposition made by
Old Tumpao.
JLT AGRO vs. BALANSAG
 35

FACTS:Julian married Antonia and they had 2 children.

After Antonias death, Julian married Milagros and they had
4 children. A compromise agreement was entered wherein
it was to be owned in common by Julian and his 2 children
from the 1st marriage.

The 3 of them executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets

and Liabilities in favor of JLT Agro. A Supplemental Deed
was later executed transferring ownership over the lot in
favor of JLT Agro. Meanwhile, Milagros and her children
took possession over the subject lot. Balansag also bought
the said lot from Milagros.
HELD:
The appellate court erred in holding that future
legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior
to the death of Don Julian. At the time of the execution of
the deed of assignment covering the lot in question in favor
of petitioner, Julian remained the owner of the property
since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his
heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death.
Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted
to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced
by the court approved Compromise Agreement. It is
premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the
death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a
legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties
which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from
Don Julian upon his death. Hence, the total omission from
inheritance of Don Julian's heirs from the second
marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly
imaginable as it is unfounded