REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BATASAN COMPLEX
CONSTITUTION HILLS
QUEZON CITY

HON. JUAN ANDRES DONATO BAUTISTA,

Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------------x

ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT

RESOLVED, that Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chair Juan Andres D.

Bautista is impeached for graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust and culpable
violation of the Constitution pursuant to Article XI, Sec. 2 of the Philippine
Constitution.

ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT APPROVED BY THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 17TH CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, IN THE NAME OF ITSELF AND OF ALL OF THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE, AGAINST JUAN ANDRES D. BAUTISTA, IN SUPPORT OF HIS
IMPEACHMENT FOR GRAFT AND CORRUPTION, BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC
TRUST AND CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE 1, in that over a period of time in 2016, the following documents and
information pertaining to bank accounts, funds, businesses, corporations, and financial
transactions involving Respondent and/or members of his family were gathered by
Respondent Bautistas wife, Ms. Patricia Paz Cruz Bautista:1

BANK ACCOUNTS

A. Luzon Development Bank (LDB) Accounts

Thirty (30) separate accounts in Luzon Development Bank in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig totaling
P227,701,053.00, under the name of Respondent Bautista and his family members.

LDB Account Nos. Amount in PhP

040-17-00008-9 6,431,181.76
040-17-00009-5 7,425,296.54
040-17-00010-3 15,931,505.09

1 She subsequently submitted an affidavit to the National Bureau of Investigation regarding these.
 040-17-00012-6 6,918,192.63
040-17-00016-1 6,982,936.92
040-17-00017-8 9,120,942.52
040-17-00018-4 6,439,702.59
040-17-00020-9 11,636,802.58
040-17-00022-1 11,592,878.45
040-17-00025-1 6,106,361.82
040-17-00028-0 6,812,489.82
040-17-00029-6 8,581,859.35
040-17-00031-1 6,241,455.48
040-17-00033-3 10,738,222.74
040-17-00037-9 6,316,398.56
040-17-00038-5 13,144,118.47
040-17-00040-0 9,172,839.99
040-17-00084-2 8,123,352.02
040-17-00044-5 7,838,177.41
040-17-00046-8 5,942,573.33
040-17-00047-4 7,648,378.12
040-17-00049-7 7,990,420.78
040-17-00050-5 9,879,912.23
040-17-00052-8 6,354,028.51
040-17-00055-7 5,508,591.05
040-17-00051-1 400,000.00
040-17-00042-1 8,092,689.71
040-01-00058-2 37,055.17
040-17-00053-4 2,200,000.00
040-17-00042-2 8,092,689.71
===================
Total PhP227,701,053.00

Five (5) separate accounts in LDB Makati City totaling P101,519,909.00.

LDB Account Nos. Amount in PhP

028-05-00103-5 12,225,070.69
028-17-00010-3 24,451,842.42
028-17-00012-8 29,469,320.37
028-17-00005-0 21,732,835.77
028-05-00104-1 13,640,840.34
====================
Total PhP101,519,909.00

B. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) Accounts

A Foreign Currency Account and Peso Account with RCBC, under the following details and
information:

RCBC Account Nos. Denomination Amount in PhP/US$

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 8275007227 US Dollars 12,778.30
1-275-93034-9 Pesos 257,931.60
=====================
Total US$12,778.30/PhP257,931.60

C. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC)

An HSBC Bank Account in Hong Kong with the following details:

HSBC Account No. Denomination Amount in HK$

611-355967-888 HK Dollars 948,358.97
================
Total HK$948,358.97

REAL PROPERTIES

a. House and Lot Phase 1, Blk. 10, Lot. 81, Pili Road, Ayala Westgrove Heights,
Silang, Cavite (included in the SALN);
b. Units 3A/B South of Pacific Plaza Towers (included in the SALN);
c. Unit 17A, The Suite at One Bonifacio High Street plus parking slots (not included in
the SALN);
d. Unit 4503, Two Meridien plus parking slots (included in the SALN);
e. Two Meridien Unit plus parking slots (included in his SALN);
f. St. Francis Place (included in his SALN);
g. Ayala Greenfield Estates, Phase II, Block 8, Lot 1 (indicated in the SALN);
h. Ayala Greenfield Estates, Phase III, Block 2, Lot 8 (indicated in the SALN);
i. Unit 11L, North Tower, One Shangri la Place (indicated in the SALN); 2
j. Unit 12L, North Tower, One Shangri la Place (indicated in the SALN);
k. Unit 38D, North Tower, One Shangri la Place (indicated in the SALN);
l. The District in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.;
m. Taytay, Rizal Property (indicated in the SALN); and
n. Parking Slot Nos. 91 and 92, One Shangri la Place (indicated in the SALN)

FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND PROPERTIES

Mrs. Bautista also discovered documents establishing the existence of the following foreign
companies in locales known to be offshore banking hotspots, and which Respondent Bautista
apparently did not declare in his SALN:

a. Bauman Enterprises Limited a company established in the British Virgin

Islands on 29 September 2010. This is the trustee company that Respondent Bautista set
up with the Bank of Singapore.

2Mrs. Bautista, in her affidavit, stated that she was initially unaware that she was made a co-
owner of this property.

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 b. Mantova International Limited a company established in Brunei
Darussalam on 26 April 2011.

c. Mega Achieve Inc. a company established in Anguilla on 15 July 2014;

these being only a portion of what he had illegally amassed while in public office and
which he failed to declare in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN), in
betrayal of the public trust, in culpable violation of the Constitution and in acts of
massive graft and corruption;

ARTICLE 2, in that among the documents mentioned above as there are more were
several checks and commission sheets from a private law firm, Divina & Uy Law Offices.
The documents show that Respondent Bautista procured the services of this Law Firm or
referred clients to the latter, in order to profit from or in consideration of his position in
government, including the COMELEC. What is worthy to note is that among the clients
that Respondent Bautista would refer to the Law Firm are government clients such as
Smartmatic, BASECO and UCPB -- government entities that Respondent Bautista
constantly dealt with while in COMELEC and as PCGG Chairman, and which are clear
indications of graft and corrupt practices and his betrayal of public trust reposed on him
and his culpable violation of the Fundamental Law of the land. Respondent Bautista
knowingly allowed his office, including his influence as the COMELEC Chairman, to be
used for private gains and profits, including his own.

ARTICLE 3, in that SALN Respondent Bautista submitted last 2016, considering the
information and documents obtained, was grossly undeclared or substantial properties,
as both personal and real, were not included therein, in violation of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Moreover, based
on documents and information obtained, Respondent Bautistas total and declared assets
in his 2016 SALN are grossly below his true and correct assets that are under his name,
as Respondent Bautistas net assets as found and disclosed by his wife as stated in the
foregoing far exceed the total assets, including the liabilities, he declared in his 2016
SALN. Respondent Bautistas accumulated income and assets are manifestly
disproportionate and may not be reasonably explained and justified even by his Salary
Grade 31. Respondent Bautista has to be made to account for how he was able to
accumulate such a substantial amount of wealth in such a short period of time.

By his non-declaration of these substantial amounts of wealth, Respondent Bautista

clearly had the malicious and fraudulent intent to hide these huge assets from public view
and scrutiny.

More importantly, it is in violation of his positive duty under the law and the
Constitution to render and submit an account of his wealth in keeping with the principle
of transparency and full public disclosure and the state policy of maintain(ing) honesty
and integrity in the public service in accordance with the sacred doctrine that a public
office is a public trust. His grave omissions in his SALNs constitute betrayal of the public
trust, culpable violation of the Constitution and acts of massive graft and corruption.

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ARTICLE 4, in that between 20 and 27 March 2016, or before the May 2016 election, a
massive personal data breach involving the Commission on Elections website and/or
data processing system happened, exposing to the recesses of the dark web the sensitive
personal information of more or less 50 million registered voters based here and abroad;
subsequently, the National Privacy Commission, in a pioneering proceeding under the
new Data Privacy Act, RA 10173, found serious omissions in his part, in that
Respondent Bautista, as the Head of Agency, and despite knowledge of the serious
weakness of the COMELECs data processing system, failed to implement reasonable
and appropriate measures to protect personal data against human dangers, such as, but
not limited to, unlawful access, fraudulent misuse, unlawful destruction, alteration, and
contamination; COMELEC, among other things, failed to implement stricter security
measures, which include, but is not limited to:

i. Removal of variables from the database that were not necessary for the
COMELEC to achieve the intended purposes of the Precinct Finder and Post
Finder applications; in other words, the privacy and security policy did not adhere
to the principles of transparency, legitimate purpose, and proportionality.

ii. A data classification process that would have allowed COMELEC to implement
greater security measures; COMELEC knew or ought to have known that
pursuant to Section 11 of the Data Privacy Act of 2012, data collected should be
accurate, relevant, adequate and not excessive in relation to the purposes for
which they are collected and processed, and retained only if necessary for the
fulfillment of the purposes for which the data was obtained.

iii. A process for identifying and accessing reasonably foreseeable vulnerabilities in its
computer networks, and for taking preventive, corrective and mitigating action
against data breaches.

iv. The Head of Agency is responsible for complying with security arrangements,
adhering to the most appropriate standard recognized by the information and
communications technology industry. There should have been adherence to the
minimum standards provided in the issuances from the Department of Science and
Technologys ICTO.

Moreover, Respondent Bautista failed to designate of an individual accountable for the

organizations compliance with the Data Privacy Act of 2012, either by appointing a data
protection officer, or by designating another employee or official to take over that role;
in after affording the respondents due process, the NPC concluded in its ruling dated 28
December 2016, that: It is quite clear from the foregoing that there was very little to no
awareness on the part of COMELEC Chairman Bautista regarding his accountability
toward handling personal data. There is no documentation that shows that there were
continuous efforts to increase the level of protection of personal data that was in
COMELEC custody, or what other steps were taken to achieve adherence to data
protection standards, as required by the Data Privacy Act of 2012.

His serious and grave omissions as Head of Agency in relation to the COMELEAK
now said to be the second worst data breach in digital history after that of Mexicos data
breach of the records of 90 million voters constitute betrayal of public trust.

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 BY HIS CONDUCT, Respondent Bautista has undermined the integrity of his office,
brought disrepute on the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and committed graft and
corruption, culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayed the public trust.

By so flouting justice and the Rule of Law, he has committed an unforgivable outrage
against the Filipino people to whom he must answer under the Constitution.

Indeed, by such conduct, Respondent Bautista warrants impeachment and trial, and
removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit
under the Republic of the Philippines.

Adopted 137 in the affirmative, 75 in the negative and 2 in abstention by the

House of Representatives of the 17th Congress of the House of Representatives of the
Republic of the Philippines, on or around 5 p.m. on Wednesday, 11 October 2017.