CARBONELL VS.

COURT OF APPEALS, AND PONCIO

January 1976

FACTS:
On January 27, 1955, respondent Jose Poncio executed a private memorandum of sale of his parcel of
land with improvements situated in San Juan, Rizal in favor of petitioner Rosario Carbonell who knew that
the said property was at that time subject to a mortgage in favor of the Republic Savings Bank (RSB) for
the sum of P1,500.00. Four days later, Poncio, in another private memorandum, bound himself to sell the
same property for an improved price to one Emma Infante for the sum of P2,357.52, with the latter still
assuming the existing mortgage debt in favor of the RSB in the amount of P1,177.48. Thus, in February 2,
Poncio executed a formal registerable deed of sale in her (Infante's) favor. So, when the first buyer
Carbonell saw the seller Poncio a few days afterwards, bringing the formal deed of sale for the latter's
signature and the balance of the agreed cash payment, she was told that he could no longer proceed with
formalizing the contract with her (Carbonell) because he had already formalized a sales contract in favor
of Infante.
To protect her legal rights as the first buyer, Carbonell registered on February 8, 1955 with the Register of
Deeds her adverse claim as first buyer entitled to the property. Meanwhile, Infante, the second buyer,
was able to register the sale in her favor only on February 12, 1955, so that the transfer certificate of title
issued in her name carried the duly annotated adverse claim of Carbonell as the first buyer. The trial court
declared the claim of the second buyer Infante to be superior to that of the first buyer Carbonell, a
decision which the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, Court of
Appeals annulled and set aside its first decision and affirmed the trial courts decision.

ISSUE:
Who has the superior right over the subject property?
HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate courts decision and declared the first buyer Carbonell to have
the superior right over the subject property, relying on Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Unlike the first and
third paragraphs of said Article 1544, which accord preference to the one who first takes possession in
good faith of personal or real property, the second paragraph directs that ownership of immovable
property should be recognized in favor of one "who in good faith first recorded" his right. Under the first
and third paragraphs, good faith must characterize the prior possession, while under the second
paragraph, good faith must characterize the act of anterior registration.
When Carbonell bought the lot from Poncio on January 27, 1955, she was the only buyer thereof and the
title of Poncio was still in his name solely encumbered by bank mortgage duly annotated thereon.
Carbonell was not aware - and she could not have been aware - of any sale to Infante as there was no
such sale to Infante then. Hence, Carbonell's prior purchase of the land was made in good faith which did
not cease after Poncio told her on January 31, 1955 of his second sale of the same lot to Infante. Carbonell
wanted to meet Infante but the latter refused so to protect her legal rights, Carbonell registered her
adverse claim on February 8, 1955. Under the circumstances, this recording of Carbonells adverse claim
should be deemed to have been done in good faith and should emphasize Infante's bad faith when the
latter registered her deed of sale 4 days later.

SEMIRA V. CA
230 SCRA 577
FACTS:
Gutierrez was the owner of a parcel of land. This parcel was sold to Buenaventura An. He entered the
premises based on the boundaries stated in the deed of sale. He then bought two additional parcels of
land. On a relevant date, he sold the first parcel to his nephew who also entered the premises based on
the boundaries stated in the deed. The deed also stated the same boundaries and area of the lot, which
was larger in actuality. This nephew then sold the land to petitioner. The deed this time reflected a
different area, the actual area of the land. The land was found to be larger than what was stated in the
previous documents. Semira entered then the premises based on the boundaries and began construction
of a rice mill. Buenaventura then filed an action for forcible entry against Semira, alleging that latter
illegally encroached on the other parcel of land previously bought by the former and that the land that
was supposed to be occupied by the latter was smaller than the land he was actually occupying.
HELD:
In the case at bar, the issue of possession cannot be decided independently of the question of ownership.
Private respondent claimed constructive possession of the parcel of land he alleged to be encroached by
Semira. Likewise, Semira based his occupancy of the land by virtue of the Ramirezs sale of the land to
him. The question of prior possession may only be resolved in answering the question of who is the real
owner of the disputed portion. Where land is sold for a lump sum and not so much per unit of measure,
the boundaries of the land stated in the contract determines the effects and scope of the sale, not the
area thereof. The vendor is thus obligated to deliver the land included within the boundaries regardless
of whether the land is greater or lesser than the area stipulated in the sale.

BALATBAT V. CA
FACTS:
A parcel of land was acquired by plaintiff Aurelio Roque and Maria Mesina during their conjugal union.
Maria died on August 28, 1966. On June 15, 1977, Aurelio filed a case for partition. The trial court held
that Aurelio is entitled to the portion at his share in the conjugal property, and 1/5 of the other half
which formed part of Marias estate, divided equally among him at his 4 children. The decision having
become final and executory, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued a transfer certificate of title on
October 5, 1979 according to the ruling of the court. On April 1, 1980, Aurelio sold his 6/10 share to
spouses Aurora Tuazon-Repuyan and Jose Repuyan, as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. On June 21,
1980, Aurora caused the annotation of her affidavit of adverse claim. On August 20, 1980, Aurelio filed a
complaint for rescission of contract grounded on the buyers failure to pay the balance of the purchase
price. On February 4, 1982, another deed of absolute sale was executed between Aurelio and his children,
and herein petitioner Clara Balatbat, involving the entire lot. Balatbat filed a motion for the issuance of
writ of possession, which was granted by the court on September 20, 1982, subject to valid rights and
interests of third persons. Balatbat filed a motion to intervene in the rescission case, but did not file her
complaint in intervention. The court ruled that the sale between Aurelio and Aurora is valid.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the alleged sale to private respondents was merely executory
(2) Whether there was double sale
(3) Whether petitioner is a buyer in good faith and for value
HELD:
(1) Contrary to petitioner's contention that the sale dated April 1, 1980 in favor of private respondents
Repuyan was merely executory for the reason that there was no delivery of the subject property and that
consideration/price was not fully paid, we find the sale as consummated, hence, valid and enforceable.
The Court dismissed vendor's Aurelio Roque complaint for rescission of the deed of sale and declared that
the Sale dated April 1, 1980, as valid and enforceable. No appeal having been made, the decision became
final and executory.
The execution of the public instrument, without actual delivery of the thing, transfers the ownership from
the vendor to the vendee, who may thereafter exercise the rights of an owner over the same.In the instant
case, vendor Roque delivered the owner's certificate of title to herein private respondent. The provision
of Article 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or
enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be
embodied in a public instrument. A contract of sale being consensual, it is perfected by the mere consent
of the parties. Delivery of the thing bought or payment of the price is not necessary for the perfection of
the contract; and failure of the vendee to pay the price after the execution of the contract does not make
the sale null and void for lack of consideration but results at most in default on the part of the vendee, for
which the vendor may exercise his legal remedies.
(2) Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that in case of double sale of an immovable property, ownership
shall be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. In the case at bar, vendor
Aurelio Roque sold 6/10 portion of his share to private respondents Repuyan on April 1, 1980.
Subsequently, the same lot was sold again by vendor Aurelio Roque (6/10) and his children (4/10),
represented by the Clerk of Court pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, on February 4,
1982. Undoubtedly, this is a case of double sale contemplated under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.
Evidently, private respondents Repuyan's caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the
subject property on July 21, 1980. The annotation of the adverse claim in the Registry of Property is
sufficient compliance as mandated by law and serves notice to the whole world. On the other hand,
petitioner filed a notice of lis pendens only on February 2, 1982. Accordingly, private respondents who
first caused the annotation of the adverse claim in good faith shall have a better right over herein
petitioner. As between two purchasers, the one who has registered the sale in his favor, has a preferred
right over the other who has not registered his title even if the latter is in actual possession of the
immovable property. Further, even in default of the first registrant or first in possession, private
respondents have presented the oldest title. Thus, private respondents who acquired the subject property
in good faith and for valuable consideration established a superior right as against the petitioner.
(3) Petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. If petitioner did investigate before buying the
land on February 4, 1982, she should have known that there was a pending case and an annotation of
adverse claim was made in the title of the property before the Register of Deeds and she could have
discovered that the subject property was already sold to the private respondents. It is incumbent upon
the vendee of the property to ask for the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of the title from the
vendor. One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot
claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest
therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him
upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of
his vendor. Good faith, or the want of it is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but
rather a state or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual or fancied tokens or signs.