Cases for AGRA 092117

II. Agricultural Tenancy

08 De Jesus v. IAC (Differentiate an Agricultural Lessee from a Civil Law Lessee)

Facts: The private respondents in this case are the owners of 7,162 hectares of land known as Lot No.
513 located at Pilar, Bataan. The private respondents, as heirs of Spouses Eustacio Calimbas and
Modesto Paguio, entered into a civil law contract of lease with the petitioner De Jesus and a certain
Felicisimma Rodriguez. The contract was to be effective for 2 and a half years, starting January 1,
1972 to July 1, 1974.
Located 4 hectares above the subject land is a fish pond owned by the petitioner. While on a
civl law lease agreement with the respondents, petitioners formed a partnership over the fish pond
with De Jesus as the industrial partner and Rodriguez as the capitalist.
When the civil law lease agreement between the petitioners and respondents expired,
Rodriguez left the property but herein petitioner De Jesus refused to vacate the leased premises
despite repeated demands. In 1975, private respondents filed a complaint for Recovery of
Possession with Damages before the trial court, who ruled in favor of petitioner De Jesus, saying that
the fish pond is an agricultural land and that petitioner is an agricultural lessee and not a civil law
lessee on the basis of the ff: (1) The land is agricultural (2) When the civil law contract of lease
expired, Felicisima left and De Jesus managed the fishpond it alone (3) The CFI judge visited the fish
pond and found De Jesus working on it alone. The CA affirmed at first, but later on reversed the Trial
Courts ruling saying that De Jesus is not an Agricultural Lessee because he hired the services of
people other than his family to work on the fishpond. Thus, the petition by De Jesus.

Issue: Whether petitioner De Jesus is an agricultural lessee

Held: No.
Ruling:
The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make him an agricultural lessee.
The law provides conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural
is only one of them. Among others, the law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family
to work the land. Absent the requisite of personal cultivation, petitioner cannot be considered an
Agricultural Lessee. Moreover, petitioner was also proven to be managing an adjacent 11 and a half
hectare fish pond which proves he is not a small farmer but a businessman.
Despite petitioners allegation that the law (Agricultural Reform Code) does not contemplate
on farmers having other sources of income, the court ruled on this matter based on the spirit of the
law which is to assist and help small farmers, to uplift their economic status by providing them a
modest standard of living sufficient to meet the farm familys needs.
B. Elements
09 Cayetano & Tiongson v. CA
Facts: Severino Manotok, the owner of the subject 34 hectare lot located in Balara, Quezon City,
donated this property to his eight grandchildren and 2 great grandchildren (petitioners). No one
occupied the property at the time.
Teodoro Macaya (respondent) went to Manotoks house and asked to occupy and guard the
property to prevent squatters from entering and theft of the fruits of the property, planted by the
owner. Manotok allowed Macaya to use the property, raise animals and plant, but the Manotoks
should not have any liability to these activities, and that if the Manotoks will, Macaya and his family
should vacate the property immediately.
The property-owners organized themselves into a corporation engaged primarily in the real
estate business known as the Manotok Realty, Inc. The owners transferred the 34-hectare lot to the
corporation as part of their capital contribution or subscription to the capital stock of the corporation.
Macaya was not required to pay, however, because the tax payments became burdensome
to the owners, Macaya was asked to pay 10 cavans of rice, which was elevated to 20 upon demand
of the owners because the value of the land increased. Macaya refused to pay an even greater
amount of palays, and so the owners said that if we wont, then he might as well not give anything at
all.
Thereafter, the Manotoks informed Macaya that they needed the property to construct their
houses. Macaya at first said that he will just harvest the fruits of the property before vacating, but he
never did and he even expanded the area hes working on from 3 hectares (the area agreed upon)
to 6 hectares.
Macaya insisted that he is an Agricultural tenant, that there is an Agricultural tenancy
relationship involved. The trial court ruled in favor of the Manotoks, but the CA ruled otherwise. Thus,
the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Severino Manotok is an Agricultural Tenant
Held: No.
Ruling:
Section 3 of RA 1199 as amended by RA 2263 defines agricultural tenancy as: the physical
possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another
for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate
farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to
pay a price certain, either in produce or in money, or in both.
All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship between the parties and the
absence of one or more requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as
contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status
as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform
Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

Sec. 5(b) A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who, either as owner, lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, lets or grants to another the use or cultivation of his land for a
consideration either in shares under the share tenancy system, or a price certain under the leasehold
tenancy system.

Sec. 5(a) A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the
latters consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system or paying to the landholder a price certain in produce or in money or both, under
the leasehold tenancy system.

Thus, the essential requisites of tenancy relationship are:

1) the parties are the landholder and the tenant;
a. the parties have not agreed as to their contributions of the several items of productions
such as expenses for transplanting, fertilizers, weeding and application of insecticides,
etc. In the absence of an agreement as to the respective contributions of the parties or
other terms and conditions of their tenancy agreement, the lower court concluded that
no tenancy relationship was entered into between them as tenant and landholder.
2) the subject is agricultural land;
a. the tax declarations of real property and the annual receipts for real estate taxes paid
have always classified the land as residential. Also, the property was located in the
metropolis and through the photo evidences, the land was surrounded by residential
properties, houses.
3) there is consent;
a. No. There has never been consent on the part of the petitioners, to form a, agricultural
tenancy relationship.
4) the purpose is agricultural production; and
 a. No. He was only allowed to cultivate the land for his own benefit, and it was not meant
to be shared to the owners.
5) there is consideration
a. The consideration mentioned was only as payment for the burdensome tax obligations
of the property, and not as a consideration for an agricultural tenancy relationship. The
petitioners did not get anything from the harvest and respondent Macaya was never
required to pay for any charge or expense.

10 Caballes v. DAR
Facts: The subject property consists of 60 meters (20x3). This was part of a 500 square meter lot (Lot
3109-c) located in Lawa-an, Cebu. This was initially owned by Andrea Millenes, which she then sold to
Arturo and Yolanda Caballes (petitioner).
In 1975, before the sale in favor of the spouses Caballes, private respondent Bienvenido
Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00
to the owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the
land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a fitfy-fifty basis. From 1975-
1977, Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn but
continued to plant bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the P2.00 rental for the lot
occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea Millenes.
Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda
Caballes, told Abajon that the poultry they intended to build would be close to his house and
pursuaded him to transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding. Abajon
offered to pay the new owners rental on the land occupied by his house, but his offer was not
accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying that they needed the
property. But Abajon refused to leave.
Respondent Abajon alleged that he is a bonafide tenant by the previous owners and invoking
Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, which provides that: [T]he agricultural leasehold relation under this
Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor
by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding; and that (I)n case the
agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or
transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor,

Issue: Whether or not respondent Cabajon is an agricultural tenant

Held: No.
Ruling:
Section 2 of RA 3844 provides: It is the policy of the State: (1) To establish cooperative-cultivatorship
among those who live and work on the land as tillers, owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-
size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in
agriculture to industrial development;
An economic family-size farm as an area of farm land that permits efficient use of labor and capital
resources of the farm family and will produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of
living to meet a farm familys needs for food, clothing, shelter, and education with possible
allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly
fluctuations in income.
The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-
square meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and corn cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be considered as an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting camote,
bananas, and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land cannot produce an income sufficient to
provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm familys basic needs. The private respondent
himself admitted that he did not depend on the products of the land because it was too small, and
that he took on carpentry jobs on the side.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation (added by the Supreme Court just for this case); and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The
absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
thereon, a de jure tenant.
The sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual
for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops
thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of
expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a
tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an
urban area and in the heart of an industrial or commercial zone. Tenancy status arises only if an
occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural
production.
 The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondents status is more of a
caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises
and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion.
Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear
that the private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently,
Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not a
tenant of the herein petitioner.

11 Hilario v. IAC
Facts: Salvador Baltazar (respondent) claims that since 1955, he is the share tenant of a 2 hectare
parcel of land located in San Miguel, Bulacan previously owned by a certain Socorro Balagtas. That
on 27 December 1980, the spouses Hilario (petitioners) threatened him to desist from entering and
cultivating the land, and that they threatened to put up fences around the said land. Baltazar further
claims that he is a tenant of Socorro Balagtas, as evidenced by a Kasunduan dated 1979, that he
planted halaman which he shared to Balagtas on a 70-30, 50-50 agreement and thus constructed
his house on the said land. After Socorro Balagtas death, he allegedly gave the shares to Corazon
Pengzon, the daughter of Balagtas and it was only in 1980 that he found out the land was already
owned by the Hilarios.
The petitioners alleged that they acquired the land through a deed of sale executed between
them and Philippine National Bank (PNB). The former owner (Corazon Pengson) testified that she only
owned two lots, with a total of 1,740 square meters and that at the time of the partition of the
property in 1964, she declared the land as Bakuran for classification purposes but had no
knowledge of pomelos and bananas planted therein. Pengson also said that she did not receive any
shares from Baltazar because she knew that after the deed of sale, she was no longer the owner of
the land. The Court of Agrarian Relations ruled in favor of the petitioners, saying that the land was not
Agricultural Land but only a Bakuran. However, the appellate court ruled otherwise, declaring
Baltazar a leasehold tenant entitled to a security of tenure of the land. Thus, the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is a leasehold tenant entitled to a security of tenure
Held: NO.
Ruling: The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit:
(1) The parties are the landholder and tenant;
(2) The subject is agricultural land;
(3) The purpose is agricultural production; and
(4) There is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.
 Tenancy relationship is indivisible. The two-hectare land subject of plaintiff s alleged contract
with Socorro Balagtas having been parcelled into seven (7) and possession thereof
relinquished/surrendered in 1965 results in the termination of plaintiff s tenancy relationship with the
previous owner/landholder. Such being the case, he cannot now claim that the landholding in
question consisting of 4,000 square meters, more or less, is being cultivated by him under the old
contract. The owner thereof Corazon Pengson has no tenancy relationship with him (petitioner).
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder
through lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation. So the mere cultivation of the land by
usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection
of security of tenure of the law.
Also, the subject land is clearly proven to be residential and not agricultural. A lot inside the
poblacion should be presumed residential, or commercial or non-agricultural unless, unless there is a
preponderance of evidence that proves otherwise.

12 QUA v. CA
Facts: Petitioner Lourdes Pena Qua filed for an ejectment against respondents Carmen Carillo, et al.
alleging that she is the owner of the subject land (with a total area of 11,057 sq. m.) which she
considers as residential situated at Poblacion, Malinao, Albay. She alleged that the occupants of the
land in question (346 sq. m), herein respondents, are mere squatters and that their occupancy was
just out of tolerance and that there was no agreement between both Qua and Carillo, no payment
of rents nor realty taxes.
The respondent Carmen Carillo, who is the wife of the late Salvador Carillo, alleges that they
are agricultural tenants to the subject land and two other lots adjoining the subject land, which also
belong to petitioner. That the former owner, Leovigildo Pena, instituted them as tenants and allowed
them to construct the auto-repair shop and the 3 other houses. Salvador Carillo (deceased) also
served as a mechanic for the former owner. The respondents further claim that they planted 500
coconut trees, 50 of which survived .
The municipal circuit court ruled in favor of the petitioners, ordering the respondents to vacate
the land. However, the RTC dismissed the complaint in favor of Carmina Carillo, saying that they are
agricultural tenants. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Thus, the petition by Lourdes Pena Qua.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Carmen Carillo is an Agricultural Tenant
Held: No.
Ruling: For tenancy relationship to exist, the following requisites must be present:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant
(2) The land is an agricultural land
(3) That the purpose is for agricultural production
(4) There is consideration
(5) There is consent (on the part of the owner, allowing the tenant to cultivate the land.
(6) There is personal cultivation; or with the help of the immediate farm household
In the case at bar, there is no agricultural production because it was proven that only seven
coconut trees were planted in the subject land contrary to the claims of the respondent. If they had
the purpose of agricultural production, they should have planted more to replace the coconut trees
that did not survive. Also, the auto repair shop was near the poblacion and along the highway which
made them choose to stop the cultivation of the land and pursue their auto-repair shop business
from which they were able to build two other houses. Furthermore, there was no evidence proving
that the respondents shared the proceeds of their harvests to the petitioners.

13 Guerrero v. CA
Facts: In 1969, plaintiff spouses Guerrero asked Apolinario Benitez (respondent) to take care of 21
cows grazing in their 21-hectare coconut plantation situated at Aurora, Quezon. For this purpose,
Benitez was allowed to construct a hut within the plantation for his family. He was also made to clean
the fruit-bearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves. During harvest time, Benitez was also made to
gather fallen coconuts from the 16-hectare part of the 21-hectare plantation. This was to husk and
split the nuts and then process its meat to Copra, which was then sold to the market. He shared 1/3
from the proceeds of the selling to the owner-herein plaintiffs. Benitez was also paid P500 for his work
on the cows.
In 1973, the plaintiffs-Guerrero prohibited Benitez from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare
portion of the 16-hectare land where he was previously allowed. He brought the matter to the Office
of Special Unit of Malacanang and there, both parties come into an agreement allowing Benitez, as
tenant, to work on the 16-hectare land and that their relationship will be guided by RA 1199, the
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.
In July, 1973, the Guerreros again refrained Benitez from gathering nuts on the subject land
and asked a certain Paulino and Rogelio to do the gathering and processing to copra, instead. They
were also said to have threatened bodily harm to Benitez and his family, and then caused the
demolition of the familys hut.
The petitioner Guerreros insist that Benitez was just a farm-hand worker who was dismissed as
an employee and not ousted as an agricultural share tenant.
Issue: Whether or not Apolinario Benitez is a share tenant / Whether the repeal of RA 3844 and RA
1199 impairs the rights vested on the share tenants before such repeal
Held: (1) Yes (2) No
 Ruling: (1) The meaning of cultivation is not restricted to tilling, plowing or harrowing of the
land. It includes the promotion of the growth and care for the plants or husbanding the ground to
forward the products of the Earth by general industry.
Respondent Benitez was proven to continuously physically possess the landholding from 1969
to 1973, the time he was ejected. The fact that respondent Benitez and his family handles all the
phases of farm work makes him a tenant and not a mere farm worker. Also, there was tercio basis
of sharing the produce of the coconut plantation from 1/3 to 2/3 of sharing in favor of the petitioner-
landowners. Also, the fact that Benitez constructed a hut for his family with the plantation also shows
the intention to stay in the landholding because a mere farm worker would not risk losing his house
upon the termination of his status as employee.
Section 3 of RA 1199 defines Agricultural Share Tenancy as physical possession of a
land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of
Agricultural Production through the labor of the former and of his immediate farm household, in
consideration of which the farmer agrees to share the harvest, or pay a price ascertainable either in
produce or in money or both.
(2) Once a tenancy relationship is established, such tenant has the right to work on the
agricultural land until the relationship is extinguished according to law. The phasing out of share
tenancy does not mean to label the former tenants as mere farm workers or laborers with no tenurial
rights. The Agriculture Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) was not
entirely repealed by RA 6389.
The respondent right as a share tenant does not end with the abolition of the share tenancy.
The goal and spirit of the laws as to having strong and independent farm owners remain.

14 Bonifacio v. Dizon
Facts: In 1968, Olimpio Bonifacio filed a complaint for ejectment before the Court of Agrarian
Reforms (CAR) against herein respondent Pastora San Miguel from the two-hectare land located in
Marilao, Bulacan. After trial, the CAR ruled in favor of Bonifacio, ordering that Pastora San Miguel
(respondent) to vacate the two-hectare land. The CA affirmed the decision, but ordered Olimpio
Bonifacio to pay San Miguel P1,376. Pastora San Miguel then sought relief from the Supreme Court
and during the pendency of the relief sought, Olimpio Bonifacio died. As no notice of the death was
given to the courts, no order for the substitution of the heirs was made.
Subsequently, the heirs of Bonifacio including Rosalina Bonifacio (petitioner) moved for the
execution of the judgment by the CAR, before the RTC of Bulacan. A writ of execution was then
issued. Pastora San Miguel moved to quash the writ of execution, which was then opposed by the
petitioners and thereafter sought issuance of a writ of demolition. After hearing, respondent Judge
Dizon rendered a decision declaring the writ of execution null and void because of the fact that this
case was not an ordinary case for ejectment but an Agrarian case for the ejectment of an
agricultural-lessee, and further asserted that the right being asserted by the petitioners is personal to
Olimpio Bonifacio (i.e this is in accordance to Sec. 36 p. 1 of RA 3844 re: Personal Cultivation
requirement) and so, this right died with with Olimpio. She also alleged that the non-substitution after
the death of Olimpio Bonifacio, rendered the judgment of CAR null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the right asserted by petitioners is personal to Olimpio Bonifacio, thus rendering
the CAR case null and void
Held: No.
Ruling: Sec.36.Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.Notwithstanding any agreement as to the
period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that: (1)The agricultural lessor-
owner or a member of the immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert
the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-
agricultural purposes.
Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the
landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his immediate
family so desired. In so providing, the law clearly did not intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly
and personally to the landowner but to extend the exercise of such right to the members of his
immediate family. Clearly then, the right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right
exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. To say otherwise would be to put to naught the right
of cultivation likewise conferred upon the landowners immediate family members.
The right of cultivation was extended to the landowners immediate family members evidently
to place the landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still is) allowed to
cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. In this regard, it must be observed that an
agricultural lessee who cultivates the landholding with the aid of his immediate farm household is
within the contemplation of the law engaged in personal cultivation. Thus, whether used in
reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term personal cultivation cannot be given a
restricted connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. Thus, the
petitioners being immediate family members of the deceased, the right to personally cultivate the
landholding was transmitted to them, a right that is not personal to Olimpio Bonifacio.

15 Laztimosa v. Blanco
Facts: In 1956, the CFI Iloilo adjudicated in favor of petitioner Lastimoza and his wife Honorata a
parcel of land identified as Lot #14. They were subsequently placed in possession of the land by
virtue of a writ of possession which ejected from the said land Perfecto Gallego and 5 others.
Herein respondent Nestor Panada claims that he was the tenant of recently ejected Perfecto
Gallego since the start of 1956-1957 Agricultural Year. He prays that he be maintained a tenant of 2-
hectares of the land.
The petitioners alleged that there was no tenancy relationship between them and Nestor
Panada and prayed that the petition be denied, and to also lift the interlocutory order issued by the
courts directing JAGO officer to supervise the harvesting of the crops and the depositing of the net
producing to the warehouse. Both petitions were denied, thus the petition herein.
Issue: Whether or not Nestor Panada, has the right to a security of tenure
Held: No.
Ruling: Section 9 of RA 1199 or the Tenancy Law assumes the validity of the Tenant Relationship
between the owner and the tenant. Thus, Nestor Panada cannot invoke the said law. The court
already held that the former owner, Perfecto Gallego to whom he considered sharing a tenant
relationship with the subject land, was an unlawful possessor and intruder.
Section 9 of RA 1199 provides that: "the sale or alienation of the land do not of themselves
extinguish the tenancy relationship," for in such cases, "the purchaser or transferee shall assume the
rights and obligations of the former landholder in relation to the tenant."
The court also ruled that a valid tenancy between Perfecto Gallego and Nestor Panada
cannot be presumed because Gallego was ousted from the subject land by virtue of a writ of
possession in favor of the petitioners, and he was proven to be an unlawful possessor. This is NOT in
accordance with section 5(b) of RA 1199 which provides that: Tenancy relationship can only be
created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either the "owner, lessee,
usufructuary or legal possessor of the land". In this case, Perfecto Gallego was not the true and lawful
landowner.
Security of tenure is a right guaranteed only to tenants de jure. To rule otherwise would be to
pave the way for fraudulent collusions among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and
lawful landholder. Such an anomalous and absurd result could not have been intended by Congress.
Since the tenant of an unlawful possessor, who was judicially ejected from the landholding has no
tenancy relationship with the lawful owner or possessor of the land, the Agrarian Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the tenant against the latter.

C. Establishment
16 Felizardo v. Fernandez
Facts: Respondent Siegfredo Fernandez filed for ejectment, reinstatement and damages against
Ronemar Felizardo et al. (Felizardos) and Perfecto Adalid (Adalids), owners of a 2-hectare
agricultural land located at Misamis, Oriental, from which a 1.5 hectare land was tenanted by
respondents father Policarpio (original tenant), which is used for planting coconuts and corn since
the 1930s. For 15 years, Siegfredo succeeded his then 74 year old father Policarpio (original tenant)
in the cultivation of the land and the harvesting of the coconuts which were then processed as
copra, sold to buyers in Tangub City. Siegfredo had a 1/3-2/3 sharing arrangement with the
landowners
In 1995, the Felizardos and Adalids - children of the landowners wanted to eject Siegfredo
from the land he was tilling. The petitioners did not want to recognize Siegfredo as the tenant, and
instead wanted to assign 65 year old Ascunsion, Siegfredos elder sister. Subsequently, the petitioners
brought criminal charges against Siegfredo for usurpation and qualified theft before the regular
courts. While these charges were pending, the landowners-petitioners harvested the furits of the land
but refused to acknowledge the 1/3 2/3 sharing agreement with Siegfredo.
Siegfredo filed this case against the landowner-petitioners, that by virtue of successional
tenancy rights, he is the lawful tenant of the land. He pointed out that he substituted his father and
assumed cultivation of the land for 15 long years without objection from the landowners. Therefore,
he became a bona fide tenant and could not be ejected because he is the lawful tenant. Siegfredo
further alleged in the complaint that there he is the only member of the immediate farm household
of his father, and that her aunt, Ascunsion was never a farm worker in her life, and that she is already
65 years old and living in Tangub City, far from the subject land.
On the other hand, the Felizardos and Adalids denied their tenancy relationship wth Siegfredo,
claiming that upon the death of Policarpo, they had the right to choose which tenant they prefer in
accordance with SEC. 9 of RA 3844 the Agricultural Land Reform Code which provides that
Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the Parties.In case of
death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall
continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the landholding
personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within one month from such death or permanent
incapacity, from among the following: (a) the surviving spouse; (b) the eldest direct descendant by
consanguinity; (c) the next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their age: Provided,
That in case the death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during the
agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at the end of that agricultural year: Provided,
further, That in the event the agricultural lessor fails to exercise his choice within the periods herein
provided, the priority shall be in accordance with the order herein established.
 The landowners contend that for 15 years, they did not object to the fact that Siegfredo
helped in the cultivation of the land because they believed SIegfredo was merely helping as a
member of the immediate farm household, and that this should not be construed as their implied
consent to Siegfredo being the Agricultural Tenant. This is premised also to the fact that Policarpo
was not incapacitated or dead at the time, which is why they did not object to siegfredos work in
the subject land.

The Regional Adjudicator ruled in favor of Siegfredo, that the chosen Agricultural lessee succeeding
the deceased or incapacitated previous lessee should be from the immediate farm household and
should be able to cultivate the land. The DARAB and CA affirmed this decision. Thus, the petition.

Issue: Whether or not Siegfredo Fernandez acquired the status of an Agricultural Tenant which
precludes the right of the landowners to choose another Agricultural Tenant.
Held: Yes
Ruling: The court ruled that the period of 15 years is too long a time to hold on to such a thought
which appears to be only an unverified assumption. The undisputed fact, as found by the DARAB, is
that respondent worked on the land since 1981 because his father could no longer do so.
Respondent did not merely aid his father in the latters farm work, but completely took over that work
since Policarpo was already very old and incapable to continue farming.
The landowners were proven to have known of the incapacity of Policarpo which
strengthened the claim of Siegfredo.
A tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or impliedly, in
accordance with Section 7 of R.A. No. 1199. As aptly held by the Regional Adjudicator: . . . the
transfer and/or delegation of such tenancy obligations to herein complainant [respondent] was in
conformity to the general practice among farmers, especially so in the case of complainant who
had been assisting his father in the farmworks (sic).
When defendants failed to intervene or object to this development, and continued to accept
their shares as preferred by the new cultivator, they have thereby impliedly consented to it giving rise
to the new tenancy relationship with the complainant.

D. Rights of Agricultural Lessee (RA 3844 as amended)

D.1 Security of Tenure (RA 3844, Sections 7, 9, 10)
17 Endaya v. CA
Facts: The subject land in this case is a 20,200 hectare agricultural land owned by Spouses Trinidad
and San Diego located at Malvar, Batangas. This land was devoted to rice and corn. The respondent
Fideli is the tenant of the subject land cultivating it since 1934 on a 50-50 share agreement.
In 1974, a lease contract was executed between Spouses San Diego and one Regino
Cassanova wherein the lessee, Cassanova was obliged to pay P400 and thereafter to P600 upon the
renewal of the said lease contract. Both lease contracts were signed by respondent as one of the
witnesses.
In 1980, spouses San Diego sold the land to the petitioners where a TCT was issued in favor of
the petitioners Endaya. Respondent Fideli continued to cultivate the land even though the petitioners
required him to vacate the land. However, private respondent deposited P8,000 as partial payment
to the landowners share for the years 1980-1985.
Due to the persistent demand of the petitioners, respondent Fideli filed an action before the
RTC praying that he be declared the Agricultural Tenant. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners
Endaya, stating that respondent is not an Agricultural Lessee. The CA reversed the decision, thus the
petition.
Petitioners contend that when the Spouses San Diego entered into a lease agreement with
Regino Cassanova, the leasehold relationship between spouses San Diego and Respondent was
terminated. They further contend that a landowner cannot have a civil law lease contract with one
person at the same time have a leasehold relationship, over the same land. Also, that by the
respondents signing of the lease contract as a witness, he is deemed to have waived his right as an
agricultural lessee.
Issue: Whether or not there is no security of tenure on the part of respondent Fideli when the Spouses
San Diego entered into a lease contract with Regino Cassanova, signed by Fideli
Held: No. There is still security of tenure.
Ruling: R.A. No. 3844 (1963), as amended by R.A. No. 6839 (1971), which is the relevant law governing
the events at hand, abolished share tenancy throughout the Philippines from 1971 and established
the agricultural leasehold system by operation of law. Section 7 of the said law gave agricultural
lessees security of tenure by providing the following:
The agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee
the right to continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected
therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.
The fact that the landowner entered into a civil lease contract over the subject landholding
and gave the lessee the authority to oversee the farming of the land, as was done in this case, is not
among the causes provided by law for the extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation.
 Transactions involving the agricultural land over which agricultural leasehold subsists resulting
in change of ownership will not terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee.

This code is relevant as to the subrogation of the rights of the former lessor to the one who
purchased the land: Sec.10.Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period,
etc.The agricultural leasehold relation under this code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration
of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal
possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights
and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.

18 Milestone Realty v. CA
Facts: Spouses Alfonso and Carolina Zacarias and Spouses Claro Zacarias and Cristina Lorenzo were
co-owners of the agricultural land of the Malinta Estate, located at Valenzuela City. Carolina
became the owner of the property by virtue of a deed of extrajudicial settlement after her spouse
Alfonsos death.
Meanwhile, Anacleto Pena was a tenant of the property and a holder of a Certificate of
Agricultural Leasehold issued on February 23, 1982; he had a house constructed on the lot. Anacleto
died intestate and was survived by Delia and his children in his first marriage, including Emilio Pena.
Edmundo and Delia with the help of her brother in law continued to cultivate the land. On January
22, 1992, Emilio signed a handwritten declaration that he was the tenant in the land and he was
returning the landholding to Carolina Zacarias in consideration of the sum of P1,500,000 as
disturbance compensation. He initially opted for a 1,000 square meter homelot but later changed
his mind. After receipt of the money, he executed a Katibayang Paglilipat ng Pagmamay- ari.
In the meantime, petitioner William Perez, et al. established Milestone as incorporators, in order
to acquire and develop the aforesaid property and the adjacent parcel of the Malinta Estate.
On July 30, 1992, Carolina Zacarias executed a deed of sale transfering the Lot No. 616 to
petitioner Milestone for P7,110,000. Milestone became the owner of the adjoining lots, Lot Nos. 616
and 617 of the Malinta Estate with a total area of three (3) hectares. Development of the property
then commenced.
On October 13, 1992, private respondents Delia Razon Pea and Raymundo Eugenio filed a
complaint against Emilio Pea, Carolina Zacarias and her brother Francisco Olympia, and William
Perez with the PARAD, praying inter alia to declare as null and void the sale by Carolina to Perez and
by the latter to Milestone, and to recognize and respect the tenancy of private respondents Delia
and Raymundo.
 In her answer, Carolina Zacarias declared that she chose Emilio Pea as her tenant-
beneficiary on the said property within 30 days after the death of Anacleto, conformably with
Section 9, through an affidavit when they answered to the complaint filed by Delia. Petitioners further
argued that Delia cannot be a successor-tenant because she did not personally cultivate the land.
Respondents note that it was only after the lapse of two (2) years (and not 30 days as
provided by the law) from the death of Anacleto on February 17, 1990, that both Carolina and Emilio
claimed in their respective affidavits that Emilio inherited the rights of Anacleto as a tenant. Such
inaction was said to be a waiver to choose the successor-tenant, according to respondents.

PARAD: Dismissed the complaint and ruled that the order of preference cited in Section 9 of Republic
Act 3844 is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause.

Thereafter, Delia and Eugenio appealed the decision to DARAB.

DARAB: Reversed the decision of PARAD and noted that Carolinas affidavit did not show any
categorical admission that she made her choice within the one (1) month period except to state
that when Anacleto died, the right of the deceased was inherited by Emilio Pea which could only
mean that she recognized Emilio Pea by force of circumstance under a nebulous time frame.

The Court of Appeals affirmed DARABs decision, further ruled that spouses Carolina and Francisco
failed to choose within the statutory period, therefore, any substitution of the deceased (Anacleto),
and that without prior notice to Delia (the wife of deceased), the Petitioners made their choice of
Petitioner Emilio Pea as substitute tenant only in January, 1992, after they had agreed to sell the
property to the Petitioner Milestone Realty & Co., Inc.

Issue: Whether or not Delia Razon Pea has a right of first priority over Emilio Pea in succeeding to
the
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844 is clear and unequivocal in providing for the rules on
succession to tenancy rights. A close examination of the provision leaves no doubt as to its rationale
of providing for continuity in agricultural leasehold relation in case of death or incapacity of a party.
To this end, it provides that in case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to
work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the person
who can cultivate the landholding personally.
 In the same vein, the leasehold shall bind the legal heirs of the agricultural lessor in case of
death or permanent incapacity of the latter. It is to achieve this continuity of relationship that the
agricultural lessor is mandated by law to choose a successor-tenant within one month from the
death or incapacity of the agricultural lessee from among the following: (1) surviving spouse; (2)
eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (3) the next eldest direct descendant or descendants
in the order of their age. Should the lessor fail to exercise his choice within one month from the death
of the tenant, the priority shall be in accordance with the aforementioned order.
The court found that it is true that Carolina failed to choose the successor-tenant within 30
days. In fact, it took her two years to declare Emilio Pena as the successor tenant.
On the other issue, the sale should not be declared null and void because Carolina was still
the owner of the property when the sale was consummated.

19 Villaviza v. Panganiban
Facts: Quirino Capalad
Issue: Whether or not the salary of the respondent-tenants shall be deducted from the damages they
incurred? (Di ko gets)
Held: No.
Ruling:

D.2 Pre-emption and Redemption

20 Rupa v. CA
Facts: Petitioner Rupa was the agricultural share tenant of the subject coconut land for twenty years
and that he was the one watching, taking care of and cleaning the coconut plantation; he also
gathers coconuts every three months and processes them into copra which he shares with the
Lim spouses under a 50-50% sharing basis; that aside from being a share tenant, he is also the
overseer of four parcels of coconut land.
Petitioner Rupa seeks the right of redemption, for he alleged that he was not given prior
notice, whether written or verbal, about the sale of the property he was cultivating. The former
owners, Spouses Lim, sold the property to Magin Salipot for P5,000.
In Magin Salipots answer, she denied that Rupa was indeed the agricultural tenant of the
former owners and that Rupa was only hired hired every now and then to oversee the copra-making
of the laborers of spouses Lim. She further argued that the right to redemption has already elapsed
because it has been 180 days since petitioner had actual knowledge of the sale, and that this right is
lost by laches or non-use.
RTC: dismissed the complaint, Ruled that RUPA was not a tenant thu not entitled to right of
redemption
CA: affirmed the RTC decision, that no clear and convincing evidence to show that plaintiff was a
share tenant of spouses Lim; that RUPA was only an overseer and administrator of the land.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Rupa is entitled to a right of redemption

Held: Yes.
Ruling:
RUPA was indeed an agricultural tenant-farmer as evidenced by the fact that he planted
coconut seedlings and that he gathered coconuts for the production of COPRA. The court also held
that RUPA is entitled to Right of Redemption because
We are also inclined to believe the position of RUPA that he came to know of the sale of the
land to SALIPOT only on February 16, 1981 as evidenced by a letter of the same date of the former
landowner Patrocenia Yu Lim to RUPA informing the latter to give up possession of the land to
SALIPOT as the land had already been sold to the latter. Thus, the action for redemption
commenced on March 26, 1981 was filed within the six-month reglementary period.

21 Conejero v. CA
Facts: Paz Torres and Enrique Torres were co-owners pro indiviso (undivided) of a lot and building in
Cebu City.
According to appellees, they knew of the sale on August 19, 1952 and that they immediately
made an offer to redeem the property. As of September 15, 1949, Enrique Torres sold his half interest
to the Raffian spouses for P13,000, with right to repurchase within one year.
Subsequent advances by the vendees a retro increased their claims against Enrique Torres,
and finally, on April 3, 1951 (six months after the expiration of the right to repurchase), said Enrique
executed a deed of absolute sale of the same half interest in the property in favor of the Raffians for
P28,000.
Conejero forthwith went to the buyers, offering to redeem his brother-in-laws share, which offer he
latter raised to P29,000.00 and afterwards to P34,000.
The parties were not able to settle, and so, the petitioner Conejero filed a complaint to
redeem the half interest of Enrique Torres.
The appellants contend that upon the sale in April 1951, appellees already knew of the sale at
that time.
However, the appellees contend that the deed of absolute sale was only shown to them in
August 19, 1952.

CFI: declared the plaintiffs Conejero entitled to redeem Enriques half interest for P34,000

CA: reversed the decision of the court of first instance, found that the deed in favor of the Raffians
was a true sale there should be an actual tender of an acceptable redemption price. In the case
at bar, the evidence shows that the appellees had offered only P10,000.00 in check with which to
redeem the property with a promise to pay the balance by means of a loan which they would apply
for and obtain from the bank. We hold that the offer was not in pursuance of a legal and effective
exercise of the right of redemption as contemplated by law; hence, refusal of the offer on the part of
the appellants is justified. The conditions precedent for the valid exercise of the right do not exist

Issue: Whether the petitioner spouses Conejero are entitled to a right of redemption
Held: No.
Ruling: In legal preemption or redemption under the Civil Code of the Philippines, written notice of
the sale to all possible redemptioner is indispensable. Mere knowledge of the sale, acquired in some
other manner by the redemptioner, is not sufficient.
There should be an actual tender of an acceptable redemption price. In the case at bar, the
evidence shows that the appellees had offered only P10,000.00 in check with which to redeem the
property with a promise to pay the balance by means of a loan which they would apply for and
obtain from the bank. We hold that the offer was not in pursuance of a legal and effective exercise
of the right of redemption as contemplated by law; hence, refusal of the offer on the part of the
appellants is justified. The conditions precedent for the valid exercise of the right do not exist.
The furnishing of the copy of the deed of absolute sale was equivalent to the giving of written
notice required by law; it came from the vendor and made available in writing the details or finality
of the sale. As a necessary consequence, the 30-day period for the legal redemption began to run
from the date of receipt of said deed of sale. Thus in the case at bar, the reglementary period of 30
days in favor of Conejero has already elapsed.

E. Termination of the Leasehold

22 Teodoro v. Macaraeg
Facts: Respondent Macaraeg is a leasehold tenant of Teodoro cultivating a farmholding situated in
the municipality of Talugtug, Nueva Ecija, of an area of four (4) hectares devoted to rice culture, and
that he has worked said land as a tenant for the last seven years.
That on March 2, 1961, Macaraeg received a letter from Teodoro and his wife, which states
that the landholding will be given to another tenant with a pretext that Macaraeg will be a tenant of
another landholding. Teodoro placed a new tenant, Jose Niegos, in the disputed land; that
subsequently, Niegos repeatedly forbade him from working on said riceland; that in order to avoid
trouble, he refrained from forcibly entering the landholding, but with the advent of the planting
season, it became imperative that the agrarian court order his reinstatement and restrain Teodoro
and Niegos from committing further acts of dispossession.

Teodoro denied that Macaraeg was his tenant, that the 39-hectare land he owned were all
subject to a civil lease contract, one of which Macaraeg was a party.

Macaraeg filed a supplemental petition, claiming damages as a result of his dispossession.

Petitioner Teodoro entered into a civil lease contract which provides that the tenant should
personally cultivate the agricultural land for the purpose of agricultural production,

CAR: Macaraeg is entitled to damages to be claimed from the landholder

CA affirmed.
Thus, the petiotion
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Macaraeg abandoned the landholding, thus extinguishing the
leasehold agreement
Held: No.
Ruling: Macaraeg vacated the land to avoid further trouble, because Teodoro and Niegos
prevented Macaraeg from entering and cultivating the land. The Abandonment should be without
the knowledge of the Agricultural Lessor.

23 Talavera v. CA
Facts:
Action for recovery of possession was filed by respondents against petitioners over a parcel of
agricultural land located at Capas, Tarlac.
Petitioners aver that through a casunduan, respondent Laxamana voluntary surrendered the
subject agricultural land,selling his rights and interests in for P1,000.
RTC:
CA: Affirmed the RTC decision that there was no voluntary surrender, that the Casunduan did not
constitute voluntary surrender
Issue: Whether or not by virtue of the Casunduan, respondent Laxamana has voluntary surrendered
the subject land
Held: No.
Ruling: The court held that by virtue of the Casunduan, Laxamana did not voluntary surrender the
landholding.
Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require any
court authorization considering that it involves the tenants own volition. To protect the tenants right
to security of tenure, voluntary surrender, as contemplated by law, must be convincingly and
sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenants intention to surrender the landholding
cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere implication. Otherwise, the right of a tenant to
security of tenure becomes an illusory one.
 A voluntary surrender to be valid must be due to circumstances more advantageous to him
and his family.
The court also emphasized that Laxamana continued to work on the farm from 1973 up to 1984 when
the petitioners ejected him. As stated by the appellate court, why did it take the petitioners more
than ten years to enforce the Casunduan? We are more inclined to believe that Laxamana was
forced by circumstances to sign something he did not fully understand and then went right back to
the farm and continued to work on it until 1984.
Tenancy relations cannot be bargained away except for the strong reasons provided by law
which must be convincingly shown by evidence in line with the States policy of achieving a dignified
existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices.

24 Sta. Ana v. Carpo

Facts: Respondents Leon and Francisco Carpo are the owners of the parcel of land situated at Sta.
Rosa, Laguna, 3.5 hectares of the said land was devoted to rice and corn owned by Leon and his
wife Aurora (THE SUBJECT LAND). The subject land was tenanted by Domingo Pastolero. Domingos
wife assumed the tenancy relationship upon the formers death.
Issue:
Held:
Ruling: mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholders share does not necessarily give the latter the right
to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate intent

F. Lawful Consideration/Determination of Lease Rentals

25 Tan v. Pollescas
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Ruling:

G. Share Tenancy Abolition

26 Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Ruling:

27 Guerrero v. CA
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Ruling: