ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DOCTRINES

MEMORIZE:
1987 Constitution, Art. 8, Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Doctrine of Separation of Powers

* Book II, Administrative Code of 1987

PLANAS VS. GIL

(Extensive authority over the public service is granted the President)
Non-interference Rule: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of
his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive
action in such cases.

But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that we are precluded from
making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of
governmental powers is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and
actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers, for as
observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down "with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments" not only
because "the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
black and white" but also because "even the more specific of them are found to terminate
in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other."
(Springer vs. Government [1928], 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845, 852.) As far as the
judiciary is concerned, while it holds "neither the sword nor the purse" it is by
constitutional placement the organ called upon to allocate constitutional boundaries, and
to the Supreme Court is entrusted expressly or by necessary implication the obligation of
determining in appropriate cases the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation. (Sec. 2 [1], Art. VIII, Constitution of the
Philippines.) In this sense and to this extent, the judiciary restrains the other departments
of the government and this result is one of the necessary corollaries of the "system of
checks and balance" of the government established.
 GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. SPRINGER
(The appointment of managers of property or a business in which the government is interested essentially
an executive act)
ISSUE: Where does the power to appoint to Public Office reside? W/N section 4 of Act No. 2705, as
amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822 is constitutional and valid.

HELD: (1) The right to appoint to office has been confided, with certain well defined exceptions, by the
Government of the United States to the executive branch of the government which it has set up in the
Philippines; (2) Section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822 is unconstitutional and
void

RATIO: The applicable legal doctrines are found in the Organic Law, particularly in the Organic Act, the
Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, and in statutes enacted under authority of that Act, and in decisions
interpretative of it. It is true that the Organic Act contains no general distributing clause. But the principle
is clearly deducible from the grant of powers. It is expressly incorporated in our Administrative Code. It has
time and again been approvingly enforced by this court. No department of the Government of the Philippine
Islands may legally exercise any of the powers conferred by the Organic Law upon any of the others. Again
it is true that the Organic Law contains no such explicit prohibition. But it is fairly implied by the division
of the Government into three departments. The effect is the same whether the prohibition is expressed or
not. It has repeatedly been announced by this court that each of the branches of the Government is in the
main independent of the others.

The Organic Act vests the:

a.) EXECUTIVE POWER in the Governor- General of the Philippine Islands.
execute the law
power of appointment; membership in the voting committee in question is an office or executive function
he is given general supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government of the
Philippine Islands as far as is not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
made responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands and of the United States
operative within Philippine Islands.
By the Administrative Code, "the Governor-General, as chief Executive of the Islands, is charged with the
executive control of the Philippine Government, to be exercised in person or through the Secretaries of
Departments, or other proper agency, according to law."
b.) LEGISLATIVE POWER except as otherwise provided therein to the Philippine Legislature.
make the law.

c.) JUDICIAL POWER is conferred on the Supreme Courts, Courts of First Instance, and inferior courts.
construe the law

Doctrine of separation of powers

the Supreme Court emphasized that the power of appointment in the Philippines appertains, with minor
exceptions, to the executive department; that membership in the voting committee in question is an office
or executive function; that the NCC and similar corporations are instrumentalities of the Government; that
the duty to look after government agencies and government property belongs to the executive department;
that the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature on the voting committee constitutes an invasion
by the Legislative Department of the privileges of the Executive Department. Under a system of government
of delegated powers, under which delegation legislative power vests in the Philippine Legislature and
executive power vests in the Governor-General, and under which Governor-General and a specified power
of appointment resides in the Philippine Legislature, the latter cannot directly or indirectly perform
functions of an executive nature through the designation of its presiding officers as majority members of a
body which has executive functions. That is the meaning we gather from the tri-partite theory of the division
of powers. That is the purport of the provisions of the Organic Law.

Section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, as purports to vest the voting
power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. However, the Supreme Court
notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public
office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the
legislative branch this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.

ARTICLE VIII
1987 Constitution, Art. 7 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987
BOOK 2 Chapter 4 JUDICIAL POWER Sec. 16. Judicial Power. - The judicial power shall be vested
in one (1) Supreme Court, and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Such lower courts include
the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Shari's District Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and Shari'a Circuit
Courts and they shall continue to exercise their respective jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and, in cases prescribed by law, to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.

BOOK 3 POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

Sec. 1. Power of Control.- The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Chapter 5 POWER OF APPOINTMENT Sec. 16. Power of Appointment. - The President shall exercise
the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.

Chapter 6 GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Sec. 18. General

Supervision Over Local Governments. - The President shall exercise general supervision over local
governments.

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

Besides the constitution, the powers of the President of the Philippines are specifically outlined in Executive
Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. The following powers are:

1. Power of control over the executive branch

The President of the Philippines has the mandate of control over all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. This includes restructuring, reconfiguring, and appointments of their respective officials. The
Administrative Code also provides for the President to be responsible for the abovementioned offices strict
implementation of laws.

2. Power ordinance power

The President of the Philippines has the power to give executive issuances, which are means to streamline
the policy and programs of an administration. There are six issuances that the President may issue. They
are the following as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987:
 Executive orders Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in
implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Administrative orders Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental
operations in pursuance of his duties as the administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders.
Proclamations Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall
be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
Memorandum orders Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail, or of subordinate or
temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or government office shall be embodied in
memorandum orders.
Memorandum circulars Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the
President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus, or offices of
the government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
General or special orders Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as commander-in-chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.

It is important to note that during the term of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he used executive issuances
known as presidential decrees as a form of legislation. These decrees have the full force and effect of laws
because at the time the legislature did not exist and, when the 1973 Constitution was put into full force and
effect, it gave the power to the President to do as such. This continued until the first year of President
Corazon C. Aquinos term. However, President Aquino opted to used executive orders instead of
presidential decrees. President Aquinos executive orders, however, still had the full force and effect of laws
until the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

3. Power over aliens

The President of the Philippines has the power over non-Filipinos in the Philippines. The powers he may
exercise over foreigners in the country are as follows:
The chief executive may have an alien in the Philippines deported from the country after due
process.
The President may change the status of a foreigner, as prescribed by law, from a non-immigrant
status to a permanent resident status without necessity of visa.
The President may choose to overrule the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration
before their decision becomes final and executory (after 30 days of the issuance of the decision). The Board
of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration has jurisdiction over all deportation cases.
The president is also mandated by the Administrative Code of 1987 to exercise powers as recognized
by the generally accepted principles of international law.
 4. Powers of eminent domain, escheat, land reservation and recovery of ill-gotten wealth
The President of the Philippines has the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain. The power of
eminent domains means the state has the power to seize or authorize the seizure of private property for
public use with just compensation. There are two constitutional provisions, however, that limit the exercise
of such power: Article III, Section 9 (1) of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of
his/her life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Furthermore, Article III, Section 9 (2), provides
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Once the aforementioned conditions are met, the President may exercise the power of eminent domain
which are as follows:
Power of eminent domain The President shall determine when it is necessary or advantageous to
exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the national government, and direct the solicitor general,
whenever he deems the action advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the proper court.
Power to direct escheat or reversion proceedings The President shall direct the solicitor general to
institute escheat or reversion proceedings over all lands transferred or assigned to persons disqualified
under the constitution to acquire land.
Power to reserve lands of the public and private domain of the government
1) The president shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for specific public purposes,
any of the lands of the public domain, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. The reserved land
shall thereafter remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or
proclamation.
2) He shall also have the power to reserve from sale or other disposition and for specific public uses or
purposes, any land belonging to the private domain of the government, or any of the friar lands, the use of
which is not otherwise directed by law, and thereafter such land shall be used for the purposes specified by
such proclamation until otherwise provided by law.
Power over ill-gotten wealth The President shall direct the solicitor general to institute proceedings to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees
or transferees.

Within the period fixed in, or any extension thereof authorized by, the constitution, the President shall have
the authority to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime,
and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts.

5. Power of appointment
The President may appoint officials of the Philippine government as provided by the constitution and laws
of the Philippines. Some of these appointments, however, may need the approval of the Committee on
Appointments (a committee composed of members from the House of Representatives and the Senate of
the Philippines).
 6. Power of general supervision over local governments
The President of the Philippines, as chief executive, has the mandate to supervise local governments in the
Philippines, despite their autonomous status as provided by Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991.

Traditionally, this is done by the Department of the Interior and Local Government, headed by a cabinet
secretaryan alter ego of the President.

7. Other powers
Aside from the aforementioned powers of the President of the Philippines, he can also exercise powers
enumerated in the constitution, and powers given to him by law.

OCCENA VS. COMELEC

(Delegating to administrative agencies the power to make rules and regulations.)
ISSUES:
(1) WON The 1973 Constitution and Javellana Ruling is Valid.
(2) WON The Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose such amendments.

HELD:
It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect."Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even
be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that, as of January
17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme
Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only
entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed.
The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed
is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect.

Petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the challenged resolutions are tainted by unconstitutionality.

The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable provision in
the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang Pambansa
shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights,
privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and
the Members thereof."
 One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call
by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article
on Amendments therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime
Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its authority
to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now
being assailed.

Creation, Reorganization and Abolition of Administrative Agencies

SEC. OF DOTC VS. MABALOT
(Power of the president to reorganize the government)
ISSUE: WON the administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary valid.
HELD:
YES. The President through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the
present case may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the
establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region with
the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional
office of the LTFRB.

Public Office may be created through any of the ff. modes:

1) by the Constitution,
2) by law, or
3) by authority of law.

The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the third mode which
could be decreed for instance, through and Executive Order issued by the President or an order of an
administrative agency such as the Civil Service Commission under the Administrative Code. In the case at
bar, the DOTC Secretary issued the assailed Memorandum and Department Order pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 36 of the President establishing the regional officer in the CAR.

The said Administrative Order did not merely authorize but directed the various departments and agencies
of government to immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their regional offices in the CAR.
What law then gives the President the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which
amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government. In fine, the designation and subsequent
establishment of DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office of LTFRB in the Cordillera Administrative Region and
the concomitant exercise and performance of functions by the former as the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office,
fall within the scope of the continuing authority of the President to effectively reorganize the Department
of Transportation and Communications.

Reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith, and, as a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient.

EUGENIO VS. CSC

(Power of congress to abolish)
FACTS: Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. In
1993, Aida Eugenio passed the Career Executive Service Eligibility (CES). She was given
a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career
Executive Service Board. But her appointment to said rank was impeded when in the same
year, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) abolished the Career Executive Service Board
(CESB).

CESB is the office tasked with promulgating rules, standards, and procedures on the
selection, classification and compensation of the members of the Career Executive
Service.
Eugenio then assailed the resolution which abolished CESB. She averred that the CSC
does not have the power to abolish CESB because the same was created by law (P.D. 1).
CSC on the other hand argued that it has the power to do so pursuant to the
Administrative Code of 1987 which granted the CSC the right to reorganize the CSC.

ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission may validly abolish the Career Executive
Service Board.

HELD:
NO. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1. It cannot be disputed,
therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature.
This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices
is primarily a legislative function In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted
any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB.
On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature
has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes
Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the
source of its power to abolish the CESB. But as well pointed out by petitioner and the
Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which
enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission. As read together, the
inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commissions power to reorganize is limited to
offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..

From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the
problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive
outlook.

The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the
control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose
of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain
policy and program coordination. This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7,
Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit: Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral
relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation
for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished
by having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or
corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is
permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system
of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having
the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the
board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached
corporation or agency.

LARIN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(Power of the president to dismiss)
ISSUE: WON the President has the power to dismiss.

HELD:
 NONE. Under the law, Career Executive Service Officers, namely Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive
Service Board, are all appointed by the President.

Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct diciplining authority of the President. This is in
line with the well settled principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred
to the President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.

This power of removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no reservation. It must be pointed
out that petitioner is a career service officer. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is
characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose
tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified
by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made. As a career
service officer, petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure. No less than the 1987 Constitution
guarantees the right of security of tenure of the employees of the civil service. Specifically, Section 36 of
P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, is emphatic that
career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure may be removed only for any of the
causes enumerated in said law. In other words, the fact that the petitioner is a presidential appointee does
not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted
fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus,
may only be removed for a cause and in accordance with procedural due process.

Powers of Administrative Agencies

PHIL. ASS. OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. VS. TORRES, ET AL

(Rule-making power of administrative body)
FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily
suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong
Kong. As a result of the department order DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying
Hong Kong bound workers. The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and
recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining
overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul the afore
mentioned order and to prohibit implementation.

ISSUES:
1) WON respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in
issuing said circulars;
2) WON the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, areunreasonable, unfair and
oppressive; and
3) WON the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register
were not complied with.

HELD:
FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and
placement activities, to wit: Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to
restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title
[Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is here by authorized to issue orders and
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.

SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is

constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society.

THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the lack of
proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2
of the Civil Code to wit: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided; Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit: Art. 5.
Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the
administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation; and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2,
Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are
not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafterbe the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with
this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from thedate of filing as above provided unless
a different date is fixed by law, or specified in therule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety
and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency
shall takeappropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affectedby them.
(Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987). Prohibition granted
 MATEO V. COURT OF APPEALS
(RTC without jurisdiction over civil action involving employee of quasi public corporation)
ISSUE: WON the RTC of Rizal has jurisdiction over the case involving dismissal of an employee of quasi-
public corporation.

HELD: No.

RATIO: MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to PD No. 198, known as the provincial
Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. In Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commissions, the
Court en banc ruled that employees of GOCCs with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC).

The established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of GOCCs are governed by the provisions of
the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. PD No. 807, EO 292, and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum
Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private
respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a decision,
ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the
Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent could go on certiorari under Rule 65
of the ROC if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC.

Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the party within thirty days from receipt
of a copy thereof.

The CSC under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the Civil service and as such,
its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Court's Certiorari judgment. Regional Trial Courts
have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil
Service Law.
CARINO V. CAPULONG
(Authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational institution a discretionary duty)
ISSUES:
1) WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction
2) WON the authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational institution is a discretionary duty?

HELD:
(1)Yes
(2) Yes
RATIO:
(1) In the case at bar, private respondents' application for a permit to operate AMACC-Davao City as an
educational institution was denied by the petitioners. Otherwise stated, the private respondents do not have
a permit to operate or a certificate of recognition from the government to undertake educational or school
operations. In fine, the private respondents do not have any existing right that needed to be protected
during the pendency of their principal action for mandamus. Hence, the "closing" and/or "padlocking" of
AMACC-Davao City would not and did not violate any right of the private respondents.

Moreover, it is not the function of the WPI to restrain a public officer from performing a
duty imposed by law or to permit the doing of that which is declared unlawful. Under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the establishment
and operation of schools are subject to the prior authorization of the government. And, as
sanctions for operating without permit, the DECS is authorized either to impose the total
closure of school and/or to disqualify the school from conferring title or degree in the
non-recognized program or course of studies. In ordering the total closure of AMACC-
Davao City, the petitioners were only performing their duties as public officers; hence, the
respondent Judge should not have issued the writ of preliminary injunction. In issuing
the writ, he allowed the private respondents to continue the operation of AMACC-Davao
City as an educational institution without a permit or certificate of government
recognition, thereby sanctioning the act which is unlawful.

(2) The action filed by the private respondents in the court below is a petition for
mandamus to compel the petitioners to approve their application to operate AMACC-
Davao City as an educational institution. As a rule, mandamus will lie only to compel an
officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a discretionary function. A ministerial duty
is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its
performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the
exercise of judgment.

In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial duty of the petitioners. It is
a discretionary duty or function on the part of the petitioners because it had to be exercised in
accordance with and not in violation of the law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Establishment or recognition of private schools through government grant of permits is governed by law,
specifically Batas Pambansa Blg. 232. The authority to grant permit is vested upon the judgment of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, which prescribes the rules and regulations governing the
recognition on private schools (Section 27, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232).
Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports. Rather it is a discretionary duty to be exercised in accordance with the
rules and regulations prescribed.

In the case at bar, petitioner has been operating a school without a permit in blatant violation of law. Public
respondent has no ministerial duty to issue to petitioner a permit to operate a school in Davao City before
petitioner has even filed an application or before his application has been first processed in accordance with
the rules and regulations on the matter. Certainly, public respondent is not enjoined by any law to grant
such permit or to allow such operation without a permit, without first processing an application. To do so
is violation of the Educational Act

CARPIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ISSUE: WON RA 6975 violates Section 6, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that The State
shall establish and maintain one police force, which stall be national in scope and civilian in character, to
be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the
police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.

HELD:
NO.
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive
officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us, in the landmark case
of Mondano vs. Silvosa, to mean "the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
with that of the latter." It is said to be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive."

SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential
power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet
Secretary to the lowliest clerk. As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the Doctrine
of Qualified Political Agency. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all
at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive
is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed
by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment
that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the
integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.

This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as the independent Constitutional
Commissions of Article IX and the other constitutionally created independent Office, namely, the
Commission on Human Rights.

It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives
muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under
the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. This is necessarily so since the police
force, not being integrated with the military, is not a part of the AFP. As a civilian agency
of the government, it properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the
President of the power of executive control.

Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers.

It simply provides for the transition period or process during which the national police
would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the
State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers.
It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose
duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision "represent only a part of the organic
duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature." 31 His
position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the
constitutional principle that "civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military."
(Article II, Section 3, 1987 Constitution)

Finally, petitioner submits that the creation of a "Special Oversight Committee" under
Section 84 of the Act, especially the inclusion therein of some legislators as members
(namely: the respective Chairmen of the Committee on Local Government and the
Committee on National Defense and Security in the Senate, and the respective Chairmen
of the Committee on Public Order and Security and the Committee on National Defense
in the House of Representatives) is an "unconstitutional encroachment upon and a
diminution of, the President's power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices."
But there is not the least interference with the President's power of control under Section
84. The Special Oversight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body, established
and tasked solely with planning and overseeing the immediate "transfer, merger and/or
absorption" into the Department of the Interior and Local Governments of the "involved
agencies." This it will undertake in accordance with the phases of implementation already
laid down in Section 85 of the Act and once this is carried out, its functions as well as the
committee itself would cease altogether. 32 As an ad hoc body, its creation and the
functions it exercises, decidedly do not constitute an encroachment and in diminution of
the power of control which properly belongs to the President. What is more, no executive
department, bureau or office is placed under the control or authority, of the committee. 33

As a last word, it would not be amiss to point out here that under the Constitution, there
are the so-called independent Constitutional Commissions, namely: The Civil Service
Commission, Commission on Audit, and the Commission on Elections. (Article IX-A,
Section 1)
As these Commissions perform vital governmental functions, they have to be protected
from external influences and political pressures. Hence, they were made constitutional
bodies, independent of and not under any department of the government. 34 Certainly,
they are not under the control of the President.

The Constitution also created an independent office called the "Commission on Human
Rights." (Article XIII, Section 17[1]).However, this Commission is not on the same level
as the Constitutional Commissions under Article IX, although it is independent like the
latter Commissions. 35 It still had to be constituted thru Executive Order No. 163 (dated
May 5, 1987).

In contrast, Article XVI, Section 6 thereof, merely mandates the statutory creation of a
national police commission that will administer and control the national police force to
be established thereunder.

This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as
the independent Constitutional Commissions of Article IX and the other constitutionally
created independent Office, namely, the Commission on Human Rights.

By way of resume, the three Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service, Audit, Elections)
and the additional commission created by the Constitution (Human Rights) are
all independent of the Executive; but the National Police Commission is not. In fact, it
was stressed during the CONCOM deliberations that this commission would be under the
President, and hence may be controlled by the President, thru his or her alter ego, the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government.

BLAQUERA V. ALCALA
(Presidential power of control over executive departments)
ISSUE: WON AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over executive
departments.

HELD:
YES. Implementation of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System has been decentralized to
the President or to the head of each department of agency -

In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission, the President or the
head of each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the
honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government who by their suggestions,
inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or
other improvement of government operations, or who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in
the public interest in connection with, or in relation to, their official employment.

The President is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and
implemented through him. His power includes the control over executive departments The president
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed (Section 17, Article VII, 1987 Constitution)

Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute judgment of the former for that of the latter.

President was only exercising his power of control.

When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government
agencies from granting incentive benefits without prior approval from him, and directing the refund of the
excess over the prescribed amount, the President was just exercising his power of control over executive
departments. This is decisively clear from the WHEREAS CLAUSES of AO 268 and AO 29. The President
was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive
benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the President, thereby resulting
in the uneven distribution of government resources. The President did not encroached upon the authority
of the CSC to grant benefits in issuing AO 29 and AO 268
 Delegation of Power

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC VS. POEA

(Undue delegation of legislative authority)
ISSUE: WON the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers
HELD: YES.
In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was
given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

What Can Be Delegated:

Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated
is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment
of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered
by the legislature to the delegate.

GR: Non-delegation of powers.

E: It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What
can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated
or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power (MEMORIZE!)

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power,
1.) COMPLETENESS TEST - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
2.) SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature
to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its
 activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to
reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems
attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected
from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the power of
subordinate legislation.

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by filling
in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum
Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

Power Of Subordinate Legislation:

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by filling
in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected
by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of
law.
Accepted Sufficient Standards:
1) public interest;
2) justice and equity;
3) public convenience and welfare;
4) simplicity, economy and efficiency;
5) sense and experience of men; and
6) national security.

ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

Tests Of Delegation
(1) COMPLETENESS TEST - what is to be examined:
a) subject matter (what is delegated)
b) scope of the subject matter or measure
c) what job must be done
d) authority (who is to do it)
e) scope of authority

(2) SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST - what is to be examined:

a) legislative policy (whereas clauses)
b) specific administrative agency to apply the legislative policy
c) scope of the policy and the circumstances under which it is to be carried out

TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF DEPT. OF ENERGY

We hold that the power and obligation of this Court to pass upon the constitutionality of laws cannot be
defeated by the fact that the challenged law carries serious economic implications. This Court has struck
down laws abridging the political and civil rights of our people even if it has to offend the other more
powerful branches of government. There is no reason why the Court cannot strike down R.A. No. 8180 that
violates the economic rights of our people even if it has to bridle the liberty of big business within reasonable
bounds.

PELAEZ VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL

(Sufficiency of standards)
ISSUE:WON Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of
the RAC.

HELD:
NO. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate and
b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.

In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate
would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which would
mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such
will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase as
the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper
interpretation is the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of government may be changed by the President
when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.

The SC declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in character
not administrative (not executive).

DOCTRINES:
The power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption
of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create
municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a
legislative function" or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power". As the Supreme Court of
Washington has put it, "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of
such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of
the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution
to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental
law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the
officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot
interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority.
He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had
thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial
officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance
passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may
not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him,
except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.

Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its
officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned
resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new
municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his
dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no
more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion
by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an executive
department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create
municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than
that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68
of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above
quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the
executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring
upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments,
bureaus or offices.

In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68,
as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the
subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said
statutory enactment.

ADDITIONAL CASES
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER VS. GARCIA, JR.,
An administrative body may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details which
the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid
provisions of law are the regulatory bodies authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a
transport operator or other public service.

Exception To The Exception:

The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the
authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative
authority. Potestas delegate non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This
doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty
to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another. A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the
duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing
the provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at will would result not only to a chaotic
situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport
operators who may increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases
them or whenever they deem it necessary to do so.

NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS
The Congress cannot further delegate the power delegated to it by the people. This is in keeping with the
principle of non-delegation of powers which is applicable to all the three branches of the government. The
rule states that what has been delegated cannot further be delegated potestas delegata non delegari
 potest. A delegated power must be discharged directly by the delegate and not through the delegates
agent. It is basically an ethical principle which requires direct performance by the delegate of an entrusted
power. Further delegation therefore constitutes violation of the trust reposed by the delegator on the
delegate. The people, through the Constitution, delegated lawmaking powers to the Congress, and as such,
it cannot as a rule delegate further the same to another.

Exceptions:
a) In order to address the numerous and complex demands of legislative function, the Constitution provides
exceptions to the rule. Further delegation is permitted in the following cases:
a) Delegation to the people at large. The Congress further delegates its legislative power by allowing direct
legislation by the people in cases of initiative and referendum;
b) Delegation of emergency powers to the President. Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution states that
in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy. Emergency powers are delegated to the President by the Congress
to effectively solve the problems caused by war or other crisis which the Congress could not otherwise solve
with more dispatch than the President;
c) Delegation of tariff powers to the President. Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution states that the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
Tariff powers are delegated to the President by the Congress to efficiently and speedily solve economic
problems posed by foreign trade which the Congress could not otherwise address with more dispatch than
the President;
d) Delegation to administrative bodies. The Congress delegates the so called power of subordinate
legislation to administrative bodies. Due to the growing complexity of modern society, it has become
necessary to allow specialized administrative bodies to promulgate supplementary rules, so that they can
deal with technical problems with more expertise and dispatch than the Congress or the courts. Regulations
or supplementary rules passed by the administrative bodies are intended to fill-in the gaps and provide
details to what is otherwise a broad statute passed by Congress. For the rules and regulations to be valid
and binding, they must be in accordance with the statute on which they are based, complete in themselves,
and fix sufficient standards. If any of the requirements is not satisfied, the regulation will not be allowed to
affect private rights; and
e) Delegation to the local governments. This delegation is based on the principle that the local government is
in better position than the national government to act on purely local concerns. Legislative power is
therefore given to them for effective local legislation.
 NON-DELEGABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively
exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular,
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative
and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a
bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may
constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle
of non-delegability of legislative power.

EXCEPTIONS TO NON-DELEGABILITY
a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are
allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and
b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law,
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of
war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.

NON-DELEGABILITY vs. RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to
delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either
filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making). The
conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case
of People v. Maceren as follows:

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the

principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative
powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the
public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the law."

xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned.

The doctrine of presidential control over the executive department likewise furnishes no
basis to uphold the validity of EO 378. As distinguished from supervision, the doctrine of
control finds application in altering acts of the Presidents subordinates. It does not
sanction structural or functional changes even within the executive department. This is
apparent from the following canonical distinction of the two doctrines: In administrative
law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what asubordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

Quasi legislative power or Rule Making Power

ABELLA, JR.. V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
RATIO: Civil Service laws have expressly empowered the CSC to issue and enforce rules and regulations
to carry out its mandate. In the exercise of its authority, the CSC deemed it appropriate to clearly define and
identify positions covered by the Career Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to issue guidelines to
meet this objective, specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular.

On petitioners averment that he was not afforded due process for CSCs alleged failure to notify him of a
hearing relating to the issuance of the challenged Circular, is not convincing. The issuance of the
circular was an exercise of a quasi-legislative function as such, prior notice to and hearing of every
affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past events
or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.

Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent appointment. The appointee
need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the action did not involve the imposition of an
administrative disciplinary measure. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, merely
examines the conformity of the appointment with the law and the appointees possession of all the
minimum qualifications and none of the disqualification. In sum, while petitioner was able to demonstrate
 his standing to appeal the CSC Resolutions to the courts, he failed to prove his eligibility to the position he
was appointed to.

DOCTRINES:
1.) Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

Significantly, the selection of the appointee -- taking into account the totality of his qualifications,
including those abstract qualities that define his personality -- is the prerogative of the appointing
authority. No tribunal, not even this Court, may compel the exercise of an appointment for a favored
person.

The CSCs disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing authoritys
discretion. The appointing authority must have the right to contest the disapproval. Thus, Section 2 of
Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 is justified insofar as it allows the appointing authority
to request reconsideration or appeal.

2.) The classification of positions in career service was a quasi-legislative, not a quasi-judicial, issuance. This
distinction determines whether prior notice and hearing are necessary

In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons before
it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the applicable
law, as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the performance of
this function. On these considerations, it is elementary that due process requirements, as enumerated
in Ang Tibay, must be observed. These requirements include prior notice and hearing.

On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the
promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior
notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no
determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future
conduct.
Significantly, the challenged Circular was an internal matter addressed to heads of departments, bureaus
and agencies. It needed no prior publication, since it had been issued as an incident of the administrative
bodys power to issue guidelines for government officials to follow in performing their duties.

SMART COMMUNICATION V. NTC

(Quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers distinguished)
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated
legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within
the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required
that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.[17] They must conform to and be consistent with the
provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and
statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an
administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make
rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly
the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance
of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial nature.

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a

party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where
the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and
not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. In Association of
Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, it was held:

The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so
strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The
resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative
power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.

Even assuming arguendo that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in this case, the
records reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement. Even during the drafting and
deliberation stages leading to the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, petitioners were able
to register their protests to the proposed billing guidelines. They submitted their respective position papers
setting forth their objections and submitting proposed schemes for the billing circular. After the same was
issued, petitioners wrote successive letters dated July 3, 200 and July 5, 2000, asking for the suspension
and reconsideration of the so-called Billing Circular. These letters were not acted upon until October 6,
2000, when respondent NTC issued the second assailed Memorandum implementing certain provisions of
the Billing Circular. This was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of the requests contained in their
previous letters, thus prompting them to seek judicial relief.

In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises
its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has
been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute
administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining
whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has
determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It
applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of
the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an
administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in
the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum
dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were
justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity
of the said issuances. In Drilon v. Lim, it was held:

We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187,
this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid
and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, B.P. 129 vests in
the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the
constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly
as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

In their complaint before the Regional Trial Court, petitioners averred that the Circular contravened Civil
Code provisions on sales and violated the constitutional prohibition against the deprivation of property
without due process of law. These are within the competence of the trial judge. Contrary to the finding of
the Court of Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters. Rather, what
is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular
telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards and this is judicially known to be within the
knowledge of a good percentage of our population and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law
and the Constitution.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221. The Court
of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the case.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. VS. CA
(Nature of quasi-legislative power)
It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute because that would imply
the withdrawal of power from the PPA. What determines whether an act is a law or an administrative
issuance is not its form but its nature. Here as we have already said, the power to fix the rates of charges
for a service, including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in character.

Its legislative purpose is the rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform
and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports. We conclude that E.O. No. 1088
is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the
rates but it may not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution. It is axiomatic that an administrative agency, like the PPA, has no discretion
whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore, if there is any conflict
between the PPA circular and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails.

ARANETA VS. GATMAITAN

(Administrative regulation must be reasonable)
ISSUE: WON the President is empowered by law to issue the executive orders.

HELD:
YES. The words found in Secs. 6, 13 and 75 of Act 4003 (The Fisheries Law), as amended by Sec. 1 of CA
471, clearly declare unlawful and fixes the penalty for the taking, except for scientific or educational
purposes or propagation, destroying or killing of any fish or fish eggs. Said provisions authorize the
Agriculture and Natural Resources Secretary to promulgate regulations restricting the use of any fish net
or fishing device for the protection of fry or fish eggs, and establish reservations/fish refuges and
sanctuaries to be administered in the manner he prescribes. Hence, with or without the questioned
Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing are within the powers of the Agriculture and
Natural Resources Secretary.

The President, being the head of the Executive Department, can exercise the same power and authority as
mandated by Sec. 10 (1), Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercises general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Sec. 63 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that administrative acts and commands of the
President of the Philippines touching the organization or mode of operation of the Government or
rearranging or readjusting any of the district, divisions, parts or ports of the Philippines, and all acts and
commands governing the general performance of duties by public employees or disposing of issues of
general concern shall be made in executive orders.

Sec 74 of the same Code provides that All executive functions of the government of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be directly under the Executive Departments subject to the supervision and control of the
President of the Philippines in matters of general policy. The Departments are established for the proper
distribution of the work of the Executive, for the performance of the functions expressly assigned to them
by law, and in order that each branch of the administration may have a chief responsible for its direction
and policy. Each Department Secretary shall assume the burden of, and responsibility for, all activities of
the Government under his control and supervision.

Sec. 79-A of the same Code provides, in part, that executive orders, regulations, decrees and
proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation
whereof is expressly assigned by law to the President of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued
upon proposition and recommendation of the respective Department."

The Presidents exercise of such authority does not constitute undue delegation of powers of Congress
because

The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the conferring of authority or
discretion as to the execution of law consists in that the former necessarily involves a discretion as to what
the law shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; the latter can be done.

The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If a law is a law unto itself, and it does
nothing more than to authorize the official to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the
Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act
within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to
make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the office, the act is delegation of legislative power,
is unconstitutional and void.

THE POWER TO DELEGATE. The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act
No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make
rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of
power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not complete,
and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the
Governor-General, the act is delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

TAYUG RURAL BANK VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILS

(Administrative rule with penal sanction)
ISSUE: WON the Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty on Appellee's past overdue loans
beginning July 4, 1965, by virtue of Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8 dated December 23, 1964.

HELD:
NO. Administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law. There are, however, limitations
to the rule-making power of administrative agencies. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when
Congress authorizes promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement given legislation,
all that is required is that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that
the law prescribes. The rule delineating the extent of the binding force to be given to administrative rules
and regulations was explained by the Court in Teoxon v. Member of the Board of Administrators (33 SCRA
588), thus: "The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of the statute, as necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment.

The Court held in the same case that "A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its
promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statute granted by the legislature, even if the courts are
not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom ...." On the other hand, "administrative
interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means." Indeed, it cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom
all executive power resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser administrative,
executive office, or agency then can, contrary to the express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a
more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the constitutional mandate. There must be
strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Hence an administrative agency cannot impose a penalty
not so provided in the law authorizing the promulgation of the rules and regulations, much less one that is
applied retroactively.

Quasi-Judicial Power
DOLE PHILIPPINES INC. V. ESTEVA
(Nature of quasi-judicial power)
ISSUE/S: WON the DOLE Secretary is in the nature of having/exercising quasi-judicial power.

HELD:
YES. The DOLE Secretary is in the nature of having/exercising quasi-judicial power.
It is obvious that the visitorial and enforcement power granted to the DOLE Secretary is
in the nature of a quasi-judicial power. Quasi-judicial power has been described by this
Court in the following manner
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the
power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply
and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or
reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or
bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected it is
elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be
observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

The DOLE Secretary, under Article 106 of the Labor Code, as amended, exercise quasi-
judicial power, at least, to the extent necessary to determine violations of labor standards
provisions of the Code and other labor legislation. He can issue compliance orders and
writs of execution for the enforcement of his orders. As evidence of the importance and
binding effect of the compliance orders of the DOLE Secretary, Article 128 of the Labor
Code, as amended, further provides

ART. 128. Visitorial and enforcement power.

xxxx
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to obstruct, impede, delay or otherwise
render ineffective the orders of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized
representatives issued pursuant to the authority granted under this article, and no inferior
court or entity shall issue temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order or
otherwise assume jurisdiction over any case involving the enforcement orders issued in
accordance with this article.

The Orders of DOLE Regional Director Parel, dated 19 September 1993, and of DOLE
Undersecretary Trajano, dated 15 September 1994, consistently found that CAMPCO was
engaging in labor-only contracting. Such finding constitutes res judicata in the case filed
by the respondents with the NLRC.
It is well-established in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata. The rule of res judicata, which forbids the reopening of a matter once
judicially determined by competent authority, applies as well to the judicial and quasi-
judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. The orderly
administration of justice requires that the judgments or resolutions of a court or quasi-
judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations, so as to
write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in the Philippine
justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations.

Res judicata has dual aspects, "bar by prior judgment" and "conclusiveness of
judgment." This Court has previously clarified the difference between the two

Section 49, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the dual aspects of
res judicata in actions in personam. to wit:
"Effect of judgment. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge
of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as
follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged
or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive
between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity;

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face
to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto."

Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res judicata known as "bar by prior
judgment," whereas, Section 49(c) is referred to as "conclusiveness of judgment."

There is "bar by former judgment" when, between the first case where the judgment
was rendered, and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of
 parties, subject matter and cause of action. When the three identities are present, the
judgment on the merits rendered in the first constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent
action. But where between the first case wherein Judgment is rendered and the second
case wherein such judgment is invoked, there is only identity of parties but there is no
identity of cause of action, the judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those
matters actually and directly controverted and determined, and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is what is termed "conclusiveness of judgment."

The second concept of res judicata, conclusiveness of judgment, is the one applicable to
the case at bar.

CUENCA VS. ATAS

(Cardinal primary requirements of procedural due process)
ISSUE: WON the Petitioner is right when he challenged the CA decision on the ground that he was denied
due process.

HELD:No.

RATIO: In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings where the magistrates or tribunals hearing the
case are not bound by the niceties and finer points of judicial due process, the CARDINAL PRIMARY
REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS:
1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x
2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must considerthe evidence presented. x x x
3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. x x x
4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G. R.
No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O.G. 1335), but the evidence must be substantial. x
xx
5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected. x x x
6) The [c]ourt x x x or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
xxx
7) [The court] should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
 Indeed, the rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are
controlling on the reviewing authority.

It is well-settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally held to be binding and final
so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the records of the case. It is not the function of this
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence and the credibility of witnesses presented before the
lower court, tribunal, or office, as we are not a trier of facts. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and
revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, the latters findings of fact being conclusive and not
reviewable by this Court.

VIVO vs. PAGCOR

The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process.
The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules
of procedure are not strictly applied.

LEDESMA V. COURT OF APPEALS

Doctrine of due process in administrative proceedings
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in court is not
always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is
otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause
guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain
proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of
law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established
administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a
determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to
 the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due
process requires.

SANTIAGO VS. ALIKPALA

First requirement of procedural due process, namely, the existence of the court or tribunal clothed with
judicial, or quasi-judicial, power to hear and determine the matter before it.
There is the express admission in the statement of facts that respondents, as a court-martial, were not
convened to try petitioner but someone else, the action taken against petitioner being induced solely by a
desire to avoid the effects of prescription; it would follow then that the absence of a competent court or
tribunal is most marked and undeniable. Such a denial of due process is therefore fatal to its assumed
authority to try petitioner.

FABELLA vs. CA
In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following:
1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents
legal rights;
2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights;
3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during
the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.

In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against
private respondents did not include a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial
or national teachers organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees
were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were
necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private
respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers organization in these committees was
indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and
meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is
embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.

MADENILLA vs. CSC

Due process of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the tribunal
which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty, and property in its most comprehensive
sense; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of controverting, by proof, every
material fact which bears on the question of the light in the matter involved."
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. The presence of a party is not always the
cornerstone of due process. In the case at bar, any defect was cured by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.

SEC VS. GMA NETWORK, INC.

Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and
other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine whether the
regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it
down when it arbitrarily infringes on a persons right to property.

LEGISLATIVE v. QUASI-JUDICIAL:
When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of
a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the
rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-
judicial in character.

CARINO VS. CHR

The CHR has the power to investigate but not to adjudicate alleged human right violation.
Investigate means to examine, inquire, explore.
Adjudicate to resolve, rule, settle, decide.

MEGAWORLD GLOBUS ASIA VS. DSM CONSTRUCTION

Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

LUPANGCO vs. CA
Quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers
or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To
expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties
resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation . This does not cover rules and
regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative
policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to
preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.

SCENARIOS, INC. VS. VINLUAN

(Technical rules not applicable)
ISSUE: WON Scenarios Inc., was denied of procedural due process.

HELD: NO. Service of notices and resolutions, including summons, in cases filed before the labor arbiters
is governed by Sections 5 and 6 of Rule III of the New NLRC Rules of Procedure.

Moreover, it is a fundamental rule that unless the contrary is proven, official duty is presumed to have been
performed regularly and judicial proceedings regularly conducted. This presumption of the regularity of
the quasi-judicial proceedings before the NLRC includes the presumption of regularity of service of
summons and other notices. It is therefore incumbent upon herein petitioners to rebut that legal
presumption with competent and proper evidence, for the return of the registered mail as unclaimed
is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein.

PISON-ARCEO AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. NLRC

(Procedural rules governing service of summons are not strictly construed)
ISSUE: WON the NLRC decision is valid and binding upon petitioner PADC even when it was not
impleaded in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the subsequent appeal to the NLRC.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO:The Supreme Court stressed that in quasi-judicial proceedings, procedural rules governing service
of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. Also, in labor cases,
punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in the interest of the working man; it
should not defeat the complete and equitable resolution of the rights and obligations of the parties. The
Court said that it is ever mindful of the underlying spirit and intention of the Labor Code to ascertain the
facts of each case speedily and objectively without regard to technical rules of law and procedure, all in the
interest of due process. So long as there is a substantial compliance, a party can be placed under the
jurisdiction of the labor court.
In the case at bar, there is substantial compliance when summons was served to Jose Edmundo Pison who
was also the administrator of the Hacienda. Petitioner is therefore adequately represented by Pison in the
proceedings in the labor tribunal. If at all, the non-inclusion of the corporate name of PADC in the case
before the executive labor arbiter was a mere procedural error which did not at all affect the jurisdiction of
the labor tribunals.

PASCUAL VS BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

(Right against self-incrimination)

UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION VS. LAGUESMA

SEC. 3. Employees' Right to Self-Organization. -- Employees shall have the right to self-organization and
to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection. Individuals employed as supervisors shall not
be eligible for membership in a labor organization of employees under their supervision but may form
separate organizations of their own.

For its part, the Supreme Court upheld in several of its decisions the right of supervisors to organize for
purposes of labor relations.

Although it had a definition of the term "supervisor," the Industrial Peace Act did not define the term
"manager." But, using the commonly-understood concept of "manager," as above stated, it is apparent that
the law used the term "supervisors" to refer to the sub-group of "managerial employees" known as front-
line managers. The other sub-group of "managerial employees," known as managers per se, was not
covered.

However, in Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association v. Court of Industrial Relations, the right
of all managerial employees to self-organization was upheld as a general proposition, thus:

It would be going too far to dismiss summarily the point raised by respondent Company - that of the alleged
identity of interest between the managerial staff and the employing firm. That should ordinarily be the
case, especially so where the dispute is between management and the rank and file. It does not necessarily
follow though that what binds the managerial staff to the corporation forecloses the possibility of conflict
between them. There could be a real difference between what the welfare of such group requires and the
concessions the firm is willing to grant. Their needs might not be attended to then in the absence of any
organization of their own. Nor is this to indulge in empty theorizing. The record of respondent Company,
even the very case cited by it, is proof enough of their uneasy and troubled relationship. Certainly the
impression is difficult to erase that an alien firm failed to manifest sympathy for the claims of its Filipino
executives. To predicate under such circumstances that agreement inevitably marks their relationship,
ignoring that discord would not be unusual, is to fly in the face of reality.

. . . The basic question is whether the managerial personnel can organize. What respondent Company
failed to take into account is that the right to self-organization is not merely a statutory creation. It is
fortified by our Constitution. All are free to exercise such right unless their purpose is contrary to
law. Certainly it would be to attach unorthodoxy to, not to say an emasculation of, the concept of law if
managers as such were precluded from organizing. Having done so and having been duly registered, as did
occur in this case, their union is entitled to all the rights under Republic Act No. 875. Considering what is
denominated as unfair labor practice under Section 4 of such Act and the facts set forth in our decision,
there can be only one answer to the objection raised that no unfair labor practice could be committed by
respondent Company insofar as managerial personnel is concerned. It is, as is quite obvious, in the
negative.

Right of Self-Organization of Managerial Employees under the Labor Code

Thus, the dictum in the Caltex case which allowed at least for the theoretical unionization of top and middle
managers by assimilating them with the supervisory group under the broad phrase "managerial personnel,"
provided the lynchpin for later laws denying the right of self-organization not only to top and middle
management employees but to front line managers or supervisors as well. Following the Caltex case, the
Labor Code, promulgated in 1974 under martial law, dropped the distinction between the first and second
sub-groups of managerial employees. Instead of treating the terms "supervisor" and "manager" separately,
the law lumped them together and called them "managerial employees," as follows:

ART. 212. Definitions . . . .

(k) "Managerial Employee" is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions. All employees not falling within this
definition are considered rank and file employees for purposes of this Book.

The definition shows that it is actually a combination of the commonly understood definitions of both
groups of managerial employees, grammatically joined by the phrase "and/or."

This general definition was perhaps legally necessary at that time for two reasons. First, the 1974 Code
denied supervisors their right to self-organize as theretofore guaranteed to them by the Industrial Peace
Act. Second, it stood the dictum in the Caltex case on its head by prohibiting all types of managers from
forming unions. The explicit general prohibition was contained in the then Art. 246 of the Labor Code.
The practical effect of this synthesis of legal concepts was made apparent in the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code which the Department of Labor promulgated on January 19, 1975. Book V,
Rule II, 11 of the Rules provided:

Supervisory unions and unions of security guards to cease operation. - All existing supervisory unions and
unions of security guards shall, upon the effectivity of the Code, cease to operate as such and their
registration certificates shall be deemed automatically cancelled. However, existing collective agreements
with such unions, the life of which extends beyond the date of effectivity of the Code, shall be respected until
their expiry date insofar as the economic benefits granted therein are concerned.

Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the definition of managerial employees shall become
eligible to join or assist the rank and file labor organization, and if none exists, to form or assist in the
forming of such rank and file organization. The determination of who are managerial employees and who
are not shall be the subject of negotiation between representatives of the supervisory union and the
employer. If no agreement is reached between the parties, either or both of them may bring the issue to the
nearest Regional Office for determination.

The Department of Labor continued to use the term "supervisory unions" despite the demise of the legal
definition of "supervisor" apparently because these were the unions of front line managers which were then
allowed as a result of the statutory grant of the right of self-organization under the Industrial Peace
Act. Had the Department of Labor seen fit to similarly ban unions of top and middle managers which may
have been formed following the dictum in Caltex, it obviously would have done so. Yet it did not, apparently
because no such unions of top and middle managers really then existed.

DELFIN VS. INCIONG

(Res Adjudicata)
FACTS: The 136 petitioners herein are former employees of private respondent Atlantic Container
Corporation, organized themselves into Atlantic Container Employees Organization (ACCO) and affiliated
with the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU).

Claiming that Atlantic and its General Manager, private respondent Roberto Jacinto, refused to implement
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, petitioners and FEDLU held a strike. Thereafter, ACCO and FEDLU
filed a case in the Court of Industrial Relations. The CIR found Atlantic Container Corporation and Jacinto
guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering them to cease and desist from further committing the same and
to reinstate complaints striking members. They filed motions to reconsider the said decision, presumably
for the reinstatement of all the petitioners, but the CIR denied the motions.
 The petitioners again filed a charge with the CIR alleging that the named respondents established a
corporation which was an alter ego of Atlantic and which was allegedly organized to engage in the identical
business as Atlantic Container, absorbing all the assets including the facilities and machineries.

When the CIR was abolished, the case was transferred to NLRC which ordered the reinstatement of
complainants. Only 86 out of the 136 petitioners were ordered reinstated. The appeal was dismissed, based
on the ground of Res Judicata. Petitioners appealed to the Minister of Labor through respondent Deputy
Minister Inciong who affirmed the NLRC decision.

ISSUE: WON the cause of action was barred by the principle of Res Judicata

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: While it is true that the complainant in the first charge was the union, in reality it had no material
interest in the outcome of the case. The real party who stands to be benefited or defeated by the case brought
in the name of the union is the union members themselves. Since the judgment therein had become final
and executory, the subsequent filing of another charge against Atlantic for the same violations committed
during its existence is barred by Res Judicata. The bringing of the same action in the name of the individual
members of the union will not take out the case from the ambit of the principle of Res Judicata.

JUDGE BASILLA VS. BECAMON (additional)

Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case becomes
dismissible. The Court held that applied the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment. Under the
said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to
have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties
and for the same cause. It provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the
ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter
in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again.
This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and
repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata
stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law.

ABELITA VS. DORIA (additional)

For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must be present:
a. the former judgment or order must be final;
b. it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence
or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
c. it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
d. there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of
action; this requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially between the same parties.

ADDITIONAL CASES
QUASI JUDICIAL
The Court has classified the functions the COMELEC exercises into the quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, and
administrative in Bedol v. Commission on Elections, to wit:

The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The
quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the
issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions
as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A)
and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to
implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.

The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions
of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down
by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva,
described quasi-judicial power in the following manner, viz:

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises
its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for
the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that
 in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the
proceedings.

I emphasize without hesitation that in order to properly proceed against the COMELEC, an aggrieved party
must choose the proper remedy. The choice depends on which function quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative,
and administrative the COMELEC has discharged in doing the assailed action. It is true that pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court,[3] the remedy of an aggrieved party against a judgment or final
order or resolution of the COMELEC is a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 brought in the
Supreme Court. In Macabago v. Commission on Elections,[4] however, the Court has clarified that Rule 64
applies only to the judgments or final orders or final resolutions rendered by the COMELEC in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial function (that is, the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of
election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications).

Meaning and Characteristics of Quasi-Judicial or Adjudicatory Power

1) adjudicatory power involves specific parties
2) exercise of the power is done in a judicial manner
3) exercised by a person or body other than a judge
4) requires notice and hearing
5) set different requirements before going to court
6) when a body is exercising quasi-judicial function, it is co-equal with the RTC

SANADO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license,
permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. The
act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the
ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights and
liabilities determined.

Quasi-Judicial Function
As can be readily seen, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions,
the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and co-equal bodies have no power to control
the other. However, although under B.P. 129, the CA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgmentof regional trial courts and quasi-judicial bodies, E.O. 14 specifically provides in section 2 that
"The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with
the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who
wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same
 court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's
decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court.

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. VS. SEC OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND

SPORTS
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE v. QUASI-JUDICIAL:
When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of
a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the
rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-
judicial in character.

REQUIREMENTS FOR VALID EXERCISE

(1) Jurisdiction

Q: How is jurisdiction determined?

A: Jurisdiction is conferred by law and by the Constitution. Thus, in order to determine who has jurisdiction
to take cognizance of a case, one only needs to look at the law whether or not it confers jurisdiction on the
body.

Q: How do you resolve a conflict of jurisdiction between a quasi-judicial body and the court?
A: First, determine what the controversy is all about. Is the plaintiff questioning whether an administrative
body has a certain power? Or is he questioning how said power was exercised? In the first, the particular
law creating the body must be considered in order to determine whether or not the administrative body has
authority. If the law has been entrusted to that body for its implementation and such law vests authority in
said body, then it has jurisdiction. Upon the other hand, if the case puts in issue, not whether the body has
authority, but the questionable manner it is exercised, then the courts have jurisdiction to determine
whether or not in the exercise of such powers rights and obligations have been impaired.

(2) Due Process

Q: What is meant by opportunity to be heard?

A: It is the essence of due process. Due process in administrative proceedings includes the opportunity to
be heard OR the opportunity to explain ones side OR the opportunity to seek reconsideration UNLESS
administrative rules on proceeding do not allow such motion for reconsideration. Thus, an opportunity to
be heard does not require physical presence; for as long as the party is provided a remedy with which he
can appeal his case or seek relief from an adverse judgment, then due process is complied with.
 Res judicata in administrative decisions
OCHO VS. CALOS,
The doctrine of res judicata applies to both judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. The doctrine actually
embraces two concepts: the first is bar by prior judgment and the second is conclusiveness of judgment.

The second concept is explained thus: The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or
questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters
essentially connected with the subject matter of litigation. Thus it extends to questions necessarily involved
in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific
finding may have been made in reference thereto, and although such matters were directly referred to in
the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial
shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be
considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgment
necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. Reasons for the rule
are that a judgment is an adjudication on all the matters which are essential to support it, and that every
proposition assumed or decided by the court leading up to the final conclusion upon which such conclusion
is based is as effectually passed upon as the ultimate question which is solved.

QUASI LEGISLATIVE
Doctrine of Subordinate Legislation; Limitations
rule-making power
cannot contravene a statute or the Constitution
rules are not laws but have the force and effect of laws - partakes of the nature of statute
enjoy presumption of legality - therefore courts should respect and apply them UNLESS declared invalid;
all other agencies should likewise respect them

Q: Distinguish between Legislative and Quasi-Legislative power.

A:
Legislative Quasi-Legislative
vested in the Legislature power is in the nature of subordinate
legislation or the rule-making power
delegated to administrative bodies
plenary not plenary and therefore subject to
limitations e.g. Constitution,
statute, and administrative law
limitations such as the tests for valid
delegation.
 includes the power to determine what
the law is and how it shall be applied.
includes the power to determine how
the law is to be applied but not what
the law is; administrative bodies
cannot determine the legality or
illegality of an act, NOT UNLESS they
are duly authorized by Congress

Q: Distinguish between Judicial and Quasi-Judicial power.

Judicial Quasi-Judicial
is original, vested in the judiciary is derivative, a product of valid
delegation of power to administrative
bodies.
includes the determination of rights temporary in nature as courts have
and obligations conclusively the final say
a primary power exercised by the is incidental to the primary function
judiciary of administrative bodies of
implementing and enforcing laws.
(NOTA BENE: It is called quasi-judicial because it is a power that belongs to the judiciary but is exercised
by a non-judicial body. In addition, it is only incidental to the primary function of implementation and
enforcement of laws.)

Q: Why is it important to distinguish between quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power?

A: It is important to distinguish between these two powers of administrative bodies because there are
certain rules and principles in administrative law, which apply to one but not to the other. Thus, the
requirements of due process (notice & hearing) apply when the administrative body is exercising quasi-
judicial functions because such power includes the determination of rights and obligations. On the other
hand, there is generally no need of prior notice & hearing in the exercise of quasi-legislative power. Likewise
the prior exhaustion of remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction do not apply in quasi-legislative
processes, and only in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions. And finally, a body exercising quasi-judicial
functions is considered equivalent to a regional trial court. Hence, one can seek relief from its judgment by
appealing to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on the mode of appeal. A body
exercising quasi-legislative functions is not considered equivalent to a court. Hence, one can resort to the
regional trial court to obtain relief.

Administrative Appeal and Review

SUYAT JR. VS. TORRES

(Appeal to the president)
TAN VS. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
(Appeal To The President)
FACTS: Tan submitted his application for the bidding of a land. Questions arose as to the wisdom of having
the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be awarded to the most qualified bidder.
Meanwhile, Tan won the bidding process. However, President Garcia directed the declaration of the subject
land as watershed forest land, hence not available for exploitation. As a result, Director of Forestry revoked
the award to Tan. Tan filed a case in court.

ISSUE: WON the appeal to the court is the proper remedy.

HELD: No.
Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive
Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing it
as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power
to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the
petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative
remedies. Thus, this Court, in the case of Calo vs. Fuertes, held that:
At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources is the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the
latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and
that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands he had exhausted the
administrative remedies, is untenable.

The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to
not appealing all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is
the last step he should take in an administrative case.

In 1912, in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps, this Court stressed the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies, thus:
When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the executive
department of the government the courts will not interfere until at least that remedy has
been exhausted. The administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted
before resort can be had to the courts, especially when the administrative remedies are by
law exclusive and final. Some matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely
and absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the executive department of the
government. When the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive
department of the government to dispose of particular questions, their judgments or the
judgments of that particular department are no more reviewable by the courts than the
final judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be reviewed and modified by them.

Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that
he has no other speedy and adequate remedy. In the case at bar, petitioner- appellant's
speedy and adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the Philippines.

The proper remedy is an appeal to the OPRES. When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by
and within the executive department of the government the courts will not interfere until at least that
remedy has been exhausted. The administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted before
resort can be had to the courts, especially when the administrative remedies are by law exclusive and final.
Some matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely and absolutely to the discretion of particular
branches of the executive department of the government. When the law confers exclusive and final
jurisdiction upon the executive department of the government to dispose of particular questions, their
judgments or the judgments of that particular department are no more reviewable by the courts than the
final judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be reviewed and modified by them"

CALO VS. FUERTES

(Withdrawal of appeal)
At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the
alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the
decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands he
had exhausted all the administrative remedies, is untenable.

The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing at all
thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an
administrative case.

Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court lies
only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
In the case at bar, appeal from an opinion or order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
to the President of the Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner.
law library
The judgment appealed from already had become final and cannot be reviewed. The appeal is dismissed,
with costs against the petitioner-appellant.

Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action

FORTICH VS. CORONA
(Failure to file motion for reconsideration)
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied
in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for
by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.

Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases.

It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever
practicable.

When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29,
1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office
had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the
Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution.
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that
only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And
even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases,
as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been
entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing
the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-
opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final
and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. BATHAN-VELASCO

(Finality of factual determination by administrative body)
ISSUE: WON SSSEA failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.
HELD: Yes.

RATIO: When a party fails to exhaust all administrative remedies, a premature resort to the courts would
result in the dismissal of the petition.

Moreover, the issues raised by SSSEA in its special civil action for certiorari involve a review of the factual
findings of the Bureau of Labor Relations.

Factual issues are not proper subjects of an original petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, as its
power to review is limited to questions of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion of judicial or quasi-
judicial tribunals or officials. Judicial review does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination.

Judicial Review

MACAILING, ET AL VS. ANDRADA, ET AL

(Mere silence of a statute on availability of judicial review does not necessarily imply that it is
unavailable)
In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially provide for such
judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial review is
unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes; appeal, petition for review or a writ
of certiorari. No general rule applies to all the various administrative agencies. Where the law stands mute,
the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still available

The pertinent statutory provision, Section 44 (h) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, reads: "Courts of First
Instance shall have original jurisdiction ... (h) Said court and their judges, or any of them, shall have the
power to issue writ of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in
their respective provinces and district in the manner provided in the Rules of Court." Complementary
thereto is Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court,4 providing that: "The petition may be filed ... if it relates to
the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in a Court of First
instance having jurisdiction thereof."
Citing several cases, even if the action done is not within the jurisdiction of the CFI, "The Preliminary
injunction that may be granted by a court of first instance under said Section 2 [Rule 58] is, in its
application, co-extensive with the territorial boundaries of the province or district in which the said court
sits

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. LOPEZ

(Quantum required is substantial evidence)

Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court. Weight and Sufficiency of

Evidence
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having burden of proof
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which there are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the
number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required,
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

Section 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may
be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)

DELA CRUZ vs. MALUNAO

The weight of evidence required in administrative investigations is substantial evidence.
In Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, substantial evidence is defined:

In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed

established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at
the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of
evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that order.

For these reasons, only substantial evidence is required to find Malunao guilty of the
administrative offense. In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, substantial evidence, or
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion, is the lowest standard of proof provided under the Rules of Court. In
assessing whether there is substantial evidence in administrative investigations such as
this case, the Court is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence.

MARCELO V. BUNGUBUNG,
Substantial evidence and laid down guidelines relative to the conduct of judicial review of decisions
rendered by administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial power, viz:

x x x Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable
might conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch
of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported
by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine
the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with
respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive
jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These
principles negate the
power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if
originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not
submitted to the administrative agency concerned.

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

GONZALES VS. CA
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded
an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error
committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from
entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the
courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner.
The proper procedure which the petitioner should have taken is to move for a reconsideration of the orders
of the Regional Director, or to go directly to the DARAB, or to its executive adjudicator in the region, the
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). Prior resort to these administrative bodies will not only
satisfy the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, but may likewise prove advantageous to the
parties as the proceedings will be conducted by experts, and will not be limited by the technical rules of
procedure and evidence. From there, the petitioner has yet another forum available--the Special Agrarian
Courts which are the final determinants of cases involving land valuation or determination of just
compensation.

Thus, the procedural short-cut taken by the petitioner which finds no justification both in law and in
jurisprudence must be considered fatal to the petitioner's cause of action. Accordingly, we rule that the CA
committed no error in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

NFA VS. CA
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is subject to some
limitations and exceptions. In this case, private respondents contracts were terminated in the midst of
bidding preparations and their replacements hired barely five days after their termination. In fact,
respondent Masada, a prequalified bidder, submitted all requirements and was preparing for the public
bidding only to find out that contracts had already been awarded by negotiation. Indeed, an appeal to the
NFA Board or Council of Trustees and the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987 was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
The urgency of the situation compelled private respondents to go to court to stop the implementation of
these negotiated security contracts.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. NAVARRO

Exceptions: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

VDA. DE TAN VS. VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION

FACTS: Maria Natividad Vda. de Tan filed before the CFI a petition for mandamus seeking an order to
compel the respondent: (1) to declare deceased Lt. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese National.
Entitled to back pay rights, privileges, and prerogatives under R.A. No. 304, as amended by R.A. No. 897;
and (2) to give due course to the claim of the petitioner, as the widow of the said veterans, by issuing to her
the corresponding back pay certificate of indebtedness.
The lower court granted the petition and ordered the respondent Commission to give due course to the
claim of herein petitioner to the back pay to which her husband was entitled as member of a duly recognized
guerrilla organization. However, respondent avers in this appal that the petitioner failed to exhaust
available administrative remedies.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner required to exhaust available administrative remedies in the present case?

HELD: No.

RATIO:The respondent Commission is n estoppel to invoke the rule on the exhaustion of administrative
remedies, considering that in its resolution, it declared that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice were
Advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any
aggrieved party has the court for recourse, thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final
judicial ruling in her favor wold be accepted by the Commission.

BORDALLOVS. PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION

As a rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or
officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not absolute but admits of exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the
question is purely legal, such as the one presented in the case at bar. The failure of petitioners to appeal to
the PRC, therefore, is not fatal to petitioners cause.

KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG

PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA,IINC. VS. DOMINGUEZ

ISSUE:Whether or not suit brought by KBMBPM is premature due to non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, on the ground that KBMBPM should have petitioned directly the Secretary of Agriculture to
reverse the Order stripping the KBMBPM Board of its authority

HELD:
No.
As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply
where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied
approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures
speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office
of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, suchas when the question involved is purely legal,
as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the
claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. VS.CA

Primary jurisdiction involves matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies.
It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the
matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters
or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a
court.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas
should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said
areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the
specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters
concerning activities relative to the exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal.
These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when
apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an
administrative agency.

ROXAS AND COMPANY INC. VS. CA

(Inapplicability of the doctrine)
However, failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition
proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOAs already issued to the farmer
beneficiaries. Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner's application for conversion,
being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.

To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course.
Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings.
In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. Since then until the
present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands. It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness
and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till.
PIMENTEL, ., ET AL VS. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE REPRESENTED BY
SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE
FACTS:
Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and not with the Ethics Committee.
Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved that the responsibility of the Ethics
Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by the majority.
In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the quorum, and proposed
amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole.

HELD:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here do not require
the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues
here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.