HPCL - Palanpur Terminal EIA

HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM
CORPORATION LTD
Rapid Risk Assessment and Disaster

Management Plan (DMP) for Palanpur
Terminal
Prepared by
SECON PVT. LTD.

Vadodara - 390020
Phone/ Fax No.:91-265-6630700/6630707
E-mail: secon.baroda@secon.in
In association with
National Environmental Engineering
Research Institute
Nehru Marg, Nagpur 440 020
DECEMBER 2011
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Secon Pvt Ltd. highly appreciates the opportunity provided by

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, New Delhi by assigning
the preparation of Rapid Risk Assessment study report for Palanpur
Terminal. We express our sincere gratitude to the officials of HPCL
for the cooperation and support extended to us during this
assignment, but for which this report could not have been
successfully prepared.
The assistance of large number of persons in government

departments and private individuals in data collection are also
thankfully acknowledged.
DISCLAIMER
The information contained in this report is based on the

scientific analysis of data/information/drawings provided by
the sponsor and also collected from other sources / nodal
agencies during the time of the study. Conscious efforts have
been made to ensure the accuracy of information in the report,
however, NEERI shall not own, in any manner, any legal,
financial or consequential responsibility for any event of
occurrence of any accident/hazard or direct or indirect
damage/loss to any third party or to sponsor due to the use
or inability to use the information contained in the report.
The sponsor shall exercise due diligence and make their own
decision to implement the contents of this report. The report
shall not be construed as any guarantee or warranty from
NEERI
T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S
Chapter Contents
Page No.
No.
Contents (i-vi)
List of Tables (v)
List of Figures (vi)
Executive Summary (I-XV)
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Preamble 1.1
1.2 Objectives of the Risk Assessment Study 1.2
1.3 Scope of Work 1.2
Chapter 2: Technology Profile

2.1 Project Highlights 2.1
2.2 Pipelines and Stations 2.3
2.2.1 Salient Features of the Main Pipeline 2.3
2.2.2 Pipeline Route Description 2.5
2.2.3 Summary of Pipeline Details 2.6
2.2.4 Geographical Location of Terminal 2.7
2.2.5 Sum Summary of Station Details at Terminal 2.8
2.3 Facilities provided at terminal 2.8
2.3.1 Pumping & Loading Facilities in Terminal 2.8
2.3.2 Schedule Of Facilities Available At Palanpur Terminal 2.9
2.3.3 Tank Truck Loading Facilities 2.10
2.4 Design basis for Product Facilities 2.11

2.4.1 Product Characteristics 2.11
2.4.2 Storage Facilities 2.12

2.4.3 Road Loading/Receipt Facilities 2.12
2.4.4 Applicable Codes & Standards 2.12

2.5 Instrumentation ,Control and Communication System 2.13
i
T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S
Chapter Contents
Page No.
No.
2.5.1 Instrumentation & Automation 2.13

2.5.2 Shut down Features 2.14
2.5.3 Communication System 2.14
2.6 Fire protection system for Terminal 2.15
2.6.1 System Description 2.15
2.6.2 Fire Protection Facilities 2.15
2.7 Safety ,Health and Environment Policy 2.16
2.8 Utilities 2.17
2.8.1 Power Supply Arrangement 2.17
2.8.2 Make up Water System 2.18
2.8.3 Effluent Treatment Plan (ETP) 2.18
Chapter 3: Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) Analysis

3.1 Introduction 3.1
3.1.1 Methodology of MCA Analysis 3.2
3.2 Past accident Data Analysis 3.2
3.3 Hazard Identification 3.4
3.3.1 Fire and Explosion index( FEI) 3.5
3.4 MCA Analysis 3.7

3.4.1 3.8
Fire, Explosion and Toxic Scenarios
3.4.1.1 Jet Fire 3.8
3.4.1.2 Flash Fire 3.8
3.4.1.3 Vapour Cloud Explosion 3.9
3.4.1.4 Pool Fire 3.9
3.4.1.5 Lower and Upper Flammability Limit 3.10
3.4.2 Models for the Calculation of Heat load and Shock Waves 3.12
3.4.3 Model for Pressure Wave 3.12
3.4.4 3.13
Vulnerability Models
3.5 3.15
Computation of Damage Distances
Chapter 4: Risk Mitigation Measures
ii
4.1 Introduction 4.1
4.1.1 General Recommendations 4.1
4.1.2 Specific Recommendations 4.2
4.1.2.1 Control Rooms 4.2
4.1.2.2 Electricity Hazard 4.2
4.1.2.3 4.3
Pumps
4.1.3 Fire Fighting System 4.3
4.1.4 Fire Protection System 4.3
4.1.5 Risks to Personnel 4.4
4.1.6 Risk to Environment 4.5
4.1.7 Precautionary Measures for Falling Objects 4.5
4.1.8 Training 4.5
4.1.9 Strategies 4.5
4.1.10 4.6
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
Chapter 5: Disaster Management Plan
5.1 5.1
Preamble
5.2 5.1
Introduction
5.2.1 Facilities Provided At Terminal 5.2
5.2.2 Instrumentation, Control & Communication System 5.2
5.2.3 Communication System 5.3
5.2.4 Fire Protection Facilities 5.3
5.3 Need for Disaster Management Plan 5.4
5.4 Objectives of Disaster Management Plan 5.4
5.5 Statutory Requirement 5.5
5.6 Different Phases of Disaster 5.5
5.7 Key Elements 5.6
5.7.1 Basis of the Plan 5.6
5.7.2 5.6
Emergency Planning and Response Procedures
5.7.3 5.7
On-site Disaster Management Plan
5.7.3.1 5.8
Emergency Actions For Various Accident Scenarios
5.7.3.2 5.9
Various phases of onsite disaster management plan
5.7.3.3 5.12
Emergency Organization structure
5.7.3.4 5.14
Role and Responsibilities
i ii
5.7.4 5.30
Off-site Disaster Management Plan
5.7.4.1 5.30
Fire
5.7.4.2 5.30
Explosion
5.7.4.3 5.30
Toxic Gas/Vapor Release
5.7.4.4 5.31
Various phases of onsite disaster management plan
5.8 5.36
Mock Drills
5.9 5.37
Evacuation Plan
5.9.1 5.37
Purpose
5.9.2 5.38
Fire Escape Drill Procedure
5.10 5.39
Training
5.11 Checklist for Capability Assessment 5.39
5.11.1 Welding and Cutting Inspection Checklist 5.40
5.11.2 Flammable Liquid Storage Facilities Checklist 5.41
5.11.3 Services Checklist 5.42
5.11.4 Fire Prevention and Fire Protection Checklist 5.43
5.11.5 Checklist for Compressed and Liquefied Gases 5.44
5.11.6 Checklist for Electrical Hazards 5.44
5.11.7 Checklist for Personal Protection 5.45
5.11.8 Checklist for Handling Chemical Substances 5.45
Annexures
Lay out of the Terminal
iv
LIST OF TABLES
Table No. Particulars Page No.
2.1 Salient Features of Palanpur Terminal 2.3

2.2 Salient Features of the Main Pipeline 2.4
2.3 Length of the Pipeline Sections 2.6
2.4 Summary of Pipeline Details 2.6
2.5 Geographical Locations of Terminal 2.7
2.6 Station Details at Terminal 2.8
2.7 Tank Truck Loading Facilities in Terminal 2.10
2.8 Salient Features Of Existing And Proposed Tankages At Palanpur 2.10
2.9 Applicable Codes & Standards 2.12
2.10 Fire Water Tanks & Fire Fighting Pumps at Terminals 2.15
2.11 Emergency Preparedness 2.16
2.12 Power Supply Arrangement 2.18
3.1 Degree of Hazards based on FEI 3.6
3.2 Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) for Process Units 3.6
3.3 Pasquill Giffard Atmospheric Stability 3.7
3.4 List of Damages Envisaged at Various Heat Loads 3.12
3.5 Damage Criteria for Pressure Waves 3.13
3.6 Range of Thermal Flux Levels and their Potential Effects 3.14
3.7 Consequence Analysis for Jet Fire Scenario 3.15
3.8 Consequence Analysis for Pool Fire Scenario 3.19
3.9 Consequence Analysis for Flash Fire Scenario 3.25
3.10 Consequence Analysis for VCE Scenario 3.29
4.1 Summary of Recommended Personal Protective Equipment 4.7
According to Hazard
v
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
Particulars Page No.
No.
3.1 Accidental Release of Chemicals: A Scenario 3.11
3.2 Damage Contour for Jet Fire due to 50 mm leak in MS Tank (Tf-16) at 2F 3.18
weather condition
3.3 Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 25 mm leak in HSD Tank (Tf-4) at 3.23
2F weather condition
3.4 Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 25 mm leak in MS Tank 3.23
(Tf-9,10,11) at 2F weather condition
3.5 Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 50mm leak in SKO Tank 3.24
(Tf-12,13) at 2F weather condition
3.6 Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 50mm leak in Ethanol Tank 3.24
(Ts-6,7) at 5D weather condition
3.7 Damage Contour for VCE due to 50mm leak in SKO Tank 3.32
(Tf-12,13) at 5D weather condition
5.1 Onsite DMP - Disaster Control / Management System 5.8
5.2 Various Organizations Involved During Emergency 5.36
vi
Executive Summary for Rapid Risk Assessment and
Disaster Management Plan for Palanpur Terminal
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Preamble
To meet the requirement of Finished Petroleum Products, HPCL has proposed a 437
km 18 Dia minimum 6.4 mm thickness pipeline between Rewari to Kanpur.The pipeline
will originate from existing marketing terminal at Rewari in Haryana and terminate at
proposed new terminal of HPCL at Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) .
Various grades of Motor Spirit BS IIIMS & BS IV MS, BS III High Speed Diesel (HSD) &
BS IV HSD, Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) are the different Petroleum products proposed
to be pumped through the pipeline. Annual thruput capacity for the pipeline is 3.17
MMTPA in phase I, (Year 2018-19) and 3.86 MMTPA in phase II (Year 2023-24).
Required facilities have been planned along the pipeline route depending on major
consumer centres and other engineering requirements. New storage installation and
receiving station are proposed to be constructed by HPCL at Kanpur in U.P., and
existing facilities at Palanpur, Rewari, Bharatpur, and Mathura location will be utilized by
augmenting more facilities for receiving products. The present project, for which this
Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental Management Plan are
formulated, involves the details of Palanpur Terminal which is located in the state of
Gujarat.
However, the proposed activity as a part of RKPL pipeline project will be addition
of three tanks within the premises of existing terminal facilities already developed
for MDPL project, and conversion of one tank storage material from HSD IV to HSD
III grade.
In order to carry out Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA), HPCL has retained its consultant
Secon Private Limited in association with National Environmental Engineering Research
Institute (NEERI) to undertake the Rapid Risk Assessment with a view to assess the
risk posed on the surroundings due to Palanpur terminal and its installation.
1.2 Objectives of Risk Assessment Study
Identification of vulnerable units with resources to hazard indices
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Generation of release scenarios for escape of flammable chemicals
Estimation of damage distances for the accidental release based on different

scenarios
Suggestion of risk mitigation measures for the Terminal based on consequence

analysis
Approach to Disaster Management Plan
1.3 Scope of the work:
The scope of the present report is to carry out risk assessment for terminal. Standard
industry practices are considered while carrying out risk assessment study.
The hazard potential and estimation of consequences in case of its accidental release
are the issues of immediate relevance to be considered. It is therefore, imperative to
carry out Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) analysis at the first stage, which identifies
vulnerable areas around the pipeline route and suggests a set of recommendations to
improve safety.
HPCL has retained its consultant Secon Private Limited in association with National
Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) to undertake the Rapid Risk
Assessment with a view to assess the risk posed on the surroundings due to proposed
terminal
The work undertaken consists of the following stages:
Collection of relevant data on project description and proposed activities.
Damage distance computations
Maximum Credible Accident analysis is carried out to arrive at the hazard distance for
the worst case scenario. The consequences of all the scenarios are computed and
hazard distances are worked out and listed for flammable materials and possible
explosion effects. Risk mitigation measures, based on MCA analysis and engineering
judgements are suggested in order to improve overall system safety.
Suggestions for risk mitigation measures and delineation of approach to Disaster

Management Plan (DMP) for minimizing the risks which are of concern and can be
practically implemented are documented. International standard operation practices and
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Indian regulatory requirements are considered while giving suggestions /

recommendations.
2.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
2.1 Project Highlights
To meet the requirement of Finished Petroleum Products, HPCL has proposed a 437 km
18 Dia minimum 6.4 mm thickness pipeline between Rewari to Kanpur. The pipeline will
originate from existing marketing terminal at Rewari in Haryana and terminate at proposed new
terminal of HPCL at Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.).
Various grades of Motor Spirit (BS IIIMS & BS IV MS), BS III High Speed Diesel (HSD) & BS IV
HSD, Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) are the different Petroleum products proposed to be pumped
through the pipeline. Annual thruput capacity for the pipeline is 3.17 MMTPA in phase I, (Year
2018-19)and 3.86 MMTPA in phase II (Year 2023-24) . However, the proposed activity as a part
of RKPL pipeline project will be addition of three tanks within the premises of existing terminal
facilities already developed for MDPL project, and conversion of one tank storage material from
HSD IV to HSD III grade. This will have marginal impact on the environment of the area
Required facilities have been planned along the pipeline route depending on major consumer
centres and other engineering requirements. New storage installation and receiving station are
proposed to be constructed by HPCL at Kanpur in U.P., and existing facilities at Palanpur,
Rewari, Bharatpur, and Mathura location will be utilized by augmenting more facilities for
receiving products.
The following storage, pumping, receipt and marketing terminals are proposed for receipt
and marketing of the products:
1) Rewari - Receipt and Marketing Terminal ( Existing facilities will be used )

2) Bharatpur- Tap-off & Other associated facilities
3) Mathura - Tap-off & Other associated facilities
4) Palanpur - Additional Tankage facilities
5) Bahadurgarh - Pumping & associated facilities
6) Kanpur- Proposed storage terminal.
The present report addresses the Palanpur terminal. At present, there is a well-developed
complex for the marketing facilities, wherein the additional tankage requirements of
marketing terminal forming part of present project will also be satisfied within the same
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campus and so, in the present report, the discussion will be focussed on the facilities of
existing terminal at Palanpur.
The present project, for which this Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental
Management Plan are formulated, involves the details of Palanpur Terminal which is located in
the state of Gujarat.
2.2 Facilities Provided At Terminal
Product Pump House, Manifold, Fire water Pump House, Two Tank truck Filling Gantrys,
Calibration Facilities, Electric Room/MCC, D G yard, Transformer Yard, Lube Drum Yard and
Grease Drum Shed, Lube Ware House, Marketing Room, Admin. Building, Control Room,
Amenity, Parking, Sealing Platform, Effluent Treatment Plant, Security & Gate House checking
Platform , Watch Tower (4 Nos), Compound wall, Emergency Gate-1 No., Drivers Toilet, Foam
Tank Shed, Blue Dye Dosing System, Turbo jet Dosing System, Power Dosing System, Product
Storage Tanks.
2.3 Instrumentation, Control & Communication System
Instrumentation & Automation
The major activities performed by terminal are the following:
a) Storage facilities for BSIII MS, BS IV MS, BSIII HSD, BS IV HSD, and SKO.
b) Receipt of product through pipeline
c) Road loading facilities
d) Sump & Slop tanks
e) Fire water pumps and make up water system
Full-fledged Terminal Automation System (TAS) is envisaged for these units. These include:
a) Tank Farm Management System (TFM)

b) Terminal data management system
c) Bay Queuing
d) Tank Truck loading
Shut Down Features
Emergency shutdown is provided in the marketing terminal control room to stop all dispatch
operation. ESD shall be implemented in the PLC logic as part of terminal automation.
Emergency push buttons to stop all road loading operations are provided in the middle
gantry.
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Emergency push buttons to stop all loading operations in the terminal/depot are provided
in the control room.
Communication System
Telecommunication system (interfaced with the public address system) along with Plant
Communication System (PCS) is envisaged for the terminals.
2.4 Fire Protection Systems for Terminals
System Description
The following fire protection facilities are envisaged at terminals as per the requirements of
OISD-117:
a) Fire Water System Pressurized at 7.0 Kg/cm2

b) Foam system
c) First Aid Fire Fighting Equipment and safety accessories
d) Mobile Fire Fighting Equipment
Fire Protection Facilities
The facilities provided consist of the following units
1) Fire Water Storage Tanks

2) Fire Water Pumps
3) Fire Water Piping
4) Fire Hydrants
5) Fixed Foam System
6) Water/foam Monitors
7) Fixed Water Spray Systems
8) Mobile Fire Fighting Equipment
9) Portable Extinguishers
2.5 Safety, Health and Environment Policy
Petroleum Industry occupies an important segment of our economy and is a source of large
benefit to the society. In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in volumes handled to
meet the increasing demand. Products such as, Euro III MS, Euro IV MS, Euro III HSD, Euro IV
HSD, SKO and FO are highly flammable, and safety which forms an integral part of the industry,
has always been given paramount importance.
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Several Government authorities, both at the centre and state levels such as Inspectorate of
Factories, Department of Explosives etc. are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring safe
handling and accident prevention measures. In spite of the measures, possibility of accidents
either due to human errors and/or due to equipment/system failure cannot be ruled out. The
lessons learnt from the disasters all over the world, made it essential to draw an Emergency
Preparedness Plan to negotiate such eventuality. The imperative of Emergency Preparedness
to minimize the adverse effects due to an unfortunate accident occurring in manufacture,
storage, import and transport of any hazardous substance is thus well recognized by all
concerns.
An Emergency Preparedness Plan is essential to obviate such an eventuality by providing the
measures to contain the incident and minimize the after effects. To assist the Industry it is
considered essential to provide the guidelines for preparing such plans based on the
interactions within the oil industry.
Over the years the oil industry has developed and refined its own directives in the field of safety,
health and environment which are to be followed stringently by their members. In addition to the
environmental legislation, the OISD (Oil Industry Safety Directorate) makes it mandatory for its
members to implement its directives on these issues. HPCL has thus formulated its own
corporate policy on environment and safety which is followed in all its installations.
2.6 Utilities
Power Supply Arrangement
Power requirement will be fulfilled from the local grid. Provision for DG set is kept as back up
arrangement for emergency power only.
Make Up Water System
The source of water for the make up water system is bore wells. Water from the bore well is
collected in sump. From the sump water will be pumped by self priming pumps installed on top
of the sump and distributed through a network of buried GI pipes to individual HDPE overhead
tanks of Amenities buildings, Admin building, drivers rest room etc. and to the fire water storage
tanks.
Effluent Treatment Plan (ETP)
The Effluent Treatment Plant receives oily water through a separate drain line connecting tank
farms, TT Gantry area, Pump house manifold area etc. The plant includes a Primary separation
unit consisting of a bar screen, Titled Plate Interceptor and Belt type oil skimmer. Subsequently
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Effluent will be pumped to Filtration unit using a multimedia filter and coalescing filter. The slop
oil collected will be pumped to the slop tank. The capacity of the existing ETP is 75KL/hr at
Palanpur terminal.
3.0 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT (MCA) ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction
Accidental risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident consisting of
an event or sequence of events resulting into fire, explosion or toxic hazards to human health
and environment.
Risk Assessment (RA) provides a numerical measure of the risk that a particular facility poses to
the public. It begins with the identification of probable potential hazardous events at an industry
and categorization as per the predetermined criteria. The consequences of major credible
events are calculated for different combinations of weather conditions to simulate worst possible
scenario. These consequence predictions are combined to provide numerical measures of the
risk for the entire facility.
MCA stands for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident with maximum
damage distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis does not include
quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident. In practice the selection of
accident scenarios for MCA analysis is carried out on the basis of engineering judgement and
expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in accident analysis.
Detailed study helps in plotting the damage contours on the detailed plot plan in order to assess
the magnitude of a particular event. A disastrous situation is the outcome of fire, explosion or
toxic hazards in addition to other natural causes that eventually lead to loss of life, property and
ecological imbalances.
3.2 Methodology
The MCA analysis involves ordering and ranking of various sections in terms of potential
vulnerability. The data requirements for MCA analysis are:
Operating manual
Flow diagram and P&I diagrams
Detailed design parameters
Physical and chemical properties of all the chemicals
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Detailed plant layout
Detailed area layout
Past accident data
Following steps are involved in the MCA analysis:
Identification of potential hazardous sections and representative failure cases
Visualization of release scenarios considering type and the quantity of the
hazardous material
Damage distance computations for the released cases at different wind velocities
and atmospheric stability classes for heat radiations and pressure waves
Drawing of damage contours on plot plan to show the effect due to the accidental
release of chemicals
3.3 Hazard Identification
Identification of hazards is an important step in Risk Assessment as it leads to the generation of

accidental scenarios. The merits of including the hazard for further investigation are
subsequently determined by its significance, normally using a cut-off or threshold quantity.
Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to evaluate it in terms of the risk it presents to
the employees and the neighbouring community. In principle, both probability and
consequences should be considered, but there are occasions where it either the probability or
the consequence can shown to be sufficiently low or sufficiently high, decisions can be made on
just one factor.
During the hazard identification component, the following considerations are taken into account.
Chemical identities
Location of process unit facilities for hazardous materials.
The types and design of process units
The quantity of material that could be involved in an airborne release and
The nature of the hazard (e.g. airborne toxic vapours or mists, fire, explosion,
large quantities stored or processed handling conditions) most likely to
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accompany hazardous materials spills or releases
3.4 Consequence Analysis
MCA analysis encompasses defined techniques to identify the hazards and compute the
consequent effects in terms of damage distances due to heat radiation, toxic releases, vapour
cloud explosion etc. A list of probable or potential accidents of the major units in the complex
arising due to use, storage and handling of the hazardous materials are examined to establish
their credibility. Depending upon the effective hazardous attributes and their impact on the
event, the maximum effect on the surrounding environment and the respective damage caused
can be assessed.
Hazardous substance, on release can cause damage on a large scale. The extent of the
damage is dependent upon the nature of the release and the physical state of the material. In
the present report the consequences for flammable hazards are considered and the damages
caused due to such releases are assessed with recourse to MCA analysis.
Flammable substances on release may cause Jet fire and less likely unconfined vapour cloud
explosion causing possible damage to the surrounding area. The extent of damage depends
upon the nature of the release. The release of flammable materials and subsequent ignition
result in heat radiation wave or vapour cloud depending upon the flammability and its physical
state. Damage distances due to release of hazardous materials depend on atmospheric stability
and wind speed. It is important to visualize the consequence of the release of such substances
and the damage caused to the surrounding areas. Computation of damage distances are
carried out at various atmospheric stability conditions for various wind velocities and the result is
tabulated.
3.5 Computation of Damage Distances
Damage distances for the accidental release of hazardous materials have been computed at 2F,
3D and 5D weather conditions. In these conditions, 2, 3 and 5 are wind velocities in m/s and F
and D are atmospheric stability classes. These weather conditions have been selected to
accommodate worst case scenarios to get maximum effective distances. DNV based PHAST
Micro 6.51 software has been used to carry out consequence analysis. Damage distances
computed for fire and explosion scenarios for the various storage tanks in Palanpur Terminal
are described below.
Jet Fire
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This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50 mm in MS tank with
capacity 4700KL at various heat radiation levels under the different atmospheric stability classes
and wind velocities. The damage distance due to 50 mm leak for stability class 2F is 49.81 m at
heat load of 4.0 KW/m.
Pool Fire
This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50 mm in HSD tank of
capacity 2918.8KL for various heat radiation levels under the different atmospheric stability
classes and wind velocities. The damage distance due to 25 mm leak for stability class 2F is
14.72 m at heat load of 37.5 KW/m condition.
Flash Fire
This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50 mm and catastrophic
rupture of HSD tank of capacity 313.2KL for LFL concentrations under the different atmospheric
stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distances due to 50 mm leak are 7.15 m, 7.05
m and 7.60 m for stability classes 2F, 3D and 5D conditions respectively.
Vapor Cloud Explosion
This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm, 50 mm and catastrophic
rupture of SKO tank of capacity 1497.7KL at various overpressure waves under the different
atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distance due to 50 mm leak at
stability class 5D is 24.29 m for overpressure wave of 0.03 bar.
4.0 RISK MITIGATION MEASURES
The scope of the study covers mitigation measures based on Maximum Credible
Accident (MCA) Analysis. The Fire and Explosion Indices were computed for the identification
and screening of vulnerable sections and consequence analysis was carried out for the
accidental release scenarios of hazardous chemicals at various atmospheric conditions. The
following are general and specific mitigation measures
4.1 General Recommendations
Fire prevention and code enforcement is one of the major areas of responsibility for
the fire service. Following are the general recommendations for the proposed facility
Facility should be equipped with the following fire fighting systems
- Water supply
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- Fire hydrant and monitor nozzle installation

- Foam system
- Water fog and sprinkler system
- Mobile Fire fighting equipment
Surrounding population (includes all strata of society) should be made aware of the safety
precautions to be taken in the event of any mishap within the plant. This can effectively be
done by conducting the safety training programs
Safety escape routes should be provided at strategic locations and should be easily
accessible.
Critical switches and alarm should be always kept in line
A wind direction pointer should also be installed at storage site, so that in an emergency
the wind direction can be directly seen and downwind population cautioned
Shut off and isolation valves should be easily approachable in emergencies
Periodical mock drills should be conducted so as to check the alertness and efficiency of
the DMP and EPP and records should be maintained
Signboard including phone numbers, no smoking signs and type of emergencies should
be installed at various locations.
4.2 Specific Recommendations
Control Rooms
Adequate number of doors shall be provided in the control room for safe exit
Halon / Dry chemical fire extinguishers should be used in control rooms and computer
rooms
Smoke detectors system shall be provided for control rooms at suitable locations
To resist fire spread through ducts, dampers shall be installed in ducts
Electricity Hazard
All electrical equipments shall be provided with proper earthing. Earthed electrode
shall periodically tested and maintained
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Emergency lighting shall be available at all critical locations including the operators
room to carry out safe shut down and ready identification of fire fighting facilities such
as fire water pumps and fire alarm stations.
All electrical equipments shall be free from carbon dust, oil deposits, and grease
Approved insulated tools, rubber mats, shockproof gloves and boots, tester, fuse
tongs, discharge rod, safety belt, hand lamp, wooden or insulated ladder should be
used while carrying out the maintenance of electrical parts
Danger from excess current due to overload or short circuit should be prevented by
providing fuses, circuit breakers, thermal protection
Carbon dioxide, halon or dry chemical fire extinguishers are to be used for electrical
fires
Pumps
Preventive Maintenance Inspection Schedule for Pumps will be observed as per the
equipment manual of the manufacturer.
Fire Fighting System

The fire protection equipment shall be kept in good operating condition at all times
and fire fighting system should be periodically tested for proper functioning and logged
for record and corrective actions.
Fire Protection System

The typical fire fighting system for the various facilities described is outlined in this section. The
exact details of the fire fighting systems and capabilities to be installed and developed will be
finalised after the completion of detailed engineering in consultation with the concerned process
and equipment vendors and fire. It is also to be understood that not all facilities described below
will be applicable for every installation.
Risks to Personnel
Good safety management, strict adherence to safety management procedures and

competency assurance will reduce the risk. Safety practices are needed to carry out jobs safely
and without causing any injury to self, colleagues and system.
For total safety of any operation, each team member must religiously follow the safety
practices / procedures pertaining to respective operational area. If every team member starts
working with this attitude, zero accident rate is not a distant dream.
Secon Private Limited XII

Any operation is a team effort and its success depends upon the sincerity, efficiency
and motivation of all team members. Safety in such operations is not a duty of a single person,
but it is everyone's job.
Use of protective fireproof clothing and escape respirators will reduce the risk of being
seriously burnt. In addition, adequate fire fighting facilities and first aid facilities should be
provided, in case of any emergency.
5.0 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN
The objective of any terminal should be safe and trouble free operation this is ensured
by taking precautions right from design stage i.e. design of plant, equipment/pipeline as per
standard codes, ensuring selection of proper material of construction, well designed codes/rules
and instruments for safe operation of the plant. Safety should be ensured afterwards by
operating the plant/pipe line by trained manpower. In spite of all precautions accidents may
happen due to human error or system malfunction. Any accident involving release of hazardous
material may cause loss of human lives & property and damage to environment. Industrial
installations are vulnerable to various natural as well as man made disasters. Examples of
natural disasters are flood, cyclone, earthquake, lightening etc. and manmade disasters are like
major fire, explosion, sudden heavy leakage of toxic and poisonous gases and liquids from
pipeline storage terminals, civil war, nuclear attacks, terrorist activities etc.
The damage caused by any disaster is determined by the potential for loss
surrounding the event. It is impossible to predict the time and nature of disaster, which might
strike on undertaking. However, an effective disaster management plan i.e. preplanned
procedure involving proper utilization of in-house as well as outside resources helps to minimize
the loss to a minimum and resume the working condition as soon as possible.
5.1 Need for Disaster Management Plan
Following are the general types of Emergency /Disaster which lead to preparation of
disaster management plan:
Fire in tank farm area

Large oil spillage which may escape outside the boundary.
Major fire / explosion in unit area
Toxic gas release
Major Earthquake above 7 Richter Scale
Secon Private Limited XIII

5.2 Objectives of Disaster Management Plan
Disaster Management Plan is basically a containment, Control & mitigation Plan. The
plan includes activities before disaster, during disaster and post disaster:
The objective of disaster management plan is to formulate and provide organisational

setup and arrange proper facilities capable of taking part and effective action in any
Brief the incident under control making full use of inside and outside resources
Protect the personnel inside the depot as well as public outside.
Safeguard the depot as well as outside property and environment.
Carry out rescue operation and treatment of casualties.
Preserve relevant records and evidences for subsequent enquiry
Ensure rapid return to normal operating conditions.
The above objectives can be achieved by
Proper identification of possible hazards and evaluation of their hazard potential

and identification of maximum credible hazard scenario.
Arrange/augment facilities for fire fighting, safety, medical (both equipment and
Manpower)
Evolving proper action plan with proper organisational set-up and communication
facilities as well as warning procedure.
5.3 Statutory Requirement:
Disaster Management Plan is a statutory requirement for all petroleum products

marketing terminals to tackle the emergencies. The plan has been prepared in view of the
following regulations
Factories Act, 1948 and as amended
Manufacture, Storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989,

notified under Environment Protection Act 1986 and amended in 1994.
Rules on Emergency Planning Preparedness and Response for Chemical

Accidents, 1996.
Stipulations of OISD-168
Secon Private Limited XIV

Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991.
5.4 Key Elements
Following are the key elements of Disaster Management Plan:
Basis of the plan
Accident prevention procedures/measures
Accident/emergency response planning procedures
Secon Private Limited XV

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Preamble
To meet the requirement of Finished Petroleum Products, HPCL has proposed a

437 km 18 Dia minimum 6.4 mm thickness pipeline between Rewari to Kanpur.The
pipeline will originate from existing marketing terminal at Rewari in Haryana and
terminate at proposed new terminal of HPCL at Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) .
Various grades of Motor Spirit BS IIIMS & BS IV MS, BS III High Speed Diesel (HSD)
& BS IV HSD, Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) are the different Petroleum products
proposed to be pumped through the pipeline. Annual thruput capacity for the pipeline
is 3.17 MMTPA in phase I, (Year 2018-19) and 3.86 MMTPA in phase II (Year
2023-24).
receiving station are proposed to be constructed by HPCL at Kanpur in U.P., and
existing facilities at Palanpur, Rewari, Bharatpur, and Mathura location will be utilized
by augmenting more facilities for receiving products. The present project, for which
this Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental Management Plan are
Rapid Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
For Palanpur Terminal
formulated, involves the details of Palanpur Terminal which is located in the state of
Gujarat.
However, the proposed activity as a part of RKPL pipeline project will be

addition of three tanks within the premises of existing terminal facilities
already developed for MDPL project, and conversion of one tank storage
material from HSD IV to HSD III grade.
In order to carry out Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA), HPCL has retained its consultant
Secon Private Limited in association with National Environmental Engineering
Research Institute (NEERI) to undertake the Rapid Risk Assessment with a view to
assess the risk posed on the surroundings due to Palanpur terminal and its
installation.
1.2 Objectives of the Risk Assessment Study
Identification of vulnerable units with resources to hazard indices
Generation of release scenarios for escape of flammable chemicals
Estimation of damage distances for the accidental release based on different

scenarios
Suggestion of risk mitigation measures for the Terminal based on consequence

analysis
Approach to Disaster Management Plan
1.3 Scope of Work
The scope of the present report is to carry out risk assessment for terminal. Standard
industry practices are considered while carrying out risk assessment study.
The hazard potential and estimation of consequences in case of its accidental

release are the issues of immediate relevance to be considered. It is therefore,
imperative to carry out Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) analysis at the first stage,
which identifies vulnerable areas around the pipeline route and suggests a set of
recommendations to improve safety.
HPCL has retained its consultant Secon Private Limited in association with National
Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) to undertake the Rapid Risk
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore NEERI, Nagpur

Page No: 1.2
Assessment with a view to assess the risk posed on the surroundings due to
proposed terminal
The work undertaken consists of the following stages:
Collection of relevant data on project description and proposed activities.
Damage distance computations
Maximum Credible Accident analysis is carried out to arrive at the hazard distance
for the worst case scenario. The consequences of all the scenarios are computed
and hazard distances are worked out and listed for flammable materials and possible
explosion effects. Risk mitigation measures, based on MCA analysis and engineering
judgements are suggested in order to improve overall system safety.
Suggestions for risk mitigation measures and delineation of approach to Disaster

Management Plan (DMP) for minimizing the risks which are of concern and can be
practically implemented are documented. International standard operation practices
and Indian regulatory requirements are considered while giving suggestions /
recommendations.
Disaster Management Plan
Evaluation of organization of disaster management plan for the facilities
Delineation of risk prevention and mitigation measures for the proposed facilities

Page No: 1.3
Chapter 2
Technology Profile
2.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
2.1 PROJECT HIGHLIGHTS
To meet the requirement of Finished Petroleum Products, HPCL has proposed a 437 km
18 Dia minimum 6.4 mm thickness pipeline between Rewari to Kanpur. The pipeline will
originate from existing marketing terminal at Rewari in Haryana and terminate at proposed
new terminal of HPCL at Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) .
Various grades of Motor Spirit (BS IIIMS & BS IV MS), BS III High Speed Diesel (HSD) &
BS IV HSD, Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) are the different Petroleum products proposed to
be pumped through the pipeline. Annual thruput capacity for the pipeline is 3.17 MMTPA in
phase I, (Year 2018-19)and 3.86 MMTPA in phase II (Year 2023-24) . However, the
proposed activity as a part of RKPL pipeline project will be addition of three tanks within the
premises of existing terminal facilities already developed for MDPL project, and conversion
of one tank storage material from HSD IV to HSD III grade. This will have marginal impact on
the environment of the area
receiving station are proposed to be constructed by HPCL at Kanpur in U.P., and existing
facilities at Palanpur, Rewari, Bharatpur, and Mathura location will be utilized by augmenting
more facilities for receiving products. The project components for the proposed Rewari
Kanpur Pipeline are as follows:
Rapid Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan for
Palanpur Terminal
Sr Location Pipeline Terminal

No.
1 Cross country Pipeline Rewari-Bharatpur- -

including SV & IP Mathura- Kanpur
station
2 Rewari Pumping station & Existing installation will be

associated facilities utilized.
3 Bharatpur Tapoff & Other associated Additional Tankage

facilities
4 Mathura Tapoff & Other associated Additional Tankage

facilities
5 Palanpur Additional Tankage
6 Kanpur Receiving and associated New Storage and Distribution

Facility Terminal with Road and Rail
loading facilities
7 Bahadurgarh Pumping & associated

facilities for pumping of
Product from Bahadurgarh
to Rewari
The following storage, pumping, receipt and marketing terminals are proposed for receipt
and marketing of the products:
1) Rewari - Receipt and Marketing Terminal ( Existing facilities will be used )

2) Bharatpur- Tap-off & Other associated facilities
3) Mathura - Tap-off & Other associated facilities
4) Palanpur - Additional Tankage facilities
5) Bahadurgarh - Pumping & associated facilities
6) Kanpur- Proposed storage terminal.

Page No: 2.2
Palanpur Terminal
The present report addresses the Palanpur terminal. At present, there is a well
developed complex for the marketing facilities, wherein the additional tankage
requirements of marketing terminal forming part of present project will also be satisfied
within the same campus and so, in the present report, the discussion will be focussed
on the facilities of existing terminal at Palanpur.
The present project, for which this Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental
Management Plan are formulated, involves the details of PalanpurTerminal which is located
in the state of Gujarat.
The salient features of the terminal have been summarized in Table-2.1 below.
Table-2.1Salient Features of Palanpur Terminal
Existing and Proposed Storage Tanks
HSD
HSD HSD BS MS MS MS MS Receipt Loading
SKO SLOP BSIV
BSIII IV BSIII BSIV BSIII BSIV Facilities facilities
Existing
Palanpur
Marketing TT
Terminal Pipeline
3(E) 3 (E) 2(E) 3(E) 2(E) 2(E) 1(P) 1(P) 1(P) loading
(E )
(E )
TT Tank Trucks (Road Loadings), E-Existing, P-Proposed
Road loading terminal also have small storage and injection facilities for dosage of Ethanol
and various other additives like Furfural, Blue Dye, Power, Turbojet, Marker etc.
2.2 PIPELINES & STATIONS
2.2.1 SALIENT FEATURES OF THE MAIN PIPELINE
The salient features of the proposed Rewari- Kanpur petroleum product pipeline, which will
be supplying the petroleum products to above terminals, has been summarized in Table-2.2
below.

Page No: 2.3
Palanpur Terminal
Table-2.2 Salient Features of the Main Pipeline
Name Rewari- Kanpur Pipeline
Transport MS BS III, MS BS I V, HSD BS III, HSD BS IV, and SKO.

Material
Pipeline Length 437 km 18Dia, min. 6.4mm thickness, carbon steel pipeline.
Take-off point 1) Existing Rewari Originating Terminal in Haryana (km0.0,253

mt. s AMSL)
Terminal Point Proposed Kanpur Terminal of HPCL in U.P. (km 437 ,128 mt.s
AMSL)
ROU 18 m
Operating Hours 8000Hrs./Annum
Pipeline 45 microns
Roughness
Pipeline 0.5mm
Corrosion
allowance
Pigging Facilities Permanent pigging facilities at Rewari, Mathura, and Kanpur,

suitable for intelligent Pigging shall be provided. Intermediate
pigging stations at Saiyyadpur Pran.
Sub soil 25 C throughout the length of the pipeline.

temperature
Surge Control Suitable surge control/surge relief system shall be provided as per
requirement of codes/ standards( ASME B31.4-2009Edition)
Pipeline Internal protection-Suitable corrosion inhibitor injection system will

corrosion be provided .Also suitable automated system shall be provided for

Page No: 2.4
Palanpur Terminal
protection automated dosing rate.

System
External Protection- Suitable coating shall be provided. Cathodic
Protection by impressed current technique for buried portion of
pipeline will be provided.
Corrosion Corrosion coupons shall be provided as per requirement including

monitoring continuous monitoring of corrosion rate.
system
Sectionalizing Sectionalizing Valve shall be provided as per ASME B 31.4 & OISD
Valve relevant standard.
Design Margin On flow: Nil.
On length: 5%
On elevation difference: 5%
Power supply Power supply shall be taken from SEB.
Battery back up shall be provided at all stations for emergency

loads.
Emergency power by DG sets, UPS supply for instrumentation,

Telecom& SCADA at dispatch and receipt station.
Fire Fighting and Fire Tender and gully suckers will be provided at Bharatpur,
Line Mathura and Kanpur.
maintenance
Terminals Rewari, Bharatpur, Mathura and Kanpur with tap off point and
associated facilities.
States en-route Haryana, Rajasthan &U.P.
2.2.2 PIPELINE ROUTE DESCRIPTION
The pipeline takes off at Rewari in Haryana and terminates at Kanpur in U.P .The length of
the pipeline including main route is given in Table-2.3

Page No: 2.5
Palanpur Terminal
Table-2.3 Length of the Pipeline Sections
SN Section Length(km)
1. Main Line (Rewari to Kanpur ) 437
2.2.3 SUMMARY OF PIPELINE DETAILS
Summary of the various pipeline parameters is given in Table-2.4
Table-2.4 Summary of Pipeline Details
Item Details
Length (km) Main line:437 km,
Line size & thickness 18 and 6.4-7.9 mm.
Pipe Material & Grade Carbon steel
ROU (m) 18m
Throughput 3.17 MMTPA in phase I, (Year 2018-19)and 3.86

MMTPA in phase II (Year 2023-24) .
Burial Depth (m) 1.0 m to 1.2 m.
Pipeline Design Basis ASME B 31.4 and OISD -141
Methods for Horizontal Directional Drilling (HDD), boring and

rail/road/river/canal conventional methods as required.
crossings
Pipeline corrosion Three layers of external PE coating consisting epoxy,

protection measures adhesive and Polyethylene having coating thickness
2.2 -3.5mm shall be provided.
To avoid internal corrosion, corrosion inhibitor is

injected at the rate of 6-12 ppm during product
pumping.

Page No: 2.6
Palanpur Terminal
Cathodic Protection by Impressed Current Cathodic

Protection ( ICCP)system
Communication System Optical Fibre Cable(OFC)based telecom system
Leak Detection & During construction, the welds will be radio graphed
protection system followed by hydro testing to ensure no leakage from
pipe manufacturing source or construction work.
During operation, SCADA with electronic leak

detection soft ware based on pressure flow will be
provided. This will also have necessary detectors to
give necessary alarms and repeating of alarms at
central control room, SCADA system along with
telecommunication system and instrumentation system
shall be supplied power through uninterrupted power
supply source with 12 hours back up. Besides UPS,
Diesel generators will also be installed in case of power
failure for more than 12 hours.
Inspection & Patrolling Periodical Inspection of ROU by Officers, periodical

system inspection of pipeline and coating health and regular
patrolling of ROU by line walkers.
2.2.4 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF TERMINAL
Geographical locations of the Terminal is given in the Table-2.5
Table-2.5 Geographical Locations of the Terminal
Stations RL Lat (N) Long(E) Village District State
(m)
Palanpur 190 2412 7121 Chandisar Banskantha Gujarat
Terminal

Page No: 2.7
Palanpur Terminal
2.2.5 SUMMARY OF STATION DETAILS AT TERMINAL
The summary of Pipeline station details at terminal location including type of station, facilities
provided in the station are given in Table-2.6
Table-2.6 Station Details at Terminal
Station Station Type Facilities Provided
Palanpur Pumping station and associated Product Receipt Facilities. Pig

facilities. Receiving facilities, Metering,
Sump tank, Slop tanks
2.3 FACILITIES PROVIDED AT TERMINAL
Product Pump House, Manifold, Fire water Pump House, Two Tank truck Filling Gantrys,
Calibration Facilities, Electric Room/MCC, D G yard, Transformer Yard, Lube Drum Yard
and Grease Drum Shed, Lube Ware House, Marketing Room, Admin. Building, Control
Room, Amenity, Parking, Sealing Platform, Effluent Treatment Plant, Security & Gate House
checking Platform , Watch Tower (4 Nos), Compound wall, Emergency Gate-1 No., Drivers
Toilet, Foam Tank Shed, Blue Dye Dosing System, Turbo jet Dosing System, Power Dosing
System, Product Storage Tanks.
2.3.1 PUMPING & LOADING FACILITIES AVAILABLE AT PALANPUR TERMINAL
Product Palanpur
HSD BS III 3 X 4800
HSD BSIV 2 X 2400
MS BSIII 3 X 2400
MSBSIV 2 X 2400
SKO 2 X 2400
Slop 2 X 1200

Page No: 2.8
Palanpur Terminal
U/G & HOR 7 X 300
2.3.2 SCHEDULE OF FACILITIES AVAILABLE AT PALANPUR TERMINAL
Item Description Size (M) Area (SQM)
1 Product Pump House 5.5MX49M 269.5
2 Manifold 10MX49M 560
3 Fire water Pump House 19MX7.5M 142.50
4 Tank truck Filling Gantry 42.32MX14.6M 617.87
4A Tank truck Filling Gantry 21.16MX14.6M 308.94
5 Calibration Facilities 12MX8M 96
6 Electric Room/MCC 30MX8M 240
7 D G yard 10MX10M 100
8 Transformer Yard 10MX10M 100
9 Lube Drum Yard and Grease Drum 30MX15M 450

Shed
10 Lube Ware House 30MX15M 450
11 Marketing Room 12MX6M 72
12 Admin. Building, Control Room, 12MX24M 288

Amenity
13 Parking 18MX6M 108
14 Sealing Platform 8MX9.6M 76.8
15 Effluent Treatment Plant 35MX25M 875
16 Security & Gate House checking 4MX5M 20

Platform
17 Watch Tower (4 Nos) 1.2MX1.2M 1.44
18 Compound wall 3M Ht. with Barbed Wire fencing

Page No: 2.9
Palanpur Terminal
19 Emergency Gate-1 No. 6M Wide
20 Drivers Toilet 4.5MX3.25M 14.625
21 Foam Tank Shed 5.0MX4.0M 20.00
22 Blue Dye Dosing System 4MX8M 32

23 Turbo jet Dosing System
24 Power Dosing System
2.3.3 TANK TRUCK LOADING FACILITIES
The Tank Truck loading Gantry consists of loading bays & loading arms. Product wise
distribution of loading arms envisaged in the Gantry of the Terminal is given in Table-2.7
Table-2.7 TT Loading Facilities in Terminal
Terminal No. of No. of Loading Arms for

Loading
HSD BSIII HSD BSIV MS BSIII MS BSIV SKO
Bays
Palanpur 12 8 2 4 3 3
Table 2.8 Salient Features of Existing and Proposed Tankages At Palanpur

Page No: 2.10
Palanpur Terminal
Sr. Item Description Dimension Remarks Existing/

No. No Proposed
1 TF- FRVT 3173.2KL EACH 18M14MHT. API-650 Existing
1,2,3 HSDIII CLASS-B
TF-6 CONVERTED
TF-6 FROM HSD-IV TO III
2 TF-4,5 TANK FRVT 2918.8KL 18M13MHT API-650 Existing
EACH HSD IV CLASS-B
3 TF-7,8 TANK FRVT 2603.8KL 17M13MHT API-650 Existing
EACH MS III-CLASS-A
4 TF- TANK FRVT 3602.4KL 20M13MHT API-650 Existing
9,10 EACH MS IV CLASS A
TF-11
5 TF-12 TANK FRVT 1497.7KL 15M10MHT API-650 Existing
TF-13 EACH SKO CLASS -B
6 TF- TANK FRVT 509.2KL 10M8MHT API-650 Existing
14,15 EACH SLOP CLASS-A/B
7 U/G SUMP VESSELS (7 Existing
No.s) 70 KL EACH
TS-1 MSIII,CLASS-A 3M11MHT As per
TS-2 MSIV, CLASS-A EACH
TS3,4,5 HSD III,HSD IS: 10987-
IV,SKO,CLASS-B 92
TS-6,7 ETHANOL CLASS-A
8 W-1 FIRE WATER TANKS(2 14M15MHT API-650 Existing
W-2 Nos)
ORVT-2228.5-each API-650 Existing
9 W-3 DISPLACEMENT 27.7M15MH API-650 Existing

WATER TANK T
10 TF-16 MSIII,CLASS- 22M14MHT API-650 Proposed
A,FRV,4700KL
11 TF-17 MSIV, CLASS-A,1700 KL 15M13MHT API-650 Proposed
12 TF-18 HSD IV,CLASS-B,3450 20M13MHT API-650 Proposed
KL
2.4 DESIGN BASIS FOR PRODUCTS FACILITIES
2.4.1 PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS
POL Products to be handled/stored are: MS BS III, MS BS I V, HSD BS III, HSD BS IV and

SKO

Page No: 2.11
Palanpur Terminal
2.4.2 STORAGE FACILITIES
The storage facilities are planned to suit the minimum requirement of 1 Batch plus 5 days
off-take at the terminal.
2.4.3 ROAD LOADING/RECEIPT FACILITIES
Product loading in Road tankers is through loading arms. Contingency provision is also
made for unloading of product from road tankers and pumping into respective storage tanks.
2.4.4 APPLICABLE CODES & STANDARDS
Laws Codes & Rules as mandatory under the legislation of India, among others,
but not limited to and due attention shall be paid to the following with amendments
thereof :
a.OISD: Oil Safety Directorate
b. PMPA: Petroleum & Mineral pipeline Act, 1962
c. Railways./ Forest/NH/Other pipeline Terms and conditions applicable.
d. Petroleum Act, 1934 and Rules 2002.
e. MoEF- Ministry of Environment and Forest.
The set of laws- Codes and Rules that have been agreed between HPCL and the
authorities for the implementation of the high pressure system where applicable.
AMSE (ANSI) B 31.4 American Code and relating US code applicable for similar
facilities.
The Rules of good practice commonly used world wide OIL industry.
Table-2.9Applicable Codes & Standards
S.N. Code/Standard Applicable for
1. API 650/ IS803 For above ground storage tanks
2. IS 10987 For underground storage tanks
3. API 5L For product pipes

Page No: 2.12
Palanpur Terminal
4. API 1104 For welding of pipelines and related facilities
5. API 1110 Pressure testing of pipelines
6. OISD 117 For fire fighting facilities
7. OISD 118 Layout of Terminal Depots
8. API 600 Gate Valves
9. API 6D Pressure Balanced Plug Valves
10. BS 5351 Ball Valves
11. ASME B16.9 Pipe Fittings
12. ASME B16.5 Pipe Flanges
13. API 610 Products Pumps
2.5 INSTRUMENTATION, CONTROL & COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
2.5.1 INSTRUMENTATION & AUTOMATION
The major activities will be performed by terminal are the following:
a) Storage facilities for BSIII MS, BS IV MS, BSIII HSD, BS IV HSD, and SKO.
b) Receipt of product through pipeline
c) Road loading facilities
d) Sump & Slop tanks
e) Fire water pumps and make up water system
Full fledged Terminal Automation System (TAS) is envisaged for these units. These include:
a) Tank Farm Management System (TFM)

b) Terminal data management system
c) Bay Queuing
d) Tank Truck loading
TFM Automation

Page No: 2.13
Palanpur Terminal
Tank Farm Management System (TFMS) is a part of Terminal Automation System. Each
tank is provided with Radar type level transmitter, Multi Element averaging temperature
sensor, Water/Product interface measurement and pressure transmitters for density
measurement is also envisaged for additional facilities created at Palanpur. The indication is
available locally in the tank side display unit and in the TAS in the control room.
Underground tanks are provided with Radar type transmitter. Data of the underground tank
are available on the TAS. Volumetric data of each product are also being available as a part
of tank farm management system.
Fire Water Pump Automation
Fire water pumps are diesel engine driven. Pumps are activated by remote manual call
points located at various points in the terminal/depot. If the pressure developed by one pump
drops less than 7 kg/cm2 second pump starts automatically. Three nos. of firewater pumps
are operating. One pump is on stand by. Fire water pump automation is achieved through
PLC. It is possible to operate the pumps manually too locally and from control room.
Make Up Water Pump
Make up water system may be by means of bore well.
2.5.2 SHUT DOWN FEATURES
Emergency shut down is provided in the marketing terminal control room to stop all dispatch
operation.
Emergency push buttons to stop all road loading operations are provided in the
middle gantry.
Emergency push buttons to stop all loading operations in the terminal/depot are
provided in the control room.
2.5.3 COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
Telecommunication system (interfaced with the public address system) along with Plant
Communication System (PCS) is envisaged for the terminals. The communication system
broadly comprises of the following:
1) Telephone exchange equipment and peripherals (EPABX) and Mobile Phones

2) Main Distribution Frame
3) Explosion proof and industrial type telephone instruments.

Page No: 2.14
Palanpur Terminal
2.6 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR TERMINAL
2.6.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The following fire protection facilities are envisaged at terminals as per the requirements of
OISD-117:
a) Fire Water System Pressurized at 7.0 Kg/cm2

b) Foam system
c) First Aid Fire Fighting Equipment and safety accessories
d) Mobile Fire Fighting Equipment
2.6.2 FIRE PROTECTION FACILITIES
1) Fire Water Storage Tanks

2) Fire Water Pumps
3) Fire Water Piping
4) Fire Hydrants
5) Fixed Foam System
6) Water/foam Monitors
7) Fixed Water Spray Systems
8) Mobile Fire Fighting Equipment
9) Portable Extinguishers
The design of the fire water system is based on one single largest risk. Table-2.10 presents
the capacity of firewater tanks and pumps at different locations.
Table-2.10 Fire Water Tanks & Fire Fighting Pumps at Terminal
Terminal Fire Water Tank Fire Water Pumps
Capacity Dia(m) x No. Capacity

Ht(m)
PalanpurTerminal(Existing) 2x2228.5KL 14x15 2W+1S 410m3/hr
*DCP/CO2 extinguishers, water/foam monitors, personnel proactive equipment etc. are

provided as per the prevailing OISD norms.

Page No: 2.15
Palanpur Terminal
2.7 SAFETY, HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT POLICY
Petroleum Industry occupies an important segment of our economy and is a source of large
benefit to the society. In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in volumes handled to
meet the increasing demand. Products such as, Euro III MS, Euro IV MS, Euro III HSD, Euro
IV HSD, SKO and FO are highly flammable, and safety which forms an integral part of the
industry, has always been given paramount importance.
Several Government authorities, both at the centre and state levels such as Inspectorate of
Factories, Department of Explosives etc. are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring
safe handling and accident prevention measures. In spite of the measures, possibility of
accidents either due to human errors and/or due to equipment/system failure cannot be ruled
out. The lessons learnt from the disasters all over the world, made it essential to draw an
Emergency Preparedness Plan to negotiate such eventuality. The imperative of Emergency
Preparedness to minimize the adverse effects due to an unfortunate accident occurring in
manufacture, storage, import and transport of any hazardous substance is thus well
recognized by all concerns.
An Emergency Preparedness Plan is essential to obviate such an eventuality by providing

the measures to contain the incident and minimize the after effects. To assist the Industry it
is considered essential to provide the guidelines for preparing such plans based on the
interactions within the oil industry.
Over the years the oil industry has developed and refined its own directives in the field of
safety, health and environment which are to be followed stringently by their members. In
addition to the environmental legislation, the OISD (Oil Industry Safety Directorate) makes it
mandatory for its members to implement its directives on these issues. HPCL has thus
formulated its own corporate policy on environment and safety which is followed in all its
installations.
Table-2.11 Emergency Preparedness
Emergency communication facility Three independent modes of

communication viz dedicated OFC line and
Land Line and Mobile Telephone are
adequate for communication during any
emergency.

Page No: 2.16
Palanpur Terminal
Copy of Mutual Aid Agreements Will be provided before commissioning.
Emergency Control Will be provided before commissioning.

Structure/organization chart of HPCL Sample control structure/ organization
chart is provided in the Risk Analysis
Report.
List of safety equipment available at Safety equipment like breathing apparatus,

site (e.g. fire proximity suits, SCBAs, safety helmets, rubber gloves, fire
First Aid etc) extinguishers, fire proximity suits, first aid
box will be made available at all control
locations before commissioning as per
OISD guidelines.
Details of emergency control centre Terminal control station at the respective

and standby location. location is designated to act as emergency
control centre. First aid facilities with
ambulance services will be provided to
treat the affected people as and when
need arises or to shift the injured to the
nearby hospitals in case of any
emergency.
The same HSE Policy which is practiced presently by HPCL, will be adopted for
transportation, storage and marketing of proposed petroleum products as well.
2.8 UTILITIES
2.8.1 POWER SUPPLY ARRANGEMENT
Power requirement will be fulfilled from the local grid. Provision for DG set is kept as back up
arrangement for emergency power only. The Estimated Power Requirement is given in table
2.12

Page No: 2.17
Palanpur Terminal
Table:2.12 Power Supply Requirement
Station Requirement (KVA) Source Back up DG sets for Emergency

Power (KVA)
Palanpur 420 66 KV (Grid) 525
(Existing)
2.8.2 MAKE UP WATER SYSTEM
The source of water for the make up water system is bore wells. Water from the bore well is
collected in sump. From the sump water will be pumped by self priming pumps installed on
top of the sump and distributed through a network of buried GI pipes to individual HDPE
overhead tanks of Amenities buildings, Admin building, drivers rest room etc. and to the fire
water storage tanks.
2.8.3 EFFLUENT TREATMENT PLAN (ETP)
The Effluent Treatment Plant receives oily water through a separate drain line connecting
tank farms, TT Gantry area, Pump house manifold area etc. The plant includes a Primary
separation unit consisting of a bar screen, Titled Plate Interceptor and Belt type oil skimmer.
Subsequently Effluent will be pumped to Filtration unit using a multimedia filter and
coalescing filter. The slop oil collected will be pumped to the slop tank. The capacity of the
existing ETP is 75KL/hr at Palanpur terminal.

Page No: 2.18
Chapter 3
Maximum Credible
Accident (MCA) Analysis
3.1 Introduction
Accidental risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident
consisting of an event or sequence of events resulting into fire, explosion or toxic hazards to
human health and environment.
Risk Assessment (RA) provides a numerical measure of the risk that a particular
facility poses to the public. It begins with the identification of probable potential hazardous
events at an industry and categorization as per the predetermined criteria. The
consequences of major credible events are calculated for different combinations of weather
conditions to simulate worst possible scenario. These consequence predictions are
combined to provide numerical measures of the risk for the entire facility.
MCA stands for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident with
maximum damage distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis does not
include quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident. In practice the
selection of accident scenarios for MCA analysis is carried out on the basis of engineering
judgement and expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in accident analysis.
Detailed study helps in plotting the damage contours on the detailed plot plan in
order to assess the magnitude of a particular event. A disastrous situation is the outcome of
fire, explosion or toxic hazards in addition to other natural causes that eventually lead to loss
of life, property and ecological imbalances.
3.1.1 Methodology of MCA Analysis

The MCA analysis involves ordering and ranking of various sections in terms of
potential vulnerability. The data requirements for MCA analysis are:
Operating manual
Flow diagram and P&I diagrams
Detailed design parameters
Physical and chemical properties of all the chemicals
Detailed plant layout
Detailed area layout
Past accident data
Following steps are involved in the MCA analysis:
Identification of potential hazardous sections and representative failure cases
Visualization of release scenarios considering type and the quantity of the

hazardous material
Damage distance computations for the released cases at different wind velocities
and atmospheric stability classes for heat radiations and pressure waves
Drawing of damage contours on plot plan to show the effect due to the accidental
release of chemicals
3.2 Past Accident Data Analysis

Analysis of events arising out of the unsafe conditions is one of the basic
requirements for ensuring safety in any facility. The data required for such an analysis has
either to be generated by monitoring and/or collected from the records of the past
occurrences. This data, when analysed, helps in formulation of the steps towards mitigation
of hazards faced commonly. Trends in safety of various activities can be evaluated and
actions can be planned accordingly, to improve the safety.
Data analysis helps in correlating the causal factors and the corrective steps to be
taken for controlling the accidents. It is, therefore, of vital importance to collect the data
methodically, based on potential incidents, sections involved, causes of failure and the
preventive measures taken. This helps to face future eventualities with more preparedness.

Page No: 3.2
A) November 23, 2003, Crude Oil Tank Explosion

A battery of crude oil tanks exploded on a lease near the intersection of Highway
349 and County Road 300 about 32 km south of Midland, TX. Perenco LLC. According to
the field superintendent for Perenco, an electrical spark caused the fire: We seemed to
have a leak on the lack unit. He said that a lack unit measures how much oil moves
through the tanks and checks oil content. He said that when the pumper checking the lease
turned off the lack unit, an electrical spark set the leaking oil on fire. The workers quickly left
the lease to turn off the 18 wells that sent oil to the tank battery. They were about 400m
away from the battery when it exploded 45 minutes later. He said about 640 barrels of oil;
three stock tanks, three water tanks and associated equipment were destroyed
B) December 20, 2003, Flange Failure Causes Tank Fire

An explosion occurred in a tank at an oil plant, causing a fire which burned for
more than an hour near Houston, TX. at Marcus Oil and Chemical. A spokesman for the
Houston Fire Department said: A flange on the south side of the tank broke or cracked and
let the hot oil out. When in turn hit the atmosphere at 700 degrees, it burst into flames. The
fire department said the blaze was never a considerable danger. No one was ever
evacuated. There was only one minor injury a twisted ankle in the incident. The Houston
Fire Department said this was at least the third time theyve been called to Marcus Oil and
Chemical in the last five or six years.
C) October 29, 2009, Indian oil corporation Ltd, Jaipur

A massive fire broke out on 29th October at an oil storage depot in the western
state of Rajasthan, killing at least 11 people and injuring 135 others. Two huge explosions
were heard before the fire ignited and spread. The fire broke out around 19:30 local time at
the Jaipur storage depot run by Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) Ltd and was visible from over
25 kilometers away, according to reports. Company officials said the depot covers an area
of several square kilometers and the oil tanks store gasoline, diesel and kerosene fuel for
several state-owned oil companies. Reports said the depot had a 100,000-kilolitre capacity.
Initial estimates indicate that products valued at 1.5 billion rupees have been burnt, and the
petroleum stocks were insured.
D) 11 December 2005, the Buncefield Incident, Hemel Hempstead

On Sunday 11 December 2005, a series of explosions and subsequent fire
destroyed large parts of the Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot, Hemel Hempstead,
and caused widespread damage to neighbouring properties. The main explosion took place

Page No: 3.3
at 06.01:32 hours and was of massive proportions. It was followed by a large fire that
engulfed 23 large fuel storage tanks over a high proportion of the Buncefield site. The
incident injured 43 people. Fortunately, no one was seriously hurt and there were no
fatalities. Nevertheless, there was significant damage to both commercial and residential
properties near the Buncefield site. About 2000 people had to be evacuated from their
homes and sections of the M1 motorway were closed. The fire burned for five days,
destroying most of the site and emitting a large plume of smoke into the atmosphere that
dispersed over southern England and beyond.
3.3 Hazard Identification

Identification of hazards is an important step in Risk Assessment as it leads to the
generation of accidental scenarios. The merits of including the hazard for further
investigation are subsequently determined by its significance, normally using a cut-off or
threshold quantity.
Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to evaluate it in terms of the

risk it presents to the employees and the neighbouring community. In principle, both
probability and consequences should be considered, but there are occasions where it either
the probability or the consequence can shown to be sufficiently low or sufficiently high,
decisions can be made on just one factor.
During the hazard identification component, the following considerations are taken
into account.
Chemical identities
Location of process unit facilities for hazardous materials.
The types and design of process units
The quantity of material that could be involved in an airborne release and
The nature of the hazard (e.g. airborne toxic vapours or mists, fire, explosion,
large quantities stored or processed handling conditions) most likely to
accompany hazardous materials spills or releases

Page No: 3.4
3.3.1 Fire and Explosion Index (FEI)

Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) is useful in identification of areas in which the
potential risk reaches a certain level. It estimates the global risk associated with a process
unit and classifies the units according to their general level of risk. FEI covers aspects
related to the intrinsic hazard of materials, the quantities handled and operating conditions.
This factor gives index value for the area which could be affected by an accident, the
damage to property within the area and the working days lost due to accidents. The method
for evaluation of FEI involves following stages.
Selection of pertinent process unit which can have serious impact on plant safety
Determination of Material Factor (MF): This factor for a given substance in the
process unit gives intrinsic potential to release energy in case of fire or an
explosion. Material Factor can be directly obtained from Dows Fire and
Explosion Index Hazard classification Guide of American Institute of Chemical
Engineers, New York. The factor can also be evaluated from NFPA indices of
danger, health, flammability and reactivity.
Determination of Unit Hazard Factor: The Unit Hazard Factor is obtained by

multiplication of General Process Hazard (GPH) factor and Special Process
Hazard (SPH) factor. GPH factor is computed according to presence of
exothermic reactions and loading and unloading operations. The penalties due
to each of these reactions / operations are summed up to compute GPH
factor. Similarly, SPH factor can be evaluated for the operations close to
flammable range or pressures different from atmospheric. Penalties of these
operations for both factors can be obtained from Dows EFI index form.
Fire and explosion index is then calculated as the product of Material Factor (MF)
and Unit Hazard Factor. Degree of hazards based on FEI is given in the following Table 3.1.

Page No: 3.5
Table 3.1
Degree of Hazards Based on FEI
FEI Range Degree of Hazard

0 60 Light
61-96 Moderate
97 - 127 Intermediate
128 - 158 Heavy
159 and Above Severe
Source: Dows Fire and Explosion Index Hazard Classification Guide, Seventh
Edition, AIChE Technical Manual (1994)
Preventive and protective control measures are recommended based on degree

of hazard. Therefore, FEI indicates the efforts to be taken to reduce risks for a particular unit.
FEI computed for various process equipments are presented
in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2
Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) for Process Units
Sr. Tank No Unit Name FEI Category

No.
1 TF-1-3,6 HSD (3173.2KL) 34.23 Light

2 TF-4,5 HSD (2918.8KL) 34.20 Light
3 TF-7, 8 MS (2603.8KL) 60.8 Moderate
4 TF-9,10,11 MS (3602.4KL) 60.8 Moderate
5 TF-12,13 SKO (1497.7KL) 34.20 Light
7 TS-1 MS (70KL) 52.59 Light
9 TS-3,4,5 HSD (70KL) 29.07 Light
11 TS-6,7 ETHANOL (70KL) 52.63 Light
11 TF-16 MS (4700KL) 60.8 Moderate

12 TF-17 MS (1700KL) 60.8 Moderate
13 TF-18 HSD (3450KL) 34.20 Light

Page No: 3.6
3.4 MCA Analysis

MCA analysis encompasses defined techniques to identify the hazards and
compute the consequent effects in terms of damage distances due to heat radiation, toxic
releases, vapour cloud explosion etc. A list of probable or potential accidents of the major
units in the complex arising due to use, storage and handling of the hazardous materials are
examined to establish their credibility. Depending upon the effective hazardous attributes
and their impact on the event, the maximum effect on the surrounding environment and the
respective damage caused can be assessed. Flow chart of accidental release of hazardous
chemicals is presented
in Fig. 3.1.
Hazardous substance, on release can cause damage on a large scale. The extent
of the damage is dependent upon the nature of the release and the physical state of the
material. In the present report the consequences for flammable hazards are considered and
the damages caused due to such releases are assessed with recourse to MCA analysis.
Flammable substances on release may cause Jet fire and less likely unconfined
vapour cloud explosion causing possible damage to the surrounding area. The extent of
damage depends upon the nature of the release. The release of flammable materials and
subsequent ignition result in heat radiation wave or vapour cloud depending upon the
flammability and its physical state. Damage distances due to release of hazardous materials
depend on atmospheric stability and wind speed. It is important to visualize the
consequence of the release of such substances and the damage caused to the surrounding
areas. Computation of damage distances are carried out at various atmospheric stability
conditions for various wind velocities and the result is tabulated. Pasquill-Giffard atmospheric
stability classes with corresponding weather conditions are listed in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3
Pasquill Giffard Atmospheric Stability
Sr. Stability Weather Conditions
No. Class
1. A Very unstable sunny, light wind
2. A/B Unstable - as with A only less sunny or more windy
3. B Unstable - as with A/B only less sunny or more windy
4. B/C Moderately unstable moderate sunny and moderate wind
5. C Moderately unstable very windy / sunny or overcast / light wind
6. C/D Moderate unstable moderate sun and high wind

Page No: 3.7
7. D Neutral little sun and high wind or overcast / windy night

8. E Moderately stable less overcast and less windy night thand
9. F Stable night with moderate clouds and light / moderate wind
10. G Very stable possibly fog
Source: Hanna , S. R. and Drivas, P. J. (1996) Guidelines for Use of Vapour Cloud
Dispersion Models. AIChE, CCPS, New York
3.4.1 Fire, Explosion and Toxic Scenarios

Combustible materials within their flammable limits may ignite and burn if exposed
to an ignition source of sufficient energy. On process plants, this normally occurs as a result
of a leakage or spillage. Depending on the physical properties of the material and the
operating parameters, the combustion of material in a plant may take on a number of forms
like jet fire, flash fire and pool fire.
3.4.1.1 Jet Fire

Jet fire occurs when flammable material of a high exit velocity ignites. In process
industries this may be due to design (flares) or an accidental. Ejection of flammable material
from a vessel, pipe or pipe flange may give rise to a jet fire and in some instances the jet
flame could have substantial reach. Depending on wind speed, the flame may tilt and
impinge on pipeline, equipment or structures. The thermal radiation from these fires may
cause injury to people or damage equipment some distance from the source of the flames.
3.4.1.2 Flash Fire

A flash fire is the non-explosive combustion of a vapour cloud resulting from a
release of flammable material into the open air, which after mixing with air, ignites. A flash
fire results from the ignition of a released flammable cloud in which there is essentially no
increase in combustion rate. The ignition source could be electric spark, a hot surface, and
friction between moving parts of a machine or an open fire.
Flash fire may occur due to its less vapour temperature than ambient temperature.
Hence, as a result of a spill, they are dispersed initially by the negative buoyancy of cold
vapours and subsequently by the atmospheric turbulence. After the release and dispersion
of the flammable fuel the resulting vapour cloud is ignited and when the fuel vapour is not
mixed with sufficient air prior to ignition, it results in diffusion fire burning. Therefore the rate
at which the fuel vapour and air are mixed together during combustion determines the rate of
burning in the flash fire.

Page No: 3.8
The main dangers of flash fire are radiation and direct flame contact. The size of
the flammable cloud determines the area of possible direct flame contact effects. Radiation
effects on a target depend on several factors including its distance from the flames, flame
height, flame emissive power, local atmospheric transitivity and cloud size. Most of the time,
flash combustion lasts for no more than a few seconds.
3.4.1.3 Vapour Cloud Explosion

The Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) begins with a release of a large quantity of
flammable vaporizing liquid or gas from a storage tank, transport vessel or pipeline
producing a dangerous overpressure. These explosions follow a well-determined pattern.
There are basically four features, which must be present for an effective vapour cloud
explosion to occur with an effective blast. These are:
First, the release material must be flammable and at a suitable condition of

temperature and pressure which depends on the chemical. The materials which come under
this category, range from liquefied gases under pressure (e.g. butane, propane); ordinary
flammable liquids (e.g. cyclohexane, naphtha) to non liquefied flammable gases (e.g.
ethylene, acetylene)
Second, before the ignition, a cloud of sufficient size must have been formed.
Normally ignition delays of few minutes are considered the most probable for generating the
vapour cloud explosions
Third, a sufficient amount of the cloud must be within the flammable range of the
material to cause extensive overpressure
Fourth, the flame speed determines the blast effects of the vapour cloud
explosions, which can vary greatly
The flammable content of a gas cloud is calculated by three-dimensional

integration of the concentration profiles, which fall within the flammable limits. If the gas
cloud ignites, two situations can occur, namely non-explosive combustion (flash fire) and
explosive combustion (flash fire + explosion).
3.4.1.4 Pool Fire

Vapors of flammable liquids when spilled outside due to leak in the storage tank or
process unit can give rise to a flammable mixture with air which when ignited is called as
pool fire. Burning of the spilled liquid can affect the other surrounding units. Main hazards of
pool fire are due to the heat radiations generated.
Page No: 3.9
3.4.1.5 Lower and Upper Flammability Limit

In case of any spillage and leakages of hydrocarbons / flammable material,
probability of getting ignited is depending on whether the air borne mixture is in the
flammable region. The Lower flammability limit corresponds to minimum proportion of
combustible vapour in air for combustion. The Upper flammability limit Correspond to
maximum proportion of combustible vapour in air for combustion and the concentration
range lying between the lower and the upper limit is called as flammable range.

Page No: 3.10
Release of
Chemical
Continuous
Instantaneous
Bottom Top
Two Phase
Liquid
Outflow
No
Ignition Pool
Formation Vapours
Yes Yes
Yes Ignition ? Flare
Ignition ? Pool Fire
No No
Detonation Evaporation
Dispersion
Vapour Cloud
Formation
No
Toxicity Ignition ?
Yes
Vapour Cloud
Explosion
Pressure Heat
Wave Radiation
TOXICITY
COMPUTATION CONSEQUENCE MODELLING
Fig. 3.1: Accidental Release of Chemicals: A Scenario

Page No: 3.11
3.4.2 Models for the Calculation of Heat load and Shock Waves
If a flammable gas or liquid is released, damage resulting from heat radiation or
explosion may occur on ignition. Models used in this study for the effects in the event of
immediate ignition (torch and pool fire) and the ignition of a gas cloud will be discussed in
succession. These models calculate the heat radiation or peak overpressure as a function of
the distance from the torch, the ignited pool or gas cloud. The physical significance of the
various heat loads is depicted in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4
List of Damages Envisaged at Various Heat Loads
Sr. Heat loads Type of Damage Intensity

No. (kW/m)
Damage to Equipment Damage to People
1 37.5 Damage to process equipment 100% lethality in 1 min. 1%
lethality in 10 sec
2 25.0 Minimum energy required to ignite 50% Lethality in 1 min.
wood Significant injury in 10 sec
3 19.0 Maximum thermal radiation --
intensity allowed on thermally
unprotected equipment
4 12.5 Minimum energy required to melt 1% lethality in 1 min
plastic tubing
5 4.0 -- First degree burns, causes pain
for exposure longer than 10 sec
6 1.6 -- Causes no discomfort on long
exposures
Source: World Bank (1988). Technical Report No. 55: Techniques for Assessing
Industrial Hazards. , Washington, D.C: The World Bank.
3.4.3 Model for Pressure Wave

A pressure wave can be caused by gas cloud explosion. The following damage
criteria are assumed as a result of the peak overpressure of a pressure wave:
0.03 bar over pressure wave is taken as the limit for the occurrence of wounds as
a result of flying fragments of glass

Page No: 3.12
Following assumptions are used to translate an explosion in terms of damage to

the surrounding area:
Within the contour area of the exploding gas cloud, Casualties are due to
burns or asphyxiation. Houses and buildings in this zone will be severely
damaged.
In houses with serious damage, it is assumed that one out of eight persons
present will be killed as a result of the building collapse. Within the zone of
a peak over pressure of 0.3 bar the risk of death in houses is 0.9 x 1/8 =
0.1125, and in the zone with a peak over pressure of 0.1 bar the
probability of death is 0.1 x 1/8 = 0.0125, i.e. one out of eighty people will
be killed.
The significance of the peak over pressure 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar, 0.03 bar and 0.01 bar
are depicted in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5
Damage Criteria for Pressure Waves
Human Injury Structural Damage
Peak Over Type of Peak Over Type of Damage
Pressure (bar) Damage Pressure (bar)
5-8 100% lethality 0.3 Heavy (90% damage)
3.5-5 50% lethality 0.1 Repairable (10% damage)
2-3 Threshold 0.03 Damage of Glass
lethality
1.33-2 Severe lung 0.01 Crack of windows
damage
1-1.33 50% Eardrum - -
rupture
Source: Marshall, V.C. (1977) How lethal are explosives and toxic escapes.
3.4.4 Vulnerability Models

Vulnerability models are used in order to determine how people are injured by
exposure to heat load. Such models are designed on the basis of animal experiments or on
the basis of the analysis of injuries resulting from accidents, which have occurred.

Page No: 3.13
Vulnerability models often make use of a probit function. In this function, a link is made
between the heat load and the percentage of people exposed to a particular type of injury.
It is assumed that everyone inside the area covered or gas cloud will be burnt to
death or will asphyxiate. Human fatality is a function of heat flux and exposure time. The
probit expressions for the prediction of mortality due tot thermal radiation from fire scenarios
are proportional to the product of t and q4/3. The probit equation usually used is that
proposed by Eisenberg and coworkers*
Pr = -14.9 + 2.56 In (10-4 q4/3 t)
In which,
Pr = Probit the measure of the percentage of people exposed to a particular injury
t = exposure time in seconds
q = thermal load in W/m
For 1% lethality in the exposed persons the corresponding probit value is 2.67.
Table 3.6 gives time is seconds for percentage of fatality at various heat radiations.
Table 3.6
Range of Thermal Flux Levels and their Potential Effects
Heat Flux Seconds Exposure For % Fatality

(kW/m)
1% 50% 99%
1.6 500 1300 3200
4 150 370 930
12.5 30 80 200
37.5 8 20 50
*Eisenberg, N. A., Lynch C. J. and Breeding, R. J. (1975) Vulnerability Model. A

Simulation System for Assessing Damage Resulting from Marine Spills. National Technology
Information Service Report AD-A015-245, Springfield, MA

Page No: 3.14
3.5 Computation of Damage Distances

Damage distances for the accidental release of hazardous materials have been
computed at 2F, 3D and 5D weather conditions. In these conditions, 2, 3 and 5 are wind
velocities in m/s and F and D are atmospheric stability classes. These weather conditions
have been selected to accommodate worst case scenarios to get maximum effective
distances. DNV based PHAST Micro 6.51 software has been used to carry out
consequence analysis. Damage distances computed for fire and explosion scenarios for the
various storage tanks in Palanpur Terminal are described below.
Jet Fire
This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50 mm in
MS tank with capacity 4700KL at various heat radiation levels under the different
atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distance due to 50 mm leak
for stability class 2F is 49.81 m at heat load of 4.0 KW/m and the corresponding damage
contour is shown in Fig.3.2.
The computed damage distances for other process units for 25 mm and 50 mm
leak sizes at heat loads of 37.5 KW/m, 12.5 KW/m and 4.0 kW/m are given in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7
Consequence Analysis for Jet Fire Scenario
Scenario Leak Source Weathe Damage Distance (m) for

Considered Leak Size Strength r Various Heat Loads
(mm) (kg/sec) 37.5 12.5 4.0
kW/m kW/m kW/m
Tank TF 1,2,3,6 25 4.11 2F - - -
Material - HSD 3D - - -
Capacity -3173.2KL
5D - - -
50 16.44 2F - - -
3D - - -
5D - - -
Tank TF4,5 25 3.95 2F - - -
Capacity -2918.8KL
5D - - -
50 15.80 2F - - -
3D - - -
5D - - -

Page No: 3.15

(mm) (kg/sec) 37.5 12.5 4.0
kW/m kW/m kW/m
Tank - tf-7,8 25 3.13 2F - 30.08 31.53
Material - MS 3D - 31.03 32.53
Capacity -2603.8KL
5D - 31.92 33.47
50 12.53 2F 44.45 46.22 48.91
3D 47.01 48.83 51.63
5D 49.79 51.72 54.77
Tank - tf-9,10,11 25 3.13 2F - 30.08 31.53
Material - MS 3D - 31.03 32.53
Capacity -3602.4KL
5D - 31.92 33.47
50 12.53 2F 44.45 46.22 48.91
3D 47.01 48.83 51.63
5D 49.79 51.72 54.77
Tank - tf-12,13 25 3.20 2F - - -
Material - SKO 3D - - -
Capacity -1497.7KL
5D - - -
50 12.83 2F - - 14.14
3D - - 15.35
5D - - 16.62
Tank - ts- 1 25 2.86 2F - 28.52 29.87
Material - MS 3D - 29.41 30.80
Capacity -70KL
5D - 30.44 31.89
50 11.44 2F 42.72 44.37 46.78
3D 44.63 46.35 48.91
5D 47.18 48.98 51.76
Tank - tf-3,4,5 25 3.60 2F - - -
Capacity -70KL
5D - - -
50 14.42 2F - - -
3D - - -
5D - - -
Tank - tf-6,7 25 3.55 2F - - 17.67
Material - MS 3D - - 18.76
Capacity -70KL
5D - - 19.47
50 14.20 2F - - 26.83
3D - 26.90 28.35
Page No: 3.16

(mm) (kg/sec) 37.5 12.5 4.0
kW/m kW/m kW/m
5D - 29.09 30.34
Tank - tf-16 25 3.26 2F - 30.78 32.27
Material - MS 3D - 31.69 33.23
Capacity -4700KL
5D - 32.71 34.32
50 13.05 2F 45.15 46.98 49.81
3D 48.25 50.12 53.05
5D 51.05 53.05 56.24
Tank - tf-17 25 3.13 2F - 30.08 31.53
Material - MS 3D - 31.03 32.53
Capacity -1700KL
5D - 31.92 33.47
50 12.53 2F 44.45 46.22 48.91
3D 47.01 48.83 51.63
5D 49.79 51.72 54.77
Tank - tf-18 25 3.95 2F - - -
Capacity -3450KL
5D - - -
50 15.80 2F - - -
3D - - -
5D - - -
Tank - tf- 3,4,5 25 3.60 2F - - -
Capacity -70KL
5D - - -
50 14.42 2F - - -
3D - - -
5D - - -

Page No: 3.17
Fig. 3.2: Damage Contour for Jet Fire due to 50 mm leak in MS Tank (Tf-16) at 2F
weather condition

Page No: 3.18
Pool Fire
This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50 mm in
HSD tank of capacity 2918.8KL for various heat radiation levels under the different
atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distance due to 25 mm leak
for stability class 2F is 14.72 m at heat load of 37.5 KW/m condition and the corresponding
damage contour is shown in Fig.3.3.
The computed damage distances for other process units for 25 mm and 50 mm
leak sizes at heat loads of 37.5 KW/m, 12.5 KW/m and 4.0 kW/m are given in Table 3.8.
Damage contour for other storage tanks are shown in Fig. 3.4 to Fig. 3.6
Table 3.8
Consequence Analysis for Pool Fire Scenario
Scenario Leak Source Pool Weat Damage Distance (m) for

Considered Size Strength Radius her Various Heat Loads
(mm) (kg/sec) (m) 37.5 12.5 4.0
kW/m kW/m kW/m
Tank TF 1,2,3,6 25 4.11 7..89 2F 15.08 24.66 41.03
Material - HSD 3D 15.09 26.67 42.17
Capacity -
3173.2KL 5D 15.34 29.49 43.48
50 16.44 15.79 2F - 25.66 53.05
3D - 26.54 55.97
5D - 28.11 59.63
Catastro - 22.56 2F - 26.98 60.64
phic 3D - 27.69 64.78
Rupture
5D - 30.86 71.6
Tank TF4,5 25 3.95 7.74 2F 14.72 24.49 40.56
Material - HSD 3D 14.73 26.52 41.66
Capacity -
2918.8KL 5D 15.73 30.13 43.77
50 15.80 15.48 2F - 25.15 52.37
3D - 26.16 55.13
5D - 27.56 58.51
Catastro - 22.56 2F - 34.07 67.72
phic 3D - 33.49 70.57
Rupture
5D - 40.00 80.73
Tank - tf-7.8 25 3.13 6.31 2F 12.57 22.02 41.72
Material - MS 3D 12.49 24.01 43.32
Capacity -
5D 12.79 27.07 44.91
Page No: 3.19

(mm) (kg/sec) (m) 37.5 12.5 4.0
kW/m kW/m kW/m
2603.8KL 50 12.53 13.08 2F - 22.84 52.90
3D - 24.05 57.49
5D - 25.35 62.47
Catastro - 25.23 2F - 33.16 75.00
phic 3D - 32.76 81.43
Rupture
5D - 37.67 95.03
Tank - tf-9,10,11 25 3.13 6.31 2F 12.57 22.02 41.72
Material - MS 3D 12.49 24.01 43.32
Capacity -
3602.4KL 5D 12.79 27.07 44.91
50 12.53 13.08 2F - 22.84 52.90
3D - 24.05 57.49
5D - 25.35 62.47
Catastro - 25.23 2F - 34.59 76.42
phic 3D - 33.87 82.54
Rupture
5D - 39.52 96.88
Tank - tf-12,13 25 3.04 6.94 2F 12.88 23.84 41.48
Material - SKO 3D 12.98 26.19 42.94
Capacity -
1497.7KL 5D 12.98 29.14 44.23
50 12.17 13.92 2F - 23.46 51.83
3D - 24.97 55.66
5D - 26.52 59.73
Catastro - 22.56 2F - 28.86 65.49
phic 3D - 29.14 70.32
Rupture
5D - 33.14 79.77
Tank - ts- 1 25 2.86 6.05 2F 12.00 21.73 40.75
Material - MS 3D 11.98 23.88 42.27
Capacity -70KL
5D 11.89 26.50 43.30
50 11.44 12.54 2F - 22.08 51.67
3D - 23.02 55.77
5D - 25.23 61.30
Catastro - 63.22 2F - 64.90 141.54
phic 3D - 64.25 152.94
Rupture
5D - 65.30 170.48
Tank - tf-3,4,5 25 3.60 7.39 2F 13.96 24.11 39.56

Page No: 3.20

(mm) (kg/sec) (m) 37.5 12.5 4.0
kW/m kW/m kW/m
Material - HSD 3D 13.96 26.15 40.56
Capacity -70KL
5D 13.95 28.61 41.66
50 14.42 14.79 2F - 24.21 50.54
3D - 25.56 53.62
5D - 26.88 56.66
Catastro - 66.98 2F - 68.96 137.42
phic 3D - 68.98 145.82
Rupture
5D - 70.76 157.09
Tank - ts-6,7 25 3.55 6.92 2F 23.84 34.72 52.11
Material - Ethanol 3D 24.84 35.06 51.83
Capacity -70KL
5D 26.12 35.79 51.42
50 14.20 13.99 2F 38.86 58.18 88.71
3D 40.57 58.58 88.46
5D 42.99 60.08 88.11
Catastro - 62.85 2F 119.81 186.01 288.46
phic 3D 125.28 188.19 289.46
Rupture
5D 132.1 191.18 289.55
Tank - tf-16 25 3.26 6.42 2F 12.89 22.22 42.21
Material - MS 3D 12.74 24.14 43.81
Capacity -4700KL
5D 12.90 26.91 45.30
50 13.05 13.32 2F - 23.25 53.54
3D - 24.58 58.31
5D - 25.75 63.35
Catastro - 34.66 2F - 45.63 96.93
phic 3D - 44.28 104.27
Rupture
5D - 50.85 121.83
Tank - tf-17 25 3.13 6.31 2F 12.57 22.02 41.72
Material - MS 3D 12.49 24.01 43.32
Capacity -1700KL
5D 12.79 27.07 44.91
50 12.53 13.08 2F - 22.84 52.90
3D - 24.05 57.49
5D - 25.35 62.47
Catastro - 34.66 2F - 41.07 92.36
phic 3D - 40.70 100.69

Page No: 3.21

(mm) (kg/sec) (m) 37.5 12.5 4.0
kW/m kW/m kW/m
Rupture 5D - 44.88 115.87
Tank - tf-18 25 3.95 7.74 2F 14.72 24.49 40.56
Material - HSD 3D 14.73 26.52 41.66
Capacity -3450KL
5D 15.73 30.13 43.77
50 15.80 15.48 2F - 25.15 52.37
3D - 26.16 55.13
5D - 27.56 58.51
Catastro - 34.66 2F - 49.48 93.46
phic 3D - 47.49 96.99
Rupture
5D - 56.51 111.26
Tank - tf- 3,4,5 25 3.60 7.12 2F 13.27 23.92 42.03
Material - SKO 3D 13.37 26.33 43.55
Capacity -70KL
5D 13.45 29.35 44.91
50 14.42 14.29 2F - 23.77 52.53
3D - 25.17 56.46
5D - 26.63 60.55
Catastro - 66.82 2F - 68.61 142.53
phic 3D - 68.66 153.09
Rupture
5D - 69.98 167.27

Page No: 3.22
Fig. 3.3: Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 25 mm leak in HSD Tank (Tf-4) at 2F
weather condition
Fig. 3.4: Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 25 mm leak in MS Tank
(Tf-9,10,11) at 2F weather condition

Page No: 3.23
Fig. 3.5: Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 50mm leak in SKO Tank
(Tf-12,13) at 2F weather condition
Fig. 3.6: Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 50mm leak in Ethanol Tank
(Ts-6,7) at 5D weather condition
Page No: 3.24
Flash Fire
This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50 mm and
catastrophic rupture of HSD tank of capacity 313.2KL for LFL concentrations under the
different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distances due to 50
mm leak are 7.15 m, 7.05 m and 7.60 m for stability classes 2F, 3D and 5D conditions
respectively. The computed damage distances for other process units at LFL distances are
given in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9
Consequence Analysis for Flash Fire Scenario
Scenario Considered LFL Leak Source Weathe LFL
Concentrati Size Strength r Distance
on (ppm) (mm) (kg/sec) (m)
Tank TF 1,2,3,6 5000 25 4.11 2F 6.17
Material - HSD 3D 6.18
Capacity -3173.2KL
5D 6.37
50 16.44 2F 7.15
3D 7.05
5D 7.60
Catastrop - 2F 23.99
hic 3D 24.06
Rupture
5D 26.14
Tank TF4,5 5000 25 3.95 2F 5.96
Capacity -2918.8KL
5D 6.95
50 15.80 2F 6.94
3D 6.74
5D 7.10
hic 3D 44.25
Rupture
5D 48.03
Tank - tf-7.8 10500 25 3.13 2F 38.42
Material - MS 3D 35.00
Capacity -2603.8KL
5D 26.91
50 12.53 2F 62.21
3D 57.49
5D 46.21

Page No: 3.25

hic 3D 300.87
Rupture
5D 297.00
Tank - tf-9,10,11 10500 25 3.13 2F 38.42
Capacity -3602.4KL
5D 26.91
50 12.53 2F 62.21
3D 57.49
5D 46.21
hic 3D 343.05
Rupture
5D 335.28
Tank - tf-12,13 7000 25 3.04 2F 4.94
Material - SKO 3D 5.04
Capacity -1497.7KL
5D 5.05
50 12.17 2F 7.05
3D 7.17
5D 6.74
hic 3D 27.82
Rupture
5D 30.93
Tank - ts- 1 10500 25 2.86 2F 36.33
Capacity -70KL
5D 26.95
50 11.44 2F 57.83
3D 53.16
5D 44.01
hic 3D 109.15
Rupture
5D 100.56
Tank - tf-3,4,5 5000 25 3.60 2F 5.55
Capacity -70KL
5D 5.54
50 14.42 2F 6.12
3D 6.37
5D 6.58
Page No: 3.26

hic 3D 10.83
Rupture
5D 11.44
Tank - tf-6,7 43000 25 3.55 2F 5.64
Capacity -70KL
5D 5.44
50 14.20 2F 11.49
3D 11.42
5D 11.03
hic 3D 9.63
Rupture
5D 10.15
Tank - tf-16 10500 25 3.26 2F 39.21
Capacity -4700KL
5D 27.48
50 13.05 2F 64.84
3D 59.21
5D 48.17
hic 3D 384.64
Rupture
5D 372.92
Tank - tf-17 10500 25 3.13 2F 38.42
Capacity -1700KL
5D 26.91
50 12.53 2F 62.21
3D 57.49
5D 46.21
hic 3D 260.24
Rupture
5D 254.85
Tank - tf-18 5000 25 3.95 2F 5.96
Capacity -3450KL
5D 6.95
50 15.80 2F 6.94
3D 6.74
5D 7.10
Page No: 3.27

hic 3D 52.74
Rupture
5D 60.41
Tank - tf- 3,4,5 7000 25 3.60 2F 5.55
Material - SKO 3D 5.56
Capacity -70KL
5D 5.54
50 14.42 2F 6.12
3D 6.37
5D 6.58
hic 3D 10.83
Rupture
5D 11.44

Page No: 3.28
Vapor Cloud Explosion

This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm, 50 mm and
catastrophic rupture of SKO tank of capacity 1497.7KL at various overpressure waves under
the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distance due to
50 mm leak at stability class 5D is 24.29 m for overpressure wave of 0.03 bar and damage
contour is shown in Fig. 3.7. The computed damage distances for other Storage Tanks are
given in Table 3.10.
Table 3.10
Consequence Analysis for VCE Scenario
Scenario Leak Size Source Weathe Damage Distance (m)
Considered (mm) Strength r
(kg/sec) 0.03ba 0.1bar 0.3bar
r
Tank tf 1,2,3,6 25 4.11 2F - - -
Capacity -3173.2KL
5D - - -
50 16.44 2F - - -
3D - - -
5D - - -
Catastrophic - 2F 403.97 183.75 101.76
Rupture 3D 410.50 186.54 103.16
5D 409.06 185.92 102.85
Tank tf4,5 25 3.95 2F - - -
Capacity -2918.8KL
5D - - -
50 15.80 2F - - -
3D - - -
5D - - -
Catastrophic - 2F 837.92 380.29 209.92
Rupture 3D 860.04 389.72 214.63
5D 846.59 383.99 211.76
Tank - tf-7,8 25 3.13 2F 111.27 76.13 63.04
Material - MS 3D 70.19 52.87 46.42
Capacity -2603.8KL
5D 73.77 54.40 47.19
50 12.53 2F 157.92 110.91 95.43
3D 141.39 100.44 85.20
5D 112.07 82.21 71.09

Page No: 3.29

r
Catastrophic - 2F 957.91 628.26 513.36
Rupture 3D 899.52 574.94 468.75
5D 868.72 542.61 447.09
Tank - tf-9,10,11 25 3.13 2F 111.27 76.13 63.04
Material - MS 3D 70.19 52.87 46.42
Capacity -3602.4KL
5D 73.77 54.40 47.19
50 12.53 2F 157.92 110.91 95.43
3D 141.39 100.44 85.20
5D 112.07 82.21 71.09
Catastrophic - 2F 1072.8 708.52 581.45
Rupture 3D 1007.1 649.34 530.73
5D 982.4 610.68 504.14
Tank - tf-12,13 25 3.04 2F - - -
Capacity -1497.7KL
5D - - -
50 12.17 2F 21.40 14.86 12.42
3D 23.27 15.65 12.82
5D 24.29 16.09 13.04
Catastrophic - 2F - - -
Rupture 3D - - -
5D - - -
Tank - ts- 1 25 2.86 2F 81.42 57.66 48.82
Material - MS 3D 75.37 55.08 47.53
Capacity -70KL
5D 74.97 54.91 47.44
50 11.44 2F 178.78 116.39 93.16
3D 143.97 101.54 85.75
5D 117.68 84.59 72.28
Rupture 3D - - -
5D - - -
Tank - tf-3,4,5 25 3.60 2F - - -
Capacity -70KL
5D - - -
50 14.42 2F - - -
3D - - -

Page No: 3.30

r
5D - - -
Catastrophic - 2F 226.56 102.36 56.11
Rupture 3D 237.92 107.20 58.53
5D 237.01 106.81 58.34
Tank - ts-6,7 25 3.55 2F 21.52 14.91 12.45
Material - Ethanol 3D 22.91 15.50 12.75
Capacity -70KL
5D - - -
50 14.20 2F 46.91 37.21 33.60
3D 36.61 27.08 23.53
5D 37.24 27.35 23.67
Catastrophic - 2F 302.32 134.67 72.25
Rupture 3D 43.57 24.32 17.15
5D 310.75 138.26 74.04
Tank - tf-16 25 3.26 2F 111.78 76.34 63.15
Material - MS 3D 70.99 53.21 46.59
Capacity -4700KL
5D 73.06 54.10 47.04
50 13.05 2F 186.90 125.59 102.76
3D 162.51 115.19 97.57
5D 139.90 99.81 84.88
Catastrophic - 2F 1187.2 790.19 651.66
Rupture 3D 1112.5 721.51 592.58
5D 1068.3 676.05 560.47
Tank - tf-17 25 3.13 2F 111.27 76.13 63.04
Material - MS 3D 70.19 52.87 46.42
Capacity -1700KL
5D 73.77 54.40 47.19
50 12.53 2F 157.92 110.91 95.43
3D 141.39 100.44 85.20
5D 112.07 82.21 71.09
Catastrophic - 2F 838.97 547.96 446.55
Rupture 3D 779.29 496.99 404.98
5D 760.63 469.29 387.99
Tank - tf-18 25 3.95 2F - - -
Capacity -3450KL
5D - - -
50 15.80 2F - - -

Page No: 3.31

r
3D - - -
5D - - -
Rupture 3D - - -
5D - - -
Tank - ts- 3,4,5 25 3.60 2F - - -
Capacity -70KL
5D - - -
50 14.42 2F 21.40 14.83 12.42
3D 23.27 15.65 12.82
5D 24.29 16.09 13.04
Rupture 3D - - -
5D - - -
Fig. 3.7: Damage Contour for VCE due to 50mm leak in SKO Tank
(Tf-12,13) at 5D weather condition

Page No: 3.32
Chapter 4
Risk Mitigation Measures

4.1 Introduction
The scope of the study covers mitigation measures based on Maximum
Credible Accident (MCA) Analysis. The Fire and Explosion Indices were computed for the
identification and screening of vulnerable sections and consequence analysis was carried
out for the accidental release scenarios of hazardous chemicals at various atmospheric
conditions. The following are general and specific mitigation measures
4.1.1 General Recommendations

Fire prevention and code enforcement is one of the major areas of
responsibility for the fire service. Following are the general recommendations for the
proposed facility
Facility should be equipped with the following fire fighting systems
Water supply
Fire hydrant and monitor nozzle installation
Foam system
Water fog and sprinkler system
Mobile Fire fighting equipment
Surrounding population (includes all strata of society) should be made aware of

the safety precautions to be taken in the event of any mishap within the facility.
This can effectively be done by conducting the safety training programs
Safety escape routes should be provided at strategic locations and should be

easily accessible
Critical switches and alarm should be always kept in line
A wind direction pointer should also be installed at the site, so that in an

emergency the wind direction can be directly seen and downwind population
cautioned
Shut off and isolation valves should be easily approachable in emergencies
Periodical mock drills should be conducted so as to check the alertness and

efficiency of the DMP and EPP and records should be maintained
Signboard including phone numbers, no smoking signs and type of emergencies

should be installed at the site
In general, all the safety precautions will be strictly adhered to as per the
guidelines and recommendations of Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD) in
addition to other statutory requirements of concerned organizations.
4.1.2 Specific Recommendations

4.1.2.1 Control Rooms
Adequate number of doors shall be provided in the control room for safe exit
Halon / Dry chemical fire extinguishers should be used in control rooms and
computer rooms
Smoke detectors system shall be provided for control rooms at suitable locations
To resist fire spread through ducts, dampers shall be installed in ducts
4.1.2.2 Electricity Hazard

All electrical equipments shall be provided with proper earthing. Earthed electrode
shall periodically tested and maintained
Emergency lighting shall be available at all critical locations including the

operators room to carry out safe shut down and ready identification of fire fighting
facilities such as fire water pumps and fire alarm stations.
All electrical equipments shall be free from carbon dust, oil deposits, and grease
Approved insulated tools, rubber mats, shockproof gloves and boots, tester, fuse
tongs, discharge rod, safety belt, hand lamp, wooden or insulated ladder should
be used while carrying out the maintenance of electrical parts

Page No: 4.2
Danger from excess current due to overload or short circuit should be prevented
by providing fuses, circuit breakers, thermal protection
Carbon dioxide, halon or dry chemical fire extinguishers are to be used for
electrical fires
4.1.2.3 Pumps
Preventive Maintenance Inspection Schedule for Pumps will be observed as per
the equipment manual of the manufacturer.
4.1.3 Fire Fighting System

The fire protection equipment shall be kept in good operating condition at all
times and fire fighting system should be periodically tested for proper functioning and logged
for record and corrective actions.
4.1.4 Fire Protection System

The typical fire fighting system for the various facilities described is outlined in
this section. The exact details of the fire fighting systems and capabilities to be installed and
developed will be finalised after the completion of detailed engineering in consultation with
the concerned process and equipment vendors and fire. It is also to be understood that not
all facilities described below will be applicable for every installation. The outline of the fire
system proposed is described below:
Fire protection system shall be deigned in accordance with the requirements

of OISD, design requirements and safe engineering practices and will have full capability for
early detection and suppression of fire. The system will primarily consist of:
Hydrant system
Foam protection system
Portable fire extinguisher
Hydrant System: The system will essentially consists of firewater storage,

pumping, system pressurisation and all inter connected pipe work and auxiliary fire fighting
appliances. The water storage and pumping capacity and other features of this system will
be finalised considering OISD recommendations.
Adequate number of engine driven fire water pumps will be provided. The
pumps will be started automatically in the event of drop in header pressure. The actuation

Page No: 4.3
will be through pressure switches, the setting of which will be staggered to achieve
sequential starting of the pumps to meet the system demand.
Foam Protection System: Oil storage tanks and the surrounding dyke areas
will be protected with low expansion foam system. The storage tanks will be provided with
sub-surface foam injection system. The foam protection system will be designed as per the
requirements of OISD. A central foam preparation unit consisting of at least foam storage
tank, proportionating devices etc. shall be provided, to supply foam solution to the foam
protection system. Pressurised water for foam system will be tapped from the outdoor main
hydrant.
Sprinkler System: Sprinkler system will be provided. An array of spray

nozzles will be provided all around the protected area.
Manually initiated water spray system will be provided for exposure protection
of oil storage tanks, so that when one tank is on fire, the other tank can be cooled to guard
against exposure heating. Pressurized water supply to all sprinkler systems will be tapped
from the outdoor hydrant main.
Portable Fire Extinguishers: Besides, fire hydrant arrangement, portable

fire extinguishers of suitable categories will be placed at control rooms, electrical switchgear
room and various utility buildings for immediate use in the event of fire. Three different kinds
of extinguishers i.e. foam, CO2 and DCP will be provided. Each type of extinguisher has its
own characteristic to fight a particular class of fire. The size and type of extinguishers will be
decided as per recommendations of OISD and relevant Indian Standard and will be placed in
convenient accessible locations.
4.1.5 Risks to Personnel

Good safety management, strict adherence to safety management
procedures and competency assurance will reduce the risk. Safety practices are needed to
carry out jobs safely and without causing any injury to self, colleagues and system.
For total safety of any operation, each team member must religiously follow
the safety practices / procedures pertaining to respective operational area. If every team
member starts working with this attitude, zero accident rate is not a distant dream.

Page No: 4.4
Any operation is a team effort and its success depends upon the sincerity,
efficiency and motivation of all team members. Safety in such operations is not a duty of a
single person, but it is everyone's job.
Use of protective fireproof clothing and escape respirators will reduce the risk
of being seriously burnt. In addition, adequate fire fighting facilities and first aid facilities
should be provided, in case of any emergency.
4.1.6 Risk to Environment

In general, the frequency of leaks is low. Ensuring proper safety can still
lower this frequency. Risk reducing measures include proper training for personnel,
presence of well-trained engineers and strict adherence to safety management procedures
to be incorporated in the plan.
4.1.7 Precautionary Measures for Falling Objects

Provide safety helmets to protect workers below against falling objects
Ensure that there are no loose objects & all tools are properly secured
Danger areas should be clearly marked with suitable safety signs indicating that
access is restricted to essential personnel wearing hard hats while the work is in
progress.
4.1.8 Training
On job training to the engineers on various facets of risk analysis would go a
long way in improving their horizon which in turn is expected to reflect in the operation of
plant, especially from the safety stand point. In order to combat with emergency situations
arising out of accident release of hazardous chemicals, it is necessary for industries to
prepare an exhaustive offsite and onsite emergency preparedness plan.
4.1.9 Strategies
Act quickly.
Contain and control as near source as possible.
Protect resources in oil pathway.
Prevent oil reaching streams, rivers, or groundwater.
Use the natural features to contain and control flow whenever possible.

Page No: 4.5
Points to Remember
Always pay attention to fire and health hazards.
Start containment operations immediately to prevent oil from reaching a

watercourse, the groundwater, or otherwise sensitive area or object.
Evaluate logistical factors (safety, access, availability, etc.) to assess feasibility

and to ensure effective and efficient implementation.
Consider the type of equipment that can be used, as different equipment has
different operational capabilities. It is necessary to match planned activities with
the available equipment and personnel.
As much as possible, do not allow vehicles to run over oil-saturated areas.
Do not flush the oil down clean drains and other inlets.
Do not use excavators on areas with free oil on the surface.
Containment is easier on land than on open water.
4.1.10 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) provides additional protection to
workers exposed to workplace hazards in conjunction with other facility controls and safety
systems.
PPE is considered to be a last resort that is above and beyond the other
facility controls and provides the worker with an extra level of personal protection. Table 4.1
presents general examples of occupational hazards and types of PPE available for different
purposes. Recommended measures for use of PPE in the workplace include:
Active use of PPE if alternative technologies, work plans or procedures cannot

eliminate, or sufficiently reduce, a hazard or exposure
Identification and provision of appropriate PPE that offers adequate protection to

the worker, co-workers, and occasional visitors, without incurring unnecessary
inconvenience to the individual
Proper maintenance of PPE, including cleaning when dirty and replacement when
damaged or worn out. Proper use of PPE should be part of the recurrent training
programs for Employees

Page No: 4.6
Selection of PPE should be based on the hazard and risk ranking described earlier
in this section, and selected according to criteria on performance and testing
established
Table 4.1
Summary of Recommended Personal Protective Equipment
According to Hazard
Objective Workplace Hazards Suggested PPE
Eye and Flying particles, molten metal, Safety glasses with side-shields,
face liquid chemicals, gases or protective shades, etc.
protection vapours, light radiation
Head Falling objects, inadequate Plastic helmets with top and side
protection height clearance, and impact protection
overhead power cords
Hearing Noise, ultra-sound Hearing protectors (ear plugs or ear
protection muffs)
Foot Failing or rolling objects, Safety shoes and boots for protection
protection points objects. Corrosive or against moving and failing objects,
hot liquids liquids and chemicals
Hand Hazardous materials, cuts or Gloves made of rubber or synthetic
protection lacerations, vibrations, material (Neoprene), leather, steel,
extreme temperatures insulation materials, etc.
Respiratory Dust, fogs, fumes, mists, Facemasks with appropriate filters for
protection gases, smokes, vapours dust removal and air purification
(chemical, mists, vapours and gases).
Single or multi-gas personal monitors,
if available
Oxygen deficiency Portable or supplied air (fixed lines).
Onsite rescue equipment
Body / leg Extreme temperatures, Insulating clothing, body suits, aprons
protection hazardous materials, etc. of appropriate materials
biological agents, cutting and
laceration

Page No: 4.7
Chapter 5
Disaster Management Plan
5.1 Preamble
In spite of various preventive and precautionary measures taken in works, the
possibility of a mishap cannot be totally ruled out. Hence the need to prepare emergency plan
for dealing with the incidences which may still occur and are likely to affect life and property in
the residential areas and other places are identified in this plan. Such an emergency could be
the result of malfunction or non-observance of operating instructions. It could, at times, be the
consequences of acts outside the control of residents / employees like severe storm, flooding, or
deliberate acts of arson or sabotage.
Pipeline shall commence from Rewari with a new Dispatch Station, followed by Tap
Off points at existing depots at Bharatpur & Mathura with proposed end Terminal at Kanpur.
(Here in after referred to as Project) The Capacity of the proposed Pipeline is 3.17 MMTPA
(Ph-I) and 3.86 MMTPA (Ph-II).
The proposed pipeline length would be approximately 437 km long 18 Dia and it
passes through the states of Haryana, Rajasthan, and U.P. Associated facilities along the
pipeline route shall require sectionalized valve stations at every 30 kms approx., as per
conventional practice. They are buried underground (at a minimum depth of 1m), are controlled
by SCADA systems which allow continuous monitoring and rapid closure of valves, etc., and
that they are routed to avoid human settlements and ecologically sensitive areas.
5.2 Introduction
The objective of the terminal should be safe and trouble free operation this is ensured
by taking precautions right from design stage i.e. design of equipment/pipeline as per standard
codes, ensuring selection of proper material of construction, well designed codes/rules and
instruments for safe operation of the facility. Safety should be ensured afterwards by operating
the facility by trained manpower. In spite of all precautions accidents may happen due to human
error or system malfunction. Any accident involving release of hazardous material may cause
loss of human lives & property and damage to environment. Industrial installations are
vulnerable to various natural as well as man made disasters. Examples of natural disasters are
flood, cyclone, earthquake, lightening etc. and manmade disasters are like major fire, explosion,
sudden heavy leakage of toxic and poisonous gases and liquids from pipeline storage
terminals, civil war, nuclear attacks, terrorist activities etc.
The damage caused by any disaster is determined by the potential for loss
surrounding the event. It is impossible to predict the time and nature of disaster, which might
strike on undertaking. However, an effective disaster management plan i.e. preplanned
procedure involving proper utilization of in-house as well as outside resources helps to minimize
the loss to a minimum and resume the working condition as soon as possible.
5.2.1 Facilities Provided at Terminal

Various facilities such as Product Pump House, Manifold, Fire water Pump House, Two Tank
truck Filling Gantrys, Calibration Facilities, Electric Room/MCC, D G yard, Transformer Yard,
Lube Drum Yard and Grease Drum Shed, Lube Ware House, Marketing Room, Admin. Building,
Control Room, Amenity, Parking, Sealing Platform, Effluent Treatment Plant, Security & Gate
House checking Platform , Watch Tower (4 Nos), Compound wall, Emergency Gate-1 No.,
Drivers Toilet, Foam Tank Shed, Blue Dye Dosing System, Turbo jet Dosing System, Power
Dosing System, Product Storage Tanks are provided at the terminal.
5.2.2 Instrumentation, Control & Communication System

The major activities at the terminal are:
Storage facilities for BS III MS, BS IV MS, BS III HSD, BS IV HSD and SKO.
Receipt of product through pipeline
Road loading system
Sump & Slop system
Fire water pump system and make up water system
Full fledged Terminal Automation System (TAS) is envisaged for these units. These
include:
Tank Farm Management System (TFM)
Terminal data management system
Bay Queuing
SECON PVT. LTD, BANGALORE NEERI, NAGPUR

PAGE NO: 5.2
Tank Truck loading
Shut Down Features
Emergency Shut Down (ESD) is provided in the terminal control room to stop all
dispatch operation. ESD is implemented in the PLC logic as part of terminal automation.
Emergency push buttons to stop all road loading operations are provided in the
middle gantry.
Emergency push buttons to stop all loading operations in the terminal are
provided in the control room.
5.2.3 Communication System

A dedicated telecommunication system is implemented to meet the requirements.
This system provides voice, data and video communication. In addition to this, dedicated Optical
Fibre Cable (OFC) for audio communication, direct dialling facility, conferencing facilities, data
communication for SCADA, Facsimile communication, PABX net work is included.
5.2.4 Fire Protection Facilities

Fire Water Storage Tanks
Fire Water Pumps and Jockey Pumps
Fire Water Piping
Fire Hydrants
Fixed Foam System
Water/foam Monitors
Fixed Water Spray Systems
Mobile Fire Fighting Equipment
Portable Extinguishers

PAGE NO: 5.3
5.3 Need for Disaster Management Plan

- Following are the general types of Emergency /Disaster which lead to
preparation of disaster management plan:
Fire in tank farm area
Large oil spillage which may escape outside the boundary.
Major fire / explosion in unit area
Toxic gas release
Major Earthquake above 7 Richter Scale
5.4 Objectives of Disaster Management Plan

- Disaster Management Plan is basically a containment, Control & mitigation
Plan. The plan includes activities before disaster, during disaster and post disaster:
- The objective of disaster management plan is to formulate and provide
organisational setup and arrange proper facilities capable of taking part and effective action in
any
Brief the incident under control making full use of inside and outside resources
Protect the personnel inside the depot as well as public outside.
Safeguard the depot as well as outside property and environment.
Carry out rescue operation and treatment of casualties.
Preserve relevant records and evidences for subsequent enquiry
Ensure rapid return to normal operating conditions.
- The above objectives can be achieved by
Proper identification of possible hazards and evaluation of their hazard potential and
identification of maximum credible hazard scenario.
Arrange/augment facilities for fire fighting, safety, medical (both equipment and
Manpower)
Evolving proper action plan with proper organisational set-up and communication
facilities as well as warning procedure.

PAGE NO: 5.4
5.5 Statutory Requirement

- Disaster Management Plan is a statutory requirement for all petroleum
products marketing terminals to tackle the emergencies. The plan has been prepared in view of
the following regulations
Factories Act, 1948 and as amended
Manufacture, Storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989, notified under
Environment Protection Act 1986 and amended in 1994.
Rules on Emergency Planning Preparedness and Response for Chemical Accidents,

1996.
Stipulations of OISD-168
Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991.
5.6 Different Phases of Disaster

Warning Phase (Before disaster)
- Emergencies /disasters are generally preceded by warnings during which
preventive measures may be initiated. For example release of light hydrocarbons, uncontrollable
build-up of pressure in process equipment, pipe line weather forecast give warning about
formation of vapour cloud, cyclones, equipment failure, cyclones respectively.
Period of Impact Phase (During disaster)

- This is the phase when emergency /disaster actually strike and preventive
measures may hardly be taken. However, control measures to minimise the effects may be
taken through a well-planned and ready-to-act disaster management plan. The duration may be
from seconds to days.
Rescue Phase
- This is the phase when impact is almost over and efforts are concentrated on
rescue and relief measures.
Relief Phase (post disaster)

- In this phase, apart from organization and relief measures internally,
depending on severity of the disaster, external help should also be summoned to provide relief
measures (like evacuations to a safe place and providing medical help, food clothing etc.). This
phase will continue till normalcy is restored.

PAGE NO: 5.5
Rehabilitation Phase
- This is the final and longest phase. During which measures required to put the
situation back to normal as far as possible are taken. Checking the systems, estimating the
damages, repair of equipments and putting them again into service are taken up. Help from
revenue/insurance authorities need to be obtained to assess the damage, quantum of
compensation to be paid etc.
5.7 Key Elements

- Following are the key elements of Disaster Management Plan:
Basis of the plan
Accident prevention procedures/measures
Accident/emergency response planning procedures
5.7.1 Basis of the Plan

- Identification and assessment of hazards is crucial for on-site emergency
planning and it is therefore necessary to identify what emergencies could arise in storage of
various products. Hazard analysis or consequence analysis gives the following results.
Hazards from spread of fire or release of flammable and toxic chemicals from
storage and production units.
Hazards due to formation of pressure waves due to vapour cloud explosion of

flammable gases and oil spill hazards.
5.7.2 Emergency Planning and Response Procedures

- Emergency rarely occurs; therefore activities during emergencies require
coordination of higher order than for planned activities carried out according to fixed time
schedule or on a routine day-to-day basis. To effectively coordinate emergency response
activities, an organizational approach to planning is required. The important areas of emergency
planning are Organization and Responsibilities, Procedures, Communication, Transport,
Resource requirements and Control Centre. Offsite emergency requires additional planning over
and above those considered under onsite plans, which should be properly integrated to ensure
better coordination.

PAGE NO: 5.6
- The emergency planning includes anticipatory action for emergency,

maintenance and streamlining of emergency preparedness and ability for sudden mobilization of
all forces to meet any calamity.
5.7.3 On-site Disaster Management Plan

- Onsite Emergency/disaster is an unpleasant event of such magnitude which
may cause extensive damage to life and property due to the emergencies resulting from
deficiencies in Operation, Maintenance, Design and Human error, Natural Calamities like Flood,
Cyclone and Earthquake; and deliberate and other acts of man like Sabotage, Riot and War etc.
An Onsite Disaster may occur all of a sudden or proceeded by a Major Fire. Purpose for the on-
site disaster management plan is
To protect persons and property of the equipments in case of all kinds of

accidents, emergencies and disasters
To inform people and surroundings about emergency if it is likely to adversely

affect them
To inform authorities including helping agencies (doctors, hospitals, fire, police

transport etc.) in advance, and also at the time of actual happening
To identify, assess, foresee and work out various kinds of possible hazards, their
places, potential and damaging capacity and area in case of above
happenings. Review, revise, redesign, replace or reconstruct the process,
facility, vessels and control measures if so assessed.
- In order to handle disaster / emergency situations, an organizational chart

entrusting responsibility to various personnel showing their specific roles should be available as
shown in following Fig. 5.1.

PAGE NO: 5.7
Plant
Manager
Section Medical
Incharge Co-ordinator
Incident
Controller
Fire & Security Medical

Officer Representative
Site
Controller
Communication Communication
Officer Co-ordinator
Personal /
Administrative Emergency Transport
Manager Co-ordinator
Fig. 5.1: Onsite DMP - Disaster Control / Management System
5.7.3.1 EMERGENCY ACTIONS FOR VARIOUS ACCIDENT SCENARIOS

- There are instructions that whoever detects fire will give a fire alarm and rush
to the spot with the Fire Extinguisher and try to extinguish the fire. Fire Hydrant System is
operated & Foam/water is sprayed to keep the exposed tanks, pipelines & pumps cool.
Following are the emergency actions to be taken in case of occurrence of following Incidents
Missile/Air Attack during War

- If bombing on terminal takes place due to war scenarios, it would be
completely destructed leading to loss of millions of rupees. There would be a significant loss of
Product, Property and Human beings. The supply of petroleum product will be affected.
Emergency Action
Terminal personnel should contact district authorities like collector, police

immediately
All pipeline and tank valves should be closed and all the operations inside the
Terminal should be stopped. The intensity of operations should be reduced
once the weather department announces the possibility of storm or cyclone

PAGE NO: 5.8
The Terminal lighting should be stopped during nighttime
Persons inside the Terminal should be evacuated as soon as possible
In case of fire, city fire brigade should be called
Earthquakes
Earthquakes can cause large damage to the Terminal. Earthquakes result in cracks in the
foundation, which in turn result into vessel damage. This may result into release of stored
petroleum products into the surrounding area. There is a danger of pool fire around the tank. If
the earthquake is not severe, it could result into leaks and cracks in the pipeline, storage
vessels, etc. The scene could be as dangerous, if not properly managed might cause vast
destruction to the Terminal.
Emergency Action
Raise the alarm to inform everyone to be alert in the facility
Inform the fire brigade, nearest hospital and police control
Rush to check out cracks and leakages in the facility immediately
Switch off the main switch of electricity supply, so that electricity distribution to the
Terminal will be interrupted
The site controller will give signal when the situation is under control
Sabotage & Bomb Threats

- With increase in terrorist activities and as oil installations having, significant
role in national economy sabotage & bomb threats should also be considered in the disaster
management plan. In any such situation, city police/ administration should be informed
immediately and their help should be sought.
Emergency Action
The persons inside the Terminal should be evacuated as soon as possible
Terminal personnel should contact district authorities like collector, police

immediately
Any new or doubtful thing should not be touched
All pipeline and tank valves should be closed and all the operations inside the
Terminal should be stopped

PAGE NO: 5.9
In case of fire, city fire brigade should be called
5.7.3.2 Various phases of onsite disaster management plan

Before Crisis
Prepare a plan of the storage, handling and pumping stations premises and
surroundings showing therein the areas of various hazards like fire, explosion,
toxic releases and also location of assembly points, fire station or equipments
room, telephone room, medical facilities will be provided by arrangements with
nearby hospitals, emergency control room, main gate, emergency gates,
normal wind direction, outside fire station, hospital and other services. Mention
their distances from proposed activities.
The fire protection equipment shall be kept in good operating condition at all the
time and fire fighting system should be periodically tested for people
functioning logged for record and corrective action.
The fire fighting training shall be provided to all officers, truck drivers and other
employees who are likely to be present in installation
There should be regular mock fire drills once a month record of such drills shall be
maintained
Every employee or authorized person working in the production /storage shall be

familiarized with the fire alarm signal and shall know the location of fire alarm
point nearest to place of work
Assign key personnel and alternate responsible for site safety
Describe risk associated with each operation conducted.
During Crisis
Monitor the behaviour of entrant for any effects that suggests they should be
evacuated
Evacuate the space if any hazard that could danger the entrant is detected
Perform no other duties that may interfere with their primary responsibilities
Notify the attendant if they experience any warning signs or symptoms of

exposures or detect a dangerous condition

PAGE NO: 5.10
Exit the permit space when instructed by attendant
Reporting Procedure
- In the event of fire from accidental release of flammable gas or liquid, a person
seeing the incident will follow the laid down procedure in the facility and report as follows:
Will dial the nearest telephone
Will state his name and exact location of emergency
Will contact affected officers on duty
People reporting the accident will remain near the location to guide emergency
crew arriving at the scene
- In case fire emergency person should activate the nearest available push
button type instrument which will automatically sound an alarm in fire control room indicating the
location of fire.
After Crisis
Report injuries or blood or body fluid exposures to the appropriate supervisor
immediately
Assembly points:
Assembly points shall be set up farthest from the location of likely hazardous
events, where pre-designed persons from the works, contractors and visitors
would assemble in case of emergency. Up-to-date list of pre-designed
employees shift wise must be available at these points so that roll call could be
taken. Pre-designated persons would take charge of these points and mark
presence as the people come into it
Wash wounds and skin sites that have been affected with soap & water
Workers should be seen as soon as possible by a health professional
Provide information to the relevant public authority and community including other
closely located facilities regarding the nature of hazard and emergency
procedure in event of major accident

PAGE NO: 5.11
Record and discuss the lessons learned and the analysis of major accidents and
misses with employees and employee representative
5.7.3.3 Emergency Organization structure

- Following are the key personnel and the units in the terminals which are
responsible to take appropriate actions during emergencies.
Site Main Controller

- Site Shift Manager - (the senior most functionary available at site).
- The Site Shift Manager (SSM) will be designated as the Site Main Controller at
the time of an emergency and report at the Emergency Control Centre (ECC) which will be the
Primary Command Post. He will be the Chief Co-ordinator and take overall command of the
emergency management. He will be assisted by other co-ordinators as designated for various
functions. The Site Main Controller will provide all decisions support and resources support to
the Site Incident Controller at the incident site for initiating appropriate actions for emergency
control. He will also liaise with mutual aid members and all outside agencies including Local
Crisis Management Committee, District Contingency Plan Committee (District Collector), Police,
Civil Defence, Factories Inspectorate, etc. to seek assistance/help and provide necessary
information to them.
- Normally, the SSM is available on round the clock duty at the site to co-
ordinate overall manufacturing activities and management of emergency (if any). In the event of
an emergency, the Site Shift Manager (SSM) will assume the charge of the Site Main Controller
till the Executive or the President arrives.
Site Incident Controller

- Sr. Mgr. / Mgr. - (next lower to the senior most functionary of operation
available at site).
- The next lower to senior most functionary of operation available at site will be
Site Incident Controller. On receiving information about the emergency, he will report at the
incident site and take over from the Deputy Incident Controller (shift-in-charge). He will take
overall command of the emergency control operation as the Site Incident Controller and will take
decisions in co-ordinations with Site Main Controller for controlling emergency situation. He will
co-ordinate with all the key personnel, fire fighting and rescue team leaders and other support
services and provide necessary information and advice to them for effectively managing control
measures / actions.

PAGE NO: 5.12
Deputy Incident Controller

The shift-in-charge is available on round the clock duty in terminals. He is competent for
the operation and responsible for all activities related to storage / maintenance including
prevention / control of incidents and handling emergencies (if any) in the terminal. He will be
designated as the Deputy Incident Controller. In the event of an emergency in the terminal, he
will immediately assume the charge of the site Incident Controller and take decisions in
consultation with the Site Main Controller. To initiate immediate actions for controlling/mitigating
emergency situation at the incident site till the Site Incident Controller (next senior personnel in
production) arrives.
Co-ordinators
- (The senior most functionaries available in the respective services)
- The senior most functionaries available at site in the respective services will
be the co-ordinators at the time of an emergency. They will report at the Emergency Control
Centre (ECC), known as the Primary Command Post, unless and otherwise instructed by the
Chief Co-ordinator (The Site Main Controller). They will assist and advise the Site Main
Controller in all matters for effectively managing control measures and mitigating operations.
Emergency Control Centre (ECC) (The Primary Command Post)

- In the event of an emergency, SSM Office will be designated as the
Emergency Control Centre, which will be known as the Primary command Post. If, the SSM
office is likely to be affected due to unfavourable wind direction or any other reasons, the
Emergency Control Centre will be shifted to the Construction Conference Room which will be
having necessary facilities to connect communication links as provided in the SSM Office.
Field Command Post (Incident Site)

- An emergency requires co-ordination of numerous activities beyond spill
containment and countermeasure efforts from a safe location at the incident scene. The Field
Command Post will be established in the "Cold Zone" for staging deployed apparatus, resources
and equipment with means of communications and manning to effectively co-ordinate control
efforts.
Assembly Points
Two alternate locations for safe assembly points have been earmarked at all the
operating terminals. These locations are designated for assembling non-

PAGE NO: 5.13
essential workers, visitors, and other persons who are not required at the site
at the time of emergency but they are to be moved to safe places. These
locations have been provided with sign boards displaying "Assembly Points"
for easy identification
The persons required to be assembled at the assembly point should choose safer
assembly point out of the two, considering the wind direction at that time. The
control room will also announce the same on the PA system, if possible
The person assembled at the assembly point shall follow the instruction for
evacuation of the terminal area and move to safe locations as directed. They
should move in the cross wind direction or up-wind direction, whichever is
more safer
5.7.3.4 Role and Responsibilities

Site Main Controller
- The Site Main Controller will be the chief co-ordinator and shall be assisted by
other co-ordinators (senior most functionaries in the respective disciplines). He will take overall
command of the emergency management and his duties and the responsibilities are as below:
- He will:
Report at the Emergency Control Centre as soon as he gets information about the
emergency at site and will assume overall responsibility if taking decisions and
directing actions as necessary for mitigating the situation and managing the
emergency effectively with due consideration and priorities for personnel
safety, safety to the company's property and the environment
Assess the magnitude of the situation in co-ordination with the Incident Controller /
Dy. Incident Controller and decide whether major emergency exists or is likely
to develop, requiring external assistance. Accordingly, he will decide to inform
Local/District emergency Chief and other emergency control groups for help
and the nature of help required including assistance from mutual aid members
and declare on-site emergency
Decide the safe route of entry for external assistance/help to reach at site of the
incident considering wind direction and the place of the incident and also the

PAGE NO: 5.14
place of reporting such assistance. He will also direct the security to guide
them properly
Ensure that the Key Personnel and Co-ordinators are called in
Ensure that all non-essential workers, visitors, contractors are safely moved to
assembly points and direct for search and rescue operation within the affected
areas, if necessary
Be in constant communication with the Site Incident Controller to continuously

review and assess the situation and possible developments
Direct actions for safe shut down of terminal or section of the terminal and
evacuation of terminal personnel and other necessary action is in consultation
with the other co-ordinators
Exercise direct operational control over areas in the complex other than those
affected in consultation with other co-ordinators
To liaise with the local meteorological office to receive early notification of

changes in wind direction and weather conditions
Liaise with the senior officials of Police, Fire Brigade, Medical and Factories
Inspectorate and pass on information on possible effects to the surrounding
areas outside the factory premises and necessity of evacuating the area and
moving the people to safe places
Liaise with various co-ordinators to ensure that various team are functioning well,
casualties are receiving attention and traffic movement within the works is well
regulated
Arrange for a log of the emergency to be maintained in the Primary Command

Post
Release authorized information to press through the media co-ordinator
Control rehabilitation of the affected persons and the affected areas after
cessation of the emergency
Site Incident Controller

PAGE NO: 5.15
- The Site Incident Controller is the Key Personnel for operations function
reporting at the incident site and will take the overall command of actions for emergency control
operation on his arrival at the incident site. He will be supported by other key personnel
representing various emergency services and initiate emergency control actions under the
direction of the Site Main Controller (Primary Command Post). The duties and the
responsibilities of the Site Incident Controller include the following:
- He will:
Report at the incident site immediately after getting information about an

emergency. Upon his arrival at the site, he will assess the scale of emergency
in consultation with the Deputy Incident Controller and evaluate, if a major
emergency exists or is likely to develop and inform Emergency Control Centre
(primary Command Post) accordingly asking for assistance and indicating kind
of support needed
Take overall control of handling the emergency at site and take action for isolation
of source of containment loss to the extent feasible. Simultaneously, in case
of fire organize appropriate fire response in co-ordination with Key personnel
(Fire & Safety) to get the situation under control and to prevent it's escalation
Set up communication point (Field Command Post) and establish contact with Site
Main Controller (Primary Command Post) and keep him informed about the
development
Keep on assessing the emergency situation at the site and communicate to the
Site Main Controller (Primary Command Post) and keep him informed about
the development
Co-ordinate the activities of other key personnel reporting at the Field Command
Post, under his overall command
Direct all operation with the affected areas giving due priorities for safety of
personnel and to minimize damage to environment, the facility and property
Provide advice and information to Fire fighting and rescue personnel, external fire
services and other emergency services/teams as and when they arrive at the
incident site and co-ordinate with them for effective control actions

PAGE NO: 5.16
Ensure that all non-essential workers and staff within the affected area are
evacuated to appropriate assembly points and that areas are searched for
casualties
Organize rescue teams for search of casualties in the affected areas (if any) and
send them to safe areas / medical centre for first aid and medical relief
Seek additional support and resources as may be needed through Primary

Command Post
Send decision support from the Primary Command Post for decision such as
precautionary shut down of neighbouring facilities, precautionary evacuation of
people in the neighbouring facilities, activating mutual aid plan, etc.
Be in constant liaison with the Site Main Controller and keep him informed about
the situation at the incident site
Preserve all evidences so as to facilitate any inquiry into the cause and
circumstances, which caused or escalated the emergency (to arrange
photographs, video, etc.)
Arrange for head count after the emergency is over with respect to the personnel
on duty in the affected areas
Deputy Incident Controller

- Normally, the Shift-in-charge of a terminal being always available at the
terminal site and well aware of the terminal operating conditions at all times will be designated
as the Deputy Incident Controller and assume the charge of the Site Incident Controller at the
time of an emergency till the Site Incident Controller arrives at the incident site, he will assist the
Site Incident Controller on his arrival and work under his direction in emergency control
operation.
- The responsibilities and duties of the Deputy Incident Controller will be as
defined for the Site Incident Controller. In addition he will ensure the following:
- He will:
In the event of an emergency, caused due to any incident in the terminal, he will
immediately actuate terminal level emergency siren (hooter) to warn the field
personnel, contractors' employees, etc. and also arrange for announcement

PAGE NO: 5.17
about the emergency and necessary instruction for them for assembling at the
safe assembly point or evacuation, etc.
Ensure that the SSM and senior terminal personnel have been informed about the
emergency Fire Services Personnel
- Main role of Fire Services personnel is fire fighting and rescue operations,
helping in operations like, prevention of loss of containment of hydrocarbon, spill/leak
containment, etc. Their main responsibilities and duties are described specifically as below:
Chief of Fire (or next senior most fire personnel available)

He will be the Key Personnel for the Fire and Safety Services at the incident
scene and co-ordinating and commanding all the related operations in
consultation with the Site Incident Controller
He will report at the Field command Post (Incident Site) immediately after
receiving the information about an emergency at site, contact the Site Incident
Controller and the first turn out leader for necessary information/advice to
decide control strategies
He will take overall command of fire fighting/rescue operations and other

measures as necessary to control and mitigate the situation and lead the fire
fighting crew including outside / mutual aid fire fighting teams
He will assess the severity/magnitude of the situation and decide the level of the
emergency in consultation with the Site Incident Controller and inform the Site
Main Controller (Primary Command Post) at ECC. He will also advise him for
declaring on-site emergency (if necessary)
He will call for additional resources/help from other Depts. (AFS personnel),
mutual aid members, etc. through Primary Command Post as necessary and
deploy them appropriately for fire fighting and rescue operation at the incident
scene. He will also co-ordinate with other key personnel
He will ensure that sufficient personnel protective equipment, masks, Breathing

Air sets, Spare Breathing Air, Cylinders etc. are available at the field
Command Post for use by the crew members and ensure that no one access
the "Hot Zone" without adequate personnel protection. He will call for logistic

PAGE NO: 5.18
support (mobilising additional supplies through Primary Command Post (Site

Main Controller/HSE&F Co-ordinator)
He will keep constant contact with Primary Command Post and seek decision
support from the Site Main Controller in critical matters/operations and also
inform him, if other terminals in the complex or surrounding population are
likely to be affected
He will co-ordinate with Security Key Personnel for access control and barricading
the affected area in order to prevent vehicular movement
He will assist in rescue and first aid operations
Shift Fire Officer (Riding Officers)

Upon receiving emergency call/alarm, he will quickly prepare for the fire turn out
and mount the leading fire tender along with the crew members and rush to
the incident site taking a safe route of entry considering the wind direction
Report to the Dy. Incident Controller/the Incident Controller and Position the Fire
Tender strategically at a location in consultation with the Dy. Incident
Controller/the Incident Controller
He will decide the line of action for fire fighting and/or other control actions at the
scene in consultation with the Dy. Incident Controller/Incident Controller and
take appropriate actions for fire fighting and control measures
He will guide and lead the fire fighting crew in fire fighting and rescue operation till
the arrival of F&S Key person (the Chief of Fire or next senior most person)
He will ensure the safety of the crew members and that crew members are fully
equipped with necessary personnel protection prior to enter "Hot Zone"
He will assess the severity of the situation and may call for second
turnout/additional help through the Dy. Incident Controller/Incident Controller
(Field Command Post)
He will keep constant contact with the key personnel (F&S) at the Field Command
Post and inform about the situation and probable developments
Firemen on Duty at the Fire Control Room

PAGE NO: 5.19
The fireman on duty at the Fire Control Room will acknowledge the emergency
alarm received on the panel and promptly note the facility area/where the
incident occurred
He will note down the information, if emergency call is received through

telephone, hot line or messenger
He will sound the fire bell to inform the fire crew to get ready and take their
positions, simultaneously brief the Shift Fire Officer about the emergency
message
He will intimate the Site Shift Manager and the Security Dept. about the
emergency giving short description about the occurrence (if known)
He will actuate emergency siren after receiving instruction from Primary

Command Post (Site Main Controller/HSE&F Co-ordinator)
He will ask telephone operator to pass on to the communication about the

emergency to the Auxiliary Fire Squad of the terminal on receiving the
instruction from HSE&F Co-ordinator/Site Main Controller
He will always be ready and alert for receiving any message / instructions from
Primary Command Post/Field Command Post
Auxiliary Fire Squad Members

- AFS Members shall be ready on hearing emergency siren and will report to
site incident controller at site (Field Command Post) on receiving message from ECC
They will do the fire fighting under the instruction of Shift Officer. Help to bring fire
fighting equipment from nearby terminals
AFS Members of the terminal under emergency will immediately go to the

emergency site and will start first aid fire fighting
As per the emergency situation they will use the fixed fire fighting equipment to
protect terminal equipment from heat exposure
They will guide non-essential personnel in case of evacuation
They will do monitoring/closing of storm water drains if required

PAGE NO: 5.20
They will help key personnel for taking action on site. Help to Security Personnel
for traffic Control
Non-essential Personnel
- Employees, contractors' employees, visitors, etc., (other than emergency
response personnel) present at the incident site that is not required to be present at the incident
site during the emergency at the site. In the event of declaration of an emergency in the
terminal/area, these persons shall quickly assemble at the safe assembly point of the
terminal/area and shall respond as instructed by the Site Incident Controller.
Instruction to the Non-essential Personnel

Do not panic. Ensure that persons in your immediate vicinity are warned
Remain alert for announcement from the Control Room, such "Proceed to Safe
Assembly Point" and act accordingly
Do not rush to the scene to be a spectator
Await instructions at the Assembly Point, report your presence to the superiors/ or
the Site Incident controller, inform his whereabouts of your colleagues if they
have not arrived
Do not engage telephone/talk back system and other communication channels,

unnecessarily
Do not approach Control Centres without urgent/or important reasons
If you are not assigned any specific role, move away as directed
Do not offer non-authentic information/unconfirmed facts/fact/or conjecture
Telephone Operator
- At the time of emergency, communications both inwards as well as outward
are very essential and telephone operator's swift action becomes very important. He plays very
important part in communicating information/messages to the concerned personnel/outside
agencies/mutual aid members/staff members etc. and also receiving a large numbers of outside
calls. His main responsibilities and duties are as below:
He will keep the board free to the extent possible for incoming calls

PAGE NO: 5.21
He will immediately convey message to the "Key Personnel" and the "Co-
ordinator" about the emergency as per the instruction of the Site main
controller. The designated personnel list is given in the On-site Emergency
Plan (Flip Chart)
The telephone operator will follow instructions from the Site Main Controller/or
Media Co-ordinator only, for passing on any information to outside agency
about the emergency or direct all such queries to the media co-ordinator for
appropriate reply
As far as possible he should not entertain unknown/unimportant outside

calls/inquiries during initial few hours of the emergency
External Communication:
- Telephone Numbers of internal/External authorities shall be provided as
separate attachments.
- Sr. - Authority - Phone Numbers

- Fire Brigade
- 1 - Fire -
Brigade(Terminal)
- police
- 2 - Police Control -
Room (Rural)
- 3 - Terminal -
Gramin Police
- 4 - Police Station -
- District Authorities
- 5 - District -
Collectorate Office
- Ambulance
- 6 - Ambulance -
- Doctor
- 7 - Doctor -
- - -
- Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited
- 8 - Terminal Office -

PAGE NO: 5.22
- 9 - Sr. Terminal -
Manager
- 10 - Manager -
Operations
- Others
- 11 - Other nearby -
installations
HSE & Fire Co-ordinators

He will report at the Emergency Control Centre (Primary Command Post)
immediately after receiving information about the emergency. He will assist
the Site Main Controller for taking critical decisions and provide necessary
advice and information
He will co-ordinate with Key Person (Fire & Safety) and will assist the Site Main
Controller for providing decision support and resources support to the Key
Persons (F&S), as may be necessary
He will arrange for mobilizing off-duty fire personnel from their residence; and call
other members of the staff for assistance
He will ensure that the AFS members have been called for assistance and liaise
with mutual aid members / Surat Fire Brigade for mobilization of additional
resources
He will co-ordinate with the materials/stores co-ordinator and mobilize additional

resources, viz., spillage containment equipment/fire fighting
equipment/material, personal protective equipment, spare breathing air
cylinders, etc., as may be required at the incident site for control measures
He will liaise with Factory Inspectorate / Pollution Control authorities in

consultation with the Site Main Controller and provide necessary information.
He will also ask for the help, if necessary to evacuate neighbouring area
outside the complex as advised by the Site Main Controller
He will organize relieving groups for fire fighting
He will also initiate necessary actions to minimise impact on Environment
Medical Co-ordinators

PAGE NO: 5.23
- The Chief Medical Officer (or the next in command available at site) will be the
Medical Co-ordinator and perform the following duties:
He will contact the Site Main Controller immediately after receiving the information
about the emergency
He will report immediately at the Emergency Control Centre (Primary Command

Post) or OHC as instructed by the Site Main Controller and contact the Key
personnel (Medical) and take stock of the situation
He will assist and advise the Site Main Controller in all critical decisions in the
area of health/medical services to the affected persons and keep constant
liaisons with him
Organize rescue and first aid arrangements for the affected persons at the site in
the "cold Zone", as may be necessary with essential staff/equipment and post
additional ambulance for transporting seriously injured persons
Ensure that adequate paramedical staff, equipment and medicines are available
at the OHC. He will mobilize additional resources from neighbouring
industries, if necessary
To liaise with the Local Medical Authorities and City Hospitals, if the causalities
are more and situation demands treatment at additional medical centres
To co-ordinate with the Transport Co-ordinator for transporting victims to various

hospitals
To arrange for additional ambulances from other hospitals/ Municipal Corporation
The Medical Co-ordinator should ensure the upkeep of agreed medical supplies,
antidotes and equipment that should always be kept in stock for treating
victims of burns and hazardous chemicals. The medical authorities should be
aware of the type of treatment to be administered
He will liaise with the media co-ordinator for release of news to the press
Security Co-ordinators
- The Chief of Security or the next in command available at site shall be the
Security Co-ordinator. He will have the following duties / responsibilities:

PAGE NO: 5.24
He will instruct and deploy the security personnel to ensure that the law and order
is maintained ; and unnecessary gathering of the personnel at the scene of
emergency is prevented and ensure control of traffic movement in and out of
the factory areas
He will instruct the security personnel / Security Gates to direct and guide external
emergency vehicles (Fire tenders/ambulances etc.) called for assistance/help
from neighbouring industries/Local administration, to the scene of incident
He will instruct security personnel who could be spared to assist Site Incident
Controller/Key Personnel (fire and Safety) in fire fighting and evacuation of
personnel, at the Incident Site
He will take action to regulate traffic movement and prevention of traffic jams
inside the works as well as outside the factory gates for proper and speedy
movement of the emergency vehicles, ambulances, other vehicles carrying
outside resources, etc.
He will mobilize additional security force for help, as necessary
He will liaise with the police and other local authorities for external help, as
necessary for evacuation of the neighbouring areas outside the factory
premises in consultation with the Site Main Controller
If necessary, he will arrange for announcement through the mobile P.A. system for
alerting and instructing the population in the surrounding areas as directed by
the Site Main Controller
Engineering Co-ordinators
He will report to the Site Main Controller at the Emergency Control Centre
(Primary Command Post) immediately after receiving information about On-
site emergency
He will take stock of the situation and assist/advise the Site Main Controller in
deciding control strategies
He will mobilize the team from the Maintenance Dept. to assist the Site Incident
Controller in control operation at the Field Command Post

PAGE NO: 5.25
Arrange isolation of electrical lines from distribution point/substations as required

by the Site Incident Controller by calling the Electrical Engineer / Electricians
Provide all other engineering support, as may be required
Liaise with Key Personnel (Eng./Maintenance) and co-ordinate with other groups
Communication Co-ordinators
- Communication Co-ordinator plays very important part at the time of an
emergency particularly when extensive disruption of services takes place. He has the following
duties and responsibilities:
To ensure all available communications links remain functional
To quickly establish communication links between the Field command Post and (if
this happens to be in remote off site area) and the Primary Command Post
To arrange for announcement on the public address system and maintain

contacts with congregation points like canteen, main gate, control rooms etc.
To ensure that previously agreed inventory of various types of communication

equipment is maintained in working condition and frequent checks are carried
out and records maintained
To maintain voice record of significant communications with timings

received/passed from the Primary Command Post
To provide additional/alternate communication facilities as required at the site
P&A Co-ordinators
- He will report at the Primary Command Post (ECC) immediately after getting
information about an emergency at the site and assist/advise the Site Main Controller in taking
important decisions in the matters related to welfare/necessities/of emergency personnel at site,
care/needs of the affected persons. His duties and responsibilities include the following:
He will ensure that a record of affected personnel is prepared with their

local/permanent addresses and telephone numbers
He will ensure that the relatives of the affected personnel have been informed
Assign officials at the hospitals to look after the needs of the affected personnel
under medical treatment

PAGE NO: 5.26
Co-ordinate with the Finance Co-ordinator for necessary funds required to cater
the needs of affected personnel, emergency purchases and for other
requirements
To arrange for refreshments, snacks, food, and other needs as may be required
for the emergency personnel from time to time
Co-ordinate with the Purchase Co-ordinator for necessary emergency

procurement of necessary items
Ensure that staff personnel as necessary for assistance and help are
informed/called from their residences
he will co-ordinate with the instruct Key Personnel transport/welfare & canteen for
mobilizing additional resources, as may be required
To co-ordinate with the neighbouring industries for additional vehicles/ambulances

and other resources as may be required
To liaise with the Local Administration for additional assistance/help as may be

needed
Transport Co-ordinators
- The Transport Co-ordinator shall perform the following duties
Mobilize all available company's vehicles for emergency use along with the drivers
Arrange for transport of victims to hospitals/dispensaries
Arrange for duty rotation of the drivers to meet the emergency situation
To direct refuelling of the vehicles
To co-ordinate with the neighbouring industries for additional vehicles /

ambulances as may be required
To mobilize buses of the RECCS, if necessary
To co-ordinate with the neighbouring industries for additional vehicles /

ambulances as may be required
To arrange for vehicles from outside local transport agencies, if required

PAGE NO: 5.27
To keep in contact with the Site Main Controller for evacuation of personnel and
transportation of victims
The Welfare / Canteen Co-ordinators

- The Welfare Co-ordinator will have the following responsibilities:
Ensure that casualties receive adequate attention and arrange additional help (ex-
gratia payment etc.), if required with consultation with the Chief Co-ordinator
Inform the relatives of the victims
When emergency is prolonged, he will arrange for relieving personnel and

organize refreshment / catering facilities and arrangements for their rest
(bedding, and other necessities)
He will arrange to procure and keep stocks of necessary food items and other
necessary supplies as may be required for the personnel working round-the-
clock
He will arrange for hot drinks / snacks and food and other necessary items for
emergency response personnel, as required
Media Co-ordinators
- The Media Co-ordinator will co-ordinate the following under the direction of the
Site Main Controller (The Chief Co-ordinator):
He will liaise with various media and release written statements to the press
through prior concurrence of the Chief Co-ordinate
He will handle media interview with various media groups make arrangements for
televising the information about the incident, the number of casualties, etc
He will inform State and Central Government and the statutory bodies of the
nature and magnitude of the incident, the number of casualties, etc.
He will locate himself such that media persons/third parties do not need to go past
the complex security gates and that adequate communication links exists
Media personnel often insist on visiting incident scene. He will escort media
team(s) If such visits are approved by the Chief Co-ordinator

PAGE NO: 5.28
He will be in constant contact with the Medical Co-ordinator, and other co-
ordinators to be aware of latest development and closely liaise with the Chief
Co-ordinator
Finance Co-ordinators
He will report at the Emergency Control Centre immediately after getting
information about the emergency at site
He will release finance (cash / cheques, etc) as directed by the Site Main
Controller (Chief Co-ordinator)
He will assist the Purchase Co-ordiantor for emergency procurement
He will liaise with Insurance Company personnel as directed by the Site Main
Controller
Purchase Co-ordinators
The Purchase Co-ordinator will report at the Emergency Control Centre as soon
as he is informed about an emergency at site
He will assist the Site Main Controller and arrange for emergency purchase of
necessary items as maybe required during the emergency
He will co-ordinate with the Materials Co-ordinator and other co-ordinator for
necessary emergency items to be procured
He will mobilize necessary manpower as may be required, etc.
Materials Co-ordinators
- The Materials Co-ordinator will ensure:
Availability of the materials required by the Site Incident Controller
Arrange issues of materials from the General Stores round-the-clock during an

emergency
Arrange emergency procurements form local dealers / vendors or from

neighbouring industries
Arrange transportation of materials from General Store to the Incident Site in co-
ordination with the Transport Co-ordinator

PAGE NO: 5.29
5.7.4 Off-site Disaster Management Plan

- Emergency is a sudden unexpected event, which can cause serious damage
to personnel life, property and environment outside the boundary wall of the refinery as a whole,
which necessitate evolving Off-site Emergency Plan to combat any such eventuality. In Offsite
disaster management plan, many agencies like Revenue, Public Health, Fire Services, Police,
Civil Defence, Home Guards, Medical Services and other Voluntary organization are involved.
Thus, handling of such emergencies requires an organized multidisciplinary approach.
- In case of a leak from the pipeline and storage tanks, the control system may
not be sophisticated enough to detect the same. Hence the leak has to be notified by the
eyewitness to the owner who would immediately shut down the pumping operation. This may
not necessarily result in declaration of the disaster. In absence of an eyewitness, the leak may
go undetected in the incipient stages and may result in a major disaster requiring activation of
District Disaster Management Plan.
- Evacuation of people required, if leak from the pipeline and storage tank, can
be done in orderly way. The different agencies involved in evacuation of people are Civil
Administration (both state and central), non Govt. organizations, factory Inspectorate and Police
authorities.
5.7.4.1 Fire
- Effects of fire on population will be mainly due to thermal radiation. In such
cases, houses situated to the proximity of disaster need to be evacuated, although a severe
smoke hazard due to fire is to be reviewed periodically.
5.7.4.2 Explosion
- An explosion will give a very little time to warn population and areas affected
may be much longer than that in case of fire. The effects of explosion on population will be
mainly due to shock waves, flying splinters, collapse of structures and exposure to thermal
radiation.
5.7.4.3 Toxic Gas/Vapor Release

- A toxic gas release will generally threat much larger area and population,
exposed to the drifting cloud of toxic gases and vapours. The time available for warning
population will depend on the point of release, wind direction and velocity.
- Procedures for dealing with outside Reported Gas/ Vapour Escapes

PAGE NO: 5.30
The setting up of a continuously manned Emergency Control Centre for the

receipt of telephone calls related to emergencies and gas/ vapour escapes and/or
from which, the employees are directed by telephone and/or radio
The provision of adequate management, co-ordination and supervision of all
administration and operations necessary to maintain disciplined progress and
clearance of emergency work
The organisation of adequate staff and other resources in order to progress
reported gas/vapour escapes within the specified times
The organisation of facilities for the monitoring of the receipt, issue, attendance at
and clearance of emergency work so as to ensure that none are overlooked or
unduly delayed
- The purpose of the off-site disaster management plan is:
To save lives and injuries and to prevent or reduce property losses
To provide for quick resumption of normal situation or operation
To make explicit the inter related be suggested if necessary
To make explicit inter related set of actions to be undertaken in the event of an

industrial accident posing hazards to the community
To inform people and surrounding about emergency and disaster if it is likely to

adversely affect machinery will be established for this purpose to guide the
people in proper way
To plan for rescue and recuperation of casualties and injuries. To plan for relief
and rehabilitation
To plan for prevention of harms, total loss and recurrence of disaster. It will be
ensured that absolute safety and security is achieved within the shortest time
5.7.4.4 Various phases of onsite disaster management plan

Before Crisis
- This will include the safety procedure to be followed during an emergency
through posters, talks and mass media in different languages including local language. Leaflets
containing dos/ donts before and during emergency should be circulated to educate the people
in vicinity

PAGE NO: 5.31
People in vicinity of hazardous installation, and others who are potentially affected
in the event of an accident, should be aware of the risks of accidents, know
where to obtain information concerning the installation, and understand what
to do in the event of an accident
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) (Such as environmental, humanitarian

and consumer group) should motivate their constituents and others, to be
involved in risk reduction and accident prevention efforts. They should help to
identify specific concerns and priorities regarding risk reduction and
prevention, preparedness and response activities
NGOs should facilitate efforts to inform the public and should provide technical
assistance to help the public analyze and understand information that is made
available
Public authorities (at all levels) and management of hazardous installation should
established emergency planning activities/ programs for accidents involving
the hazardous substance
All parties who will be involved in emergency planning process. In this respect
public health authorities, including experts from information centers should be
involved in relevant aspects of offsite emergency planning
Emergency warning alert system should be in place to warn the potentially

affected public, or there is an imminent threat of an accident
The system chosen should be effective and provide timely warning. Suitable
warning system could include or a combination of for e.g.: sirens, automatic
telephone message, and mobile public address system
During Crisis
Central Control Committee: As the off-site plan is to be prepared by the
government a central control committee shall be formed under the
chairmanship of area head. Other officers from police, fire, factory, medical,
engineering, social welfare, publicity, railway, transport and requisite
departments shall be incorporated as members. Some experts will also be
included for guidance. The functions of committee should be:

PAGE NO: 5.32
To work as main co-coordinating body constituted of necessary district heads and

other authorities with overall command, coordination, guidance, supervision,
policy and doing all necessary things to control disaster in shortest times
To prepare, review, alter or cancel this plan and to keep it a complete document
with all details
To take advice and assistance from experts in fields to make plan more
successful
To set in motion all machineries to this plan in event of disaster causing or likely to
cause severe damage to public, property or environment
The incident control committee, traffic control committee and press publicity
committee will first be informed, as they are needed first
Medical Help, Ambulance and Hospital Committee: This committee consisted of

doctors for medical help to the injured persons because of disaster. Injuries
may be of many types. As such doctors are rarely available we have to
mobilize and utilize all available doctors in the area. Functions and duties of
the committee include:
To give medical help to all injured as early as possible
Civil surgeon is the secretary who will organize his team
On receiving information to rush to spot he will immediately inform his team and
will proceed with all necessary equipments
First aid and possible treatment shall be provided at the spot or at some
convenient place and patients may be requested to shift to hospitals for further
treatment
All efforts shall be made on war basis to save maximum lives and to treat
maximum injuries
Continuity of the treatment shall be maintained till the disaster is controlled
Traffic Control, Law and Order: The committee is headed by District

Superintendent of Police. Functions and duties of this committee should be:
To control traffic towards and near disaster , to maintain law and order

PAGE NO: 5.33
To evacuate the places badly affected or likely to be affected
To shift the evacuated people to safe assembly points
To rehabilitate them after disaster is over.
Necessary vehicles, wireless sets and instruments for quick communications shall
be maintained and used as per need
After Crisis
At the time of disaster, many people may badly be affected. Injured people shall
be treated by medical help, ambulance and hospital committee, but those not
injured but displaced kept at assembly points, whose relative or property is
lost, houses collapsed and in need of any kind of help shall be treated by this
welfare and restoration committee. Functions and duties of this committee are:
To find out persons in need of human help owing to disastrous effect. They may
give first aid if medical team is not available
They will serve the evacuated people kept at assembly points. They will arrange
for their food, water, shelter, clothing, sanitation, and guidelines to reach any
needful places
They will look for removal and disposal of dead bodies, for help of sick, weak,
children and needy persons for their essential requirements
The team will also work for restoration of detached people, lost articles, essential
commodities etc.
The team will also look after the restoration of government articles
The team will also ensure that the original activities, services and systems are
resumed again as they were functioning before the disaster
Police Department
The police should assist in controlling of the accident site, organizing evacuation
and removing of any seriously injured people to hospitals.
Co-ordination with the transport authorities, civil defence and home guards
Co-ordination with army, navy, air force and state fire services

PAGE NO: 5.34
Arrange for post mortem of dead bodies
Establish communication center
Fire Brigade
The fire brigade shall organize to put out fires and provide assistance as required.
Hospitals and Doctors
Hospitals and doctors must be ready to treat any injuries.
Co-ordinate the activities of Primary Health Centers and Municipal Dispensaries to

ensure required quantities of drugs and equipments
Securing assistance of medical and paramedical personnel from nearby

hospitals/institutions
Temporary mortuary and identification of dead bodies
Media
The media should have ready and continuous access to designated officials with
relevant information, as well as to other sources in order to provide essential
and accurate information to public throughout the emergency and to help
avoid confusion
Efforts should be made to check the clarity and reliability of information as it

becomes available, and before it is communicated to public
Public health authorities should be consulted when issuing statements to the

media concerning health aspects of chemical accidents
Members of the media should facilitate response efforts by providing means for
informing the public with credible information about accidents involving
hazardous substances
Non-governmental organizations (NGO)
NGOs could provide a valuable source of expertise and information to support

emergency response efforts. Members of NGOs could assist response
personnel by performing specified tasks, as planned during the emergency
planning process. Such tasks could include providing humanitarian,

PAGE NO: 5.35
psychological & social assistance to members of community and response

personnel.
- Duties of NGO are listed below:
Evacuation of personnel from the affected area
Arrangements at rallying posts and parking yards
Rehabilitation of evacuated persons
Co-ordination with other agencies such as police, medical, animal husbandry,

agriculture, electricity board, fire services, home guards and civil defence.
Establishing shelters for rescue, medical, fire fighting personnel.
- Various organizations involved during emergencies are shown in Fig. 5.2.
Environmental Health
and Safety Department
Public
Education Medi
Plant Level
District Level
Emergency
Emergency
Committee
Committee
EMERGENCY
Medical Plant
Aid Security
Police Fire
Department Department
Emergency Control Center

Chief Co-Ordinator
Fig. 5.2: Various Organizations Involved During Emergency
5.8 Mock Drills

- As per the Industrial Major Accident Hazard Rules,
- (a) The occupier shall ensure that a mock drill of the on-site emergency plan is
conducted every six months.

PAGE NO: 5.36
- (b) A detail report of the mock drill conducted under sub-rule (4) shall be made
immediately available to the concerned authority.
- Accordingly,
- Onsite Disaster Mock Drills are conducted once in six months.
- Also, Major Fire and Minor Fire mock drills are conducted once in three
months and one month respectively.
Lessons Learned System for Mock Drills

- Performances during the mock drills are reviewed by CEC, Co-ordinators and
other involved persons including Observers. Observations / shortcomings are reviewed and
recommendations are made for improvements which are followed by F&S for compliance. The
action points from the mock drill observations should be circulated to all concerned for
liquidation. The critical points shall be presented to management in Apex Loss control meeting
bimonthly.
All Clear / Re-entry Procedures

- Chief Emergency Controller (CEC) will declare All Clear after control of the
Incident and arrange measures required for post Disaster control period and ask Fire Station to
Blow 2 minutes straight run siren.
- After incident normalization, CEC would ask Unit in-charge to visit and check
the incident site along with representatives of Inspection and F&S and also Maintenance
(Electrical / Mechanical / Civil/ Instrumentation/ Rotary) as needed. Standard Checks particular
to a unit will be provided by respective Area Managers.
- Based on feedback of the team, CEC would allow re-entry / resumption of
operations at the incident site.
5.9 Evacuation Plan

5.9.1 Purpose
- To establish method of systematic, safe and orderly evacuation of all the
occupants in case of fire or any emergency, in the least possible time, to a safe assembly point
through nearest safe means of escape. Additionally to use available fire appliances provided for
controlling or extinguishing fire and safeguarding of human life.

PAGE NO: 5.37
5.9.2 Fire Escape Drill Procedure

In the event of fire condition or on hearing the fire alarm all the occupants of the
building shall immediately leave the work area and proceed towards nearest
safe escape route. A care should be taken before leaving the workplace so
that the escape route shall not be blocked due to chairs or other similar object.
Security In-charge will ensure the access control system is defeated for safe
evacuation of all the occupants from the affected building.
The occupants will have to leave the affected area / block / building in a speedy
and orderly manner.
Before leaving the workplace occupants will switch off electrical gadgets such as
AC, Computers, Water heaters, etc. The area owner of the building will ensure
electric supply cut off to the affected building.
The emergency exit / normal exit if not affected due to fire and / or smoke shall be
used for speedy evacuation.
All occupants will follow in a row while escaping from the block / building.
Unnecessary haste and crowding shall be avoided on the escape route. Panic
actions of the occupants will definitely delay the evacuation.
The occupants having visitors shall ensure the safe evacuation of the visitor along
with them to the safe assembly point.
Efforts shall be made to control or extinguish the fire with the help of available fire
extinguishers in that area.
Building / block in-charge shall ensure the safe escape and orderly evacuation of
all the occupants.
All occupants after being evacuated shall assemble at designate safe assembly
point. Block / building in-charge will arrange for head count to ensure that all
the occupants have been safely evacuated.
Security in-charge shall ensure that all the visitors have been evacuated as per
visitor entry register / gate pass register. The visitors shall evacuate from the
building / block along with the occupants and report to security in-charge.

PAGE NO: 5.38
The missing / suspected trapped occupants will be searched and rescued by the
fire crew.
Upon All-Clear signal from the incident controller, occupants can go back to their
work place.
5.10 Training
On job training to the engineers on various facets of risk analysis would go a long way
in improving their horizon which in turn is expected to reflect in the operation of
terminal, especially from the safety stand point. In order to combat with emergency
situations arising out of accident release of hazardous chemicals, it is necessary for
industries to prepare an exhaustive offsite and onsite emergency preparedness plan.
The fire crew belonging to the fire fighting department shall be given intensive training
for the use of all equipment and in various fire fighting methods for handling different
types of fires.
5.11 Checklist for Capability Assessment

The checklist will help in assessing the preparedness, prevention and response
resources capabilities. The points included in the checklist are only indicative and there is a
need to closely examine the local requirements while preparing the checklist.
For good control and management of an incident, there are three important requisites.
Defined Organisation
Effective means
Trained people
The organisation has to be properly structured for routine as well as emergency

purposes with clear understanding of duties and responsibilities. The structure has to consider
an execution and speedy implementation of the response plans; while at the same time, it
should be flexible enough to tune itself to the fast changing situations. All plans and procedures
for emergency handling should be established. Checklists in the form of Dos and Donts of
preventive maintenance, strengthening of HSE, manufacturing utility staff are listed in the
subsequent subsections.
Work permit check list is described below:

PAGE NO: 5.39
Sr. Precaution to be taken Yes No

No.
1 Flow isolated by closing valves
2 De-pressurized vacuum released
3 Drained fully and drain kept open
4 Personal PPes provided
5 Caution boards placed
6 Tools and tackles checked as per specifications
7 Head count of the area known to relevant persons
8 Trained Site supervisor nominated
9 Safety measures such as hydrant, alarms, sensors checked
5.11.1 Welding and Cutting Inspection Checklist

Are only authorized and trained personnel permitted to use welding, cutting, or
brazing equipment?
Does each operator have a copy of the appropriate operating instructions and
are they directed to follow them.
Are compressed gas cylinders regularly examined for obvious signs of defects,
deep rusting, or leakage?
Is care used in handling and storage of cylinders, safety valves, etc., to
prevent damage?
Are precautions taken to prevent the mixture of air or oxygen with flammable
gases, except at a burner or in a standard touch?
Are only approved apparatus (torches, regulators, pressure-reducing valves,
acetylene generators, manifolds) used?
Are signs reading: DANGER-NO SMOKING, NO-MATCHES, OR NO-OPEN-
LIGHTS, or the equivalent posted?
Are provisions made to never crack a fuel-gas cylinder valve near sources of
ignition?
Before a regulator is removed, is the valve closed and gas released from the
regulator?
Is red used to identify the acetylene (and other fuel-gas) hose, green for
Oxygen hose, and black for inert gas and air hose?

PAGE NO: 5.40
Are pressure-reducing regulators used only for the gas and pressures for
which they are intended?
Is open circuit (no load) voltage of arc welding and cutting machines as low as
possible and not in excess of the recommended limits?
Under wet conditions, are automatic controls for reducing no load voltage use?
Is grounding of the machine frame and safety ground connections of portable
machines checked periodically?
Are electrodes removed from the holders when not in use?
Is it required that electric power to the welder be shut off when no one is in
attendance?
Is suitable fire extinguishing equipment available for immediate use?
Is the welder forbidden to coil or loop welding electrode cable around his
body?
Are wet machines thoroughly dried and tested before being used?
Are work and electrode lead cables frequently inspected for wear and damage
and replaced when needed?
Do means for connecting cable lengths have adequate insulation?
When the object to be welded cannot be moved and fire hazards cannot be
removed, are shields used to confine heat, sparks, and slag?
Are fire watchers assigned when welding or cutting is performed in locations
where a serious fire might develop?
Are combustible floors kept wet, covered by damp sand, or protected by fire-
resistant shields?
When floors are wet down, are personnel protected from possible electrical
shock?
When welding is done on metal walls, are precautions taken to protect
combustibles on the other side?
Is it required that eye protection helmets, hand shields, and goggles meet
appropriate standards?
5.11.2 Flammable Liquid Storage Facilities Checklist

Are storage facilities, shelves, etc. arranged so that stores are secure against
sliding, collapse or falls?

PAGE NO: 5.41
Are storage facilities kept free from accumulations of rubbish, unwanted

materials and objects that present hazards from tripping, fire, explosion and
harbourage of pests?
Are freezers and storage areas lockable?
Is the storage facility for bulk flammable liquids separated from the main
building?
Is it clearly labelled as a fire-risk area?
Does it have a gravity or mechanical exhaust ventilation system that is
separate from the main building system?
Are the switches for lighting sealed or placed outside the building?
Are the light fittings inside sealed to protect against ignition of vapours by
sparking?
Are flammable liquids stored in proper, ventilated containers that are made of
Non-combustible materials?
Are the contents of all containers correctly described on the labels?
Are appropriate fire extinguishers and/or fire blankets placed outside but near
to the flammable liquid store?
Are No smoking signs clearly displayed inside and outside the flammable
liquid store?
Are only minimum amounts of flammable substances stored in laboratory
rooms?
Are they stored in properly constructed flammable storage cabinets?
Are these cabinets adequately labelled with Flammable liquid Fire hazard
signs?
Are personnel trained to properly use and transport flammable liquids?
5.11.3 Services Checklist

Is each laboratory provided with enough sinks, water, electricity and gas
outlets for safe working?
Is there an adequate inspection and maintenance programme for fuses, lights,
cables, pipes, etc.?
Are faults corrected within a reasonable time?

PAGE NO: 5.42
Are internal engineering and maintenance services available, with skilled

engineers and craftsmen who also have some knowledge of the nature of the
work of the laboratory?
Is the access of engineering and maintenance personnel to various laboratory
areas controlled and documented?
If no internal engineering and maintenance services are available, have local
engineers and builders been contacted and familiarized with the equipment
and work of the laboratory?
Are cleaning services available?
Is the access of cleaning personnel to various laboratory areas controlled and
documented?
Are information technology services available and secured?
5.11.4 Fire Prevention and Fire Protection Checklist

Is there a fire alarm system?
Are the fire doors in good order?
Is the fire detection system in good working order and regularly tested?
Are fire alarm stations accessible?
Are all exits marked by proper, illuminated signs?
Is access to exits marked where the routes to them are not immediately
visible?
Are all exits unobstructed by decorations, furniture and equipment, and
unlocked when the building is occupied?
Is access to exits arranged so that it is not necessary to pass through a high-
hazard area to escape?
Do all exits lead to an open space?
Are corridors, aisles and circulation areas clear and unobstructed for
movement of staff and fire-fighting equipment?
Is all fire-fighting equipment and apparatus easily identified by an appropriate
color code?
Are portable fire extinguishers maintained fully charged and in working order,
and kept in designated places at all times?

PAGE NO: 5.43
Are laboratory rooms with potential fire hazards equipped with appropriate
extinguishers and/or fire blankets for emergency use?
If flammable liquids and gases are used in any room, is the mechanical
ventilation sufficient to remove vapours before they reach a hazardous
concentration?
Are personnel trained to respond to fire emergencies?
5.11.5 Checklist for Compressed and Liquefied Gases

Is each portable gas container legibly marked with its contents and correctly
colour coded?
Are compressed-gas cylinders and their high-pressure and reduction valves
regularly inspected?
Are reduction valves regularly maintained?
Is a pressure-relief device connected when a cylinder is in use?
Are protection caps in place when cylinders are not in use or are being
transported?
Are all compressed gas cylinders secured so that they cannot fall, especially in
the event of natural disaster?
Are cylinders and liquid petroleum gas tanks kept away from sources of heat?
Are personnel trained to properly use and transport compressed and liquefied
gases?
5.11.6 Checklist for Electrical Hazards

Are all new electrical installations and all replacements, modifications or
repairs made and maintained in accordance with a national electrical safety
code?
Does the interior wiring have an earthed/grounded conductor (i.e. a three-wire
system)?
Are circuit-breakers and earth-fault interrupters fitted to all laboratory circuits?
Do all electrical appliances have testing laboratory approval?
Are the flexible connecting cables of all equipment as short as practicable, in
good condition, and not frayed, damaged or spliced?
Is each electric socket outlet used for only one appliance (no adapters to be
used)?

PAGE NO: 5.44
5.11.7 Checklist for Personal Protection

Is protective clothing of approved design and fabric provided for all staff for
normal work, e.g. gowns, coveralls, aprons, gloves?
Is additional protective clothing provided for work with hazardous chemicals
and radioactive and carcinogenic substances, e.g. rubber aprons and gloves
for chemicals and for dealing with spillages; heat-resistant gloves for
unloading autoclaves and ovens?
Are safety glasses, goggles and shields (visors) provided?
Are there eye-wash stations?
Are there emergency showers (drench facilities)?
Is radiation protection in accordance with national and international standards,
including provision of dosimeters?
Are respirators available, regularly cleaned, disinfected, inspected and stored
in a clean and sanitary condition?
5.11.8 Checklist for Handling Chemical Substances

Are incompatible chemicals effectively separated when stored or handled?
Are all chemicals correctly labelled with names and warnings?
Are chemical hazard warning charts prominently displayed?
Is staff trained to deal with spills?
Are flammable substances correctly and safely stored in minimal amounts in
approved cabinets?
Are bottle carriers provided?

PAGE NO: 5.45

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HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM

Rapid Risk Assessment and Disaster

SECON PVT. LTD.

Secon Pvt Ltd. highly appreciates the opportunity provided by

The assistance of large number of persons in government

The information contained in this report is based on the

1.2 Objectives of the Risk Assessment Study 1.2

1.3 Scope of Work 1.2

Chapter 2: Technology Profile

2.2 Pipelines and Stations 2.3

2.2.1 Salient Features of the Main Pipeline 2.3

2.2.2 Pipeline Route Description 2.5

2.2.3 Summary of Pipeline Details 2.6

2.2.4 Geographical Location of Terminal 2.7

2.2.5 Sum Summary of Station Details at Terminal 2.8

2.3 Facilities provided at terminal 2.8

2.3.1 Pumping & Loading Facilities in Terminal 2.8

2.3.2 Schedule Of Facilities Available At Palanpur Terminal 2.9

2.3.3 Tank Truck Loading Facilities 2.10

2.4 Design basis for Product Facilities 2.11

2.4.2 Storage Facilities 2.12

2.4.4 Applicable Codes & Standards 2.12

2.5.1 Instrumentation & Automation 2.13

2.6 Fire protection system for Terminal 2.15

2.6.1 System Description 2.15

2.6.2 Fire Protection Facilities 2.15

2.7 Safety ,Health and Environment Policy 2.16

2.8 Utilities 2.17

2.8.1 Power Supply Arrangement 2.17

2.8.2 Make up Water System 2.18

2.8.3 Effluent Treatment Plan (ETP) 2.18

Chapter 3: Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) Analysis

3.1.1 Methodology of MCA Analysis 3.2

3.2 Past accident Data Analysis 3.2

3.3 Hazard Identification 3.4

3.3.1 Fire and Explosion index( FEI) 3.5

3.4 MCA Analysis 3.7

3.4.1.2 Flash Fire 3.8

3.4.1.3 Vapour Cloud Explosion 3.9

3.4.1.4 Pool Fire 3.9

3.4.1.5 Lower and Upper Flammability Limit 3.10

3.4.3 Model for Pressure Wave 3.12

4.1.1 General Recommendations 4.1

4.1.2 Specific Recommendations 4.2

4.1.2.1 Control Rooms 4.2

4.1.2.2 Electricity Hazard 4.2

4.1.4 Fire Protection System 4.3

4.1.5 Risks to Personnel 4.4

4.1.6 Risk to Environment 4.5

4.1.7 Precautionary Measures for Falling Objects 4.5

4.1.8 Training 4.5

4.1.9 Strategies 4.5

Chapter 5: Disaster Management Plan

5.2.2 Instrumentation, Control & Communication System 5.2

5.2.3 Communication System 5.3

5.2.4 Fire Protection Facilities 5.3

5.3 Need for Disaster Management Plan 5.4

5.4 Objectives of Disaster Management Plan 5.4

5.5 Statutory Requirement 5.5

5.6 Different Phases of Disaster 5.5

5.7 Key Elements 5.6

5.7.1 Basis of the Plan 5.6

5.11.1 Welding and Cutting Inspection Checklist 5.40