G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988 Court and in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo.
Court and in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Considering that (l)there
EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO
SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P.
TEODOSIO, respondents.
Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.
Rico & Associates for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432 and the
private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of these two (2) cases and
the instant case is the same a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the filing of
the earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our resolution dated December
29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows:
. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed
with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land
known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia.
Eventually, Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued in the names of
Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda The Court issued a writ of
possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao
refused to honor on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772
over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after considering the private
respondents' opposition and finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulently
acquired, ordered that the writ of possession be carried out. A motion
for reconsideration having been denied, a writ of demolition was
issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6,
1982, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. Perez and Gotera filed
the petition for review on certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042
before the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition was denied in
a resolution dated January 7,1983. The motion for reconsideration
was denied in another resolution dated March 25, 1983, which also
stated that the denial is final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in
accordance with the entry of judgment, became final on March 25,
1983. The petitioners in the instant case G.R. No. 64432--contend
that the writs of possession and demolition issued in the respondent
court should now be implemented; that Civil Case No. 00827 before
the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to delay the
implementation of the writ; that counsel for the respondent should be
held in contempt of court for engaging in a concerted but futile effort to
delay the execution of the writs of possession and demolition and that
petitioners are entitled to damages because of prejudice caused by
the filing of this petition before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On
September 26, 1983, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order ' to maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate Appellate
is merit in the instant petition for indeed the issues discussed in G.R.
No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827 before the respondent
court have already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Intermediate Appellate
Court was only intended not to render the petition moot and academic
pending the Court's consideration of the issues, the Court
RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court
not to take cognizance of issues already resolved by this Court and
accordingly DISMISS the petition in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate
implementation of the writs of possession and demolition is likewise
ordered. (pp. 107-108, Rollo G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for
reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this same
date, another resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of the private respondents (Baranda
and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and
March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court issued a
resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which covered the
same subject matter as the Resolutions above cited pursuant to our Resolution dated
December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432
became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by
Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:
Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated
January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable
Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December
29, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in
G.R. No. 64432;
(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under
Act 496, therefore she must register all orders, judgment, resolutions
of this Court and that of Honorable Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition
thereto, the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby
declared null and void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098
is hereby declared valid and subsisting title concerning the ownership
of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara
Cadastre.
The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the
Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as
prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo--G.R. No. 64432)
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for reconsideration
and manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito,
on the ground that there was a pending case before this Court, an Action for
Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo
Baranda, against the former which remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432
ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court and Acting
Register of Deeds to execute and implement the judgments of this Court. They prayed
that an order be issued:
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under
Hon. Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P.
Sornito to register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower
court;
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once
cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p. 473,
64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution in G.R. No.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on another
motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we issued another Resolution dated
October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court Administrator for implementation by the
judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided
by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6,1986 and January
6,1987 respectively, to wit:
ORDER
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the
movants through counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of
Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and
formerly acting register of deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated
October 23, 1986 and the Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso,
Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.
Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation
of the writ of possession was granted by the Honorable Supreme
Court, Second Division per its Resolution dated September 17,1986,
the present motion is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is
hereby ordered to register the Order of this Court dated September 5,
1984 as prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
ORDER
This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners
Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2, 1986,
in compliance with the order of this Court dated November 25, 1 986,
a Motion for Extension of Time to File Opposition filed by Maria
Provido Gotera through counsel on December 4, 1986 which was
granted by the Court pursuant to its order dated December 15, 1986.
Considering that no Opposition was filed within the thirty (30) days
period granted by the Court finding the petition tenable, the same is
hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10)
days from the date of this order, after which period, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared annulled and the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo is ordered to issue a new Certificate of Title
in lieu thereof in the name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate shall contain a memorandum of the
annulment of the outstanding duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, private
respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for
explanation in relation to the resolution dated September 17, 1986 and manifestation
asking for clarification on the following points:
a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of
TCT T-25772, should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals
(as mentioned in the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it already
deemed granted by implication (by virtue of the Resolution dated
September 17, 1986)?
b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only
the implementation of the writ of possession but also the cancellation
of TCT T-25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p. 536, Rollo
4432)
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a resolution
dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx
Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7,
1983 and in G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is
the implementation of our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to
refer the matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to apply
disciplinary sanctions upon whoever attempts to trifle with the
implementation of the resolutions of this Court. No further motions in
these cases will be entertained by this Court. (p. 615, Rollo-64432)
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated November
6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds AvitoSaclauso annotated the
order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and void, cancelled the
same and issued new certificates of titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562
in the name of petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer
Certificate of TItle No. T-106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil
Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in
the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This was upheld by the trial court
after setting aside its earlier order dated February 12, 1987 ordering the cancellation of
lis pendens.
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987 directing the
Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates of
titles.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in another order
dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction to compel the respondent judge to reinstate his
order dated February l2, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the
notice of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the
petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of is
pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners, the
petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to immediately
cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the motion and
directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found on
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for reconsideration
of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said
order based on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to
wit:
"At any time after final judgment in favor of the
defendant or other disposition of the action such as
to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to
the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in
which a memorandum or notice of Lis Pendens has
been registered as provided in the preceding
section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall be deemed
cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the
clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was
pending stating the manner of disposal thereof."
That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-
106098, T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case
docketed as Civil Case No. 15871, now pending with the Intermediate
Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr.,
Maria Provido and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."
That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation
of subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed
cancelled upon the registration of the certificate of the Clerk of Court
in which the action or proceeding was pending, stating the manner of
disposal thereof.
Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis
Pendens was based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of
Appeals, only the Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this
Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings can order the
cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (pp. 68-69, Rollo)
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by the Supreme Court resolutions,
respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987 order and granted the
Acting Register of Deeds' motion for reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871
with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis pendens in
the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were earlier declared valid and
subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue is on
the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta. Barbara
Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No. 64432) from
petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima
Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the
instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the Provides' counsel, a notice of is pendens was
annotated on petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta.
Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order dated
October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason why
respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the Acting
Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of
titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although Calixta
Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is very clear in the petition that Maria
Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos who allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No.
4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772
issued in her name and the names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among
others. (Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues raised by
petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent
Judge Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare as null and void
the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner Maria Provido
Gotera and her other co-owners. (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. No. 62042
contrary to the trial court's findings that they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in the
reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos over Lot
No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently obtained and
declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in
the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,1983 long
before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private respondents
herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the
final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered
immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition in the reconstitution
proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party
causing the registration thereof With the lis pendens duly recorded, he
could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it.
For, notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective
purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation;
and that he should keep his hands off the same, unless of course he
intends to gamble on the results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14,
RuIes of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules
of Court, p. 415, footnote 3, citing cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18
SCRA 481, 485-486)
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in this
case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v.
Rovila (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which
has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action
is pending and undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary
power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance,
where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out
the main allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of
the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily
delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the
defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of
Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, supra)
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the Supreme
Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but unsuccessfuly the already
final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the
respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the
certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be
cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals.
In upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof which
provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse
party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of
Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration
thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been misled
by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact he was the
same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871 prompting the
private respondents to appeal said order dated October 10, 1984 to the Court of
Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the court below but based on the
order, it can be safely assumed that the various pleadings filed by the parties
subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants therein)
touched on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos over
Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds
to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register
of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with
real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If the
instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the
presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising
him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the
proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage
or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does
not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such
instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by
the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court
of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union
[IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the function of the
Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and
leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third International Dictionary of
the English Language the word shall means "ought to, must, ...obligation used to
express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to express
what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature.
The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a
motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the
notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the
subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of
any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of
the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title
and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full
implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated in the
certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre
falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to become part of
dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed
by the private respondents involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under
their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued
by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs
against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
 MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC Consulta
No. 366.
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a
duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an
instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the same be
annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be annotated one
Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548,
appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (/) portion thereof in favor
of petitioners. The entire area of the land is 11.2225 hectares.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or
otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that previously annotated in the
memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of undivided
portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different buyers.
The pertinent entries read:
Entry No. 5658. Sales.

Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying
an undivided portion of an area of 3,710 square meters only in favor of
Florentino Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby
cancelled with respect to said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu
thereof, the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all
rights, participation in interest of the vendor. ...

Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, ...

xxx xxx xxx

Entry No. 5659. Sale of portion.

Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying
an undivided portion of an area of 16,713 square meters in favor of
Roberto Bravo, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby
cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the
name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights,
participation and interest of the vendor ...

Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953. ...

Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion.

G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969
AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.
Vicente Llanes for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner,
conveying an undivided portion of an area of 15,000 square
meters in favor of Juana Gabayan, this Certificate of Title No.
548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ...
and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby
substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of
the vendor ...
 Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952. ...
The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales contains an
additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title No.
548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino
Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr. Andres
Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the vendees, this 5th
day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly because these three other co-owner's
copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented by petitioners, the
Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation.
Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration,
who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution dated April
10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in controversy, the Commissioner
observed:
(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property
described in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold
undivided portions thereof on three different occasions in favor of three
different buyers. Consequently, aside from the owner's duplicate issued to
Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owner's duplicates which are
presumably in the possession of the three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to
the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-
owner's duplicates must likewise be surrendered. The claim of counsel for the
donees that the issuance of the three co-owner's duplicates was unauthorized
is beside the point. Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction rules to
the contrary, these titles are presumed to have been lawfully
issued.lawphi1.et
Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would want to
compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in their possession, citing
section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate
certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall
be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a
memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument." Under this provision,
according to petitioners, the presentation of the other copies of the title is not required,
first, because it speaks of "registered owner" and not one whose claim to or interest in
the property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three vendees-co-owners in
this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their favor was
illegal or unauthorized.
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously assumes that
there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered
owner himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented
constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to make the
corresponding memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of
the title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As correctly
observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of
those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed
until otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies
of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely
affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and
not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a
duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the
transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this
were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole
system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.
One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in upholding the
action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since the property subject of
the donation is presumed conjugal, that is, property of the marriage of the donor,
Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife, Nemesia Mina, "there should first be a
liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a
conveyance." This legal conclusion may appear too general and sweeping in its
implications, for without a previous settlement of the partnership a surviving spouse may
dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein subject of course to the result of future
liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the conjugal character of the
property is assumed, the deed of donation executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin,
bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact
that the two-thirds portion of said property which he donated was more than his one-half
share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of
the same land to three other parties.
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (CC
No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the character of the
land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the different conveyances
executed by him. The matter of registration of the deed of donation may well await the
outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be
protected by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur
and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No pronouncement as
to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.
Capistrano, J., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.
Footnotes
*Section 43. Certificates where land registered in names of two or more
persons. Where two or more persons are registered owners as tenants in
common, or otherwise, one owner's duplicate certificate may be issued for the
whole land, or a separate duplicate may be issued to each for his undivided
share.

G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land
situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original
certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo."
Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in
Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate
of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds,
inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of
Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is
considered conjugal property;
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the
New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made,
the surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property without violating
the existing law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).
To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is
necessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of
the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of
extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of such other heir or
heirs must be procured by means of another document ratifying this sale
executed by their father.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a
petition for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register of Deeds to register
the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title, and to
recover P5,000 in moral damages and P1,000 attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to
perform the acts required of him, and that he (Almirol) has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent reiterated
the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner has "other
legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by appealing the decision of the
respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of Land Registration," and prayed for
dismissal of the petition.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus
does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act
1151", dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner.
Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will lie to
compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in question.
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on
his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real
properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed.
Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this
function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.1
Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not
the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction.
(Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953).
. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection
to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a
valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on registration does not
require that only valid instruments shall be registered. How can parties affected
thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before they become aware,
actually or constructively, of their existence or of their provisions? If the
purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the
effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before,
registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that registration must
first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards. (Gurbax Singh Pablo
& Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183).
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151
from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem
of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the
said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any
deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do
is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who
shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the
doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration.
When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be
taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or
other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in
interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such
matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the
question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the
party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the
matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands,
after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step
to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be
conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That
when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the
Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the
notice thereof.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition for
mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in interest does not
agree with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing
the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and
binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be resorted to by
the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.
 ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1969, is
affirmed, at petitioner's cost.1wph1.t Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085, which reversed and set aside the January 16, 2002
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Sanchez, J., concurs in the result.
Footnotes
1In re Consulta filed by Francisco on behalf of Cabantog, 67 Phil. 222, 228;
Smith Bell & Co., Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 61; Register
of Deeds, Pasig, Rizal vs. heirs of Hi Caiji, et al., 99 Phil. 25, 29-31; Mendoza
vs. Abrera, et al., L-10519, April 30, 1959; Agricultural Credit Cooperative
Association of Hinibiran vs. Yulo Yusay, et al., L-13313, April 28, 1960; Dulay,
et al., vs. Herrera, L-17084, August 30, 1962.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 25, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of
Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land Registration
Case No. 99-023, and the November 20, 2006 Resolution3 which denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as duly
authorized representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed an
Application for Registration of Title4 over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay
Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of five hundred seventy four (574) square
meters, more or less. They alleged that they are the co-owners of the subject lot; that
the subject lot is their exclusive property having acquired the same by purchase from
spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is
presently unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners
for more than thirty (30) years.

After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of the Philippines
(respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the
application for registration of title. Respondent asserted that neither applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required
by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title to prove their
claims; that the tax declaration appended to the application does not appear genuine
and merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that the application was filed
beyond the period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and that the subject lot is part of the
public domain which cannot be the subject of private appropriation.

On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner and his
brothers, viz:

The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant indubitably established sufficient

Republic of the Philippines basis to grant the applicant (sic) for registration. Originally, the whole parcel of land was
SUPREME COURT owned by spouses Teofilo Abellara and Abella Charmine who acquired the same by
Manila virtue of a Deed of Sale from Cynthia Cacho, Agustin Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho, Jover
Cacho and Lauro Cacho. Later, they sold the same parcel of land to spouses Tony C.
THIRD DIVISION Villamil and Alicia Bautista, who in turn sold the same land to herein applicants.
G.R. No. 175746 March 12, 2008 The same parcel of land has been declared in the name of the applicant and her
predecessors-in-interest and its taxes has (sic) been religiously paid.
CHARLES L. ONG, Petitioner,
vs. The said circumstances further show that the possession and ownership of the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. applicant and her (sic) predecessors-in-interest over the same parcel of land has (sic)
been continuous and peaceful under bona fide claim of ownership before the filing of
DECISION
the instant application for registration on [July 1, 1999].
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
WHEREFORE, after confirming the Order of General Default, the Court hereby orders
and decrees the registration of a parcel of land as shown on plan ap-01-004897
approved by the Bureau of Land(s) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan, containing an area of Five Hundred Seventy Four (574) square meters,
subject of the application for registration of title, in accordance with Presidential Decree
No. 1529, in favor of CHARLIE L. ONG in his behalf and as representative of his
brothers namely, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG and CESAR L. ONG.
Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati City, Metro
Manila, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Dagupan City, Atty. Celestino Domingo
Jr., the Office of the Land Registration Authority, Quezon City, as well as the applicant.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the court a
quo granting the application for registration of title of applicants-appellees is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.6
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the subject lot
is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, it was
incumbent upon petitioner to prove that they possessed the subject lot in the nature and
for the duration required by law. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in the
concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D.
1529. It noted that the earliest tax declaration which petitioner presented is dated 1971.
Consequently, petitioner could not fairly claim possession of the land prior to 1971.
Neither was petitioner able to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest actually
occupied the subject lot prior to the filing of the application. Thus, the trial court erred in
granting the application for registration of title over the subject lot.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS BROTHERS,
NAMELY, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG AND CEZAR L. ONG,
HAVE REGISTRABLE OWNERSHIP OVER THE REAL PROPERTY
SUBJECT MATTER OF LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-023, AND
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE
FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS A PUBLIC LAND IS CORRECT.7
The petition lacks merit.
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 ("Property Registration Decree"), as amended, provides
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title
must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.8 These requisites involve questions of fact which are
not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings of the court a quo are
generally binding on this Court except for certain recognized exceptions, as is the case
here, where the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting findings.9 After
a careful review of the records, we sustain the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals.
There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain. The Report10 dated January 17, 2000 of the Bureau of Lands stated
that the subject lot is "within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under
Project 50 L.C. Map No. 698 and released and classified as such on November 21,
1927."11 This finding is, likewise, embodied in the Report12 dated January 7, 1999 of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) and the blue print Copy13 of the plan
covering the subject lot. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses
Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998,14 who in turn purchased the
same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen on January 16, 1997.15 The
latter bought the subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all
surnamed Cacho, on July 10, 1979.16 The earliest tax declaration which was submitted
in evidence was Tax Declaration No. 2560617 issued in 1971 in the names of spouses
Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista. While tax declarations are not conclusive proof
of ownership, they constitute good indicia of possession in the concept of owner and a
claim of title over the subject property.18 Even if we were to tack petitioners claim of
ownership over the subject lot to that of their alleged predecessors-in-interest, spouses
Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista in 1971, still this would fall short of the required
possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphi1
Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not sufficient
to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires
possession and occupation. As held in Republic v. Alconaba:19
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the
all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the
fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.20

Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses
Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his brothers actually occupied
the subject lot.21 No improvements were made thereon and the most that they did was
to visit the lot on several occasions.22 Petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Tony
Bautista testified that he and his wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the
time they bought the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in
1997.23 Aside from these two testimonies, no other evidence was presented to
establish the character of the possession of the subject lot by petitioners other alleged
predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioners evidence failed to establish specific acts of
ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed
and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law.

The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by
clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of THIRD DIVISION
the land is of the nature and duration required by law.24 Unfortunately, petitioners NELSIE B. CAETE, RONA ANAS, G.R. No. 154080
evidence do not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary in cases Petitioners, Present:
of this nature.25 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the Decision Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
of the trial court and in denying his application for registration of title over the subject lot. - versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona,*
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The April 25, 2006
Nachura, and
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085 which reversed and set
Reyes, JJ.
aside the January 16, 2002 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan,
GENUINO ICE COMPANY, INC.,
Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-023, and the November 20, 2006
Respondent. Promulgated:
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner. January 22, 2008

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------x
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Associate Justice
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of
WE CONCUR:
Appeals dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 entitled Genuino Ice
Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Victorino P. Evangelista, Nelsie B. Caete, et al., and its
Resolution[2] dated June 26, 2002, dismissing petitioners Second Amended Complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483 filed in Branch 223 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.

Records show that on January 11, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for cancellation of
title to property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. N-
140441;[3] 14399;[4] RT-94384 (292245);[5] RT-94794 (292246);[6] and
292247.[7] Petitioners alleged that said titles are spurious, fictitious and were issued
under mysterious circumstances, considering that the holders thereof including their
predecessors-in-interest were never in actual, adverse and physical possession of the
property, rendering them ineligible to acquire title to the said property under the Friar
Lands Act.[8] Petitioners also sought to nullify Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614
from which the foregoing titles sought to be cancelled originated or were derived.
Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss[9] on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action because petitioners are not real parties-in-interest;
that no relief may be granted as a matter of law; and that petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, but it was denied by the trial court. Respondent moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied.
On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed a Second Amended Complaint[10] which sought
to annul, in addition to the titles already alleged in the original complaint, TCT Nos.
274095 and 274096;[11] 274097 and 274098;[12] and 274099.[13]
The Second Amended Complaint alleged the following causes of action, as well as the
remedy sought to be obtained, thus:
4. That plaintiffs (petitioners) and their predecessors-in-interest are
among those who have been in actual, adverse, peaceful and
continuous possession in concept of owners of unregistered parcels
of land situated at Sitio Mabilog, Barangay Culiat, Quezon City, Metro
Manila, which parcels of land are more particularly described as
follows:
(1) A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 668,
situated at Barangay Culiat, Quezon City x x x.
(2) A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 669,
situated at Barangay Culiat, Quezon City x x x.
5. That the above-described real property is a portion of a friar land
known as Piedad Estate, which property is intended for distribution
among the bona fide occupants thereof pursuant to the Friar Lands
Act.
6. That transfer certificates of title allegedly having originated or
derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 were issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, which transfer certificates of title
are in truth and in fact fictitious, spurious and null and void, for the
following reasons: (a) that no record of any agency of the government
shows as to how and in what manner was OCT 614 issued; (b) that
no record of any proceedings whatsoever, whether judicial or
administrative, can support defendants claim that the above-
described property originated from OCT 614; and (c) that the transfer
certificates of title over the above-described property were issued
under mysterious circumstances for the above-named defendants
and their so-called predecessors-in-interest never had any actual,
adverse, physical possession of the said property, thus, not allowed
to acquire title over the property in litigation pursuant to the Friar
Lands Act.
7. That defendants are holders of transfer certificates of title of the
above-described property, which transfer certificates of title are null
and void, for reasons specifically mentioned in Paragraph 6 hereof x x
x;
8. That the acts in acquiring and keeping the said transfer certificates
of title in violation of the Friar Lands Act and other existing laws are
prejudicial to plaintiffs rights over the above-described property.
9. That equity demands that defendants transfer certificates of title as
specified in Paragraph 7 hereof be declared fictitious, spurious and
null and void ab initio.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of
this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiffs
and against defendants:
(1) Declaring as null and void ab initio OCT 614 and all transfer
certificates of title derived therefrom;
(2) Declaring as null and void defendants transfer certificates of title
over the property in litigation;
(3) Ordering defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
defendants transfer certificates of title and all transfer certificates of
title derived therefrom;
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in
litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other
existing laws.[14]

Respondent moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the following
grounds:
a) The complaint states no cause of action because: (1) on the
allegations alone, plaintiffs (petitioners) are not real parties in interest
who may bring suit to cancel defendants (including respondent) titles;
(2) based on the allegations and prayer of the complaint, no relief, as
a matter of law, may be granted;
b) Prescription has set in;
c) There are earlier similar complaints (Civil Case Nos. Q-95-22834
and Q-95-23111) filed by a different set of plaintiffs against a different
set of defendants but which involve the same subject matter, cause of
action and allegations of the plaintiffs, with respect to the cancellation
of OCT 614 and succeeding titles derived from it. Said complaints
have since been dismissed by Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, the dismissal of which is the subject of a pending
certiorari proceeding in the appellate court.[15]
On January 3, 2001,[16] the trial court denied respondents motion to dismiss the
Second Amended Complaint. Its motion for reconsideration was likewise denied hence
respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari and dismissed petitioners
Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Hence, the instant
petition raising the following issues:
A. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE
PETITIONERS WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-99-36483 DOES
NOT STATE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION;
B. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT REAL
PARTIES IN INTEREST;
C. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING
THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES; and,
D. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND DENIED PETITIONERS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT DISMISSED THEIR
COMPLAINT.[17]
We deny the petition.
The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land acquired on
December 23, 1903 by the Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila
Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands, as indicated in
Public Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26, 1904.[18]
After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No. 614 in the name of the Philippine
Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496, the area was subdivided originally
into 874 lots. As a result of subsequent surveys executed in the course of disposition,
the number of lots increased to 1,305. Disposition of these lots was made by the Bureau
of Lands thru sales, under the Friar Lands Act, as early as 1910 and records show that
even before the Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate have been disposed
of.[19] The Piedad Estate has long been segregated from the mass of the public domain
and has become private land duly registered under the Torrens system following the
procedure for the confirmation of private lands prescribed in Act 496. Thus the lands
inside the Piedad Estate are no longer lands of the public domain.[20]
One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-interest,
may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time
immemorial, as this contravenes the historical fact that friar lands were bought by the
Government of the Philippine Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United
States, approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual persons but from certain
companies, a society and a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only actual
settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government were
given preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings, in disregard of the
settlement and occupation of persons before the government acquired the lands.[21]
The basic rules of proper pleading and procedure require that every pleading shall
contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the
ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case
may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.[22] And in all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with
particularity.[23]
It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint determine the
nature of the action, and consequently, the jurisdiction of the
courts. This is because the complaint must contain a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action and must specify the relief sought. No rule is better established
than that which requires the complaint to contain a statement of all
 the facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. Additionally,
Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that in all averments
of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
must be stated with particularity. In the case at bar, while there are
allegations of fraud in the above quoted complaints, the same are not
particular enough to bring the controversy within the SEC's
jurisdiction. The said allegations are not statements of ultimate facts
but are mere conclusions of law.
A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of
action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of
fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations that a contract is valid
or legal, or is just, fair and reasonable, are mere conclusions of
law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid,
illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts
showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law.[24]
Ultimate facts means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action, or
such facts as are so essential that they cannot be stricken out without leaving the
statement of the cause of action inadequate.[25]Cause of action has been defined as an
act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;[26] and
its essential elements are: 1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; 2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and 3) an act or omission on the part of
the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action.[27] In the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of
action, only the facts alleged in the complaint as well as its annexes must be
considered.[28] The test in such case is whether a court can render a valid judgment on
the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein.[29]
Corollarily, the question of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action against a
defendant or the action is premature is one of law. The trial court can consider all the
pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on record. However in so
doing, the trial court does not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely
includes such documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of lack
of cause of action based on these documents would not involve a calibration of the
probative value of such pieces of evidence but would only limit itself to the inquiry of
whether the law was properly applied given the facts and these supporting
documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a review are pure
questions of law, and not questions of fact.
The trial court must likewise apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in determining
whether the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of action. While it focuses on
the complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper
appreciation of the questions before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court
must take cognizance of decisions this Court has rendered because they are proper
subjects of mandatory judicial notice. The said decisions, more importantly, form part of
the legal system, and failure of any court to apply them shall constitute an abdication of
its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and shall be a ground for
administrative action against an inferior court magistrate.[30]
Considering the foregoing, it is not difficult to see the need for particularity and incipient
substantiation in the petitioners Second Amended Complaint.
First, their initial claim that OCT 614 of which all the other subject titles are derivatives
is null and void, has been proven wrong. As has been held in Pinlac and other cases,
OCT 614 did legally exist and was previously issued in the name of the Philippine
Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496.
Second, the Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of Natural Resources, which was
specifically tasked to investigate the historical background of the Piedad Estate, found
that as early as the period prior to the Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate
had already been disposed of.
Third, the Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens system of land
registration, which means that all lots therein are titled.
Fourth, as held in the Balicudiong case, one who acquires land under the Friar Lands
Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase
by reason of occupation from time immemorial, which means that petitioners claimed
actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property is really of
no moment unless it is shown that their predecessors-in-interest were actual settlers
and occupants at the time said lands were acquired by the Government, and whose
rights were not disregarded even though they were in occupation of the same before the
government acquired the land; yet, no period of time in relation to adverse possession is
alleged.
Petitioners Second Amended Complaint betrays no more than an incomplete narration
of facts unsupported by documentary or other exhibits; the allegations therein partake of
conclusions of law unsupported by a particular averment of circumstances that will show
why or how such inferences or conclusions were arrived at. It is replete with sweeping
generalizations and inferences derived from facts that are not found therein. While there
are allegations of fraud upon the claim that the subject titles were fictitious, spurious and
obtained under mysterious circumstances, the same are not specific to bring the
controversy within the trial courts jurisdiction. There is no explanation or narration of
facts as would show why said titles are claimed to be fictitious or spurious, contrary to
the requirement of the Rules that the circumstances constituting fraud must be stated
with particularity; otherwise, the allegation of fraud would simply be an unfounded
conclusion of law. In the absence of specific averments, the complaint is defective, for it
presents no basis upon which the court should act, or for the defendant to meet it with
an intelligent answer.
As to the second issue raised, petitioners claim that they are bona fide occupants of the
subject property within the contemplation of the Friar Lands Act, having allegedly been
in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the property, although it is
not stated for how long and since when. In their second amended complaint, they seek
judgment
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in
litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other
existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)
They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject property despite their alleged
adverse possession but only to be adjudged as the bona fide occupants thereof. In
other words, petitioners concede the States ownership of the property.
Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real parties in interest for the purpose
of maintaining the suit for cancellation of the subject titles. The Court of Appeals is
correct in declaring that only the State, through the Solicitor General, may institute such
suit. Jurisprudence on the matter has been settled and the issue need not be
belabored. Thus
The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper
parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as it did for
the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the
ground that they were derived from a spurious OCT No. 4216,
assailed in effect the validity of said title. While private respondents
did not pray for the reversion of the land to the government, we agree
with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will have the same
result of reverting the land to the government under the Regalian
doctrine. Gabila vs. Barriga ruled that only the government is entitled
to this relief. The Court in that case held:
The present motion to dismiss is actually predicated
on Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of
Court, i.e., failure of the complaint to state a cause
of action, for it alleges in paragraph 12 thereof that
the plaintiff admits that he has no right to demand
the cancellation or amendment of the defendants
title, because, even if the said title were canceled or
amended, the ownership of the land embraced
therein, or of the portion thereof affected by the
amendment, would revert to the public domain. In
his amended complaint the plaintiff makes no
pretense at all that any part of the land covered by
the defendants title was privately owned by him or
by his predecessors-in-interest. Indeed, it is
admitted therein that the said land was at all times
a part of the public domain until December 18,
1964, when the government issued a title thereon in
favor of defendant. Thus, if there is any person or
entity to relief, it can only be the government.
In the case at bar, the plaintiffs own averments
negate the existence of such right, for it would
appear therefrom that whatever right might have
been violated by the defendant belonged to the
government, not to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-appellant
argues that although his complaint is captioned as
one for cancellation of title, he has nevertheless
stated therein several causes of action based on
his alleged rights of possession and ownership over
the improvements, on defendant-appellees alleged
fraudulent acquisition of the land, and on the
damages allegedly incurred by him (plaintiff-
appellant) in relation to the improvements. These
matters are merely ancillary to the central issue of
whether or not defendant-appellees title should be
canceled or amended, and they may not be leaned
upon in an effort to make out a cause of action in
relation to the said focal issue. Indeed, the principal
relief prayed for in the amended complaint is the
cancellation or amendment of defendant-appellees
title.[31]
Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The interest of the party must also
be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some
third and unrelated party. Real interest, on the other hand, means a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate,
or consequential interest.[32]
If petitioners are to be believed, they would possess a mere inchoate interest in the
properties covered by the subject titles, a mere expectancy conditioned upon the fact
that if the questioned titles are cancelled and the property is reverted to the State, they
would probably or possibly be given preferential treatment as qualified buyers or
lessees of the property under the Friar Lands Act. But this certainly is not the interest
required by law that grants them license or the personality to prosecute their case. Only
to the State does the privilege belong.

On the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, suffice it to state that since

petitioners do not possess the necessary interest to prosecute the case for cancellation
of title in the courts, neither do they have the right to pursue administrative remedies EN BANC
outside thereof. They are not the owners; nor are they qualified applicants therefor. It
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No.179987
has not been shown by their complaint that they have previously taken steps to avail of
Petitioner,
the benefits under the Friar Lands Act, since all they seek, should the questioned titles
Present:
be nullified, is to be declared bona fide occupants of the property covered by the
PUNO,C.J.,
questioned titles. Neither is there any indication that they possess the qualifications
QUISUMBING,
necessary to enable them to avail of the preference granted under the Act.
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
Finally, there is no merit in petitioners contention that respondent belatedly filed the
-versus-
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and that the appellate court gravely
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
abused its discretion when it entertained and resolved the same.
CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO DE CASTRO, BRION,
The Order of the trial court dated January 3, 2001 denying respondents motion to
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, and
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint was received by the respondent on January
Respondent. BERSAMIN, JJ.
16, 2001. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2001 which was
denied on February 28, 2001. Respondent received the order denying its motion for
Promulgated:
reconsideration on March 27, 2001. On the same day, it filed a Notice to File Petition for
April 29, 2009
Certiorari. On April 2, 2001, the petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
x---------------------------------------------------x
Appeals. Clearly, the same was timely filed hence, the appellate court correctly DECISION
entertained the same.
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not
dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 dismissing petitioners Second
titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483 and the Resolution dated June 26,
called Third World. And it has many consequences.
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
xxx
SO ORDERED.
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in
Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and
have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the
state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal
titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property ownership
to each other which are not the same means developed by the Spanish
legal system. The informals have their own papers, their own forms of
agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which are very
clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal
business transactions.
 If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and
you walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to bark
at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only
one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that there
exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American
formal legal system does not know how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto[1]
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and
entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the
facts, was accepted by the Court en bancin order to provide definitive clarity to the
applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the
relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the
ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of
informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect.
Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the
phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord
with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our public land law,
though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic
problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2]
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous
adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City,
Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the
State.[4] Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his
witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property
was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-
grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and
Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons
inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans
wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the
Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their
son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which
originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by
Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.[5]
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes
Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of
the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.[6] The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not
present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11
June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that
the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7]
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing
an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four
(71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now
forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age,
Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding
decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession
of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation
of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing the RTC
and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the
classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court
noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was
declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession
prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession.
This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]

Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;[10] hence, it
was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this
Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just four
months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the
Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein
which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place
since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already
begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the
property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands,
any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be
counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act
and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008, the case
was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral
arguments, to wit:
1.In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain
may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should
the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945
or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the
filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that
the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed
private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil Code?
3.May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be
registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in
relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4.Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both?[13]
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in
Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory
pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since
the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of
the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v.
Bibonia,[14]promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the
same observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was
patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply,
the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945.
Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v.
Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic[16] and Republic v. Imperial
Credit Corporation,[17] as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals.[18]
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years
ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of
Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as,
at the time of the application, the property had already been converted into private
property through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively
from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive.
The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of
properties of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of
private lands. It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section
14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period
refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not
the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that,
assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period
should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and
disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual
circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its
enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.
The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain
into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.[20] Alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a)
agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c)
educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and
for public and quasi-public uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges
that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial legalization.[22]Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably
grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law
was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D.
No. 1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope
of the lands that may be registered. This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the
Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain are a larger class than only agricultural lands.
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty
(30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession since June
12, 1945 or earlier. The Court in Naguitexplained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided
that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty
(30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was
again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the
reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same
as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various
laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is
Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain.
The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1)those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of
Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly
refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a
redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed
or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
 Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may
apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the
right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right
itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by
P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a
Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his
title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public
Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that
both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes
the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree
recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the
Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek
registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several times, most
recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are
hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within
which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period
shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve
(12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time
designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of
this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this
Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said
persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period
fixed by the President.[24]
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under
Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section
14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for
one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest
be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the
alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of
12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and
disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The
absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June
12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of
Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies
its antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership. Generally
speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located.[25] Ad proximum antecedents fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would
be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which
were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would
not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes
the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify
public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet
even considered an independent state.
 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained: claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.

Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If
had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June
the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize
the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
Appeals[27] since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on
land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell,
property.
its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling
in Republic v. Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim of possession that extended back to
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was
1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in
adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit,
1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of
absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it
the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June
1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our
forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated
Registration Decree.
November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that
from Herbieto are obiter dictasince the land registration proceedings therein is void ab
the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and
initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial
disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per
hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts
map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient
acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section
evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private
14(1) is indeed obiter.
respondents application. Further, the certification enjoys a
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the Court,
presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
citing Herbieto, again stated that [a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the
evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the
[s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and
observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession That statement, in
the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands
in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The application therein was
and Forestry to contest the application of appellees
ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein
on the ground that the property still forms part of
did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding
the public domain. Nor is there any showing that
the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether
the lots in question are forestal land....
petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section
 Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession
of public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant
to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of
private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the
burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their
application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were
able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule,
we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one
of them.[29]
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who
authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain
lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June
1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed
nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while
in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared
alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to
contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The
provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx
(2)Those who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we
did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to
it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.[[30]] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years.[[31]] With such conversion, such property may
now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2),
and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired
ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945,
and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then
the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where
petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the
evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is
in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis
for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113
which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of
its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in
character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among
the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber
lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber
or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real
property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary
prescription of ten (10) years,[32] or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30)
years.[33] Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith,[34] as
well as just title.[35]

When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons
who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration
of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by
prescription of private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus,
the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass
original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private
person has acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that
properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years.[36] Yet if we ascertain the source of the thirty-year period, additional complexities
relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in
fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public
lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(emphasis supplied)[37]
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the
date 12 June 1945the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for
registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep.
Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it
applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in
relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil
Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which,
under Article 1137, is completed through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith.
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became
unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is
the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2).
However, there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated
under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to
or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a
requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application for
confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be
declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire
thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act
No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement,[38] similar to our earlier finding with
respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the
point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis
for original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
which entitled those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-
year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of
the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of
prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section
14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription
under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of
prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is
no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription. The identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by
Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character
stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging
to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce
of man.[39] Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or
not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or
any duly authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the
public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted,
under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property?
After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of
the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man
are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial
property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State. It is this provision that controls how public dominion
property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which belong to
the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if when it is intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of
the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2),
and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in
the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of
lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide
possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord
with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the
State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used
only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the
Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is
to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very
well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example.
Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military
Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known as the BCDA
law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and portions
of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base.For
purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the President to
transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA)[40]which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.[41]The
President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in
part.[42].Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof
are alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations
governing sales of government properties.[43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become
alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the
BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order
to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases
at Clark and Subic.[44]Such purpose can be tied to either public service or the
development of national wealth under Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands
remained property of the public dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their
status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA
law to a private person or entity that such lands become private property and cease to
be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a
duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of
possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned
in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the
purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property
before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil
Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the
framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during
the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to
meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section
14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis
of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of
the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under
Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the
Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year
period available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to
Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year
period of possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year
period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of
possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary
prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply
as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it
ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes
such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere
to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation.
Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that
provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our
land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the
Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states
that [a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription,
and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under
the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117,
requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is
completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that
bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary
acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the
same time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment
of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article
1127 of the Civil Code,[45] provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article
1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of
ownership, and which would have actually transferred ownership if the
grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by
prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation,
succession, and dacion in payment.[46]
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability
of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the
argument is that the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to
the possessor before the completion of the required period of possession.[47] It is
evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129
is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive
prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any
other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary
prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion
lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But
after the property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run
in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal
events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land; and
(2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires
ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted
patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under
the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of property is not a mode
of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.[48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration
Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully
accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code.
What the system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought about
by the completion of a period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either
30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public
lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did
not preclude such registration.[50]Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the
Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who
have completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed
with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2)
thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that
is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.
(a)Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land
Act.[51]
(b)The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property
not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a)Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code
is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b)There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their
own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of
the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
 VI. DANTE O. TINGA
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines Associate Justice
established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays
ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the country
will be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and
the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply
levied the law without comment.

The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a

phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common
among the so-called Third World countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the
disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has
been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these
public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven
unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation
of said properties.[52] Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most
viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this
decision, has considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held
residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have
tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been
regarded for generation by their families and their communities as common law
owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states.
Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself
considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to
Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize
the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before
the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by
liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil
Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into
patrimonial.

Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only
of that individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is deprived,
life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome
closure to the long pestering problem. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 Manila
February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs. FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39248 May 7, 1976

SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE, defendant-appellant, LAND REGISTRATION
COMMISSIONER and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, defendants.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez
and Atty. Baltazar Llamas plaintiff-appellee.
Jose R. Madrazo, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
Gregorio Bilog, Jr. for defendant Land Registration Commissioner.
ESGUERRA, J.:
This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 47438-R. The Court of Appeals certified it to this Court for final consideration
and resolution of the pure question of law involved.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court of
First Instance of Davao, Branch 1, alleging, among others, the following:
3. That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and defendant
Register of Deeds of Davao City whose Offices are at Espaa
Extension, Quezon City and Davao City, respectively. "(are included
in this complaint, the first being the public Official charged under the
law with the approval )." subdivision surveys of private lands while the
second is the Official vested with the authority to issue certificates of
titles, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496, as amended, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Law;
4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa
Abrille) is the owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing
an area of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED FIFTY TWO SQUARE METERS (525.652), more or less,
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 of the Registry of Deeds
of Davao City, issued in her name;
5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the
subdivision of the aforesaid parcel of land into two lots designated as
Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-69322 which was approved by the Land Registration
Commissioner on March 17,1967;
6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379- B-2-B-
1 contains an area of 30,100 Square Meters while Lot No. 379-B-2B-2
contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters or a total area of 607,779
Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square Meters more than the original
area covered in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of
said defendant Luisa Villa Abrille;
7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land
Registration Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure
an order from the Court of First Instance of Davao in LRC (GLRO)
Doc. No. 9969, directing the Register of Deeds for the City of Davao
and Province of Davao, to correct the area of Certificate of Title No. T-
1439 and thereafter to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof TCT
Nos. T-18886 and T-18887;
8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned
registered Lot 379-B-2-B-1 and issued TCT No. 18886 therefor, in the
name of Luisa Villa Abrille and on the same date registered Lot No.
379-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT No. 18887 in the name of Luisa Villa
Abrille;
9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the
aforementioned excess area of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in
accordance with law for lack of the required notice and publication as
prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Law;
10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a
result of the approval of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was
formerly a portion of the Davao River which dried up by reason of the
change of course of the said Davao River; hence a land belonging to
the public domain; and
11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
18887 which covers Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey (LRC)
Psd-69322, wherein the excess area of land belong to the public
domain (not private land) is null and void ab initio.
On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao- City filed her answer
averring that she, "in the performance of her ministerial duty, honestly and in good faith
effected the registration of Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No. 379B-2-B-2 and
the issuance of corresponding TCT No. 18886 and TCT No. 18887 therefor,
respectively, in view of the approval of the Land Registration Commissioner of
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of the Court of First
Instance of Davao to correct the area in Certificate of Title No. T-1439, to cancel the
same and to issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887".
On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their answer admitting the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the complaint; that they admit the increase in
area of the land of their predecessor but that the increase in area of the land was
acceded to and concurred in by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, and
the same was duly noted and approved by the Court of First Instance of Davao; that
they admit the issuance of TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887 out of Certificate of Title No.
T- 1439 in the name of their predecessor-in-interest Luisa Villa Abrille but that TCT No.
T-18886 had been cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-19077 was issued in favor
of Gaudencio Consunji, and, TCT No. T-18887 had likewise been cancelled and several
Transfer Certificates of Title were issued thereunder; that the subject increase of area
was made in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence; and that Luisa Villa
Abrille, predecessor-in-interest of herein defendant-appellant, as riparian owner was
entitled under the law to claim, as she did, the increase or excess in area of her original
land as her own.
On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land Registration prays for a
judgment on the pleadings and avers in his answer that he has no knowledge of the
subject matter of the complaint since the subdivision plan involved therein was
approved by the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas; and that on
February 19, 1968, the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas,
issued LRC Circular No. 167 directing the Register of Deeds throughout the Philippines
to, among others, deny the registration of subdivision plans with increased or expanded
areas and to withhold the issuance of the corresponding titles, or if the plans have
already been registered and the titles issued, to recall the titles and to take appropriate
steps for their cancellation.
Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants, tried to intervene in the
case as movant-intervenors but they were denied standing in court by the trial court in
its order of August 16,1969.
On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court their "Agreed Stipulation of
Facts" and pray that judgment be rendered by the trial court on their case based on
their stipulation of facts. The "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" of the parties reads as
follows:
COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys, and
unto the Honorable Court, most respectfully submit the following
stipulation of facts and allege:
1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28, 1916 in
the Registry Book of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga as Vol.
A27, Page 40 under Original Certificate of Title No. 5609, Case No. 1,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 317, in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim
Juna, father of Luisa Villa Abrille;
2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said property was
inherited by Luisa Villa Abrille and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
1439 was issued in the name of said Luisa Villa Abrille;
3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision plan Psd-
69322 by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-18886 and 18887 were issued by the
defendant, Register of Deeds of Davao, copy of which subdivision
plan is hereto attached as Annex "A", and made integral part hereof;
4. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18886 was subsequently
cancelled by virtue of deed of sale, and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-19077 was issued in the name of Gaudencio Consunji a
purchaser in good faith and for value;
5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved by the
Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, through an Order dated
March 27, 1967, copy of which order is hereto attached as Annex "B"
and made part hereof;
6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch IV, on the strength of the Report of the
defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy of which report is
hereto attached as Annex "C" and made integral part hereof;
7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887 was by
virtue of an Order of the Court of First Instance, Branch 1, in Special
Proceedings No. 1357, entitled: In the Matter of the Testate Estate of
Luisa Villa Abrille, approving a project of partition cancelled, and in
lieu thereof, the following Transfer Certificates of Title were issued to
the following named persons, to wit:
(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;
(b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin;
(c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang;
(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang;
(e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang;
(f) T-20732 Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang;
(i) T-23015 - Miguel Huang;
(j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang;
(k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang;
which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a subdivision
plan LRC Psd-71236 duly approved by the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner, copy of which subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-71236 is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made integral part
hereof;
8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the area of Lot
379-B-2-B, but the same was with the knowledge of the defendant,
Land Registration Commissioner and the court of First Instance of
Davao, Branch IV;
9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been affected
or prejudiced in the increase in area as only Luisa Villa Abrille as the
registered owner holds property adjacent to the parcel of land in
question;
10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot 379-B-
2-B and abuts the Davao River;
11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully planted with
coconuts, bananas and other seasonal crops by the defendants,
through their predecessor-in-interest;
12. That the increase in area could have taken place very long time
ago as the coconuts planted thereon had long been fruit bearing;
13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not contain any
portion of the increase in area;
14. That of the certificates of title issued based under subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-71236, only Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T- 20725; T-
20701; T-20713; and T-20690 contain the increase in area; while all
the other certificates of title issued under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
71236 do not contain any increase in area;
15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order Annex "B"
was without notice to the Director of Lands.
The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January 27,
1970, which reads as follows:
This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title
instituted by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director of Lands, against the Estate of Luisa Abrille, represented by
Huang Siu Sin, Administrator, the Land Registration Commissioner
and the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao. Because the residue
of the intestate estate of Luisa Villa Abrille had been divided among
Huang Siu Sin, Josefino Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang and
lap Tong Ha, heirs, they were directed to appear and to substitute for
the intestate estate and they did.
The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
xxx xxx xxx
The increase in area of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 5609 of the Register of Deeds of Davao in the name of Francisco
Villa Abrille Lim Juna and subsequently by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T. 1439 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and finally, based on
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-20725 in the name of Milagros Huang, T20701 in the name of
Josefino Huang, T-20713 in the name of Miguel Huang and T-20690
in the name of Huang Siu Sin, is from 525,652 square meters to
607,779 square meters, or 82,127 square meters.
The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to
include the increase in area was a petition for approval of Subdivision
Plan (LRC) Psd-79322 recommended by the Commissioner of Land
Registration in his Report, and for issuance of new title under Section
44, Act 496, as amended, filed with this court, which was assigned to
Branch IV.
Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid
remedy was sought, notice before the hearing is required. The parties
admit that there was no notice to the persons interested, including the
Director of Lands, before the petition was heard.
Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690
even assuming arguendo that the same belonged to the owner of the
land to which it is adjacent by the simple expediency of a petition for
approval of subdivision plan and issuance of new titles, because a
subdivision of a registered land under Section 44 of Act 496 does not
authorize the inclusion of land or area not embraced in the titled or in
excess of what is stated in the title. And the approval by the Court of
such subdivision plan does not lend validity to it. The subdivision must
be limited to the area stated in the title. Neither amendment of the title
under Section 112 of Act 496 would be a valid remedy 1.
The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille.. owners of the adjacent estate, might
have acquired a registrable title to the land in question but to bring it
under the operation of the Land Registration Act, a petition for
registration under Act 496 should have been filed. More so when the
title acquired is by continuous possession for at least 30 years under
a claim of ownership And even assuming that the land is an accretion,
the fact that the riparian estate is registered does not bring ipso facto
effect its accretion thereto under the operation of the Land
Registration Act. No decree of registration of the land based upon
final judgment promulgated by a court of competent jurisdiction after
due publication, notice and hearing, has been issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration and transcribed by the Register of
Deeds of Davao in the registry, for the reason that no initial or original
registration proceedings have been instituted by the owner. And the
only way by which a title to the land in question can be issued for the
first time is for the Land Registration Commissioner to issue a decree
 of registration based upon final judgment rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction after trial.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 and
directing the Register of Deeds of Davao to issue new certificates of
title in lieu thereof after the portions consisting of 82,127 square
meters, the land involved, shall have been segregated therefrom in
accordance with law.
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille
brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, in
its Resolution dated July 22, 1974, certified the case (CA-G.R. No. 47438-R) to this
Court for consideration and final disposition.
Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the approval of
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on ground of lack of notice
to interested persons, and in ordering the cancellation of Certificates of Title Nos. T-
20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690. It is the contention of the defendant-appellant
that since the government agencies having to do with lands know all the time the
increase in area in subdivision plan Psd-69322, and the government agencies
concerned tolerated if not abetted the ultimate inclusion of the involved increase in area,
defendant-appellant should not be made to suffer the effect of the allegedly wrong
procedure or step taken in the approval of the aforementioned subdivision plan.
Besides, defendant-appellant claims that it is their honest belief that the legal remedy
taken by them in seeking the approval of their subdivision plan concerned was well
within the law, particularly the provision of Section 44 of Act 496, as amended.
Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the subdivision plan,
with the increase in area, by the defendant-appellant Land Registration Commission
does not lend validity to the said subdivision plan; and that the issuance of the four
transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690) over the
increased area in question is improper and invalid notwithstanding the conformity of the
Land Registration Commissioner and the subsequent order of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch IV, approving the subdivision plan concerned, as the
required giving of notice to all parties interested in defendant-appellant's petition for
approval of subdivision plan was not at all followed,
Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in order to arrive at a
judicious disposition of the case at bar, is whether or not the lower court erred in
ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-
20713 and T-20690 which cover the increased area in question totalling 82,127 square
meters.
After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, We are of the
opinion and so hold that the lower court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which
admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square meters under Subdivision Plan
(LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for the City of Davao.
Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the approval
of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to include the
questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to say the least, unwarranted
and irregular. This is so, for the increased area in question, which is not a registered
land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a mere mistake in area of
the original registration of the tracts of land of the defendant-appellant formerly
belonging to and registered in the name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim
Juna. In order to bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a
former river bed of the Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the Land
Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in registrations of land title should have been
filed Instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan.
It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the
predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took, is
good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In the instant case, part of the
tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meters, has not yet been brought
under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still, the approval of Subdivision
Plans (LRC) Psd-69322 and Psd-71236 was without notice to all parties in interest,
more particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have his imperfect or
incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered under Act 496, the following
requisites should all be satisfied:
1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private
surveyor;
2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the
Court;
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together
with all the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the
Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission;
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and
place of the hearing in the Official Gazette;
6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those
known to have interests in the property by the sheriff;
7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in
the notice or not;
8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
 10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final
and instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of
confirmation and registration;

11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration

Commission;

12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding

Register of Deeds, and

13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book

and the issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of title to
the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the
prescribed fees.

Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower court
committed no error in its appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.

Republic of the Philippines
No special pronouncement as to costs. SUPREME COURT
SO ORDERED. Manila

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur. EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.

Monico R. Mercado for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint
filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for
judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land
described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the
Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private
property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela
Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with
the costs.

For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation
contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a
property of the Government of the United States under the administration and control of
the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance
with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the
land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and
ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against
Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning
thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior
case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question
is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the
possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of
Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the
register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale
be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in
question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of
P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in
possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed,
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for
the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of
the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said
land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of
which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land
in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi
has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during
the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913,
commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the
possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence introduced
at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela
Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain
possession of the land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the
Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having
learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6,
1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making
the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of
Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of
deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela
Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the
land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry
and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F
and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the
appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the
land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through
his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the
forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela
Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August
15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had
already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-
four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said
land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated
when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is
beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there
is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45
of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act.
So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already
acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government,
for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant
may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the
provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired
the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public
domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question
to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer
any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon
did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the
plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become,
by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial
sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession
thereof and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the
same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.
Johnson, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 41 Phil., 935.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,
ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five
parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed
judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is
a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December
23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario
can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation
particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally
acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano
Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural
minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as
the sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by
Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from
generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and
Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is
continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of
the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29,
1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the
non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the
alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than
Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements
were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered
on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the
applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of
Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of
Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land
bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N')
on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal
Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on
November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts
that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long
after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law;
and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from
holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962
when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to
decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance
of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the
trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no
longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom
Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the
national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors,
possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the
required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right
granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is
there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified
to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973
Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the
Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in
proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect,
having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the
public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public
domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then
already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-
Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric
Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is
Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing
spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their
predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in
1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots
were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical
person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this
Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the
issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b).
Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to
apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due
course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction
between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant
has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to
which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction
or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens
title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b)
'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30,
1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases
beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which
developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without
the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. That said dissent expressed what is the better and, indeed, the correct,
view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited
therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied
by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove'
possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means
may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would
have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not
calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family
possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was
expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical
language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure
established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that
all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for
he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said
land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of
law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act
No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant
of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of
Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of
Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale
thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any
right. 6
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent
Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation
and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-
in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from
the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act
as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing
provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of
law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession
of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the
equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that
the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
.... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to
private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law
from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well
put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels
had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it
from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter,
in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from
acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was
actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be
no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being
nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from
purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already
acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then
extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in
excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids
corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already
vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid
and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the
sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a
vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new
Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations
to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four
hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not
impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent
repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except
in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and
established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent
had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's
right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right
without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<re||an1w> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own
name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a
defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of
the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt
of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the
undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have
had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter
of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority
ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent.
The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable
public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under
The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the
undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time
it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there
being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private
land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial
confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than
substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are
natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would
just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error
not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as
the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against
their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition
against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original
owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application
being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of
law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be
necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications
in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after
all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate
of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and
sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the
latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the
certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be
merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and
speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on
amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage,
in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were,
doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and
inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well
as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in
Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person,
was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article
XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion,
and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided
no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this
instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the
Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired,
by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is
not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond
his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who
would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application
for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the
Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of
June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the
other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.
There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show
that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred
by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases
subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating
back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco
decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive
prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without
the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be
of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and
acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in
Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so
expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified
corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the
1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of
the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no
public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on
October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no
prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares)
unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the
erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open
possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding
presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality
of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a
vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later.
But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into
private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in
confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title)
which they lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and
disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the
State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered
lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated
under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into
private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such
fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally
expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941,
then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to
December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for
confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My
submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice
would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons
who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that
they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and
who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations
duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed,
then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the
majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would
characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person
rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this
case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v.
City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly
taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our
equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if
the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume
suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while
concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority
ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are
sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they
were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of
acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is
the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable.
" 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural
citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the
required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest
possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required
statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious.
But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession,
the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow
the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although
they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot
and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions,
that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the
application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in
accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by
operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all,
recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It
should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign
its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the
decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on
paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation
of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance
of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any
citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a
corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates
of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome,
114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my
opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over
the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to
directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous
"literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and
afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply
for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity
of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the
application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners
and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive
effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the
end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of
ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their
favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all
such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the
Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only
citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which
prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That
interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction
adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the
legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688,
93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in
73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have
done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the
courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being
construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is
defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed,
explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a
statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act,
while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute
may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover,
notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by
construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used
in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to
prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general
everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by
implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in
73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The
proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus
laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-
Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the
Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired,
by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is
not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond
his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who
would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application
for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the
Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of
June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the
other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.
There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show
that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred
by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases
subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating
back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco
decision was promulgated).<re||an1w> We reaffirm the established doctrine that who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations
such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by
operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land
ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may
be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent
corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so
expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified
corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the
1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of
the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no
public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on
October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no
prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares)
unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the
erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open
possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding
presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality
of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a
vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later.
But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into
private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in
confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title)
which they lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and
disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the
State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered
lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated
under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into
private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such
fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally
expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941,
then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to
December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for
confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My
submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice
would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons
who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that
they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and
duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed,
then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the
majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would
characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person
rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this
case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v.
City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly
taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our
equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if
the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume
suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while
concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority
ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are
sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they
were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of
acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is
the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable.
" 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural
citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the
required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest
possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required
statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious.
But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession,
the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow
the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although
they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot
and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions,
that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the
application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in
accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by
operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all,
recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It
should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign
its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the
decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on
paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation
of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance
of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any
citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a
corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates
of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome,
114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my
opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over
the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to
directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous
"literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and
afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply
for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity
of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the
application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners
and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive
effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the
end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of
ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their
favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all
such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the
Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Emphasis supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only
citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which
prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That
interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction
adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the
legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688,
93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in
73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have
done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the
courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being
construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is
defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed,
explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a
statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act,
while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute
may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover,
notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by
construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used
in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to
prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general
everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by
implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in
73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The
proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus
laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-
Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June,
1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is
the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark
1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited
therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an
open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the
period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately SECOND DIVISION
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a [G.R. No. 144057. January 17, 2005]
private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes
COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since
we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the DECISION
recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and
TINGA, J.:
ratio decidendi.
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June,
1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision[1] of the Sixth Division of the Court of
1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the
therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC),[2] Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated
open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)[3] of Ibajay-Nabas,
period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application for registration of a parcel
in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a The facts are as follows:
private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on
said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito
private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title
we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and
recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation of
ratio decidendi. respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid land.
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director
of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public
of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of
have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence. Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico
Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court
issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to the heirs of
Rustico Angeles and the government.

The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under
Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.[4] On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of
Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all
his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming
sometime in 1955 or 1956.[5] Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same.
She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The
administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and
gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old,
and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels
of land surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial
decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in
the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the
government until she filed her application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that
the government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as
representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite
notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the
subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed
in the name of Naguit.[6]
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for
was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification
from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, Region VI.[7] However, the court denied the motion for
reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998.[8]
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the
RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision,
dismissing the appeal.[9]
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a
decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed
decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by
the Republic on September 4, 2000.[10]
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the
appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the governments prior
release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienable
or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in
possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period.[11]
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as
alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court[12] in arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive
possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only
on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration
proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of
title under Section 14(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of
the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is
not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in
the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership.
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to
which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely
located.[13] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners
position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view,
that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the
length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government
from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application
is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize
the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already
been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of
Appeals.[14] Therein, the Court noted that to prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute.[15] In that case, the subject land had been certified by
the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the
alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein
respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application
for registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that
the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone
in 1980 by the DENR.[16]
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,[17] wherein the
Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in
1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the
bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his
application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and
disposable. Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after the property
had been certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,[18] such as those which form part of a
reservation for provincial park purposes[19] the possession of which cannot ripen into
ownership.[20] It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land
cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,[21] forest
land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it
into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.[22] In the case at bar, the property in question was undisputedly classified as
disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held
by the Court of Appeals.[23]
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the
basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original
registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file the application for
registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, by reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but those titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession
deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public
domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A.
No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at
least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12,
1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the
Public Land Act does refer to agricultural lands of the public domain, while the Property
Registration Decree uses the term alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.[24] Clearly, the subject lands under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are
of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D.
No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public
domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not,
considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.[25] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court
exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[26] With such conversion, such of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and
SO ORDERED.
thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through
prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and
exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with
coconut trees now over fifty years old.[27] The inherent nature of the land but confirms
its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the
application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly
accomplished by the lower courts.

The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in
possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The argument begs the
question. It is again hinged on the assertionshown earlier to be unfoundedthat there
could have been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land
was declared alienable or disposable.

We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous
possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of
such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factual
findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through
proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the
property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax
declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of
owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to
the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such
an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[28]

Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent
can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since
1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has
acquired title thereto which may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens
system. That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open,
continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the
government itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of SECOND DIVISION
protection under the law.
 [G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID
HERBIETO, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,[1] which affirmed the Judgment of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December
1999,[2] granting the application for land registration of the respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and
David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for
registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan,
Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the
Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and
Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.[3] Together with their application for registration,
respondents submitted the following set of documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and
Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David;[4]
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;[5]
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
dispensing with the need for Surveyors Certificates for the Subject Lots;[6]
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates of
title covering the Subject Lots;[7]
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable,
by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963;[8]
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in
the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No.
941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in
1994;[9] and
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and
Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and
respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to
Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.[10]
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed
an Opposition to the respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing
that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the
Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents muniments of title were not genuine and
did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fideacquisition of the
Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the
Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.[11]
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.[12] All owners
of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial
Hearing.[13] A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous
place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of
Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located.[14] Finally, the Notice was
also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 1999[15] and The Freeman Banat
News on 19 December 1999.[16]
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of
Special Default,[17] with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for
registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to
offer and mark documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC
commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and
to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and
of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February
2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and
directing the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of
registration for the Subject Lots.[18]
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the
Court of Appeals.[19] The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002,
affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has
been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article
1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that All things
which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall
not be the object of prescription and that Ownership and other real rights over
immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith.
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the
subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they
cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees
(Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein
appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject
land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even
assuming arguendo that appellees possession can be reckoned only from June 25,
1963 or from the time the subject lots had been classified as within the alienable and
disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant does not hold water.
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by
CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus
susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees are,
with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4)
of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by law.
Again, even considering that possession of appelless should only be reckoned from
1963, the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees
have been possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the
concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant application for
registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no reason to disturb the
finding of the court a quo.[20]
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following
arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the
concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic,
possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in
determining compliance with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject
Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENROs
certification. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive
prescription period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,[21] where this Court
declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as
amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the public
domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of
the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by
two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as
amended, that the application for registration of title to land shall be filed by a single
applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-
owners. While an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the
subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject
parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the same province. Where the
authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of
obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the proceedings
will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land
registration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the
MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
I
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no
jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the
respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction
of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even
though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually
seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
respectively.
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the
respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with
and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Courts
pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[22] to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-
cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the
authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of
obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been
strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This
procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the
MTC to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree[23] recognizes and expressly allows the
following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several applicants for as long
as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered;[24] and (2) the filing
of a single application for registration of several parcels of land provided that the same
are located within the same province.[25] The Property Registration Decree is silent,
however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for
two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of the
parcels of land in their respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then
this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section
34 of the Property Registration Decree itself provides that, [t]he Rules of Court shall,
insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land
registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with
the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint
application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a
misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for
registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed
separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction
of the court to hear and proceed with the case.[26]They are not even accepted grounds
for dismissal thereof.[27] Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of
action and parties involve an implied admission of the courts jurisdiction. It
acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or
on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be
proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the
dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to
be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have
been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is
regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application
for registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner
Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance
of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this
Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements
mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested
with jurisdiction as a land registration court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did
not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court,
nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing,
which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents
application for registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,[28] and jurisdiction in rem cannot
be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and
service of notice.[29]
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given
Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall
be made in the following manner:
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all
persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining
owners so far as known, and to all whom it may concern. Said notice shall also require
all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why
the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property
Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its
declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals[30] that publication in a newspaper
of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm and
register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property
Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of publication,
mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements,
including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and
imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded
on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation, thus
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be
deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official
Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with
in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette
is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its
circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties
on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties,
and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all encompassing in
rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued
against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a
manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.[31]
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held,
on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of
the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it
was published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and
circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao,
only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing,
would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was
published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was
deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on
the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents application for registration, and to
present his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself
states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial
hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting
respondents application for registration and even the registration decree that may be
issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03
September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general
circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing
to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the
Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents application for registration
thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots
No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000,
declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA
Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and
void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
II
Period of Possession
Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots
for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear
and proceed with respondents application for registration, this Court nevertheless
deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession for
acquiring title to public land.
Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for
their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the
Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel
Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his
parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since
1950.[32]
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents
themselves, the Subject Lots are within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No.
28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative
Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga
Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29,
1992.[33] The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as
alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government;[34] and it is
indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was
acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.[35]
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except
timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the
State.[36] It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as
follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).[37]
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public
Land Act because there are specific requirements and application procedure for every
mode.[38] Since respondents herein filed their application before the MTC,[39] then it
can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization
of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not
exceeding 144 hectares,[40] may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48
of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots must have
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
and the procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be
entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs
requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be
Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any considered a special law[45] that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general
period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as law. It is an established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the special law, the special law prevails Generalia specialibus non derogant.[46]
computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The
ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,
rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.[41] It is very apparent
is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-
then that respondents could not have complied with the period of possession required
75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared
by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete
NULL AND VOID. Respondents application for registration is DISMISSED.
title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.
SO ORDERED.
The confirmation of respondents title by the Court of Appeals was based on the
erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the Puno, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated Tinga, J., out of the country.
22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals
to own land in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents,
having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-
interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application,
have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113,
in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.[42]

The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already
exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the
presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the Republic of the Philippines
occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect SUPREME COURT
title or continuous, open, and notorious possession.[43] As established by this Court in Manila
EN BANC
the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
vs.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their RESOLUTION
application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with BERSAMIN, J.:
the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties
who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the
claiming any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground
every case present an application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in
validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.[44] (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D,
with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario
Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application
for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay
City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for
more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang
Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite
containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-
00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-
1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans
application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus
places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as
Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A
and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324)
Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record
of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN,
who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had
been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by
law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification
stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of
computing Malabanans period of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated
the CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on
certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon
Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land
prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of
the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in
Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for
registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings
therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice
of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 6 to support
their argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by
reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their
predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30
years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the application
without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified
as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan
failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on
his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of
the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v.
Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that
the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive
prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest
had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership
thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil
Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their
favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20,
1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from
1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with
reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by
implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to
registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared alienable
and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
 Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different
classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the
Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property, 10 may be classified as either of public dominion
or of private ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is
intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. 12 Land
belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no
longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property
of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private
individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into
the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State. 15This means that the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain
unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons. 17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on
the classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely,
agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with
the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber,
and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by
law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. 21 The identification of lands
according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of
the Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that
may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural
lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a)
patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under
Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or
the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands
must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are
reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable
such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under
existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however,
public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national
park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development
of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public
dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises
its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares
that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to
wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in
relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by
a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public
domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that
lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of
patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What
the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and
disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of
the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing
in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the
following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in
possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or
earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public
domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to
classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of
the application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of
the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is
already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine
applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as
laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable
and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or
earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification
produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be
minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy
concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the
requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the
determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that
said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent
appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the
Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the
legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that
Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should
have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the
applicants imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of
the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain
determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed
statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the
period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the
public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by
operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed
by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the application
of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is
necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point
at which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason
of the applicants possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous,
exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right
to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate
of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts. 31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and
quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their
occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law 32 will be
defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a
fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation
(Republic Act No. 10023)33in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures
in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential
lands, subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or
for the development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President,
thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable
provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land
or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private
ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be
alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises, 36 and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land
has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer
intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the
sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands
of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription,
whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to
private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine
qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
THIRD DIVISION
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that
they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June
12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, G.R. No. 181502
possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since Petitioner,
June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private Present:
property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. CORONA, J., Chairperson,
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained - v e r s u s - CARPIO ,
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. VELASCO, JR.,
Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of NACHURA and
the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues PERALTA, JJ.
a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.1wphi1 REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES,
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the Respondent.
respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
Promulgated:
SO ORDERED.
February 2, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time) of the June 16,
2008 resolution of this Court denying the petition for review filed by petitioner Florencia
G. Diaz.

Petitioners late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for registration of a
vast tract of land[1] located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the then Court of
First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on August 12, 1976.[2] She alleged that she
possessed the land as owner and worked, developed and harvested the agricultural
products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly and adversely for more or less
26 years.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application because the land in question was within the Fort
Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237
(Proclamation 237)[3] in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the public
domain.
Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in Director of Lands v.
Reyes[4] that the property subject of Garcias application was inalienable as it formed
part of a military reservation. Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information Title
No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla on March 5,
1895), on which therein respondent Paraaque Investment and Development
Corporation anchored its claim on the land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of
registration issued in its favor was declared null and void.
Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcias favor in a decision[5] dated July 1,
1981.
The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of Appeals (CA).
In its decision[6] dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
(Mendoza decision),[7] the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the
CFI. The CA found that Reyes was applicable to petitioners case as it involved the
same property.
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in question to
Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcias right to the property was largely
dependent on the existence and validity of the possessory information title the probative
value of which had already been passed upon by this Court in Reyes, and inasmuch as
the land was situated inside a military reservation, the CA concluded that she did not
validly acquire title thereto.
During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was substituted by
her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.[8]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While the motion
was pending in the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of the records from the
former CFI. Without acting on the motion for reconsideration, the appellate court, with
Justice Mendoza as ponente, issued a resolution[9] upholding petitioners right to recall
the records of the case.
Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable settlement
on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and finalize the same.
The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the Republic
withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly outside the FMMR.
For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the portion of the property inside the
military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the amicable settlement in the
CA.[10]
On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise agreement.[11] On
January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration Administration to issue the
corresponding decree of registration in petitioners favor.[12]
However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the OSG filed
a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the issuance of the decree of
registration. The OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the
amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.
On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended
resolution)[13] annulling the compromise agreement entered into between the parties.
The relevant part of the dispositive portion of the resolution read:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:
(1) x x x x x x
(2) x x x x x x
(3) x x x x x x
(4) x x x x x x
(5) x x x x x x
(6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court
approving the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed
between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia
Diaz[;]
(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated May
18, 1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and
Florencia Garcia Diaz; the said Amicable Settlement is
hereby DECLARED to be without force and effect;
(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General and, consequently, SET ASIDE the Resolution
dated January 12, 2000 which ordered, among other matters, that a
certificate of title be issued in the name of plaintiff-appellee
Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject property in
consonance with the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999
approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999;
(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the
May 18, 1999 Amicable Settlement and the Resolution dated
September 20, 1999 amending the aforesaid June 30, 1999
Resolution; and
(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992
dismissing applicant-appellee Diaz registration herein.
SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed the validity of the
Mendoza decision the February 26, 1992 decision adverted to in the CAs amended
resolution. She alleged that Justice Mendoza was the assistant solicitor general during
the initial stages of the land registration proceedings in the trial court and therefore
should have inhibited himself when the case reached the CA. His failure to do so, she
laments, worked an injustice against her constitutional right to due process. Thus, the
Mendoza decision should be declared null and void. The motion was denied.[14]
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari[15] in this Court. It was
denied for raising factual issues.[16] She moved for reconsideration.[17] This motion
was denied with finality on the ground that there was no substantial argument
warranting a modification of the Courts resolution. The Court then ordered that no
further pleadings would be entertained. Accordingly, we ordered entry of judgment to be
made in due course.[18]
Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and motion for
leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and to refer the case to the Supreme
Court en banc.[19] The Court denied[20] it considering that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.[21] Furthermore, the motion to refer the case to
the banc was likewise denied as the banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or
resolutions of the divisions may be appealed.[22] We reiterated our directive that no
further pleadings would be entertained and that entry of judgment be made in due
course.
Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first addressed to Justice
Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno himself.[23] The body of the letter, undoubtedly in the nature of a third motion
for reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its entirety:
This is in response to your call for Moral Forces in order to redirect
the destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence,
that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer,
January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502,
and my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the
court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result
from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE
RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for
justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en
banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving
the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto
attached as Annex A.
The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court
involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of
Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente
Mendoza in a position in which it became possible for him to
discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of
the court to render impartial justice, because Mr. Justice Mendoza
became the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the
findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant
Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the
Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration
proceedings in which he lost.
In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in
the very same case.
In the case of the Alabang Boys[,] the public was outraged by the
actions of Atty. Verano who admitted having prepared a simple
resolution to be signed by the Secretary of Justice.
In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of my
constitutional right. It is simply immoral, illegal and unconstitutional,
for the prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse the very
decision in which he had lost.
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater
spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. I must
confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however
believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even
destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.
I fully support your call for moral force that will slowly and eventually
lead our country to redirect its destiny and escape from this moral
decadence, in which we all find ourselves.
I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to
fight the dark forces that surround us everyday.
I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases
such as mine do not happen again, so that the next person who
seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I
suffered under our judicial system.
Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original).

The language of petitioners letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled threat
precisely worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into giving in to her demands to
honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise agreement, at the risk of being vilified in
the media and by the public.
This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioners letter/third motion for
reconsideration.
APPLICABILITY
OF REYES
The Court agrees with the Republics position that Reyes is applicable to this case.
To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
parties; and
(4) there must be between the first and
second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action. [24]
The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However, petitioner
takes exception to the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of identity of parties. In
her petition for review filed in this Court, she contends that since the applicants in the
two cases are different, the merits of the two cases should, accordingly, be determined
independently of each other.[25]
This contention is erroneous.
The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino v. Director of
Lands.[26] In that case, Quintin Taedo endeavored to secure title to a considerable tract
of land by virtue of his possession thereof under CA 141. When the case eventually
reached this Court, we affirmed the trial courts decision to dismiss the proceedings as
the property in question was part of the public domain. Quintins successor-in-interest,
Florencia Taedo, who despite knowledge of the proceedings did not participate therein,
thereafter sold the same property to Benigno S. Aquino. The latter sought to have it
registered in his name. The question in that case, as well as in this one, was whether
our decision in the case in which another person was the applicant constituted res
judicataas against his successors-in-interest.
We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the provisions
of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title,
an order dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the
public domain constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also
against all persons.[27]
We also declared in Aquino that:
From another point of view, the decision in the first action has
become the law of the case or at least falls within the rule of stare
decisis. That adjudication should be followed unless manifestly
erroneous. It was taken and should be taken as the authoritative view
of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is indispensable to the due
administration of justice especially by a court of last resort that a
question once deliberately examined and decided should be
considered as settled and closed to further argument. x x x[28]
Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its decision in favor
of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made an earlier ruling on
November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was inalienable as it formed part of a
military reservation. Thus, petitioners argument that the findings of fact of the trial court
on her registrable title are binding on us on the principle that findings of fact of lower
courts are accorded great respect and bind even this Court is untenable. Rather, it was
incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this Courts ruling in Reyes, and not the other
way around.
However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings in Reyes (which should
have been a matter of judicial notice in the first place), the trial court still insisted on its
divergent finding and disregarded the Court's decision in Reyes, declaring the subject
land as forming part of a military reservation, and thus outside the commerce of man.
By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the decision of this
Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion.[29] Notably, a judgment
rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and does not exist in legal
contemplation.[30]
All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought to be reminded
that it is their duty to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A conduct becoming of
inferior courts demands a conscious awareness of the position they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of our judicial system. As eloquently declared by Justice J.B.
L. Reyes, "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decision all other courts
should take their bearings."[31]
ACQUISITION OF
PRIVATE RIGHTS

Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes that its effectivity is
subject to private rights, if any there be.
By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the military
reservation is situated is forest land. Thus:
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is
inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the
land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of
fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately
13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)[32]
Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest lands are
not registrable under CA 141.
[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended,
applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area
covered with forest are excluded. It is well-settled that forest land
is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether
such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under
the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the
title. (Emphasis supplied).[33]
However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified
as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon the
recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to classify the
lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral
lands)[34] coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-
in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce such evidence.
Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-interest, could not
have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is because prior to the conversion
of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be
counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession requirement under
Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act.[35] This was our ruling
in Almeda v. CA.[36] The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest land is released through an official
proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.[37]
Coming now to petitioners contention that her private rights to the property, meaning her
and her predecessors possession thereof prior to the establishment of the FMMR, must
be respected, the same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had already recognized the
same land to be public forest even before the FMMR was established. To reiterate:
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is
inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the
land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact,
at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957
hectares of said land consist of public forest. x x x
Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen to
ownership.
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was
established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence
with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more
than 30 years. In Reyes, we noted:
Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely
five (5) years after the inscription of the informacion possessoria,
could not have converted the same into a record of ownership twenty
(20) years after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the
Spanish Mortgage Law.
xxx
During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was
cleared and cultivated under the kaingin system, while some portions
were used as grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria
Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and had about forty (40)
tenants for the purpose. During the Japanese occupation, Maria
Padilla died. x x x
xxx
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and
the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim
of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious
as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing
livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of
dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing
livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or other permanent
improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru
acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long
the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
 possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land
does not operate against the State unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for
the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.[38]
xxx
Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which petitioner also
bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes,[39] thus rendering its
probative value suspect, further militates against granting her application for
registration.
NULLITY OF COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT
On the compromise agreement between the parties, we agree with the CA that the
same was null and void.
An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a contract and
must necessarily comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of the New Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the Republic, through
the appropriate government agencies, i.e. the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Land Management Bureau, Land Registration Authority, and the Office of
the President, was secured by the OSG when it executed the agreement with
her.[40] The lack of authority on the part of the OSG rendered the compromise
agreement between the parties null and void because although it is the duty of the OSG
to represent the State in cases involving land registration proceedings, it must do so
only within the scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the Republic of the
Philippines.[41]
In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel for respondent, it
was never given the specific or special authority to enter into a compromise agreement
with petitioner. This is in violation of the provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules
of Court which requires special authority for attorneys to bind their clients.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have
authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation
thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special
authority, compromise their clients litigation, or receive anything
in discharge of a clients claim but the full amount in cash. (Emphasis
supplied).
Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject matter of a contract
because, being forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men,
including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights
which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in
cases expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract.
(Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation contrary to law and
against public policy. The agreement provided that, in consideration of petitioners
withdrawal of her application for registration of title from that portion of the property
located within the military reservation, respondent was withdrawing its claim on that part
of the land situated outside said reservation. The Republic could not validly enter into
such undertaking as the subject matter of the agreement was outside the commerce of
man.
PETITIONERS CONTEMPT
OF COURT
This Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice, cannot reasonably be
expected to just sit by and do nothing when it comes under attack.
That petitioners letter-motion constitutes an attack against the integrity of this Court
cannot be denied. Petitioner started her letter innocently enough by stating:
This is in response to your call for Moral Forces in order to redirect
the destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence,
that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer,
January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]

It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed resentment for what she
perceived as this Courts failure to exercise utmost prudence in rendering impartial
justice in deciding her case. Petitioner recounted:
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502,
and my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the
court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that will
result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE
RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for
justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en
banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving
the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto
attached as Annex A.
The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court
involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of
Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente
Mendoza in a position in which it became possible for him to
discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of
the court to render impartial justice, because Mr. Justice Mendoza
became the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the
findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant
Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the
Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration
proceedings in which he lost. (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to shove, she has no choice but
to expose the irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to the media. This is evident
in her arrogant declaration that:
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater
spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light.
But she hastens to add in the same breath that:
I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I
however believe that such an action will do more harm than good,
and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.
Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:
. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again,
so that the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain
and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.
When required to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for her
baseless charges and veiled threats, petitioner answered:
xxx
The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a veiled threat[.] It was written in
response to the call of the Chief Justice for a moral revolution.
Juxtaposed against the factual backdrop of the Alabang Boys case
and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice Jose L. Sabio which also
enjoyed wide publicity over the tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts
of the said cases pale in comparison to the facts of her case where
the lawyer of her opponent eventually became justice of the appellate
court and ended up reversing the very decision in which he lost, in
clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental fair play for
no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge without
transgression of the due process clause. This is basic.
Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the
delivery of her piece, because correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes
they are irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional delivery, she has
offended your honors sensibilities, she is ready for the punishment,
and only prays that his Court temper its strike with compassion as her
letter to the Chief Justice was never written with a view of threatening
the Court.
xxx
Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and
correction of the inequity bestowed upon her by destiny. It was never
meant as a threat.
The Court now puts an end to petitioners irresponsible insinuations and threats of going
public with this case. We are not blind to petitioners clever and foxy interplay of threats
alternating with false concern for the reputation of this Court.
It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently rendered justice with neither
fear nor favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at after a careful and thorough
deliberation of the facts of this case and all the matters pertaining thereto. The records
of the case, in fact, show that all the pertinent issues raised by petitioner were passed
upon and sufficiently addressed by the appellate court and this Court in their respective
resolutions.
As to petitioners complaint regarding this Courts denial of her petition through a mere
minute resolution (which allegedly deprived her of due process as the Court did not
issue a full-blown decision stating the facts and applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to
say that the Court is not duty-bound to issue decisions or resolutions signed by the
justices all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate ponencias, extended
resolutions or even minute resolutions issued by or upon its authority, depending on its
evaluation of a case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute resolution (signed
by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition or motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the assailed decision or order,
together with all its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained.[42]
Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by filing three
successive motions for reconsideration, including the letter-motion subject of this
resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that no further pleadings shall be
entertained in this case. Her unreasonable persistence constitutes utter defiance of this
Courts orders and an abuse of the rules of procedure. This, alongside her thinly veiled
threats to leak her case to the media to gain public sympathy although the tone of
petitioners compliance with our show-cause resolution was decidedly subdued
compared to her earlier letters constitutes contempt of court.
In Republic v. Unimex,[43] we held:
A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be
entertained is a declaration that the Court has already considered all
issues presented by the parties and that it has adjudicated the case
with finality. It is a directive to the parties to desist from filing any
further pleadings or motions. Like all orders of this Court, it must be
strictly observed by the parties. It should not be circumvented by filing
motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification.
A FEW OBSERVATIONS
If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her constitutional right to due
process, then why did she question the validity of the Mendoza decision late in the
proceedings, that is, only after her motion for reconsideration in the CA (for its
subsequent annulment of the compromise agreement) was denied? It is obvious that it
was only when her case became hopeless that her present counsel frantically searched
for some ground, any ground to resuscitate his clients lost cause, subsequently raising
the issue. This is evident from a statement in her petition to this Court that:
It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the
nullity of the proceedings of the Court of Appeals that places in
doubt the entire proceedings it previously conducted, which led to the
rendition of the February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact that escaped the
scrutiny of applicant for registration Flora L. Garcia, as well as
her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante Diaz, who died in 1993, and the
late Justice Fernando A. Santiago, who stood as counsel
for Flora L. Garcias successor-in-interest, herein petitioner,
Florencia G. Garcia.[44] (Emphasis supplied).
The above cited statement does not help petitioners cause at all. If anything, it only
proves how desperate the case has become for petitioner and her counsel.
WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of petitioner is NOTED and is
hereby treated as a third motion for reconsideration. The motion is DENIED considering
that a third motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and the plea utterly lacks
merit.
Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court. Accordingly, a FINE of Five Thousand
Pesos is hereby imposed on her, payable within ten days from receipt of this resolution.
She is hereby WARNED that any repetition hereof shall be dealt with more severely.
Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173423 March 5, 2014
SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the petitioners, spouses
Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna, assailing the decision dated May 16, 20052 and the
resolution dated June 27, 20063 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
71143. The CA reversed and set aside the decision dated May 7, 20014 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, in Land Registration Case
(LRC) No. 2372.
THE BACKGROUND FACTS
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a 2,597-
square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando,
La Union. The application was filed with the RTC and docketed as LRC No. 2372.
The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by Pastora
Vendiola, upon whose death was succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria
Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced
all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor
of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same lot to the spouses Fortuna
through a deed of absolute sale dated May 4, 1984.
The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of Lot No.
4457 for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the lots survey plan, technical
description, and certificate of assessment.
Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the
application,5 it did not present any evidence in support of its opposition. Since no
private opposition to the registration was filed, the RTC issued an order of general
default on November 11, 1996 against the whole world, except the Republic.6
In its Decision dated May 7, 2001,7 the RTC granted the application for registration in
favor of the spouses Fortuna. The RTC declared that "[the spouses Fortuna] have
established [their] possession, including that of their predecessors-in-interest of the land
sought to be registered, has been open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the
whole world and in the concept of an owner since 1948, or for a period of over fifty (50)
years."8
The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the spouses Fortuna
did not present an official proclamation from the government that the lot has been
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses
Fortunas evidence Tax Declaration No. 8366 showed that possession over the lot
dates back only to 1948, thus, failing to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off period provided
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree (PRD).
In its decision dated May 16, 2005,9 the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.
Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish the alienable and
disposable nature of the land,10 they failed to show that they complied with the length
of possession that the law requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945. It agreed with the
Republics argument that Tax Declaration No. 8366 only showed that the spouses
Fortunas predecessor-in-interest, Pastora, proved that she had been in possession of
the land only since 1948.
The CA denied the spouses Fortunas motion for reconsideration of its decision in its
resolution dated June 27, 2006.11
THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS
Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.
They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or
the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No. 1942
amended the PLA by requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession to acquire imperfect title over an agricultural land of the public domain. This
30-year period, however, was removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required that the
possession should be since June 12, 1945. The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073
was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD.12
The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977 and
published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and published on
January 2, 1979. On the basis of the Courts ruling in Taada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera,
etc., et al.,13 they allege that PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective
only on May 24, 1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to
have already satisfied the 30-year requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment
because Pastoras possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.
They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948, this does not
contradict that fact that Pastora possessed Lot No. 4457 before 1948. The failure to
present documentary evidence proving possession earlier than 1948 was explained by
Filma Salazar, Records Officer of the Provincial Assessors Office, who testified that the
records were lost beyond recovery due to the outbreak of World War II.
Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than 1948, the spouses
Fortuna contend that evidence exists indicating that Pastora possessed the lot even
before 1948. First, Tax Declaration No. 8366 does not contain a statement that it is a
new tax declaration. Second, the annotation found at the back of Tax Declaration No.
8366 states that "this declaration cancels Tax Nos. 10543[.]"14 Since Tax Declaration
No. 8366 was issued in 1948, the cancelled Tax Declaration No. 10543 was issued, at
the latest, in 1947, indicating that there was already an owner and possessor of the lot
before 1948. Third, they rely on the testimony of one Macaria Flores in LRC No. 2373.
LRC No. 2373 was also commenced by the spouses Fortuna to register Lot Nos. 4462,
27066, and 27098,15 which were also originally owned by Pastora and are adjacent to
the subject Lot No. 4457. Macaria testified that she was born in 1926 and resided in a
place a few meters from the three lots. She stated that she regularly passed by these
lots on her way to school since 1938. She knew the property was owned by Pastora
because the latters family had constructed a house and planted fruit-bearing trees
thereon; they also cleaned the area. On the basis of Macarias testimony and the other
evidence presented in LRC No. 2373, the RTC granted the spouses Fortunas
application for registration of Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098 in its decision of January
3, 2005.16 The RTCs decision has lapsed into finality unappealed.
The spouses Fortuna claim that Macarias testimony in LRC No. 2373 should be
considered to prove Pastoras possession prior to 1948. Although LRC No. 2373 is a
separate registration proceeding, it pertained to lots adjacent to the subject property, Lot
No. 4457, and belonged to the same predecessor-in-interest. Explaining their failure to
present Macaria in the proceedings before the RTC in LRC No. 2372, the spouses
Fortuna said "it was only after the reception of evidence x x x that [they] were able to
trace and establish the identity and competency of Macaria[.]"17
Commenting on the spouses Fortunas petition, the Republic relied mostly on the CAs
ruling which denied the registration of title and prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to sufficiently prove their
compliance with the requisites for the acquisition of title to alienable lands of the public
domain.
The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and
disposable public land has not been sufficiently
established
The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the
State.18 Of the four classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands, forest or timber lands,
mineral lands, and national parks, only agricultural lands may be alienated.19 Public
land that has not been classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Thus, it is essential for any applicant for registration of title to
land derived through a public grant to establish foremost the alienable and disposable
nature of the land. The PLA provisions on the grant and disposition of alienable public
lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48(b), will find application only from the time that a
public land has been classified as agricultural and declared as alienable and
disposable.
Under Section 6 of the PLA,20 the classification and the reclassification of public lands
are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through a presidential
proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or
excluded from the public domain. The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land
classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.21
Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired
through a public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject
of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of a positive
act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.
In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was established by
the notation in the survey plan,22 which states:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map No.
1395 certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil or military reservation.23
It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record, neither
any public land application filed nor title previously issued for the subject
parcel[.]"24 However, we find that neither of the above documents is evidence of a
positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered
properties alienable and disposable character.25 These notations, at the very least,
only establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved alienable and disposable area per verification through survey by the proper
government office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR
Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.26 In Republic v. Heirs of Juan
Fabio,27 the Court ruled that [t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application
for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the
PENRO28 or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR
Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or
the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and
disposable. The offices that prepared these documents are not the official repositories
or legal custodian of the issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring
the public land as alienable and disposable.29
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been reclassified
as alienable and disposable land of the public domain though a positive act of the
Executive Department, the spouses Fortunas claim of title through a public land grant
under the PLA should be denied.
In judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title, the period of
possession should commence, at the
latest, as of May 9, 1947
Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to establish the alienable
and disposable character of Lot No. 4457 serves as sufficient ground to deny the
petition and terminate the case, we deem it proper to continue to address the other
important legal issues raised in the petition.
As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and disposition of alienable
agricultural lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of the public domain
may be disposed of, among others, by judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title. This mode of acquisition of title is governed by Section 48(b) of the PLA, the
original version of which states:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except
as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety- four,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. [emphasis supplied]
On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a 30-year period of
possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942,
read:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. [emphasis and underscore ours]
On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of possession by
requiring possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of PD No. 1073 reads:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself
or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945. [emphasis supplied]
Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years from 1945 up to
its enactment in 1977 is required. This effectively impairs the vested rights of
applicants who had complied with the 30-year possession required under the RA No.
1942 amendment, but whose possession commenced only after the cut-off date of June
12, 1945 was established by the PD No. 1073 amendment. To remedy this, the Court
ruled in Abejaron v. Nabasa30that "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their
predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25,
1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947 may apply for
judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the [PLA]."
January 24, 1947 was considered as the cut-off date as this was exactly 30 years
counted backward from January 25, 1977 the effectivity date of PD No. 1073.
It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073 was enacted;
based on the certification from the National Printing Office,31 PD No. 1073 was
published in Vol. 73, No. 19 of the Official Gazette, months later than its enactment or
on May 9, 1977. This uncontroverted fact materially affects the cut-off date for
applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA.
Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall take effect upon its
promulgation," the Court has declared in Taada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et
al.32 that the publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity. "[A]ll
statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature."33 Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No.
1073 should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon its
publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date for applications
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA to
May 8, 1947. In other words, applicants must prove that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30
years, or at least since May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove
that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947
Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain, the spouses Fortunas application for registration of title
would still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land since
May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortunas allegation that: (1) the absence of a notation that Tax
Declaration No. 8366 was a new tax declaration and (2) the notation stating that Tax
Declaration No. 8366 cancels the earlier Tax Declaration No. 10543 both indicate that
Pastora possessed the land prior to 1948 or, at the earliest, in 1947. We also observe
that Tax Declaration No. 8366 contains a sworn statement of the owner that was
subscribed on October 23, 1947.34 While these circumstances may indeed indicate
possession as of 1947, none proves that it commenced as of the cut-off date of May 8,
1947. Even if the tax declaration indicates possession since 1947, it does not show the
nature of Pastoras possession. Notably, Section 48(b) of the PLA speaks of possession
and occupation. "Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear
intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is
broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore,
the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction."35 Nothing in Tax Declaration No.
8366 shows that Pastora exercised acts of possession and occupation such as
cultivation of or fencing off the land. Indeed, the lot was described as "cogonal."36
The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax Declaration No. 8366 by
relying on Macarias testimony in a separate land registration proceeding, LRC No.
2373. Macaria alleged that she passed by Pastoras lots on her way to school, and she
saw Pastoras family construct a house, plant fruit-bearing trees, and clean the area.
However, the Court is not convinced that Macarias testimony constituted as the "well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence" required in cases of this nature.
The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired adjoining parcels of land, all of
which are claimed to have previously belonged to Pastora. These parcels of land were
covered by three separate applications for registration, to wit:
a. LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a total area of 2,961 sq.
m., commenced by Emeteria;
The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, upholding Pastora's
possession, do not tie this Court's hands into ruling in favor of the spouses Fortuna.
Much to our dismay, the rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373 do not even show that
the lots have been officially reclassified as alienable lands of the public domain or that
the nature and duration of Pastora's occupation met the requirements of the PLA, thus,
failing to convince us to either disregard the rules of evidence or consider their merits. In
this regard, we reiterate our directive in Santiago v. De las Santos:38
Both under the 193 5 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the
utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its
command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership
of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no
justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that
lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with
law, it retains its rights over the same as do minus.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16, 2005 and the
resolution dated June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143 are
AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed the spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna's
application of registration of title on the basis of the grounds discussed above. Costs
against the spouses Fortuna.
SO ORDERED.

b. LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098, with a total area
of 4,006 sq. m., commenced by the spouses Fortuna; and

c. LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No. 4457, with a total area of
2,597 sq. m.

As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that belonged to the same
predecessor-in-interest, the spouses Fortuna alleged that the final rulings in LRC Nos.
N-1278 and 2373,37 upholding Pastoras ownership, be taken into account in resolving
the present case.

Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to have previously
belonged to Pastora is 9,564 sq. m. This is too big an area for the Court to consider that
Pastoras claimed acts of possession and occupation (as testified to by Macaria)
encompassed the entirety of the lots. Given the size of the lots, it is unlikely that
Macaria (age 21 in 1947) could competently assess and declare that its entirety
belonged to Pastora because she saw acts of possession and occupation in what must
have been but a limited area. As mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366 described Lot
No. 4457 as "cogonal," thus, Macaria could not have also been referring to Lot No. 4457
when she said that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on her properties.