Moralde, Katraena P.

Llb - III, USJ-R School of Law

Succession Assignment
Atty. Brenda Tangarorang (Mon & Tues 7:00-9:00 PM)
October 3, 2017

1. CARANDANG-COLLANTES vs. FELIX CAPUNO ET. AL.

Gliceria Carandang-Collantes/Luz Carandang (Petitioners/defendants) vs. Felix Capuno, et al.

(Respondents/Plaintiffs)

This case is brought to the Supreme Court by way of appeal by certiorari (rule 45) from the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC (Felix Capuno, et al., plaintiffs vs. Gliceria Carandang-
Collantes, defendants)

FACTS:

A complaint for annulment of a donation inter vivos ( executed by Josefa Capuno in favor of Gliceria Carandang
Collantes/Luz Carandang) was instituted by Capuno, et al with the RTC of Laguna involving 4 parcels of real
property including a residential house all situated in San Pablo, Laguna.

Capuno, et al in their complaint alleged that the thumbmark appearing on the document was not that of Josefa
Capuno and granting for the sake of argument that it was her thumbmark, she did not intend to convey the
properties to defendants, Carandang-Collantes/Luz Carandang, for the reason that Josefa Capuno's consent was
secured either thru undue influence or fraud. Hence, the plaintiffs (Capuno, et al) should be declared true
owners of the property.

On the other hand Gliceria Carandang-Collantes/Luz Carandang, the defendants contended that the
thumbmarks on the document were actually that of the deceased Josefa Capuno and the latter's consent as
donor was given freely and voluntarily.

Ruling of the RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of Felix Capuno, et al, respondents/plaintiffs, declaring the donation
as null and void and further declaring that plaintiffs, all surnamed Capuno as the only surviving heirs of the
deceased Josefa Capuno, hence entitled to the ownership and possession of the properties.

Court of Appeals decision: On appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

Hence, this present appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not findings of fact of the respondent Court are not conclusive upon the Supreme Court
and that reversible errors were committed.

2. Whether or not the baptismal certificate presented by the plaintiffs- appellees have no evidentiary
value to prove their claimed relationship to their supposed parents and their alleged aunt, Josefa
Capuno.

HELD:

The decision of the CA is reversed and set aside, the complaint for annulment is dismissed.

The conclusions reached by the RTC and the CA that the donor did not execute the deed of donation are not
correct being based on immaterial and trivial lapses in memory of the notary public. The physical position of
the donor when she thumbmark a deed of donation is not important, what is important is the genuineness of
her thumbmarks as affirmed by the notary public. The testimony of the notary public must be given greater
credence than the testimony of the ordinary witness.

On Succession: The declaration of the heirship in favor of Felix Capuno et al, (the respondents) in the
intestate proceeding of Josefa Capuno's estate CANNOT affect or prejudice Gliceria Crandang
Collantes/ Luz Carandang's (petitioners) right to the donated properties as the donor (Josefa Capuno)
has left many other properties.

It must be stressed that respondents admit that there are 15 parcels of lands left by Josefa Capuno at the time
of her death which were not disposed of by virtue of a will or testament. They constituted the intestate estate
of the Josefa Capuno to which Felicx Capuno et al may legally succeed and inherit.

The deed of donation inter vivos must be respected.

2. BORROMEO-HERRERA vs. FORTUNATO BORROMEO

Intestate Estate of the late Vito Borromeo

The present consolidated cases are brought to the Supreme Court by way petition for review on certiorari from
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.

FACTS:

Under consideration are the properties (located in the province of Cebu) left by Vito Borromeo, a widower/
resident of Cebu City who died (March 13, 1952) without forced heirs.

Jose Junquera petitioned for probate of the will with the CFI of Cebu the last will and testament of Vito
Borromeo devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato, and Amelia in equal and undivided shares and
Junquera as executor of the said last will and testament. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed.

After trial, the CFI ruled that the document presented as the will of Vito Borromeo was a forgery.

On Appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision of the CFI disallowing the probate was affirmed.

The testate proceedings was then converted into an intestate proceedings. Several parties presented their
claims or petitions alleging as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.

The trial court issued an order declaring Jose Cuenco Borromeo, Judge Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo,
Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera, Salud Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Marcial Borromeo, Amelinda Borromeo
de Talam, and the heirs of Canuto Borromeo, as the intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo, to the exclusion of all
others.

Further, the trial court ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9
and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9 above-named declared intestate
heirs. The declared heirs except Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the properties which
was approved by the trial court, ordering the administrator to effect the partition of the properties.

Respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir under the forged will, moved that he be
declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, claiming as an illegitimate son. As an acknowledged
illegitimate child, he was entitled to a legitime equal in every case to 4/5 of the legitime of an acknowledged
natural child.

Fortunato contends that under Art. 1043 of the Civil Code, there is no need for a person to be first declared as
heir before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of the
death of the person whom he is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right of inheritance.

In addition, as basis for his claim he asserted that 5 of the declared heirs executed a waiver of the hereditary
rights in favor of Fortunato Borromeo.

After hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of Fortunato Borromeo and declared that he is entitled to 5/9 of the
estate of Vito Borromeo.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fortunato Borromeo is entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo

HELD:

The order of the respondent judge declaring Fortunato Borromeo as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito
Borromeo is set aside as null and void.

The order of the trial court declaring that the waiver of hereditary rights document is valid, is set aside.

On Succession: The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that the properties
included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third person with respect to
the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former;

The trial court in G.R. NO. 62895 is ordered to speedily terminate special proceedings No. 916-R subject to the
submission of an inventory of the real properties of the estate an accounting of the cash and bank deposits by
the administrator of the estate .

The portion of the order of august 15, 1969 segregating 40% of the market value of the estate from which
attorneys fees shall be taken and paid should be, deleted. The lawyers should collect from the heirs distributees
who individually hired them attorneys fees according to the nature of the services rendered but in amounts
which should not exceed more than 20% of the market value of the property the heirs acquired from the estate
as beneficiaries.
3. LESACA vs. LESACA

This case involves three appeals which all have been certified to the Court of Appeals for the reason that they
involve only questions of law.

FACTS:

Appeal No. 1.

Baldomaro J. Lesaca died in the City of Manila on November 8, 1946. He was survived by his second wife (Juana
Felix), two minor children by the latter, two children by his marriage, and three acknowledged natural children
by a third woman. In his will he named Juana F. Lesaca and Consuelo F. Lesaca, his children by his first marriage,
co-executrices.

Proceedings for the probate of the will and for the administration of the estate of the deceased at the instance
of the widow but over the opposition of the co-executrices and the three acknowledge natural children, granted
each of the two minor children a monthly allowance of P100 for the living expenses, "plus an extra sum of P300
for their matriculation and uniforms," and later ordered the co-executrices to deposit in court all the allowances
in arrears. The co-executrices refused to make the deposit, contending that if any amount were to be paid for
the support and education of the minors the same should be charged against their share of the inheritance.

But the court took a different view and issued an order, holding that the amounts it had authorized to be paid
to the minors should be considered allowances for support, to be deducted from hereditary portion only insofar
as they exceed what they are entitled to as fruits or income, and requiring the co-executrices to deposit in court
" all the amounts due the said minors, namely P2,955.83, if and when the financial condition of this estate under
administration so warrants."

Counsel for the appellant minors, however, contends that Art. 1430 should be harmonized with Art. 1041,
which provides that "allowances for support, education, attendance and illness, even though unusually
expensive, apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or customary presents are not subject to collation,".

Appeal No.2.

This appeal is taken by the co-executrices from another order of March 11, 1949, declaring that the sum of
P2,500 received by them as repurchase price of land bought by the deceased before the marriage is conjugal
property and directing that one-half of said sum be paid to the widow.

The deceased and his second wife had been living-in since 1924 and on 1930, before he married Juana, he
bought 3 parcels of land from Ramon Garcia for 2,500. When he died on 1946, however, just after a year he
finally wed Juana, his children from his first wife sold the 3 parcels of land back to Ramon Garcia for the same
price of 2,500 php. Now, claiming that this sum was conjugal property, Juana, the second wife petitioned the
court to order the coexecutrices to give her one-half thereof, which the RTC declared in her favor thus, the
appeal to the CA, and, subsequently, this case.

Appeal No. 3

This is an appeal from the order of April 29, 1949, which declares that the 1,040 cavans of palay of the value of
P20,800 received as rent on decedent's land for the agricultural year 1946-1947 should be considered conjugal
property so that one-half thereof should go to the widow.

In this case, it was gather from the findings of the trial court that the decedent's participation (as rent) in the
palay planted by the lessee in June or July and which must have been harvested on the following November, if
not before, accrued during coverture. Such being the case it should belong to the conjugal partnership. It is
immaterial that the rent was actually received after the dissolution of the marriage through the death of one of
the spouses. It is the date of accrual that is important.

Under Article 1380 of the old Civil Code "after the marriage has been dissolved, the uncollected fruits or rents
shall be divided pro rata between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased in accordance of the rules
which govern in case of termination of usufruct," the conjugal partnership being considered usufructuary of
the private property of each spouse. As rents are civil fruits (Art. 355, old Civil Code) they must be deemed to
accrue from day to day and belong to the usufructuary (in this case the conjugal partnership) in proportion to
the time the usufruct may last. (Art. 474, old Civil Code.)

It follows from the foregoing that the order appealed from is in accordance with the law and should therefore
be affirmed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not money received after marriage, as purchase price of land sold a retrovendado before such
marriage to one of the consorts, constitutes conjugal property or not;
2. Whether allowances for support granted by the court to the minor heirs should or should not be subject to
collation and deducted from their respective hereditary portions; and

3. Whether a standing crop of palay planted during coverture, and harvested after the death of the one of the
consorts, constitutes fruits and income within the purview of Article 1401 of the Civil Code, and one-half of
such crop should be delivered to the surviving spouse.

HELD:

1) The order of March 11, 1949, declaring that the allowances granted the minors pending liquidation of the
estate should be deducted from their hereditary shares in so far as they exceed what they may be entitled to as
fruits or income, is affirmed.

Under the Civil Code, "the surviving spouse and his or her children shall be given an allowance for their support
out of the general estate, pending the liquidation of the inventoried estate, and until their share has been
delivered to them, but it shall be deducted from their portion insofar as it exceeds what they may have been
entitled to as fruits or income."

On Succession: Article 1067 of the New Civil Code provides, Expenses for support, education, medical
attendance, even in extraordinary illness, apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or customary gifts are not
subject to collation.

Analysis: The foregoing article is the general rule. The exception is that if it exceeds or it impairs the
legitime of the compulsory heirs then it shall now be collationable.

2) The other order of March 11, 1949, declaring the sum of P2,500 received by the co-executrices from Ramon
Garcia as repurchase price of the three parcels of land resold to the latters is conjugal property and that the
widow is entitled to one-half thereof is reversed and the said sum is declared to be part of the estate of the
deceased;

3) The order of April 28, 1949, declaring that the decedents share of standing crop of palay planted during the
coverture and harvested after the dissolution of the marriage are fruits and income within the purview of
Article 1401 of the Civil Code and, therefore, should be considered conjugal property, of which one-half should
be delivered to Juana F. Vda. de Lesaca, is affirmed.

4. QUIRICO SATURNINO vs. FELIZA LUZ PAULINO

This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:

On February 10, 1937, Jaime Luz Paulino, was survived by his children, Timoteo Esteban, Macario and Feliza,
all surnamed Luz Paulino and a grandson-Quirico L. Saturnino, son of his deceased daughter Antonia Luz
Paulino. Among the properties left by Jaime Luz Paulino is a house and lot. On October 22, 1945, his daughter
Feliza Luz Paulino executed a deed of absolute sale of said property in favor of the spouses Maxima Daleja and
Juana Lucas and Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo, for the aggregate sum of P1,200.00.

As said sale was made without the knowledge or consent of Quirino L. Saturnino who, according to him, learned
of it in the early morning of October 23, 1945 and being desirous of exercising his right of subrogation as co-
heir of the vendor, on October 23, 1945, and again on the 29th of the month, in the presence and with the
assistance of his lawyer, offered verbally and in writing to the vendees to return then and there to them, in
actual case, 4/5 of the purchase price of said property, together with the expenses incurred by them in the
preparation of the document, and tendered to them in their respective houses in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, written
copies of the offer and the money in actual cash, Philippine currency, but defendants Juana Lucas and Donato
Guillermo, for themselves and in representation of their respective husbands who were absent, refused
acceptance thereof.

Quirino L. Saturnino then instituted this action in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte against the
defendants mentioned in the captain hereof, depositing with the Clerk of said Court the sum of P960, Philippine
currency, for delivery to the defendant vendees by way of reimbursement, together with the amount of P50
Philippine currency, to cover the expenses incurred in the preparation of the deed of sale, and stating that he
was ready and willing to deposit other additional sums that the court may deem just and necessary.

On November 14, 1945, defendants answered the complaint with counterclaim, which was amended on
December 12 of the same year, wherein it is alleged that all their inheritance from the deceased Jaime Luz
Paulino had been divided in accordance with Section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the last verbal wish
of the decedent before his death, giving the residential lot in question together with the house of strong
materials constructed thereon to Feliza Luz Paulino as her exclusive and only share, and leaving her brothers,
Timoteo, Esteban and Macario, and their nephew Quirino Saturnino to divide all the agricultural lands among
themselves, which division was duly effected. Defendants Maximo Daleja, Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and
Donata Guillermo allege that they are engaged in business and that because of their inability to realize this plan
due to action of the plaintiff, they will suffer damages in the sum of P3,000 yearly unit this case is terminated.

Meanwhile, or on November 19, 1945, Quirino L. Saturnino had filed, with said court, a petition for the probate
of the will and testament of Jaime Luz Paulino. Said will provided that the property in dispute in Case No. 23,
be distributed, share and share alike among the heirs of the testator.

On or about March 10, 1950, the respondents herein filed a supplemental answer alleging the petitioner herein
has no legal capacity to sue, because the property in litigation therein is part of the estate and so the Court
renders judgment declaring the sale made by defendant Feliza Luz Paulino to her co-defendants null and void.

On appeal from this decision, that defendants contended in the Court of Appeals, that the lower court had erred
in their decision. The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the complaint dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

The present petition for review by certiorari filed by Quirico L. Saturnino, is directed against this decision of
the Court of Appeals. It is clear, that said petition must be granted. Pending "partition, adjudication or
assignment to the heirs" of a deceased estator, their "right of inheritance" is not merely" in the nature of hope,"
for pursuant to Article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the
death of Jaime Luz Paulino "the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his
death" and the heirs pursuant to Article 661 of the same Code "succeed to the deceased in all his rights and
obligations by the mere fact of his death."

In other words, the person concerned is an heir and he may exercise his rights as such, from the very moment
of the death of the decedent. One of those rights is that of redemption under Article 1067 of the aforesaid code.

Under Article 1088 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, this right of redemption may be
exercised only before partition, for said provision declares explicitly:

Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of his co-
heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the purchase price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the
sale of the vendor.

It should be noted that a property may be adjudicated either to one heir only or to several heirs pro-indiviso.
In the first case, the adjudication partakes, at the same time, of the nature of a partition. Hence, if the property
is sold by the heir to whom it was adjudicated, the other heirs are not entitled to redeem the property, for, as
regards, the same, they are neither co-heirs nor co-owners. In the second case, the heirs to whom the property
was adjudicated pro-indiviso are, thereafter, no longer co-heirs, but merely co-owners. Consequently, neither
may assert the right of redemption conferred to co-heirs, although, in proper cases, they may redeem as co-
owners, under Article 1522 of the Civil Code of Spain (Article 1620, Civil Code of the Philippines).

5. GREGORIO FAVOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

The deceased father in this case was Regino Favor, who left three sons and several parcels of land in his name.
Before the property could be divided among the three brothers, one of them died with neither wife nor children.
Only the surviving brothers, Gregorio and Prudencio (or Florencio), are involved in this litigation.

The dispute arose in 1972 when Gregorio filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental
against his older brother Prudencio for partition of the properties they had inherited from their father.

Prudencio moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of a cause of action. He contended that the properties
mentioned in the complaint had already been partitioned under a Compromise Agreement concluded between
Gregorio and him on October 4, 1948, and acknowledged before the justice of the peace of Luzuriaga, Negros
Oriental.

The motion to dismiss was denied, and Prudencio reiterated the same defense in his answer. Gregorio filed an
amended complaint in which he prayed, in addition to the partition, for the invalidation of the Compromise
Agreement on the ground of fraud and mistake.

At the trial, Gregorio testified that the greater portion of his father's properties were in the possession of
Prudencio, who was occupying 16,794 square meters as against the 3,789 square meters left to him. He also
assailed the Compromise Agreement, claiming that he had signed it under the mistaken impression that it was
a mortgage receipt for P150.00 and not a partition. He alleged that he could not read or speak English and that
he was defrauded into signing the document by the defendant.
For his part, Prudencio narrated under oath that after the death of their father and later of their brother Hilario,
he and Gregorio verbally partitioned their inheritance, but in 1948 Gregorio asked for a new partition. He
refused. Gregorio then filed a complaint against him which was, however, withdrawn after they signed the
Compromise Agreement. He insisted that the agreement was a valid and binding document that justified the
dismissal of the new complaint.

(On November 20, 1983, while the case was pending, Prudencio died and was substituted by his legal heirs,
Eufemio and Agustin Favor, the herein private respondents.)

On January 6, 1984, Judge Pedro Gabaton of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete, rendered judgment
declaring the Compromise Agreement null and void, ordering partition of the disputed properties, and
awarding the plaintiff damages and attorney's fees.

The respondent court is faulted for upholding the Compromise Agreement and not applying the pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code sustaining the right of the petitioner as co-owner to the partition of the properties
in dispute.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Compromise Agreement is valid and that such is deemed a deed of partition.

HELD:

It was held that the Compromise Agreement is valid and binding.

The Court said that although denominated a Compromise Agreement, the document in question is deemed a
deed of partition under Article 1082 of the Civil Code, which categorically provides as follows:

Every act which is intended to put an end to in division among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed
to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.

The document appears to have been duly notarized, and by the then justice of the peace, and ex officio notary
public, of the town where it was executed. Also, Gregorio was in fact a businessman and even ran for the
position of barangay captain, for which the ability to read and write is prescribed as an indispensable
qualification. He also signed his complaint of February 15, 1972, and its verification as well, but in the petition
he filed with this Court after the respondent court had found that he was literate he merely affixed his
thumbmark to the verification. If his purpose was to convince the court that he really could not write, he has
not succeeded.

To prove defect or lack of consent, the evidence must also be strong and not merely preponderant. Gregorio's
claim that he was tricked by his brother into signing the Compromise Agreement, which he believed was only
a mortgage receipt, is not convincing enough.

But while upholding the Compromise Agreement, the Court also finds that the complaint for partition should
not have been entirely dismissed by the respondent court. The reason is that there are still certain properties
of Regino Favor that have not been distributed between the brothers, as a close examination of the Compromise
Agreement will reveal.

There still remain two parcels of land that have not yet been partitioned, to wit, Lot 4114, which by agreement
of the brothers "shall remain our property," and the lot at Barrio Bongao, which was not included in the
Compromise Agreement as found by both the trial and the respondent courts. Partition of these lots is
mandatory under Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides as follows:

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years,
shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

Article 1083 of the New Civil Code supports the above rule which provides that:

Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate unless the testator should have expressly
forbidden its partition, in which case the period of in division shall not exceed twenty years as provided in
Article 494. xxx"

No such prohibition was made by Regino Favor, who died intestate. And as the Compromise Agreement was
entered into in 1948, the provision therein for the co-ownership of Lot 4114 is deemed to have expired in 1958,
no extension thereof having been established. Hence, these two lots must now be the subject of a separate
partition conformably to the prayer in the complaint.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the respondent court insofar as it upholds the Compromise
Agreement partitioning three of the parcels of land mentioned therein. It dismisses the complaint with regard
to the other properties inherited from Regino Favor which have not been partitioned so far.