A.M. No.

MTJ-94-963 July 14, 1995

MARILOU NAMA MORENO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila,
respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:
The responsibility of a Judge is indeed heavy. As the incarnation of law and justice, it is his
sworn duty to lead by example, to be the example. But how can he inspire the people to live
by the law if he himself fails to do so?
Marilou Nama Moreno filed this complaint against Judge Jose C. Bernabe of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the
law.
Complainant alleges that on October 4, 1993, she and Marcelo Moreno were married before
respondent Judge Bernabe. She avers that Respondent Judge assured her that the marriage
contract will be released ten (10) days after October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the
office of the Respondent Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the
marriage contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage
license. She claims that Respondent Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to
deceive her.1
In his comment,2 Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno
to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant.
Respondent contends:
1. That the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig has actually prepared the marriage license but it was
not released due to the subsequent objection of the father of Marcelo Moreno;
2. That he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the law
when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a desire to help a
begging and pleading complainant who wanted some kind of assurance or security due to her
pregnant condition;
3. That in order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the
marriage ceremony, with the express assurance that "the marriage license was definitely
forthcoming since the necessary documents were complete;"3
4. That the contracting parties were not known to him; and
5. That both parties, particularly the complainant, were fully apprised of the effects of a
marriage performed without the required marriage license.
In a Resolution dated August 10, 1994, we referred this matter for investigation, report and
recommendation to Executive Judge Martin Villarama, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 156.
In his Memorandum of October 11, 1994, Judge Villarama, Jr. recommended the dismissal of
the complaint against Respondent for failure of complainant to appear on any of the
scheduled hearings and on the basis of a "Sinumpaang Salaysay"4 executed on behalf of
complainant who has left for Singapore by her elder sister Sherlita N. Bendanillo expressly
withdrawing her complaint against Respondent.
Judge Villarama, however, also recommended that the Respondent be issued a stern warning
"in view of the fact on record that he indeed solemnized a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. . . ."5
On November 7, 1994, we referred the aforementioned Memorandum to the Office of the
Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator stated:
Careful study of the records reveal that indeed respondent Judge displayed his
ignorance of the law when he solemnized the marriage without a marriage
license. As a judge, he is presumed to be aware of the existence of Article 3(2)
of the Family Code of the Philippines (E.O. 209, as amended by E.O. 227),
which provides that one of the formal requisites of a marriage is a valid marriage
license. Absence of said requisite will make the marriage void from the
beginning (Article 35 [3], the Family Code of the Philippines). Judges are
enjoined to show more than just a cursory acquaintance of the law and other
established rules.6
It recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage
without a marriage license and that the appropriate administrative sanctions be imposed
against him.7
We concur with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator.
Respondent, by his own admission8 that he solemnized the marriage between complainant
and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has dismally failed to live up to his
commitment to be the "embodiment of competence, integrity and independence"9 and to his
promise to be "faithful to the law." 10
Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at most,
would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions
could never justify violation of the law.
Must we always repeat our reminder in Uy v. Dizon Capulong 11 and several other cases12
that
. . . the judge is the visible representation of law and justice from whom the
people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return
that regard, the latter must be the first to abide by the law and weave an
example for the others to follow. The judge should be studiously careful to avoid
even the slightest infraction of the law. To fulfill this mission, the judge should
keep abreast of the law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. If the judge is
already aware of them, the latter should not deliberately refrain from applying
them; otherwise such omission can never be excused.
And have we not frequently stressed that:
. . .judges should endeavor to maintain at all times the confidence and high
respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice. Circular No. 13, dated
July 1, 1987, enjoins judges "to conduct themselves strictly in accordance with
the mandate of existing laws and the Code of Judicial Conduct that they be
exemplars in their communities and the living personification of justice and the
 Rule of Law. . . . 13
A case in point, a definite precedent and a clear basis in determining the liability of
Respondent in the instant case is Cosca, et al. v. Palaypayon, Jr.,
et a1. 14 where Judge Palaypayon, Jr. was duly fined and sternly warned for, among others,
solemnizing marriages without licenses. We declared:
. . . the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with
the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should
be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all
times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all
else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of
integrity, uprightness and honesty. Integrity in a judicial office is more than a
virtue, it is a necessity. It applies, without qualification as to rank or position,
from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the
exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides
that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license
except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the
marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall
not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the
illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the
administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal
responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]riests or ministers of
any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with
the provisions of the Marriage Law." This is of course, within the province of the
prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
Finally, on the alleged withdrawal of the complaint against Respondent, we reiterate our ruling
in Imbing v. Tiongson:15
The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case
against herein respondent judge will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof.
Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its
jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the
complaint. The Court has an interest in the conduct of members of the Judiciary
and in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts in that
direction may not be derailed by the complainant's desistance from further
prosecuting the case he or she initiated.
To condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant, who may,
for one reason or another, condone a detestable act, is to strip this Court of its
supervisory power to discipline erring members of the Judiciary. Definitely,
personal interests are not material or controlling. What is involved here is a
matter of public interest considering that respondent is no ordinary citizen but an
officer of the court whose personal behavior not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
 reproach.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of
P10,000.00 and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL,
INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no
cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment
of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient"
to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking
for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G.
Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their
father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and
void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of
the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners
averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.
[3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated
the petition for review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation
in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.[9] This
interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State.[11] This
is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"[12]
and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants
name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from
the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt
them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that
"they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."[16] The only
issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under
Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt
the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both
parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or
should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether
there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife
for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be
a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse
to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge
of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17]
The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons
under oath. x x x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar
thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof
and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day.
From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where
there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence
of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare
their fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code[20] cannot be applied
even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an
annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains
to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration
of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid
until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered
as having never to have taken place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never
be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding
while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action
or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership
through actual joint contribution,[23] and its effect on the children born to such void marriages
as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the
Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup
rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should
be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the
death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence
of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for
the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore,
being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which
the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the
wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so
that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26]
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.
[28] For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000]
ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-
Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent. ALEX
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and
Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso
charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and
of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office
of the Local Civil Registrar alleging
"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN got
married and our marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his
residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar; xxxalex
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as
our principal sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; xxx
c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me
 without any reason at all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and
wrote the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding my Marriage Contract;
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog
City that my marriage was not registered; xxxSc lex
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I wrote Judge Juan
Daguman, to inquire;
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the
copies of the Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);
h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my
interest such as: x law
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage
before the office of the Local Civil Registrar."
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to
be solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as
municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the following and pressing
circumstances: Sc
1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and
unable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita. In the forenoon of that
date, without prior appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman
unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in said City, urgently
requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there, first,
because complainants said she must leave that same day to be able to
fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to go
to another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail
serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of
witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former Undersecretary Pacifico
Maghacot, Sangguniang Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were
already with them as sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on
August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long
period and their marriage license would lapse and necessitate another
publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their plans for the
scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her
employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to date and venue
of marriage were considered impracticable by the parties;
1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic)
for a valid marriage, which respondent found all in order. Spped
1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who,
respondent realized, deserved more than ordinary official attention under
 present Government policy.
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in
good faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so
that it may be not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married.
3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was also
occasioned by the following circumstances beyond the control of respondent:
Scmis
3.1. After handing to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate,
respondent left the three remaining copies on top of the desk in his
private office where the marriage ceremonies were held, intending later
to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the forth (sic) in
his office.
3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the
papers relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in
the premises and private files, all the three last copies of the certificate
were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena xxx Mr. Yman to
shed light on the missing documents and he said he saw complainant
Beso put the copies of the marriage certificate in her bag during the
wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contact complainant for a
confirmation of Mr. Ymans claim. Mis sc
3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is out
of the country, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the
established facts so far in this dispute. If we believe the claim of
complainant that after August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr. Yman,
abandoned her without any reason xxx but that said husband admitted
"he had another girl by the name of LITA DANGUYAN" xxx it seems
reasonably clear who of the two marriage contracting parties probably
absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate. Jo spped
3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but
to protect the public interest by trying all possible means to recover
custody of the missing documents in some amicable way during the
expected hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the City of
Marikina, failing to do which said respondent would confer with the Civil
Registrar General for possible registration of reconstituted copies of said
documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11, 1998
found that respondent Judge " committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he
be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of the same or
future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing out that:
"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar,
the authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under
his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction.
Miso
Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the
 Family Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his
chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place; Nex old
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house
or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he
failed to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which
provides: Ncm
"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish
either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate
referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of
the certificates not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local
civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. xxx"
(underscoring ours)
It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge
committed non-feasance in office, he also undermined the very foundation of
marriage which is the basic social institution in our society whose nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by law. Granting that respondent
Judge indeed failed to locate the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage
certificate, he should have exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the
same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he is expected to be
conscientious in handling official documents. His imputation that the missing
copies of the marriage certificate were taken by Bernardito Yman is based
merely on conjectures and does not deserve consideration for being devoid of
proof."
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation
report of the OCA well-taken. Mani kx
Jimenez v. Republic[1] underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution thus:
"[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The
state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The
security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of
each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that
would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction."
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among
others, that
"ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: Maniks
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction; xxx"
(Italics ours)
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
 ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge
or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-
general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except
in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at
a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect." (Italics
ours) Spped jo
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judges
chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote
places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman was at the
point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the
contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his
chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that
respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and
Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved
more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy." Respondent Judge
further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by
doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive
and complicated for citizens to get married." Manikan
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and
abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for.[2]
A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law;[3] he must also be conscientious and
thorough in doing so.[4] Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office should be
more circumspect in the performance of their duties.[5]
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the
marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoyed by marriage in the
hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also betray respondents cavalier proclivity
on its significance in our culture which is more disposed towards an extended period of
engagement prior to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital
unions.Ncmmis
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order to preserve
so sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability of judicial doctrines
laid down by superior authority should have given respondent judge pause and made him
more vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties as a
solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the
authority or jurisdiction of his court.[6] Thus respondent Judge should be reminded that
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful,
is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his
Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over
the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long
as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, Judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts
 jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject
the officiating official to administrative liability.[7] Scnc m
Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-
Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage
in the City of Calbayog.[8]
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should
exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its
solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that the
event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which states
in no uncertain terms that
ART. 23. - It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish
either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to
in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not
later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place
where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the
local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage
certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy
of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper
cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the
marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (Italics supplied)
Sdaad
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge was
less than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with exercising
extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are
intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events.[9] However, the
records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judges part. This
Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record management and organize their
dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business.[10] It is, in fact,
incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court because he
is after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.[11]
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA. Juris
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
infractions will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law
via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without
the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast
properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment
and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the
Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a
certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17
February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete,
he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a
difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost
25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could
solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined
the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not
possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested
its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of
visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the
marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might
aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the
solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia
assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that
same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the
latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his
sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is
valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with
the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to
solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was
because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She
confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the
Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered
by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application
for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage
license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has
no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated
7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has
no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the
issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal,
informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the
failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November
2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was
recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge
held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of
Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes
a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.[2] (Emphasis
supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We
further held that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the
law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced
the status of married persons.[3]
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in
Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability.
His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the
marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the
law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the
issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided
by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner.
This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint
does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.
Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court
personnel, would be undermined.[5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely
private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every
complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be
bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Courts
constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught,
undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this
Court as a disciplining authority.[6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-8014 March 14, 1955
PEDRO V. VILAR, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIO V. PARAISO, respondent-appellant.
Claro M. Recto and Jose Nava for petitioner-appellant.
Josefina R. Phodaca and Naomi P. Salvador for respondent-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso
were among the candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija.
after the canvass was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso garnered 1,509, and as
a result the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly elected
with a plurality of 41 votes. However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as
mayor because he was then a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and
such was disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative
Code, Vilar instituted the present quo warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared
ineligible to assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be declared null and void.
He also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of
respondent Paraiso.
Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of
the United Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951, that his resignation was
accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August
27, 1951, and that even if respondent was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be
declared elected to take his place.
After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of mayor, being an
ecclesiastic, and, consequently, it declared his proclamation as mayor null and void, but
refrained from declaring petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so.
from this election both parties have appealed, respondent from that portion finding him
ineligible, and petitioner from that portion holding he cannot be declared elected as mayor for
lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so.
The case was originally taken to the Court of Appeals. However, as the latter court found that
while petitioner raises in his brief only questions of law respondent raises both questions of
law and fact, and both appeals are indivisible in that they pertain to only one case, that court
resolved to certify it to this Court pursuant to the provisions of sections 17 and 31 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, upon the theory that one of the appeals is exclusively cognizable by the
Supreme Court.
The only issue before us is whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold
office under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, or whether he actually resigned
as minister before the date of the elections, and his resignation duly accepted, as claimed,
thereby removing his disability. As may be noted, this is a question of fact the determination of
which much depends upon the credibility and weight of the evidence of both parties.
The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent was ordained as minister of the
Evangelical Church of the Philippines in 1944 and as such was given license to solemnize
marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries; that since 1944 up to 1950 he acted as minister
in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously and without interruption and has been
renewing his license to solemnize marriages as prescribed by the regulations of the Bureau of
Public Libraries; that on April 19, 1950, respondent transferred to the United Church of Christ
in the Philippines, having been assigned to work in the same place and chapel during the
years 1944-1950; that on April 7, 1951, respondent applied for, and was issued, a license to
solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries as minister of the new church up to the
end of April, 1952; that said license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of the
united church nor respondent has requested for its cancellation; and that respondent has
been publicly known as minister of the United Church of Christ, but he has not attached to his
certificate of candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as minister.
The evidence for the respondent, on the other hand, tends to show that while he was formerly
a minister of the United of Christ in the Philippines, he, however, filed his resignation as such
minister on August 21, 1951, because of his desire to engage in politics; that said resignation
was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on
August 27, 1951; that respondent turned over his chapel and his office to the elder members
of his religious order on August 21, 1951, and since then he considered himself separated
from his order and in fact he has refrained ever since from conducting any religious services
pertaining to that order.
Which of these versions is correct?
After careful examining the evidence of record, and after weighing its credibility and probative
value, we have not found any reason for deviating from the finding of the trial court that
respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which he belonged and that the
resignation he claims to have filed months before the date of the elections is but a mere
scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a
municipal office. Indeed, if respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of
the religious organization to which he belonged for the purpose of launching his candidacy
why did he not resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation registered with
the Bureau of Public Libraries.1 The importance of resignation cannot be underestimated. The
purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the minister
to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious
status. This information is necessary for the protection of the public. This is specially so with
regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the law
mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no argument to say that the duty to secure
the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head
of his organization or upon the official in charge of such registration, upon proper showing of
the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the interested party
the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This
he failed to do. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of
his alleged resignation as minister knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run
for a municipal office.
It is true that respondent attempted to substantiate his claim by submitting as evidence certain
documents purporting to show the alleged resignation and its acceptance by the cabinet of his
church at a meeting held on August 27, 1951, but, considering said documents in the light of
the shortcomings we have pointed out above, one cannot help but brand them as self-serving
or as documents merely prepared to serve the political designs of respondent in an attempt to
obviate his disqualification under the law. And this feeling appears strengthened if we
examine the so-called minute book wherein, according to witness Jose Agpalo, are entered
the minutes of all the meeting of the church, because upon an examination thereof one would
at once get the impression that it was prepared haphazardly and not with such seriousness
and solemnity that should characterize the religious activities of a well established religious
order. As the trial court aptly remarked "All these lead the court to believe with the petitioner,
that the supposed resignation and acceptance were made at a later date to cure the
ineligibility of the respondent." We are therefore constrained to hold that respondent is
disqualified to hold the office of mayor as found by the trial court.
As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible, petitioner can be declared elected,
having obtained second place in the elections, our answer is simple: this Court has already
declared that this cannot be done in the absence of an express provision authorizing such
declaration. Our law not only does not contain any such provision but apparently seems to
prohibit it. This is what we said in at least two cases where we laid down a ruling which is
decisive of the present case.
. . . . In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that
the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible,
since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has
 obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. (Nuval vs.
Guray, 52 Phil., 645.)
Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known as the Revised Election Code, does not
provide that if the contestee is declared ineligible the contestant will be proclaimed.
Indeed it may be gathered that the law contemplates no such result, because it permits
the filing of the contest by any registered candidate irrespective of whether the latter
occupied the next highest place or the lowest in the election returns. (Llamoso vs.
Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil., 489, 47 Off. Gaz., [No. 2] p. 727.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.