VII.

SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION

Chapter V. Sections 51-77

I. Voluntary Dealings with Registered Lands

a. Primary Entry Book

1. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, UDK No. 7671,
June 23, 1998

Provisional Registration; Effect. In view of the provisional nature of the registration process, the vendors certificate
of title is not stamped cancelled until the title is reconstituted and a new one issued to the vendee. The effect of the
provisional registration, however, is to effectively convey the property to the vendee since the entry of an instrument in
the primary entry book is not rendered ineffective because the title involved has not yet been reconstituted when such
entry was made and therefore registration of the instrument may resume once the title has been reconstituted using
the old entry (DBP vs. Actg. Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, UDK No. 7671, June 23, 1988). Consulta No. 1815

Two Ways of Dealing with Lands: Voluntary

Transactions and Involuntary Transactions.
In voluntary registration, such as a sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the owner's duplicate certificate be not
surrendered and presented or if no payment of registration fees be made within 15 days, entry in the day book of the
deed of sale does not operate to convey and affect the land sold. In involuntary registration, such as an attachment, levy
upon execution, lis pendens and the like, entry thereof in
the day book is a sufficient notice to all persons of such adverse claim. ...

NARVASA, J.:

This case, rather cut-and-dried as far as factual background is concerned, turns upon a determination of the true
meaning and intendment of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, 1 which in part reads:

Sec. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees, certified copies. Each Register of Deeds shall keep a primary entry book in which,
upon payment of the entry fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception, all instruments including copies of writs
and processes filed with him relating to registered land. He shall, as a preliminary process in registration, note in such
book the date, hour and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in which they were received. They shall be
regarded as registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument, when made on the certificate
of title to which it refers, shall bear the same date: Provided, that the national government as well as the provincial and
city governments shall be exempt from the payment of such fees in advance in order to be entitled to entry and
registration.

xxx xxx xxx

The facts are few and undisputed. On June 13, 1980, the Development Bank of the Philippines (hereafter, DBP)
presented for registration to the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City, a sheriff's certificate of sale in its
favor of two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT-149033 and NT-149034, both in the names
of the spouses Andres Bautista and Marcelina Calison, which said institution had acquired as the highest bidder at an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The transaction was entered as Entry No. 8191 in the Registry's Primary Entry Book and
DBP paid the requisite registration fees on the same day. Annotation of the sale on the covering certificates of title could
1

not, however be effected because the originals of those certificates were found to be missing from the files of the
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Registry, where they were supposed to be kept, and could not be located. 2 On the advice of the Register of Deeds, DBP
instituted proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to reconstitute said certificates, and reconstitution
was ordered by that court in a decision rendered on June 15, 1982. 3 For reasons not apparent on the record, the
certificates of title were reconstituted only on June 19,1984. 4

On June 25, 1984, DBP sought annotation on the reconstituted titles of the certificate of sale subject of Entry No. 8191
on the basis of that same four-year-old entry. The Acting Register of Deeds, being in doubt of the proper action to take
on the solicitation, took the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration by consulta raising two questions: (a)
whether the certificate of sale could be registered using the old Entry No. 8191 made in 1980 notwithstanding the fact
that the original copies of the reconstituted certificates of title were issued only on June 19, 1984; and (b) if the first
query was answered affirmatively, whether he could sign the proposed annotation, having assumed his duties only in
July 1982.5

The resolution on the consulta held that Entry No. 8191 had been rendered "... ineffective due to the impossibility of
accomplishing registration at the time the document was entered because of the non-availability of the certificate (sic)
of title involved. For said certificate of sale to be admitted for registration, there is a need for it to be re-entered now
that the titles have been reconstituted upon payment of new entry fees," and by-passed the second query as having
been rendered moot and academic by the answer to the first. 6

Unwilling to accept that result, the DBP appealed the resolution to the Court of Appeals (then the Intermediate
Appellate Court) 7 which, after reviewing the record, certified the appeal to this Court as involving a question purely of
law.8

The appealed resolution appears to be based upon a reading of the cited Section 56 of PD No. 1529, and particularly of
the provision therein referring to the Register's act of making a primary entry as " ... a preliminary process in registration
...," as depriving of any effect a primary entry without a corresponding annotation thereof on the certificate of title to
which the instrument subject of said entry refers.

That view fails to find support from a consideration of entire context of said Section 56 which in another part also
provides that the instrument subject of a primary entry "... shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted ...,"
and, at the very least, gives such entry from the moment of its making the effect of putting the whole world on notice of
the existence the instrument on entered. Such effect (of registration) clearly attaches to the mere making of the entry
without regard to the subsequent step of annotating a memorandum of the instrument subject of the entry on the
certificate of title to which it refers. Indeed, said Section, in also providing that the annotation, "... when made ... shall
bear the same date ..." as the entry, may be said to contemplate unspecified intervals of time occurring between the
making of a primary entry and that of the corresponding annotation on the certificate of title without robbing the entry
of the effect of being equivalent to registration. Neither, therefore, is the implication in the appealed resolution that
annotation must annotation entry immediately or in short order justified by the language of Section 56.

Furthermore, it is amply clear that the four-year hiatus between primary entry and proposed annotation in this case has
not been of DBP's making. Though it was under no necessity to present the owner's duplicates of the certificates of title
affected for purposes of primary entry, since the transaction sought to be recorded was an involuntary transaction, 9
and the record is silent as to whether it presented them or not, there is nonetheless every probability that it did so. It
was the mortgagee of the lands covered by those titles and it is usual in mortgage transactions that the owner's
duplicates of the encumbered titles are yielded into the custody of the mortgage until the mortgage is discharged.
Moreover, the certificates of title were reconstituted from the owner's duplicates, 10 and again it is to be presumed that
said duplicates were presented by DBP, the petitioner in the reconstitution proceedings.

It is, furthermore, admitted that the requisite registration fees were fully paid and that the certificate of sale was
registrable on its face. 11 DBP, therefore, complied with all that was required of it for purposes of both primary entry
and annotation of the certificate of sale. It cannot be blamed that annotation could not be made contemporaneously
2

with the entry because the originals of the subject certificates of title were missing and could not be found, since it had
Page
nothing to do with their safekeeping. If anyone was responsible for failure of annotation, it was the Register of Deeds
who was chargeable with the keeping and custody of those documents.

It does not, therefore, make sense to require DBP to repeat the process of primary entry, paying anew the entry fees as
the appealed resolution disposes, in order to procure annotation which through no fault on its part, had to be deferred
until the originals of the certificates of title were found or reconstituted. That it is hardly just or equitable to do so also
seems to have occurred to the Solicitor General, who dilutes his argument in support of the appealed resolution with
the suggestion that "... the making of a new entry ... would be the more orderly procedure," and that DBP should not be
made to pay filing fees anew.12

Jurisprudence on the subject, while it has not been entirely consistent, is not wanting. In Government vs. Aballe, 13 this
Court ruled that " ... (a)lthough a notice of attachment has not been noted on the certificate of title, its notation in the
book of entry of the register of deeds produces all the effects which the law gives to its registration or inscription."
Seemingly, that ruling was abandoned in the wartime case of Basa vs. De la Rama, 14 where it was held that the entry of
an instrument in the primary entry book produces no legal effect unless a memorandum thereof is noted on the
certificate of title. Villasor vs. Camon, 15 however, clarified that Aballe was never really abandoned or reversed insofar
as it applied to involuntary transactions. Said the Court in that case, which involved a voluntary transactions a deed of
assignment of rights in a parcel of land and its improvements:

The appellant cannot invoke in support of her contention, the ruling laid down in the case of Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Aballe, 60 Phil., 986, which was followed in Director of Lands vs. Abad, 61 Phil. 479, to the effect
that an attachment entered upon the entry book is duly registered although the duplicate certificate is not presented at
the time of registration to the register of deeds. Appellant cannot invoked said ruling, not because it has been
abandoned by the Supreme Court during the Japanese occupation in the case of Bass VS. De la Rama, et al., ... in which it
was said that "we are constrained to abandon the ruling in said two cases,"- it was not abandoned for the decision was
concurred by only two justices or less than a majority, and said statement was not necessary or an obiter dictum and
against the law, as correctly stated by the two associate justices who dissented and only concurred in the result, but
because said ruling, subsisting and in force, does not support appellant's contention, for it is only applicable to
registration of involuntary instruments, such as attachment, or other liens and adverse claims of any description. This
ruling is correct or in conformity with the provisions of section 72 of Act No. 496, which do not require the production by
the registrant of the duplicate certificate of the land to be affected, ... (emphasis supplied)

The decision in Villasor also quoted with approval the following excerpt from an earlier case, Philippine National Bank vs.
Fernandez. 16

Coming now to the second ground on which the appellant bases his claims, we find that when Simona Fausa executed
the document, Exhibit 3, on October 17, 1928, conveying her interest in the land to the appellant, her interest therein
had already been attached by the provincial sheriff and also by him at public auction to the Philippine National Bank,
and the certificate of sale filed in the office of the register of deeds in accordance with the law (sections 429 and 450 of
the Code of Civil Procedure). It was not necessary for the sheriff to present the owner's duplicate of the certificate of
title when he filed notice of attachment with the register of deeds, nor was it necessary for the Philippine National Bank
to present the owner's duplicate when the bank filed its certificate of sale for registration (sections 71 and 72 of Act No.
496).

Later cases appear to have applied the Aballe ruling that entry in the day book, even without the corresponding
annotation on the certificate of title, is equivalent to, or produces the effect of, registration to voluntary transactions,
provided the requisite fees are paid and the owner's duplicates of the certificates of title affected are presented. Thus, in
Levin vs. Bass, et al., 17 it was held:

... Under the Torrens system the act of registration is the operative act to convey and affect the land. Do the entry in the
3

day book of a deed of sale which was presented and filed together with owner's duplicate certificate of title which the
Page

office of the Registrar of Deeds and full payment of registration fees constitute a complete act of registration which
operates to convey and affect the land? In voluntary registration, such as a sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the
owner's duplicate certificate be not surrendered and presented or if no payment of registration fees be made within 15
days, entry in the day book of the deed of sale does not operate to convey and affect the land sold. In involuntary
registration, such as an attachment, levy upon execution, lis pendens and the like entry thereof in the day book is a
sufficient notice to all persons of such adverse claim. ... The pronouncement of the court below is to the effect that an
innocent purchaser for value has no right to the property because he is not a holder of a certificate of title to such
property acquired by him for value and in good faith. It amounts to holding that for failure of the Registrar of Deeds to
comply and perform his duty, an innocent purchaser for value loses that character-he is not an "innocent holder for
value of a certificate of title." ... Neither violence to, nor stretching of the meaning of, the law would be done, if we
should hold that an innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes the registered owner and in contemplation
of law the holder of a certificate thereof the moment he presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title to the
property sold and pays the full amount of registration fees, because what remains to be done lies not within his power
to perform. The Registrar of Deeds is in duty bound to perform it. We believe that is a reasonable and practical
interpretation of the law under considerations-a construction which would lead to no inconsistency and injustice.
(emphasis supplied)

A similar ruling was made in Potenciano vs. Dineros, et al., 18 concerning land a deed of sale of which was entered in the
day book upon payment of the corresponding fees and presentation of the owner's duplicate of the covering certificate
of title, on November 4, 1944. However, due to the confusion arising from the bombing of Manila (this having happened
during the final months of the Japanese Occupation), the papers presented by the registrant were either lost or
destroyed, no certificate of title was issued to him and as far as the records of the Register of Deeds showed, the
property remained in the name of the vendor. Another party later sued the vendor, obtained judgment against him and
purchased the property on execution sale. In affirming judgment annulling the execution sale in an action brought by the
original purchaser, this Court held:

The judgment creditor contends that entry of the deed in the day book is not sufficient registration. Both upon law and
authority this contention must be rejected. Section 56 of the Land Registration Act says that deeds relating to registered
land shall, upon payment of the filing fees, be entered in the entry book also called day book in the same section
with notation of the year, month, day, hour, and minute of their reception and that "they shall be regarded as registered
from the moment so noted." And applying this provision in the cases of Levin vs. Bass, etc., G.R. Nos. L-4340 to 4346,
decided on May 28, 1952, this Court held that "an innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes the
registered owner and in contemplation of law the holder of a certificate thereof the moment he presents and files a duly
notarized and lawful deed of sale and the same is entered on the day book and at the same time he surrenders or
presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title to the property sold and pays the full amount of registration fees,
because what remains to be done lies not within his power to perform."

Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction entered
is a voluntary or an involuntary one, so long as the registrant has complied with all that is required of him for purposes
of entry and annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the register of deeds.

Therefore, without necessarily holding that annotation of a primary entry on the original of the certificate of title may be
deferred indefinitely without prejudice to the legal effect of said entry, the Court rules that in the particular situation
here obtaining, annotation of the disputed entry on the reconstituted originals of the certificates of title to which it
refers is entirely proper and justified. To hold said entry "ineffective," as does the appealed resolution, amounts to
declaring that it did not, and does not, protect the registrant (DBP) from claims arising, or transactions made, thereafter
which are adverse to or in derogation of the rights created or conveyed by the transaction thus entered. That, surely, is a
result that is neither just nor can, by any reasonable interpretation of Section 56 of PD 1529, be asserted as warranted
by its terms.

The qualms implicit in the query of the respondent (and present appellee) register of deeds about making annotation of
4

an entry effected before he assumed that office are more imagined than real. He would only be making a memorandum
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of an instrument and of its entry based on or reciting details which are already of indubitable record and, pursuant to
the express command of the law, giving said memorandum the same date as the entry. No part of that function is
exclusive to the incumbent of the office at the time entry was made or is forbidden to any of his successors.

WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the Acting Commissioner of Land Registration is SET ASIDE. The respondent-
appellee Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, or his successor, is ordered to annotate on the originals of the reconstituted
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT-149033 and NT-149034 of his Registry a memorandum of the certificate of sale in
favor of appellant Development Bank of the Philippines as entered under Entry No. 8191 dated June 13, 1980 of the
Primary Entry (Day) Book of said Registry. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

2. National Housing Authority vs Augusto Basa, GR 149121, April 20, 2010

FACTS:
Spouses Basa loaned from NHA secured by a real estate mortgage over their properties. Spouses Basa did not pay the
loan despite repeated demands. To collect its credit, the NHA filed a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage before the Sheriffs Office in Quezon City.

After notice and publication, the properties were sold at public auction where NHA emerged as the highest bidder. On
April 16, 1991, the sheriffs certificate of sale was registered and annotated only on the owners duplicate copies of the
titles in the hands of the respondents, since the titles in the custody of the Register of Deeds were among those burned
down when a fire gutted the City Hall of Quezon City on June 11, 1988.

On April 16, 1992, the redemption period expired, without respondents having redeemed the properties. Shortly
thereafter, on April 24, 1992, NHA executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership over the foreclosed properties,
and the same was inscribed by the Register of Deeds on the certificates of title in the hand of NHA.

NHA moved for the issuance of an alias writ of possession. Before the RTC could resolve the motion for the issuance of
an alias writ of possession, respondents, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition in Intervention.
Respondents theorized that the instrument is deemed registered only upon actual inscription on the certificate of title in
the custody of the civil registrar. Since the sheriffs certificate was only inscribed on the owners duplicate certificate of
title, and not on the certificate of title in the possession of the Register of Deeds, then there was no effective
registration and the one-year redemption period had not even begun to run. Thus, respondents asked the RTC, among
others, to declare the foreclosure sale null and void, to allow the respondents to redeem the mortgaged properties.
NHA maintained that respondents right of redemption had long expired on April 15, 1992 since the certificate of sale
was inscribed on their TCT Nos. 285413 and 287008 a year earlier, or on April 16, 1991.

RTC issued an Order admitting the Petition in Intervention and treating the same as the petition to set aside sale.

NHA filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the NHA. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals, in its Amended Decision, reconsidered its earlier stance.
It declared that the period of redemption had not expired as the certificate of sale had not been registered or annotated
in the original copies of the titles supposedly kept with the Register of Deeds since said titles were earlier razed by fire.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the annotation of the sheriffs certificate of sale in the primary entry book of the register of deeds and
on the owners duplicate title is sufficient compliance with the requirement of law on registration.
5

HELD:
Page
The prevailing rule is that there is effective registration once the registrant has fulfilled all that is needed of him for
purposes of entry and annotation, so that what is left to be accomplished lies solely on the register of deeds.

NHA followed the procedure in order to have its sheriffs certificate of sale annotated in the transfer certificates of title.
It was not NHAs fault that the certificate of sale was not annotated on the transfer certificates of title which were
supposed to be in the custody of the Registrar, since the same were burned. Neither could NHA be blamed for the fact
that there were no reconstituted titles available during the time of inscription as it had taken the necessary steps in
having the same reconstituted as early as July 15, 1988. NHA did everything within its power to assert its right.
Since entry of the certificate of sale was validly registered, the redemption period accruing to respondents commenced
therefrom, since the one-year period of redemption is reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale.

3. Durawood vs Candice Bona, GR 179884, January 25, 2010

B. Necessity and effects of registration in general

a. Entry in the primary book produces the effect of registration

b. There is effective registration once the registrant has fulfiiled all that is needed of him for purposes of entry
and annotation, so that what is left to be accomplished lies solely on the Register of Deeds.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
94479 dated April 18, 2007 and its Resolution[2] dated September 18, 2007.

On June 3, 2004, petitioner Durawood Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc. (Durawood) filed an action for sum
of money plus damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against LBB
Construction and Development Corporation (LBB Construction) and its president Leticia Barber (Barber) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo. In said suit, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-7240, Durawood
prayed for the sum of P665,385.50 as payment for construction materials delivered to LBB Construction.

On June 14, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting Durawoods prayer for the issuance of a writ of attachment.
On June 16, 2004, the corresponding writ was issued.

On June 17, 2004, Sheriff Rolando C. Leyva (Sheriff Leyva) levied on a 344-square meter parcel of land in
Richdale Subdivision, Antipolo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. R-17571 in the name of LBB
Construction. A Notice of Levy on Attachment was annotated in TCT No. R-17571s Memorandum of
Encumbrances on the same day, June 17, 2004.

On July 13, 2004, respondent Candice S. Bona (Candice) filed a Motion seeking leave to intervene in Civil Case
No. 04-7240. Attached to said Motion was Candices Answer in Intervention, her Third Party Claim addressed to
Sheriff Leyva, and a copy of TCT No. R-17571. Candice claimed therein that she is a co-owner of the property
covered by TCT No. R-17571. She alleged that LBB Construction had sold the property to her and her siblings,
Michael Angelo S. Bona, Diane Sheila S. Bona, Glenda May S. Bona and Johann Louie Sebastian S. Bona, through
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 2, 2004. Candice asserted that the sale is the subject of Entry No. 30549
dated June 16, 2004 in the books of the Registry of Deeds of Antipolo City, while the levy on attachment is only
Entry No. 30590 dated June 17, 2004. What was attached to the Motion was a copy of TCT No. R-17571, and not
a title in Candice and her co-owners names.
6

On August 11, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting Candices Motion to Intervene.
Page
LBB Construction and Barber filed their Answer in Civil Case No. 04-7240, but failed to attend the scheduled
hearings, including the pre-trial. Consequently, Durawood was allowed to present its evidence ex parte.

On July 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision[3] in Civil Case No. 04-7240 in favor of Durawood. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants, viz:

1. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of Six Hundred Sixty[-]Five Thousand Three Hundred
Eighty[-]Five Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P665,385.50) plus two percent (2%) interest per month from May 11,
2004 up to the present;

2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount due to the plaintiff by
way of attorneys fees; and

3. To pay the costs of suit.[4]

The Decision became final and executory. On September 12, 2005, Durawood filed a Motion for the Issuance of
a Writ of Execution. On November 15, 2005, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution. It was when this Writ was about
to be enforced that Durawood discovered the cancellation of TCT No. R-17571 and the issuance of TCT No. R-
22522 in the name of Candice and her siblings.

It would appear from the records that on June 16, 2004, the supposed Register of Deeds of Antipolo City, Atty.
Randy A. Rutaquio (Atty. Rutaquio), cancelled TCT No. R-17571 and issued TCT No. R-22522 in the name of
Candice and her co-owners. The parties, however, do not dispute that said cancellation of the old TCT and
issuance of the new one was antedated, since Atty. Rutaquio was still the Register of Deeds of Malabon on said
date.[5] According to a certification of the Land Registration Authority,[6] it was a certain Atty. Edgar D. Santos
(Atty. Santos) who was the Acting Register of Deeds of Antipolo City on June 16, 2004.

Durawood filed a Motion to Reinstate Notice of Levy on Attachment in TCT No. R-22522 and Cite Atty. Randy A.
Rutaquio for Contempt[7] on the following grounds:

5. The cancellation of TCT No. R-17571 and the issuance of TCT No. R-22522 was made by Atty. Randy A.
Rutaquio who, on June 2004, was not the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City. As evidence of such fact, plaintiff
corporation was issued a certification by LRA Human Resource Management Officer IV Loreto I. Orense that
Atty. Edgar D. Santos was the Acting Register of Deeds of Antipolo City from June 1-30, 2004.

6. While the Deed of Sale annotated in TCT No. R-17571 appears to have been made on June 16, 2004, the fact
of its inscription was made after that of the levy on attachment as it obviously appears below and next to it.

7. The records of this case reveal that in the Third Party Claim filed by Candice Bona sometime in July 2004,
there was never any mention of any recording about a Deed of Absolute Sale in the Memorandum of
Encumbrances in TCT No. R-17571. It is difficult to comprehend that Atty. Hernando U. Salvador, Bonas lawyer,
would miss mentioning that a Deed of Absolute Sale was inscribed ahead of the notice of levy on attachment if
ever such sale was made on June 16, 2004.

8. Thus, under the circumstances, plaintiff corporation cannot help speculate that [the] Deed of Sale between
LBB Construction and the Bonas was made to appear to have been recorded a day before the attachment.
7
Page
9. While the Notice of Levy on Attachment was inscribed in TCT No. R-17571 ahead and before of the Deed of
Sale between LBB Construction Co., Inc. and the Bonas, the said notice was not carried over in TCT No. R-22522
despite the fact that there was no order coming from this Honorable Court dissolving the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment dated June 16, 2004.

10. Randy Rutaquios unauthorized acts of cancelling TCT No. R-17571 and issuing TCT No. R-22522 without
inscribing the Notice of Levy on Attachment despite the absence of a court order dissolving the writ of
Preliminary Attachment constitute improper conduct tending to directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice.[8]

Atty. Rutaquio filed a Manifestation alleging that the sale was entered in the Primary Entry Book prior to the
Levy on Attachment. The two transactions were assigned to different examiners and it just so happened that the
examiner to whom the levy on attachment was assigned was able to inscribe the memorandum ahead of the
sale, although the inscription of the sale was entered ahead of the levy. The levy on attachment was not
inscribed on TCT No. R-22522 because allegedly the sale should have priority and preference. The cancellation of
TCT No. R-17571 and the issuance of TCT No. R-22522 was already completed when he took over the position of
Atty. Santos as Acting Register of Deeds and was therefore already clothed with the authority to issue and sign
TCT No. R-22522.

Atty. Rutaquio also submitted a letter dated June 25, 2004 from Atty. Santos to Land Registration Authority
(LRA) Administrator Benedicto B. Ulep (Administrator Ulep) consulting the latter as regards the registration of
the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Notice of Levy on Attachment.[9] In said letter received by the LRA on July 1,
2004, Atty. Santos stated that he had not acted on the Deed of Absolute Sale since the required registration fees
were not paid therefor.[10] Administrator Ulep was able to reply to said letter on October 6, 2004, when Atty.
Rutaquio was already the Acting Register of Deeds. Administrator Ulep stated that since the Deed of Sale was
considered registered on June 16, 2004, the same shall take precedence over the Notice of Levy on Attachment
registered on June 17, 2004.[11]

Acting on the Motion to Reinstate Notice of Levy on Attachment in TCT No. R-22522 and Cite Atty. Randy A.
Rutaquio for Contempt, the RTC issued an Order[12] dated March 2, 2006, ruling in favor of Durawood. The RTC
gave great weight to the certification by LRA Human Resource Management Officer IV Loreto I. Orense that Atty.
Santos was the Acting Register of Deeds from June 1-30, 2004, and held that this proves the fact that Atty.
Santos was the only person authorized to sign and approve all the transactions with the Registry of Deeds of
Antipolo City at the time. Moreover, according to the RTC, the alienation of LBB Construction in favor of the
Bonas without leaving sufficient property to pay its obligation is considered by law in fraud of creditor under
Articles 1381[13] and 1387[14] of the Civil Code.

The RTC did not rule on Durawoods prayer to cite Atty. Rutaquio for contempt. The dispositive portion of the
March 2, 2006 Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion to reinstate notice of levy on attachment in TCT No. R-
22522 now in the name of the intervenors is hereby GRANTED its non-inscription therein having been made
without order of this Court.

The Register of Deeds of Antipolo City is directed to reinstate the notice of levy on attachment in TCT No. R-
22522 in the names of intervenors immediately upon receipt of this Order.[15]

Candice filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order. In the meantime, on March 13, 2006, Sheriff
8

Leyva issued a Notice of Sheriffs Sale setting the sale of the property covered by TCT No. R-22522 at public
Page

auction on April 11, 2006 at 10:00 a.m., pursuant to the November 15, 2005 Writ of Execution. Candice filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order the Branch Sheriff to Desist from the Sale of Intervenors Property for Being
Premature, which was granted by the RTC in an Order dated March 29, 2006.

On March 8, 2006, the new Acting Register of Deeds Jose S. Loriega, Jr. complied with the March 6, 2006 Order
of the RTC by reinstating in TCT No. R-22522 the Notice of Levy on Attachment in favor of Durawood.

On April 7, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying Candices Motion for Reconsideration. In said Order, the RTC
highlighted its observation that in TCT No. R-17571, the inscription of the levy on attachment by Atty. Santos
dated June 17, 2004 was in page A (the dorsal portion) of the title, while the supposedly earlier inscription of the
Deed of Sale by Atty. Rutaquio dated June 16, 2004 was found in page B (a separate page) of the title. The RTC
found this fact, as well as the above-mentioned certification that Atty. Santos was the Acting Register of Deeds
of Antipolo City from June 1 to 30, 2004, sufficient proof of the irregularity of the June 16, 2004 inscription of
the Deed of Sale.

On April 11, 2006, Sheriff Leyva sold the subject property at public auction for P1,259,727.90 with Durawood
being the lone bidder, and issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale. The sale was inscribed in TCT No. R-
22522 on the same date.[16]

Candice filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the March 2, 2006 and
April 7, 2006 Orders of the RTC.

On April 18, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision in favor of Candice. According to the
Court of Appeals, the sequence of presentation of the entries in the TCT cannot control the determination of the
rights of the claimants over a disputed property. It is the registration in the Primary Entry Book (also referred to
in other cases as the day book) that establishes the order of reception of instruments affecting registered land.
As explained by Atty. Rutaquio, the entry in the day book is only the preliminary step in the registration. The
inscription of the levy on attachment on TCT No. R-17571 (which was made before the inscription of the Deed of
Sale on said title) retroacts to the date of entry in the Primary Entry Book, which is June 17, 2004. However, the
inscription of the Deed of Sale on TCT No. R-17571, although made after the inscription of the levy on
attachment, retroacts to the earlier date of entry in the Primary Entry Book, which is June 16, 2004.

As regards the issuance by Atty. Rutaquio of TCT No. R-22522 on June 16, 2004 despite the fact that he was not
yet the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City at that time, the Court of Appeals held that there was substantial
compliance with the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA; now the Land
Registration Authority [LRA]) Circular No. 94 on Certificates of title and documents left unsigned by former
Register of Deeds, which provides:

It has been brought to the attention of this Registration that, in some Registries, there are certificates of title
with the full transcriptions and inscriptions, including the volume and page numbers, the title number, the date
and the name of the former Register of Deeds, already typewritten thereon but which, for some reasons, cannot
anymore be signed by the former official. In such cases and to resolve this problem, the present Register of
Deeds may, without changing or altering the transcriptions and inscriptions, affix his signature below the name
of the former Register of Deeds but placing the actual date and time of signing enclosed in parenthesis below his
signature.[17]

The Court of Appeals accepted Atty. Rutaquios manifestation that he signed TCT No. R-22522 subsequent to
June 16, 2004, on a date when he was already the Acting Register of Deeds of Antipolo City. Since the entry in
the Primary Entry Book was made at the time of the incumbency of Atty. Santos, the name of the latter still
appears on the document. According to the Court of Appeals, Candice cannot be made to suffer for the failure of
9

Atty. Rutaquio to affix the date when he signed the document. Furthermore, a certificate of title, once
Page

registered, cannot be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished except in a direct
proceeding permitted by law. Finally, an action for rescission of contracts entered into in fraud of creditors
cannot be instituted except when the party suffering damage has no other legal means to obtain reparation for
the same.[18]

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed Orders of public respondent judge ordering the
reinstatement of the subject notice of levy on attachment in TCT No. R-22522 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. As a result thereof, the public auction sale carried out pursuant to said levy is also declared null and
void.[19]

Durawood filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
dated September 18, 2007.

Durawood filed the instant Petition for Review, with the following Assignment of Errors:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE FACT THAT NON-PAYMENT OF THE REQUIRED REGISTRATION FEES BY
CANDICE S. BONA AND HER SIBLINGS DID NOT COMPLETE THE REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
ON JUNE 16, 2004.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT NALTDRA CIRCULAR NO. 94
WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH BY ATTY. RANDY RUTAQUIO.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ENTRIES IN TCT NO. R-17571
(THE PREDECESSOR OF TCT NO. R-22522) ARE EVIDENCES OF THE FACTS STATED THEREIN.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE REAL PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. R-17571 AND
SUBSEQUENTLY BY TCT NO. R-22522 HAS ALREADY BEEN ATTACHED BUT WAS UNILATERALLY RELEASED FROM
THE COURTS JURISDICTION BY A USURPER.[20]

All these allegations are specific matters to be resolved by this Court in determining the overriding issue of the
case at bar: whether the Court of Appeals correctly granted Candices Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition on
its finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its March 2, 2006 and April 7, 2006
Orders. In other words, the main issue to be determined by this Court is whether or not there was grave abuse
of discretion in the RTCs order to reinstate the notice of levy on attachment in TCT No. R-22522. Grave abuse of
discretion signifies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.[21]
10

The Court of Appeals, in considering the date of entry in the day book of the Registry of Deeds as controlling
over the presentation of the entries in TCT No. R-17571, relied on Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
Page

which provides that:

SEC. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies. Each Register of Deeds shall keep a primary entry book in
which, upon payment of the entry fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception, all instruments including
copies of writs and processes filed with him relating to registered land. He shall, as a preliminary process in
registration, note in such book the date, hour and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in which
they were received. They shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each
instrument, when made on the certificate of title to which it refers, shall bear the same date: Provided, that the
national government as well as the provincial and city governments shall be exempt from the payment of such
fees in advance in order to be entitled to entry and registration. (Emphasis supplied.)

The consequence of the highlighted portion of the above section is two-fold: (1) in determining the date in
which an instrument is considered registered, the reckoning point is the time of the reception of such
instrument as noted in the Primary Entry Book; and (2) when the memorandum of the instrument is later made
on the certificate of title to which it refers, such memorandum shall bear the same date as that of the reception
of the instrument as noted in the Primary Entry Book. Pursuant to the second consequence stated above, the
Court of Appeals held that Atty. Rutaquio correctly placed the date of entry in the Primary Entry Book as the
date of the memorandum of the registration of the deed of sale in TCT No. R-17571.

As regards the first consequence, this Court has applied the same in several cases. Thus, in the old cases of Levin
v. Bass,[22] Potenciano v. Dineros,[23] and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija,[24] as well as in the fairly recent cases of Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals,[25] Armed Forces
and Police Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Santiago,[26] and National Housing Authority v. Basa, Jr.,[27] we
upheld the entry of instruments in the Primary Entry Book to be equivalent to registration despite even the
failure to annotate said instruments in the corresponding certificates of title.

Based on this alone, it appears that the RTC was in error when it considered the registration of the Absolute
Deed of Sale on June 16, 2004 inferior to the registration of the Notice of Levy on Attachment on June 17, 2004
on the ground that the Attachment was annotated on TCT No. R-17571 earlier than the Deed of Sale. As
discussed in the above-mentioned cases, the annotation in the certificate of title is not determinative of the
effectivity of the registration of the subject instrument.

However, a close reading of the above-mentioned cases reveals that for the entry of instruments in the Primary
Entry Book to be equivalent to registration, certain requirements have to be met. Thus, we held in Levin that:

Do the entry in the day book of a deed of sale which was presented and filed together with the owner's
duplicate certificate of title with the office of the Registrar of Deeds and full payment of registration fees
constitute a complete act of registration which operates to convey and affect the land? In voluntary registration,
such as a sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the owner's duplicate certificate be not surrendered and
presented or if no payment of registration fees be made within 15 days, entry in the day book of the deed of
sale does not operate to convey and affect the land sold. x x x.[28]

Levin, which was decided in 1952, applied Section 56 of the Land Registration Act[29] which provides:

Sec. 56. Each register of deeds shall keep an entry book in which, upon payment of the filing fee, he shall enter
in the order of their reception all deeds and other voluntary instruments, and all copies of writs or other process
filed with him relating to registered land. He shall note in such book the year, month, day, hour, and minute of
reception of all instruments in the order in which they were received. They shall be regarded as registered from
11

the time so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument when made on the certificate of title to which it
refers shall bear the same date; Provided, however, That no registration, annotation, or memorandum on a
Page

certificate of title shall be made unless the fees prescribed therefor by this Act are paid within fifteen days' time
after the date of the registration of the deed, instrument, order or document in the entry book or day book, and
in case said fee is not paid within the time above mentioned, such entry shall be null and void: Provided further,
That the Insular Government and the provincial and municipal governments need not pay such fees in advance
in order to be entitled to entry or registration. (Emphasis supplied.)

This provision is the precursor of the aforequoted Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which seems to
have dispensed with the provision nullifying the registration if the required fees are not paid:

SEC. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies. Each Register of Deeds shall keep a primary entry book in
which, upon payment of the entry fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception, all instruments including
copies of writs and processes filed with him relating to registered land. He shall, as a preliminary process in
registration, note in such book the date, hour and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in which
they were received. They shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each
instrument, when made on the certificate of title to which it refers, shall bear the same date: Provided, that the
national government as well as the provincial and city governments shall be exempt from the payment of such
fees in advance in order to be entitled to entry and registration.

In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,[30] this Court applied the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and modified the doctrine as follows:

Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction
entered is a voluntary or an involuntary one, so long as the registrant has complied with all that is required of
him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on
the register of deeds.[31]

This pronouncement, which was reiterated in National Housing Authority v. Basa, Jr.,[32] shows that for the
entry to be considered to have the effect of registration, there is still a need to comply with all that is required
for entry and registration, including the payment of the prescribed fees. Thus, in Autocorp Group v. Court of
Appeals,[33] this Court compared the date when the required fees were paid with the therein assailed writ of
preliminary injunction:

Petitioners contend that payment of the entry fee is a condition sine qua non before any valid entry can be
made in the primary entry book. Allegedly, the Court of Appeals resorted to judicial legislation when it held that
the subsequent payment of the entry fee was curative and a substantial compliance with the law. Petitioners
claim that the ruling in DBP vs. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija does not apply to this case. As there was
no valid registration, petitioners conclude that the order of the trial court issuing a writ of preliminary injunction
was proper, considering the irregularities present in the conduct of the extrajudicial foreclosure x x x.

We find the petition bereft of merit.

First. The objection as to the payment of the requisite fees is unavailing. There is no question that the fees were
paid, albeit belatedly. Respondent bank presented the certificate of sale to the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Cebu City for registration on January 21, 1999 at 4:30 p.m. As the cashier had already left, the Office could not
receive the payment for entry and registration fees, but still, the certificate of sale was entered in the primary
entry book. The following day, respondent bank paid the requisite entry and registration fees. Given the peculiar
facts of the case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the payment of respondent bank must be deemed to
12

be substantial compliance with the law; and, the entry of the instrument the day before, should not be
invalidated. In any case, even if we consider the entry to have been made on January 22, the important fact is
Page
 that the entry in the primary entry book was done prior to the issuance of the writ of injunction [on February 15,
1999; TRO issued on January 25, 1999] by the trial court.[34] (Emphases supplied.)

Records in the case at bar reveal that as of June 25, 2004, the date of the letter of Atty. Santos seeking the
opinion of the LRA as regards the registration of the Deed of Sale and the Notice of Levy on Attachment, the
required registration fees for the Deed of Sale has not yet been paid:

25 June 2004
[received by the LRA: July 01, 2004]

HON. BENEDICTO B. ULEP

Administrator
This Authority

Sir:

This has reference to the TCT No. R-17571/T-87 registered under the name of LBB Construction and
Development Corporation relative to the Deed of Absolute Sale with Entry No. 30549, which was sought to be
registered on 16 June 2004 at 11:20 a.m. (a photocopy of which is hereto attached as Annex A).

However, on 17 June 2004 at 11:45 a.m. a Notice of Levy on Attachment (a photocopy of which is hereto
attached as Annex B) with Entry No. 30590 was filed and annotated against TCT No. R-17571/T-87.

In view of the foregoing, we are now in a quandary as to what proper steps should be taken. It should be noted
further that the required registration fees of the abovementioned sale was not paid the reason for which the
same was not immediately acted upon by the undersigned.[35]

Since there was still no compliance of all that is required x x x for purposes of entry and annotation[36] of the
Deed of Sale as of June 25, 2004, we are constrained to rule that the registration of the Notice of Levy on
Attachment on June 17, 2004 should take precedence over the former. Considering that the Notice of Levy on
Attachment was deemed registered earlier than the Deed of Sale, the TCT issued pursuant to the latter should
contain the annotation of the Attachment.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the RTC was, in fact, acting properly when it ordered the reinstatement of
the Notice of Levy on Attachment in TCT No. R-22522. Since the RTC cannot be considered as to have acted in
grave abuse of its discretion in issuing such Order, the Petition for Certiorari assailing the same should have
been dismissed.

b. Double Sales

1. Rodriguez vs. Sioson, GR 199180, July 27, 2016

THELMA RODRIGUEZ, joined by her husband vs. SPS. JAIME and ARMI SIOSON
G.R. No. 199180, July 27, 2016
Ponente: J. Reyes, 3rd Division
13

Nature of Action: Petition for review under rule 45.

Page

Facts:
In 1997, Municipality of Bataan purchased from Neri delos Reyes an area of about 1.7 ha. of Lot 398 to be used for the
extension of the Municipalitys public market. It was agreed that Neri will surrender the mother title to the municipality
upon full payment of purchase price.

Lot 398 was subsequently divided into 5 lots: A, B, C, D, and E. Lots C and D pertain to the portions that were sold to the
municipality while E is a road lot. Consequently, A and B were left as remaining portions over which Neri retained
absolute title. TCTs T-209894 and T-209895 were then issued over lots A and B respectively and registered in Neris
name married to Violeta Lacuata. The owners duplicate copies were however retained by the municipality pending
Neris payment in the share in expenses incurred for the subdivision of the lot 398.

Neri, however, sold lot A to Thelma for P1,243,000 and on Mar. 20, 1997, Thelma issued a check for said amount
payable to Neri. When it fell due, no sufficient funds were available to cover the check. Thelma promised to pay the
purchase price in installments until Sept. 4, 1997 but Thelma was only able to pay P442,293.50. On Nov. 12, 2001,
Thelma caused the annotation of an adverse claim on lot As title. She saw an announcement that a new Orani Common
Terminal will be built on lot A. Thelma then filed a complaint for injunction against incumbent Mayor Pascual and
municipality under claim of ownership.

In 2002, Neri executed an affidavit claiming that the owners copies of TCTs covering lots A and B were lost and caused
for the reconstitution of new owners copies. After new copies were issued, Neri sold lot A to respondent Sps. Sioson,
Sps. Camacho, and Agnes Samonte. Consequently, the TCT covering lot A was cancelled and a new TCT was thus issued
in the respondents names. Respondents filled the said lot with about 40 truckloads of soil/fillings but Thelma sent two
armed blue guards who entered the premises and set up a tent therein. Respondents brought the matter to the
attention of the barangay who referred them to the mayor but mayor did not take any action. Respondents filed a
forcible entry case against Thelma.

Pending the ejectment case, Thelma sought for the annulment of the second sale of lot A. RTC in its joint decision ruled
in favor of Thelma. Respondents moved for reconsideration but was denied by RTC. On appeal, CA granted the appeal
and ruled that there was no double sale since the contract between Neri and Thelma was a mere contract to sell and not
contract of sale. Thelma moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
1) Whether the contract entered into by Neri and Thelma is a contract to sell or a contract of sale.

2) Whether double sale exists in the instant case.

Ruling:
1) The contract entered by Neri and Thelma is a contract to sell.

In determining the nature of the agreement between Thelma and Neri, the CA took note of these two documents and
coupled with Thelmas own admissions, correctly found that it was a mere contract to sell. According to CA:

During trial, Thelma explained the apparent disparity between the 2 deeds of absolute sale by testifying that the
undated and unnotarized deed of sale served only as a receipt which was signed by Neri when the latter received the
downpayment for the lot. The dated and notarized deed of sale, on the other hand, was signed by both Thelma and Neri
upon Thelmas alleged full payment of purchase price.

xxx

Second, the execution of the deed of absolute sale and the transfer and delivery of the title to Thelmas name were
14

conditional upon full payment of purchase price.

Page

xxx
Despite the denomination of their agreement as one of sale, the circumstances tend to show that Neri agreed to sell the
subject property to Thelma on the condition that title and ownership would pass or be transferred upon full payment of
the purchase price. This is the very nature of a contract to sell which is a bilateral contract whereby the prospective
seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the property despite delivery thereof to the buyer, binds himself to
sell the property exclusively to the buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, i.e. full payment of purchase
price.

2) Double sale doesnt exist in this case.

It was established that Thelma was not able to pay the full purchase price. To bolster her claim, Thelma insists that she
holds title over the property after Neri allegedly delivered the subject lot to her right after the execution of sale. There is
however nothing on record to support this claim aside from her bare allegations.

Moreover, the alleged delivery of property, even if true, is irrelevant considering that in a contract to sell, ownership is
retained by the registered owner in spite of the partial payment of the purchase price and delivery of possession of the
property.

2. Melencio vs CA, GR 148846, Sept 25, 2007

FACTS:

The subject property is a 30,351 SQ.M. parcel of land particularly denominated as Lot No. 3368, located at Suba-basbas,
Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, and part of a total area of 30,777 SQ.M. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 20626 in the name of the late petitioner Go Kim Chuan. The property was previously owned by the Amodias,
where entire property was brought under the operation of the Torrens System. However, the title thereto was lost
during the Second World War.

On July 10, 1964, the Amodias allegedly executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale
whereby they extra-judicially settled the estate of Esteban Bonghanoy and conveyed the subject property to respondent
Aznar Brothers Realty Company (AZNAR) for a consideration of P10,200.00. After several decades, the Amodias executed
a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale in favor of Kim Go Chuan, to whom a derivative title TCT No.
20626 was issued in his name on December 1, 1989 after availing of the remedy of reconstitution of a lost title under RA
26.

On February 14, 1990 AZNAR asked the petitioners to withdraw said sale with Kim Go Chuan and on the same date
annotated on TCT No. 20626 a Notice of Adverse Claim. However the Amodias ignored the request of AZNAR, thus they
filed a complaint in the regional trial court, where the court ruled in favor of the Amodias; Aggrieved, AZNAR appealed
the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals who found in their favor. Thus the instant petition.

ISSUE/S:
First, did the CA misapply the doctrine in Heirs of Severa Gregorio v. CA in ruling that the RTC committed an error in
appreciating the testimony of an expert witness as to the forgery of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed
of Absolute Sale?

Second, who between Go Kim Chuan and AZNAR has the better right over the subject property?
15

RULING: For the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative; however in the second issue, the Court ruled in favor of Go
Kim Chuan. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
Page
CV No. 51814 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Courtof Lapu-Lapu City, Branch 27, in Civil
Case No.2254-L, is REINSTATED. No costs.

RATIONALE:
Although there was a procedural issue, the Court found that it was not the issue but still resolved the same. AZNAR
argued, that the Petition is dismissible because the Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping were not
signed by all the petitioners.

Counsel for petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition for Review on Certiorari in order to implead
the Heirs of the late Go Kim Chuan as the new petitioners and to delete the names of petitioners Amodias because they
could no longer be located. Said petitioners sought the relaxation of the rules so that in the interest of justice, the case
can be decided on the merits. Given the circumstances, the Court ruled that the rules may be reasonably and liberally
construed to avoid a patent denial of substantial justice, because it cannot be denied that the ends of justice are better
served when cases are determined on the merits, citing the case of Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada.

The main issues:

Forgery cannot be presumed, the burden of proof always lies upon the party alleging such. In this case, the trial court
relied solely on testimony of the document examiner and no independent examination was conducted by the trial court
judge.

On the second issue, the Court found that there is a double sale of a registered land, where there was the first sale with
AZNAR, and the second sale with Kim Go Chuan. The subject land had been registered under a Torrens title only that the
title was lost during the Second World War, the fact that the certificate of title over the registered land is lost does not
convert it into unregistered land.

AZNAR should have registered the property under Act 496 and not under RA 3344, since the property is registered. This
Court agrees with the petitioners that AZNAR should have availed itself of the legal remedy of reconstitution of the lost
certificate of title, instead of registration under Act 3344. On the other hand, Kim Go Chuan, availed of the remedy of
reconstitution and registered the property under RA 26. Applying Article 1544 of the New Civil Code which provides:

ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person
who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. Should it be immovable
property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession;
and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

Kim Go Chuan is a buyer in good faith, since AZNAR only annotated the Notice of Adverse Claim on the TCT No. 20626 on
February 4, 1990, after the lost certificate of title was reconstituted and after the issuance of said TCT in the name of Go
Kim Chuan on December 1, 1989. Thus Kim Go Chuan could not have seen that there was such a notice when he
purchased the property. In addition, Kim Go Chuan was more diligent than AZNAR, he made verifications with the Office
of the City Assessor of Lapu-Lapu City and the Register of Deeds, he visited the premises of the subject property and
found no adverse claim against the Amodias; upon the purchase of the property, he paid all taxes in arrears, caused the
publication of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale in a newspaper of general circulation, caused the
reconstitution of the lost certificate of title and caused the issuance of the assailed TCT in his name.
16

3. Antonio vs Santos, GR 149238, 538 SCRA 1, Nov, 22, 2007

Page
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated July 31, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58246, affirming,
with modification, the Decision[2] dated October 7, 1997 of Branch 72, Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Antipolo, Rizal in Civil
Case No. 1261-A. The RTC had dismissed the complaint for Reconveyance, Annulment of Title and Damages filed by
petitioner Sixto Antonio against respondents.

The antecedent facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

On September 19, 1988, petitioner Sixto Antonio filed before Branch 72, RTC, Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint for
Reconveyance, Annulment of Title and Damages against respondents spouses Sofronio and Aurora Santos, Luis and
Angelina Liberato, and Mario and Victoria Cruz. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1261-A.

In his complaint,[3] Antonio alleged that he is the absolute owner of a 13,159-square meter parcel of land denominated
as Lot No. 11703, CAD 688-D, Cainta-Taytay Cadastre, situated in Barangay San Juan, Cainta, Rizal. He averred that, as
evidenced by certificates of payment of realty taxes for the years 1918 and 1919, the property was previously owned by
his father and that in 1984, he filed before Branch 71, RTC, Antipolo, Rizal, an application for the registration of two
parcels of land, one of which was Lot No. 11703, CAD 688-D, situated in Barangay San Juan, Cainta, Rizal. His application
was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 142-A (LRC No. 142-A).

Although the RTC, Branch 71, declared him the true and absolute owner in fee simple of the two parcels of land he
applied for, it set aside its decision with respect to Lot No. 11703, CAD 688-D in an Order dated August 21, 1986, to
avoid duplication of issuance of titles.

Antonio said that after investigation, he discovered that Lot No. 11703, CAD 688-D was already titled in the name of
respondents. He then filed the complaint for Reconveyance, Annulment of Title and Damages against respondents,
averring that respondents committed fraud in their application for titling because they made it appear in their
application for registration that the subject property was located in Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Rizal, when in fact, the
property is located in Barangay San Juan, Cainta, Rizal. He added, respondents also made it appear in their application
for registration that the subject property is bound on the North East by the Pasig River when in fact it is bound on the
North East by the Tapayan River. Furthermore, the Pasig River does not traverse any portion of the jurisdiction of Cainta,
Rizal. He argued that Original Certificate of Title No. 108 (OCT No. 108) in respondents' names, insofar as it included Lot
No. 11703, CAD 688-D, is, therefore, null and void because it was obtained through fraudulent misrepresentations and
machinations.

In their Answer[4] dated July 26, 1989, respondents averred that OCT No. 108 was duly issued to them by the Register of
Deeds for Metro Manila, District II, on May 20, 1977. They alleged that prior to the issuance of OCT No. 108, they, as
registered owners, had always been in peaceful possession of the property and at no time had Antonio possessed the
property, nor did he ever make any claim against the said property.

The RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 72, in a Decision dated October 7, 1997 dismissed the complaint and ordered Antonio
to pay respondents moral damages and attorney's fees. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant complaint, and orders plaintiff
as follows:
To pay defendants Sofronio Santos, Aurora Santos, Sps. Luis Liberato and Angelina Santos, the amount of P100,000.00
each, by way of moral damages;

To pay defendants the amount of P60,000.00, by way of attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated July 31, 2001 affirmed with modification the abovementioned decision by
deleting the award of moral damages and attorney's fees. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals
17

states:
WHEREFORE, with modification deleting [or] setting aside the award for moral damages and attorney's fees, the
Page

decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[6]
Hence, the instant petition, raising the following issues:
I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN LAND REGISTRATION
CASE NO. 142-A, LRC RECORD NO. 58707, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 71, IS SUFFICIENT BASIS
OF PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN TREATING PETITIONER'S ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AS
ONE FOR TITLING OF A PARCEL OF LAND.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE FRAUDULENTLY
REGISTERED AND TITLED SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THEIR NAMES.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS' MOTHER ACQUIRED SUBJECT
PROPERTY FROM HER FATHER, GAVINO SANTOS, WHICH THE LATTER ALLEGEDLY PURCHASED FROM LADISLAO RIVERA.

V.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO
DISMISSING PETITIONER'S ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE.[7]
Simply put, the issues raised are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in not holding that the decision in LRC No. 142-A was
sufficient basis of petitioner's claim of ownership over the subject property? (2) Did the Court of Appeals and RTC
erroneously treat petitioner's action for reconveyance as one for titling of a parcel of land? (3) Did respondents
fraudulently title the subject property in their names? (4) Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that respondents'
mother acquired the subject property from her father, Gavino Santos, who purchased it from Ladislao Rivera? and (5)
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the decision of the RTC dismissing petitioner's action for reconveyance?

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the decision in LRC No. 142-A is sufficient basis for
his claim of ownership over the property; in treating his action for reconveyance as one for titling; in not holding that
respondents had fraudulently registered the property in their names; and in holding that respondents' mother had
acquired the subject property from her father, Gavino Santos, who allegedly bought the property from Ladislao Rivera.

Respondents, on the other hand, in their Comments,[8] contend that they have proved they have a better title to the
property. They argue that petitioner's attempt to register Lot No. 11703, CAD 688-D in his name is tainted with fraud,
and that petitioner had failed to adduce any evidence of fraud on their part. They assert that their documentary and
testimonial evidence which were unrebutted by petitioner show original ownership of the land by Ladislao Rivera from
whom their grandfather bought the property.

After serious consideration, we find that petitioner's arguments lack merit.

On the first issue, petitioner argues that in LRC No. 142-A, the RTC of Antipolo, Branch 71, rendered a Decision on
18

January 7, 1986 adjudicating ownership of two lots, including Lot No. 11703, CAD 688-D, in his favor. He adds that on
February 19, 1986, after said decision has become final and executory, the said RTC issued a certification for issuance of
Page

decree, directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration. Hence, he argues,
his right of ownership over the land has already been fully established, but no certificate of title was issued to him only
because the property was already registered in the name of respondents.

But we agree with respondents that petitioner cannot rely on the decision in LRC No. 142-A. As pointed out by the Court
of Appeals, even if a title had been issued to petitioner based on said decision, his title would be of a later date than the
title of respondents, hence inefficacious and ineffective. This Court has ruled that, when two certificates of title are
issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail; and in case of
successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the same land, the person holding a prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate.[9]

On the second issue, petitioner contends that it is very apparent the RTC and Court of Appeals had the notion that his
case a quo was not an action for reconveyance, but rather an application for registration of land where the applicant and
oppositor had to prove their respective registrable titles. This, he adds, could be gleaned from the RTC's findings that
"the claim of plaintiff on the basis of said documents cannot prevail over the adverse, public, open, peaceful and
continuous possession by the defendants over the subject property," and that "it was indubitably shown that the
defendants have occupied said property since time immemorial while plaintiff has never at anytime taken possession of
said property."

We find petitioner's contentions unconvincing. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, this Court has
held that the party seeking reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the
fact of fraud.[10] The RTC, in making the abovementioned findings, was not treating petitioner's action for reconveyance
as one for titling of property. But it was weighing whether petitioner has, by clear and convincing evidence, proven his
title to the property. Moreover, the RTC, in its decision, discussed the merits of petitioner's ground for his action for
reconveyance, i.e. whether or not respondents committed fraud in titling the subject property in their names. The RTC
held that as shown by public records in the custody of the RTC, Pasig City and the Land Registration Authority,
petitioner's claim that the property was fraudulently titled in the names of respondents is baseless. Thus, petitioner's
contention that the RTC and the Court of Appeals treated his action for reconveyance as one for titling of property lacks
any persuasive basis.

On the third and fourth issues, we find them to be factual issues, hence beyond our jurisdiction to resolve. In a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court's power of review is limited to questions of law
only.[11]

Note, however, should be taken of the established doctrine that an action for reconveyance resulting from fraud
prescribes four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance
of the certificate of title over the property. Registration of real property is considered a constructive notice to all
persons, thus, the four-year period shall be counted therefrom.[12] It appears that OCT No. 108 was issued to
respondents by the Register of Deeds for Metro Manila on May 20, 1977. From the time of registration of the land in the
name of respondents on May 20, 1977 to the filing of the complaint on September 19, 1988, more than four years had
already elapsed. Hence, it cannot be denied that petitioner's action had already prescribed.

Based on the foregoing considerations, we find that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision of the RTC
dismissing petitioner's action for reconveyance.

Finally, concerning the deletion of moral damages and attorney's fees, we agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals
that here an award of moral damages is not warranted since the record is bereft of any proof that Antonio acted
maliciously or in bad faith in filing the action.[13] Neither should attorney's fees be awarded. The accepted rule is that
the reason for the award of attorney's fees must be stated in the text of the trial court's decision; otherwise, if it is
19

stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same must be disallowed.[14] In this case, we find that the trial
court's decision failed to show the reason for the award of attorney's fees, hence it was properly deleted by the
Page

appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated July 31, 2001 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 58246 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

c. Buyer in Good Faith

1. LBP vs Poblete, GR 196577, February 25, 2013

FACTS:
On October 1997, respondent Poblete obtained a loan worth P 300,000.00 from Kapantay Multi-Purpose. She
mortgaged her Lot No. 29 located in Buenavista, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, under OCT No. P-12026. Kapantay, in
turn, used OCT No. P-12026 as collateral under its Loan Account No. 97-OC-013 with Land Bank Sablayan Branch.

After a year, Poblete instructed her son-in-law Domingo Balen to look for a buyer for the Lot No. 29 in order to pay her
loan and he referred Angelito Joseph Maniego. Both parties agreed that the lot shall amount to P 900,000.00 but in
order to reduce taxes they will execute a P 300,000.00 agreed price appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 9, 1998. In the Deed, Poblete specifically described herself as a widow. Baledn, then, delivered the Deed
to Maniego. Instead of paying the price, Maniego promised in an affidavit dated November 19, 1998 stating that the
said amount will be deposited to her Land Bank Savings Account but he failed to do so.

On August 1999, Maniego paid Kapantays Loan Account for P 448,202.08 and on subsequent year he applied for a loan
worth P 1,000,000.00 from Land Bank using OCT No. P-12026 as a collateral in a condition that the title must be first
transferred on his name. On August 14, 2000, the Registry of Deeds issued TCT No. T-20151 in Maniegos name
pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale with the signatures of Mrs. Poblete and her husband date August 11, 2000 and
Maniego successfully availed the Credit Line Agreement for P 1,000,000.00 and a Real Estate Mortgage over TCT No. T-
20151 on August 15, 2000. On November 2002, Land Bank filed an Application for an Extra-judicial Foreclosure against
the said Mortgage stating that Maniego failed to pay his loan.

Poblete filed a complaint for nullification of the Deed of Sale dated August 11, 2000 and TCT No. T-20151, Reconveyance
of the Title and Damages with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against Maniego, Landbank and the Register of Deeds.

The judgment of RTC, affirmed by the CA upon appeal, favors the plaintiff Poblete.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not:
1. the CA erred in upholding the finding of the trial court declaring the TCT No. T-20151 as null and void. The CA
misconstrued and misappreciated the evidence and the law in not finding the title registered in the name of Maniego.

2. the CA promulgated a decision and misconstrued the evidence and the law in not finding the Land Bank a
mortgagee in good faith.

3. the CA misconstrued the evidence and the law in not finding the respondent and Maniego in pari delicto.

4. the CA erred in not applying the principle of estoppels or laches on respondent in that the proximate cause of
her loss was negligence to safeguard her rights over the subject property, thereby enabling Maniego to mortgage the
same with Land Bank.
20

RULING:
Page

The petition is meritorious.

It is well-entrenched rule, as applied, by the CA, that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title.
Moreover, where the deed of sale is states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been, the deed is
void ab initio for lack of consideration. Since the deed, is void, the title is also void.

Since the land title has been declared void by final judgment, the Real Estate Mortgage over it is also void. It is essential
that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the mortgage; otherwise, the mortgage is void. The doctrine the
mortgagee in good faith as a rule does not apply to banks which are required to observe a higher standard of diligence.
A bank cannot assume that, simply because the title offered as security is on its face, free of any encumbrances or lien, it
is relieved of the responsibility of taking further steps to verify the title and inspect the properties to be mortgage. The
records do not even show that Land Bank investigated and inspected the actual occupants. Lad Bank merely mentioned
Maniegos loan application upon his presentation of OCT No. P-12026, which was still under the name of Poblete. Land
Bank even ignored the fact that Kapantay previously used Pobletes title as collateral in its loan account with Land Bank.

Furthermore, only one day after Maniego obtained TCT No. P-20151 under his name, Land Bank and Maniego executed
a Credit Line Agreement and Real Mortgage. It appears that Maniegos loan was already completely processed while the
collateral was still in the name of Poblete. Where said mortgagee acted with haste in granting the mortgage loan and
did not ascertain the ownership of the land being mortgaged, it cannot be considered innocent mortgagee.

The pari delicto rule provides when two parties are equally at fault, the law leaves them as they are and denies
recovery by either one of them. This court adopt the decisions of RTC and CA that only Maniego is at fault.

Finally, on the issue of estoppels and laches, such question were not raised before the trial court. It is settled that an
issue which are neither alleged in the complaint nor raised during the trial cannot be raised for the time on appeal.

2. Legarda vs CA, et al, GR 94457, Oct 16, 1997

SYNOPSIS

The parties hereto entered into a lease agreement over a certain property owned by petitioner Victoria Legarda.
Legarda, however, refused to sign a contract although respondent New Cathay House already made a deposit and a
down payment of rentals. Cathay, therefore, filed a complaint against Legarda for specific performance with preliminary
injunction and damages. The court a quo issued an injunction.

Legarda's counsel (Atty. Coronel) failed to file an answer, thereby prompting the court to declare her in default. Cathay
was allowed to present evidence ex-parte and a judgment by default was reached by the trial court ordering Legarda to
execute the lease contract in favor of Cathay.

When the judgment became final and executory, the trial court issued a writ of execution and a public auction was held
where Cathay's Manager, Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. was the highest bidder. The sheriff
issued a Certificate of Sale. Upon failure of Legarda to redeem her property within the one-year redemption period, a
final Deed of Sale was issued by the sheriff which was registered by Cabrera with the Register of Deeds.

Legarda's Transfer Certificate of Title was cancelled with the issuance of a new TCT in favor of Cabrera. Atty. Coronel did
not inform Legarda of all these developments. He then filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court by dismissing the petition for annulment of
judgment and holding Legarda bound by the negligence of her counsel. Legarda then hired a new lawyer for the purpose
21

of elevating her case to the Supreme Court.

Page
The Supreme Court's decision reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and declared that Atty. Coronel committed
reckless, inexcusable and gross negligence which deprived his client of her property without due process of law.

Aggrieved, Cathay filed the instant motion for reconsideration alleging that the reconveyance would not be possible
because its owner Cabrera, even prior to the promulgation of the decision, had already sold the subject property. The
motion for reconsideration of respondent New Cathay House, Inc. was granted.

A new judgment was entered dismissing petition for review and affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals. What
was clear from the records of the case was that the auction sale was conducted regularly. The certificate of sale and the
final deed of sale were properly issued to Cabrera that allowed him to consolidate his ownership over the subject
property, register it and obtain a title in his own name
and sell it to an innocent purchaser for value. Therefore, since the property was already sold to an innocent purchaser
for value, Cabrera, much less by Cathay can no longer return it to its original owner.

FULL TEXT:

Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a complaint for specific performance with damages filed by private
respondent New Cathay House, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint was aimed at
compelling Victoria Legarda to sign a lease contract involving her house and lot at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City which
New Cathay House, Inc. intended to use in operating a restaurant.[1]

As prayed for in the complaint, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Victoria Legarda and her
agents from stopping the renovation of the property which was being done by New Cathay House, Inc. After hearing, the
lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

Thereafter, Antonio P. Coronel of the Coronel Law Office at 146 Katipunan Road, White Plains, Quezon City, entered his
appearance as counsel for Victoria Legarda. He also filed an urgent motion for an extension of ten (10) days from
February 6, 1985 within which to file an answer to the complaint. The motion was granted by the court which gave
Victoria Legarda until February 20, 1985 to answer the complaint.

However, Victoria Legarda failed to file her answer within the extended period granted by the court. Hence, upon
motion of New Cathay House, Inc., she was declared in default, thereby paving the way for the presentation of evidence
ex parte.

On March 25, 1985, the lower court rendered a decision by default. It ordered Victoria Legarda to execute and sign the
lease contract and to pay the following: (a) exemplary damages of P100,000.00, (b) actual and compensatory damages in
the total amount of P278,764.37, and (c) attorney's fees of P10,000.00.

Atty. Coronel received a copy of the lower court's decision on April 9, 1985 but he did not interpose an appeal therefrom
within the reglementary period. Consequently, the decision became final and, upon motion of New Cathay House, Inc.,
the lower court issued a writ of execution. In compliance with the writ, on June 27, 1985, the sheriff levied upon, and
sold at public auction, the property subject of the litigation to New Cathay House, Inc., the highest bidder. The sheriff's
certificate of sale was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

The one-year redemption period having expired on July 8, 1986, the sheriff issued a final deed of sale which, on July 11,
1986, was duly registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. On November 6, 1986, Victoria Legarda, represented
by her attorney-in-fact Ligaya C. Gomez, filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment against
her in Civil Case No. Q-43811. She alleged therein that the decision was obtained through fraud and that it is not
22

supported by the allegations in the pleadings nor by the evidence submitted.

Page
Forthwith, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from dispossessing
petitioner of the premises in question. Private respondent New Cathay House, Inc. then filed its consolidated comment
on the petition with a motion for the lifting of the temporary restrain-ing order. Victoria Legarda, through Atty. Coronel,
filed a reply to the consolidated comment. The petition was thereafter orally argued. Required by the Court of Appeals
to manifest if the parties desired to file their respective memoranda, Dean Coronel informed the appellate court that he
was adopting Victoria Legarda's reply to the consolidated comment as her memorandum.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on November 29, 1989. On the issue of fraud, for which Victoria Legarda
claimed that Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., who represented New Cathay House, Inc., made her believe through false
pretenses that he was agreeable to the conditions of the lease she had imposed on the lessee and that the latter would
withdraw the complaint against her, thereby prompting her to advise her lawyer not to file an answer to the complaint
anymore, the Court of Appeals[2] said:

"On the other hand, petitioner's above allegation of fraud supposedly practiced upon her by Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. is so
improbable as to inspire belief. For the Coronel Law Office had already entered its appearance as petitioner's counsel by
then, so that if it were true that Cabrera had already agreed to the conditions imposed by petitioner, said law office
would have asked plaintiff to file the proper motion to dismiss or withdraw complaint with the Court, and if plaintiff had
refused to do so, it would have filed defendant's answer anyway so that she would not be declared in default. Or said
law office would have prepared a compromise agreement embodying the conditions imposed by their client in the lease
contract in question which plaintiffs had allegedly already accepted, so that the same could have been submitted to the
Court and judgment on a compromise could be entered. All these, any conscientious lawyer of lesser stature than the
Coronel Law Office, headed by no less than a former law dean, Dean Antonio Coronel, or even a new member of the bar,
would normally have done under the circumstances to protect the interests of their client, instead of leaving it to the
initiative of plaintiff to withdraw its complaint against defendant, as it had allegedly promised the latter. Thus, it is our
belief that this case is one of pure and simple negligence on the part of the defendant's counsel, who simply failed to file
the answer in behalf of defendant. But counsel's negligence does not stop here. For after it had been furnished with
copy of the decision by default against defendant, it should then have appealed therefrom or file (sic) a petition for relief
from the order declar-ing their client in default or from the judgment by default. Hence, defendant is bound by the acts
of her counsel in this case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different if it had proceeded
differently (Pulido v. C.A., 122 SCRA 63; Ayllon v. Sevilla, 156 SCRA 257, among other cases). And the rationale of this
rule is obvious and clear. For if such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for opening cases, there would never be an
end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that the prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned' (Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick, SCRA 1138)." (Underscoring supplied.)
Finding the second ground for the petition to be likewise unmeritorious, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
Surprisingly, however, inspite of the Court of Appeals' tirade on his professional competence, Atty. Coronel did not lift a
finger to file a motion for reconsideration. Neither did he initiate moves towards an appeal to this Court of the decision
which was adverse and prejudicial to his client.

Thus, the Court of Appeals decision became final. On December 8, 1989, counsel for New Cathay House, Inc. sent
petitioner through the Coronel Law Office, a letter demanding that she vacate the property within three days from
receipt thereof. Atty. Coronel did not inform petitioner of this develop-ment until sometime in March, 1990. Due to
petitioner's persist-ent telephone calls, Atty. Coronel's secretary informed her of the fact that New Cathay House, Inc.
had demanded her eviction from the property. Consequently, petitioner had no recourse but to oblige and vacate the
property.[3]

On August 7, 1990, Victoria Legarda, represented by a new counsel,[4] filed before this Court a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 contending that the decisions of the courts below "are null and void as petitioner was deprived of her day
in court and divested of her property without due process of law through the gross, pervasive and malicious negligence
of previous counsel, Atty. Antonio Coronel."[5]
23

In its decision of March 18, 1991, this Court declared as null and void the decisions of March 25, 1985 And November 29,
Page

1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the Court of Appeals, respectively, as well as the sheriff's certificate
of sale dated June 27, 1985 of the property involved and the subse-quent final deed of sale covering the same. The
Court further directed private respondent New Cathay House, Inc. to reconvey the property to the petitioner and the
Register of Deeds to cancel the registration of said property in the name of said private respondent and to issue a new
one in the name of the petitioner.

The same decision required the former counsel of petitioner, Atty. Antonio Coronel, to show cause within ten (10) days
from notice why he should not be held administatively liable for his acts and omissions which resulted in grave injustice
to the petitioner. Said counsel having been inadvertently omitted in the service of copies of said decision,[6] on February
11, 1992, the Clerk of Court of this Division to which this case was transferred, sent Atty. Coronel a copy thereof which
he received on February 12, 1992.[7]

On the tenth day from his receipt of said copy, Atty. Coronel filed an urgent ex-parte motion for an extension of thirty
(30) days from February 22, 1992 within which to file his explanation. He alleged as reason for the motion pressure of
work "consisting of daily hearings in several forums and preparations of pleadings in equally urgent cases, such as the
more than 80 civil and criminal cases against the Marcoses."[8]

The Court, in its resolution of March 9, 1992, granted said motion for extension with warning that no further extension
will be given. Atty. Coronel received a copy of said resolution on March 27, 1992 but it appears that on March 24,
1992,[9] a day after the expiration of the 30-day extended period prayed for in his first motion for extension, he had
mailed another urgent motion for a second extension of thirty (30) days within which to submit his explanation on the
ground that since March 2, 1992, he had been "treated and confined at the St. Luke's Hospital." Attached to the motion
is a medical certificate stating that Atty. Coronel had "ischemic cardiomyopathy, diabetes mellitus, congestive heart
failure class IV and brain infarction, thrombotic."[10]

While off-hand, the reasons cited in the second motion for reconsideration seem to warrant another extension, the fact
that it was filed one day late, coupled with the circumstances of this case do not call for a reconsideration of the
resolution of March 9, 1992. Hence, the second motion for extension must be denied. Lawyers should not presume that
their motions for exten-sion of time will always be granted by the Court. The granting or denial of motions for extension
of time is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court with a view to attaining substantial justice.[11]

It should be emphasized that the show-cause resolution was addressed to Atty. Coronel not in his capacity as a lawyer of
a litigant in this Court. It was addressed to him in his personal capacity as a lawyer subject to the disciplinary powers of
this Court. That he failed to immediately heed the directive of the decision of March 18, 1991 to show cause,
notwithstanding the grant of a 30-day extension for him to do so, reflects an unbe-coming disrespect towards this
Court's orders. We cannot counte-nance such disrespect. As a lawyer, Atty. Coronel is expected to recognize the
authority of this Court and obey its lawful processes and orders.[12]

Hence, the Court considers his failure to show cause, notwithstanding reasonable notice therefor, as a waiver of his
rights to be heard and to due process, thereby warranting an ex parte determination of the matter for which he had
been required to explain.[13]

The facts of the case clearly show that Atty. Coronel vio-lated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." He failed to observe particularly Rule
18.03 of the same Code which requires that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

Indeed, petitioner could not have gone through the travails attending the disposition of the case against her not to
mention the devastating consequence on her property rights had Dean Coronel exercised even the ordinary diligence of
a member of the Bar. By neglecting to file the answer to the complaint against petitioner, he set off the events which
24

resulted in the depriva-tion of petitioner's rights over her house and lot. In this regard, worth quoting is the observation
of Justice Emilio A. Gancayco in his ponencia of March 18, 1991:
Page
"Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be expected that he would
extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned
the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by private respondent,
said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the answer.
Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default on the motion of private
respondent's counsel. x x x."
This is not the only case wherein, in dealing with this Court's orders, Atty. Coronel appears to exhibit a pattern of
negligence, inattention to his obligations as counsel, sloppiness and superciliousness. In G.R. No. 97418, "Imelda R.
Marcos, et al. v. PCGG, et al.," the Court en banc, in its Resolution of May 28, 1992, imposed upon Atty. Coronel a fine of
Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) after he was found guilty of inexcusable negli-gence in his failure to comply with this
Court's resolutions. The Court said:

"We find the explanation for his failure to comply with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991
unsatisfactory. Atty. Coronel had obviously taken this Court for granted. Although he received a copy of the 4 June 1991
Resolution on 4 July 1991, he nonchalantly let the 10-day period pass and even deliberately chose to remain silent about
it even after he received a copy of the Resolution of 27 August 1991. It was only on the last day of the period granted to,
him under said Resolu-tion that he showed initial efforts to comply with the Resolution by filing a motion for a 20-day
extension from 30 September 1991 to file the Reply. This was a self-imposed period and, therefore, he was expected to
faithfully comply with it not only because of the re-spect due this Court, but also because he had put his honor and
virtues of candor and good faith on the line. For reasons only known to him, he did not. Worse, de-spite his receipt on
27 November 1991 of the Resolution of 5 November 1991 which granted his 30 September 1991 motion, Atty. Coronel
did not even move for a new period within which to comply with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991.
This Court had to issue the Resolution of 30 January 1992 to compel compliance. When he finally did, he committed,
allegedly through inad-vertence, the blunder of placing his Reply under a wrong caption.
"For deliberately failing, if not stubbornly refusing, to comply with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991
and meet his self-imposed deadline, Atty. Coronel was both unfair and disrespectful to this Court. Furthermore, he has
unduly delayed the disposi-tion of the pending incidents in this case." (Underscor-ing supplied.)
Undoubtedly, in the case at hand, Atty. Coronel's failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the
interest of his client caused the latter material prejudice.[14] It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes
a client's cause, he covenants that he will exert all effort for its prose-cution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails
to exercise due diligence or abandons his client's cause makes him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the
latter.[15] Moreover, a lawyer owes fealty, not only to his client, but also to the Court of which he is an officer. Atty.
Coronel failed to obey this Court's order even on a matter that personally affects him, such that one cannot avoid the
conclusion that he must be bent on professional self-destruction. Be that as it may, Atty. Coronel cannot escape this
Court's disciplinary action for gross negligence which resulted in depriving petitioner of her property rights, for, as this
Court enunciated in the aforecited Cantiller v. Potenciano case:

"Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong
and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance with one's oath of office and the
canons of professional ethics is an imperative.
"Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The
profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest."
WHEREFORE, the second motion for an extension of time to file explanation is hereby DENIED. Atty. Antonio P. Coronel
is hereby found GUILTY of gross negligence in the defense of peti-tioner Victoria Legarda in Civil Case No. Q-43811 and
accordingly SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of
this resolution. A repetition of the acts constituting gross negligence shall be dealt with more severely.
25

3. Gabutan vs Nacalaban, GR 185857-58, June 29, 2016

Page

FACTS:
On January 25, 1957, Godofredo Nacalaban (Godofredo) purchased an 800-square meter parcel of prime land (property)
in Poblacion, Cagayan de Oro City. Pursuant to the sale, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-22597covering the
property was issued in the name of Godofredo. He thereafter built a house on it.

Godofredo died on January 7, 1974. He was survived by his wife, Baldomera, and their children, Dante, Helen, and
Susan. On March 19, 1979, Baldomera issued a Certification in favor of her mother, Melecia. It provided, in effect, that
Baldomera was allowing her mother to build and occupy a house on the portion of the property. Accordingly, the house
was declared for taxation purposes. The tax declaration presented in evidence showed that Melecia owned the building
on the land owned by Godofredo.

Baldomera died on September 11, 1994. On July 3, 1996, her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale
where they adjudicated unto themselves the property and sold it to Cagayan Capital College. On August 22, 1996, TCT
No. T-2259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-111846 covering the property was issued in the name of the College.

Melecia died and was survived by her children who continued living in the house, Gabutan was one of these children.
College demanded that said heirs vacate the premises.

On July 7, 1997, Gabutan, et al. filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of Real Property, Declaration of Nullity of Contracts,
Partition and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment and Injunction against Nacalaban, et al. and the College.
They alleged that: (1) Melecia bought the property using her own money but Godofredo had the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed in his name instead of his mother-in-law;(2) Godofredo and Baldomera were only trustees of the property in
favor of the real owner and beneficiary, Melecia;(3) they only knew about the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale upon
verification with the Registry of Deeds;and (4) the College was a buyer in bad faith, being aware they were co-owners of
the property.

ISSUES:
W/N the action for reconveyance is proper
W/N the college is a buyer in good faith

HELD:

Gabutan, et al., through the testimonies of Felisia, Crisanta, and Trifonia, established that Melecia's money was used in
buying the property, but its title was placed in Godofredo's name. She purchased the property because Felisia wanted to
build a pharmacy on it. On one occasion in Melecia's house, and when the entire family was present, Melecia gave
Godofredo the money to purchase the property. Melecia entrusted the money to Godofredo because he was in Cagayan
de Oro, and per Melecia's instruction, the deed of sale covering the property was placed in his name. It was allegedly her
practice to buy properties and place them in her children's name, but it was understood that she and her children co-
own the properties.

Melecia built a residential building on the property, where her daughter Crisanta and some of her grandchildren resided.
Godofredo also thereafter built a house on the property. Twice, he also mortgaged the property to secure loans. Melecia
allowed him to do so because she trusted him. After Godofredo's death, and when Baldomera fell ill, there were family
discussions to transfer the title in Melecia's name so Melecia's children can divide it together with the rest of Melecia's
properties. The plans, however, always fell through.

Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides in part that there is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is
granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property.
The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. The trust created here, which is also referred to as a
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purchase money resulting trust, occurs when there is (1) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an
equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; (2) and such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary
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of a resulting trust. These two elements are present here.

Having established the creation of an implied resulting trust, the action for reconveyance filed by Gabutan, et al., the
heirs of Melecia in whose benefit the trust was created, is proper. An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable
remedy granted to the rightful landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another,
to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.

College is not a buyer in good faith. To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he
relied on the face of the title to the property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to
explore beyond the four corners of the title. Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the
following
conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in possession thereof; and
third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or
of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property.

Thus, the College, which has the burden to prove the status of being a purchaser in good faith, is required to prove the
concurrence of the above conditions. This onus probandi cannot be discharged by mere invocation of the legal
presumption of good faith.We find that the College failed to discharge this burden. They knew that the heirs of Melecia
lived on the property yet did not conduct a proper inquiry into it. The "honesty of intention" which constitutes good
faith implies a freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry. If the land purchased
is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser must be wary and must investigate the rights of
the actual possessor. Without such inquiry, the purchaser cannot be said to be in good faith and cannot have any right
over the property.

4. Cusi vs Domingo, GR 195825, Feb. 27, 2013

Facts:

Respondent Lilia V. Domingo was the owner of the lot in dispute covered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-
165606.On July 18, 1997, without her consent, RadeliaSy (Sy) petitioned before the RTC for reissuance of new owners
copy and, as proof, presented a deed of sale dated July 14, 1997 executed by Domingo in her favor, and an affidavit of
loss dated July 17, 1997, stating that her bag containing the owners copy of TCT No. N-165606 had been snatched while
she was at the SM City, North EDSA.

After the RTC granted the petition, the Register of Deeds cancelled the TCT No. N-165606 and issued a new TCT No.
186142 in favor of Syby virtue of the deed of absolute sale date July 14, 1997. Sy immediately subdivided the property
and sold each half to Spouses De Vera and Spouses Cusi, and were issued TCT Nos. 189568 and 189569 respectively,
annotatedon the TCT a consideration of onlyPhp 1M each but the entire lot had an actual valueof not less than Php
14M.

It was only on July 1999 when the respondent learned the situation.She filed an action against Spouses Sy, Spouses De
Vera, and the Spouses Cusi seeking annulment of titles, injuction, and damages. She also applied for the issuance of writ
of preliminary prohibition and mandatory injunction, and a temporary restraining order (TRO).

The RTC granted her application, however, the title of Spouses De Vera and Spouses Cusiremain valid as they were held
purchasers in good faith. Dissatisfied with the decision, Domingo filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC set aside
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its first decision and declaring the sale between the respondent and Sy void; the buyers were not purchasers in good
faith; cancellation of TCT Nos. 189568 and 189569; the TCT No. 165606 shall be revalidated in the name of Domingo.
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This decision was brought up to the CA filed by the petitioners but was denied. A motion for reconsideration was also
filed but the same was denied.Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners are purchasers in good faith and for value.

Held:

The petitioners were NOT purchasers in good faith.

Under the Torrens System of land registration, a person dealing in the registered land has the right to rely on the
Torrens certificate title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, exceptwhen the party has actual knowledge
of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry.

Their observance of a certain degree of diligence within the context of the principles underlying the Torrens System was
not the only barometer for them to verify the acquisition of title. Under the law and jurisprudence, it was not enough for
them to show that the property was unfenced and vacant nor it was safe for them to rely on the face of Sys TCT No.
186142 because they were aware that the TCT was derived only from a duplicate owners copy reissued by virtue of the
loss of the original duplicate owners copy. That circumstance should have already alerted them to the need to inquire
beyond the face of the Sys TCT. Other circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry
in dealing with the property are the almost simultaneous transactions affecting the acquisition of the property that the
petitioners were also aware of and the material, undervaluation of the property in the deed of sale, e.i. the price in
consideration of the property of Php 1M each half when the market value is at least Php 14Mostensibly at the request of
Sy to minimize her liabilities for Capital Gains Tax.

5. Saberon vs Ventanilla, GR 192669, April 21, 2014

Facts:
On March 3, 1970, Manila Remnant Co., Inc. (MRCI) and A.U. Valencia & Co. Inc. (AUVC) executed two (2) contracts to
sell in favor of Oscar C. Ventanilla, Jr. and Carmen Gloria D. Ventanilla (Ventanillas). MRCI resold the same property to
Carlos Crisostomo (Crisostomo). Aggrieved, the Ventanillas commenced an action for specific performance, annulment
of deeds and damages against MRCI, AUVC, and Crisostomo with the Court of First Instance.

The CFI Quezon City rendered a decision in favor of the Ventanillas. The CA sustained the CFI Quezon Citys decision in
toto. The Ventanillas moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ was issued and served upon MRCI.
However, MRCI alleged that the subject properties could not longer be delivered to the Ventanillas because they had
already been sold to Samuel Marquez (Marquez)

The case was elevated to this Court where MRCI argued that the sale of the properties to Marquez was valid because at
the time of the sale, the issue of the validity of the sale to the Ventanillas had not yet been resolved. Further, there was
no specific injunction against it re-selling the property.

As a buyer in good faith, Marquez had a right to rely on the recitals in the certificate of title. The subject matter of the
controversy having been passed to an innocent purchaser for value, the execution of the absolute deed of sale in favor
of the Ventanillas could not be ordered by the trial court. Yet the court ruled in favor of the Vetanillas.
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As it turned out, the execution of the judgment in favor of the Ventanillas was yet far from fruition. Samuel Cleofe,
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Register of Deeds for Quezon City (ROD Cleofe) revealed to them, that on March 11, 1992, MRCI registered a deed of
absolute sale to Marquez who eventually sold the same property to the Saberons, which conveyance was registered in
July 1992. ROD Cleofe opined that a judicial order for the cancellation of the titles in the name of the Saberons was
essential before he complied with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 26411.

Apparently, the notice of levy, through inadvertence, was not carried over to the title issued to Marquez, the same being
a junior encumbrance which was entered after the contract to sell to Marquez had already been annotated. Once again,
the Ventanillas were constrained to go to court to seek the annulment of the deed of sale executed between MRCI and
Marquez as well as the deed of sale between Marquez and the Saberons, as the fruits of void conveyances.

RTC ruled in favor of the Ventanillas Meanwhile, the Saberons filed a case in the CA relying on one central argument
that they were purchasers in good faith, having relied on the correctness of the certificates of title covering the lots in
question; and therefore, holders of a valid and indefeasible title. CA ruled in favor of the Ventanillas. The Saberons filed
the present petition.

Unknown to the Saberons, the former owner of the properties had entered into contracts to sell with the Ventanillas,
way back in 1970. It was only upon receipt of the summons in the case filed by the Ventanillas with the RTC that they
learned of the present controversy. With the RTC and the CA rulings against their title over the properties, the Saberons
now come to the Court with their vehement insistence that they were purchasers in good faith and for value.

Before purchasing the lots, they exercised due diligence and found no encumbrance or annotations on the titles. At the
same time, the Ventanillas also failed to rebut the presumption of their good faith as there was no showing that they
confederated with MRCI and its officers to deprive the Ventanillas of their right over the subject properties. According to
the Saberons, the CA likewise erred in ruling that there was no constructive notice of the levy made upon the subject
lands.

Issue:
Whether or not there was constructive notice of levy as an encumbrance prior to the sale to the Saberons.

Ruling:
The Court is beckoned to rule on two conflicting rights over the subject properties: the right of the Ventanillas to acquire
the title to the registered land from the moment of inscription of the notice of levy on the day book (or entry book), on
one hand; and the right of the Saberons to rely on what appears on the certificate of title for purposes of voluntary
dealings with the same parcel of land, on the other.

The Saberons could not be said to have authored the entanglement they found themselves in. No fault can be attributed
to them for relying on the face of the title presented by Marquez. In ultimately ruling for the Ventanillas, the courts a
quo focused on the superiority of their notice of levy and the constructive notice against the whole world which it had
produced and which effectively bound third persons including the Saberons. This complex situation could have been
avoided if it were not for the failure of ROD Cleofe to carry over the notice of levy to Marquezs title, serving as a senior
encumbrance that might have dissuaded the Saberons from purchasing the properties.

It is undeniable, therefore, that no title was transferred to Marquez upon the annotation of the contract to sell on
MRCIs title. As correctly found by the trial court, the contract to sell cannot be substituted by the Deed of Absolute Sale
as a "mere conclusion" of the previous contract since the owners of the properties under the two instruments are
different. Considering that the deed of sale in favor of Marquez was of later registration, the notice of levy should have
been carried over to the title as a senior encumbrance.

The fact that the notice of levy on attachment was not annotated on the original title on file in the Registry of Deeds,
which resulted in its non-annotation on the title TCT No. PT-94912, should not prejudice petitioner. As long as the
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requisites required by law in order to effect attachment are complied with and the appropriate fees duly paid,
attachment is duly perfected.
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The attachment already binds the land. This is because what remains to be done lies not within the petitioners power to
perform but is a duty incumbent solely on the Register of Deeds. In the case at bench, the notice of levy covering the
subject property was annotated in the entry book of the ROD QC prior to the issuance of a TCT in the name of the
Saberons. Clearly, the Ventanillas levy was placed on record prior to the sale. This shows the superiority and preference
in rights of the Ventanillas over the property as against the Saberons.

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