US Anti-Tank Defense at Dom Butgenbach, Belgium in 1944

AD-A284 379
ANTI-ARMOR DEFENSE DATA STUDY

(A2D2)
PHASE I
DRAFT FINAL REPORT

VOLUME III -- US ANTI-TANK DEFENSE AT
DOM BUTGENBACH, BELGIUM (DECEMBER, 1944)
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SAIC RPT 90-1306
ANTI-ARMOR DEFENSE DATA STUDY

(A2D2)
PHASE I
DRAFT FINAL REPORT
VOLUME III -- US ANTI-TANK DEFENSE AT
DOM BUTGENBACH, BELGIUM (DECEMBER, 1944)
SEPTEMBER 10, 1990 - -
Charles M. Baily t ELEC.' L_

Joyce B. Boykin
Lloyd J. Karamales
Victoria I. Young I
${F 1 5 9 i
for ;: - s been Qpproved
PREPARED FOR
THE US ARMY CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGENCY
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Dom Butgenbach,
Anti-Armor Defense Data Study (A2D2), Vol III-US Anti-Tank Defense At Belgium
1Z. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Young, Victoria; Baily. Charles; Karamales. LIyd J_. Boykin, JoyceB.
13a. TYPE OF REPORT 13b TIME COVERED 14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 15 PAGE COUNT
.Technical ReportFROM L 4 9 0
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FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP Anti-armor, WWII, historical analysis, Weapon degradation,
database.
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
The objective of the effort was to collect historical data on at least five actions where
the US was in defense of enemy armor. The data will be used in a joint US/UK analysis of
the degradation in anti-armor defense effectiveness under combat actions. Thirteen combat
actions were described in detail from the engagement at Dom Butgenbach, Belgium in December
1944. The combat actions are presented in both narrative form and in data tables with all
identified data displayed. A database and hard copy file will also be delivered as a final
product.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER TITLE PAGE
INTRODUCTION ................................................ I
1 THE ARDENNES: THE BATTLE FOR THE NORTHERN SHOULDER .......... 2

2 THE ENGAGEMENT AT DOM BUTGENBACH ............................ 16
APPENDICES
A BIBLIOGRAPHY
B INDEX TO FILES ON DOM BUTGENBACH
0 h V....
r.
. . ..
JII
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
FIGURE TITLE
1 The German Plan and Actual Penetration ..................... 4

2 Sixth Panzer Army Attack, 16 December 1944 ................. 8
7 1210 Hours, 18 December 1944 ............................... 30
8 1010 Hours, 19 December 1944 ............................... 36
9 0330 Hours, 20 December 1944 ............................... 49
10 0600 Hours, 20 December 1944 ............................... 59
11 0630 to 1600 Hours, 21 December 1944 ....................... 75
TABLE
1 Dom B~tgenbach Actions ..................................... 28

Action 1 Destruction of "Hitlerjugend's" Probe ...................... 32
Action 2 The Attack From the South .................................. 40
Action 3 The Attack From the East ................................... 44
Action 4 Kampfgruppe Kuhlmann Attacks ............................... 54
Action 5 Warner's First Tank ........................................ 62
Action 6 Warner's Second Tank ....................................... 65
Action 7 Warner's Third Tank ........................................ 68
Action 8 The Shooting Gallery ....................................... 71
Action 9 Schwartz and Rose's First Kill ............................. 88
Action 10 Schwartz and Rose's Second Kill ............................ 91
Action 11 Kolar's Gun ................................................ 94
Action 12 Harris' Gun ................................................ 97
Action 13 Warner's Last Tank ......................................... 100
ii
INTRODUCTION
The information gathered and compiled in this Volume was part of an effort
performed for the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency under Contract MDA903-88-D-
1000, Delivery Order Number 40. The objective of the effort was to collect
detailed historical data on at least five combat actions where US forces were
defending against enemy armor attacks. The data set will be used in a joint
US/UK analysis of the degradation in anti-armor defense effectiveness under
combat conditions. The resulting degradation factors will allow projections of
the combat performance of future anti-armor defenses to be based upon a balanced
combination of historical and instrumented field test data.
A complete description of the work performed by SAIC is found in Volume I,

Technical Report, dated 30 March 1990. Volume I1 describes the anti-tank combat
actions that took place at Mortain, France in August, 1944. This Volume
describes the result of the detailed data collection on the engagement at Dom
Batgenbach, Belgium, in December, 1944.
Copies of the actual WWII maps (1:25,000) of Dom Butgenbach and overlays
were delivered to the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency as part of this project.
Maps within this Volume were created from the original maps.
0
CHAPTER 1
THE ARDENNES: THE BATTLE FOR THE NORTHERN SHOULDER
BACKGROUND
Following the Allied breakout at St. Lo in July 1944, the near encirclement
of the German forces near Falaise wrecked the German Army in the West., Even
though the Allies never completely closed the pocket and many units escaped, the
Germans left most of their equipment and thousands of casualties behind. 2
Allied armies chased the shattered remnants towards the German border, but their
logistics could not sustain this sudden, swift advance. By fall, supply
difficulties and stiffening German resistance, from units which the Germans had
managed to rebuild with prodigious effort, combined to slow the Allied advance.
As the Allies ran into the defenses along the German border, they became locked
into a grinding battle of attrition in terrain where even second-rate German
units could defend effectively. By mid-December 1944, American units were moving
forward slowly. The main objective of General Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group was
the capture of the Roer River dams which, if opened, could flood the river and
prevent its crossing. Since the Roer blocked the approach to the Rhine, it had
to be crossed before Germany could be invaded and defeated.
THE GERMAN PLAN
Even as Allied units raced toward Germany in September, Hitler was already
planning a counteroffensive. On 16 September, gesturing at a map, he announced
to his astonished generals that he would attack, "...here, out of the Ardennes,
with the objective -- Antwerp.' 3 Hitler was determined to make an attack in the
West. The vastness of the Eastern front and the fact that the Soviets had over
500 division-sized units meant that there was little likelihood for a decisive
The background for the Ardennes offensive is drawn mainly from Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the
Bulge (Wash. D.C.: OCMH, 1965).
According to Martin Blumnson, Breakout and Pursuit, (Washington. DC; OCMH, 1961), pg. 555 and Map II.
only 20.000-40,000 Germans escaped, of i9 Divisions in The pocket on August 6.
3 rCole,
n pg.2.
2
victory there. But in the West, a hard blow against the forces of what Hitler
always considered decadent democracies seemed to offer some chance of success.
During the months of planning that followed, Hitler's generals tried to persuade
him to adopt a less ambitious plan. An offensive to Antwerp, in their view,
exceeded the combat power and logistics reach of the forces they were able to
rebuild during the fall of 1944. But in the end, the plan was very much the one
that Hitler dictated.
With elaborate secrecy, the Germans assembled forces for their offensive.
For the assault, the Germans were able to gather thirteen infantry and seven
armored divisions. Another five divisions were in reserve. The assault units
had over a thousand tanks or armored assault guns and some 1,900 supporting
artillery pieces. The German plan, shown in Figure 1, was to attack west to the
Meuse River and cross that obstacle in the vicinity of Liege. Then, the Germans
would swinc north and capture Antwerp, separating the British from the Americans
and, Hitler hoped, create another Dunkirk. The main attack would be carried out
by Sixth Panzer Army with Fifth Panzer Army attacking to cover the southern
flank. On both sides of the penetration, infantry divisions would attack to
secure the shoulders and defend against allied counterattacks.
Figure 1 also shows the actual German penetration compared to the German
plan. Clearly, the main attack made almost no progress. After the failure of
the main attack to break through, the Germans tried to shift their main effort
to the south. But they lacked sufficient fuel for this more lengthy advance and,
more importantly, had lost the time they needed to overcome a surprised but
swiftly reacting American army. Clearly, the American defenders who held the
northern shoulder were instrumental in defeating the German Army's last major
offensive during World War II.
SIXTH PANZER ARMY PLAN
Responsibility for conducting the main attack of the German offensive

belonged to Sixth Panzer Army. Commanded by SS-General Josef "Sepp" Dietrich,
a former butcher by trade and a fanatical Nazi, the Sixth Panzer Army was the
3
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FIGURE 1. THE GERMAN PLAN AND ACTUAL PENETRATION
4
strongest of the three armies participating in the offensive. It included nine
divisions in three corps: LXVII Armeekorps (AK), 326th and 246th Volks Grenadier
Divisions (VGD); I SS Panzerkorps (PzK), 1st and 12th SS Panzer divisions, 12th
and 277th VGD, and 3rd Parachute Division; and II SS PzK with 2d and 9th SS
Panzer Divisions. For its main effort, Sixth Army planned that I SS PzK would
break through along Rollbahns (Routes) C and 0. North of the main attack, at
Monschau, LXVII AK's mission was to break through American lines and block any
thrust from the north (its bloody failure is not described in this narrative).
To exploit I SS PzK's breakthrough, Dietrich held II SS PzK in reserve.
To conduct its main attack, Sixth Panzer Army planned to use I SS PzK's
infantry to break through the defending Americans and open the way for its
armored divisions to exploit towards the West. In the north, 277th Volks
Grenadier Division (VGD) was to seize the twin village Rocherath-Krinkelt to give
12th SS-PzD access to Route C. To the south, the 3rd Parachute and 12th Volks
Grenadier Divisions were to open Route D for 1st SS-PzD. Seizing these roads was
critical to German success. The hilly, forested terrain in the Ardennes made
cross country movement, particularly in the winter, difficult or impossible. The
German attack depended on quickly opening the roads to have any chance of
success. Sixth Army's timetable allowed one day to break through, another to
clear the Hohes Venn high ground, reaching the Meuse on the third day, and
crossing on the fourth.
AMERICAN POSITIONS
Standing in the way of the German attack was the American 99th Infantry
Division, a new unit being seasoned in what was considered to be a quiet sector
of the front. Inserted in the 99th's sector, the veteran 2nd Infantry Division
was attacking toward the Roer dams. The 99th was stretched over a broad front
with no reserves. From north to south, its 395th, 393rd, and 394th regiments
defended the front. Because it was astride both routes needed by the Germans,
the 394th would be hardest hit.
5
The 99th "Checkerboard" Division was a green unit, having been in Europe
only since 3 November. Being a new unit, the 99th had not had time to accumulate
the extra weapons, vehicles, and equipment commonly found in other units that had
been in action for a while. In addition, its attached tank destroyer battalion
had towed guns, and their lack of mobility was an especially severe problem in
the Ardennes. The Division was occupying a quiet sector of the northern Ardennes
to gain bome experience before being committed to offensive operations. The 99th
Division's front stretched 19 miles, from Buchholz Station in the south to
Monschau in the north.
In contrast to the 99th, the 2d Infantry Division was a very seasoned unit.
After the St. Lo breakout in late July, the 2d Division advanced into Brittany
with the VIII. Corps. The division came to the Ardennes in the autumn of 1944 to
rest and absorb replacements. Following this respite, V Corps gave it the
mission of capturing the Roer River dams. The 2d Division launched this attack
on 13 December, meeting stiff resistance. By the beginning of the German
offensive three days later, the 2d Division had already suffered 1,200
casualties.
Despite its losses, the 2d was still a formidable force, having collected
many extra automatic weapons and vehicles in earlier actions, as well as having
three self-propelled TD battalions attached to it rather than one, the normal
practice in the theater. One of its chief assets was the experienced 741st Tank
Battalion, which on 16 December had 47 Sherman tanks. The division was also
fortunate in having as its commander General Walter M. Robertson, a bold and
skillful commander who was largely responsible for the success of the American
defense around the Elsenborn Ridge. The presence of this seasoned unit in the
Rocherath area came as a complete surprise to the Germans.
In reserve in Belgium, the 1st Infantry Division joined V Corps at 2400 on

16 December to help plug the holes the Germans had torn in the US lines. The 1st
was arguably the most veteran unit in the US Army, having seen battle in North
Africa, Sicily, and Normandy. After fighting across France in July and August
1944, the division suffered heavy casualties in the battle to take Aachen during
September and October, and in the bloody fighting in the Hurtgen Forest in
6
November. Like the 2d Division, the 1st was sent to the Ardennes to recuperate
in early December, being short more than 3,300 men, most of them from the front-
line combat elements.
THE FIGHTING PRIOR TO DOM BUTGENRACH
December 16, 1944
At 0530, the German attack opened with a heavy artillery barrage which
lasted until about 0700 (Figure 2). German searchlights created artificial
moonlight to aid their advance. At about 0730, the 277th VGD struck hard at the
393rd, which had one battalion detached to the 395th. The Germans pushed back
the third battalion in the north and Ist in the south, inflicting heavy losses,
and German infantry infiltrated through a gap created between the two battalions.
To backstop the heavily pressed regiment, the 99th Division asked for and
received the 2nd Infantry's reserve, the 23rd Infantry Regiment. One battalion,
the 3/23, moved into a position east of Rocherath behind the 393rd.
German attackers also struck the 394th. Its northern-most battalion, the
2nd, repulsed assaults starting about 0800 and by mid afternoon had stabilized
its front. After completing a tortuous approach march, the 12 VGD did not strike
the 1st battalion at Losheimergraben until noon. The battalion held but was
badly hurt; regiment pulled four platoons from the 3rd battalion, southwest of
the town, to reinforce the depleted unit. Division ordered another of 2nd
Infantry's reserve battalions, the 1/23, to move into positions south of
Hunningen; a move completed by nightfall. South of the 99th's sector, the
Germans had broken through and could be seen moving west. But at the end of the
day, the 99th still held its line.
During the night, Kampfgruppe Peiper of 1st SS-Panzer Division overran the
defenders of Buchholz, which had been stripped of troops to reinforce 1st
Battalion. By 0500 on the 17th, Peiper began to advance on Honsfeld.
7
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FIGUE
08
December 17, 1944
0 Early on the 17th, the tired 3/AJ3 counterattacked to regain the positions
lost the previous day (Figure 3). About 1000, they collided with an attacking
German battalion, reinforced by tanks parceled out from 12th SS. The tank-
infantry attack forced the Americans to retreat through the 1/23. To avoid
* creating a gap in the front, the 1/393 fell back to a position abreast of the
1/23 by 1400. The 3/393 had barely passed through American lines when the
Germans struck hard at the 1/23. Tanks and infantry overran two rifle companies
after a bitter fight, and what remained of the battalion had to retreat to
* Krinkelt. This action isolated the 1/393 to the south, which withdrew cross
country to Wirtzfeld the following day. Wearily, the 3/393 moved forward again
to defend Rocherath, and, joined by the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, still held
its position in front of Rocherath at nightfall.
0
To the south, the day began ominously when Peiper's battlegroup struck
Honsfeld just before dawn. Occupied by 99th Division rear echelon troops and a
variety of units moving to reinforce the front, the attack surprised the
Americans and quickly overran them. Peiper then detoured from Rollbahn D to
Bullingen in order to avoid the poor secondary road leading to Moderscheid. The
Americans at Bullingen, expecting the enemy to move north to capture major supply
dumps, were surprised when the Germans turned south from Bullingen back toward
Rollbahn D. A small reconnaissance unit sent by Peiper to Butgenbach was stopped
by an American roadblock.
In its sector, the 394th near Losheimergraben suffered a strong German

attack just after dawn. By noon, the town had fallen, and during the afternoon
the survivors of the regiment began withdrawing toward Murringen. Later that
afternoon, the Germans finally turned their attention to the 1/23 south of
Hunningen, striking that unit at 1600. The Americans repulsed a series of
assaults before withdrawing to Wirtzfeld during the night.
Most importantly, the American commanders, now fully recognizing the

seriousness of the German offensive, began to shift reinforcements into the
battle. Second Infantry Division canceled its attack toward Wahlerscheid early
0
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10
on the morning of the 17th and began moving forces to Rocherath-Krinkelt with the
mission of holding the villages and vital road long enough to permit withdrawal
of the 99th and 2nd divisions to Elsenborn Ridge. in addition, 1st Infantry
Division, in reserve to the north, began moving to help. Its 26th Regiment had
been alerted the day before, and by dusk the 2/26 was digging in at Dom
Butgenbach. The battalions of the 2nd Infantry Division thickened the defenses
of the twin villages during the day. Three battalions, 2/9, 2/23, and 3/9,
established a position south of Wirtzfeld, to guard against further advance from
Bullingen, while one of the 3/9th's companies moved on to Rocherath to reinforce
the battered 3/393. By dusk, the 1/9 was in position in front of Rocherath, and
the 1/38 established a defense east of Krinkelt. Tanks and tank destroyers
reinforced both of these battalions. During the night, German armor and infantry
launched a heavy but poorly coordinated attack against the villages. Penetrating
the infantry's defenses, the Germans were able to get men and tanks into the
towns. But after wild fighting during the night, the American defenders managed
to hunt down and eliminate the Germans.
December 18, 1944
The hours before dawn at Rocherath-Krinkelt were ominously quiet as the

Americans sought to reorganize after the confused fighting during the night.
Just before light, the Germans began coordinated tank-infantry assaults against
the U.S. positions (Figure 4). The 1/9 withstood the German attack against
Rocherath for nearly six hours, enough time for the 2/38 to move into position
and permit the battered 9th infantrymen to withdraw. During the day, the Germans
again managed to penetrate into the villages with tanks and infantry, but the
Americans eliminated them in close combat. After fighting all afternoon, the
2/38 still held Rocherath.
At Krinkelt, German assaults also began just before dawn. Though repulsing
the main attacks, the Americans, reinforced by two rifle companies of 1/23, could
not prevent German tanks from penetrating as far as the 1/38's command post in
Krinkelt. But the end of the day found the German armor smoking and destroyed.
During the night, German infiltrators continued to infiltrate tanks and infantry
11
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FIGURE 4
12
into both villages, and the Americans had to fight all night to mop them up.
Failure to capture the twin villages after two days of heavy fighting
convinced the Germans that 12th SS-Panzer Division would have to find another way
to Rollbahn C. The division began shifting to the south and finally assembled
at Bullingen, days behind schedule, to begin its advance toward Butgenbach.
T.here it would find the 1st Infantry Division in position.
For their part, the American mission of protecting the withdrawal of the
99th Infantry was fulfilled during the night of 18-19 December as the last units
of that division withdrew through the 2nd (Figure 5). After repulsing another
assault on December 19th, the 2nd Division units withdrew at night to establish
positions on the Elsenborn Ridge (Figure 6).
13
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FIGURE 5
14
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FIGURE 6
15
CHAPTER 2
THE ENGAGENENT AT DON BUTGENBACH
THE GERMAN FORCES AT DOM BUTGENBACH
After two frustrating days of fighting to open its route of advance, the
12th SS-Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend" began a difficult shift toward Dom
Butgenbach over muddy roads and trails. Rebuilt after the German debacle at
Falaise, the division still hoped to achieve its attack objectives. 4 Fighting
with the British and Canadians at Caen, prior to Falaise, had nearly destroyed
the division. Only 300 riflemen and 10 tanks remained when it reached the safety
of the Westwall in August 1944.5 Over the next three months, the division had
a high priority for receiving replacements, and by 16 December it was back to
full strength with 23,346 men. However, the cadre of experienced officers and
NCOs in the division was very small, and most of the staff officers were green.
These defects were most apparent in the panzergrenadier regiments, which were not
considered ready for defensive duty, much less for a major attack. The
divisional armored reconnaissance battalion had, in actual strength, only one
light armored rifle company.
The real backbone of the division, the 12th SS-Panzer Regiment, was down
to one battalion, although this battalion was fortunate in being well-manned with
seasoned veterans of all ranks. To help correct the deficiency of tanks, the
560th Heavy Panzerjager Battalion was attached to the regiment in mid-December
to act as its second battalion. The 560th was a regular Wehrmacht unit, not part
of the Waffen-SS. The battalion was composed of heavily armored Mk IV Jagdpanzer
and Mk V Jagdpanther self-propelled tank destroyers. But the mix of four types
of vehicles in the panzer regiment was a logistical nightmare for the division's
already overloaded support units. The panzer regiment was at 90% full strength
in personnel and 80% strength in vehicles, with 39 Mk IV tanks and 41 of the
4
Information on 12th SS-PzDiv composition and state of readiness was taken from the following sources:
Bundesarchiv Records RH 10/321 (12th SS-Pz4), 19 ec 1944. ETHINT 21, KS #8-522, MS * A-924. "Commitment of the
6th Pz Arm- in the Ardennes (Krbmr), ETHINT 15, and Pallud, The Battle of the Bulge: Then and Now.
'Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 577.
16
formidable Mk V Panthers in the 1st Bn, and 14 Mk V Jagdpanthers and 21 Mk IV
Jagdpanzers in the 2d Bn. Of the division's 118 armored half-tracks, the 26th
Panzergrenadier Regiment had 63. The 12th SS-PzJg Bn, a battalion of SP TDs
organic to the division, also had 22 PzJg IV/48 Jagdpanzers at the start of the
campaign. 6 The 12th SS-Artillery Regiment, the "HJ" Division's organic
artillery support, was comprised only of towed artillery pieces (105 and 150mm),
plus a towed rocket-launcher (nebeiwerfer) battalion. However, the artillery
officers and staff were all veterans.
The 25th SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment, which was officially motorized, had

almost no motor transport and was relegated largely to marching on foot. The
chief handicap to the division's mobility at the start of the Ardennes Campaign
was its lack of motorized transport. Fully 25% of its trucks had not been
replaced after Normandy. The division's trains could carry no more than 300
tons, about 50% of their authorized capacity.
Of course, the intense fighting to capture Rocherath-Krinkelt had already

reduced the division. Further, combat and a difficult move to the south over
muddy trails meant that the troops were no longer "fresh".
THE AMERICAN FORCES AT KRINKELT-ROCHERATH AND DOM BUTGENBACH
The 2d Battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment, which was to defend so

tenaciously at Dom Butgenbach, was among the 1st Infantry Division units that had
suffered heavily in the Hurtgen Forest. 7 E and F Companies, with two heavy
machine gun platoons of H Co (the heavy weapons company) attached, had been
surrounded and destroyed in the town of Merode from 30 November to 3 December.
G Co was also hit hard. Two days after the division pulled out of the forest and
moved to Aubel, Belgium, to rest on 7 December, it received a batch of new
replacements. When the battalion moved to Dom Butgenbach on 17-18 December, E
"From Bundesarchlv Records RH 10/321 (12th SS-Panzer ODvision). 19 Dec 1944.

7
1nformatlon on the Ist IO, and specifically the 26th Inf Regt. was drawn from : Gendron, Operations of
the 2/26th Inf in the Ardennes: and US Army ETO Combat Interviews - Ist Infantry Division.
17
and F Cos were only up to 60% strength, with about 100 men each, and these men
were 90% green replacements and 10% hospital returnees. G Co was especially
weak, with only about 50 men, although only 10 to 15 percent of these were
replacements. The two heavy machine gun platoons of H Co had to be completely
rebuilt, and between them they could count only eight veterans. In the entire
2d Bn, there were only seven officers remaining who had been with the unit on D-
Day: four in the battalion HQ, the rest in the line. Although not acute, the
battalion was also suffering from some equipment shortages. The companies had
only four Browning Autonuatic Rifles (BARs) apiece, and there was a scarcity of
rifle grenade launchers. All the other heavy weapons in the battalion (machine
guns, mortars, bazookas, etc.) were at full strength or above. The battalion had
nearly all its authorized vehicles, being short by two jeeps. In total, the 26th
Infantry Regiment had about 2500 men, about 500 less than its authorized
strength.
THE FIGHTING AT DOM BUTGENBACH
The fighting leading up to the engagement at Dom Butgenbach started on

December 16, when the 254th Engineer Combat Battalion was ordered to take up a
defensive line south and east of Bullingen to protect the roadblocks into
Bullingen.8 After capturing Honsfeld on 17 December, the Germans attacked the
254th three times in rapid succession. The engineers drove back the first attack
at 0600 from Kampfgruppe Peiper of 1st SS-PzD. Charging again at 0630 Vith tanks
firing in support, the Germans were again repulsed with heavy losses by the
defensive fire. In their third attack, at 0645, with panzers leading the
assault, the tanks overran the American foxholes. However, the defenders
repulsed the following grenadiers with heavy fire.
Given time to catch its breath, the 254th Eng Cbt Bn began digging more
permanent positions at the east end of the Dom Butgenbach crossroads. An ad hoc
infantry force, composed of men from the 99th Division Headquarters, nearby anti-
aircraft artillery units, and four towed 3-inch guns of the 612th TD Bn.
254th Eng Cbt on History, 1944 and 254th Eng Cbt en Journal, Dec 1944.
18
augmented the engineers. Capt John J. Kennedy, commander of the tank destroyer
unit, took command of the roadblock group. A skeleton force of engineers stayed
on the ridgetop overlooking Billingen.
Around 1000, five Mk IV tanks from KG Peiper tried to reconnoiter the road
from Bellingen to Dom Butgenbach, but Kennedy's TO guns opened fire and knocked
9
out three of the five. The surviving two hurriedly returned to Ballingen.
While the engineers were fighting to block the Ballingen-Butgenbach

highway, the 26th Infantry Regiment set out for Camp Elsenborn and commitment on
V Corps' western flank, which was now wide open.' 0 The first units of the 26th
reached Camp Elsenborn by 0700 on the 17th, and the remainder of the regiment
arrived by ogo0. The Americans were told that the Germans had captured the town
of Billingen at 0700 that morning, and with it a large fuel dump that 1st Army
had built there. Fearing that the Germans might secure the vital highway running
from Ballingen through Butgenbach to Malmedy and Liege, the 26th quickly moved
to guard the important road junction at Domane Bitgenbach, 2 km southeast of
Bitgenbach.11
The 2d Battalion of the 26th, commanded by LtCol Derrill M. Daniel, drove

onto the grounds of the manor house at 1300 hours on 17 December. By that time,
B Co of the 254th Eng Cbt Bn had worked its way out of Billingen. Some of the
men infiltrated into Hunningen where the 1/23 was establishing defenses; the
remainder joined the rest of the engineers at Dom Butgenbach, just as a German
artillery barrage drove the American pickets off the ridge. The men of the 26th
Regt relieved the battered engineers, who began moving back to Bitgenbach about
1500.
US Army Combat Interviews - 1st Infantry Division; Cole. The Ardennes The Battle of the Bulge. pp. 112-
113; Interview with William Spray. 4 August 1990.
10
26th Inf Rgt AMR. Dec 1944; 26th Inf Regt Unit Journal. Dec 1944.
126th Inf Regt AAR; US Army ETD Coumbat Interviews - 1st Infantry Division. "OonAneO is a German word
manin a m er by a lord. and it was just such an estate that overlooked the vital area. Most American
hld
accouns abbreviate the word to Dao because that isthe way itappeared on maps.
19
The large stone manor house at Dom Butgenbach, with its flanking stone-
foundation wooden barns and nearby gardens, was situated in a narrow valley
between two hills, one to the north (Hill 598) and one to the south (Hill 613).
These hills were mostly devoid of cover except for some straight rows of tall,
widely spaced spruce trees on either side of the trails that criss-crossed the
estate. At the top of Hill 613, almost a kilometer south of the manor, lay the
edge of the Butgenbacher Heck, a dense strip of coniferous forest. A kilometer
beyond that, out of sight over the hill's crest, was the village of Morschheck,
which was occupied at that time by the paratroopers of the 3d Fallschirmjager
Division. The main east-west highway (Route C) that the Germans wanted so
desperately ran southeast past the manor, dipping into another small valley about
500m to the east. Through this valley flowed the Schwarzenbach, or Black Creek,
north toward Lac de Bitgenbach. The road rose again on the other side of the
stream bed and split into two roads, both of which led into Bullingen, 2km from
the Domane. Another main road led due north out of Morschheck, over the top of
Hill 613, and down the steep hillside to a junction with the Billingen-Butgenbach
highway about rOOm east of the manor house.
After analyzing the terrain and its advantages and disadvantages for his
12
defensive mission, LtCol Daniel immediately set about positioning his troops.
G Co went east toward Bullingen and dug in behind a row of trees running along
the top of a hill on the east side of the Schwarzenbach. E Co took up positions
behind similar treelines south of the manor, about halfway up the hill which led
to the Batgenbacher Heck and Morschheck. F Co moved southwest to cover the area
between the other two companies, digging its foxholes on the reverse slope of a
ridge scarcely half a kilometer from Morschheck. This was the sAme area occupied
by the engineers earlier that morning. LtCol Daniel parceled out the machine
guns and bazooka teams of H Co among the line companies to stiffen the defense,
and he placed their six 81mm mortars behind Hill 598, from where they could
support the whole perimeter. He held one platoon of G Co in reserve behind the
manor house, all he could afford because of the limited manpower of his
battalion.
"2Details of 26th Inf Regt's deploymnt were drawn from : Gendron, Ooerations of the 2/26th Inf in the
Ardennes, . 12; Rivette, Operatlons of the 2/26th Inf at Dom BOtgenbach, pp.11,1Z: ana letter, OZnieP to
Trvtte, i Oct 1948.
2U
The nature of the terrain and the fog which blanketed the area compelled
LtCol Daniel to place his anti-tank assets well forward, in order to have
sufficient visibility to support the foxhole lines. He set up three 57mm anti-
tank guns covering the road running east to Bullingen, and supported them with
three M-1O self-propelled tank destroyers mounting 3-inch guns. He sent three
more AT guns to bolster the main line of resistance, or MLR, in the E and F Co
areas. Each of the 57mm guns had, as part of its ammunition supply, seven to ten
rounds of British discarding sabot (DS) ammunition, which the British had given
to the regiment before D-Day.' 3 These rounds used a disposable sleeve, or
sabot, around the penetrator for the British 2-pounder gun. The result was a
lighter projectile with increased velocity, about 4200 ft/sec vice 2900 ft/sec
for the normal 57mi round. With this velocity, a DS round could penetrate
approximately six inches (154mm) of armor at a 300 slope. 1 4 This made the
obsolescent 57mm gun more effective, particularly against the heavy Panther tank
and Jagdpanther tank destroyer.
LtCol Daniel 4ept four M-4 Sherman tanks around his CP as a mobile reserve
and counterattack force. He set up his command post in one wing of the stone
manor house. The battalion's medics set up their aid station in the house also.
E and H Cos established their company command posts in the barns to the west and
east of Lhe manor house, respectively, while F and G Cos collocated their CPs in
a hut alongside the BIillingen road just behind their MLR. The third floor of the
manor house provided good observation of the entire battalion sector, so the
battalion OP was located there.
LtCol Daniel was not very happy with his battalion's defensive positions,
although they were the best that could be done under the circumstances. After
the war, in a letter to the commander of his AT company, Donald Rivette, he
wrote:
".The reverse slope defense on the right flank rE Col was just niecessary. We couldn't go very far south
to get on the crest of the hill because that would add several hundred yards to the MLR [main line of
resistance] and I just didn't have enough men for that. Besides. if we did go to the hill we would have to
curve over into the woods with the MLR and that would take even more men. So we went where I thought we had
0 Rivette Certificate, 1 Dec 1986.
14
Rivette, Operations of the 2/26th Inf at Dom BEtoenbach,
p. 11.
21
a reasonable chance. The hedgerow was bad, I admit it was a perfect target. But either side (north or south)
of the hedgerow was even worse. If to the south there was no concealment and each foxhole could be definitely
sotte. If to the north we would have concealment from ground observation afforded by the hedgerow, but also
sth thedgerow would limit our observation to a marked degree. Besides. if the line was moved far enough north
to get away from fire directed at the hedgerow, the line would be too close to the CP. So we took the hedgerow.
which mad a reverse slope defense--no help for it."13
To provide as much protection as possible for his men from the German
artillery, which was expected to be intense, LtCol Daniel ordered that all front-
line positions, including crew-served weapons, be improved with overhead cover,
usually in the form of wooden planks and sandbags laid over the top of the
* foxholes. To help his men, LtCol Daniel arranged for a load of lumber to be
trucked to the battalion from Butgenbach. The GIs also camouflaged their
positions as well as they could with whatever materials were to hand, and they
piled sandbags around the fighting pits.
The 2d Bn completed its positions around Dom Butgenbach by 1700 on 17

December. The 3d Bn, meanwhile, had moved to occupy the hilltop sector between
G Co and the railroad embankment which paralleled the Warche River, its flank
* firmly anchored on the lake. Its positions were as exposed as those of the 2d
Bn except for a sparsely wooded patch on top of Hill
503 known as the
Schwarzenbuchel, or "Black Beech Forest." 1st Bn stayed in reserve in Butgenbach
itself. This left 2d Bn's right flank hanging on air, and its rear vulnerable
* to attack from the west or southwest.
As darkness fell about 1830, LtCol Daniel ordered each of his companies to
prepare one 60mm mortar to fire illumination rounds during the hours of darkness.
0 Telephoning the regimental HQ in Butgenbach, he also requested that the
supporting artillery battalions have one howitzer each laid to fire illuminating
shells every night. Regiment agreed, and informed Daniel that since 1800, the
7th and 32d Field Artillery Battalions had established new positions from which
* to support the 26th. The Regiment's normal supporting artillery battalion, the
33d FA Bn, had been in place since 1430.18 At dusk, LtCol Daniel met with the
commanders of his line companies in his CP at the manor house. They had all
netter.
inielto Rivette, 19 Oct 1948.
'GUS Army ETO Combat Interview - Ist Inf Div; 1st I G-3 Operations Report, Dec 1944.
22
0
heard rumors over the past two days of American soldiers giving up to the Germans
or fleeing to the rear. He was determined that the 2/26th would acquit itself
better than that. Although the regimental combat team was effectively isolated
from the rest of the division, it had fought under those conditions at Kasserine
in Africa and at Barrafranca in Sicily. Daniel therefore adopted a slogan for
the battalion, which he wanted passed on to every man in the outfit: "We fight
and die here." 17
After dark, even though his men were tired from their long move and hours
of digging foxholes in the cold, LtCol Daniel sent patrols out to reconnoiter to
his front. A patrol to Bullingen soon came back to the crossroads position,
reporting about 100 American prisoners in the town and over a thousand German
infantrymen. 1' Another patrol crept up the hill to the south to establish a
listening post at the edge of the Butgenbacher Heck. Still another patrol
reported a brief skirmish with Germans to the southwest of Dom Butgenbach,
leading to unfounded fears that the town of Weywertz, to the west of 2d Bn, might
be occupied by Germans. Having confirmed the presence of German troops, the
American soldiers waited anxiously through the long winter night.
SUMMARY OF DOM BUTGENBACH FIGHTING
The anti-tank combat actions that are described next come from the fighting
that occurred during the 18th through the 21st of December. Around noon on the
18th, elements of the 12th SS-PzD's reconnaissance battalion probed towards Dom
Butgenbach from Morschheck to test the state of the American defenses. The
American AT guns guarding the Morschheck-Dom Butgenbach road quickly dispatched
7
Gendron, The Operations of the 2/26th Inf at .0mOitaenoach.
1
What they had seen was the 12th SS-PzD's Kampfgruppe Krause, with most of the 26th SS-PzGren Regt (except
III Bn), two battalions of artillery, and a battalion each of engineers and flak vehicles. This Kampfgruppe
had not yet seen action in the Offensive and had moved forward from its assembly area through Hallschlag and
Losheimergraben to open the division's drive on BOtgenbach. source: 1st ID G-3 Opns Rpt; Pallud, pp. 95-96.
23
the probing force consisting of ani armored car and a jeep with no infantry
support (Action 1). The Germans had not expected the crossroads to be defended
in strength, so there was a delay of about 15 hours before enough of 12th SS-
PzD's combat elements had gathered in Billingen and Morschheck to mount a real
attack.
Early on the 19th, about 0230, the Germans struck the 2/26 with a dozen
Jagdpanthers and twenty truckloads of infantry only to be driven off by American
artillery and infantry fire19 (Actions 2,3). Later in the morning, the Germans
launched a series of company strength attacks which the American infantry also
repulsed. Following this reverse, the Germans ceased their attacks until more
forces could be assembled in Billingen.
On December 20th, German attacks began in the early morning, around 0330,
when about twenty German tanks and tank destroyers rolled out of thick fog to hit
the 2/26's positions. Heavy fire stopped the attack, but some of the tanks
penetrated as far as the battalion's command post (Action 4). Just before dawn,
the Germans began a series of assaults but were repulsed by a combination of
artillery, Anti-tank guns, and small arms fire (Actions 5-8). With their
infantry scattered by shellfire, the Germans ceased attacking, although they
probed the perimeter at dusk with patrols. To replace losses and strengthen the
American battalion's right flank, the regiment's Anti-tank company moved two
additional platoons of 57-mm guns into the 2/26's positions.
On the 21st, the Germans delivered their hardest blows against the Dom
Butgenbach defenses. Beginning about three hours before dawn, a heavy artillery
preparation crashed down on the Americans, inflicting heavy damage and ripping
gaps in the defenses. At first light, the artillery fire ceased and the Germans
advanced -- only to be met by massive American shellfire from as many as twelve
battalions. On the right flank of the 2/26, Germans tanks emerged from the woods
where the regimental anti-tank guns engaged them (Actions 9-13). After losing
at least five tanks and self-propelled guns, the Panzers managed to destroy the
19 Amrtcan sources report that tanks were In the attack, but a Germn source. Meyer. Kriegsgeschichte
der 12.SS Panzerdivision "HitlerJuend" I1,is very positive that these were Jagdpanthers.
24
guns and penetrate into Dom Butgenbach, where they were gradually destroyed or
driven away during the day. Though battered, the 2/26 still held its positions
when night and reinforcements arrived.
On December 22, fresh German troops, the infantry reserve of 12th SS

Panzer, attacked again at about 1000. Deciding to avoid the unsuccessful,
headlong assaults against the 2/26 of the previous two days, the Germans moved
around the right flank of the battalion. There they ran into 3/26. With the
help of artillery and tank destroyers, the third battalion defeated the attack.
By the end of the day, the American defenders had the situation well in hand.
Abandoning its effort to open Route C, the 12th SS headed south to follow in the
wake of the more successful Fifth Panzer Army, ending German efforts to open the
northern shoulder.
AFTERMATH
As the grenadiers and panzers withdrew into Morschheck and Bullingen on the
afternoon of 21 December, the weary US 2/26th began rebuilding its defenses and
preparing for the next German attack. Engineers laid a belt of 2,400 mines in
front of the MLR, built two strong roadblocks to block the approaches from east
and south, and erected three rows of concertina wire across the battalion's
entire front.2
However, these new defenses would not be tested. After the failed attack
of 22 December, the Germans abandoned their effort to open Rollbahn C and reach
Liege. The 12th SS-PzD was withdrawn from the fighting and sent west, eventually
to fight around Bastogne. The Volksgrenadier units were too weak to attack and
assumed the mission of defending Billingen and Morschheck against any American
* counterattack.
After four days of fighting, the 12th SS-Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend" had
suffered at least 782 dead, and a total of at least 1,200 casualties. Including
2 st I0 G-3 Opns Rpt, Dec 44.
25
losses incurred at Krinkelt-Rocherath, in its first week of commitment in W.cht
Am Rhein the division lost 47 panzers, panzerjagers, and self-propelled guns, 15
armored half-tracks, one armored car, one jeep, two rocket launcher batteries
(due to counterbattery artillery fire) and an unknown number of unarmored
trucks. 2 1 US patrols sent out to the Butgenbacher Heck on 23 December reported
German dead "as common as grass" on the hillside above E Co's MLR and found over
300 dead inside the edge of the forest.Y The commander of M Co, 3d Bn's heavy
weapons company, told Captain Rivette of the AT Co that the bodies of dead
panzergrenadiers were piled so high in front of 3d Bn's positions that special
23
patrols had to be sent out to clear them from the final protective line.
The American casualties were proportionally no less severe. The 26th

Infantry Regiment lost 6 bazookas, 5 57mm AT guns, 6 BARs, 2 .3Ocal machine guns,
3 M-10 self-propelled tank destroyers, and 3 M-4 Sherman tanks defending Dom
Butgenbach. 24 Worse, the regiment suffered 500 men killed, wounded, or
captured: 13 officers and 487 men. Since Ist Division as a whole lost 15
officers and 948 men between 16 and 24 December, that meant that 51% of the
enlisted losses and 87% of the officer casualties came from the 26th Regiment. 25
After the German attack subsided on the afternoon of 21 December, 2/26th had
elements of six companies holding the line -- its own E, F, and G Cos leavened
by heavy weapons from H Co, plus C Co from 1st Bn and parts of E Co of the 18th
Regiment. A head count taken that night of men available for duty in the
foxholes revealed that E Co had 75 men left, F Co had 75, G Co had 55, and H Co
had 80. Company C, 1st Bn had 75 men, and even the "fresh" E/18 only had 125.26
Credit for the defense must be shared with the various supporting
battalions of American artillery. These units were no less heroic than the
21
Information from Unit Citation Documentation, gathered by Rivette; US Arary ETO Cbt Int - 1st Inf Div.
2 Gendron. Opns of the 2/26th Inf in the Ardennes, p.
33.
lRtvette Certificate, I Dec 1986.
24
US Arm ETO Cbt Int - 1st Inf Div: 26th Inf Regt Unit Jnl, Dec 44; 1st IDG-3 Opns Rpt, Dec 44.
'US Ariy ETD Cbt Int - 1st Inf Div.

226th Inf Regt Unit Jnl, Dec 44; Gendron, Dins of the 2/26th Inf in the Ardennes, p. 32.
26
infantry in stopping the German attacks. On 18 December, the battalions
supporting the Ist Division fired 26 missions; on 19 December, 102 missions; on
the 20th, 169; on the 21st, 291; and on 22 December, they fired 334 fire
missions. Often they fired until they ran out of ammunition or until the guns
were too hot to fire. In one eight-hour period on the 21st, when artillery
explosions were all that kept the German infantry from overrunning LtCol Daniel's
CP, 10,000 rounds were fired to support his position. The same day, the mortar
sections at Dom Butgenbach fired 750 rounds, while the 955th FA Bn fired 555
rounds in a single interdictory and harassing mission and a total of 2,054 rounds
for the day, the battalion's largest one-day ammunition expenditure of the
war.2
The engagement at Dom Butgenbach proved to be the last act in the German's
effort to break through the northern shoulder. When the Germans shifted forces
to the south, they had, in effect, abandoned their main attack. The stout
American defense of the northern shoulder prevented Hitler's plan from being
completed and the valiant defenders of Dom B6tgenbach provided a fitting finale.
*US Arny ETO Cbt Int - 1st 10; Rivette, "Hot Corner at Dom Bitgenbach'.
27
ACTIONS FROM THE DON BUTGENBACH ENGAGEMENT
The combat actions described in this volume come from the German
attempts to capture Dom Butgenbach, defended by the 2/26 Infantry Battalion.
Historical records contain sufficient information to isolate, in detail, 13
distinct actions. Each of these actions involved a US weapon or weapons
system defending against German armor. Each action occurred within a distinct
time period, and within a distinct geographical location.
Table 1 summarizes these actions.
NUMBER TITLE
1 Destruction of "Hitlerjugend's" Probe
2 The First Attack: Attack from the South
3 The First Attack: Attack from the East
4 Kampfgruppe Kihlmann Attacks
5 Warner's First Tank
6 Warner's Second Tank
7 Warner's Third Tank
8 The Shooting Gallery
9 Schwartz and Rose's First Kill
10 Schwartz and Rose's Second Kill
11 Kolar's Gun
12 Harris' Gun
13 Warner's Last Tank
0
28
0
ACTION 1
Name: Destruction of "Hitlerjugend's" Probe

Location: North End of the Morschheck-DomAne BUtgenbach Road, Belgium
Time: 1210 Hours, 18 December 1944
Around 1000 hours on 18 December, after a fitful night of rest, the 2d

Bn, 26th US Infantry Regiment guarding the road junction at Dom Butgenbach
began to expand its lines to the west, trying to give more coverage to its
open right flank 28 (Figure 7). This was done without German interference,
but it thinned E Co's line even further. The 2/26 was now covering a front
that stretched 1,800 to 2,100 yards, depending on how it was measured, and its
right flank and rear were still exposed. At 1040, the listening post at the
edge of the Bitgenbacher Heck reported hearing at least six German tanks
prowling around on trails inside the forest. LtCol Daniel thought about
calling down artillery fire on the woods, but the scouts couldn't pinpoint the
location of the tanks and soon they drove out of earshot.
What the listening post had probably heard was the vehicles of the 12th
SS-Reconnaiisance Battalion, which reached Bollingen and Morschheck shortly
before noon that day. The rest of the "Hitlerjugend" Division was either
engaged at the twin villages of Krinkelt-Rocherath, or slowly moving toward
the battle area on the clogged roads leading west. Soon after its arrival,
elements of the recon battalion set out to investigate the state of the
American defenses at Butgenbach. This was to be the first contact between the
German 12th SS and the American Ist Infantry.
At 1210, a small SS reconnaissance force consisting of a single eight-

wheeled armored car 29 followed by a Kubelwagen (the German jeep) crested Hill
613 on the highway from Morschheck and began a slow descent towards the road
"US Army ETC Cbt Int -Ist Inf Div.

" Judging by eyewitness accounts, thiswas probabLy an Sd Kfz 234/1 or 234/3 armored car; see von Senger
und Ettertin, German Tanks of WorLd War II, p. 154 and Roffschmidt and Tantum, german Tank and Antitank of
Worgd War 11, pp. 212-213. It may atso have been an Sd Kfz 231 or 233, but these test two were not as
ScomnLy used as the 234 in SS divisions.
29
..... .~
fi
C
C
*
CY
CD
FIGURE 7. 1210 HOURS, 18 DECEMBER 1944
30
junction near the Domane. Because of the lingering fog, the men of E Co could
not identify the vehicles as American or German until they were only 200 yards
south of the intersection, at which point one of the 57mm AT guns opened fire,
quickly destroying the thin-skinned armored car and unarmored Kubelwagen.
(Action 1) The four soldiers riding in the jeep were killed instantly, as
were three of the armored car crewmen. The American soldiers nearby
extricated the fourth German from the wreckage and carried him to the command
post, where he was interrogated. He gave his unit affiliation30 and said
that the Germans had thought the Dom B(tgenbach area to be lightly defended.
Five minutes after this skirmish, American observers reported that two
truckloads of German infantry (about 20-30 men) had just unloaded at the edge
of Morschheck and dashed into the woods northeast of the town. Immediately,
American artillery and 81mm mortar fire began raining down on the forest.
When the barrage lifted, an American patrol infiltrated the woods to assess
the damage of the shelling. They found about twenty dead SS-panzergrenadiers,
and ten more Germans moving back toward Morschheck carrying wounded comrades.
The first meeting was over. 31
30
Some sources, notaLy the 26th Inf Regt AAR, Dec 44, and the 26th Inf Regt Jnt, Dec 44, say
he claimed
to be from the 1st SS-PzO. White It is possible that the vehicles were stragglers from KG Peiper's column,
it is unlikely since that unit was already some miles away to the west by this time. It is more Likely that
the officers interrogating him misunderstood him and confused the 12th SS-PzO with the 1st SS-PzD.
3
'Accounts of this action were gleaned from: Gendron, 020s of the 2/26th in the Ardennes,
p. 16; 26th
Inf Regt AAR, Dec 44; and 26th lnf Regt Unit JnL, Dec 44.
31
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ACTIONS 2, 3
Name: The Attack Toward BOtgenbach

Location: South and East of Dom Bitgenbach, Belgium
Realizing that the Americans were defending the Dom BUtgenbach cross-
roads in force, the commander of the 12th SS-PzD, SS-Col Kraas, spent the rest
of 18 December withdrawing his forces from Krinkeit-Rocherath and marshalling
them at B1llingen for an attack in force toward BUtgenbach (Figure 8). This
attack was commanded by the division's executive officer from the forward
command post, since Kraas was still preoccupied with the battle at the twin
villages. The troops of 3d Bn, 26th SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment (26th SS-
PzGren Regt) relieved the elements of 12th VGD holding BUllingen, and at 0225
on 19 December they attacked westward with about 12 panzerjdgers 32 and 20
half-tracks and trucks carrying 200-300 infantrymen. The heavy American
defensive fire, including prearranged defensive artillery concentrations,
stopped most of the attackers before they could reach the American MLR, but
three of the panzerjagers succeeded in breaking through E Co's line and onto
the road from Morschheck to the DomAne. They began firing their main guns at
the manor house, wounding five or six GIs, but a barrage of 155mm artillery
shells drove them off. As they passed through the American foxhole line on
their way back to Billingen, two of the three panzerj~gers were disabled
either by artillery, tank destroyer, antitank gun, or bazooka fire. This
attack cost the Germans over 100 dead and at least three tank destroyers and
four trucks destroyed.
Following the hour-long German attack in the pre-dawn darkness, Col John
F.R. Seitz, commander of the US 26th Infantry Regiment, began moving elements
of his 1st Bn out of reserve positions in BUtgenbach. Company B dug in along
the north side of the BOllingen-Bitgenbach road between the town and the
DomAne. Soon after, A Co moved to new positions 1000 yards south of
2
3' n this text,the word "panzerjAger" is used to refer to the Gerroan setf-propetted turrettess, tank
destroyers. "Panzer" is used to refer to a turreted German tank. The two types of panzerjagers that witt
be referred to are the PzJg IV/48 Jagdpanzer and PzJg V Jagdpanther.
35
-nm
N0
* FIGURE 8. 1010 HOURS, 19 DECEMBER 1944
36
Butgenbach to tie in with B Co. This had the added benefit of guarding 2d
Bn's open right flank, and by 0500 the gap between the two battalions was
reduced to 600 yards. B Co would cover this gap by fire during the daytime
and establish outposts there at night.
About 0630, shortly after daylight, the Germans began shelling 2d Bn's
positions with artillery and mortar fire. Not heavy at first, the barrage
gradually increased in intensity throughout the morning, reaching its maximum
strength by 1000. At 1010,
the second German attack of the day hit the
American positions from south and east.
The first force (Action 2) came out of Morschheck, over the crest of
Hill 613 and down the road to the Domane. Leading the attack was a German
eight-wheeled armored car with a large gun in a rotating turret. 3 Following
closely behind was a large armored vehicle. 3' Together, these two vehicles
protected the advance of a company of SS infantry, who were probably from
3/26th SS-PzGren Regt. Because of the heavy fog blanketing the area, the
American gun crews let the Germans approach to within 100 yards of their
positions in order to increase the chances of a hit on the vehicles, and to
confirm their identity as enemy. The gun crew of 2d Gun Squad, 2d Platoon of
the Regimental Anti-Tank Co had just finished setting up their 57mm AT gun on
the MLR a few minutes before the attack, and now they drew a bead on the
approaching vehicles. On command, they began firing the gun as quickly as
they could reload it, hammering out three armor-piercing (or possibly
discarding sabot) rounds in a few seconds. The first two shells were aimed
at the Jagdpanzer which, being the most heavily armed and armored of the two
vehicles, was the most important target. Both rounds struck the panzerjAger,
" Contemporary American accounts say the armored car had a SOnm anti-tank gun in its turret; that
would
indicate that it was an Sd Kfz 234/2 ,Puma.,, However,the German aliederuno (Table of Organization) for the
12th SS-PzD for 19 Oec 1944 shows no such vehicles in the division's inventory. The atiederurg does indicate
that the 12th SS-Recon On contained seventeen Sd Kfz 234/1 cars with 20mm guns, and six Sd Kfz 234/3 cars
with 75 guns. It would have almost certainly been one of these that was des:royed in this action. See von
Senger und Ettertin, German Tanks of world war iI, p. 154-156; Hoffschmidt and Tantum, German Tank and
Antitank of world war iI, pp. 212-213.
3
'Contemporary American accounts claim this second vehicle was a Mk V Panther
tank, but the only
Panthers in the 12th SS-PzD were in the 1st an of the 12th SS PzRegt, which at this time was still on its
way to 90ttingen from Krinkett-Racherath. This vehicte was probably from the 12th SS-PzJg On of KG Muller,
* which would mean it was almost certainty a PzJg lv/48 Jagdpnzer.
37
and although it is not known where on the vehicle they hit, they damaged it
enough that it was forced to limp back to its own lines. But the AT gun's
muzzle flashes had given away its location, and the armored car swung its
turret to fire at the gun. Armored car and AT gun fired simultaneously. The
American 57mm shell struck the armored car and instantly destroyed it.
However, the German 50mm shell also found its mark, destroying the AT gun and
killing two members of the gun crew, Cpl Hale Williams and PFC Richard
Wollenberg. An additional crewman was blinded by the blast, and another had
to be evacuated because of battle fatigue. The German advance from Morschheck
now ground to a halt because the grenadiers could not advance against the
deadly American artillery and small arms fire without tank support. The
commanding officer of E Co, Capt Pierre Stepanian, called in artillery and
81mm mortar fire on the exposed Germans, and almost the entire company was
slaughtered in front of the American foxholes. Some of the artillery rounds
fell within 50 yards of the American positions. Those few SS who were able
to stumble back into the BUtgenbacher Heck were ambushed and killed by the men
of the American listening post still hiding just inside the forest's edge.
Twenty minutes after the start of the southern attack, the Germans
launched another assault westward out of B~llingen (Action 3). This time they
employed between four and eight of the huge panzerjAgers and an infantry force
reckoned to be at least a company and possibly a battalion, probably the
remainder of 3/26th SS-PzGren Regt. This force advanced along the secondary
road that ran parallel to and north of the main BUllingen-BUtgenbach road.
Again, because of the fog, the Americans allowed the SS troops to approach
close to their positions. The GIs could catch glimpses of the grenadiers
through the fog, seeing them deployed perfectly in attack formation behind the
panzerjAgers. When the Germans reached a point about 100 yards from the
American line, the leading SS officer called out in English for the Americans
to surrender. The Americans answered him with a hail of fire. All the small
arms of F and G Cos opened up, as well as bazookas, tank destroyers, and the
two AT guns covering the east-west road. These latter destroyed the two
leading panzerjagers and again the German advance halted.
The Germans' morning barrage had cut F Co's communication lines to the
38
battalion CP and disabled both the company's radio and the radio used by the
artillery forward observer stationed with the company, so they had to rely on
the company's organic 60mm mortars to help drive off the Germans.
The grenadiers began to fall back after an hour, unable to penetrate the
American perimeter on either side. At about 1100, they again withdrew into
BUllingen. Further attacks would have to wait for the arrival of more of the
panzergrenadiers. Also, the Germans were running short on ammunition because
the muddy roads were delaying the supply units. Under increasing time
pressure to break through the US defense and open the highway to Malmedy, the
"Hitlerjugend" Division had to content itself with artillery harassment of Dom
BUtgenbach for the rest of the 19th of December. 35
3
5Details of the fighting were taken from: Rivette, "Hot Corner at Dom *otgenbach;" Rivette, Opns of
the 2/26th at Dom Sutaenbach, pp. 12-13; Letter, Daniel to Rivette, 19 Oct 1948; Gendron, Omn of the 2/26th
in the Ardenrwnes, pp. 18-19; 26th int Regt AAR, Doec4; 26th tnt Regt Jnt, Dec 44; US Army ETO Cbt Int - 1st
Inf Div; Gendron Certificate, 14 Mar 1986; Rivette Certificate, 1 Dec 1986; Cole, The Ardennes, p. 130; and
SMacDonald, A Time For Trumcts, pp. 404-405.
39
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61
ACTION 4
Name: Kampfgruppe Klhlmann Attacks

Location: East of Dom B0tgenbach, Belgium
Throughout the 19th of December, elements of the 12th '7S-PzD dribbled

into Bullingen, hampered by the muddy, clogged roads and tired from two days
of hard fighting at Krinkelt-Rocherath 3 (Figure 9). At some point during
the afternoon the rocket-launcher (nebelwerfer) battalion of the 12th SS-
Artillery Regt arrived and fired at least one barrage of rockets at the 2/26th
positions at Dom BUtgenbach; the other three artillery battalions kept up a
light but steady rain of shells throughout the day.
Under pressure to attack quickly to seize Bitgenbach and open Rollbahn

C, SS-Col Kraas reorganized Kampfgruppe Kihlmann to include the tanks of Ist
Bn/]2th SS-PzRegt; the 1st and 3d Bns of the 26th SS-PzGren Regt; the
panzerjagers of the 560th Hvy PzJg Bn; and the 2/12th Artillery Regt of towed
105mm howitzers. 3 7 This force assembled and set out at 2310 on 19 December,
under cover of darkness, to mount a concentrated attack on the US positions
east of Dom Butgenbach. The 3/26 SS secured the assembly area in the west
section of Bullingen and pushed a screen of scouts forward while the 1/26 SS
and the panzerjagers of the 560th Hvy PzJg Bn moved down both sides of the
Bllingen-Butgenbach highway. The force took a wrong turn, however, and got
lost in the darkness. It ended up south of the DomAne near Morschheck at
about 0150, and Capt. Stepanian of E Co, 2/26 called upon the US 1st
Division's supporting artillery to blast the German colu ...The 5th, 33d, and
955th FA Bns, as well as one 90mm battery from the 414th AAA Bn and a battery
of 8-1iich guns, answered the call and the resulting 10-minute barrage knocked
-,,;t two of the 560th's Jagdpanzer IV/48s. 38 It was some time before the
3 Krkmer, MS ETHINT 21
31meyer, Krteoeae*chfchte der 12. SS-Panzerdfvolon "Hftteriuaend" p.440
30Gerdron, Oms of th* 2126th |nf Rent in the Arnnen,

p. 21
48
CYC
_ c m
gl CL I
9
FIUR 33 HUS,20DEEBE 14
I9
kampfgruppe could turn around and reassemble back in its proper starting area.
Finally, at 0330 on the 20th, the Germans neared the Americans' eastern
perimeter.
Just before reaching the American lines, the kampfgruppe split into
three columns. The northernmost force, a company of panzerjagers and some
infantry of 3/26 SS-PzGren Regt, had the task of clearing the troops of the
US 3/26th from the Schwarzenbuchel on Hill 503 in order to protect the
attack's flank; it succeeded in occupying the southern part of the hill, but
the attack stalled and the grenadiers there were locked in combat for hours
with the American infantry along the treeline.
The center group rolled due west down the highway for a clash with F Co,
which had been alerted by the sounds of battle on Hill 503. The commander of
the lead Jagdpanther was struck in the head and killed by an American bullet
before his vehicle reached the foxhole line. His driver, panicking, quickly
threw the vehicle in reverse before it could be hit by anti-tank fire and
rammed into the following Jagdpanther.
39 Despite the snarl this caused, the
attackers pressed on, and heavy combat ensued between the Americans of F Co
and the Germans of 2/26 SS-PzGren Regt. One of the M-1O self-propelled tank
destroyers of the 634th TD Bn was in this area, near the F Co CP, and could
have been of great value in supporting against the German thrust, but the crew
disabled their vehicle, thinking themselves surrounded, and fled toward the
0
battalion CP at the Domine.'
The leftmost German force enjoyed the most success. Some tanks and a
company of PzJg IV/48s accompanied by infantry from the 1/26 SS encountered
a belt of American mines across the road a hundred yards or so in front of the
MIR, so they swung southwest off the main road and headed for the seam between
E and F Companies using unpaved trails along the hillsides. The Germans
skirted just south of the head of the Schwarzenbach Creek, but several of the
45-ton Jagdpanzers became mired in the soft mud, some up to their rear decks.
39Meyer,
2
Letter, Oaniet to Rivette, 19 Oct 1948
50
9 e
Five of the panzerjagers from ist Kompanie managed to make it up the hill and
through the American foxhole line, but the grenadiers were checked by the
heavy American small arms and artillery fire. Once through the MLR, the
Jagdpanzers turned around briefly to spray the American positions from the
rear with machine gun and HE fire. This fire knocked out some of the 57mm AT
guns and caused casualties among the infantry, including destroying three
bazooka teams and a machine gun section of four or five men from H Co, but it
also aided in further pinning the German infantry on the other side of the
MLR. After a few minutes the Jagdpanzers turned northwest to continue their
mission of breaking through to the Domane, leaving the grenadiers and GIs to
fight it out in the heaviest combat the US regiment had ever seen. The smoke
of battle added to the fog in obscuring visibility, and several German
panzerfaust teams were able to get close enjuch to fire at the US AT guns.
German artillery and mortar fire continued to crash down on the Americans
positions all through the battle. The Germans captured several American
soldiers in the fighting, and when they were interrogated later the Germans
learned for the first time that they were facing the 26th Regiment of the Ist
Infantry Division."
0 The five Jagdpanzers pushed on alone, criving through the American rear
area to within 100 yards of the manor house, where they began firing their
75mm guns directly into the building. However, without their supporting
infantry they were vulnerable to close combat tactics. American bazooka teams
0 set out to hunt the Jagdpanzers among the buildings of the DomAne and knocked
out two of them. The other three vehicles chose to withdraw and headed for
the road to Morschheck. After they passed through the MLR, however, the crews
of the American AT guns were able to spot the vehicles' exhaust flashes
through the smoke and fog, and destroyed two more panzerjagers in short order
(Action 4).
Fearing that his infantry line was in danger of collapse from the
enormous pressure being exerted by the panzergrenadiers, LtCol Daniel
committed his battalion reserve, the platoon from G Co, to counterattack and
41Meyer, op cit
51
0
restore the MLR. He also called the Regimental CP in Butgenbach and requested
a company from 1st Bn, which was too far west to be hit by the German attack.
Col. Seitz approved, and sent C Co to the 2d Bn area at once. Daniel
forwarded two platoons to reinforce F Co, which was being badly chewed up, and
kept two platoons as his new battalion reserve.
Meanwhile, in the center astride the highway, the battle still raged.
Three of the giant panzerjagers broke through the foxhole line and engaged the
US tanks and SP TDs along the ridgeline on the southern part of Hill 503. The
US armor pounded away at the German vehicles until they were e~ther destroyed
or they retreated back through the MLR. Two Sherman tanks and an M-10 TD were
knocked out in this action. Further north, some German armor also closed with
the GIs in the 3d Bn in the SchwarzenbOchel, but the I Co men took out some
with their bazookas, tanks, and tank destroyers while 155mm salvos knocked out
others. Heavy machine gun fire from L Co helped keep the panzergrenadiers
0 from advancing into the SchwarzenbOchel.
The German attack petered out by 0530. Their artillery fire continued
hitting the American lines even as the surviving infantry and armor pulled
0 back into Bullingen. It had been a near run thing to say the least. By the
end of the attack, only 17 rounds of bazooka ammunition were left in all of
2d Bn, and the bazooka teams were reduced to scrounging odd rocket rounds from
the crews of the AT Co's 57mm guns. 42 As mentioned earlier, the German
0 artillery had cut wire communications with Regiment early in the morning, and
the 2d Bn had lost radio contact as well during the fighting. The MLR was in
a shambles, desperately in need of repair, and LtCol Daniel was urgently
calling for more mines to help block the German advance routes. He only had
* the two platoons from C Co for a battalion reserve. Another attack might
cause the whole US defense around Dom Bitgenbach to collapse.
The 12th SS-PzD had suffered another bloody nose as well. At least four
and possibly as many as twelve tanks and panzerjigers had been destroyed or
damaged in the morning's attack, and the panzergrenadier battalions had
4226th tnf Ret AR, Oec 44; 26th Inf Regt Unit Jnt, Dec 44
0
52
0
suffered heavy casualties. 4 3 As the remnants of the attacking force withdrew
into BOllingen, SS-Col Kraas immediately regrouped them and sent them out
again, hoping the Americans would crack before his men did. This time, the
attack from BOllingen would be supported by a simultaneous attack from
Morschheck.
0P
43Accounts of the attack and the tosses an both sides were found in:
Meyer, Kriegsgeschichte der 12,
SS-Penzerdivision !,itruelp. 440; Captured German documnent quoted in US Army ETO Cbt lnto- 1st Inf
Div; 1st ID G-3 Opns Rpt, Doc 44; 26th tnf Regt AAR. Dec 44; Letter, Daniet to Rivette, 19 Oct 1948;
Mc~onstd, A Timeq For Trumpets pp. 21-22; Rivett*, Ogrs of the 2/26th at Dom Btgenbach, pp. 14-15; Paltud,
The Oatte of the Outgo: Then and Now, p. 101; Gendron Certificate, 14 marcm 1986; sind 26th Inf Regt Unit
t ~Jnt, Dec .
53
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.Y (A
ACTIONS 5-8
Name: The Heroism of Cpl. Warner

Place: Dom Butgenbach, Belgium
Time: 0600, 20 December 1944
Very quickly after the withdrawal of his units into BOllingen after the
unsuccessful 0330 attack, SS-Colonel Kraas launched a second attack, sending
a force of ten tanks westward out of Bullingen and eight panzerjagers south
from Morschheck (Figure 10). This time, the two tank destroyers and three AT
guns covering F Co were ready, and as the German tanks crested the small ridge
about 300 yards in front of F Co, advancing in single file, the concentrated
fire from the American pieces knocked out all ten, one by one (Action 8).
Again, the American artillery and small arms fire pinned down the supporting
grenadiers, and the attack on the US 2/26th's left flank accomplished nothing.
At the same time, the panzerjagers of 9th Kompanie44 rolled down the
hill out of Morschheck, fanning out a bit to cover more of the American line.
The platoon of G Co that LtCol Daniel committed earlier was practically
annihilated by the German tank fire, but the heavy American defensive
artillery fire kept the German infantry from overrunning the survivors and
deflected the advance of the panzerj~gers. As the armor approached the MLR,
a shell from somewhere struck the 9th Kompanie commander's Mk V Jagdpanther,
setting it on fire. He managed to turn the tank around and drive it back into
Morschheck, where he commandeered the 11th Kompanie's command vehicle and
returned to the battle.46 During his absence, his panzer force was further
whittled by the American defenses. Artillery fire destroyed or immobilized
three of the panzerj~gers even before they reached the US lines. The
commander of the one of the 57mm AT gun crews, Sgt Stanley Oldenski, saw some
of the panzerjagers trying to break through the MLR to his right (west), and
sent out some members of his gun crew armed with a bazooka to try to secure
" Captured German document quoted in US Army ETO Cbt Int - 1st Inf
Oiv
6
[bid.
4
58
00
w As
* FIGURE 10. 0600 HOURS, 20 DECEMBER 1944
59
that flank. 4 He could also see gun flashes from two more of the German tank
destroyers about 75 yards to his left. With Oldenski acting as loader, his
gunner, Cpl Henry ("Red") Warner, began firing British DS shells at the
Germans. He put four rounds into the first panzerjAger, destroying it (Action
5). Then, he hit another one with one round, stopping it, but he fired three
more rounds into the hulk to make sure it was dead (Action 6). On Warner's
final shot, however, the AT gun's breech block jammed and the gun would not
return to battery. As Warner struggled to fix the weapon, a third panzerjager
appeared out of the mist, approaching straight toward his gun and firing its
bow machine gun. The rest of the crew dove into the nearby foxholes for
cover, but Warner continued wrestling with the jammed gun. Instead of firing
his main gun at the American weapon, the German vehicle commander apparently
decided to just run over it. He stood up and poked his head out of the hatch
to direct the vehicle's movement. When the panzer was about 10 yards away
from the gun, Warner gave up trying to fix it, pulled his .45 caliber pistol
and fired at the tank commander. Then he dove into the slit trench dug between
the gun trails. As Warner heard the tank gun its engine and move toward him,
he expected to be crushed by it. When it was scant feet from the AT gun,
however, the panzerjAger stopped, went into reverse, and backed away at full
speed. Warner, incredulous, peeked out from his trench and saw the German
tank commander slumped half out of the hatch, apparently killed by one of his
pistol shots 4 7 (Action 7).
Soon the Germans were again in retreat, and thanks to the voluminous
American artillery fire of four FA Bns, no German infantry had been able to
penetrate the MLR. By 0800 the attack was over, and although the Germans
would launch smaller infantry attacks every four or five hours until
nightfall, these were easily repulsed. For the rest of the day the front-line
troops continued to improve their defensive positions and lay protective
minefields. LtCol Daniel also strengthened E Co's line by attaching to it one
These men later claimed to have knocked out one German panzer with their bazooka, but that claim was
never verified.
"4?Detaitls of Warner's action are repeated without variation in several sources. See Footnote 41 at
the
end of this section.
60
of the C Co rifle platoons. 48
Around 1300 on the 20th, Regiment pulled the 3d AT Platoon of the

Regimental AT Co out of the line in 3d Bn's sector and sent it, with its three
57mm AT guns, to replace the gun losses suffered by 2d Bn in the morning's
attack. 4 9 This made a total of eight AT guns in the battalion's MLR. The
3d Plt dug in its guns in the soft earth behind the hedgerow of poplar trees
running to the west. They fully expected another German tank attack, knowing
how important the highway behind them was to the German commanders. They also
knew that the gunshields on their guns, %-inch thick steel, would stop bullets
but were useless against tank rounds.
In Bifllingen and Morschheck, the Germans were apprehensively counting

their losses. When the unit reassembled later in the day, the 560th Hvy PzJg
Bn found that it had only three battleworthy Jagdpanthers and 10 Jagdpanzer
IV/48s left. These were consolidated into a single company for the attack
scheduled for 21 December, and the vehicles were sent to BUllingen for
repairs, refueling, and replenishment of ammunition. Once there, however, the
American shelling of the town was so heavy that the vehicles had to pull back
50
another two kilometers, to the hamlet of Tiefenbach.
"1lst ID G-3 Opin Rpt, Dec 44.
"4Certificate of Irwin Schwartz, 31 Mar 1986.
soRlvette, g0_o of the 2/26th inf at Domr

lotanbach, pp. 15-17; captured German document quoted inUS
Army ETO Cbt Int - 1st tnf Div. Other sources for this action incLude: 26th inf Regt Unit JnL, Dec 44;
Rivette, "Not Corner at Dom BUtgenbach;" Cole, The Ardenne., pp. 130-131; 1st I1 G-3 Oprns Rpt, 0ec 44;
Gendron, Ocrns of the 2/ th ntfin the Ardent , p. 23; Rivette Certificate, 1 Dec 1986; Information from
Unit Citation Ooctentition, gathered by Rivette. p. 5; and Macoonatd, A Time For Trumcets, p. 404-405.
61
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ACTIONS 9-13
Name: High Water Mark

Location: South of Dom B~tgenbach, Belgium
Time: 0630 to 1600 Hours, 21 December 1944
Time was running out for 12th SS-PzD (Figure 11). American forces had
closed in from behind and surrounded KG Peiper thirty kilometers to the west,
and American counterattacks were cutting his armored battlegroup to pieces.
St. Vith to the south was still being held by a US armored division. After
almost a week of heavy fighting, none of the roads assigned to carry
"Hitlerjugend" to the Meuse had been opened. Worse yet, the Americans grew
stronger daily as they mobilized more reserves, while each day more broken
panzers littered the hillsides around Dom BUtgenbach.
Accordingly, SS-Col Kraas prepared for an all-out attack with all three
of his available grenadier battalions, to be supported by every operational
tank and tank destroyer in his division. He planned to attack with two
battalions abreast out of the Butgenbacher Heck, the 3/25 SS on the left
supported by the remaining panzers and panzerjAgers of 12th SS-PzRegt, and the
2/26 SS on the right, reinforced by the panzerjagers of the 12th SS-PzJg Bn.
The 3/26 SS would be kept in reserve in the forest, to be used to exploit a
breakthrough by attacking in conjunction with the armor of the 12th SS-PzRegt
to seize BUtgenbach. The axis of the attack was to be as follows: Morschheck-
-northeast edge of the Butgenbacher Heck--west edge of Dom Bitgenbach--the
trail to Hill 575 (Ikm west of the gasthaus known as "Zum GrUnen JAger")--the
path from Hill 575 to Bitgenbach-west edge of Blitgenbach. Once the town was
occupied, blocking forces would push across the railroad embankment north of
town to stop any American counterattack from the north. Supporting the attack
were all four battalions of the division's organic artillery: Ist Bn (105mm)
at Bullingen, 2d Bn (105mm) and 4th Bn (nebelwerfer) in Hinningen, and 3d Bn
(150mm) south of Honsfeld. In addition, II SS-PzK loaned an entire volks-
artillerie korps (VAK) to the division to support this attack, but its guns
weren't in a position to fire until the 22nd because of road delays. The
74
0
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Coo.
CD co
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FIUE1. 03 O10 OR,2 EEBR14

-75
51
planned starting time for the attack was 0340 hours on 21 December.
2/26th SS-PzGren Regt set out from HOnningen to its assembly area in the
Riechels-Busch at 2300 hours on 20 December. The sound of its movement was
masked by a steady artillery barrage of the American positions around the
Domane. 5 2 Most of the other units scheduled to attack reached their assembly
areas on time, and at 0300 the four artillery battalions began a massive
bombardment of the American positions using all the guns, mortars, and rocket
launchers at their disposal. This barrage was by far the worst the defenders
at Dom BUtgenbach had experienced in the whole war, and its effects werz
telling. T'he front line troops suffered thirty to fifty percent casualties,
most of whom were still in their foxholes when the German attack began. Many
weapons were destroyed by direct hits. All wire communications between units
were cut, and even some of the radios, which so far had been used successfully
for backup communications, were damaged by concussion. The shelling disabled
the two M-4s north and northwest of the manor house (part of the battalion's
mobile reserve) as well as the M-10 tank destroyer near the east barn of the
manor. Both the east and west barns were set on fire. The west barn soon
burned down to its stone foundation, forcing the H Co CP there to move into
the east barn with the E Co CP. The nebelwerfer salvos were particularly
devastating: 96 rockets landing in one earth-wrenching blast. 53 After three
hours of this punishment, all that was left of the American MLR were isolated
groups of infantry and AT guns separated by wide undefended gaps. 5'
In the manor house, LtCol Daniel knew from the explosions and the
sporadic incoming reports that his battalion was being shredded. As yet,
however, no German tanks or infantry had appeared, so he had no targets for
his artillery. Instead, in addition to pressing for more counterbattery fire
in hopes of lessening the German barrage, he called down concentrations on
"5Meyer, Kriegsaeschichte der 12. SS-Penzerdivisfon, p. 443.
"52Ibid.
SRivette, Oons of the 2/26th Inf at Dom Butgenbach, p. 18
"5Gendron, Oans of the 2126th Inf in the Ardlenn , p. 27
76
likely German assembly areas in Bllingen and in the Botgenbacher Heck. He
recalled later that between four and twelve battalions of artillery fired in
support of his battalion that day; 55 actually there were at least 10
battalions involved, including battalions from the 2d and 99th Divisions that
were tied into the Ist Division's fire control center. Patrols later found
about 200 dead Germans in the woods in front of E Co, testimony to the
disruption this must have caused the German attack.
The American artillery was not the only problem the German attack faced
that morning. By 0330, ten minutes before the scheduled attack time, all the
attacking units were in their designated assembly areas except 2/26 SS, which
had set out from Hinningen four and a half hours earlier. The battalion staff
tried urgently to establish radio contact with any of the companies, and when
that failed the battalion adjutant and ordnance officer set out in a
KUbelwagen to find them. Meanwhile SS-Col Kraas, in his division CP in
Morschheck, ordered the attack delayed until 0430 so the missing battalion
could be found. The artillery barrage against the Americans slackened but did
not stop completely.se
The "Hitlerjugend" Division had still not located its missing battalion
by 0430. Now SS-Col Kraas was worried that the attack might not get started
until dawn, at which point his troops would have to undergo flanking fire from
the American positions at the Domine while trying to bypass that position.
Therefore, he altered the attack plan, and ordered that after all units had
assembled, they would converge on Dom BUtgenbach from east and west, and
advance to Batgenbach only after the estate had been secured.
At 0530, the 6th Kompanie of 2/26 SS was finally located. The battalion
had assembled about a kilometer west of its assigned area. It was quickly
ushered to its proper position and acquainted with the new attack plan. The
renewed German artillery bombardment reached a crescendo while the SS troops
moved out of the forest around Morschheck at 0625, almost three hours behind
SSLetter, Dariet to Rivette, 19 Oct 1948
58Meyer, cc cit.
77
schedule. 5 7
When the German artillery ceased its barrage, an eerie silence descended
over the battlefield. The American AT gun crews, who had been huddling in
their trenches for hours listening to shell fragments clang off their
gunshields, crawled shakily out of their holes, relieved to find their guns
still intact. At the far western end of the American line, S/Sgt Noah
Collier, commander of one of the 57s from 3d Plt, AT Co, told his crew, "Load
Sabot. Hold your fire until you can get a flank shot at about twenty
feet." 58 Soon, the men heard the clanking of tank treads and shouts in
German.
Afcer leaving Morschheck, the panzers and half-tracks of "Hitlerjugend"

had no room to spread out and deploy in proper attack formation until they had
* passed the northeastern corner of the BUtgenbacher Heck, so for a brief
interval they had to travel in a direction almost parallel to the American
front line. At first they received no fire of any kind from the treellne
where they knew the American positions to be, and they suspected that after
the previous day's attack, the Americans had little or no anti-tank defense
left. To relieve the oppressive silence and possibly to suppress any
Americans still left, the tank crews fired a few machine gun bursts into the
treeline, 150m to their right. They could barely see that far in the fog and
darkness. The lead Panther of the attack column, commanded by SS-SubLt
Schnittenhelm, had just reached the protruding square patch of the
Btgenbacher Heck when one of the US 57mm AT guns fired, striking the Panther
in the right flank and apparently detonating its ammunition. The tank was
* flung into the air by the force of the explosion and a huge mushroom cloud of
oily black smoke enveloped the tank. Two of the crew clambered out of the
wreck, but SS-SubLt Schnittenhelm was not one of them. Capt Hils of the 560th
Hvy PzJg Bn, following behind in his Jagdpanther, was now in command, and over
his tank'.; radio he ordered his forces to turn toward the US line and prepare
to attack. He examined his map once again to orient himself, and then fired
S7Meyer, 00 cit.
0 SeSchwartz Certificate, 31 Mar 1986
78
a flare towards the manor house to indicate the final attack direction. The
men in the other panzers and panzerjigers awaited the signal to advance,
"Marsch! Marsch!" but when no such signal was given after a few moments they
turned back to see Hils' Jagdpanther on fire, his crew abandoning the vehicle.
Hils himself was nowhere to be seen. Unnerved by the loss of two commanders
in such a short space of time, the Germans advanced raggedly, and as soon as
the panzers and half-tracks full of infantry came in full view of the MLR, a
terrific defensive artillery barrage began plunging into the formation,
plowing up the hillside aud devastating those grenadiers on foot. 5 9
Despite the American bombardment, the SS grenadiers charged the American

line, yelling and firing their weapons.60 Behind the treeline, Sgt Collier
picked up a BAR left by two wounded infantrymen near his gun and began
spraying the onrushing Germans. Another member of his gun crew, PFC Donald
Rose, fired his M-1 carbine into the attackers as well. As they rushed from
the woods, the Germans were in a line almost perpendicular to the American
MLR, so Rose and Collier were in an excellent position to fire into the
attackers' flank. So intent were they on holding back the grenadiers that
they almost didn't notice the Jagdpanther which loomed out of the fog to the
left of their AT gun. Rose quickly dropped his carbine to assist the gunner,
Cpl Irwin Schwartz, in taking out the behemoth. Schwartz fired the already
loaded sabot round, which struck the panzerjager's left front drive sprocket.
This caused the left track to jam and the vehicle's forward motion made it
slue around sideways. Rose loaded another Sabot round and Schwartz fired
again into the Jagdpanther's exposed right flank. A tongue of yellow flame
shot out of the vehicle and it ground to a halt, destroyed (Action 9). The
nearby grenadiers were now so close, despite Collier's automatic fire, that
Rose and Schwartz picked up their carbines and added their fire to his. After
a few minutes, they saw a Mk IV panzer driving along the woodline to their
*Meyer, Kricsgeschichte der 12. SS-Penzerdvyision, p. 444

The chronotogy of this attack from the American point of view is very welt
documented in the following
sources: Letter, Daniel to Rivette, 19 Oct 1948; Gendron, Oons of the 2/26th Inf in the Ardennes, pp. 27-29;
Rivette, Ools of the 2/26th lnf at Dom 80taeenbsch, pp. 18-24; US Army ETC Cbt Int - 1st ID; 26th Inf Regt
AAR, Dec 44; 26th Inf Regt Unit Jnt, Dec 44; G*edrfo Certificate, 14 Mar 1986; Rivette Certificate, 1 Dec
1986; Schwartz Certificate, 31 Mar 1986; 1st 10 G-3 Opns Rpt, Dec 44; PattLud, The Battle of the Bulge: Then
and Mow, pp. 101-103; Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 131-132; and MacDonald, A Time For Trumpets, pp. 404-405.
79
front. They reloaded and fired the 57 three times in rapid succession, and
the panzer stopped with smoke pouring from it (Action 10).
Once again taking up their carbines, Rose and Schwartz moved about 10
feet down the line to support Sgt Collier and his BAR. As they did so, one
of the grenadiers fired a panzerfaust whose rocket struck their gun and
knocked it off its pintle. With no gun to man, they remained on the MLR for
over an hour, firing and throwing hand grenades, until they ran out of rifle
ammunition. During that time, Sgt Collier dashed out in front of the MLR to
help a wounded GI even though he himself was wounded in the leg. He
disappeared into the fog and was never heard from again.
About 150 meters to the east, another 3d AT Platoon gun crew was also
being hard pressed. As the German armor rolled down the hill from the forest,
the gun squad leader, Sgt Kolar, rousted his men from their foxholes and
readied their gun for action. Two panzers appeared together out of the fog,
heading straight for their gun. Kolar fired at the nearest of the two. His
shell hit (presumably the front armor) and penetrated, and the crew reloaded
and fired again to make sure of killing the tank (Action 11). Just as this
second shot struck the panzer a burst of machine gun fire from the other tank
hit the AT gun as it was returning to battery and disabled it. His crew now
bereft of anti-tank protection, Kolar snatched up a bazooka and, with one of
his crewmen, crawled out into the fog to hunt down the other panzer. Both men
were wounded and captured by the Germans.
The third gun of 3d Plt, AT Co, was another 200 meters or so to the east
of Kolar's gun, at the intersection of the long east-west hedgerow and a
* north-south trail leading directly to the Domine. This gun, commanded by
Joseph Harris, pointed southwest rather than south in order to cover the whole
western part of E Co's line and fire into the flank of any tanks assaulting
it from the BOtgenbacher Heck. Harris, a corporal, was one of only three men
* of the gun's crew not killed or wounded by the terrible German artillery
barrage that morning. No sooner did the shelling stop than Harris, climbing
out of his foxhole, dimly saw a tank through the fog to his right, about
halfway between his gun and Kolar's. While he and his two remaining crew
80
members were loading their AT gun, the tank fired, lobbing a huge HE shell
down the hill towards the manor house. As the gun's muzzle blast briefly
parted the haze, Harris could see that the vehicle was not really a tank at
all, but a self-propelled 150mm infantry howitzer on an old Mk II panzer
chassis, known as the Sd Kfz 138, or sIG 33.6' This vehicle's armor was very
thin, only 25mm thick at best. 6 2 Harris fired the AT gun four times, enough
to set the sIG on fire6 3 (Action 12). While so engaged, however, the crew
failed to notice a Mk IV tank slowly moving up to their left. The panzer
fired an AP round which detonated against the gunshield and sent a stream of
molten metal into the AT gun's barrel just above the breech block. The force
of the impact also blew the gun off its pintle. Stunned by the explosion,
Harris and his two men were overwhelmed and captured by the advancing SS
grenadiers a few minutes later.
This incident did not go unnoticed by Cpl Red Warner, who had knocked
out two panzers and driven a third one off with his pistol the previous day.
His gun was still guarding the north-south trail paralleling the main
Morschheck-Dom BItgenbach road, about 50m east of Harris' gun. Since his
assistant gunner (and apparently also Sgt Oldenski) had already been wounded,
Warner loaded the AT gun himself and fired at the panzer that destroyed
Harris' gun. His shell struck the Mk IV just in front of its right rear idler
wheel and smoke began to pour from the rear of the tank (Action 13). The tank
was immobilized but it still had power. 6 4 As Warner reached for another
shell, the tank traversed its turret around and fired a burst from its coaxial
machine gun just as Warner was ramming his second shell into the breech. He
was hit and died moments later, still trying to close his gun's breech. For
According to RH 10/321, the gtiederu'g of the 12th SS-PzD, there were six of these vehicles attached
to 3d 9n, 26th SS-PzGren Regt on 15 Decembter, but by the time of this attack on 21 Decemter, there were only
four left.
2
4 Noffschmidt and Tantum, German Tank and Anti-Tank of World War Ii, p.
162
The AT Company commander, Captain Rivette, examined these hits two days later and found all four to
be within a two-foot circle.
"MIt is assutne
the tank still had power despite the engine compartment hit, because the turret rotated
in order to fire at Warner. While the crew could have used the hand crank to rotate the turret, this would
have been much slower than the power traverse and would probably have given Warner time to reload and fire
the AT gun a second time.
81
his action in the defense of Dom BOtgenbach, Warner was posthumously awarded
the Congressional Medal of Honor.
Having destroyed or neutralized all the AT guns west of the Morschheck

road, the surviving German panzers proceeded to drive up and down the MLR,
crushing automatic weapons emplacements and their crews and machine gunning
the US soldiers. At one point a panzer drove through a gap in the 500-yard-
long hedgerow. The tank commander climbed out of his turret hatch and dropped
to the ground, forcing an American soldier out of his foxhole and into the
tank at gunpoint. Some of the GIs still manning their foxholes in the eastern
portion of E Co's line heard pistol shots, and they assumed that the SS were
methodically shooting the American wounded and prisoners (rumors of the
massacre of American prisoners at Malmedy by KG Peiper had already filtered
down to the men at Dom BUtgenbach).eB
As soon as they crossed to the north side of the treeline, the attacking
panzers were taken under fire by the Sherman tank stationed at the southeast
corner of the barnyard and by the two M-4s on the slope of Hill 598 north of
the manor house. Around 0800, eight Mk IV panzers from 5th Kompanie, 1/12th
SS-Pz Regt 6 e made a dash for the manor house, but one was destroyed and
another one damaged by the two Shermans around the CP. Those Shermans in turn
were destroyed by the panzers' return fire. Three of the German tanks veered
northeast and wound up in 3d Bn's sector, where they were eventually destroyed
by that unit's AT guns and bazooka teams. The remaining three panzers moved
onto the grounds of the estate, hiding behind the barns to escape further
anti-tank fire from Hill 598. Running right behind them were five or six SS-
panzergrenadiers, the only German infantry to make it through the American MLR
throughout the whole siege. They sought cover in an old hospital tent that
had been set up to one side of the manor house but abandoned a few days before
when the fighting started. Four senior NCOs of the CP staff, staff officers
and radiomen, formed a small strike force and went outside and eliminated the
"'US Army ETO Cbt Int - 1st mnf Div
"Meyer, Krieasaes9hihte der 12. SS-Ponzerdlyvsion, p. 444-445
82
0
grenadiers after a brief firefight. 6"
Inside the manor house, LtCol Daniel monitored the course of the battle
with growing concern. He kept up a steady stream of calls into the regimental
CP for more artillery fire, and this unbroken ring of exploding steel in front
of the MLR was what prevented the panzergrenadiers from passing through the
former American positions. The 300 yard gap between the edge of the Butgen-
bacher Heck and the Morschheck road was wide open, and German tanks were
roaming freely over that area. Daniel knew that if the German infantry were
allowed to exploit this gap, all of the 2d and 3d Battalions could be cut off
and destroyed. He was determined not to let that happen.
The three MK IVs near the manor house had maneuvered so that they were
still covered by the south barn, but they could fire their 75mm guns directly
into the manor house from only 75 yards away. This they did, trying to
penetrate the building and force the command staff there to surrender, but the
four-foot thick walls of the old house withstood even this direct pounding.
Nevertheless, as a precaution, LtCol Daniel ordered all papers in the CP to
be burned. 68
The two platoons of C Co that he had retained as a reserve were still

available, stationed around the crossroads just east of the manor house, but
Daniel couldn't move them to reinforce the E Co positions because of the tanks
roaming around the CP area. By the same token, however, the Mk IVs were cut
off from their infantry support and were vulnerable to bazooka teams, and they
couldn't withdraw to their own lines (as they had been ordered by radio to do
by this point) without exposing themselves to anti-tank fire from the Sherman
tanks on Hill 598.69
In the 2d Battalion's eastern sector, F Co was holding off periodic
Ilnformation from Unit Citation Documentation, gatherd by Rivette
Rtvette, OQns of the 2/26th Inf Reot at Dom pOUtenbach, pp. 18-24
Meyer, op cit.
83
attacks from BQllingen while suffering relatively high casualties, and it had
also been badly hit by the morning's bombardment. To their left, K Co of 3d
Bn around the SchwarzenbOchel was attacked by 10 panzers and a battalion or
so of infantry, possibly the 1/26 SS. One of K Co's bazooka teams got one of
the panzers, and the AT guns on the battalion's left flank knocked out four
more, but this did not deter the steady advance of the grenadiers. At one
point they had advanced so far that Germans and Americans were fighting hand-
to-hand in the trenches and the K Co commander, Capt Botts, called down final
protective artillery fires on his own foxhole (he survived). This prevented
the SS from breaking through the line, and although attacks continued
throughout the day, the Germans achieved no penetration of the MLR. 70
Around 0900, the commanding officer of the AT Co, Capt Donald Rivette,
left his company CP in BUtgenbach to check on his gun squads around the
Domane. As he, his jeep driver, and his Reconnaissance Sergeant left
BUtgenbach they could see three or four tanks burning on top of Hill 613 to
their right front. They could not see any infantry along the road all the way
to the Domane, nor could they see any where they knew the MLR to be, about
halfway up Hill 613. Rivette concluded that the infantry must be deep down
in their foxholes. As they rounded a bend in the road the stone manor house
came into view, and Rivette told his driver to slow down while turning into
the estate's driveway. Fortuitously, however, the driver's foot hit the gas
pedal instead of the brake and the jeep lurched forward just as one of the Mk
IV tanks behind the south barn let loose a long machine gun burst at the
vehicle. Rivette was wounded slightly in the back, and the sergeant suffered
a minor cheek wound. The driver quickly wheeled the jeep to the back of the
CP building and the three men dashed inside. There Rivette was informed of
the grave crisis facing the 2/26th, and his 2d Platoon leader told him that
several of the AT gun crews had been wiped out. The CP staff knew that the
number of dead, wounded, and missing was staggeringly high, but they hadn't
yet been able to compile a complete count. 71
' 0Certificate of Watter F. Nechey, conmander of N Co, 3/26th

US Inf Regt, January 1985
71
Rvette Certificate, 1 Dec 1986
84
The situation around Dom Bitgenbach remained relatively static for the
next few hours. That portion of the 2d and 3d Battalions' defenses east of
the Morschheck road held against periodic attacks, while only the massed fire
of the American artillery battalions prevented the German infantry from
exploiting the breakthrough the panzers had made in the west. Every once in
a while, one of the panzers hiding behind the south barn at the estate would
move out just far enough to fire an HE round at the CP, while the battalion
staff inside prayed that the thick stone walls would hold just a little
longer. 72 The panzers also fired at the E and H Co command posts in the east
barn a few times, scoring three direct hits. Every time the panzers exposed
themselves this way to take a shot, The Shermans on the hill began firing
furiously to knock them out, but the Germans were showing too little of
themselves too briefly for the M-4s to get a good shot.
About 1000 a renewed infantry-tank attack struck at the remnants of the

platoon of G Co between E and F Cos, southeast of the Domane. As the German
tanks silhouetted themselves coming over the ridgeline, however, one of the
M-10 tank destroyers from A Co, 634th TO Bn, knocked out seven of them in
rapid succession. The other M-10 guarding the road from Btllingen destroyed
one panzer at 500 yards, while the 57mm AT guns of the AT platoon were
credited with at least one kill, knocking out a Mk IV tank from 50 yards
away.' 3 As usual, the combination of small arms and massive artillery fire
stopped the German infantry cold, but not before they put intense pressure on
the front line troops.
At 1030 LtCol Daniel urgently requested that Regiment send another rifle
company from somewhere to reinforce his position, and specified that they
should be equipped with extra bazookas to handle the large number of German
tanks being used against him.7 4 Regiment responded quickly, and within an
hour E Co of the 18th Inf Regt was on its way to shore up the 2/26th's
'Gendron Certificate, 14 March 1986
"Rivette, "Hot Corner at Dom OUtgenbach"

"7Gendron, O0ns of the 2/26th Inf fn the Ardennes, pp. 29-30
85
positions. By 1200, with no sizable penetration of the American lines after
six hours of heavy combat, the Germans all across the 2d Bn's front began to
pull back. 75 Fighting was still heavy for a while, and the three Mk IVs at
the manor house severely curtailed the Americans' freedom of movement in that
area, but the pressure on the MLR was noticeably reduced. LtCol Daniel
ensured that the curtain of artillery fire south of the manor house was
maintained until he could move infantry there to reoccupy the foxhole line,
and at 1250 he requested a platoon of self-propelled tank destroyers from
Regiment so that he could eliminate the panzers on the manor house grounds and
restore his infantry's freedom of movement. Co E of the 18th arrived
shortly afterwards, but since the panzers still threatened any movement in the
area, Daniel told them to wait behind Hill 598.
At 1305 the platoon of four M-36 TDs from the 613th TO Bn moved to
positions just west of the Domane by covering their advance from BUtgenbach
with strike grenades. Daniel ordered them to position themselves to fire
through the south barn at the panzers. The TO platoon leader placed two TDs
at the east end of the manor house to fire at the east end of the barn, and
placed the other two by the small roadside building to the west, where they
could fire at the west end of the barn. 77 They began firing their 90mm guns
through the flimsy wooden upper walls of the barn, and with each salvo they
worked their shots about 10 feet closer toward the center of the barn. This
pattern of converging shells so unnerved two of the panzer commanders that
they pointed their tanks uphill and raced for the safety of their own lines.
The M-36s picked them both off when they were halfway up the hill. The third
tank, however, held its ground. Daniel called down a barrage of mortar fire
on the south barn to flush it out (he thought about using 155mm artillery,
since this was the only shell big enough to actually damage the tank, but its
proximity to the CP convinced him not to), but even this was to no avail.
Finally, under cover of the thickening fog about 1600 hours, the last panzer
0stG-3 Opns Rpt, Dec 44

to
?0Gendron, Oons of the 2/26th Tnf in the Ardenny, pp. 30-31
"77Ibid.
86
took a parting shot at the CP, then turned and fled up the hill toward
Morschheck. Ironically, its last shot finally penetrated the manor house wall
and wounded nine men inside.' 8
For all intents and purposes, the last German attack on Domane
Butgenbach was over. the 12th SS-Panzer Division tried one last time, on 22
December, to seize Bitgenbach, but that attack primarily involved the 1st Bn
of the 26th Inf Regt. The defense that "stuck out like a sore thumb" at the
manor house had held.
7Rivette, Ojpn$ of the 2126th !of at Dom Butgembs~h, p. 25
87
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APPENDIX A
BIBLIOGRAPHY
SOURCE MATERIAL EXAMINED FOR DON BUTGENBACH ENGAGEMENTS
1. Archival Records from National Records Center, Suitland, ND
301-3 1st Infantry Division G-3 Operations Report, December
1944
301-INF(26)-0.3 26th Infantry Regiment After Action Report, December 1944
301-INF(26)-0.3 26th Infantry Regiment Unit Journal, December 1944
ENBN-254-O.1 254th Engineer Combat Battalion History, 1944
ENBN-254-O.3 254th Engineer Combat Battalion Operations Report,
December 1944
ENBN-254-0.7 254th Engineer Combat Battalion Journal, December 1944
ARBN-745-O.3 745th Tank Battalion After Action Report, December 1944
ARBN-745-O.7 745th Tank Battalion G-1 Journal, December 1944
TDBN-612-O.1 612th TDBN History, December 1944
TDBN-612-0.3 612th TDBN Operations Report, December 1944
TDBN-612-O.7 612th TDBN Unit Journal, December 1944
2. Archival-Records from Infantry School Library, Ft. Benning, GA
Gendron, Thomas J., Maj, "The Operations of the 2nd Battalion, 26th
Infantry (Ist ID) at Dom Butgenbach, BE, 18-21 December 1944"
Rivette, Donald E., Capt, "The Operations of the 2nd Battalion, 26th
Infantry (1st ID) at Dom Butgenbach, Belgium, 16-21 December 1944"
3. ETO Combat Interviews, National Records Center, Suitland, ND
Box 24012, Folder 7 "1st Infantry Division Combat Interviews"
4. Foreign Military Studies, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
MS ETHINT-21 "Sixth Panzer Army, 16 November 1944 - 4 January 1945"
MS ETHINT-15 "Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes Offensive"
MS #8-522 "The 12th SS Panzer Division 'Hitler Jugend' in the
Ardennes Offensive"
MS #A-924 "Commitment of Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes 1944
-1945"
5. Office of the Center for Military History, Washington, D.C.

6. Miscellaneous Documents
Colonel Thomas Gendron, Certificate, 14 March 1986
Major Donald E. Rivette, Certificate, 1 December 1986
Brigadier General J. Gordon Peltier, Certificate, January 1985
Letter from Derrill Daniel to Donald Rivette, 19 October 1948
Colonel Walter F. Nechey, MCo, 3/26th Commander, Certificate, January 1985
Information as part of Unit Citation documentation gathered by Donald
Rivette
S/Sgt Irwin Schwartz, Certificate, 31 March 1986
Colonel Melvin Hulse, Certificate, 27 May 1986
A-1
O
K Co Morning Report, 22 December 1944
Certificate of Casualties signed by Capt. John E. Reynolds, 26th Inf Regt
Personnel Adjutant, 7 March 1945
7. Published Secondary Sources
Cole, Hugh M., US Army in WWII: European Theater of Operations: The
Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, 1956
MacDonald, Charles B., Time for Trumpets, William Morrow & Company, Inc.,
New York, 1985
Meyer, Hubert, Krieasoeschichte der 12.SS-Panzerdivision "Hitlerjuaend'" I,
Munin Verlag GmbH, Osnabruck, 1982
Pallud, Jean-Paul, The Battle of the Bulge: Then and Now, London: Battle
of Britain Prints International Ltd., 1984
Rivette, Donald E., "The Hot Corner at Dom Butgenbach," Infantry Journal,
Vol. LVII, No. 4, October 1945, pg. 19-23
A-2
APPENDIX B
INDEX TO FILES AND REFERENCES ON ENGAGEMENTS

AT DON BUTGENBACH
0
A2D2 FILING SYSTEM FOR ALL RECORDS
FOLDER NUNBER TITLE
1 Cole, Hugh M., The Ardennes: Battle of the

Bu ge, pg._ 128-135, [Pentagon UA 25.U515
V.8 copy 6].
S2 Rivette, Donald E., "The Hot Corner at Dom

Butgenbach," Infantry Journal, Vol. LVII,
No 4, October 1945, pg. 19-23. [Ft.
Benning, GA].
3 "Dom Butgenbach Action, 26th Infantry (ist
Division) 19-22 December 1944", [Historical
Manuscript File, Call Number 2-3.7 AE.P-13,
OCMH].
4 "Attack and Penetration", 16-21 December

1944 Dom Butgenbach, Belgium, [Historical
Manuscript File, Call Number 8-3.1 AT, Reel
213,214, OCMH].
5 Monograph, "The Operations of the 2d
Battalion, 26th Infantry (1st Infantry
Division) at Dom Butgenbach, Belgium, 16-21
December 1944" (Ardennes Campaign -
Personal Experience of an Antitank Company
Commander) Captain Donald E. Rivette,
Infantry, [Academic Department The Infantry
School, Ft. Benning, GA].
Type of operation described: Infantry
Battalion defending hilly terrain against
coordinated tank-infantry attacks
6 Monograph, "The Operations of the 2d

Battalion, 26th Infantry (1st US Infantry
Division) at Dom Butgenbach, Belgium 18-21
December 1944" (Ardennes Campaign -
Personal Experience of a Battalion
Operations Officer) Major Thomas J.
Gendron, [Staff Department The Infantry
School, Ft. Benning, GA].
Type of operation described: Infantry
Battalion, reinforced, in a reverse slope
defense of hilly open terrain against
coordinated infantry-tank attacks
"7 "History of Anti-Tank Company, 12th

Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division,
B-i
July 22, 1944 to March 31, 1945,
(Microfilm, Reel #2177, Item 2329, The
Armor School Library, Ft. Knox, KY].
8 Adair, L.R., CPT, Speer, W. H., CPT, et.
al., "Mortain: Defensive, Deliberate
Defense 30th Infantry Division 9-13 August
1944" Annotated Bibliography, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas 1983.
9 Cole, Hugh, M., The Ardennes: Battle of

the Bulge, pg. 377-382, [Pentagon].
10 Hechler, Ken, Holding the Line The 51st
Engineer Combat Battalion and the Battle of
the Bulge December 1944 - January 1945,
pg. 29-49, [Pentagon D 756.5.A7 H42 1988].
11 Thompson, Jack, War Correspondent, "82nd
Airborne Division, Stories of Sicilian
Invasion," [Microfilm, Reel #2042, Item
2068, The Armor School Library, Ft. Knox,
KY].
12 Mitchell, Ralph M., COL, "The 101st
Airborne Division's Defense of Bastogne,"
[OCMH D 756.5 A7 M58 1986].
13 Martin, Darryl, R., Military History,
"Unexpected Trap for Panzers," pg. 47-53,
December 1989.
14 Rapport, Leonard, and Northwood, Arthur
Jr., Rendezvous With Destiny A History of
the 101st Airborne Division, pg. 622-630,
[Pentagon WX 220 No 101.R22].
15 MacDonald, Charles B., The Last Offensive,
* 36, 37, [Pentagon uA 25 U515 V.9 copy
16 After Action Report, August 1-14 1944, [Ft.

Knox, KY 8823 TD 101 823d TD Bn AAR (AAR
#588 U)].
17 After Action Report, December 17-26 1944,
[Ft. Knox, KY 8823 TD 101 823d TO Bn AAR
(AAR #588 U)].
18 After Action Report, January 14-18 1945,

(Ft. Knox, KY 8823 TO 101 823d TD Bn AAR
* (AAR #588 U)].
B-2
S
19 After Action Re port 607th TO Bn AAR 8
September 1944, [Ft. Knox, KY 8607 TO 101
AAR #575 U 847.6].
20 After Action Report 609th TD Bn AAR January
1945, [Ft. Knox, KY 8609 TO 101 AAR 847.7].
21 After Action Report 610th TO Bn August-

September 1944, October, December 1944,
[Ft. Knox, KY 8610 TO 101].
22 After Action Report 612th TO Bn AAR

December 1944, [Ft. Knox, KY 8612 TO 101
AAR #452 847.9].
23 After Action Report 630th TD Battalion AAR

January 1945, [Ft. Knox, KY 8630 TO 101 AAR
#615 U 847-12].
24 After Action Report 644th TD Battalion
December 1944, [Ft. Knox, KY].
25 After Action Report 7th TD Group 19-31
December 1944, [Ft. Knox, KY].
26 After Action Report 821st TD Bn AAR

November 1944, [Ft. Knox, KY 8821 TD 101
AAR #97 847-56].
27 "The Battle For Aachen," After The Battle,
[Ft. Knox, KY].
28 "Battle of the Bulge," After The Battle,
[Ft. Knox, KY].
29 Yonos, John, "Anzio The Soft Underbelly of

Europe," Part I, AFV, [Ft. Knox, KY].
Europe," Part II, AFV, [Ft. Knox, KY].
Europe," Part III, AFV, [Ft. Knox, KY].
Europe," Part Four, AFV, [Ft. Knox, KY].
Europe," Part Five, AFV, [Ft. Knox, KY].
34 Yonos, John, "Anzio The German Offensive
Failsi" Part Six, AFV, [Ft. Knox, KY].
B-3
35 Yonos, John, "Anzio The 'Lull' Before the
Breakout," Part Seven, AFV, [Ft. Knox, KY].
36 Yonos, John, "Anzio Part Eight:

Breakout!," AFV, [Ft. Knox, KY].
37 Yonos, John, "Anzio Part Nine:
Breakout!," AFV, [Ft. Knox, KY].
38 COL J. H. Green, "Anzio," After The Battle,

[Ft. Knox, KY].
39 CSI Battlebook 4-A, "The Battle of St.

Vith," December 1944, Combat Studies
* Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, [Ft.
Knox, KY].
40 CSI Battlebook 10-B, "The Battle of Schnee

Eifel," September 1944, Combat Studies
Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, [Ft.
* Knox, KY].
41 CSI Battlebook 13-C, "The Battle of

Aachen," October 1944, Combat Studies
Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, [Ft.
Knox, KY].
42 Destruction of German Armored Vehicles With

Appendices 1-5 Inclusive, [Ft. Knox, KY
809A7 Ninth Armored Section, Destruction of
German Tanks 29 May 1945].
* 43 Trials Against Front Armor of German Mark

III Tanks, [Numbered box and folders of
"George B. Jarrett Papers" at Archives,
AMNI, Carlisle Barracks, PA].
44 Fischer, Kurt, Men Against Tanks,
* "Individual Anti-Tank Weapons in the German
Wehrmacht"
45 Young, Robert, W., Capt., Military

Monograph, "Armored Support of Infantry,"
May 1948, [Ft. Knox, KY 41-417 "Armored
* Support of Infantry"].
46 Tank Destroyer Newsletter, Spring 1989,
Newsletter No. 25.
47 US Tank Destroyer Units, WWII, [AMHI,
* Carlisle Barracks, PA Librarian File].
B-4
0
48 Tank Destroyer Combat in Tunisia, January
1944, [Copied at ANHI Archives Box "Tank
Destroyers - History" Andrew Bruce Papers,
Carlisle Barracks, PA].
49 Dornbusch C.E., "Histories of American Army
Units World Wars I and II and Korean
Conflict With Some Earlier Histories,"
Bibliography, (Pentagon UX 104 D71]
50 Gabel, Christopher R., Dr., "Leavenworth
Papers Seek, Strike, and Destroy: US Army
Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II,"
Bibliography, (Pentagon D 793.G33 1985
0 c 3].
51 s30-1.2 30th Infantry Division G-1 Journal
& File, August 1944, (Box 8733, RG 407,
Stack Area 7, Row 35, Compartment 10, Shelf
28 - Suitland).
52 330-2.1 30th Infantry Division G-2 Report,
August 1944, (Box 8739, RG 407, Stack Area
7, Row 35, Compartment 10, Shelf 3 -
Suitland].
53 330-2.2 30th Infantry Division G-2 Journal,

August 1944, (Box 8749, RG 407, Stack Area
7, Row 35, Compartment 10, Shelf 38 -
Suitland].
54 330-INF(120) 30th Infantry Division
"Mortain", August 1944 [Box 8918 and 24237,
Suitland].
There are 2 documents in this folder. They
are the same but filed differently at
Suitland.
* 55 330-INF(119) 119th Infantry Regiment

After/After Action Report, August 1944 [Box
8908, Suitland].
56 330-INF(120) G-3 Supporting Document,
August 1944 (Box 3944, Suitland].
57 394-3 G-3 94th Infantry After Action

Report, January 1945 (Box 13767, Suitland].
58 330-INF(117) Unit Journal 117th Infantry,

August 1944 (Box 8995, Suitland].
B-5
59 330-INF(117) S-3 Journal and File, August
1944 [Box 8906, Suitland].
60 330-INF(117) Resume of Operations 117th
Infantry, August 1944 [Box 8894, Suitland].
61 330-FA(197) 197th Field Artillery Battalion
After Battle Report, August 1944 [Box 8880,
Suitland].
62 330-FA(230) 230th Field Artillery Battalion
"9attle of Mortain", August 1944 [Box 8881,
Suitland].
* 63 Attitude to the Questionnaire Concerning
the Commitment of the "Libstandarte Adolf
Hitler" in Auvust 1944. Draft Translation
[Manuscript #B-358 National Archives,
Washington, D.C.].
* 64 Map of Mortain actions [Manuscript #A921-A1

National Archives, Washington, D.C.].
65 2d SS Panzer Division "Das Reich",

September 1944 (in German) [Manuscript #P-
159 National Archives, Washington, D.C.].
66 Counterattack against AVRANCHES, August
1944 [Manuscript #A-921 National Archives,
Washington, D.C.].
67 Part I Northern France, 25 Jul - 26 Jul
1944. (German translation) [Manuscript #8-
68 Normandy, Cobra and MORTAIN [Manuscript #A-

69 Comments on the Seventh Army Journal August
1944 [Manuscript #A-918 National Archives,
Washington, D.C.].
70 After Action Report 629th TO Bn AAR August
71 823d TO Battalion Unit Journal, August 1944

[Box 23847, Suitland]
72 823d TO Battalion August 1944 [Box 23847,

Suitland].
0
S
73 823d TO Battalion Unit Report, G-2 Periodic

_0 Report, Messages, August 1-8 1944 [Box
23850, Suitland].
74 330-3 G-3 AAR August 1944 [Box 8788,
Suitland].
75 Hewitt, Robert L., Work Horse of the
0 Western Front - The Story of the 30th
Infantry Division [Suitland].
76 330 CAV(0.3) AAR 30th Recon Tp (Mecz) 15

June - 31 December 1944 (August only) [Box
8858, Suitland].
77 330-FA(118) 118th Field Artillery Bn After
Action Report, August 1944 [Box 8869,
Suitland].
78 330-FA(113) 113th Field Artillery Bn After
Action Report, June-December 1944 (August
only) [Box 8868, Suitland].
79 330-3.2 G-3 Journal 30th Iniantry Division,

5-7 August 1944 [Box 8796, Suitland].
80 330-3.2 30th Infantry Division G-4 Report,
8-9 August 1944 [Suitland].
81 30th Infantry Division - Mortain
Counterattack, 6-12 August 1944, Combat
Interviews [Box 24038, Suitland - RG 407,
0 Row 40, Compartment 44, Shelf 5].
There are 36 documents in this folder.
82 Ludden, Monroe, Guarding the Flanks of the

LeMans Salient XX Corps, 1-14 August 1944
0 [Historical Manuscript File, Call N',mber 8-
3.1 AP, Box 384 OCMH].
83 The Campaign in Northern France, Volume IV,
Chapter 4, The German Counterattack Against
Avranches (German Translation), August 1944
0 [Manuscript #B-725, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.].
84 5th Tank Destroyer Group History , 1
September 1942 to 9 May 1945 [Carlisle
Barracks, PA].
B-7
0
85 McGrann, Roy T., Captain, The 610th Tank
Destroyer Battalion, 11-25 September 1944,
Dieulouard Bridgehead [USMHI, Carlisle, PA]
86 A History of the 823rd Tank Destroyer
Battalion, "Battle of Mortain," Published
for the Officers and Men of the 823rd TDBN,
1951 [Mike's Files]
87 German 7th Army War Diary, Daily Reports,
Volume V, 6-12 August 1944 [Box 24237,
Suitland, MD].
Volume Il1, 7-12 August 1944 [Box 24237,
Suitland, MO].
89 "Engineer Hero Destroys Nazi Panzer Tanks,"
The Bayonet, Fort Benning, Georgia,
September 2, 1960, pg. 16.
90 Army Group "B" (7th Army) War Diary - Phone
Calls and Conversations, 7-12 August 1944,
Document IV [Box 24237, Suitland].
Volume IV, 7-12 August 1944 [Box 24237,
Suitland].
92 Buisson, Gilles, Mortain 44: Objectif
Avranches [LC D762.M56 885 1984].
93 28th Infantry Division Combat Interviews,
"German Winter Offensive, 16-24 December
1944," Co K, 110th Infantry Regiment [Box
24033, Folder 78, Suitland].
"German Winter Offensive, December 1944,"
Unit Journal [Box 24033, Folder 78,
Suitland].

1944," 3/112th Infantry Regiment [Box
24033, Folder 78, Suitland].

1944," 112th Infantry Regiment [Box 24033,
Folder 78, Suitland].
B-8
1944" [Box 24033, Folder 78, Suitland].
98 328-INF(110)-0.I History 110th Infantry
Regiment, 17 February 1941 -25 October
1945, The Ardennes Breakthrough, 16
December 1944 - 15 January 1945 [Box 8596,
Entry 927, Suitland].
99 328-2.2 30549 28th Infantry Division G-2
Journal December 1944 [RG No. 407, Stack
Area 7, Row 35, Compartment 4, Shelf 5-6,
Suitland].
100 Bennett, Ralph, Ultra in the West: The
Normandy Campaign 1944-45, Charles
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1979 [Ft.
Belvoir Library MIL 940.5421 BEN].
101 Ritgen, Helmut, Die Geschichte der Panzer-
Lehr-Division im Westen 1944-1945,
Motorbuch Verlag Stuttgart, 1979.
[Personal Collection]. Includes
translation.
102 Strauss, F.J. et al., Friedens- und
Krieaserlebnisse einer Generation. Ein
KaDitel Weltqeschichte aus der Sicht der
Panzeriager-Abteilunq 38 (SF in der
ehemaliqen 2.(Wiener) Panzerdivision
(Schweinfurt: 1960). [Dr. Volz, West
Germany]. Includes translation.
103 Lehmann, Rudolf, and Tiemann, Ralf, Die
Leibstandarte, Band IV/1 (Osnabruck: Munin
Verlag. 1986). [Dr. Volz, West Germany].
Includes translation.
104 Weidinger, Otto, Division Das Reich. Der
Weq der 2.SS-Panzer-Division "Das Reich".
Die Geschichte der Stammdivision der
Waffen-SS, Band V: ,943-4!45 (Osnabruck:
Munin-Verlag. 1982). [Dr. Volz, West
Germany]. Includes translation.
105 Weidinger Otto, ed., Kameraden bis zum
Ende. Der Weg der SS-Panzerarenadier-
Reqiments 4 "OF" 1939-1945. Die Geschichte
einer deutsch-osterreich-ischen
Kamofgemeinschaft (Gottingen: Plesse-
B-9
I
Verlag. 1962). [Dr. Volz, West Germany].
106 Stober, H.-J.E., Die Eiserne Faust.
Bildband und Chronik der 17. SS-
Panzerqrenadier-Division "Gotz von
Berlichinqen" (Neckargemund: Kurt
Vowinckel Verlag. 1966). [Dr. Volz, West
Germany]. includes translation.
107 Stober, Hans, Die Sturmflut und das Ende.

Die Geschichte der 17. SS-
Panzergrenadierdivision "Gotz von
Berlichingen", Band I: Die Invasion
(Osnabruck: Munin Verlag. 1976). [Dr.
Volz, West Germany]. Includes translation.
108 Buisson, Gilles, Mortain dans la Bataille
de Normandie (Paris: Presses de la Cite.
1971). [Dr. Volz, West Germany]. Includes
translation.
109 Kissel, Hans, Gefechte in Russland 1941-
1944 (Frankfurt am Main: E.S. Mittler &
Sohn. 1956). [Dr. Volz, West Germany].
110 Tank and Tank Destroyer Conference, Army
War College, 26 January 1945 Subj: US
Tank and Anti-tank Weapons Program [Army
Field Forces Development and Testing System
470.8/7, National Archives, Washington,
D.C.].
111 Tank Destroyer Battalions - Miscellaneous
Information on Unit, Activation Origin,
Combat Introduction, etc.
112 Stanton, Shelby, US Army Order of Battle in
World War II Part IV: Tank Destroyers
[Suitland, MD1.
113 Blumenson, Martin, United States in World
War II. The European Theater of Operation.
Breakout and Pursuit, "The Mortain
Counterattack" [Pentagon Library UA 25.U515
V.5].
114 Howe, George F., The Battle History of the

1st Armored Division "Old Ironsides",
Washington, Combat Forces Press [Pentagon
UX 222 no. 1 H85].
B-10
115 702nd Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit History
for Year 1944 [TDBN 702-0.1 Box 23714
Suitland, MD].
116 702nd Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit History
for Year 1945 [TDBN 702-0.1 Box 23714
Suitland, MD].
117 Enemy Material Captured and Destroyed, June
- December 1944 [TDBN 702-2.14 Box 23714
Suitland, MD].
118 609th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action
Report, December 1944 [TDBN 609-0.3 Box
23562 Suitland, MD].
119 Blumenson, Martin, "The Mortain
Counterattack: Future portent?" Army 8
(July 1958): 30-38.
120 Staff Group 4B, CGSOC Class of 1986-87,
"Operation Cobra and the Mortain
Counterattack," Military Review, July 1988:
pg. 58-65.
121 Letter, Sid Eichen, L'Abbaye Blanche,
August 1944.
122 Miscellaneous aocuments from Thomas
Springfield, L'Abbaye Blanche, August 1944.
123 Committee 24, Employment of Four Tank
Destroyer Battalions in the ETO. (Fort
Knox, May 1950).
124 Volz Originals - Battle of Mortain
(Originals of Folders 101 to 109).
125 Letter from Thomas Springfield to Mike
Baily, February 17,1990.
There are 5 documents in this folder.
126 Byrnes, Laurence, History of the 94th

Infantry Division in World War II,
Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press,
pg. 116-139 [OCMH Library].
127 From Spearhead in the West, Foreword on 3rd

Armored Division and pg. 142, 143.
B-11
128 "Historical Survey of Direct Fire Weapons
in World War II and the Korean War: A
Compendium in Support of the Ardfire Study
Group" (Historical Manuscript File, Call
Number 4-15.1 AA 10 v. 1, OCMH].
129 "Ardennes Campaign Statistics, 16 December
1944 - 19 January 1945" [Historical
Manuscript File, Call Number 2-3.7 AE.P-15,
OCMH].
130 "SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle and Trier, XX Corps,

14 January - 12 March 1945" [Historical
Manuscript File, Call Number 8-3.1 AU,
OCMH].
131 "Tank Fight of Rocherath-Krinkelt (Belgium)
17-19 December 1944" [Historical Manuscript
File, Call Number 2-3.7 AE.P-12, OCMHJ.
* 132 "The Siege of Bastogne" [Historical

Manuscript File, Call Number 8-3.1 AD,
OCMH].
133 "The Capture of Metz" [Historical
Manuscript File, Call Number 8-3.1 AS,
* OCMHJ.
134 "Siegfried Line" [Historical Manuscript
File, Call Number 8-3.1 AL v.2 Pt. 2 cy 1,
OCMH].
* 135 Breaching the Siegfried Line [Historical

Manuscript File, Call Number 8-3.1 AW,
OCMH].
136 german Tank Strengths and Loss Statistics

[GEOG M Germany 470.8 Tanks, OCMH].
137 Manuscript list from OCMH of possible use

to the study.
138 Cole, Hugh M., The Lorraine CampaiQn, pg.

410-415 (Pentagon Library].
139 MacDonald, Charles, S.eafried Line

Campaign, pg. 512-514 [Pentagon Libraryj.

Bulge, pg. 105, 106 [Pentagon Library].
B-12
Bulge, pg. 98-104 [Pentagon Library].
142 Cole, Hugh M The Ardennes: Battle of the
Bulge, pg. 1-115 [Pentagon Library].
143 Headquarters 30th Infantry Division G-2
Periodic Report [Box 23849, Suitland].
144 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit

Journal, March 1944 IBox 23545, Suitland].
145 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit
Journal, March and April 1945 [Box 23548,
Suitland].
146 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion History, 3
February 1941 - 2 November 1945 [Box 23768,
Suitland].
147 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit
Journal, March 1944 [Box 23771, Suitland].
148 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion History
Draft, 1943 [Box 23879, Suitland].
149 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion Operation
Report, 15 March - 11 April 1943 [Box
23880, Suitland].
Journal, July 1944 [Box 23881, Suitland].

Report, July, November 1944 [Box 23741,
Suitland].
152 Tapes and transcript of interview with L.

Lawson Neel.
153 Tapes and transcript of interview with
Thomas Springfield.
154 Tapes and transcript of interview with
George Greene.
155 Tapes and transcript of POW interview with
George Greene.
156 Tape and transcript of telephone interview
with G. Dean Noble.
B-13
0
157 Tape and transcript of telephone interview
with Thomas Springfield.
158 Transcript of telephone interview with
George Greene. (The tape is in Folder
157.?
159 1st Infantry Division G-3 Operations

Report, Folder 301-3 December 1944 [Box
5763, Suitland].
160 2nd Infantry Division News Items,
Headquarters 2nd ID - 17, 19 December 1944,
Folder 302-0.15 [Box 5977, Suitland].
161 2nd Infantry Division G-3 After Action

Report December 1944 [Box 5986, Suitland].
162 2nd Infantry Division G-3 Journal December
163 1st Infantry Division Combat Interviews

File 7 [Box 24012, Suitland].
164 2nd Infantry Division G-4 After Action

Report December 1944 [Box 6027, Suitland].
165 99th Infantry Division G-3 Journal and
File, 18-22 December 1944 [Box 14143,
Suitland].
166 99th Infantry Division After Action Report

December 1944 [Box 14119, Suitland].
167 Ist Infantry Division - 26th Infantry
Regiment After Action Report December 1944
[Box 5956, Suitland].
168 99th Infantry Division G-3 Journal and File

169 1st Infantry Division - 26th Infantry

Regiment Unit Journal December 1944 [Box
5956, Suitland].
170 2nd Infantry Division G-3 Journal December
171 99th Infantry Division Map Overlays [Box
14160, Suitland].
B-14
172 ETOUSA Battle Experiences, July 1944 -
March 1945 [Box 24148, Suitland].
173 2nd Infantry Division Combat Interviews
"Battle of the Bulge," 17-20 December 1944
"German Breakthrough," 14 December 1944 -
16 January 1945 [Box 24017, Suitland].
177 2nd Infantry Division, 9th Infantry
Regiment Unit Journal, December 1944 [Box
6064, Suitland].
178 2nd Infantry Division, 23d Infantry
Regiment After Action Report, December 1944
179 2nd Infantry Division, 23d Infantry
Regiment Unit Journal, December 1944 [Box
6070, Suitland].
180 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion History,
* December 1944 [Box 23635, Suitland].
Report, December 1944 [Box 23636,
Suitland].
182 99th Infantry Division Combat Interviews
"Ardennes 16-20 December 1944" [Box 24069,
Suitland].
183 Photos of Mark V Tank knocked out and
soldiers manning an Anti-tank gun [RG 332,
ETO/USFET Theater Historian Ardennes
Campaign 1944-1945 Box 3, Suitland].
184 254th Engineer Combat Battalion Journal,
B-15
185 254th Engineer Combat Battalion Operations
Suitland].
186 254th Engineer Combat Battalion History,

December 1944 (Box 18781, Suitland].
187 254th Engineer Combat Battalion After
Action Report, December 1944 [Box 18781,
Suitland].
188 754th Tank Battalion After Action Report,
189 745th Tank Battalion Journal, December 1944
190 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion History 25

June 1942 to May 1945 [Box 23571,
Suitland].
0 191 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion History Year
192 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion Operations
Suitland].
Journal, December 1944 [Box 23573,
Suitland].
194 Information as part of Unit Citation
0 documentation gathered by Donald Rivette.
[Obtained from Lt. Col. Tom Page 1st BN
26th Infantry Ft. Dix, NJ 08640-7010].
195 Letter from Derrill Daniel to Donald
Rivette, 19 October 1948 [Obtained from Lt.
Col. Tom Page].
196 Miscellaneous Certificates of Ist Division,

26th Infantry Regiment [Obtained from Lt.
Col. Tom Page].
197 Meyer, Hubert, Krieqsqeschichte der 12.SS-
Panzerdivision "Hitleriuaend" II, Munin
Verlag GmbH, Osnabruck, 1982. [Library of
Congress]. (Dom Butgenbach)
198 Meyer, Hubert, Krieasaeschichte der 12.SS-
Panzerdivision "Hitleriuaend" II, Munin
B-16
Verlag GmbH, Osnabruck, 1982. [Library of
Congress]. (Krinkelt-Rocherath)
199 "The 12th SS Panzer Division 'Hitler
Jugend' in the Ardennes Offensive," [MS #B-
522, German Archives].
200 "An Interview with Obstgrf 'Sepp' Dietrich
Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes
Offensive," [Ethint 15, German Archives].
201 "An Interview with Genmaj (W-SS) Fritz

Kraemer Sixth Panzer Army (16 November 1944
- 4 January 1945," [Ethint 21, German
Archives].
202 "Commitment of Sixth Panzer Army in the
Ardennes 1944-1945," [MS #A-924, German
Archives].
203 Pallud, Jean-Paul, "The Battle of the
Bulge: Then and Now," 1984, London:
Battle of Britain Prints International Ltd.
204 Operational Research in North West Europe,
The Work of No 2 Operational Research
Section With 21 Army Group, June 1944 -
July 1945.
The following documents come at the end.
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 23, American Combat

Divisions, A Comprehensive Bibliography of Ist Infantry Division Materials, Part
II: 1940-1956, Carlisle Barracks, PA. [Carlisle, PA].
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 16, Volume I, The

Era of World War II, Carlisle Barracks, PA. [Carlisle, PA].
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 16, Volume II, The
War in the Pacific, Carlisle Barracks, PA. [Carlisle, PA].
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 16, Volume III,

World War 11, The Eastern and Balkan Fronts, The Axis Forces in Europe, Carlisle
* Barracks, PA. [Carlisle, PA].
US Army Military History Institute Special Bibliography 16, Volume IV, The
Era of World War II, Mediterranean and Western European Theaters of Operations,
Carlisle Barracks, PA. (Carlisle, PA).
B-17

US Anti-Tank Defense at Dom Butgenbach, Belgium in 1944

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AD-A284 379

ANTI-ARMOR DEFENSE DATA STUDY

DRAFT FINAL REPORT

ANTI-ARMOR DEFENSE DATA STUDY

SEPTEMBER 10, 1990 - -

Charles M. Baily t ELEC.' L_

for ;: - s been Qpproved

2b. DECLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE Unlimited

SAIC 90 - 1306 to be assigned

1710 Goodridge Dr., McLean, VA 22102 8120 Woodmont Ave.

11. TITLE (include Security Classfication)

DTC QUA,,. ' .<..2 3

20 DISTRIBUTIONIAVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CHAPTER TITLE PAGE

1 THE ARDENNES: THE BATTLE FOR THE NORTHERN SHOULDER .......... 2

B INDEX TO FILES ON DOM BUTGENBACH

1 The German Plan and Actual Penetration ..................... 4

1 Dom B~tgenbach Actions ..................................... 28

A complete description of the work performed by SAIC is found in Volume I,

THE GERMAN PLAN

SIXTH PANZER ARMY PLAN

Responsibility for conducting the main attack of the German offensive

-.. ... .. .... . ...*

FIGURE 1. THE GERMAN PLAN AND ACTUAL PENETRATION

In reserve in Belgium, the 1st Infantry Division joined V Corps at 2400 on

THE FIGHTING PRIOR TO DOM BUTGENRACH

December 16, 1944

In its sector, the 394th near Losheimergraben suffered a strong German

Most importantly, the American commanders, now fully recognizing the

December 18, 1944

The hours before dawn at Rocherath-Krinkelt were ominously quiet as the

THE GERMAN FORCES AT DOM BUTGENBACH

'Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 577.

The 25th SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment, which was officially motorized, had

Of course, the intense fighting to capture Rocherath-Krinkelt had already

THE AMERICAN FORCES AT KRINKELT-ROCHERATH AND DOM BUTGENBACH

The 2d Battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment, which was to defend so

"From Bundesarchlv Records RH 10/321 (12th SS-Panzer ODvision). 19 Dec 1944.

THE FIGHTING AT DOM BUTGENBACH

The fighting leading up to the engagement at Dom Butgenbach started on

While the engineers were fighting to block the Ballingen-Butgenbach

The 2d Battalion of the 26th, commanded by LtCol Derrill M. Daniel, drove

0 Rivette Certificate, 1 Dec 1986.

The 2d Bn completed its positions around Dom Butgenbach by 1700 on 17

SUMMARY OF DOM BUTGENBACH FIGHTING

On December 22, fresh German troops, the infantry reserve of 12th SS

2 st I0 G-3 Opns Rpt, Dec 44.

The American casualties were proportionally no less severe. The 26th

'US Ariy ETD Cbt Int - 1st Inf Div.

Table 1 summarizes these actions.

Name: Destruction of "Hitlerjugend's" Probe

Around 1000 hours on 18 December, after a fitful night of rest, the 2d

At 1210, a small SS reconnaissance force consisting of a single eight-

"US Army ETC Cbt Int -Ist Inf Div.

FIGURE 7. 1210 HOURS, 18 DECEMBER 1944

4-- bdW> - - -.- cm~

4-ol tv 0.- eL N-.L I- O

003 L0 C> 4-uf

t 0 L,. 0 S-10 **-><--

Lu S-CO0t fV- - co00.0 4) 00G04-- >

rd 3 4)E (vaa at~ l

Name: The Attack Toward BOtgenbach

* FIGURE 8. 1010 HOURS, 19 DECEMBER 1944

4)~ w > c0)L*)Q