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Against Covenantal Properties

Arguments against the Central Thesis of K. Scott Oliphints

God With Us

By
Robert LaRocca

God with Us is not a general account of divine attributes; Oliphints purposes are more
foundational and basic. The intention of the book is to address theological problems that arise
when Christians confess that an absolute and independent God relates to finite creatures. The
problems Oliphint sets up for himself to solve are complex and numerous, but can be
summarized by these three questions: First, if God is independent from creation, how can
predicates be said of God which necessarily assume some relation with creation? For example,
Oliphint insists that God is not essentially a creator because it was not necessary for God to
create. (16) But if God is indeed a creator, then it would seem that God has properties that are
essential to him (such as knowledge) and others (like creator) which are not essential to him.
While there are some predicates that do not presume any dependence on creation, Scripture
guides us to make certain attributions that hold this very presumption. It is here that Oliphint
discovers tension between the scriptural teaching on Gods aseity, on the one hand, and, on the
other, Gods real interaction with creation. (133) Oliphint has found that most theologians in
answering this question have tended in two directions: either God relinquishes essential aspects
of his independent character (like aseity and simplicity) and is constrained by His creation, or
Gods true relations with creation are deflated of their real historical value and understood as
only metaphorical or improper. (183) In God with Us, Oliphint seeks a middle way.
The second question is if God has real but contingent relations with the created world,
and if not Gods necessary nature, what serves as the ontological foundation for attributions that
presume some contingency with respect to God? This question draws attention to a fundamental
distinction between divine attributes as they are presented in God with Us. Oliphint distinguishes
between properties which inhere in God essentially and another set of properties which accrue to
God given his will to covenantally condescend and relate to the created world. The former are
named essential properties and the latter are covenantal properties. Oliphint explains that
God freely determined to take on attributes, characteristics, and properties [terms which are
synonymous in Oliphints text] that he did not have, and would not have, without creation. In his
taking on these characteristics, we understand as well that whatever characteristics or attributes
he takes on, they cannot be of the essence of who he is, nor can they be necessary to his essential
identity as God Thus, his condescension means that he is adding properties and characteristics,
not to his essential being, as the triune God (since that would mean that God was essentially
mutable), but surely to himself. (110) The second question may be answered that in Oliphints
theology proper the ontological foundation for the divine attributes which suppose some
contingent action or relation are covenantal properties which are somehow assumed by God.
Third, how do these non-essential properties allow God to relate with creation without
changing His essential character? To this question, Oliphint directs his reader to Christ,
particularly the Christological formula that Christ is a divine person who has united unto himself
a contingent human nature. Oliphint reasons, Because the person of Christ is the quintessential
example of Gods remaining who he is essentially, even in his interaction with creation, we
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would do well to think carefully about how our understanding of Christs person helps us to see
what is taking place throughout covenant history as God relates to his human creatures. (182)
Furthermore, Oliphint recommends that if we begin with Christology, rather than with some
abstract concept of antinomy, paradox, or mystery, we can start to see that all explanations of
Gods relationship to creation can be understood properly only within the context of Gods
relationship to creation as expressed in the incarnation. (226) Oliphint proposal is that just as
God has assumed contingent properties in the incarnation of the Son of God, rendering him
contingently different but essentially the same, so has God assumed contingent properties at all
points and at every time in which he acts towards or relates to the contingent world. In this way,
God indeed changes, but not essentially, just has the human nature of Christ presented no
essential change to the Son of God. Hence, just as the Son of God became man by the accrual of
contingent properties, so also God became creator or lord (both terms that assume an extrinsic
relation with that which is not God) by the assumption of covenantal properties. Moreover, like
the incarnation, the assumption of covenantal properties is never necessary for God, but instead
obtains under Gods free will to act and relate amongst finite creatures.
Oliphints solves the problem of contingency with respect to Gods relations with
creatures by formulating his doctrine of covenantal condescension where the properties God
assumes may be understood in the same manner as the union of the human natures to the divine
person in the doctrine of Christ incarnate. The main explanatory vehicles for Gods contingent
relations are the coventantal properties which God assumes or takes on in every relation to
creatures. With this all in view, it must be asked: Do Oliphints covenantal properties really exist
and if they exist, do they exist as God or as a creature? If Oliphint intends to present his readers
with items that are distinct from God, those items must be situated in a Christian system that
distinguishes absolutely between Gods existence and a creatures existence. Oliphint affirms this
absolute distinction of God and creatures (71-72), thus the reader must insist that if the
covenantal properties exist, the existence ascribed to them must be decidedly Gods existence or
something that exists because created by God.
The first part of the question asks whether, according to Oliphint, the covenantal
properties exist. It should be clear that Oliphint ascribes real existence to the covenanatal
properties for the following three reasons. First, the text of God with Us leaves very little doubt
that the covenantal properties really and truly exist. Oliphint explains, any understanding of
Gods condescension affirms the literal character of these properties in God. That is to say, God
really does take on these properties. Though they are contingent and not essential to who he is,
he nevertheless assumes them to himself as he interacts with his human creatures. (219) All of
Gods covenantal or contingent properties are really and literally his. (199) Second, the
covenantal properties must really exist because the human nature of Christ, the model covenantal
property in Oliphints doctrine, really exists. If Gods other coveantnal properties such as creator,
redeemer, and consummator didnt exist, they could hardly be likened to the incarnation where
the Son of God assumed a real existing human nature. Third, because Gods necessary existence
is not the existence of a creator, redeemer, or consummator, there must be some real existing
entity that is the reason for God to be predicated as such. In Oliphints doctrine, if covenantal
properties did not exist, there would be no ontological foundation for predicating non-essential
attributes of God, buffeting the very purpose of God with Us.
Oliphints doctrine of covenantal condescension posits existence to real covenantal
properties which God truly assumes in relating to creation. Having established covenantal
properties existence in Oliphints doctrine, it can now be asked whether they exist as God or as a
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creature. It seems the covenantal properties cannot be Gods divine existence for three reasons.
First, Oliphint writes, Whatever properties exist prior to Gods condescension are themselves
identical to God and exist only in that he exists. (13n10) From this we may garner that what
distinguishes covenantal condescension properties is that they are not identical to God and exist
in some other fashion besides the divine existence. Further on Oliphint reasons that Whatever
the kind of dependence that Gods condescension entails, it is not a dependence that inheres in
him essentially. As a matter of fact, it may be more accurate to say that, though these [covenantal
properties] accrue to him, really and truly, they are never in fact in him at all. Only his essential
[properties] are identical with him and thus in him. (215) This text tells the reader that the
covenantal properties do not inhere in God as essential properties do and thus that they are not
identical to Gods existence like the essential properties are. Second, the template or model for
Oliphints covenantal properties is the human nature of Jesus Christ and neither the human nature
nor the properties that accrue to that nature are divine existent entities. Third and last, positing
multiple distinct divine properties that are also really distinct from Gods being is tantamount to
an explicit rejection of divine simplicity, a doctrine Oliphint is desirous to defend.
The best evidences for Oliphints covenantal properties being of a creaturely existence
are the arguments denying them divine existence outlined above that is, if the covenantal
properties are not God, they must be creatures. To prove that their existence is created by God
the arguments above can be inverted. First, the covenantal properties are contingent, determined,
dependent, and caused each of these predicates cannot be applied to the Uncreated but only the
created. Second, they are modeled after the human nature of Jesus Christ, which is created.
Third, Oliphint qualifies the properties as created many times in God with Us, for example:
The triune God made a free decision that the Son of God would come down and add to himself
created properties (i.e., a human nature) of humiliation. (120) The original question was Do
Oliphints covenantal properties really exist and if they exist, do they exist as God or as a
creature? With some confidence we may answer that, for Oliphint, the covenantal properties do
exist, and they most likely exist as creatures.
It seems that Oliphints doctrine of God presented in God with Us would have God
creating particular properties that are distinct from his being and then assuming (or uniting unto
himself) those properties as God comes to be that which is not essential to his nature. Oliphints
proposal indeed presents serious theological problems and the first I will indicate is the inherent
univocal reasoning throughout his text. Oliphints univocism is manifested in two ways, what I
will call a univocism of requirement and a univocism of predication. The first kind of univocism
is a requirement placed upon God that is usually relegated to the level of creatures, that is,
Oliphint requires that God must do in order to be. A creature cannot be predicated to be certain
ways unless it performs certain actions I cannot be a marathon runner unless I run marathons. I
must get married in order to be married. While I do not change essentially by running marathons
or getting married, I do change contingently or non-essentially by performing new actions or
accruing new relations. In God with Us, God is under the same requirements as creatures in that
he must perform certain actions or gain certain relations in order to be predicated as being certain
ways. God relates to creatures as creatures relate to creatures, by the addition of properties of
relation.
The second form of univocism regards theological predication and is the far more serious
form of univocism in God with Us. If the covenantal properties are indeed creatures, like the
human nature of Jesus Christ, then, like that human nature, creatures can also participate in
Gods covenantal properties. The human nature the Son of God unites to himself is the same
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human nature shared amongst the rest of humanity (except without sin). Therefore, when I
predicated the name human to Christ and Paul the Apostle, that term is predicated univocally.
God can be human and creatures can be human, all in the same sense of the word. For Oliphint,
terms like wrath, savior, lord, gracious, operate in the same manner in that each of these
terms denotes not Gods absolute existence but instead created properties. If Jim the human saves
a life and is therefore called a savior, he is a savior in an incidental (accidental?), created, and
contingent sense; when God saves, He also is a savior in an incidental (accidental?), created,
and contingent sense. This identical ontology of what it is to be a savior allows for, if not
requires, a univocal predication of savior between God and Jim the human.
Moreover, if being a creator means God taking on a created covenantal property, then
the distinction between Creator and creature only indicates the fact that we know of no creature
who takes on that same property. We may ask: if creatorhood is like the humanity of Christ, and
Christs humanity is the same humanity as other humans, could there be other creators like God
in the sense God is a creator? Yes, if the property of creatorhood is created, then there is no
reason a creature couldnt be a creator in the same sense God is. Indeed, if all of Gods
knowledge of creation is contingent and therefore created, there seems to be no reason why
Gods knowledge of creation couldnt inhere in another creaturely intellect (more on this below).
Moving on from the inherent univocism in God with Us, we may reason further that if the
covenantal properties exist as creatures and come to be when God determined to relate to
creatures, then it would seem that there were created entities (covenantal properties) for all
eternity. Oliphint writes, Because the condescension of the Lord takes place from the beginning,
we should understand all Gods dealings with creation as necessarily entailing that God has
assumed properties not essential to him. (221) But if the eternal decree is Gods dealing with
creation, would that mean that the eternal decree entails that God assume created properties?
Later on Oliphint writes, his condescension stems from eternity and moves into the temporal
realm at the point of creation. (245) Again, Oliphint explains, once God determines to relate
himself to that which is ad extra whether in his eternal decree or in creation itself he thus
necessarily freely determines to relate himself, by way of a commitment, to that which is not
himself. This can be nothing other than divine condescension; it is the taking on of properties
and attributes that he would otherwise not have had, and the properties and attributes themselves
are less than, because in no way identical to, who God is essentially. (258-259) If the eternal
decree is or entails a divine accrual of created properties, then those created properties are eternal
just as the decree is eternal. This would mean the created properties have never not existed, they
stem from eternity; they are eternal creatures. Oliphint insists that Once [God] determines to
relate to us, that relation entails that he take on properties that he otherwise would not have
had. (188) If the decree is that determination, and the decree is eternal, then the accrual of
created properties is an eternal act that transcends time, just as the decree transcends time.
The third problem with Oliphints proposal concerns his Christology, which is the center
piece of God with Us. As I have repeated, the human nature of Christ is the capitol covenantal
property and Oliphints anchoring evidence that God assumes properties distinct from his
essential nature. Even still, Oliphints view that all of Gods contingent relations must be
accounted for by real created properties would require him to abandon the orthodox formula of
Christ being one person with two natures. How is this so? We may begin with a question: how
does God know real created entities? For Oliphint, God does not know created entities
essentially, instead his exhaustive knowledge of creatures is added to God by covenantal
properties (because the knowledge in this case is a kind of contingent relation). He writes, We
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begin to see, therefore, why the will of God with respect to things created, along with Gods
knowledge of such things, is distinguished from the knowledge of God that is necessary (and
includes all possibilities). (98) For all eternity God has had two kinds of knowledge. In the
incarnation, the mediation of God (the Son) is theandric, that is, it includes, necessarily,
both the divine and human. Oliphint continues, In the same way, therefore, and proleptically,
the mediation of God (the Son) prior to the incarnation is theandric as well. The point is not that
it includes the permanent assumption of a human nature, as is the case in the incarnation, but that
it includes the fact of Gods taking to himself created, covenantal, human properties, all the while
maintaining, as he must, is essential divinity. (198) Even more specifically, Gods pre-incarnate
mediation included a contingent-covenantal mind in which Gods contingent knowledge of
creation inhered. A bit later Oliphint writes, For God to change his mind in this context would
entail that, included in his covenantal properties, is a covenantal mind such that he condescends
to us, even with respect to his knowledge and the actions that proceed from it. This, again would
be analogous to a two minds theory of the incarnation, as argued, for example, by
Aquinas. (219n74) If I have put the pieces together correctly, it seems that Oliphint understands
God to have two minds from eternity past that includes a created mind in which his contingent
knowledge of creation inheres.
It must be asked: What is the status of the second pre-incarnate mind now that the Son of
God is incarnate? It seems that God cannot absorb the pre-incarnate covenantal mind into his
own absolute essential knowledge that would add to the being of God and compromise his
simplicity and immutability. If the covenantal mind is replaced by Christs human mind, then it
would seem that a human mind can have Gods decretive, comprehensive, exhaustive knowledge
of creation. If the covenantal mind is annihilated at the point of incarnation, then it would seem
that Gods free knowledge of creation is emptied, and replaced by the limited mind of Christs
human nature. Thus Oliphints second covenantal mind must remain united to the Son of God
along with the third mind of Christs humanity. It seems, therefore, in Oliphints Christology,
Christ has three minds (triphystitism?). While we cannot delve much deeper into this issue, it
should also be said that for most of the history of Christian theology to confess that Christ is
composed of three minds is to confess that he is composed of three rational natures, as a mind
isnt an accident but is a substantial constituent in which knowledge inheres accidentally.
(Another matter that seems most perplexing is how Oliphint presents the incarnation as
the template for how God unites certain attributes to his being, even while I presume that he
would not admit that the humanity of Christ is an attribute of God. Is humanity a divine attribute
just as creator is? When listing the attributes of God, may we say that God is a Creator,
Redeemer, Human, and Consummator, all in the same sense? If Oliphint doesnt attribute
humanity to God on the basis of the covenantal property of the human nature, why would he
attribute creatorhood to God on the basis of the covenantal property of creatorhood?)
The fourth major problem with God with Us is the relationship Oliphint draws between
Gods nature and the process of redemptive history. At least in the Reformed tradition, it is
common to confess that the history of redemption is a reflection of Gods absolute nature, it is a
revelation of his essential being. For Oliphint, however, redemptive history not only reveals who
God is, it is also a process by which God becomes who he wills himself to be. God doesnt
contain the perfections of being a savior, for example, until he becomes a savior by augmenting
himself through the assumption of the covenantal property of being a savior. Moreover, the
narrative of Scripture, on Oliphints terms, can be understood as the story of God becoming the
God who the church will worship for all eternity as their creator, redeemer, and consummator.
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God was none of these things before he willed to create, but, through the process of redemptive
history, He has become a creator, redeemer and consummator by an accrual of contingent
properties. Thus in many respects, the church worships God not only as who he is essentially, but
who he has become contingently. For Oliphint, God is not the God who contains all perfection
and who reveals his perfection through the history of redemption God has many essential
perfections, but he also accrues to himself other new perfections. In a word, on Oliphints
construal, at the end of the process of redemptive history, God is not only more revealed, he is
also more perfect and glorious.
One might rejoin that Gods contingent status reflects his essential nature. But in God
with Us, that is not necessarily the case. In Oliphints theology proper, God can take on
covenantal properties that are opposite to his nature. For example, an omniscient God can take
on a covenantal unknowing where Gods knowledge is somehow restricted. (194) A God who
is without body, parts or passions, according to the Westminster Confession of Faith, can, in God
with Us, have a body (149n33), have parts (129n99), and have passions. (88) God can
contingently and deliberately become the opposite of himself, according to Oliphint, and the
church can attribute characteristics to God which are opposite to his nature. So if God can
assume covenantal properties that contradict his character, then there is no necessity that the
covenantal properties must reveal his essential being.
The fact that Oliphints theology presents a God who is contingently open to becoming
the opposite of himself introduces the fifth and perhaps most serious problem in God with Us.
Oliphint insists that Yahweh does not and cannot lie because that would imply change, and also
moral decay. (85) This is because of the fact that it is contrary to Gods character to lie. (186)
Yet while it is true that on Oliphints assumptions God cannot lie according to his essential
character (which is Truth), a God who is essentially true may by an act of his will take on
contingent covenantal falsehood. Oliphints posits a God who is incorporeal and spiritual but
can become embodied (for Oliphint, embodied is a divine attribute afforded by a created
covenantal property). His theology also allows for an all knowing God to become contingently
unknowing. Thus, we may ask, if God can become contingently the opposite of himself in a
metaphysical and epistemological sense, why cannot God become the opposite of himself in
terms of morality or ethics? Oliphint is zealous to guard Gods moral attributes, but, on his
theological ontology, a God who is essentially uncompounded of parts but through covenantal
condescension can have parts may also be the God who is essentially just but through covenantal
condescension be contingently unjust, without in any way changing who he essentially is. This
not only redefines Christian hope, it annihilates covenant theology.
Oliphints God with Us generates more theological problems than it solves. It is difficult
to exactly determine at which point Oliphints theology deviates in such a dangerous direction.
Perhaps his mistake is taking a rational/virtual distinction such as between Gods communicable
and incommunicable attributes and rendering it a hard real distinction of created and uncreated
properties. Perhaps his avoidance of a substance metaphysic (154-156) has also allowed him to
avoid the question of existence with regard to covenantal properties. Or it might be that the
problem God with Us attempts to solve isnt even a genuine theological issue, but a question
posed by univocal-thinking analytic philosophers of religion. Nonetheless and suffice it to say
that Oliphints resultant theology proper, specifically his doctrine of covenantal condescension,
cannot be appropriated into a Christian theological system that distinguishes absolutely between
God and creatures.