EN BANC

[G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.]

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J :
p

One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is
that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not
titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-
called Third World. And it has many consequences. STHDAc

xxx xxx xxx

The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's
in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people
and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none
of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of
informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property
ownership to each other which are not the same means developed
by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers,
their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration,
all of which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for
their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru,
and you walk by field after field in each field a different dog is
going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all
about. The only one who does not know it is the government. The
issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which
the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to
recognize.

Hernando De Soto 1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in
possession of persons and entities other than the Philippine government.
The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the
Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and
scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2)
of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not
only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but
also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled
lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has
unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are
hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon.
Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord
with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our
public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a
blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D,
Silang Cadastre, 2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and
consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, 3 and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous
adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30)
years.HaSEcA

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC)

Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose
Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State. 4 Apart from presenting
documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes
Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was
originally belonged * to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-
grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio,
Eduardo and Esteban the fourth being Aristedes's grandfather. Upon
Lino's death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Esteban's wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their
father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A,
which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. 5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-
examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he "also [knew] the
property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco." 6 The
Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to
controvert the application.
 Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment &
Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was
"verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982." 7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty
Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to
other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of
legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog,
Silang, Cavite.HcDaAI

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding

decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing
that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 8
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The
appellate court held that under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court
noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the
property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982,
the Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be factored in the
computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the Court of
Appeals of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree was based
on the Court's ruling in Republic v. Herbieto. 9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of
Appeals; 10 hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the
appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic
v. Naguit, 11 which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto.
Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of
Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein
which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the
first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the
hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the
controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural
land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to
the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in
reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land
Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc, 12 and on 11
November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court
formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit: HICEca

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public

domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June
12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time
prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable
be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character
either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest
lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in
their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both? 13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective
positions.
With respect to Section 14 (1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis
of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The
seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should
be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings
therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial
hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia, 14
promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the
 same observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section
14 (1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for
Section 14 (1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable
and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also
cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic, 15 Fieldman
Agricultural Trading v. Republic 16 and Republic v. Imperial Credit
Corporation, 17 as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals. 18 ACTEHI

With respect to Section 14 (2), petitioners submit that open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the
public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into
private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14 (2).
According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already
been "converted" into private property through prescription. To bolster their
argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties. 19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14 (2)
are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil
Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to
"patrimonial property", while Section 14 (2) speaks of "private lands". It
observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14
(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year
possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil
Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year
prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be
reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and
disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the
particular factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the
ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land
Act.HSEIAT

A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act,
has, since its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time,
to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable,
timber, or mineral lands. 20 Alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b)
residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c)
educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for
town sites and for public and quasi-public uses. 21
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the
Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles" through "judicial legalization". 22 Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably
grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. DEHcTI

Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in
1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant
amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural
lands" was changed to "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain". The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of
the lands that may be registered. 23 This is not actually the case. Under
Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of
"lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition." Evidently,
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than
only "agricultural lands".
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from
possession for "thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application" to possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier". The Court in
Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period
of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title
to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26,
1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which
provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at
least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged
the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. . . .
It bears further observation that Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No, 141
is virtually the same as Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of
property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14 (1) that
operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The
provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. SDTIaE

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree

and the inclusion of Section 14 (1) therein, the Public Land Act has
remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their
predecessors-in-interest who "have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance may have led to the
impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48 (b) of
the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not
the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
 xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply.
The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive
of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence
of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is
proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of
a Filipino citizen who has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by applying with the
proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance
of the corresponding certificate of title.DCSETa

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted

Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable
for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that it
is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive
ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14 (a) of the Property Registration
Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) of
the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original
registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48 (b).
Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may
exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has
been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002.
It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section
are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020
within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That
this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not
exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several
periods of time designated by the President in accordance with
Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised
in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be
construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this
Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President. 24
 Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right
granted under Section 48 (b) may be availed of only until 31 December
2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended and Section 14 (a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG
has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek
registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is
not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the
alienable and disposable character of the property must have been
declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSG's approach, all lands
certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be
registered either under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree
or Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of
such an implication was discussed in Naguit. EcTDCI

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and

disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by
the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945", as used in
the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim
of ownership". Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify
only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated,
and not those distantly or remotely located. 25 Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would
be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12,
1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the
length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect
even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines
was not yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable
and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition,
 the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the
State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative
over the property. EIcSTD

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14 (1) is

that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in
Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the
provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands
actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if
the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before
that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a
bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their
imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing
fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the
scope and reach of Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory
passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration
proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the
requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to
explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Court's acknowledgment
that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14 (1)
is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura, 26 the
Court, citing Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to
the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. . ." That statement, in the context
of Section 14 (1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as
cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The
application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14 (2). The
evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of
possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of
Section 14 (1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether
petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following
Section 14 (1), their position being that they had been in exclusive
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years,
but not before 12 June 1945. aCHDST
 Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling
Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect to Section 14 (1).
On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14 (1), since
it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945.
The Court's interpretation of Section 14 (1) therein was decisive to the
resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto
provides the final word of the Court on Section 14 (1) is now settled in
favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v.
Court of Appeals 27 since in the latter, the application for registration had
been filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The
dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two.
Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, 28 which
involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public
domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980.
Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the
mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should have
failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated
November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that
the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and
disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per
map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980". This is sufficient
evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private
respondents' application. Further, the certification enjoys a
presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence,
which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of
the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry
to contest the application of appellees on the ground that the
property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in question are forestal land. . . .
IDASHa

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession
of public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant
to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of
private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of
 the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the
burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their
application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were
able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule,
we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one
of them. 29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member
who authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48 (b) of
public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years
and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza,
the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land
had been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the
application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared
alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in
Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent
seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to
Section 14 (2). The provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning
Section 14 (2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an
obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further
discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
DEcSaI
 Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the
Civil Code. [ 30 ] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that
properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years. [ 31 ] With such conversion,
such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands"
under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those
who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later
than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to
register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14 (2), unlike in this
case where petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that
provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of
possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly
appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription
as the possible basis for application for original registration under Section
14 (2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any
of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object
of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain
are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive
prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are
not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral
lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or
mineral lands. caTESD

There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the
acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of real property
may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years, 32 or through
extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years. 33 Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith, 34 as well as just title. 35
When Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly
provides that persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws", it unmistakably refers to
the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code
is the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by
prescription of private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to
the State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether
Section 14 (2) does encompass original registration proceedings over
patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired
through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated
jurisprudence holding that properties classified as alienable public land
may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and
exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. 36 Yet if we ascertain the
source of the "thirty-year" period, additional complexities relating to Section
14 (2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact
two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which
amended Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to
seek original registration of alienable public lands through possession in
the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
TDCaSE

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis
supplied) 37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D.
1073, which made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first
time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could
have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by
implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code,
particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two
kinds of prescription under the Civil Code ordinary acquisitive
prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article
1137, is completed "through uninterrupted adverse possession. . . for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith".
 Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act
No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis
for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil
Code, as mandated under Section 14 (2). However, there is a material
difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act
No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No.
1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on
prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period
immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any
qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the
beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty (30) years.
There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No.
1942 had mandated such a requirement, 38 similar to our earlier finding
with respect to the present language of Section 48 (b), which now sets 12
June 1945 as the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year
possession period as basis for original registration became Section 14 (2)
of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those "who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions
of existing laws" to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year
period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article
1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation
the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does
not hold true with respect to Section 14 (1).
B.
Unlike Section 14 (1), Section 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles
on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply
the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our
interpretation of Section 14 (2). There is no similar demand on our part in
the case of Section 14 (1). DSHTaC

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "
[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription". The identification what consists of
patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in
full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth.
 Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes
property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or,
indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. 39 Lands of the public domain,
whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public
dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration
by the President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability
and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so
declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code,
from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by
connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of
the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision
further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
prescription.IEcDCa

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of

public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State". It is this
provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property.
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already
classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when * it is "intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420 (2),
and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when
such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the
State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of
a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
 It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus
affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and
disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants
claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the
Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by
the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and
ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the
Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their
language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the
province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to
amend Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
aATEDS

The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an

actual example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The
Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.", is
more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes
the sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in
Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes
of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the President
to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) 40 which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or
administer them. 41 The President is authorized to sell portions of the
military camps, in whole or in part. 42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself
declares that the military lands subject thereof are "alienable and
disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations
governing sales of government properties." 43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military
lands have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not
become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the
reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the
conversion of the former American bases at Clark and Subic. 44 Such
purpose can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of
national wealth" under Article 420 (2). Thus, at that time, the lands
remained property of the public dominion under Article 420 (2),
notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their
sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that
such lands become private property and cease to be property of the public
dominion.
C.
 Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are
declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation
that they are no longer intended for public service or for the development
of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the
conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in
counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the
negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that
the period of possession before the public domain land becomes
patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive
period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes
patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil
Code. As the application for registration under Section 14 (2) falls wholly
within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way
that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public
dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive
prescription and justify registration.
EHTSCD

Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14

(1) and Section 14 (2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14 (1)
mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14
(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration
under Section 14 (1) is extended under the aegis of the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under
Section 14 (2) is made available both by the Property Registration
Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year
period under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil
Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of
possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year
period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based
on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code,
while the registration under Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under
the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil
Code should not apply as well to Section 14 (1). Notwithstanding the
vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous
statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property
Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the
framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent
legislation. Section 14 (2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the
registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such
intent exists with respect to Section 14 (1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today
is seeing how our land registration procedures correlate with our law on
prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring
ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State
may be acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought
about by Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things which are within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription", and that [p]roperty of
the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be
the object of prescription".
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may
be acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith
and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through
possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a
person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary
acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a
rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisites good faith and
just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of
Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code, 45
provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some
clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of
prescription "when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right". Dr. Tolentino explains:ITCcAD

Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of
ownership, and which would have actually transferred ownership if
the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured
by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation,
succession, and dacion in payment. 46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily
precludes the applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial
property. The major premise for the argument is that "the State, as the
owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor before
the completion of the required period of possession". 47 It is evident that
the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129
is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person invoking
 ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale,
exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights. SIEHcA

Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or

extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the
classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for
the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been
become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the
possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal
events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into
private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed
under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of
the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the
owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the
registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be
remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of
ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership. 48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the
Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration
system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of
patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system
accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the
completion of a period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act
(either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945
following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act 49 was noticeably silent on the requisites
for alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the
Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude such registration. 50 Still, the
gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes
ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed
the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with
the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14
(2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons
who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now. AcDaEH

V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that
"those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
 been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires possession since
12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should
have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is
declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
51

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the

Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a
mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public
domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration
that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code
is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14
(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial
property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property
through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good
faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person's uninterrupted adverse possession
of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years,
regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
 It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish
that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The
earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their
own evidence the Tax Declarations they presented in particular is to
the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. EaCDAT

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2) as basis for

registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification
of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the
legal doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over
the implications of today's ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled
property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The
social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be
abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied
the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable
or not, is a phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural
acquiescence, and is common among the so-called "Third World"
countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal
system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been unable to
bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these public domain
lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive
due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation
of said properties. 52 Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as
the most viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal
settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even
that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or
exclusively held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their
families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the
State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their
families and their communities as common law owners. There is much to
be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such
 virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself
considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be
up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly
regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory
are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This
could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself
to ease the requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into
patrimonial.
One's sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of
well-being not only of that individual, but also to the person's family. Once
that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is
for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering
problem. caHIAS

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., joins J. Nazario.
Quisumbing, J., is on official business.
Corona, J., joins the dissent of Mr. Justice Brion.
Chico-Nazario, J., Pls. see Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., joins the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice
Nazario.
Brion, J., dissents see Opinion.

Separate Opinions
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the majority opinion in dismissing the application for

registration of a piece of land originally filed by the late Mario Malabanan
(Malabanan), petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. The land subject of the
instant Petition, being alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
may not be acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code,
nor registered pursuant to Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree. CTIEac
 At the outset, it must be made clear that the Property Registration
Decree governs registration of land under the Torrens system. It can only
identify which titles, already existing or vested, may be registered under
the Torrens system; but it cannot be the source of any title to land. It
merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. 1
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree allows "those who
have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws", to apply for registration of their title to the
lands.
Petitioners do not fall under such provision, taking into account that
the land they are seeking to register is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, a fact which would have several substantial
implications.
First, Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree clearly and
explicitly refers to "private lands", without mention at all of public lands.
There is no other way to understand the plain language of Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree except that the land was already private
when the applicant for registration acquired ownership thereof by
prescription. The prescription therein was not the means by which the
public land was converted to private land; rather, it was the way the
applicant acquired title to what is already private land, from another person
previously holding title to the same. 2 The provision in question is very
clear and unambiguous. Well-settled is the rule that when the law speaks
in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. 3
With the understanding that Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree applies only to what are already private lands, then,
there is no question that the same can be acquired by prescription under
the provisions of the Civil Code, because, precisely, it is the Civil Code
which governs rights to private lands. ECcTaS

Second, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the

Public Land Act, as amended, reads:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be
disposed of only as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
(Emphasis ours.)
 The afore-quoted provision recognizes that agricultural public lands
may be disposed of by the State, and at the same time, mandates that the
latter can only do so by the modes identified in the same provision. Thus,
the intent of the legislature to make exclusive the enumeration of the
modes by which agricultural public land may be disposed of by the State in
Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended, is not only readily
apparent, but explicit. And, undeniably, the enumeration of the modes for
acquiring agricultural public land in the said provision does not include
prescription, in the concepts described and periods prescribed by the Civil
Code.
Neither the Civil Code nor the Property Registration Decree can
overcome the express restriction placed by the Public Land Act, as
amended, on the modes by which the State may dispose of agricultural
public land.
The Public Land Act, as amended, is a special law specifically
applying to lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands.
The Public Land Act, as amended, being a special law, necessarily
prevails over the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that "where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to
a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail."
Generalia specialibus non derogant. 4
As for the Property Registration Decree, it must be stressed that the
same cannot confer title to land and can only confirm title that already
exists or has vested. As has already been previously discussed herein, title
to agricultural public land vests or is acquired only by any of the modes
enumerated in Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended. TcADCI

And, third, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended
several times, changing the period of possession required for acquiring an
imperfect title to agricultural public land:
Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title
required possession en concepto de dueo since time immemorial,
or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was
retained. However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was
enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment required
adverse possession for a period of only thirty (30) years. On
January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073, further
amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing applications
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December
31, 1987. Under this decree, "the provisions of Section 48 (b) and
Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable land of the public domain which have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
 occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-
interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945." 5 (Emphasis ours.)
Prior to Presidential Decree No. 1073, imperfect title to agricultural
land of the public domain could be acquired by adverse possession of 30
years. Presidential Decree No. 1073, issued on 25 January 1977,
amended Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by requiring possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable land of the public domain since
12 June 1945 or earlier for an imperfect title. Hence, by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 1073, the requisite period of possession for
acquiring imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public
domain is no longer determined according to a fixed term (i.e., 30 years);
instead, it shall be reckoned from a fixed date (i.e., 12 June 1945 or
earlier) from which the possession should have commenced.
If the Court allows the acquisition of alienable and disposable land of
the public domain by prescription under the Civil Code, and registration of
title to land thus acquired under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree, it would be sanctioning what is effectively a circumvention of the
amendment introduced by Presidential Decree No. 1073 to Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act. Acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the
public domain by possession would again be made to depend on a fixed
term (i.e.,10 years for ordinary prescription and 30 years for extraordinary
prescription), rather than being reckoned from the fixed date presently
stipulated by Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. DCcIaE

There being no basis for petitioners' application for registration of the

public agricultural land in question, accordingly, the same must be
dismissed.
I, however, must express my dissent to the discussion in the
majority opinion concerning the contradictory pronouncements of the Court
in Republic v. Court of Appeals 6 and Republic v. Herbieto, 7 on imperfect
titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, acquired in
accordance with Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and
registered pursuant to Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
According to Naguit,a person seeking judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,
need only prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession and occupation of the subject land since 12 June 1945 or
earlier, and that the subject land is alienable and disposable at the time of
filing of the application for judicial confirmation and/or registration of title.
On the other hand, it was held in Herbieto that such a person must
establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
and occupation of the subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that
the subject land was likewise already declared alienable and disposable
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The majority opinion upholds the ruling in
Naguit, and declares the pronouncements on the matter in Herbieto as
mere obiter dictum.
As the ponente of Herbieto, I take exception to the dismissive
treatment of my elucidation in said case on the acquisition of imperfect title
to alienable and disposable land of the public domain, as mere obiter
dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a
court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of
the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in
his decision upon a cause, "by the way", that is, incidentally or collaterally,
and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not
necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by
way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as
precedent. 8
To recall, the Republic of the Philippines opposed in Herbieto the
registration of certain parcels of land of the public domain in the names of
Jeremias and David Herbieto, based on two grounds, one substantive and
the other procedural, i.e., (1) the applicants for registration failed to prove
that they possessed the subject parcels of land for the period required by
law; and (2) the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the
subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and
separately owned by two applicants.
The Court, in Herbieto, addressed the procedural issue first, and
held that the alleged infirmity in the application constituted a misjoinder of
causes of action which did not warrant a dismissal of the case, only the
severance of the misjoined causes of action so that they could be heard by
the court separately. The Court though took note of the belated publication
of the notice of hearing on the application for registration of Jeremias and
David Herbieto, the hearing was already held before the notice of the same
was published. Such error was not only procedural, but jurisdictional, and
was fatal to the application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto.
The Court then proceeded to a determination of the substantive
issue in Herbieto, particularly, whether Jeremias and David Herbieto
possessed the parcels of land they wish to register in their names for the
period required by law. The Court ruled in the negative. Section 48 (b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended, on judicial confirmation of imperfect title,
requires possession of alienable and disposable land of the public domain
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Given that the land sought to be registered
was declared alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, and the
period of possession prior to such declaration should not be counted in
favor of the applicants for registration, then Jeremias and David Herbieto
could not be deemed to have possessed the parcels of land in question for
the requisite period as to acquire imperfect title to the same.
 The discussion in Herbieto on the acquisition of an imperfect title to
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, which could be the
subject of judicial confirmation, was not unnecessary to the decision of
said case. It was not a mere remark made or opinion expressed upon a
cause, "by the way", or only incidentally or collaterally, and not directly
upon a question before the Court; or upon a point not necessarily involved
in the determination of the cause; or introduced by way of illustration, or
analogy or argument, as to constitute obiter dictum. ECaHSI

It must be emphasized that the acquisition of an imperfect title to

alienable and disposable land of the public domain under Section 48 (b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended, was directly raised as an issue in the
Petition in Herbieto and discussed extensively by the parties in their
pleadings. That the application of Jeremias and David Herbieto could
already be dismissed on the ground of lack of proper publication of the
notice of hearing thereof, did not necessarily preclude the Court from
resolving the other issues squarely raised in the Petition before it. Thus,
the Court dismissed the application for registration of Jeremias and David
Herbieto on two grounds: (1) the lack of jurisdiction of the land registration
court over the application, in light of the absence of proper publication of
the notice of hearing; and (2) the evident lack of merit of the application
given that the applicants failed to comply with the requirements for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended. This is only in keeping with the duty of the Court to
expeditiously and completely resolve the cases before it and, once and for
all, settle the dispute and issues between the parties. Without expressly
discussing and categorically ruling on the second ground, Jeremias and
David Herbieto could have easily believed that they could re-file their
respective applications for registration, just taking care to comply with the
publication-of-notice requirement.
Of particular relevance herein is the following discourse in Villanueva
v. Court of Appeals 9 on what constitutes, or more appropriately, what does
not constitute obiter dictum:
It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues
presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and
this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally
involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of
the consideration of the case, and led up to the final conclusion, and
to any statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated.
Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a
precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been,
made on some other ground, or even though, by reason of other
points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if
the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. A
decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as
obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the
 contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can an
additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has
been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also,
where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is
sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually
decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to
every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as
having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied
authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more
fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition
make statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta. IcHTCS

An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case

cannot be considered a dictum; and this rule applies as to all pertinent
questions, although only incidentally involved, which are presented and
decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and lead up
to the final conclusion, and to any statement in the opinion as to a matter
on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided
does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case
is or might have been made on some other ground, or even though, by
reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have been the
same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. 10
I submit that Herbieto only applied the clear provisions of the law
and established jurisprudence on the matter, and is binding as a
precedent.
Section 14 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, explicitly
requires for the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, possession by a Filipino citizen of the said
parcel of land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, to wit:
Section. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
 have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours.) SCIcTD

Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, by substantially

reiterating Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, recognizes
the imperfect title thus acquired and allows the registration of the same,
viz.:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(Emphasis ours.)
Meanwhile, jurisprudence has long settled that possession of the
land by the applicant for registration prior to the reclassification of the land
as alienable and disposable cannot be credited to the applicant's favor. 11
Given the foregoing, judicial confirmation and registration of an
imperfect title, under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,
and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, respectively,
should only be granted when: (1) a Filipino citizen, by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural land of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since 12 June
1945, or earlier; and (2) the land in question, necessarily, was already
declared alienable and disposable also by 12 June 1945 or earlier.
There can be no other interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree, which would not run afoul of either the clear and unambiguous
provisions of said laws or binding judicial precedents.
I do not agree in the observation of the majority opinion that the
interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,
adopted in Herbieto, would result in absurdity. Indeed, such interpretation
forecloses a person from acquiring an imperfect title to a parcel of land
declared alienable and disposable only after 12 June 1945, which could be
judicially confirmed. Nonetheless, it must be borne in mind that the
intention of the law is to dispose of agricultural public land to qualified
individuals and not simply to dispose of the same. It may be deemed a
strict interpretation and application of both law and jurisprudence on the
matter, but it certainly is not an absurdity.
 Stringency and prudence in interpreting and applying Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act, as amended, is well justified by the significant
consequences arising from a finding that a person has an imperfect title to
agricultural land of the public domain. Not just any lengthy occupation of
an agricultural public land could ripen into an imperfect title. An imperfect
title can only be acquired by occupation and possession of the land
by a person and his predecessors-in-interest for the period required
and considered by law sufficient as to have segregated the land from
the mass of public land. When a person is said to have acquired an
imperfect title, by operation of law, he acquires a right to a grant, a
government grant to the land, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued. As such, the land ceased to be part of the public
domain and goes beyond the authority of the State to dispose of. An
application for confirmation of title, therefore, is but a mere formality.
12 EIAHcC

In addition, as was emphasized in Herbieto, Section 11 of the Public

Land Act, as amended, has identified several ways by which agricultural
lands of the public domain may be disposed of. Each mode of disposing of
agricultural public land has its own specific requirements which must be
complied with. If a person is not qualified for a judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title, because the land in question was declared alienable and
disposable only after 12 June 1945, he is not totally without recourse for he
could still acquire the same by any of the other modes enumerated in the
afore-quoted provision.
Regardless of my dissent to the affirmation by the majority of the
ruling in Naguit on Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, I cast my vote with the
majority, to DENY the Petition at bar and AFFIRM the Decision dated 23
February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2000 of the Court of
Appeals dismissing, for absolute lack of basis, petitioners' application for
registration of alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

BRION, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the ponencia's modified positions on the application of

prescription under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree
(PRD), and on the denial of the petition of the Heirs of Mario Malabanan.
I dissent in the strongest terms from the ruling that the classification
of a public land as alienable and disposable can be made after June 12,
1945, in accordance with this Court's ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Naguit (Naguit). 1 Effectively, what results from this decision is a new
law, crafted by this Court, going beyond what the Constitution ordains and
beyond the law that the Legislature passed. Because the majority has not
used the standards set by the Constitution and the Public Land Act (PLA),
2its conclusions are based on a determination on what the law ought to be
an exercise in policy formulation that is beyond the Court's authority to
make.
The discussions of these grounds for dissent follow, not necessarily
in the order these grounds are posed above. HDTCSI

Prefatory Statement
Critical to the position taken in this Dissent is the reading of the
hierarchy of laws that govern public lands to fully understand and
appreciate the grounds for dissent.
In the area of public law, foremost in this hierarchy is the Philippine
Constitution, whose Article XII (entitled National Economy and Patrimony)
establishes and fully embraces the regalian doctrine as a first and
overriding principle. 3 This doctrine postulates that all lands belong to the
State, 4 and that no public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from the State. 5
In the statutory realm, the PLA governs the classification, grant, and
disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and,
other than the Constitution, is the country's primary law on the matter.
Section 7 of the PLA delegates to the President the authority to administer
and dispose of alienable public lands. Section 8 sets out the public lands
open to disposition or concession, and the requirement that they should be
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed. Section
11, a very significant section, states that
Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of
only as follows and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title;
(5) By judicial legalization;
(6) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Section 48 covers confirmation of imperfect title, and embodies a grant of
title to the qualified occupant or possessor of an alienable public land. This
section provides: cHAIES

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
 where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from
Spain to the United States have applied for the purchase,
composition or other form of grant of lands of the public
domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and
have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection
therewith, but have, with or without default upon their part, or
for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such
applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and
cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their
applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, except as against the
Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
Significantly, subsection (a) has now been deleted, while subsection (b)
has been amended by PD 1073 as follows:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c),
Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense
that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

Complementing the PLA is the PRD. 6 It was enacted to codify the

various laws relating to property registration. It governs the registration of
lands under the Torrens System, as well as unregistered lands, including
chattel mortgages. Section 14 of the PRD provides:
SEC. 14. Who May Apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
 and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands
or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any
other manner provided for by law.SEDIaH

Subsection (1) of Section 14 is a copy of, and appears to have been lifted
from, Section 48 (b) of the PLA. The two provisions, however, differ in
intent and legal effect based on the purpose of the law that contains them.
The PLA is a substantive law that classifies and provides for the
disposition of alienable lands of the public domain. The PRD, on the
other hand, specifically refers to the manner of bringing registerable
lands, among them alienable public lands, within the coverage of the
Torrens system. Thus, the first is a substantive law, while the other is
essentially procedural, so that in terms of substantive content, the PLA
should prevail. 7
Significantly bearing on the matter of lands in general is the Civil
Code and its provisions on Property 8 and Prescription. 9 The law on
property assumes importance because land, whether public or private, is
property. Prescription, on the other hand, is a mode of acquiring ownership
of land, although it is not one of the modes of disposition mentioned in the
PLA.
Chapter 3, Title I of Book II of the Civil Code is entitled "Property in
Relation to the Person to Whom it Belongs". On this basis, Article 419
classifies property to be property of public dominion or of private
ownership. Article 420 proceeds to further classify property of public
dominion into those intended for public use, for public service, and for the
development of the national wealth. Article 421 states that all other
properties of the State not falling under Article 420 are patrimonial property
of the State, and Article 422 adds that property of public dominion, no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State. Under Article 425, property of private
ownership, besides patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and
municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively.
Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is not mentioned as
one of the modes of acquiring alienable public land under the PLA,
(Significantly, the PLA under its Section 48 provides for its system of
how possession can ripen into ownership; the PLA does not refer to this as
acquisitive prescription but as basis for confirmation of title.) Section 14 (2)
of the PRD, however, specifies that "[t]hose who have acquired ownership
of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" as
among those who may apply for land registration. Thus, prescription was
introduced into the land registration scheme (the PRD), but not into
the special law governing lands of the public domain (the PLA).
A starting point in considering prescription in relation with public
lands is Article 1108 of the Civil Code, which states that prescription does
not run against the State and its subdivisions. At the same time, Article
1113 provides that "all things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided; property of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription." The provisions of Articles 1128 to 1131 may also
come into play in the application of prescription to real properties.
In light of our established hierarchy of laws, particularly the
supremacy of the Philippine Constitution, any consideration of lands
of the public domain should start with the Constitution and its
Regalian doctrine; all lands belong to the State, and he who claims
ownership carries the burden of proving his claim. 10 Next in the
hierarchy is the PLA for purposes of the terms of the grant, alienation
and disposition of the lands of the public domain, and the PRD for the
registration of lands. The PLA and the PRD are special laws supreme
in their respective spheres, subject only to the Constitution. The Civil
Code, for its part, is the general law on property and prescription and
should be accorded respect as such. In more concrete terms, where
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are involved, the
PLA is the primary law that should govern, and the Civil Code
provisions on property and prescription must yield in case of conflict.
11

The Public Land Act

At the risk of repetition, I start the discussion of the PLA with a
reiteration of the first principle that under the regalian doctrine, all lands
of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of
such patrimony. Otherwise expressed, all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 12
Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain. 13 We should never lose sight of the impact of
this first principle where a private ownership claim is being asserted
against the State.
 The PLA has undergone many revisions and changes over time,
starting from the first PLA, Act No. 926; the second public land law that
followed, Act No. 2874; and the present CA 141 and its amendments. Act
No. 926 was described in the following terms:
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and
leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their
titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance
of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands", for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the
completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation
of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the
Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public
lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and
that the government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty
of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the
United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the
public domain whose title still remained in the government and are
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded
the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands. 14
This basic essence of the law has not changed and has been carried
over to the present PLA and its amendments. Another basic feature, the
requirement for open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable public land under a bona fide
claim of ownership also never changed. Still another consistent public land
feature is the concept that once a person has complied with the requisite
possession and occupation in the manner provided by law, he is
automatically given a State grant that may be asserted against State
ownership; the land, in other words, ipso jure becomes private land. 15 The
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title shall then follow,
based on the procedure for land registration. 16 It is in this manner that the
PLA ties up with the PRD.
A feature that has changed over time has been the period for
reckoning the required occupation or possession. In the first PLA, the
required occupation/possession to qualify for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title was 10 years preceding the effectivity of Act No. 926 July
26, 1904 (or since July 26, 1894 or earlier). This was retained up to CA
141, until this law was amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942 (enacted
on June 22, 1957), 17 which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptive
period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. This period did not last; on
January 25, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073) 18 changed the
required 30-year possession and occupation period provision, to
possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. PD 1073 likewise changed the lands subject of imperfect title, from
agricultural lands of the public domain to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. PD 1073 also extended the period for applications for
free patents and judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to December 31,
1987.
The significance of the date "June 12, 1945" appears to have been
lost to history. A major concern raised against this date is that the country
was at this time under Japanese occupation, and for some years after, was
suffering from the uncertainties and instabilities that World War II brought.
Questions were raised on how one could possibly comply with the June
12, 1945 or earlier occupation/possession requirement of PD 1073 when
the then prevailing situation did not legally or physically permit it.
Without the benefit of congressional records, as the enactment of
the law (a Presidential Decree) was solely through the President's
lawmaking powers under a regime that permitted it, the most logical reason
or explanation for the date is the possible impact of the interplay between
the old law and the amendatory law. When PD 1073 was enacted, the
utmost concern, in all probability, was how the law would affect the
application of the old law which provided for a thirty-year possession
period. Counting 30 years backwards from the enactment of PD 1073 on
January 25, 1977, PD 1073 should have provided for a January 24, 1947
cut-off date, but it did not. Instead, it provided, for unknown reasons, the
date June 12, 1945.
The June 12, 1945 cut-off date raised legal concerns; vested rights
acquired under the old law (CA 141, as amended by RA 1942) providing
for a 30-year possession period could not be impaired by the PD 1073
amendment. We recognized this legal dilemma in Abejaron v. Nabasa, 19
when we said:
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession
and occupation required by the Public Land Act, as amended by
R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D.
No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation
and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
does not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds that the grant of
title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation of law, then upon
Abejaron's satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have
already gained title over the disputed land in 1975. This follows the
doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., that the law cannot impair vested rights such as a
land grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by
themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to
the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years,
 or at least since January 24, 1947" may apply for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec.
48(b) of the Public Land Act.
From this perspective, PD 1073 should have thus provided January
24, 1947 and not June 12, 1945 as its cut-off date, yet the latter date is the
express legal reality. The reconciliation, as properly defined by
jurisprudence, is that where an applicant has satisfied the requirements of
Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended by RA 1942, prior to the effectivity
of PD 1073, the applicant is entitled to perfect his or her title, even if
possession and occupation does not date back to June 12, 1945. For
purposes of the present case, a discussion of the cut-off date has
been fully made to highlight that it is a date whose significance and
import cannot be minimized nor glossed over by mere judicial
interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns; the full legislative
intent must be respected.
In considering the PLA, it should be noted that its amendments were
not confined to RA 1942 and PD 1073. These decrees were
complemented by Presidential Decree No. 892 (PD 892) 20 issued on
February 16, 1976 which limited to six months the use of Spanish titles
as evidence in land registration proceedings. 21 Thereafter, the recording of
all unregistered lands shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344. Section 3 of PD 1073
totally disallowed the judicial confirmation of incomplete titles to public land
based on unperfected Spanish grants.
Subsequently, RA 6940 22 extended the period for filing applications
for free patent and judicial confirmation of imperfect title to December 31,
2000. The law now also allows the issuance of free patents for lands not in
excess of 12 hectares to any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is
not the owner of more than 12 hectares and who, for at least 30 years prior
to the effectivity of the amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract
or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition.
Congress recently extended the period for filing applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under RA 9176 from December 31,
2000 under RA 6940 to December 31, 2020. 23

Read together with Section 11 of the PLA (which defines the

administrative grant of title to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain through homestead settlement and sale, among
others), RA 6940 and RA 9176 signify that despite the cut-off date of
June 12, 1945 that the Legislature has provided, ample opportunities
exist under the law for the grant of alienable lands of the public
domain to deserving beneficiaries.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree
As heretofore mentioned, PD 1529 amended Act No. 496 on June
11, 1978 to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. Its
Section 14 describes the applicants who may avail of registration under the
Decree, among them
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
These subsections and their impact on the present case are separately
discussed below.
Section 14 (1)
Section 14 (1) merely repeated PD 1073 which sets a cut-off date of
June 12, 1945 and which, under the conditions discussed above, may be
read to be January 24, 1947.
The ponencia discussed Section 48 (b) of the PLA in relation with
Section 14 (1) of the PRD and, noted among others, that "under the
current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48 (b)
may be availed of only until December 31, 2020". This is in light of RA
9176, passed in 2002, 24 limiting the filing of an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title to December 31, 2020. The amendatory law
apparently refers only to the use of Section 14 (1) of the PRD as a mode of
registration. Where ownership right or title has already vested in the
possessor-occupant of the land that Section 48 (b) of the PLA grants by
operation of law, Section 14 (2) of the PRD continuous to be open for
purposes of registration of a "private land" since compliance with Section
48 (b) of the PLA vests title to the occupant/possessor and renders the
land private in character.
The ponencia likewise rules against the position of the Office of the
Solicitor General that the public land to be registered must have been
classified as alienable and disposable as of the cut-off date for possession
stated in Section 48 (b) June 12, 1945. In doing this, it cites and
reiterates its continuing support for the ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Naguit that held: 25
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by
the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945", as used in
the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim
 of ownership". Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify
only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated,
and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would
be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12,
1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the
length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect
even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines
was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is
that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is
made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is
still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
xxx xxx xxx
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,
wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in
possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in
question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the
bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the
claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years
before the property was declared alienable and disposable.
Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after
the property had been certified as alienable and disposable, the
Bracewell ruling does not apply.
As it did in Naguit, the present ponencia as well discredits Bracewell.
It does the same with Republic v. Herbieto 26 that came after Naguit and
should have therefore overtaken the Naguit ruling. In the process, the
ponencia cites with approval the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, 27 penned by
the same ponente who wrote Bracewell.
 While the ponencia takes pains to compare these cases, it however
completely misses the point from the perspective of whether possession of
public lands classified as alienable and disposable after June 12, 1945
should be credited for purposes of a grant under Section 48 (b) of the PLA,
and of registration under Section 14 (1) of the PRD. These cases, as
analyzed by the ponencia, merely granted or denied registration on the
basis of whether the public land has been classified as alienable and
disposable at the time the petition for registration was filed. Thus, except
for Naguit, these cases can be cited only as instances when registration
was denied or granted despite the classification of the land as alienable
after June 12, 1945.
The ruling in Naguit is excepted because, as shown in the quotation
above, this is one case that explained why possession prior to the
classification of public land as alienable should be credited in favor of the
possessor who filed his or her application for registration after the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable, but where such
classification occurred after June 12, 1945.
Closely analyzed, the rulings in Naguit that the ponencia relied upon
are its statutory construction interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the PLA and
the observed ABSURDITY of using June 12, 1945 as the cut-off point for
the classification.
Five very basic reasons compel me to strongly disagree with Naguit
and its reasons.
First. The constitutional and statutory reasons. The Constitution
classifies public lands into agricultural, mineral, and timber. Of these, only
agricultural lands can be alienated. 28 Without the requisite classification,
there can be no basis to determine which lands of the public domain are
alienable and which are not; hence, classification is a constitutionally-
required step whose importance should be given full legal
recognition and effect. Otherwise stated, without classification into
disposable agricultural land, the land forms part of the mass of the public
domain that, not being agricultural, must be mineral or timber land that are
completely inalienable and as such cannot be possessed with legal effects.
To allow effective possession is to do violence to the regalian doctrine; the
ownership and control that the doctrine denotes will be less than full if the
possession that should be with the State as owner, but is elsewhere
without any authority, can anyway be recognized.
From the perspective of the PLA under which grant can be
claimed under its Section 48 (b), it is very important to note that this
law does not apply until a classification into alienable and disposable
land of the public domain is made. If the PLA does not apply prior to a
public land's classification as alienable and disposable, how can
possession under its Section 48 (b) be claimed prior such classification?
There can simply be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet
classified as disposable or alienable because, in the absence of such
classification, the land remains unclassified public land that fully belongs to
the State. This is fully supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of CA 141.
29 If the land is either mineral or timber and can never be the subject of

administration and disposition, it defies legal logic to allow the possession

of these unclassified lands to produce legal effect. Thus, the classification
of public land as alienable and disposable is inextricably linked to effective
possession that can ripen into a claim under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is essentially a civil
law term that can best be understood in terms of the Civil Code in the
absence of any specific definition in the PLA other than in terms of time of
possession. 30 Article 530 of the Civil Code provides that "[O]nly things and
rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession." Prior to the declaration of alienability, a land of the public
domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed possession cannot
have legal effects. This perspective fully complements what has been said
above under the constitutional and PLA reasons. It confirms, too, that the
critical difference the ponencia saw in the Bracewell and Naguit situations
does not really exist. Whether an application for registration is filed before
or after the declaration of alienability becomes immaterial if, in one as in
the other, no effective possession can be recognized prior to the
declaration of alienability.
Third. Statutory construction and the cut-off date June 12,
1945. The ponencia assumes, based on its statutory construction
reasoning and its reading of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, that all that the law
requires is possession from June 12, 1945 and that it suffices if the land
has been classified as alienable at the time of application for registration.
As heretofore discussed, this cut-off date was painstakingly set by law and
should be given full significance. Its full import appears from PD 1073 that
amended Section 48 (b), whose exact wordings state:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c),
Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense
that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Under this formulation, it appears clear that PD 1073 did not
expressly state what Section 48 (b) should provide under the amendment
PD 1073 introduced in terms of the exact wording of the amended Section
48 (b). But under the PD 1073 formulation, the intent to count the
alienability to June 12, 1945 appears very clear. The provision applies only
to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain that is described in
terms of the character of the possession required since June 12, 1945.
This intent seen in the direct, continuous and seamless linking of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to June 12, 1945
under the wording of the Decree is clear and should be respected.
Fourth. Other Modes of Acquisition of lands under the PLA.
Naguit's absurdity argument that the ponencia effectively adopted is more
apparent than real, since the use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for the
declaration of alienability will not render the grant of alienable public lands
out of reach. The acquisition of ownership and title may still be obtained by
other modes under the PLA. Among other laws, RA 6940, mentioned
above, now allows the use of free patents. 31 It was approved on March 28,
1990; hence, counting 30 years backwards, possession since April 1960 or
thereabouts may qualify a possessor to apply for a free patent. The
administrative modes provided under Section 11 of the PLA are also open,
particularly, homestead settlement and sales.
Fifth. Addressing the wisdom the absurdity of the law. This
Court acts beyond the limits of the constitutionally-mandated separation of
powers in giving Section 48 (b), as amended by PD 1073, an interpretation
beyond its plain wording. Even this Court cannot read into the law an intent
that is not there even your purpose is to avoid an absurd situation. If we
feel that a law already has absurd effects because of the passage of time,
our role under the principle of separation of powers is not to give the law
an interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the perceived absurdity.
We thereby dip into the realm of policy a role delegated by the
Constitution to the Legislature. If only for this reason, we should avoid
expanding through Naguit and the present ponencia the plain
meaning of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, as amended by PD 1073.
In standing by Naguit, the ponencia pointedly discredits the ruling in
Herbieto; it is, allegedly, either an incorrect ruling or an obiter dictum. As to
legal correctness, Herbieto is in full accord with what we have stated
above; hence, it cannot be dismissed off-hand as an incorrect ruling.
Likewise, its ruling on the lack of effective legal possession prior to the
classification of a public land as alienable and disposable cannot strictly be
obiter because it responded to an issue directly raised by the parties.
Admittedly, its ruling on jurisdictional grounds could have fully resolved the
case, but it cannot be faulted if it went beyond this threshold issue into the
merits of the claim of effective possession prior to the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable.
To be sure, Herbieto has more to it than the Naguit ruling that the
ponencia passes off as the established and definitive rule on possession
under Section 14 (1) of the PRD. There, too, is the undeniable reason
that no definitive ruling touching on Section 14 (1) can be deemed to
have been established in the present case since the applicant Heirs
could only prove possession up to 1948. For this reason, the
ponencia falls back on and examines Section 14 (2) of the PRD. In
short, if there is a perfect example of a ruling that is not necessary for
the resolution of a case, that unnecessary ruling is the ponencia's
ruling that Naguit is now the established rule.
Section 14 (2)
Section 14 (2), by its express terms, applies only to private
lands. Thus, on plain reading, it does not apply to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain that Section 14 (1) covers. This
is the difference between Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2).
The ponencia, as originally formulated, saw a way of expanding the
coverage of Section 14 (2) via the Civil Code by directly applying civil law
provisions on prescription on alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. To quote the obiter dictum in Naguit that the ponencia wishes to
enshrine as the definitive rule and leading case on Sections 14 (1) and 14
(2): 32
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the
Civil Code. There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of
at least thirty (30) years. With such conversion, such property may
now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section
14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have
acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of
the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12,
1945, and such possession being open, continuous and exclusive,
then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The ponencia then posits that Article 1113 of the Civil Code should be
considered in the interpretation of Section 14 (2). Article 1113 of the Civil
Code provides:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any
of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object
of prescription.
The application of Article 1113 assumes, of course, that (1) the Civil Code
fully applies to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; (2)
assuming that the Civil Code fully applies, these properties are patrimonial
and are therefore "private property"; and (3) assuming that the Civil Code
fully applies, that these properties are within the commerce of men and
can be acquired through prescription.
I find the Naguit obiter to be questionable because of the above
assumptions and its direct application of prescription under Section 14 (2)
to alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. This Section
becomes relevant only once the ownership of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain vests in the occupant or
possessor pursuant to the terms of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, with or
without judicial confirmation of title, so that the land has become a
private land. At that point, Section 14 (2) becomes fully operational on
what had once been an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
Hierarchy of Law in Reading PRD's
Section 14 (2)
The hierarchy of laws governing the lands of the public domain is
clear from Article XII, Section 3 of the Constitution. There are matters that
the Constitution itself provides for, and some that are left for Congress to
deal with. Thus, under Section 3, the Constitution took it upon itself to
classify lands of the public domain, and to state that only agricultural lands
may be alienable lands of the public domain. It also laid down the terms
under which lands of the public domain may be leased by corporations and
individuals. At the same time, it delegated to Congress the authority to
classify agricultural lands of the public domain according to the uses to
which they may be devoted. Congress likewise determines, by law, the
size of the lands of the public domain that may be acquired, developed,
held or leased, and the conditions therefor.
In acting on the delegation, Congress is given the choice on how it
will act, specifically, whether it will pass a general or a special law. On
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, Congress has, from
the very beginning, acted through the medium of a special law, specifically,
through the Public Land Act that by its terms "shall apply to the lands of the
public domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special
laws." Notably, the Act goes on to provide that nothing in it "shall be
understood or construed to change or modify the administration and
disposition of the lands commonly called 'friar lands' and those which,
being privately owned, have reverted to or become property of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and disposition
shall be governed by laws at present in force or which may hereafter be
enacted." 33 Under these terms, the PLA can be seen to be a very specific
act whose coverage extends only to lands of the public domain; in this
sense, it is a special law on that subject.
In contrast, the Civil Code is a general law that covers general rules
on the effect and application of laws and human relations; persons and
family relations; property and property relations; the different modes of
acquiring ownership; and obligations and contracts. 34 Its general nature is
best appreciated when in its Article 18, it provides that: "In matters which
are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency
shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code."
 The Civil Code has the same relationship with the PRD with respect
to the latter's special focus land registration and fully applies civil law
provisions in so far only as they are allowed by the PRD. One such case
where the Civil Code is expressly allowed to apply is in the case of Section
14 (2) of the PRD which calls for the application of prescription under
existing laws.
As already explained above, the PLA and the PRD have their own
specific purposes and are supreme within their own spheres, subject only
to what the higher Constitution provides. Thus, the PRD must defer to what
the PLA provides when the matter to be registered is an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
Application of the Civil Code
In its Book II, the Civil Code has very clear rules on property,
including State property. It classifies property as either of public dominion
or of private ownership, 35 and property for public use, public service and
those for the development of the national wealth as property of the public
dominion. 36 All property not so characterized are patrimonial property of
the State 37 which are susceptible to private ownership, 38 against which
prescription will run. 39
In reading all these provisions, it should not be overlooked that they
refer to the properties of the State in general, i.e., to both movable and
immovable properties. 40 Thus, the Civil Code provisions on property
do not refer to land alone, much less do they refer solely to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. For this specie of land,
the PLA is the special governing law and, under the Civil Code itself,
the Civil Code provisions shall apply only in case of deficiency. 41
This conclusion gives rise to the question can alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain at the same time be patrimonial
property of the State because they are not for public use, public purpose,
and for the development of national wealth?
The answer to this question can be found, among others, in the
interaction discussed above between the PLA and PRD, on the one hand,
and the Civil Code, on the other, and will depend on the purpose for which
an answer is necessary.
If, as in the present case, the purpose is to determine whether a
grant or disposition of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain has been made, then the PLA primarily applies and the Civil Code
applies only suppletorily. The possession and occupation that the PLA
recognizes is based on its Section 48 (b) and, until the requirements of this
Section are satisfied, the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain remains a State property that can be disposed only under the
terms of Section 11 of the PLA. In the face of this legal reality, the question
of whether for purposes of prescription an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain is patrimonial or not becomes immaterial; a
public land, even if alienable and disposable, is State property and
prescription does not run against the State. 42 In other words, there is no
room for any hairsplitting that would allow the inapplicable concept
of prescription under the Civil Code to be directly applied to an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain before this land
satisfies the terms of a grant under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Given this conclusion, any further discussion of the patrimonial
character of alienable and disposable public lands under the norms of the
Civil Code is rendered moot and academic.
From the prism of the overriding regalian doctrine that all lands of
the public domain are owned by the State, an applicant for land registration
invoking Section 14 (2) of the PRD to support his claim must first clearly
show that the land has been withdrawn from the public domain through an
express and positive act of the government. 43
A clear express governmental grant or act withdrawing a particular
land from the mass of the public domain is provided both in the old and the
prevailing Public Land Acts. These laws invariably provide that compliance
with the required possession of agricultural public land (under the first and
second PLAs) or alienable and disposable land of the public domain
(under the prevailing PLA) in the manner and duration provided by law is
equivalent to a government grant. Thus, the land ipso jure becomes private
land. It is only at that point that the "private land" requirement of Section 14
(2) materializes. 44
Prescription
In my original Dissent (in response to the original ponencia), I
discussed ordinary acquisitive prescription as an academic exercise to
leave no stone unturned in rejecting the ponencia's original conclusion that
prescription directly applies to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under Section 14 (2) of the PRD. I am happy to note that the
present ponencia has adopted, albeit without any attribution, part of my
original academic discussion on the application of the Civil Code,
particularly on the subjects of patrimonial property of the State and
prescription.
Specifically, I posited assuming arguendo that the Civil Code
applies that the classification of a public land as alienable and
disposable does not per se signify that the land is patrimonial under the
Civil Code since property, to be patrimonial, must not be for public use, for
public purpose or for the development of national wealth. Something more
must be done or shown beyond the fact of classification. The ponencia
now concedes that "[T]here must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public use or the development of the national wealth, under Article 422
of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can
the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public domain
begin to run."
I agree with this statement as it describes a clear case when the
property has become private by the government's own declaration so that
prescription under the Civil Code can run. Note in this regard that there is
no inconsistency between this conclusion and the hierarchy of laws on
lands of the public domain that I expounded on. To reiterate, the PLA
applies as a special and primary law when a public land is classified
as alienable and disposable, and remains fully and exclusively
applicable until the State itself expressly declares that the land now
qualifies as a patrimonial property. At that point, the application of
the Civil Code and its law on prescription are triggered. The
application of Section 14 (2) of the PRD follows.
To summarize, I submit in this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
that:
1. The hierarchy of laws on public domain must be given full
application in considering lands of the public domain. Top consideration
should be accorded to the Philippine Constitution, particularly its Article XII,
followed by the consideration of applicable special laws the PLA and the
PRD, insofar as this Decree applies to lands of the public domain. The Civil
Code and other general laws apply to the extent expressly called for by the
primary laws or to supply any of the latter's deficiencies.
2. The ruling in this ponencia and in Naguit that the classification
of public lands as alienable and disposable does not need to date back to
June 12, 1945 at the latest, is wrong because:
a. Under the Constitution's regalian doctrine, classification is
a required step whose full import should be given full
effect and recognition; giving legal effect to possession
prior to classification runs counter to the regalian
doctrine.
b. The Public Land Act applies only from the time a public
land is classified as alienable and disposable; thus,
Section 48 (b) of this law and the possession it requires
cannot be recognized prior to any classification.
c. Under the Civil Code, "[O]nly things and rights which are
susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession." Prior to the classification of a public land as
alienable and disposable, a land of the public domain
cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed possession
cannot have legal effects.
 d. There are other modes of acquiring alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under the Public
Land Act; this legal reality renders the ponencia's
absurdity argument misplaced.
e. The alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom of
the law and is a matter for the Legislature, not for this
Court, to address.
Consequently, Naguit must be abandoned and rejected for being based on
legally-flawed premises and for being an aberration in land registration
jurisprudence. At the very least, the present ponencia cannot be viewed as
an authority on the effective possession prior to classification since this
ruling, by the ponencia's own admission, is not necessary for the resolution
of the present case.

Footnotes

1. "Hernando de Soto Interview" by Reason Magazine dated 30 November

1999, at http://www.reason.com/news/show/32213.html (Last visited, 21
April 2009).
2. More particularly described and delineated in Plan CSD-04-017123.
Records, p. 161.
3. But see note 5.
4. Id.
5. The trial court decision identified Eduardo Velazco as the vendor of the
property, notwithstanding the original allegation in the application that
Malabanan purchased the same from Virgilio Velazco. See note 3. In his
subsequent pleadings, including those before this Court, Malabanan or his
heirs stated that the property was purchased from Eduardo Velazco, and not
Virgilio. On this point, the appellate court made this observation:
"More importantly, Malabanan failed to prove his ownership over Lot 9864-A.
In his application for land registration, Malabanan alleged that he purchased
the subject lot from Virgilio Velazco. During the trial of the case, however,
Malabanan testified that he purchased the subject lot from Eduardo
Velazco, which was corroborated by his witness, Aristedes Velazco, a son of
Virgilio Velazco, who stated that Eduardo was a brother of his grandfather.
As aptly observed by the Republic, no copy of the deed of sale covering Lot
9864-A, executed either by Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco, in favor of
Malabanan was marked and offered in evidence. In the appealed Decision,
the court a quo mentioned of a deed of sale executed in 1995 by Eduardo
Velazco in favor of Malabanan which was allegedly marked as Exhibit "I". It
appears, however, that what was provisionally marked as Exhibit "I" was a
photocopy of the deed of sale executed by Virgilio Velazco in favor of Leila
 Benitez and Benjamin Reyes. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to
rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Thus, Malabanan has not proved
that Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco was his predecessor-in-interest." Rollo, pp.
39-40.

6. Rollo, p. 74.
7. Id. at 38. Emphasis supplied.
8. Penned by Associate Justice Marina Buzon of the Court of Appeals Fifth
Division, and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo Sundiam and
Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa.
9. G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183.
10. See rollo, p. 11.
11. G.R. No. 144507, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.
12. Through a Resolution dated 5 December 2007. See rollo, p. 141.
13. Id. at 186-187.
14. G.R. No. 157466, 21 June 2007, 525 SCRA 268.
15. G.R. No. 166865, 2 March 2007, 459 SCRA 271.
16. G.R. No. 147359, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA 92.
17. G.R. No. 173088, 25 June 2008, 555 SCRA 314.
18. G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 178 SCRA 708.
19. G.R. No. 154953, 16 June 2008.
20. Section 6, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.
21. Section 9, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.
22. Section 11, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.
23. OSG Memorandum, p. 13.
24. Section 47, Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 9176.
25. R. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3rd ed., 1995) at 182.
26. See note 3.
27. 380 Phil. 156 (2000).
28. Also known as Republic v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 697 (2002).
29. Id. at 710-712.
30. See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1113.
31. See e.g., Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992,
214 SCRA 604, 611; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24
August 1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576; Group Commander, Intelligence and
Security Group v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).
32. See Article 1134, CIVIL CODE.
33. See Article 1137, CIVIL CODE.
34. See Article 1117 in relation to Article 1128, Civil Code. See also Articles
526, 527, 528 & 529, Civil Code on the conditions of good faith required.
35. See Article 1117, in relation to Article 1129, Civil Code.
36. Citing Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214
SCRA 604, 611; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August
1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576; Group Commander, Intelligence and Security
Group v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).
37. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, immediately before its
amendment by Rep. Act No. 1942, reads as follows:
"Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the Government, since
July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter".
38. Again, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 1942, was superseded by P.D. No. 1073, which imposed the 12 June
1945 reckoning point, and which was then incorporated in Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
39. See Villarico v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 136438, 11 November 2004, 442
SCRA 110.
40. Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7.
41. Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 4 (a).
42. Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7.
43. Id.
44. Section 2, Rep. Act No. 7227.
45. See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1128.
46. A. TOLENTINO, IV CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (1991 ed.) at
26; citing 2 Castan 175.
47. Memorandum of the OSG, p. 21.
48. See Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. 44 (1938).
49. Act No. 496.
50. See Section 19, Land Registration Act, which allowed application for
registration of title by "person or persons claiming, singly or collectively, to
own the legal estate in fee simple".
51. See note 24.
52. See Section 118, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.
"Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or
institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall
not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of
the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of
issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but
the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to
qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and
before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval
shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds".
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 21 August 1994, 235
SCRA 567, 576.
2. As in the case where the land was already the subject of a grant by the
State to a private person, but the latter failed to immediately register his title,
thus, allowing another person to acquire title to the land by prescription
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
3. Department of Agrarian Reform v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 1048,
1052 (1996).
4. See De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 397, 408 (1998).
5. Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 901, 909-910
(2000).
6. G.R. No. 144057, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.
7. G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183.
8. Delta Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 173, 186 (1997).
9. 429 Phil. 194, 203-204 (2002).
10. 1 C.J.S. 314-315, as quoted in the dissenting opinion of Tuason, J., in
Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, 125 (1948).
11. See Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 196
SCRA 476; Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 680, 695-696
(1987); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 232 Phil. 444, 457 (1987), cited in
Republic v. Herbieto, supra note 7. See also Republic v. Court of Appeals,
 238 Phil. 475, 486-487 (1987); Republic v. Bacus, G.R. No. 73261, 11
August 1989, 176 SCRA 376-380; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
38810, 7 May 1992; 208 SCRA 428, 434; De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals,
349 Phil. 898, 904 (1998); Republic v. De Guzman, 383 Phil. 479, 485
(2000).
12. See National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 45664,
29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 41, 54.
BRION, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. G.R. No. 144507, January 17, 2005, 442 SCRA 445.
2. Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended (CA 141).
3. See Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002,
390 SCRA 343.
4. CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 2.
5. See Republic v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA
182.
6. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, amending Act No. 496 that originally
brought the Torrens system into the Philippines in 1903.
7. Substantive law is that which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action,
that part of the law which courts are established to administer, as opposed
to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights
or obtain redress for their invasion (Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446.) It is
the nature and the purpose of the law which determines whether it is
substantive or procedural, and not its place in the statute, or its inclusion in
a code (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume I [Ninth Revised
Edition], p. 19). Note that Section 55 of the PLA refers to the Land
Registration Act (the predecessor law of the PRD) on how the Torrens title
may be obtained.
8. CIVIL CODE, Book II (Property, Ownership and its Modifications),
Articles 415-711.
9. CIVIL CODE, Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Articles
1106-1155.
10. See the consolidated cases of The Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, G.R. No. 167707 and Sacay v.
The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 173775, jointly decided on October 8, 2008 (the Boracay cases).
11. CIVIL CODE, Article 18.
12. Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development v. Intermediate
Appellate Court and J. Antonio Araneta, G.R. No. 73246, March 2, 1993,
219 SCRA 339.
13. See the Boracay cases, supra note 8.
14. See the opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno (now Chief Justice) in Cruz
v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (G.R.
No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128) quoted in Collado (supra
note 2).
15. Enunciated in the old case of Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48
Phil. 424 (1925); See Abejaron v. Nabasa, cited on p. 10 of this Dissent.
16. PLA, Sections 49-56; the reference to the Land Registration Act (Act
No. 496) should now be understood to mean the PRD which repealed Act
496.
17. An Act to Amend Subsection (b) of Section Forty Eight of
Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty One, otherwise known
as the The Public Land Act.
18. Extending the Period of Filing Applications for Administrative
Legislation (Free Patent) and Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect and
Incomplete Titles to Alienable and Disposable Lands in the Public Domain
Under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141, As
Amended, For Eleven (11) Years Commencing January 1, 1977.
19. G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 47.
20. Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of
the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings.
21. Section 1 of PD 892 states:
SEC. 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is
discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet
covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish
titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration
proceedings under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the
Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act. 3344.

22. An Act Granting a Period ending on December 31, 2000 for Filing
Applications for Free Patent and Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title to
Alienable and Disposable Lands of the Public Domain under Chapters VII
and VIII of the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended).
23. R.A. No. 9176, Section 2.
24. See pp. 14-15 of the ponencia.
25. Supra note 1.
26. G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183, 201-202.
27. 440 Phil. 697 (2002); penned by Mme. Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago.
28. CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 2.
29. SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class
to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of
alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall
from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act.
SEC. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when
practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or
quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner
become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which,
having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the
President may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public
domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries
established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reason, suspend their
concession or disposition until they are again declared open to concession
or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the National
Assembly.
SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands
of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified,
according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as
follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;
(d) Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in
this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands
from one class to another.
 SEC. 10. The words "alienation", "disposition", or "concession" as
used in this Act, shall mean any of the methods authorized by this Act
for the acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of the public
domain other than timber or mineral lands.
30. See: Article 18, Civil Code.
31. See: pp. 10-11 of this Dissent.
32. See p. 20 of the ponencia.
33. CA 141, Section 2.
34. These are the Introductory Chapters and Books I to IV of the Civil
Code.
35. CIVIL CODE, Article 419.
36. Id., Article 420.
37. Id., Article 421.
38. Id., Article 425.
39. Id., Article 1108.
40. Article 415 of the Civil Code defines immovable property, while Article
416 defines movable property.
41. CIVIL CODE, Article 18.
42. Id., Article 1108.
43. Supra note 10, Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court.
44. At this point, prescription can be invoked, not by the
occupant/possessor who now owns the land in his private capacity, but
against the new owner by whomsoever shall then occupy the land and
comply with the ordinary or extraordinary prescription that the Civil Code
ordains. This assumes that the new owner has not placed the land under
the Torrens system; otherwise, indefeasibility and imprescriptibility would set
in.