Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
(CEV654)
Chp. 6:
RISK ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT
FACULTY OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERING
UiTM PULAU PINANG
1
Course Outcome
Identify the basic principles of process hazard analysis and
safety related to the chemical engineering / environmental issues
(A4).
Explain the issues and solutions in managing the chemical
engineering / environment using the basic principles of process
hazard analysis and safety (C6).
Present solutions related to the chemical engineering /
environmental issues using the basic principles of process
hazard analysis and safety in a report (C6).
2
Course Learning Outcome
The student should be able to :
Illustrate the risk
Assess the acceptability criteria and safe distance
Evaluate Qualitative and quantitative risk assessment
(QRA)
Evaluate fire radiation
Evaluate explosion
Evaluate toxic release
Measure probit analysis
Analyze vulnerability models
Describe the operation of each equipments/ system.
Plan risk reduction and management.
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Definition of Risk
Risk = a measure of human injury, environmental
damage, or economic loss in terms of both the
incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss
injury.
Risk can be assessed either qualitatively or
quantitatively.
Risk is considered proportional to the expected losses
which can be caused by an event and to the
probability of this event. The harsher the loss and the
more likely the event, the greater the overall risk.
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Likelihood
Likelihood = frequency values or with respect to how
easy it is for a person to exploit a threat.
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Likelihood levels
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Consequences/Severity
Described in terms of consequences for the patient (user) and
consequences for the service or the service provider.
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Risk level
Risk = Likelihood x Severity/Consequences
Three distinct levels for risks; Low, medium, and high.
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Different Risk Level
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Acceptability of Risk
The acceptability of a risk depends on many factors.
In their everyday lives, people do not simply accept or
reject risks. Rather, they make choices among courses of
actions, whose consequences may include risks.
If people accept a course of action, like deciding to drive
somewhere, despite knowing about risks, then those
risks might be termed acceptable in the context of the
other consequences of that action.
A technology should be acceptable to an individual if it
creates an acceptable balance of personal risks and
benefits.
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What is ALARP?
Many regulatory authorities require that risks should be
within acceptable limits and As Low As Reasonably
Practicable (ALARP).
To demonstrate that risks are ALARP, one must show
that enough has been done to reduce risks.
In cases where the risks are well-defined, it is sufficient
to show that recognized good practices have been
implemented.
In more complex situations, i.e., where the technology is
new, to demonstrate risks are ALARP, one should show
that all reasonably practicable risk reduction measures
have been implemented.
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Pool Fire
Liquid spilled onto the ground
spreads out to form a pool.
Volatile liquid (e.g. petrol)
evaporate to atmosphere and soon
form flammable mixture with air.
Upon ignition, a fire will burn
over the pool.
The heat vaporizes more fuel and
air is drawn in round to the side to
support combustion.
Danger to people is by direct
thermal radiation and burn.
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Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
(BLEVE)
BLEVE, pronounced /blvi/ ("blevvy"), is an acronym
for "boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion".
It is the result of a liquid within a container reaching a
temperature well above its boiling point at
atmospheric temperature, causing the vessel to
rupture into two or more pieces.
A BLEVE can occur when fire impinges on the tank
shell at a point or points above the liquid level of the
contents of the tank.
This impingement causes the metal to weaken and fail
from the internal pressure. 17
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Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
(BLEVE)
BLEVEs can also be caused by an external fire near
the storage vessel causing heating of the contents
and pressure build-up.
Such explosions can be extremely hazardous.
BLEVEs can result from mechanical damage to a
tank, as well.
This damage can be the result of a train derailment,
traffic accident, or other physical shock.
When a BLEVE occurs, debris may travel hundreds of
feet, with tremendous force, and the escaping fuel
can ignite causing an expanding fireball. 18
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Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
(BLEVE)
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Jet Fire
High pressure release of gas from
a vessel or pipeline ignites almost
immediately.
This give rises to a giant burner or
flame length tens of meters.
Danger from thermal radiation
and also impingement on adjacent
pressurized vessel, such as LPG
vessel, heating the content
followed by pressure build up
causing boiling liquid expanding
vapor explosion (BLEVE). 23
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Jet Fire Model Cook, Baharami and
Whitehouse
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The heat flux received by the target at a distance
on the ground from the center of the fireball is
given as:
qe = EF21x103
Where:
qe = radiation heat flux received by the target (W/m2)
= atmospheric transmissivity (no units) = 1
E = radiation heat flux from the surface of the fireball
(kW/m2 or kJ/m2.s)
F21 = view factor, D2/4L2 (no units)
L = distance from the centre of the fireball (m)
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The heat flux from the surface of a fireball
due to BLEVE
E = (RMHc) / (D2td)
Where:
E = radiation heat flux from the surface of the fire (kJ/m2s)
R = fraction of the heat combustion produced converted to heat flux (no
units)
= 0.3 for fireball from a vessel that fracture at a pressure lower then the set
pressure of the relief valve
M = initial mass of flammable material in the fireball (kg)
Hc = heat of combustion of the flammable material (kJ/kg)
= 45, 000 kJ/kg (assumed Hc for the hydrocarbon)
D = maximum diameter of the fireball (m)
td = time for fireball to last (s) 29
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Probit for death due to thermal
radiation is given by:
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Solution
a)
D 5.8M1/3 5.8(50,000)1/ 3 213.7 m
t d 0.9M
0.25
0.9(50,000)
0.25
13.4 s
b)
RMHc
E
D2t d
E
0.3 50,000 45,000
351.107 kJ/m2s
(213.7)2 13.4
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Solution
b) qe EF21 103
Y 14.9 2.56 ln t eqe
4/3
/ 10 4
Take te = 10 s, as it takes only 10 s for people to
evacuate
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Solution
b)
5.00 14.9 2.56 ln 10qe
4/3
/ 10 4
qe 60530 W/m2
60530L 2 4.008 10 9
L 257 m
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The scaled overpressure also can be estimated from the
figure below:
1000
Scaled overpressure, Ps
100
10
0.1
0.01
0.01 0.1 1 10 100
Scaled distance, ze (m/kg1/3)
Sachs-scaled distance:
= 1
3
where
is the Sachs-scaled distance from the charge (dimensionless)
R is the distance from the charge (m)
E is the charge combustion energy (J)
Po is the ambient pressure (Pa)
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TNO Multi-Energy Method Calculation:
Blast peak side-on overpressure:
=
where
Ps is the side-on blast overpressure (Pa)
is the Sachs-scaled side on blast overpressure (dimensionless)
is the ambient pressure (Pa)
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Baker-Strehlow Methods
First the dimensions of the cloud will be
determined and then the energy of the
explosion exactly as it was carried out in
the case of the Multi-Energy method.
Following that the overpressure will be
calculated as a function of the scaled distance,
with the flame speed as a parameter.
The effects of the shock wave to people and
materials will be calculated, as a function of the
overpressure at a given distance.
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Baker-Strehlow Methods
Cloud Dimensions
The radius of the resulting cloud, R (m), is derived from the volume,
V (m3) of the cloud, being considered as a hemisphere, as
In the case that the leaked fluid is in the liquid state (pool of flammable
liquid), then the liquid's evaporation rate must be multiplied with the
time until the explosion, so as to obtain the total amount of vapor that
participated in the development of the vapor cloud.
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Baker-Strehlow Methods
The parameters which influence the
flame speed according to the Baker-
Strehlow method [Baker et al. 1996,
Baker et al. 1998], are the way the
flame expands, the reactivity of the fuel
and the obstacle density.
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Baker-Strehlow Methods
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Baker-Strehlow Methods
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Baker-Strehlow Methods
Similar to the Multi-Energy method, in
the Baker-Strehlow method a scaled
pressure and a scaled distance is
defined as:
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Baker-Strehlow Methods
The calculation procedure is carried out in
the following steps:
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Toxic Release Calculation- Mass Dispersion
Model
Dispersion models describe the airborne transport of
toxic materials away from the accident site and into
the plant and community.
After a release, the airborne toxic is carried away by
the wind in a characteristic plume or a puff
The maximum concentration of toxic material occurs at
the release point (which may not be at ground level).
Concentrations downwind are less, due to turbulent
mixing and dispersion of the toxic substance with air.
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Plume
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Puff
Wind Direction
Puff at time
t1> 0 Puff at time
t2> t1
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Wind Speed
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Atmospheric Stability
Atmospheric stability relates to vertical mixing of the air.
During the day the air temperature decreases rapidly
with height, encouraging vertical motions.
At night the temperature decrease is less, resulting in
less vertical motion.
Temperature profiles for day and night situations are
shown in Figure 5.
Sometimes an inversion will occur. During and inversion,
the temperature increases with height, resulting in
minimal vertical motion. This most often occurs at night
as the ground cools rapidly due to thermal radiation. 64
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Figure 5: Day & Night Condition
Air temperature as a function of altitude for day and night conditions. The
temperature gradient affects the vertical air motion.
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Ground Condition
Ground conditions affect the mechanical mixing
at the surface and the wind profile with height.
Trees and buildings increase mixing while lakes
and open areas decrease it. Figure 6 shows the
change in wind speed versus height for a variety
of surface conditions.
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Figure 6: Effect of Ground Condition
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Plume
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Release
Source Dominance of
Internal Buoyancy Dominance of
Ambient
Turbulence
The initial acceleration and buoyancy of the released material affects the
plume character. The dispersion models discussed in this chapter
represent only ambient turbulence.
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Neutrally Buoyant Dispersion Model
Estimates concentration downwind of a
release
Two types
- Plume Model
- Puff Model
The puff model can be used to describe a
plume; a plume is simply the release of
continuous puffs.
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Neutrally Buoyant Dispersion Model
Consider the instantaneous release of a fixed mass of material, Qm*,
into an infinite expanse of air (a ground surface will be added later).
The coordinate system is fixed at the source. Assuming no reaction or
molecular diffusion, the concentration, C, of material due to this
release is given by the advection equation.
C
t
x j
u jC 0 (Eq 1)
2 C 2 C 2 C
0
x 2
y 2
z 2
Analytical Solution
C r
Qm
(15)
4K *r
C x, y, z
Qm
(16)
4K *
x y z
2 2 2 74
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1 C 2
C 2
C 2
C
K *
t x 2
y 2
z 2 (17)
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Case 2: Puff With No Wind
The initial condition required to solve Equation 17 is
C x, y, z 0 at t 0 (18)
C x, y, z, t
Qm*
exp
x2 y2 z 2
8 K t*
3
2 4 K *
t (20)
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Case 3: Non Steady State, Continuous Point
Release with No Wind
The applicable conditions are
- Constant mass release rate, Qm = constant,
- No wind, <uj> = 0, and
- Constant eddy diffusivity, Kj = K* in all directions
C r , t
Qm r
erfc
(21)
4K r
*
2 K *t
Analytical Solution in rectangular coordinates is
x 2 y 2 z 2 (22)
C x, y, z, t
Qm
erfc
4K * x2 y2 z 2 2 K *t
As t , Equations 21 and 22 reduce to the corresponding
steady state solutions, Equations 15 and 16.
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Case 4: Steady State, Continuous Point Release
with No Wind
The applicable conditions are
Continuous release, Qm = constant,
Wind blowing in x direction only, <uj> = <ux> = u =
constant, and
Constant eddy diffusivity, Kj = K* in all directions.
For this case, Equation 9 reduces to
u C 2 C 2 C 2 C
(23)
K * x x 2
y 2
z 2
C x, y, z
Qm
4K * x2 y2 z2
exp
2K
u
*
x2 y2 z 2 x
(24)
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Case 5: Puff with no wind. Eddy diffusivity a
function of direction
This is the same as Case 2, but with eddy diffusivity a function o
direction. The applicable conditions are -
- Puff release, Qm* = constant,
- No wind, <uj> = 0, and
- Each coordinate direction has a different, but constant eddy
diffusivity, Kx, Ky and Kz.
C 2 C 2 C 2 C
Kx Ky Kz (28)
t x 2
y 2
z 2
1 x2 2 2
C x, y, z , t
Qm y z (29)
exp
8t
32
KxKyKz
4t K x Ky K z
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Case 6 Steady state continuous point source
release with wind. Eddy diffusivity a function of
direction
This is the same as Case 4, but with eddy diffusivity a function
of direction. The applicable conditions are
Puff release, Qm* = constant,
Steady state, <C>/t = o,
Wind blowing in x direction only, <uj> = <ux> = u = constant,
Each coordinate direction has a different, but constant eddy diffusivity, Kx,
Ky and Kz, and.
C 2 C 2 C 2 C
u Kx Ky Kz
x x 2
y 2
z 2
u y2 2
C x, y, z
Qm z
exp (31)
4x K y K z 4 x K y K z 80
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Qm*
C x, y, z, t
8t
32
KxKyKz
1 x ut
2
y2 z 2
exp (33)
4t K x K y K
z
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Case 8 Puff with no wind with source on
ground
This is the same as Case 5, but with the source on the ground. The
ground represents an impervious boundary. As a result, the
concentration is twice the concentration as for Case 5. The solution
is 2 times Equation 29.
Qm*
C x, y, z, t
4t
32
KxKyKz
u x2 y 2
z 2
exp
4t K x Ky K z (34)
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u y2 2
C x, y, z
Qm z
exp (35)
2x K x K y 4 x K y K z
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uy 2
C x, y, z
Qm
exp
4x K y K z 4K z x
2 2
exp
u
z H r exp u
z H r (36)
4K z x 4K z x
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Pasquill-Gifford Model
Cases 1 through 10 described previously depend on the specification of
a value for the eddy diffusivity, Kj.
In general, Kj changes with position, time, wind velocity, and prevailing
weather conditions and it is difficult to determine.
Sutton solved this difficulty by proposing the following definition for a
dispersion coefficient
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Stability
x (m) sz (m)
class
100 300 sZ = 0.087x0.88
A
300 3000 log10sz = -1.67 + 0.902 log10x + 0.181(log10x)
100 500 sZ = 0.135x0.95
B
500 2 104 log10sz = -1.25 + 1.09 log10x + 0.0018(log10x)
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Data for puff releases
x = 100 m x = 4000 m
Stability
condition
sy (m) sz (m) sy (m) sz (m)
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Case 11 Puff. Instantaneous point source at ground level.
Coordinates fixed at release point. Constant wind in x direction only
with constant velocity u
This case is identical to Case 7. The solution has a form similar
to Equation 33.
z 2
2
Qm* y2
C x, y, z, t
1 x ut
exp
2 (38)
2 s xs ys z
32
2 s x s y s z
2
C x,0,0, t
Qm
exp
2 s xs ys z
3 2
2 s x (40)
The centre of the cloud is found at coordinates (ut,0,0). The
concentration at the centre of this moving cloud is given by
Qm*
C ut,0,0, t (41)
2 3 2s xs ys z
Dt id x, y, z C x, y, z, t dt
(42)
0
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The total integrated dose at ground level is found by integrating
Equation 39 according to Equation 42. The result is -
Qm* 1 y2
Dtid x, y,0
(43)
exp
s ys z u 2 s y2
C x,0,0, t
y sy 2 ln (45)
C x, y ,0, t
The procedure is
1. Specify <C>*, u, and t.
2. Determine the concentrations, <C> (x,0,0,t), along the x-axis using
Equation40. Define the boundary of the cloud along the x-axis.
3. Set <C> (x,y,0,t) = <C>* in Equation 45 and determine the values
of y at each centreline point determined in step 2.
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The procedure is repeated for each value of t required.
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C x, y,0
Q 1
exp
s ys z u 2 s y (47)
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C x,0,0
Q (48)
s ys z u
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2
C x, y, z
Qm 1 y
exp
2s ys z u 2 s y (49)
1 z Hr 1 z H
2
exp exp r
2 sz 2 s z
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1 y
2
2
C x, y, z
Qm 1 Hr
exp s
(50)
2s ys z u 2 s y
2 z
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The maximum ground level concentration along the x-axis,
<C>max, is found using.
2Qm sz
C (52)
max
euH r2 s y
For this case the centre of the puff is found at x = ut. The
average concentration is given by
y
2
C x, y, z, t
Qm 1
exp
2 s xs ys z
32
2 s y
1 z Hr
2
1 z H r
2
(54)
exp exp
2 s z 2 s z
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* 1 y 1 Hr
2 2
C x, y,0, t
Q m
exp (55)
2 3 2s xs ys z 2 s y
2 sz
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* 1 y 1 Hr
2 2
Dtid x, y,0
Q m
exp (57)
s ys z u 2 s y 2sz
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Probit equation
Y k1 k 2 ln V
Where:
Y = Probit Variable
k1 and k2 = constants
V = Causitive Variable
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Example
A blast produces a peak overpressure of 47,000 N/m2.
a) What fraction of structures will be damaged by
exposure to this overpressure?
b) What fraction of people exposed will die as a result
of lung hemorrhage?
c) What fraction will have eardrums ruptured?
d) What conclusions about the effects of this blast can
be drawn?
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Solution
Probit Equation
Y k1 k 2 ln V
Structural damage:
Y 23 .8 2.92 ln Po
Death from lung hemorrhage:
Y 77 .1 6.91 ln Po
Eardrum ruptures:
Y 15 .6 1.93 ln Po
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Solution
For Po 47,000 N/m 2
Structural damage:
Y 7.61
Death from lung hemorrhage:
Y 2.76
Eardrum ruptures:
Y 5.163
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Percent Affected
From probit-percentage conversion table
Eardrum ruptures 56
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Conclusion
The blast is not serious enough to expect fatalities,
but serious enough to cause extensive damage to
surrounding structures and to rupture eardrums of
more than half of the people exposed.
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