G.R. No.

114337 September 29, 1995

NITTO ENTERPRISES, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO CAPILI, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the decision1 rendered by public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired Roberto Capili
sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship
agreement2 for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75
which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage.

At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was working on,
accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby hospital.

Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office premises which was not
his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the process injured his left
thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private respondent.

The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter 3 which reads:

August 2, 1990

Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang experiensa kung papaano gamitin and
"TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin, sarili niyang desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya at
nadamay pa ang isang sekretarya ng kompanya.

Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng hapon siya ay pumasok sa shop
na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at nadisgrasya niya ang
kanyang sariling kamay.

Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:

Emergency and doctor fee P715.00

Medecines (sic) and others 317.04

Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod hanggang matanggal ang tahi ng
kanyang kamay.

Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo at ika-4 ng Agosto, 1990.

Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi ng kanyang kamay, pagkatapos
ng siyam na araw mula ika-2 ng Agosto.

Sa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang resignasyon, kasama ng kanyang
comfirmasyon at pag-ayon na ang lahat sa itaas ay totoo.

Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay aking pagkakasala sa hindi
pagsunod sa alintuntunin ng kompanya.

(Sgd.) Roberto Capili

Roberto Capili

On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of petitioner for and in consideration of
the sum of P1,912.79.4

1
Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch, National
Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits.

On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent as valid and
dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the ruling reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for cause, and the money claims
dismissed for lack of merit.

The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P500.00 as financial
assistance.

SO ORDERED.5

Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto Capilian was valid. First, private
respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the terms of their agreement when he acted with gross negligence
resulting in the injury not only to himself but also to his fellow worker. Second, private respondent had shown that "he
does not have the proper attitude in employment particularly the handling of machines without authority and proper
training.6

On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The respondent is hereby directed to reinstate
complainant to his work last performed with backwages computed from the time his wages were withheld
up to the time he is actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is hereby directed to further hear
complainant's money claims and to dispose them on the basis of law and evidence obtaining.

SO ORDERED.7

The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioner by ruling thus:

As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how an apprenticeship agreement
filed with the Department of Labor only on June 7, 1990 could be validly used by the Labor Arbiter as
basis to conclude that the complainant was hired by respondent as a plain "apprentice" on May 28, 1990.
Clearly, therefore, the complainant was respondent's regular employee under Article 280 of the Labor
Code, as early as May 28,1990, who thus enjoyed the security of tenure guaranteed in Section 3, Article
XIII of our 1987 Constitution.

The complainant being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then behooves upon respondent, pursuant
to Art. 227(b) and as ruled in Edwin Gesulgon vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 3rd Div.,
Feliciano, J.) to prove that the dismissal of complainant was for a valid cause. Absent such proof, we
cannot but rule that the complainant was illegally dismissed.8

On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private respondent's representative was
present.

On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads:

NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondent's] Motion for Issuance of the Writ, you are
hereby commanded to proceed to the premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and Jovy Foster located at
No. l 74 Araneta Avenue, Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any other places where their properties
are located and effect the reinstatement of herein [private respondent] to his work last performed or at the
option of the respondent by payroll reinstatement.

You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his backwages as called for in the
dispositive portion, and turn over such amount to this Office for proper disposition.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

The issues raised before us are the following:

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE.
2
 II

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID
CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

We find no merit in the petition.

Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be considered an apprentice
since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at the time the agreement was executed.

Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already established an employer-
apprentice relationship.

Petitioner's argument is erroneous.

The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides:

Contents of apprenticeship agreement. Apprenticeship agreements, including the main rates of

apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of
apprenticeship shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below
the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum
wage, may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister
of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of apprenticeship.
(emphasis supplied)

In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May 28,
1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an
apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However,
the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the
Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.

Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that
apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the
apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.

Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a
condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.

The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary step
towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.

Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship program through the
participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship
standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any
apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship agreement can be
fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be debased.

Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in the
absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was hired
not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered
as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code:

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to
be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for
a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time
of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature
and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and
his employment shall continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)

and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare." 9

Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent.
3
There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due process, substantive and
procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal exists. 10 Without which, the dismissal becomes void.

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. This simply means that the
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires.

Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to
prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation. 11

As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC: 12

The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2) written
notices before termination of employee can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which
informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him (Sec. 13, BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV,
Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code as amended). Failure to comply with the
requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is mandatory, in the absence of which,
any judgment reached by management is void and in existent (Tingson, Jr. vs. NLRC, 185 SCRA 498
[1990]; National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122; Ruffy vs. NLRC. 182 SCRA 365 [1990]).

The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three days after he was made to
sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was not voluntary and deliberate.

Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante").

He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned resignation letter and quitclaim
without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner made it clear to him that anyway, he did not have a choice. 13

Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the latter's alleged resignation
and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious examination of both events belies any spontaneity on
private respondent's part.

WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, the
appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

----------------------

Nitto Enterprises vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 114337 September 29, 1995

NITTO ENTERPRISES, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO CAPILI, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990
as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker, for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28,
1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage.
On August 2, he accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby hospital. In the
afternoon of the same day he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the process injured his
left thumb, prompting the petitioner to shoulder the medical expenses.
The next day, Capili was made to sign a Quit Claim and Release in favor of the petitioner and received P1, 912.79 as his
salary for the five days that he was unable to work due to his injury. But three days after, he filed an illegal dismissal
complaint and demanded monetary consideration thereof before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission in the National Capital Region.
But the Labor Arbiter dismissed his complaint citing two reasons: that private respondent who was hired as an apprentice
violated the terms of their agreement when he acted with gross negligence resulting in the injury not only to himself but
also to his fellow worker. And that private respondent had shown that "he does not have the proper attitude in employment
particularly the handling of machines without authority and proper training.
However, on July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
ordered for the reinstatement of Capili and that he must be given his back wages which shall be computed from the time
his wages were withheld up to the time he is actually reinstated.
Thus, Nito Enterprises filed a certiorari against NLRC alleging that the Commission committed grave abuse of discretion
in reversing the Labor Arbiters decision and in holding that the petitioner failed to prove a valid cause in the dismissal of
Capili.
4
Issues: Whether or not there was employer-apprentice relationship between petitioner and private respondent.
Whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the labor arbiter for failure to
provide valid cause.
Held:
Supreme Court ruled there was no employer-apprentice relationship between petitioner and private respondent because
the former failed to follow the guidelines set forth under Art 61 of the Labor Code to wit: Apprenticeship agreements,
including the main rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The
period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal
minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered into
only in accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry
shall develop standard model programs of apprenticeship.
In the case at bar, the Court found out that the apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the
Department of Labor and Employment on the day private respondent was hired and this was filed on June 7, 1990.
However, such program was not yet approved by the Department of Labor and Employment, but it was enforced the day it
was signed. The Court said the apprenticeship program was null and void because prior approval is a condition sine qua
non or indispensable. The act of finding the apprenticeship program was only the first step towards acquiring approval
from the Department of Labor and Employment. Thus the Court gave weight to the claim of private respondent that he
was hired as a kargador, his employment status thereof will fall under Art. 280 of the Labor Code regarding Regular and
Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where
the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in
nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
On the petitioners claim that there was valid cause in the dismissal of private respondent, the Court believed otherwise. It
said that, the fact that private respondent filed a complaint only three days after he was made to sign to a Quit Claim and
Release meant that the dismissal was deliberate and not voluntary. Such move by the petitioner the Court said was
against the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute which are essential elements of due process. Such
requirements mean that employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative, if he so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management
must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation.
Thus, finding no abuse of discretion, the Court dismissed the petition and upheld the decision of NLRC.

[G.R. No. 122917. July 12, 1999]

MARITES BERNARDO, ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE, REBECCA E. DAVID, DAVID P. PASCUAL, RAQUEL ESTILLER,
ALBERT HALLARE, EDMUND M. CORTEZ, JOSELITO O. AGDON GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR., CELSO M.
YAZAR, ALEX G. CORPUZ, RONALD M. DELFIN, ROWENA M. TABAQUERO, CORAZON C. DELOS
REYES, ROBERT G. NOORA, MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN, ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI, IKE
CABANDUCOS, COCOY NOBELLO, DORENDA CANTIMBUHAN, ROBERT MARCELO, LILIBETH Q.
MARMOLEJO, JOSE E. SALES, ISABEL MAMAUAG, VIOLETA G. MONTES, ALBINO TECSON, MELODY V.
GRUELA, BERNADETH D. AGERO, CYNTHIA DE VERA, LANI R. CORTEZ, MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION,
DINDO VALERIO, ZENAIDA MATA, ARIEL DEL PILAR, MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA, THELMA
SEBASTIAN, MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES, JEANNIE RAMIL, ROZAIDA PASCUAL, PINKY BALOLOA,
ELIZABETH VENTURA, GRACE S. PARDO & RICO TIMOSA, petitioners vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION & FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be granted the same terms and conditions of
employment as qualified able-bodied employees. Once they have attained the status of regular workers, they should be accorded all
the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding written or verbal contracts to the contrary. This treatment is rooted not merely on charity
or accommodation, but on justice for all.

The Case

Challenged in the Petition for Certiorari[1] before us is the June 20, 1995 Decision[2] of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC),[3] which affirmed the August, 22 1994 ruling of Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan. The labor arbiters
Decision disposed as follows:[4]

5
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above-mentioned complaint for lack of merit.

Also assailed is the August 4, 1995 Resolution[5] of the NLRC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts were summarized by the NLRC in this wise:[6]

Complainants numbering 43 (p. 176, Records) are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent
Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called Employment Contract for
Handicapped Workers. (pp. 68 & 69, Records) The full text of said agreement is quoted below:

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR HANDICAPPED WORKERS

This Contract, entered into by and between:

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a universal banking corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the
laws of the Philippines, with business address at FEBTC Building, Muralla, Intramuros, Manila, represented herein by its Assistant
Vice President, MR. FLORENDO G. MARANAN, (hereinafter referred to as the BANK);

- and -

________________, ________________ years old, of legal age, _____________, and residing at __________________ (hereinafter
referred to as the (EMPLOYEE).

WITNESSETH: That

WHEREAS, the BANK, cognizant of its social responsibility, realizes that there is a need to provide disabled and handicapped
persons gainful employment and opportunities to realize their potentials, uplift their socio-economic well being and welfare and make
them productive, self-reliant and useful citizens to enable them to fully integrate in the mainstream of society;

WHEREAS, there are certain positions in the BANK which may be filled-up by disabled and handicapped persons, particularly deaf-
mutes, and the BANK ha[s] been approached by some civic-minded citizens and authorized government agencies [regarding] the
possibility of hiring handicapped workers for these positions;

WHEREAS, the EMPLOYEE is one of those handicapped workers who [were] recommended for possible employment with the
BANK;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and in compliance with Article 80 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines as amended, the BANK and the EMPLOYEE have entered into this Employment Contract as follows:

1. The BANK agrees to employ and train the EMPLOYEE, and the EMPLOYEE agrees to diligently and faithfully work with the
BANK, as MoneySorter and Counter.

2. The EMPLOYEE shall perform among others, the following duties and responsibilities:

i Sort out bills according to color;

ii. Count each denomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a counting machine;

iii. Wrap and label bills per hundred;

iv. Put the wrapped bills into bundles; and

v. Submit bundled bills to the bank teller for verification.

3. The EMPLOYEE shall undergo a training period of one (1) month, after which the BANK shall determine whether or not he/she
should be allowed to finish the remaining term of this Contract.

4. The EMPLOYEE shall be entitled to an initial compensation of P118.00 per day, subject to adjustment in the sole judgment of the
BANK, payable every 15th and end of the month.

5. The regular work schedule of the EMPLOYEE shall be five (5) days per week, from Mondays thru Fridays, at eight (8) hours a
day. The EMPLOYEE may be required to perform overtime work as circumstance may warrant, for which overtime work he/she

6
[shall] be paid an additional compensation of 125% of his daily rate if performed during ordinary days and 130% if performed during
Saturday or [a] rest day.

6. The EMPLOYEE shall likewise be entitled to the following benefits:

i. Proportionate 13th month pay based on his basic daily wage.

ii. Five (5) days incentive leave.

iii. SSS premium payment.

7. The EMPLOYEE binds himself/herself to abide [by] and comply with all the BANK Rules and Regulations and Policies, and to
conduct himself/herself in a manner expected of all employees of the BANK.

8. The EMPLOYEE acknowledges the fact that he/she had been employed under a special employment program of the BANK, for
which reason the standard hiring requirements of the BANK were not applied in his/her case. Consequently, the EMPLOYEE
acknowledges and accepts the fact that the terms and conditions of the employment generally observed by the BANK with respect to
the BANKs regular employee are not applicable to the EMPLOYEE, and that therefore, the terms and conditions of the EMPLOYEEs
employment with the BANK shall be governed solely and exclusively by this Contract and by the applicable rules and regulations that
the Department of Labor and Employment may issue in connection with the employment of disabled and handicapped workers. More
specifically, the EMPLOYEE hereby acknowledges that the provisions of Book Six of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended,
particularly on regulation of employment and separation pay are not applicable to him/her.

9. The Employment Contract shall be for a period of six (6) months or from ____ to ____ unless earlier terminated by the BANK for
any just or reasonable cause. Any continuation or extension of this Contract shall be in writing and therefore this Contract will
automatically expire at the end of its terms unless renewed in writing by the BANK.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, have hereunto affixed their signature[s] this ____ day of _________________, ____________
at Intramuros, Manila, Philippines.

In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989 another two (2); in 1990, nineteen (19); in 1991 six (6); in
1992, six (6) and in 1993, twenty-one (21). Their employment[s] were renewed every six months such that by the time this case arose,
there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who were employed by respondent under the said employment agreement. The last one was
Thelma Malindoy who was employed in 1992 and whose contract expired on July 1993.

xxxxxxxxx

Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company maintained that complainants
who are a special class of workers the hearing impaired employees were hired temporarily under [a] special employment arrangement
which was a result of overtures made by some civic and political personalities to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired
due to pakiusap which must be considered in the light of the context of the respondent Banks corporate philosophy as well as its career
and working environment which is to maintain and strengthen a corps of professionals trained and qualified officers and regular
employees who are baccalaureate degree holders from excellent schools which is an unbending policy in the hiring of regular
employees; that in addition to this, training continues so that the regular employee grows in the corporate ladder; that the idea of hiring
handicapped workers was acceptable to them only on a special arrangement basis; that it adopted the special program to help tide over
a group of handicapped workers such as deaf-mutes like the complainants who could do manual work for the respondent Bank; that
the task of counting and sorting of bills which was being performed by tellers could be assigned to deaf-mutes; that the counting and
sorting of money are tellering works which were always logically and naturally part and parcel of the tellers normal functions; that
from the beginning there have been no separate items in the respondent Bank plantilla for sorters or counters; that the tellers
themselves already did the sorting and counting chore as a regular feature and integral part of their duties (p. 97, Records); that
through the pakiusap of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were relieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without
creating new positions as there is no position either in the respondent or in any other bank in the Philippines which deals with purely
counting and sorting of bills in banking operations.

Petitioners specified when each of them was hired and dismissed, viz: [7]

NAME OF PETITIONER WORKPLACE Date Hired Date Dismissed

1. MARITES BERNARDO Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93

2. ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE Intramuros 24 JAN 90 11 JAN 94

3. REBECCA E. DAVID Intramuros 16 APR 90 23 OCT 93

4. DAVID P. PASCUAL Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 21 NOV 94

5. RAQUEL ESTILLER Intramuros 2 JUL 92 4 JAN 94

7
6. ALBERT HALLARE West 4 JAN 91 9 JAN 94

7. EDMUND M. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 JAN 91 3 DEC 93

8. JOSELITO O. AGDON Intramuros 5 NOV 90 17 NOV 93

9. GEORGE P. LIGUTAN, JR. Intramuros 6 SEPT 89 19 JAN 94

10. CELSO M. YAZAR Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93

11. ALEX G. CORPUZ Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93

12. RONALD M. DELFIN Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93

13. ROWENA M. TABAQUERO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93

14. CORAZON C. DELOS REYES Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93

15. ROBERT G. NOORA Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93

16. MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN Intramuros 1 FEB 93 1 AUG 93

17. ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI Intramuros 22 JAN 93 22 JUL 93

18. IKE CABANDUCOS Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93

19. COCOY NOBELLO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93

20. DORENDA CATIMBUHAN Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93

21. ROBERT MARCELO West 31 JUL 93[8] 1 AUG 93

22. LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO West 15 JUN 90 21 NOV 93

23. JOSE E. SALES West 6 AUG 92 12 OCT 93

24. ISABEL MAMAUAG West 8 MAY 92 10 NOV 93

25. VIOLETA G. MONTES Intramuros 2 FEB 90 15 JAN 94

26. ALBINO TECSON Intramuros 7 NOV 91 10 NOV 93

27. MELODY V. GRUELA West 28 OCT 91 3 NOV 93

28. BERNADETH D. AGERO West 19 DEC 90 27 DEC 93

29. CYNTHIA DE VERA Bel-Air 26 JUN 90 3 DEC 93

30. LANI R. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 10 DEC 93

31. MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION West 6 SEPT 90 6 FEB 94

32. DINDO VALERIO Intramuros 30 MAY 93 30 NOV 93

33. ZENAIDA MATA Intramuros 10 FEB 93 10 AUG 93

34. ARIEL DEL PILAR Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93

35. MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA Intramuros 27 JUL 90 4 FEB 94

36. THELMA SEBASTIAN Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93

37. MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES West 6 JUN 92 7 DEC 93

38. JEANNIE RAMIL Intramuros 23 APR 90 12 OCT 93

8
39. ROZAIDA PASCUAL Bel-Air 20 APR 89 29 OCT 93

40. PINKY BALOLOA West 3 JUN 91 2 DEC 93

41. ELIZABETH VENTURA West 12 MAR 90 FEB 94 [SIC]

42. GRACE S. PARDO West 4 APR 90 13 MAR 94

43. RICO TIMOSA Intramuros 28 APR 93 28 OCT 93

As earlier noted, the labor arbiter and, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against herein petitioners. Hence, this recourse to this Court.[9]

The Ruling of the NLRC

In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed regular employees under Article 280 of the
Labor Code, as amended, Respondent Commission ratiocinated as follows:

We agree that Art. 280 is not controlling herein. We give due credence to the conclusion that complainants were hired as an
accommodation to [the] recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employment[s] were covered by xxx Employment
Contract[s] with special provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, as correctly held by the Labor Arbiter a
quo, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the parties.[10]

The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable, considering the prevailing
circumstances/milieu of the case.

Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners cite the following grounds in support of their cause:

I. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petitioners - money sorters and counters
working in a bank - were not regular employees.

II. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the employment contracts signed and renewed by
the petitioners - which provide for a period of six (6) months - were valid.

III. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in not applying the provisions of the Magna Carta for the
Disabled (Republic Act No. 7277), on proscription against discrimination against disabled persons. [11]

In the main, the Court will resolve whether petitioners have become regular employees.

This Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose contracts were
renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal.

Preliminary Matter: Propriety of Certiorari

Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company argues that a review of the findings of facts of the NLRC is not allowed in a
petition for certiorari.Specifically, it maintains that the Court cannot pass upon the findings of public respondents that petitioners were
not regular employees.
True, the Court, as a rule, does not review the factual findings of public respondents in a certiorari proceeding. In resolving
whether the petitioners have become regular employees, we shall not change the facts found by the public respondent. Our task is
merely to determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the law to the established facts, as above-
quoted from the assailed Decision.

Main Issue: Are Petitioners Regular Employees?

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 Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and counters was
necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the
application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as special workers and should not in any way be
considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank. [12] Rather, they were special workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code.
Private respondent contends that it never solicited the services of petitioners, whose employment was merely an accommodation in
response to the requests of government officials and civic-minded citizens. They were told from the start, with the assistance of
government representatives, that they could not become regular employees because there were no plantilla positions for money
sorters, whose task used to be performed by tellers. Their contracts were renewed several times, not because of need but merely for
humanitarian reasons. Respondent submits that as of the present, the special position that was created for the petitioners no longer
exist[s] in private respondent [bank], after the latter had decided not to renew anymore their special employment contracts.
At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private respondents effort to provide employment to
physically impaired individuals and to make them more productive members of society. However, we cannot allow it to elude the
legal consequences of that effort, simply because it now deems their employment irrelevant. The facts, viewed in light of the Labor
Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed
regular employees. As such, they have acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of
compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one month, after which
the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the
employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the
contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
According to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in accordance with Article 80 of the Labor Code,
which provides:

ART. 80. Employment agreement. Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall enter into an employment agreement with
them, which agreement shall include:

(a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be employed;

(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less than seventy five (75%) per cent of the applicable legal
minimum wage;

(c) The duration of employment period; and

(d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers.

The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives.

The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the aforecited provision. Succeeding events and the
enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons), [13] however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor
Code.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of
them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring
of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they
were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit
for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms
and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:

Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable employment. A
qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges,
benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.

The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of
Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the
Labor Code, which provides:

ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. -- The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of
the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.

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An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has
rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered as regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.

The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC,[14] in which this Court held:

The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of
the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been
performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and
continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the
business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.

Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. With the
exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. Thus, the following twenty-seven petitioners
should be deemed regular employees:Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller,
Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag,
Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B.
Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa,
Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo.
As held by the Court, Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of making permanent casuals
of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them probationary appointments, ad infinitum.[15] The contract signed
by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank determined the employees fitness for the job. When the
bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular
employees.[16] No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.
As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their services may be terminated
only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent failed to show such cause,[17] these twenty-seven petitioners are deemed
illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges.[18] Considering the allegation of respondent that the job of money sorting is no longer available because it has been
assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally belonged,[19] petitioners are hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.[20]
Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular employees and hence not entitled to the same
benefits.

Applicability of the Brent Ruling

Respondent bank, citing Brent School v. Zamora[21] in which the Court upheld the validity of an employment contract with a
fixed term, argues that the parties entered into the contract on equal footing. It adds that the petitioners had in fact an advantage,
because they were backed by then DSWD Secretary Mita Pardo de Tavera and Representative Arturo Borjal.
We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that the petitioners were disabled, and that the
bank had to determine their fitness for the position. Indeed, its validity is based on Article 80 of the Labor Code. But as noted earlier,
petitioners proved themselves to be qualified disabled persons who, under the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms
and conditions of employment enjoyed by qualified able-bodied individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because petitioners
are qualified for their positions. The validation of the limit imposed on their contracts, imposed by reason of their disability, was a
glaring instance of the very mischief sought to be addressed by the new law.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest.[22] Provisions of applicable
statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the
impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. [23] Clearly, the agreement of the parties regarding the
period of employment cannot prevail over the provisions of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners
must be treated as qualified able-bodied employees.
Respondents reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is instructive. Because the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
required that cash in the bank be turned over to the BSP during business hours from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., respondent resorted to
nighttime sorting and counting of money.Thus, it reasons that this task could not be done by deaf mutes because of their physical
limitations as it is very risky for them to travel at night. [24] We find no basis for this argument. Travelling at night involves risks to
handicapped and able-bodied persons alike. This excuse cannot justify the termination of their employment.

Other Grounds Cited by Respondent

Respondent argues that petitioners were merely accommodated employees. This fact does not change the nature of their
employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of service, not because of the mode
or even the reason for hiring them.

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 Equally unavailing are private respondents arguments that it did not go out of its way to recruit petitioners, and that its plantilla
did not contain their positions. In L. T. Datu v. NLRC,[25] the Court held that the determination of whether employment is casual or
regular does not depend on the will or word of the employer, and the procedure of hiring x x x but on the nature of the activities
performed by the employee, and to some extent, the length of performance and its continued existence.
Private respondent argues that the petitioners were informed from the start that they could not become regular employees. In fact,
the bank adds, they agreed with the stipulation in the contract regarding this point. Still, we are not persuaded. The well-settled rule is
that the character of employment is determined not by stipulations in the contract, but by the nature of the work
performed.[26] Otherwise, no employee can become regular by the simple expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract of
employment.
In this light, we iterate our ruling in Romares v. NLRC:[27]

Article 280 was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the circumvention of the employees right to be secure in his tenure by
indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements inconsistent with the concept of regular employment
defined therein. Where an employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business of the employer, such employee is deemed a regular employee and is entitled to security of tenure notwithstanding the
contrary provisions of his contract of employment.

xxxxxxxxx

At this juncture, the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora proves instructive. As reaffirmed in subsequent cases, this Court has
upheld the legality of fixed-term employment. It ruled that the decisive determinant in term employment should not be the activities
that the employee is called upon to perform but the day certain agreed upon the parties for the commencement and termination of their
employment relationship. But this Court went on to say that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been
imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public
policy and morals.

In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias in favor of the working class, but also the
concern of the State for the plight of the disabled. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely on
charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of qualified persons, disabled or not. In the present case, the
handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to their work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of
their employment contracts. Why then should they be dismissed, simply because they are physically impaired? The Court believes,
that, after showing their fitness for the work assigned to them, they should be treated and granted the same rights like any other regular
employees.
In this light, we note the Office of the Solicitor Generals prayer joining the petitioners cause. [28]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 20, 1995 Decision and the August 4, 1995
Resolution of the NLRC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company is hereby ORDERED to pay
back wages and separation pay to each of the following twenty-seven (27) petitioners, namely, Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante,
Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr.,
Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero,
Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes,
Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo. The NLRC is hereby directed to compute the
exact amount due each of said employees, pursuant to existing laws and regulations, within fifteen days from the finality of this
Decision.No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Bernardo vs NLRC

GR 122917 07/03/99

Facts:

Petitioners numbering 43 are deafmutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and
Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called Employment Contract for Handicapped
Workers. Subsequently, they are dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and counters was necessary
and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of
Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as special workers and should not in any way be
considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank.[12] Rather, they were special workers under Article 80 of the Labor
Code.
Issue: WON petitioners have become regular employees.
Held:

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The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one month, after which the
employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the
employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the
contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of
them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring
of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they
were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or
unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and
conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:
Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable
employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and the same
compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article
80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor
Code, which provides:
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless
of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, x x x
The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of
the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been
performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and
continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the
business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of
them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring
of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they
were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or
unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. With the
exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months.
Petition granted

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