Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
I. Independence (Sec. 1)
Safeguards insuring the independence of the Commissions:
a) They are constitutionally created; may not be abolished by
statute.
b) Each is expressly described as independent.
c) Each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot
be reduced by statute.
d) The Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by
impeachment.
e) The Chairmen and members are given a fairly long term of
office of seven years.
f) The Chairmen and members may not be reappointed or
appointed in an acting capacity
g) The salaries of the chairman and members are relatively high
and may not be decreased during continuance in office.
h) The Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy.
r) Each Commission may promulgate its own procedural rules,
provided they do not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights [though subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court],
j) The Chairmen and members are subject to certain
disqualifications calculated to strengthen their integrity.
k) The Commissions may appoint their own officials and
employees in accordance with Civil Service Law.
Designation of Acting Comelec Chairman affects independence
Sixto Brillantes, Jr. vs. Haydee T. Yorac,
G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990 (192 SCRA 358)
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino appointed Comelec Associate Commissioner
Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in
place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of
the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d
etat attempt. Petitioner Sixto Brillantes, Jr. questioned the appointment
in view of the status of the COMELEC as an independent constitutional
body and and the specific provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the
Constitution that (I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission
on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity. Brillantes further argued that the choice of the acting
chairman should not come from the President for such is an internal
matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that
the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the
COMELEC as a constitutional commission. He cites the practice in this
Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice
in the absence of the Chief Justice. No designation from the President of
the Philippines is necessary.
The Solicitor General argues that no such designation is necessary in
the case of the Supreme Court because the temporary succession cited
is provided for in Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. A similar rule
is found in Section 5 of BP 129 for the Court of Appeals. There is no
such arrangement, however, in the case of the Commission on
Elections. The designation made by the President of the Philippines
should therefore be sustained for reasons of administrative
expediency, to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the designation of an Acting Chairman of COMELEC is
unconstitutional
HELD:
Yes. The appointment of Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC
is unconstitutional.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all
the Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although
essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the
President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective
functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings
under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its
own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to
review on Certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution in
Article IX-A, Section 7.
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The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular
chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be
exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the
Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially
temporary and therefore revocable at will. No cause need be
established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the
designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission
on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at
any time and for whatever reason she sees fit.
It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot
be removed at will from her permanent position as Associate
Commissioner. It is no less true, however, that she can be replaced as
Acting Chairman, with or without cause, and thus deprived of the
powers and perquisites of that temporary position.
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the
independence of the Commission on Elections, foremost among
which is the security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is
not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the
Philippines.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no
justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by
extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent.
This is still a government of laws and not of men. The problem
allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for
presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the
members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the
participation of the President, however well-meaning.
Sol Gen as Acting Comelec Commissioner also affects
independence
Nacionalista Party vs. Angelo Bautista, 85 Phil 101(1949)
F: President Quirino designated the SolicitorGeneral as Acting
member of the Comelec in November, 1949. The Nacionalista Party
filed this prohibition on the following grounds: (1) the SG did not
resign from the office of the Solicitor General; (2) there is no vacancy
in the Comelec because the retirement of the Comelec member
causing the vacancy, was accepted by the President in bad faith; and
(3) the functions of a SolicitorGeneral are incompatible with those of
a Comelec member.
ISSUE: W/N THE DESIGNATION WAS VALID?
HELD: NO, it was not. By the nature of the Comelec's functions, the
Comelec must be independent. Members are not allowed to perform
other functions, powers and duties to preserve its impartiality. The
SolicitorGeneral's duties also require an undivided time and
attention for efficiency. Furthermore, when there is a vacancy,
appointment is preferred to designation.
ISSUE: W/N PROHIBITION WOULD LIE?
HELD: NO.
The case is by nature a quo warranto proceeding because it
questions the legality of the respondent's designation or his right to
office. The proceeding is instituted by the other party claiming the
position occupied and/or the SolicitorGeneral. Prohibition however,
has a different purpose, which is to prevent the usurpation of
jurisdiction by a subordinate court.
Although there is no other party who claims a right over the position
occupied nor will the SG file a case against himself, the court must
grant the remedy of a quo warranto proceeding because the SG's
continued occupancy as member of the Comelec is illegal.
Facts: Petitioner Nacionalista Party brought this action praying that
Page5
a writ of prohibition issue commanding the respondent
Solicitor General to desist forever from acting as acting
 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions

member of the Commission on Elections under the the appointment of a new member upon the expiration of the first
designation rendered to him by President Quirino, unless he is term of three years.
legally appointed as regular member of the said Commission on
Elections.

Held: Republic vs. Imperial, 96 Phil 770

The SG could not be appointed acting member of the COMELEC.
The revocable nature of his appointment, coupled with the fact that
as a SG he was subject to the Presidents constitutional power of
control, would impair his independence in the election body.
Ruling: Ad interim appointment is not covered. This appointment is
Ad interim Appointment: Appointment when Congress is not in
session
Dissent: Ad interim appointment is covered.
F: This is a quo warranto proceeding to test the legality of the
continuance in office of Imperial as Chairman and Perez as member of
COMELEC. When Chairman de Vera died in August 1951, before the
expiration of the maximum term of nine years of the Chairman of the
Commission, Imperial was appointed Chairman to succeed de Vera. His
appointment provided for a term expiring July 12, 1960. The SG
contended that the term for which he will legally serve as Chairman
legally expired on July 12, 1954, the expiration of the 9 year term for
which the first Chairman was appointed.

Acting Appointment (not subjected to the confirmation of COA and
no security of tenure) impairs the independence of Constitutional
commission in a way that the term of office is dependent on the
discretion of the President.
o The prohibition extends to acting appointment. Ad interim
appointment is covered
o It has to be permanent appointment so that it will not violate on
the constitutional provision of independence
II. Salaries (Sec. 3)
III. Disqualifications (Sec. 2)
Inhibitions/Disqualifications
a) Shall not, during tenure, hold any other office or employment.
b) Shall not engage in the practice of any profession.
c) Shall not engage in the active management or control of any
business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his
office.
d) Shall not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any
contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the
Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries
Comelec member Perez on the other hand, was appointed for a term of
9 years expiring on 24 November 1958. The SG contended that his term
legally expired on July 12, 1951, the expiration of the term of 6 years
for which Commissioner Enage, his predecessor was appointed.
Held: The terms cannot begin from the first appointments made in July
12, 1945 but from the date of the organization of the COMELEC under
CA 657 on June 21, 1941. Thus, the term of office of the first Chairman,
Lopez Vito began on June 21, 1941 and ended June 20, 1950. That of
member Enage began on June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1944 (but this was
not filled). Since the first 3 year term had already expired in 1944, the
appointment of De Vera on June 12, 1945 must be for the full term of
nine years (June 1944 to June 1953). The first vacancy occurred by the
expiration of the term of Enage. His successor, Perez, was named for a
full 9 year term which shall have started on June 1947 to June 1956.
The second vacancy happened upon the death of Lopez Vito on May
1947. To succeed him, de Vera appointed and lasted only up to June
1950, the unexpired period of Lopez Vito's term. Thus, on June 1950, a
vacancy occurred which De Vera could no longer fill because his
appointment was expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thus, the
next Chairman was respondent Imperial whose term of 9 years must be
deemed to have began on June 21, 1990 to expire on June 20, 1959.
V. Other Perquisites

VI. Proceedings: formalities & procedure

IV. Staggering of Terms of Office

NP vs. De Vera, 35 Phil 126

NP v. Vera, 85 Phil 149

F: This is an action brought by the Nacionalista Party against De Vera
on the ground that his appointment as Chairman of the COMELEC is
a violation of the Constitution particularly Art. X, Sec. 1 of the 1935
Constitution which provides that the members of the COMELEC shall
hold office for nine years without reappointment.

Held: The prohibition against reappointment comes as a

continuation of the requirement that the Commission shall hold
office for a term of nine years. Reappointment is not prohibited
provided his term will not exceed nine years in all.

In July 1945, three Commissioners were appointed. De Vera was

appointed for three years. If he were to succeed himself, he cannot
be reappointed to do so because that would preclude the
appointment of a new member after 3 years and would furthermore
increase his term to 12 years since upon the expiration of his term,
his successor must be appointed for nine years.

But in this case, de Vera's appointment was by virtue of the death of

the Chairman in 1947 and he was promoted to occupy the
chairmanship of the Commission for the unexpired term only. Thus,
Page5

this is not offensive to the Constitution because it does not increase

de Vera's term of office to more than nine years nor does it preclude
VII. The Constitutional Commissions
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 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
A. Civil Service Commission (Art. IX-B)
1. Composition and Qualification (Sec. 1)
2. Scope of Civil Service [Sec. 2 (1)]
NHA vs. Juco, 134 SCRA 172
F: Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case was
dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt -
owned corp. and jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the CSC.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case to
the labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to
the SC.
ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC
without original charter, covered by the Labor Code or by laws and
regulations governing the civil service?
HELD: Sec. 11, Art XIIB of the Constitution specifically provides:
"The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and
instrumentality of the Government, including every government
owned and controlled corporation. The inclusion of GOCC within the
embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort at the framers to
plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full
consequences of the civil service system. All offices and firms of the
government are covered.
This constitutional provision has been implemented by statute PD
807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCC belong to the civil service
and subject to civil service requirements.
"Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case
refers to a GOCC. It does not cover cases involving private firms
taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings.
xxx
For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt
owned or controlled corps. Whether created by special law or
formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, not the
Labor Code, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the
govt may be created by special charter does not mean that such
corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service.
xxx
The infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting the
circumvention or emasculation of Sec. 1,Art. XIIB [now Art IX, B, Sec.
2 (1)] of the Constitution. It would be possible for a regular ministry
of govt to create a host of subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Code
funded by a willing legislature. A govtowned corp. could create
several subsidiary corps. These subsidiary corps. would enjoy the
best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be
privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by
the Civil Service Dec.and the regulations of the COA. Their incomes
would not be subject to the competitive restraint in the open market
nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment.
Conceivably, all govtowned or controlled corps. could be created,
no longer by special charters, but through incorp. under the
general law. The Constitutional amendment including such
corps. in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have
application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed.
National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122
The civil service does not include Government owned or
controlled corporations (GOCC) which are organized as
subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law
F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service
Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled
ordering her reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no
jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government
corporation by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is
wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the
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terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed
by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco.
ISSUE: W/N employees of NASECO, a GOCC without original charter,
are governed by the Civil Service Law.
HELD: NO
The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that
is to cases that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do
otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees
similarly situated because under the 1973 Constitution but
prior to the ruling in NHC v Juco, this court recognized the
applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms
and conditions of employment in GOCC's, among them NASECO.
In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987
Consti starkly differs from the 1973 constitution where NHC v Juco
was based. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government owned or controlled corporation with original
charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not
include GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the
general corporation law.
3. Appointment & removal [Sec. 2 (2)]
De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil 289
Facts: Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner was appointed City
Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment
which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on
August 6, and on the 23 rd of that month, he qualified for and began to
exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June1, 1950, Gil
R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President
to the same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of
the Department of Public Works and Communications directed
Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another
assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City
Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants
ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the
position, he commenced these proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President may remove a city engineer, a
position that is neither confidential, policy determining nor highly
technical at pleasure.
HELD: No
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than
ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is
primarily confidential. A primarily confidential position is one
which denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close
intimacy which ensures freedom from intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state.
Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city
engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government
or any its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it.
With specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers
and duties are carefully laid down for him be section 2557 of the
Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial in
character.
Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A
city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a
technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, which
is the sense in which "highly technical" is, we believe, employed in
the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the
classified civil service whose technical competence is not lower than
that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city
engineer are eminently administrative in character and could very
well be discharged by non-technical men possessing executive
ability.
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 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
Salazar vs. Mathay, 73 SCRA 275
Facts: On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was
appointed by the Auditor Generals confidential agent in the Office of
the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On
March 28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965 she was extended another
appointment by way of promotion, as confidential agent in the
same office. On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the
Auditor General that her services as confidential agent have been
terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On
March 31, 1966, the Auditor General upon favorable
recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued an
appointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was
approved by the Commission of Civil Service. On the same day,
petitioner assumed the position. On December 27, 1966, petitioner
wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she be
reinstated to her former position as confidential agent. However, no
action was taken on said letter. Petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor General to
reinstate her to her former position but the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition without prejudice to her filing the proper
action to the Court of First Instance.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily
confidential or not.
(2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as confidential agent
was validly terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence,
and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to said
position after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same
office.
Held:
(1) Yes. The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential.
There are two instances when a position may be considered primarily
confidential: (1) When the President upon recommendation of
the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service
Commission) has declared the position to be primarily
confidential; or (2) In the absence of such declaration when by the
nature of the functions of the office, there exists close intimacy
between the appointee and appointing power which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom
from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential
matters of state.
In the case before us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265,
declaring ...confidential agents in the several department and offices
of the Government, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be
primarily confidential brings within the fold of the aforementioned
executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the
Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily
confidential.
(2) Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot
complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent is
in violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential positions
are excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of
officers or employees therein is allowed by the Constitution. This
should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a
primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of
the appointing power.
Important: It should be noted, however, that when such pleasure turns
into displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from
office his term merely expires, in much the same way as officer, whose
right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had
been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed removed or
dismissed there from, upon the expiration of said term.
The main difference between the former the primarily
confidential officer and the latter is that the latter's term is fixed
of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but
indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and
becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power
expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the
incumbent. When this even takes place, the latter is not removed or
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dismissed from office his term has merely expired. But even granting
for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was not primarily
confidential and that therefore her removal from said position for loss
of confidence was in violation of her security of tenure as a civil service
employee, yet by her acceptance of the position of Junior Examiner in
the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on April 1, 1976, she was deemed to have
abandoned former position of confidential agent in the same office.
Besa vs. PNB, 33 SCRA 330
Facts:
Tomas Besa was appointed Chief Legal Counsel with the rank of
Vice President of PNB. By virtue of a resolution by PNB president
Roberto Benedicto, he became Consultant on Legal Matters.
Conrado Medina took over his position. PNB justified by sayingthat:
The position of Chief Legal Counsel carries a special confidential
relationship of lawyer and client and thus they have the prerogative
to designate or change its lawyer. The transfer was made by the
Board in the exercise of its powers, upon recommendation of the
PNB president.
Resolution No. 1053: by BOD: shifted Besa to Office of President as
Consultant on Legal Matters, without change in salary and other
privileges
Issue: WON Besas transfer was illegal
Held: NO
Ratio:
1.The position of Chief Legal Counsel was a highly confidential
position and such positions term depends upon the will of thea
ppointing power.
2. Removal without just cause as a defense applies only to officers
and employees enjoying a fixed term.
3. According to Chief Justice, a primarily confidential officer cannot
be removed. His term merely expires according to nature of job.
Reyes says tenure of confidential officers ends upon loss of
confidence.
4. Court also ruled that the position of Chief Legal Counsel is
primarily confidential and secondarily technical.
Petition Dismissed
4. Security of Tenure [Sec. 2 (3)]
Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 (1989)
Facts:
Dario: Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. On March 25,
1986, Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3DECLARING A
NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY
THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASICRIGHTS, ADOPTING A
PROVISIONALCONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR ANORDERLY
TRNASITION TO AGOVERNMENTUNDER NEW CONSTITUTIONEO
127, Reorganization Program, was also issued. Several acts and rules
were issued to comply with the proclamation. January 6, 1988,Mison
issued a memorandum for employees where the latter shall be:
Informed of their reappointment, or Offered another position in the
same department or agency, Informed of their termination. As a
result, Dario was one of the many whose services were terminated
subject to normal clearances and possible receipt of retirement
benefits under existing laws, rules, and regulations. Hereafter, the
Civil Service Commission reinstated hundreds of employees who
were separated by Mison. Mison charged the CSC with grave abuse of
discretion, a case that could be subject to judicial review without
prejudice to the powers of CSC to have the final say to cases involving
its employees and officers. Dario invoked security of tenure.
Issues:
1.Is it constitutional to separate career civil service employees not
for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation3 dated March 25m 1986?
Yes. Under Section 16 of Article18: Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution. It also applies to separations as results of
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reorganization after the ratification of the Consti.
 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
2.Was there a valid reorganization in the Bureau of Customs
occurring at that time which would validate Darios and several
others separation from office?
NO. NO change in the staffing pattern prescribed by Section 34
of EO 127 was made even after Mison took office. Mison
separated 394 Customs personnel but replaced them with 522. This
was proof that such separations were not made to improve the
bureaucracy andmake them more efficient.
It was also a defiance of Presidentsdirective to halt further lay-offs
as aconsequence of reorganization.
Mison did not follow procedures laid downby EO 127 regarding lay-
offs.3.Could Mison remove Cesar Dario fromoffice?
No. Dario was a presidentialappointee and thus Mison had
noauthority to terminate Dario. Reinstated to positions
Mendoza vs. Quisumbing, 186SCRA108
Issue: Was it done on good faith?
Held: No. There should be a promotion of simplicity, efficiency,
economy
5. Prohibition Against Partisan Political Activity
[Sec. 2 (3)]
Santos vs. Yatco, 106 Phil 745
59 0G 548 (1959)
F: This is petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement
of the order of Judge Yatco disallowing then Secretary of Defense
Alejo Santos from campaigning personally for Governor Tomas
Martin in the province of Bulacan.
The petition was granted for the ff. reasons:
The position of department secretaries is not embraced and
included within the terms officers and employees in the Civil
Service;
When Santos, a Nacionalista campaigned for Gov. Martin, a candidate
of the Nacionalista Party, he was acting as a member of the Cabinet
in discussing the issues before the electorate and defending the
actuations of the Administration to which he belongs;
The question of impropriety as distinct from illegality of such
campaign because of its deleterious influence upon the members of
the armed forces, who are administratively subordinated to the
Secretary of National Defense and who are often called upon by the
COMELEC to aid in the conduct of orderly and impartial elections, is
not justiciable by the court.
Cailles vs. Bonifacio, 65 Phil 328 (1938).
F: This is a quo warranto petition to oust respondent Bonifacio from
the office of Provincial Governor of Laguna. It is contended that at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy and was elected to office,
respondent was a Captain in the Philippine Army and for this reason,
is ineligible to that office.
HELD: Section 2, Art. XI of the 1935 Const. (similar to the 1987
provision) prohibits members of the Armed Forces from
engaging in any partisan political activity or otherwise taking
part in any election except to vote, but it does not ex vi termini
grant or confer upon them the right of suffrage. As Section 431 of
the Election Law, as amended disqualifies from voting only members
in the active service of the Philippine Army and no claim is made
that this discrimination is violative of the Constitution, it follows that
the respondent, being in the reserve force, is not disqualified from
voting. The respondent being a qualified elector and the possession
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by him of the other qualifications prescribed for an elective
provincial office not being challenged, he is not ineligible to the
office of provincial governor to which he has been elected.
The constitutional provision mentioned contemplates only those in
the active service otherwise it would lead to widespread
disqualification of the majority of the able bodied men who are part
of the reserve corps of the armed forces from voting and from being
voted upon.
Raison d' etre for the disqualification: Members of the armed forces
are servants of the State and not the agents of any political group.
6. Right to Self-Organization [Sec. 2 (5)]
SSSEA vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686
SSS Employ ees Association v CA, 175 SCRA 690
[Public Sector LaborManagement has jurisdiction of
dispute concerning terms and conditions (of
employment) but not damages arising from acts of a
union.]
F: SSS filed w/ the RTCQC a complaint for damages w/ a prayer for a
writ of prel inj. against petitioners SSSEA, alleging that the officers
and members of the latter staged an illegal strike and barricaded the
entrances to the SSS building preventing nonstriking employees
from reporting to work and SSS members from transacting business
w/ SSS. The Public Sector LaborManagement Council ordered the
strikers to return to work but the strikers refused to do so. The
SSSEA went on strike bec. SSS failed to act on the union's demands.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, w/c motion was denied. The restraining order w/c was
previously issued was converted into an injunction after finding the
strike illegal. Petitioners appealed the case to the CA. The latter held
that since the employees of SSS are govt employees, they are not
allowed to strike.
HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to strikes,
walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the
private sector, in order to pressure the Govt. to accede to their
demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and
Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Govt. EEs to Self
Organization which took effect after the initial dispute arose, the
terms and conditions of employment in the Govt, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt. owned and
controlled corporations with original charters, are governed by law
and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing
changes thereof.
The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt Workers v. Minister of
Labor and Employment (124 SCRA 1) is relevant as it furnishes the
rationale for distinguishing bet. workers in the private sector and
govt employees w/ regard to the right to strike?
Since the terms and conditions of govt. employment are fixed by law,
govt. workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in
the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The
principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial
peace cannot be secured through compulsion of law. Relations bet.
private employers and their employees rest on an essentially
voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws
and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of
employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the
process of collective bargaining. In govt employment, however, it is
the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of govt w/c fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative
circulars, rules, and regulations, not through CBA's.
EO 180, w/c provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to
organize of govt employees, while clinging to the same philosophy,
has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms
Page5
and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by
law.
 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
Govt employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations,
either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and
conditions of employment which are w/in the ambit of legislation or
negotiate w/ the appropriate govt agencies for the improvement of
those w/ are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances,
the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector LaborManagement
Council for appropriate action.
Issue: W/N the RTC can enjoin the SSSEA from striking.
Held: Yes. EO 180 vests the Public Sector LaborManagement
Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving
government employees. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over
the dispute. The RTC was not precluded, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction under BP 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction
over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ
prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the PSLM Council has not been
granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor
disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council and the
NLRC that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to
general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin
the strike is appropriate.
Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) vs.
Laguio, 200 SCRA 323 (1991)
F: On September 17,1990, Monday, at least 800 public school
teachers proceeded to the national office of the DECS and aired their
grievances. The mass action continued into the week despite the
DECS Secretary's RETURN TO WORK order. The Secretary filed
administrative charges against the protesting teachers. The
Secretary rendered the questioned decisions in the administrative
proceeding. He dismissed some teachers and placed others in under
suspension. Two separate petitions were filed to assail the validity of
the return to work order and his decisions in the administrative
proceeding.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MASS ACTIONS ARE CONSIDERED
AS STRIKES?
HELD: Yes. The mass actions constituted a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from work, which it was the
teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic
reasons.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS CAN
STRIKE?
HELD: No. Employees of the public service do not have the right to
strike although they have the right to self organization and negotiate
with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of
working conditions.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DUE PROCESS WAS OBSERVED
DURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS?
HELD: This court is a court of last resort. It resolves questions of law
where there is no dispute of the facts or that the facts have been
already determined by the lower tribunals. It is not a trier of facts. It
can not resolve the issue which requires the establishment of some
facts. The remedy is for the petitioners to participate in the
administrative proceedings. If they lost, they may appeal to the Civil
Service Commission. If pending said administrative proceedings,
immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary,
recourse is with the RTC where there would be opportunity to prove
relevant facts.
7. Temporary Employees [Sec. 2 (6)]
Delector vs. Ogayan, 123 SCRA 774
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Compiled by rago
8. Disqualifications (Sec. 7)
a. N/A to officials covered by Sec. 13, Art. VII
CLU vs. Executive Sec, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
F: The petitioner challenged Ex. Order No. 284 which in effect
allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and asst.
secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive
Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit, subject of the
limitations imposed therein. The respondents, in refuting the
petitioners' argument that the measure was violative of Art. VIII, Sec.
13, invoked Art. IXB, Sec. 7, allowing the holding of multiple
positions by the appointive official if allowed by law or by the
pressing functions of his positions.
HELD: By ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries may hold in addition
to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the govt.
and GOCCs, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of
Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. If maximum
benefits are to be derived from a dept. head's ability and expertise,
he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities
without the distraction of other govt. offices or employment.
xxx
The stricter prohibition applied to the Pres. and his official family
under Sec. 13, Art. VII as compared to the prohibition applicable to
appointive officials in general under Art. IX, B, Sec. 7, par. 2 are proof
of the intent of the 1987 Consti. to treat them as a class by itself and
to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the govt during their
tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of
their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Consti.
itself. xxx
However, the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Art. VII, Sec. 13 must not be construed as
applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein w/o addition compensation in an exofficio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said
official's office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any
other office" w/in the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and
function on said officials.
9. Standardization of Compensation (Sec. 5)
a. Read the salient features of RA 6758 (Salary
Standardization Law )
10. Double Compensation (Sec. 8)
Quimzon vs. Ozaeta, 98 Phil 705
Facts:
The Rural Progress Administration is a public corporation created
for the purpose of acquiring landed estates through purchase,
expropriation or lease, and later sub-letting or sub-leasing the same
to tenants or occupants. The officials and employees of the
Administration may be considered as civil service employees
embraced in the classified service.
Sometime in 1947, one Aurelio R. Pen a, then comptroller of the
Administration and performing duties of auditor in representation of
the Auditor General recommended to the Board of Directors of the
Administration that for purposes of economy municipal treasurers
Page5
be appointed agent-collectors of the Administration, and this
recommendation was adopted by the Board of Director. Thereafter,
Faustino Aguilar, then manager of the Administration, prepared the
 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions

appointment for the post of agent- collector on a part-time basis in
favor of Plaintiff-Appellant Braulio Quimson, with compensation of
P720 per annum, the appointment to take effect upon assumption of
duty.
At the time, Quimson was deputy provincial treasurer and municipal
treasurer of Caloocan, Rizal. Defendant-Appellee Roman Ozaeta who
by reason of his office of Secretary of Justice was acting as Chairman
of the Board of Directors, signed the appointment and forwarded the
papers to the President through the Secretary of Finance for
approval. Without waiting for the said approval Quimson assumed
his position on May 6, 1948 and rendered service as agent-collector
of the Administration until October 21, 1949, inclusive, when he was
informed that because of the disapproval of his appointment, his
services were considered terminated. There were several objections
to his appointment, among them that of the Auditor General on the
ground that since Quimson was deputy provincial treasurer and
municipal treasurer of Caloocan, his additional compensation as
agent-collector would contravene the Constitutional prohibition
against double compensation.
payment to the employee of such amount from the salary of the
officers so liable.
Section 691 of the Administrative Code above reproduced refers and
applies to unlawful employment and not to unlawful compensation.
The appointment or employment of Plaintiff-Appellant Quimson as
agent-collector was not in itself unlawful because there is no
incompatibility between said appointment and his employment as
deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer. In fact, he was
appointed agent-collector by reason of his office, being a municipal
treasurer. There is no legal objection to a government official
occupying two government offices and performing the functions of
both as long as there is no incompatibility. Clerks of court are
sometimes appointed or designated as provincial sheriffs. Municipal
Treasurers like Plaintiffare often appointed and designated as
deputy provincial treasurer. The Department Secretaries are often
designated to act as Chairman or members of Board of Directors of
government corporations. The objection or prohibition refers to
double compensation and not to double appointments and
performance of functions of more than one office.

The Commissioner of Civil Service said that he would offer no
objection to the additional compensation of Quimson as agent-
collector provided it was authorized in a special provision exempting
the case from the inhibition against the payment of extra
compensation in accordance with section 259 of the Revised
Administrative Code. In this connection, it may be stated that this
section of the Administrative Code provides that in the absence of
special provision, no officer or employee in any branch of the
Government service shall receive additional compensation on
account of the discharge of duties pertaining to another or to the
performance of public service of whatever nature. Faustino Aguilar
as manager of the Administration asked for the reconsideration of
the ruling of the Auditor General, alleging that the appointment of
the Plaintiff was for reasons of economy and efficiency, but the
Auditor General denied the request stating that reasons of economy
and efficiency are not valid grounds for evading the constitutional
prohibition against additional compensation in the absence of a law
specifically authorizing such compensation. So, the services of
Quimson as agent-collector of the Administration were terminated.
But R. Gonzales Lloret, then manager of the Administration on
October 18, 1949, inquired from the auditor of the Administration
whether Quimson could be paid for the period of actual service
rendered by him from May 10, 1948, and the said auditor gave the
opinion that it could not be done for the reason that in his opinion
the appointment extended to Quimson was clearly illegal and the
Administration may not be obliged to pay him for the services
rendered since it was a violation of section 3, Article XII, of the
Constitution prohibiting double compensation.
According to law, under certain circumstances, the President
may authorize double compensation in some cases, such as
government officials acting as members with compensation in
government examining boards like the bar examinations, or
department secretaries acting as members of Board of
Directors of government corporations, and in such cases the
prohibition against double compensation is not observed. This
undoubtedly, was the reason why the appointment of Quimson had
to be coursed through different offices like the Department of
Finance, the Civil Service Commission, and the Office of the Auditor
General to the President for approval. If the President approves the
double compensation, well and good. The appointee whose
appointment may then be regarded as valid from the beginning
could receive extra compensation. If it is disapproved, then the
appointment will have to be withdrawn or cancelled, unless of
course, the appointee was willing to serve without compensation, in
which case there could be no valid objection. This is another proof
that the appointment of Quimson was not illegal or unlawful. It was
only the double compensation that was subject to objection. The
trouble was that Plaintiff herein assumed office without waiting for
the result of the action to be taken upon his appointment and
compensation by the President and the different offices which the
appointment had to go through.

At the same time he expressed the opinion that under section 691 of
the Revised Administrative Code the appointing official who made
the illegal appointment should be made liable for the payment of
salary of the appointee, and consequently, Plaintiff should claim his
salary for services rendered against said appointing officer. It is
highly possible that this opinion was what induced and prompted
Quimson to file the present case against Roman Ozaeta who, as
Chairman of the Board, signed his appointment, and the members of
the said Board, namely: Faustino Aguilar, Vicente Fragante, Roman
Fernandez and Pedro Magsalin.

Issue:
Whether or not Plaintiffs complaint for the recovery of accrued
salaries as provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer must be
denied on the ground of the constitutional prohibition against
double compensation

Held:

No. Section 691 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows:

SEC. 691. Payment of person employed contrary to law. Liability

of chief of office. No person employed in the classified service
contrary to law or in violation of the civil service rules shall be B. The Commission on Elections (Art. IX-C)
entitled to receive pay from the Government; but the chief of the
bureau or office responsible for such unlawful employment shall be 1. Composition and Qualifications (Sec. 1)
Page5

personally liable for the pay that would have accrued had the
employment been lawful, and the disbursing officer shall make 2. Powers and Functions

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 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
a. Enforce Election Laws [Sec. 2 (1) and 2 (6)]
Aguam vs. Comelec, 23 SCRA 883
USO DAN AGUAM, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND ALIM BALINDONG, RESPONDENTS. LUCMAN,
DE SANTOS AND DELFINO FOR PETITIONER. RAMON A.
GONZALES FOR RESPONDENT ALIM BALINDONG. RAMON
BARRIOS FOR RESPONDENT COMMISSION ELECTIONS.
EN BANC
SANCHEZ, J.:
In this, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction, petitioner Uso Dan Aguam seeks to annul the
resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) of
April 17,1968 declaring that it has jurisdiction to open the ballot box in
Precinct 8 of the municipality of Ganassi, Lanao del Sur, and to conduct
an investigation into the authentic electoral return therefrom, upon
petition of respondent Alim Balindong. Petitioner levels a major attack
on the jurisdiction of Comelec to inquire into the matters set forth in
private respondents petition therein, hereinafter to be recited.
Petitioner reasons out that that petition was filed out of time, and that
after proclamation Comelec is bereft of power to order the opening of
the ballot box to determine the genuineness of an election return.
But first to the controlling facts.
In the November, 1967 elections, amongst the aspirants for Mayor of
Ganassi, Lanao del Sur, were: petitioner Uso Dan Aguam, official Liberal
Party candidate; respondent Alim Balindong, an independent Liberal;
and Ali Daud B. Marohombsar, official candidate of the Nacionalistas.
It would appear that at the canvassing held in Marawi City on
November 20,1967, petitioner Uso Dan Aguam was proclaimed Mayor-
elect of Ganassi. The minutes thereof reveal a close contest between
petitioner and respondent: Petitioner Uso Dan Aguam received 575
votes; respondent Datu Alim Balindong, 572 votes.
On November 21, 1967, apparently unaware of the canvassing held at
Marawi City the day before, respondent Alim Balindong went to the
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur1 to restrain the board of
canvassers from canvassing the votes for mayoral candidates and from
proclaiming the results thereof. Bases of the petition are that 43 voters
were permitted to cast their votes in Precinct 5 by virtue of an unlawful
order of the municipal judge and that the election returns in Precinct 8
were tampered with to favor petitioner herein. Petitioner there
intervened and, inter alia, challenged the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance. The case ended up with the courts order of December
21, 1967 dismissing the petition upon a no-jurisdiction ground.
Allegedly, copy of this order was served on respondent Alim Balindong
on January 4, 1968.
Meanwhile, on December 30, 1967, petitioner took his oath and
thereafter assumed office as Mayor of Ganassi.
It was on January 6, 1968 when respondent Alim Balindong went to
Comelec with a petition for the annulment of the November 20, 1967
canvass and proclamation, and for the opening of the ballot box in
Precinct 8. The November 20 canvass and proclamation were there
assailed by respondent Alim Balindong from different directions.
Averment was there made that the board of canvassers was illegally
constituted; that fraud and irregularities, which were made in
connivance between the municipal treasurer and petitioner Uso Dan
Aguam, attended the canvassing; that no notice thereof was given to
said respondent and other candidates; that the canvassing and
proclamation were kept under wraps; that the election return for
Precinct 8 was tampered with by making it appear that Alim Balindong
obtained 8 votes in said precinct when in fact he obtained 13 votes; and
that as a result of such tampering, petitioner Uso Dan Aguam herein
was made to win against respondent Alim Balindong by a margin of 3
votes.
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Compiled by rago
The foregoing petition was met by petitioner Uso Dan Aguam with an
answer and a motion to dismiss. After making certain denials and
admissions, petitioner herein raised in Comelec the issues, amongst
others, of jurisdiction and time-bar.
It was while the case was pending in Comelec, after the parties have
been heard, that the controverted order of April 27, 1968 was issued.
Hence, the present petition. To maintain the status quo, we issued a
cease-and-desist order on May 10, 1968, upon a cash bond of
P1,000.00. Upon the petition, respondents returns, and the oral
arguments, the case is now before us for decision.
1. By constitutional mandate, Comelec shall have exclusive charge of
the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law. The Constitution enjoins Comelec to decide,
save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions,
affecting elections. And, all of these are aimed at achieving an ideal:
free, orderly, and honest elections.2 Implementing the constitutional
precept, Congress legislated in Section 3 of the Revised Election Code
that, in addition to the powers and functions conferred by the
Constitution, Comelec has direct and immediate supervision over the
provincial, municipal, and city officials designated by law to perform
duties relative to the conduct of elections.
The great breadth of the constitutional and statutory powers granted
Comelec has brought to the fore judicial pronouncements which have
long become guidelines. Time and again, this Court has given its
imprimatur on the principle that Comelec is with authority to annul
any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made.3 The fact that
a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to
the exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of where
there has been a valid proclamation.4 Since private respondents
petition before Comelec is precisely directed at the annulment of the
canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is
within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to Comelec. Not
that the view expressed herein is without reason. We draw from past
experience. A pattern of conduct observed in past elections has been
the pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest slogan of
some candidates or parties.5 Really, were a victim of a proclamation to
be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that
proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects
may easily supervene. It may not be out of place to state that in the long
history of election contests in this country, as observed in Lagumbay vs.
Climaco, supra, a successful contestant in an election protest often wins
but a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is
about to expire or has expired. Protests, counter-protests, revisions of
ballots, appeals, dilatory tactics, may well frustrate the will of the
electorate. And what if the protestant may not have the resources and
an unwavering determination with which to sustain a long drawn-out
election contest? In this context therefore all efforts should be strained
as far as is humanly possible to take election returns out of the
reach of the unscrupulous; and to prevent illegal or fraudulent
proclamation from ripening into illegal assumption of office.
But the foregoing are not all. In the course of oral arguments before this
Court, we observed that in the minutes of the canvassing at Marawi on
November 20, 1967, the following appear:
The Treasurer/Secretary then presented all the Advanced Election
Returns to the members of the Board for inspection. This was done in
the presence of representatives of the Commission on Elections and the
Philippine Army.
Then the Municipal Board of Canvassers proceeded and began opening
the election returns consecutively in accordance with the numbers of
the precincts.6
Advanced copies of election returns cannot be the basis of
proclamation. Proclamation should be based on the copies of the
returns for the municipal treasurer, or if unserviceable, on three other
Page5
authentic copies of the returns, namely: that for the Comelec (Annex 2
of Comelecs answer), or for the provincial treasurer, or that in the
 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
ballot box. Nothing in the same minutes would show that anyone of
those four returns was used. Nor do the minutes mention the presence
of candidates or their representatives in the canvassing. A probe into
these facts is important.
We have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of a
proclamation may be challenged even after the irregularly proclaimed
candidate has assumed office.
2. We now grapple with the problem of the alleged nullity of Comelecs
resolution of April 27, 1968. It will be recalled that respondent Alim
Balindong has complained of the tampering of the return in Precinct 8
before the Court of First Instance and before Comelec. The Comelec
copy of the return of Precinct 8 (Annex 2 of Comelecs answer to the
petition before this Court) gives Comelec a good starting point upon
which to look into the authenticity of the return from said precinct.
Because, so Comelec alleges, the entries of votes therein for respondent
Alim Balindong are crossed out by heavy pencil marks and written
thereon is the word eight and figure 8. Comelec also underscores
the fact that this runs counter to the certificate of votes signed by all
the members of the board of inspectors of Precinct 8 where it appears
that Alim Balindong obtained thirteen votes. Decisive of the political
fortunes of petitioner and respondent Balindong is the difference of 5
votes. Heretofore adverted to is that petitioner herein upon the
disputed canvass won by 3 votes. With these, the probability that
respondent Alim Balindong is rightfully entitled to proclamation may
not easily be shrugged off. If only for the fact that proclamation should
be made within the limits of accepted notions of justice, and also
because a candidate is not to be turned away upon a proclamation
allegedly riddled with irregularities in various forms that affect its
validity, investigation of the tampering here charged, is proper. The
power of Comelec to do this is now beyond debate.7 And, we have
specifically declared in Cauton vs. Commission on Elections, 19
Supreme Court Reports Anno. 911, 923, that in ordering the opening
of the ballot boxes the purpose of the Commission is not to help a
particular candidate win an election but to properly administer and
enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections.
We, therefore, rule that certiorari and prohibition will not lie against
the challenged resolution of April 27, 1968.
3. The stress of petitioners argument is that respondent Alim
Balindong filed his petition on January 6, 1968, i.e., long after the
proclamation of November 20, 1967. It is petitioners trenchant claim
that since the two-week period from proclamation, allowed for
protests, had long elapsed, Comelec is without power to entertain the
same it had no jurisdiction.
Petitioner draws our attention to the cases of De Leon vs. Imperial, 94
Phil. 680, and Abes vs. Commission on Elections, L-283-48, December
15, 1967. These cases, however, are not to be read as throwing
overboard Comelecs authority to inquire into whether or not a
proclamation is null and void. For, these cases merely emphasize the
rule that where a proclamation is validly made, errors in the
proclamation may not be raised in a full-dress election
protest.1vvphi1.ne t
The ratiocination advanced by petitioner fails to take stock of the fact
that where a proclamation is null and void, that proclamation is no
proclamation at all. This is axiomatic. To be remembered is Mutuc vs.
Commission on Elections, supra, citing Demafiles vs. Commission on
Elections, supra. Our ruling there is this: It is indeed true that after
proclamation the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an election is
to be found in an election protest. But that is so only on the assumption
that there has been a valid proclamation. Where as in the case at bar
the proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in any
way affect the basic issues.
And then, Comelec has yet to determine when respondent Alim
Balindong actually had knowledge of the proclamation of November 20,
1967.
The election law does not provide for a time limit within which a
candidate may challenge the validity of a proclamation before Comelec.
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Compiled by rago
We are unprepared to say that inaction for an unreasonable period may
not block him. Even then, considering the steps taken by respondent,
first, in the Court of First Instance, and second, in the Comelec, the time
gap between the alleged illegal proclamation of November 20, 1967
and the petition before Comelec of January 6, 1968 does not authorize
this Court to say that respondent Alim Balindong is guilty of laches.
We hold that Balindongs petition before Comelec was timely filed; and
that Comelec has jurisdiction to inquire into the nullity of the
November 20, 1967 proclamation, and consequently to inquire into the
tampering of the election return in Precinct 8.
For the reasons given, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
hereby denied; and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued is
hereby set aside.
Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and
Angeles, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., is on leave.
Abcede vs. Imperial, GR L-13001, 3/18/59
G.R. No. L-13001, March 18, 1958
FACTS: Prior to September 7, 1957, petitioner Alfredo Abcede filed,
with the Commission on Elections, his certificate of candidacy for the
Office of the President of the Philippines, in connection with the
elections to be held on November 12 of the same year. On or about
said date, Abcede and other candidates were summoned by the
Commission on Elections to appear before the same on September
23, 1957, "to show cause why their certificates of candidacy should
be considered as filed in good faith and to be given due course," that
their failure to appear would be sufficient ground to deny said
certificates. After due hearing, the certificates were considered not
given due course. A reconsideration of such resolution having been
denied, Abcede filed petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC can deny due course to a
certificate of candidacy of an aspiring candidate.
RULING: No. While the Constitution has given the Commission on
Elections the "exclusive charge" of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," the
power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely
"administrative questions." It cannot determine who among those
possessing the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, who
have complied with the procedural requirements relative to the
filing of certificates of candidacy - should be allowed to enjoy the full
benefits intended by law therefor. This is a matter of policy, not of
administration and enforcement of the law, which policy must be
determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative functions.
Philippine Press Institute (PPI) vs. Comelec,
244 SCRA 272
Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772
directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than
one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates.
The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of
charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of
government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the
Commission for dissemination of vital election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the
Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
Page5
prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government
against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor
 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the
information operations of print media enterprises during the
election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible
election.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as
unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to
donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal
property without payment of the just compensation required in
expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the
taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering
that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space.
The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the
constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also
Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of
existence of a national emergency to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers.
De Jesus vs. Pp., 120 SCRA 760
In De Jesus v People, 120 SCRA 760 (1983), it was ruled that a
government official (COMELEC Registrar) who violated the election
law ( tampering with returns to make it appear that there were more
registered voters) must be prosecuted by the COMELEC, before the
RTC, not the Sandiganbayan. The 1978 Election Code is clear that the
COMELEC shall have the power to conduct preliminary investigations
of all election offenses, and that the RTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide such cases. It is not the character or
personality of the offender (public official) but the crime committed
(violation of election law) that determines jurisdiction. This provision
of the 1978 Election Code has been integrated in the 1987
Constitution.
b. Decide Election Contests [Sec. 2 (2); Sec. 3]
Javier vs. Comelec, 144 SCR 194
Under the 1973 Constitution, even PreProclamation Controversies
Involving Members of the Batasang Pambansa Must be Decided by the
COMELEC en banc.
F: Petitioner Evelio Javier filed a petition for certiorari to annul a
decision of the COMELEC's Second Division proclaiming Arturo
Pacificador elected member of the BP representing Antique
Province. He contended that under the 1973 Consti., all contests,
involving members of the BP, must be decided by the COMELEC en
banc.
Art. XII, C, Sec. 2 (2) of the 1973 Consti. provided that the COMELEC
"(shall) be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of all members of the BP and elective
provincial and city officials." Sec. 3, on the other hand, provided that
"All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except
contests involving members of the BP, w/c shall be heard and
decided en banc." The former Sol.Gen. argued that the controversy in
this case is still in the admin. stage and so is to be resolved by the
COMELEC under its power to administer all election laws, not under
its authority as sole judge of election contests, bec. until one of the
candidates was proclaimed, there could be no contest, in w/c the
contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder but also to have
himself inducted into office. On the other hand, the new SolGen
sought the dismissal of the case as moot and academic on the ground
that the petitioner had been killed apparently for political reason
and that the BP had been abolished after the Feb. 1986 Revolution.
HELD: xxx
(2) It is worth observing that the special procedure for the
settlement of what are now called "pre proclamation controversies" is a
relatively recent innovation in our laws, having been introduced only in
1978, through the 1978 Election Code. Bef. that time, all proceedings
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affecting the election, returns and qualifications of public officers came
under the complete jurisdiction of the competent court or tribunal
from beginning to end and in the exercise of judicial power only. It
therefore could not have been the intention of the framers in 1935,
when the Commonwealth charter was imposed, to divide the electoral
process into the preproclamation stage and the postproclamation stage
and to provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage, considering
the first admin. and the second juridical.
Contests. The word "contests" should not be given a
restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the widest
possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the
Consti. should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973 Consti.,
the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the
title or claim of title to an elective office, made bef. or after
proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming
the office in dispute.
Elections, returns and qualifications. The phrase
"elections, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its
totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the
contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that election
refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, holding
of electoral campaign, and casting and counting of votes. "returns" to
the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners,
including questions concerning the composition of the board of
canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and
"qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto
proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty, or
ineligibility, or the inadequacy of his certifi cate of candidacy.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Sec. 3
in requiring that cases involving members of the BP be heard and
decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful
consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be
achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the
proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We
are only too familiar w/ the "grabthe proclamationanddelaythe
protest" strategy in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual
defeat of the real winners in the election. VV.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC as the judge of election
contests involving the election, returns, and qualifications of elective
officials has been bee restricted to elective local officials under the
1987 Constitution. The judge in the Presidential Election, as noted, is
the SC acting as Electoral Tribunal. The judge in the Congressional
elections, is the respective Electoral Tribunal of the Senate and House
of Representatives.
Flores vs. Comelec, 184 SCRA 484
F: RF was proclaimed as punong barangay. His election was
protested by NR. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court sustained NR &
installed him as punong barangay. RF appealed to the RTC w/c
affirmed the challenged decision. RF then went to the COMELEC but
his appeal was dismissed on the ground that the COMELEC had no
power to review the decision of the RTC based in Sec. 9 of RA 6679
(Local Gov't Code)
Issue: W/in the COMELEC has jurisdiction
Held: Under Art IXC, Sec 2(2) of the Constitution, the COMELEC shall
have jurisdiction, hence, Sec. 9 of RA 6679 insofar as it provides that
the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay
case should be appealed to the RTC must be declared
unconstitutional.
P had a right to presume the law as valid. Hence his appeal to the
RTC would be considered as an appeal to the COMELEC. Decisions of
the COMELEC on election contests involving municipal & barangay
officer shall be final & unappealable with respect to questions of fact
& not of law. Art IX6 Sec 2(2) of the Consti was not intended to divert
the SC of its authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the
judicial power conferred upon it by the Constitution.
Page5
c. Decide Administrative Qs [Sec. 2 (3)]
 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
Jose L. Guevara vs. Comelec, 104 Phil 269
G.R. No. L-12596 July 31, 1958
FACTS:
Guevara was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt for having published in the newspaper
an article which tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC
awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply of ballot
boxes; and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring into
disrepute, and undermine the exclusive constitutional function of
this Commission and its Chairman
Petitioner, filed a motion to quash on the following ground that the
Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the
publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as neither in the
Constitution nor in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so
punish the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the power and jurisdiction to
conduct contempt proceedings against Guevara in connection with
the publication of an article.
RULING: No.
Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has
resulted in controversy between several dealers, that however
merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has
performed in its administrative capacity. It only discharged a
ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being
the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as
postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.
As this Court has aptly said: "The power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and,
consequently, in the administration of justice". We are therefore
persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections has no
power nor authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if
its purpose is to discipline him because of the publication of the
article mentioned in the charge under consideration.
d. Deputize Law-Enforcement Agencies [Sec. 2 (4)]
e. Register Political Parties [Sec. 2 (5)]
f. Improve Elections [Sec. 2 (7) and 2 (9)]
g. Regulate public utilities and media during election
period [Sec. 4]
3. Election Period (Sec. 9)
a. Election period vs. campaign period
Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30
Facts:
Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period
shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with
Section 6, Article XII[C] of the Constitution. The period of campaign
shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the
election, excluding the day before and the day of the election.
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the 45-day campaign
period because: (a) it was decreed by the President and not by the
Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C
and (b) the period should cover at least ninety days (90). They argue
that Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution provides that the
election period shall commence ninety days before the day of
election and shall end thirty days thereafter.
Issue: Whether or not the 45-day period is unconstitutional
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Held: The 45-day campaign period is constitutional. Although
the campaign period prescribed in the 1978 Election Code for the
election of the representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa is
less than 90 days and was decreed by the President and not by the
Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C of
the Constitution, the same does not violate the Constitution, because
under Amendment 1, the manner of election of members of the
interim Batasang Pambansa shall be prescribed and regulated by
law, and the incumbent President under Amendment No. 5, shall
continue to exercise legislative power until martial law shall have
been lifted. Moreover, the election for members in the interim
Batasang Pambansa is an election in a state of emergency requiring
special rules, and only the incumbent President has the authority
and means of obtaining information on the peace and order
condition of the country within which an electoral campaign may be
adequately conducted in all regions of the nation. But even assuming
that it should be the Commission on Elections that should fix the
period of campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with by
the fact that the Commission has adopted and is enforcing the period
fixed in Section 4, Article 1, of the 1978 Election Code.
4. Party System (Sec. 6-8)
5. Funds (Sec. 11)
6. Judicial Review of Comelec decisions
Anacleto Luison v. Fidel Garcia, 101 Phil 1218
Ponente: Bautista Angelo J. (April 25, 1981)
Facts:
In the general elections held on November 8, 1955, Anacleto M.
Luison and Fidel A. D. Garcia were the only candidates for
mayor of Tubay, Agusan. The certificate of candidacy of Luison
was filed by the Nacionalista Party of the locality duly signed by the
chairman and secretary respectively, while the certificate of
candidacy of Garcia was filed by the local branch of the Liberal Party
but it was merely signed by one who was a candidate for vice mayor.
For this reason, the executive secretary of the Nationalista Party
impugned the sufficiency of the certificate of candidacy filed in
behalf of Garcia, whereupon the Commission on Elections, after
making its own investigation, issued Resolution No. 23 declaring
Garcia ineligible to run for the Office. Consequently, the Commission
on Elections who immediately implemented it by striking out the
name of Garcia from the list of registered candidates. Said secretary
also relayed the instruction of the Commission on Elections to the
board of inspectors of every precinct and the board of canvassers so
that they may be guided accordingly and votes cast for him may not
be counted and instead be considered as stray votes.
Notwithstanding the adverse ruling of the Commission on
Elections, as well as the dismissal of the petition for
prohibition sued out by Garcia, the latter continued with his
candidacy and the question of his ineligibility became an issue in the
campaign. And when the time came for the counting and
appreciation of the ballots, the board inspectors, in spite of the
adverse ruling of the Commission on Elections, counted all the votes
cast for Garcia as valid and credited him with them in the election
returns with the result that he garnered 869 votes as against 675 of
his opponent Luison. Consequently, the municipal board of
canvassers proclaimed Garcia as the mayor elect of Tubay, Agusan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the protestee being ineligible and protestant
having obtained the next highest number of votes, the latter can be
declared entitled to hold the office to be vacated by the former.
RULING:
The answer is in the negative. As this Court has held, "The general
rule is that the fact a plurality or a majority of the votes are
cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election does not
entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to
be declared elected. In such case the electors have failed to make a
choice and the election is a nullity. In a subsequent case, this Court
also said that where the winning candidate has been declared
Page5
ineligible, the person who obtained second place in the election
cannot be declared elected since our law not only does not contain
 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions

an express provision authorizing such declaration but apparently
seems to prohibit it.
Moreover, a protest to disqualify a protestee on the ground of
ineligibility is different from that a protest based on frauds and
irregularities where it may be shown that protestant was the one
really elected for having obtained a plurality of the legal votes. In the
first case, while the protestee may be ousted the protestant will not
be seated; in the second case, the protestant may assume office after
protestee is unseated.
order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to
enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. Hence, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by
certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no
contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no
direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from
such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken
in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Pp vs. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715 (1990)

Aratuc vs. Comelec, 88 SCRA 251
Facts:
Petitioner Aratuc filed a petition for certiorari, to review the decision
of respondent Comelec.
A supervening panel headed by Comelec had conducted hearings of
the complaints of the petitioner therein alleged irregularities in the
election records. In order for the Commission to decide properly, it
will have to go deep into the examination of the voting records and
registration records and it will have to interview and get statements
from persons under oath from the area to determine whether actual
voting took place. The Comelec then rendered its resolution being
assailed in these cases, declaring the final result of the canvass.
Issue:
Whether the Comelec committee committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
Ruling: No.
Under section 168 of the revised election code of the 1978 the
commission on elections shall have direct control and supervision
over the board of canvassers. In administrative law, a superior body
or office having supervision or control over another may do directly
what the latteris supposed to do or ought to have done.
The petition is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit
FEMS vs. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25
Facts:
In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, then
respondent Commissioners of the Commission on
Elections(COMELEC) issued an INVITATION TO BID CALL No. 127 on
September 16, 1969 calling for the submission of sealed proposals
for the manufacture and delivery of 11,000 units of voting booths.
The COMELEC issued a Resolution awarding the contract (for voting
booths) to Acme, subject to the condition, among others, that
"(Acme) improves the sample submitted in such manner as it would
be rust proof or rust resistant. On October 11, 1969, the COMELEC
issued Purchase Order No. 682 for the manufacture and supply of
the 11,000 Units of voting booths in favor of Acme. Acme accepted
the terms of the contract.
F: Upon recommendation of the provincial election supervisor, who
conducted a preliminary investigation of the alleged election offenses
of Delgado, et. al, the Comelec filed an information against the latter.
The respondents moved for reconsideration and the suspension of the
warrants of arrests on the ground that no preliminary investigation
was conducted. The trial court ordered for reinvestigation. The
Comelec opposed the order on the ground that only the SC may review
the decisions, orders, resolutions of the Comelec. The trial court denied
the Comelec motion. Hence this certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N THE COMELEC ACTION MAY BE REVIEWED ONLY ON
CERTIORARI BY THE SC?
HELD: NO.
According to the constitution, the Comelec has the following functions:
(1) enforcement of election laws; (2) decision of election contests; (3)
decision of administrative questions; (4) deputizing law enforcement
agencies; (5) registration of political parties; and (6) improvement of
elections. What are reviewable on certiorari by the SC are those orders,
decisions, etc., rendered in actions or proceedings before the Comelec
in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasijudicial powers. Thus
decisions of the Comelec on election contests or on administrative
questions are subject to judicial review only by the SC. In this case, no
Comelec adjudicatory power is exercised. As a public prosecutor, the
Comelec has the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute offenses punishable under the election
code before the competent court. But when the Comelec files the
information, the subsequent disposition of the case is subject to the
court's approval. The Comelec can't conduct reinvestigation unless so
ordered by that court nor refuse its order of reinvestigation.

On October 16, 1969, Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the then
Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 77972,
against herein public respondents COMELEC Commissioners,
chairman and members of the Comelec Bidding Committee, and
private respondent. Filipinas also applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction. After hearing petitioner's said application, the
respondent Judge in an order dated October 20, 1969 denied the
writ prayed for. Acting on the motion (to dismiss), the respondent
Judge issued the questioned Order dismissing Civil Case No. 77972.
Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and C. The Commission on Audit (Art. IX-D)
decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Courtas provided by law are those rendered in actions or 1. Composition and Qualifications (Sec. 1)
proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the
said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. 2. Powers & Functions (Sec. 2)

In the case at bar, the order of the Commission granting the award to Ynchausti vs. Wright, 47 Phil 866
a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it (see full text)
Page5

wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented We have held in the decision that, according to section 2, Article X
evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this of the Constitution, the Auditor-General has, in the present case,

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 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
discretional power to ascertain, before countersigning the
aforesaid warrant, whether the disbursement in question is
illegal or not (Ynchausti & Co. v. Wright, 47 Phil., 866).
Gonzales vs. Provincial Auditor, 12 SCRA 711
RAMON A. Gonzales of Lambunao, Iloilo, became a lawyer on March
12, 1956. He was elected councilor of Lambunao sometime in the
late 1950s.
While serving as municipal councilor of Lambunao, he was
appointed by then Iloilo governor Jose C. Zulueta as his Assistant on
Complaints and Investigation. Gonzales was given the salary of P250
every month. When he accepted his appointment as Gubernatorial
Assistant, Gonzales did not resign as councilor of Lambunao. The
appointment was made effective July 1, 1961.
On July 31, 1961, Atty. Ramon Gonzales presented a voucher
covering his salary as Assistant on Complaints and Investigation for
July 1961 in the amount of P250 to the Provincial Auditor of Iloilo
for audit, but the latter refused to pass audit of the voucher, arguing
that since Gonzales continued to hold office as municipal councilor
he may not legally be appointed as Assistant on Complaints and
Investigation with compensation payable from the provincial funds.
On Aug. 2, 1961, Ramon Gonzales appealed his case to the Auditor
General from the action of the Provincial Auditor. The Auditor
General, on Nov. 26, 1961, upheld the decision of the Provincial
Auditor.
Ramon Gonzales then went to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on
Aug. 31, 1962, and filed a case for mandamus to direct the Provincial
Auditor to pass in audit his vouchers. On Oct. 25, 1962, Judge
Pantaleon A. Pelayo denied the petition filed by Gonzales. The Court
of First Instance decision said Gonzales should have filed an appeal
with the Office of the President to exhaust administrative remedies
before going to the courts.
Gonzales, aggrieved of the decision of the Court of First Instance,
went to the Supreme Court, which on Dec. 28, 1964, affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance denying the petition for
mandamus.
Ramon A. Gonzales then rose to national prominence when he went
to the Supreme Court and asked for a restraining order for the
Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act 4913, or from
performing any act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for
the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint
Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two House of Congress of the
Philippines (referring to the House of Representatives and the
Senate) approved on March 16, 1967.
The action that Ramon Gonzales wanted declared unconstitutional
was the prelude of the Constitutional Convention that, a few years
later, convened and drafted what was later known as the 1973
Marcos Constitution.
Ramon Gonzales valiantly argued his case before the Supreme Court
on behalf of the Filipino People, questioning the act of the Philippine
Congress as to its constitutionality.
The Supreme Court ruled that, since there are less than eight votes of
the justices declaring the acts of Congress as unconstitutional, the
cases filed by Gonzales must be dismissed and the writ denied.
The historic decision of the Supreme Court was made on Nov. 9,
1967. History that unfolded later proved Gonzales correct when
President Marcos declared martial law on Sept. 21, 1972, and
abolished both houses of Congress. In the 1973 Constitution that
was drafted by the convention, both houses were replaced by what
was called the Batasang Pambansa.
Ramon Gonzales, in another gallant move, also questioned the
directive of then President Diosdado Macapagal to burn confiscated
blue-seal cigarettes. Gonzales, on his own behalf as resident of Molo,
Iloilo City, hailed to the Supreme Court Juan Ponce Enrile, then
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commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, and Rafael M. Salas, then
executive secretary of the Office of the President. The two were
officials appointed by Marcos, who defeated Macapagal in the 1965
presidential election.
The Supreme Court, on May 24, 1967, dismissed the suit of Gonzales,
saying there was no proof that the burning of the blue-seal cigarettes
was not made in accordance with law
Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil 473
Facts:
Lamb was the superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony
until he resigned on Dec. 31, 1911 due to ill health. Before that he
was assigned as provincial treasurer for Marinduque, Mindoro
and Laguna. He requested the Auditor General, Phipps, for his
clearance certificate (showing that Lamb has accounted for all
property and funds under his custody) in order that Lamb may be
allowed to leave the Philippines without incurring criminal
liability.
Phipps, although the records of the Auditor General show
that Lamb indeed has settled his accounts, refuses to issue the
certificate because a certain Fernandez may bring a civil suit
against the government. However the records also show that
Fernandez signed the receipt acknowledging payment from the
government.
The petition for mandamus, asking the SC to compel Phipps
to issue the certificate was demmurred to by the auditor because
it is a suit against the government and the petition states no cause
of action.
The SC initially asked Lamb to amend his petition but the
latter did not do so hence the SC decided the case upon the facts
Lamb intended to make.
Issue:
W/N Mandamus may issue to compel the auditor general to
issue the certificate of clearance of Lamb.
Ruling: NO
The certificate of clearance is needed only for bonded
government employees and there is no averment that Lamb is a
bonded employee other than having custody of government
property and funds, however, the SC assumed that Lamb was a
bonded officer.
It is confidently contended that the Auditor is not obliged
under the law to accept a mere paper accounting as final and
conclusive as to the real responsibility of Government employees
and to issue a clearance upon that alone. He may, it is true, if he is
satisfied; but certainly, he may, if he so desires and if he has any
doubt about the correctness of such accounts, make an actual
examination of the funds and property represented by such paper
accounts or balances.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an
unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty
occurs, if it is clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene
by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action.
If the duty is ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If
the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will
require action only. In the present case, however, the mandamus is
not for the purpose of the compelling action only. It is presented
for the purpose of requiring particular action on the part of
the Auditor. There is a very wide distinction between the use
of the writ of mandamus to compel action and its use to
compel particular action on the part of a public official,
board, or officer upon whom particular duties are imposed
by law.
The following are the powers and duties of the Auditor
General:
First, that the Auditor for the Philippine Islands has exclusive
jurisdiction in the first instance to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts from whatever
source of every governmental entity within the Philippine Islands.
Page5
Second, that his decision or the result of his accounting upon such
revenues and receipts and accounts is final and conclusive upon
all parties unless an appeal is taken within a period of one year.
 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
Third, that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands (See
sec. 36, Act No. 1792) is not possessed with power to revoke or
alter or modify the results of accountings made by the Auditor
without reference to the Secretary of War.
Fourth, that when an appeal is taken to the Governor-General and
the latter disapproves of the accounting made by the auditor, he
must at once forward to the Secretary of War for final action the
matter in controversy.
The SC held that since the nature of the Auditors job
requires him to exercise discretion, he may not compelled by
mandamus to issue the certificate to Lamb. Also, there is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy afforded to Lamb in that the
Auditors decision may be appealed to the Governor-General. The
SC relied on the case of Decatur vs. Paulding where it was held the
the US courts that an Auditor may not be compelled by
mandamus. Also, the SC held that the decision of the executive
branch is not reviewable by the courts.
Dissent of Justice Trent:
Justice Trent makes issue about the supposition of the
majority in the allegations Lamb intended to make saying that the
Court cannot do so without substantiating that inference which in
his mind the majority did not discharge this burden.
In the final analysis, the whole case, up to this point, is
narrowed down to one question only; that is, Can the courts
control by mandamus the judgment and the discretion which
were exercised by the respondent when he denied the relator's
request for a certificate of clearance upon the grounds (1) that a
probable suit might be brought by one Fernandez against the
Government, and (2) that the Government, in all probability,
would have to pay the claims of the relator for leave, salary, and
transportation? I shall now attempt to demonstrate that this
question is, upon sound legal principles, to be answered in the
affirmative, and in so doing, I shall disregard as inapplicable all
the authorities cited in the majority opinion which tend to
support the general proposition that the decision of the Auditor
upon matters pertaining to the settlement of bonded officers'
accounts is final and conclusive, because the accounts of the
relator as superintendent of the Iwahig Penal colony have been,
according to the pleadings, balanced, leaving the relator owing the
Government nothing.
That one Fernandez cannot sue the Government in a civil
action without its consent is well known by everyone. Then, why
should the respondent be allowed to hold up the claims of the
relator for accrued leave, salary, and transportation on this
ground? In deciding to do so, what kind of judgment and
discretion did he use?
The point of Justice Trent is that in order to determine
whether mandamus should issue the court must be governed by
the nature of the duty sought to be enforced and not by the nature
of the office held by the respondent( Marbury v Madison)
The courts will not interfere where it is necessary to weigh
the evidence and decide on which side a nice preponderance lies.
A strict adherence to such a rule would, however, require the
courts in every case to go into the merits and decide on which side
the preponderance lies, exactly the same as in any ordinary case.
But discretion is no concrete thing to be conferred or transferred
as a piece of land or a commission to office. It is a trait of
character bestowed by nature upon all men in a greater or less
degree. If the law permits an officer to act with discretion, he must
necessarily use that discretion. He can, in the nature of things, use
no other. Legal discretion is, after all, nothing but a man-made
standard for measuring and keeping within bounds the
personal discretion of such public officers. If they fail to make
their official acts conform to this standard, they will be called
to account. For political of legislative acts, they are
responsible directly to the people. But if it be administrative
and properly within the jurisdiction of the courts, the courts
will provide the remedy.
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Riel vs. Wright, 49 Phil 195
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25679 August 5, 1926
MAGDALENO RIEL, petitioner,
vs.
BEN F. WRIGHT, Insular Auditor of the Philippine Islands,
respondent.
Santos & Benitez for petitioner.
The respondent, supported by the Attorney-General Jaranilla, in his own
behalf.
STATEMENT
After the formal pleas, the petitioner alleges that on September 1, 1925,
he was duly appointed a "temporary clerk" in the office of the Secretary,
Philippine Senate, with an agreed compensation of P40 per month, as
shown by the letter of appointment from the Secretary of the Senate, a
copy of which is attached to the petition marked Exhibit A; that he took
his oath of office and entered on the discharge on his duties as
"temporary clerk," and has performed them from the date to the
present time; that from February 1 to 14, 1926, there is due and owing
him P20 for and on account of his services as such clerk, for which
amount a warrant was issued to and in his favor by the chairman of the
committee on accounts of the Philippine Senate, which is attached to
the petition marked Exhibit B; that it is the duty of the respondent to
approve such warrant; but the said respondent, in violation of the clear
legal rights of the petitioner, and of his, the said respondent's plain duty
in the premises, unjustly refused and still refuses to approve said
warrant; that at the time said warrant was presented to the respondent
for approval, there was a large amount of money in the Insular
Treasury not otherwise appropriated by law and subject to be applied
to the payment of said warrant; that petitioner does not have any plain,
speedy or adequate remedy, and prays for a writ of mandamus against
the Insular Auditor commanding him to sign the warrant.
For answer, the respondent admits the allegations in paragraphs 1, 2,
and 3 of the petition, and specifically denies all other allegations, and,
as a first special defense, alleges that this court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, and that the petitioner has another plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy. As second special defense, the respondent then
alleges that the appropriation for the petitioner is governed by the
provisions of paragraph 2 under section 18 of Act No. 2935, in
connection with item No. 120 of the Appropriation Act for 1925, and
item No. 134 of the Appropriation Act for 1926, he being included
among "employees rendering service before, during and several days
after a session;" that the Legislature closed its last session on
November 9, 1925; and that the petitioner was paid his salary up to
and including January 31, 1926, which latter date was many more than
several days after the close of a session;" that for such reason, the
respondent refused to sign the warrant, and for the further reason that
the services of the petitioner and like employees have been
unnecessary since February 1, 1026, for the reason that there have
been one hundred and sixty-one more or less permanent employees on
the payroll of the Senate; that on January 29, 1926, the chairman of the
Senate Committee on Accounts was advised that the respondent would
refuse the payment of such warrant; that on December 7th, such
employees were duly notified that their services would be dispensed
will not or after January 1, 1926; that the present case is a test case, the
decision of which will effect the status of forty-seven other like
employees.
It appears of record that on December 31, 1925, the Secretary of the
Senate revoked his letter of December 7, 1925, and that the petitioner
"was acquired to continue rendering services until further order."
JOHNS, J.:
The respondent appeared in person and read an exhaustive brief in
which he forcibly contended that this court did not have any
jurisdiction over his official acts or any authority to compel him to sign
Page5
the warrant, and claimed and asserted that his powers and duties as
Insular Auditor were in legal effect identical with those of the U. S.
Comptroller, and he then cited decisions of the Supreme Court of the
 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
United States to the effect that the court do not have any control over,
and do not review, the decisions of the Comptroller.
For a number of years, it has been and is now the policy of his court to
follow and respect the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States in so far as those decisions construe or apply to the law of the
Philippine Islands, and if it be a fact that the Insular Auditor has the
same powers and duties as the U. S. Comptroller, we would follow and
approve those decisions.
The voice of the argument made by the Insular Auditor in person lies in
his assumption that, under the law of the Philippine Islands, He has like
powers and duties as the U. S. Comptroller under the laws of the United
States.
As was pointed out in the Ynchausti case, 1 the law here expressly says
that the decisions of the Insular Auditor are binding upon the
"executive branch" of the government. The fact that the law specifically
says that his decisions are binding upon the "executive branch" of the
government, under all rules of statutory construction, clearly implies
and carries with it that his decisions are binding upon the executive
branch only, and that they are not binding upon any other branch of the
government.
Under the law of Congress, there is no such limitation upon the powers
and duties of the U. S. Comptroller. The finality of his decisions is not
confined or limited to the executive branch of the government, but they
apply with equal force and effect upon all branches. If and when the law
is amended to confer upon the Insular Auditor of the Philippine Islands
like powers and duties as those of the U. S. Comptroller, the authorities
cited by the Insular Auditor would then be in point, and will be
followed and approved by this court. Until such time as that is done our
decisions is overruled by the United States Supreme Court, upon that
question, we will follow and approve the law is laid down by this court
in its former decisions. Neither is there any legal merit in the allegation
made in the answer, "that the services of the petitioner and the other
employees of the same status are and have been unnecessary since
February 1, 1926." It is not for the Insular Auditor to say how many
employees the Legislature should have or the compensation which they
would receive. That is a matter within the peculiar province of the
Legislature and for which its members are responsible to their
constituents.
Be that as it may, this is petition for a mandamus in which the petitioner
prays for a writ to compel the Insular Auditor to sign the warrant in
question. To obtain the writ, the petitioner must both allege and prove
a clear legal right to a valid warrant.
He alleges that on September 1, 1925, he was "duly appointed a
"temporary clerk" in the office of the Secretary, Philippine Senate," and
the appointment itself shows that he is "a temporary clerk." He also
alleges that he accepted and continued in the performance of his duties
from the date of his appointment "to the present time." "That for his
salary as such clerk for the period from February 1 to 14, 1926, there is
now due the petitioner the sum of 20," for which a warrant was duly
drawn and which the respondent refused to sign "in violation of the
clear legal rights of the petitioner," and that he unjustly refused and still
refuses to approve said warrant."
The answer alleges "that the Philippine Legislature closed its last
session on November 9, 1925," and that the petitioner was paid his
corresponding salary to January 31, 1926. "That the respondent
refused to approve the payment of the alleged salary of the petitioner
from February 1, 1926, up to the present time for the reason that prior
to February 1, 1926, very many more than "several days" had elapsed
since the closing of the last session of the Philippine Legislature . . . ."
Section 18 of Act No. 2935 says:
The following rules are hereby establishment regarding the
appropriations for the Legislature and the Departments,
Bureaus, offices or dependencies of the Insular Government,
and shall not be understood to be repealed by any other law
unless expressly repealed:
And subdivision 2 of that section provides:
The appropriation for "supplementary force" shall be
understood to be available for the payment of officers
appointed in accordance with section one hundred of the
Administrative Code; of employees rendering service before,
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during, and several days after a session, and employees
within and outside of the Philippine Islands . . .
It must be conceded that the services of the petitioner come under the
provision for "the appropriation for supplementary force." That is to
say, that he was employed as a "temporary clerk," and as such he is
distinguished from a "permanent employee" of the Legislature, and that
the services in question were rendered eighty-two days after the final
adjourment of the Legislature. Hence, if the words "several days after a
session" cannot legally be construed to cover and apply to the period in
question, the petitioner was not legally employed, and is not entitled to
the compensation in question.
No authority has been cited, and none will ever be found, construing
the words "several days" to cover and include a period of eighty-two
days. A day has twenty-four hours, and there are seven days in a week,
and thirty days in a month, and twelve months, in a year. In using the
words "several days after a session," the Legislature must have known
the meaning of the words and their legal force and effect, and it is the
duty of the court to so construe them.
It is unnecessary in this opinion to define or specify the exact period of
time meant by "several days after a session" as used in the Act. But we
do hold that, as to the "supplementary force," the words cannot be
construed to mean or apply to a period of eighty-two days, "after a
session." Giving them this construction, it follows that the petitioner
has no legal right to compensation for the services in question.
Apparently recognizing the legal force and effect of the words used, the
petitioner contends that section 18 of Act No. 2935 is unconstitutional,
because (a) it embraces two subjects, and "(b) that one of the subjects
is not expressed in the title of the bill." It is entitled "an Act
appropriating funds for the necessary expenses of the Government of
the Philippine Islands during the fiscal year ending December thirty-
first, nineteen hundred and twenty-on, and for other purposes." And
section 18 provides that the following rules are established regarding
appropriations for the Legislature, and shall not be understood to be
repealed by any other law unless expressly repealed," which has not
been done. The Act in question must be construed as a whole, and, as
so construed, section 18 is germane to the Act. That is to say, that the
only appropriation which the Legislature has ever made for
"supplementary force" is for "employees rendering service before,
during, and several days after a session," and that upon no legal
principle can the words "several days after a session" be construed to
cover and include services rendered on and after a period of eighty-two
days after the Legislature had adjourned. In legal effect any other
construction would nullify the language used as to time, and destroy
the meaning of the words "supplementary force," and make a
"temporary clerk" a "permanent employee" of the Legislature.
For such reasons, the writ is denied and the petition dismissed, with
costs in favor of the respondent.
So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Street, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Ostrand, J., concurs in the result.
Matute vs. Hernandez, 68 Phil 68
1. CONTRACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT; PURCHASING AGENT;
POWER OF THE AUDITOR-GENERAL. Under the law the
Auditor-General has the right and power to judge the merits
and legality of any contract for supplies entered into by the
Commonwealth of the Philippines through the Purchasing
Agent. The modification of the contract of December 24, 1936
increasing the price of the meat to be delivered to the Government
Page5
by one and a half centavos, is illegal and void.
2. ID.; ID.; ID. If, according to section 2, Article X of the
 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
Constitution, the Auditor-General has the right and duty to examine,
audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts .
. . and to audit, in accordance with law, all expenditures of funds
pertaining to the Government . . . and to bring to the attention of the
proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property
which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or
extravagant, then it is logical to conclude therefrom that the act of
countersigning the treasury warrant with his signature is not a
merely ministerial duty of the Auditor-General, but a discretional
power authorizing him to determine whether or not the expenditure
in question is irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOVATION. The increase in the price of meat
allowed the petitioner by the Acting Purchasing Agent undoubtedly
constitutes a novation of the contract of December 24, 1936 entered
into between the Government and petitioner after a public bidding
had been held.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; In order that the novation of said contract may be
valid, compliance with Executive Order No. 16 which was amended
by another Executive Order No. 98, was necessary. The meaning
given the words "contract of public service" is set forth in said
Executive Order No. 98 and it includes those for "furnishing supplies,
materials and equipment to the Government."cralaw virtua1aw
library
5. ID.; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
ACCORDING TO SECTION 11 91) OF ARTICLE VII OF THE
CONSTITUTION. According to section 11 (1) of Article VII of the
Constitution, the President of the Philippines shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law,
and take case that the laws be faithfully executed. In the exercise of
these constitutional powers, His excellency, the President, as Chief
Executive of the Government, may issue regulations for the
enforcement and execution of the laws, and Executive Orders Nos. 16
and 98 have been issued, not for the purpose of amending or adding
something to the law relating to contracts of supplies for the
Government, but to better assure compliance therewith and to avoid
even suspicions of favoritism or anomalies in the execution or
renewal of said contracts.
Facts: This is a petition for mandamus to compel the respondent
Auditor- General of the Commonwealth of the Philippines to sign a
treasury warrant issued by the Director of Prisons in favor of
petitioner Amadeo Matute.
Petitioner entered into a contract on December 24, 1936 with the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, through its Purchasing Agent,
with the consent and approval of the Secretary of Finance, whereby
petitioner would supply the Government from January 1, 1937 to
June 30, of the same year, with fresh meat at the following prices:
Hindquarters per kilo P0.37
Brisket, boneless do .38.
As the City of Manila had raised the fees in the municipal slaughter
house from two to three and a half centavos per kilo, petitioner
asked the Purchasing Agent that the price per kilo of each class of
meat be increased by one and a half centavos, or P0.38 1/2 per kilo
for the hindquarters and P0.39 1/2 per kilo for the brisket, boneless.
By letter dated March 2, 1937 C.E. Unson, technical adviser to the
President and Acting Purchasing Agent, granted this request with
the approval of the Undersecretary of Finance Guillermo Gomez.
During the period from March 1 to 15, 1937 petitioner supplied and
delivered hindquarters fresh meat to the Bureau of Prisons. On Maya
31, 1937 the Director of Prisons, with the approval of the said Acting
Purchasing Agent, made and signed a treasury warrant for the
amount of P330.73, value of the meat supplied the Bureau of Prisons
during the period above-mentioned. Said treasury warrant was sent
to the respondent Auditor-General to be countersigned by him, but
he refused to do so and ordered its return to the Director of Prisons
to be cancelled. Hence, the present petition for mandamus.
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In his answer the respondent Auditor-General, through the Solicitor-
General, alleged, among other things, that the conformity given by
the Acting Purchasing Agent, with the approval of the
Undersecretary of Finance, to the increase in price per kilo of meat
as requested by petitioner, was and is illegal and null and void for
lack of valuable consideration and because no public bidding had
been held for that purpose. Furthermore, neither the respondent
Auditor-General nor the Secretary of Justice had been consulted, nor
was the approval of His Excellency, the President of the Philippines,
obtained before or after said conformity of the Purchasing Agent had
been given.
Issues:
1. Whether the Auditor-General, under the law, has the right and
power to judge the merits and legality of any contract for supplies
entered into by the Commonwealth of the Philippines through the
Purchasing Agent.
According to section 2, Article X of the Constitution, the Auditor-
General has, in the present case, discretional power to ascertain,
before countersigning the aforesaid warrant, whether the
disbursement in question is illegal or not (Ynchausti & Co. v. Wright,
47 Phil., 866).
2. Whether the amendment of the contract of December 24, 1936
raising the price of meat to be delivered to the Government by one
and a half centavos, is illegal and null and void.
For lack of compliance with said Executive Order No. 16, the
disbursement of money required by the treasury warrant issued by
the Director of Prisons could not be legally authorized.
The increase in the price of meat does not represent a valid
obligation on the part of the government for the reason that being a
novation of the contract, it was not awarded through a public
bidding nor was the consent of the Auditor-General and of the
Secretary of Justice first obtained together with the approval of His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines, in accordance with the
requirements of Executive Order No. 16.
Guevara vs. Jimenez, 7 SCRA 813
The limit of his constitutional function was clearly set forth in
Guevara v. Gimenez, the opinion being rendered by the present Chief
Justice. Thus: "Under our Constitution, the authority of the Auditor
General, in connection with expenditures of the Government is limited
to the auditing of expenditures of funds or property pertaining to, or
held in trust by, the Government or the provinces or municipalities
thereof (Article XI, section 2, of the Constitution). Such function is
limited to a determination of whether there is a law appropriating
funds for a given purpose; whether a contract, made by the property
officer, has been entered into in comformity with said appropriation
law; whether the goods or services covered by said contract have been
delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions thereof, as
attested to by the proper officer; and whether payment therefor has
been authorized by the officials of the corresponding department or
bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial
duty of the Auditor General to approve and pass in audit the voucher
and treasury warrant for said payment. He has no discretion or
authority to disapprove said payment upon the ground that the
aforementioned contract was unwise or that the amount stipulated
therein is unreasonable. If he entertains such belief, he may do no
more than discharge the duty imposed upon him by the Constitution
(Article XI, section 2), 'to bring to the attention of the proper
administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which, in his
opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant.' This
duty implies a negation of the power to refuse and disapprove
payment of such expenditures, for its disapproval, if he had authority
therefor, would bring to the attention of the aforementioned
administrative officer the reasons for the adverse action thus taken by
the General Auditing office, and, hence, render the imposition of said
duty unnecessary."
FACTS:
In 1954, the District Engineer of Sorsogon prepared a program of work
Page5
and detailed estimate for there construction of the Sorsogon Central
School building. Specifications consisting of five pages were likewise
 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
prepared. The Cost of painting was left out in the detailed estimate and
specifications. The papers were submitted to the Division Engineer in
Lucena, Quezon, who returned them duly approved with an authorized
appropriation of P40,000.00 "provided that painting shall be included".
Whereupon, the specification for painting was accordingly made and
appended to the specifications as page six. In August 1954 the District
Engineer advertised an invitation to bid for furnishing of all materials,
labor and plant, for reconstruction project. Fernando Guevarra's bid of
P37,500 was declared lowest and the contract was awarded to him.
Eighty five days after completion of the project, Guevarra file with the
Director of Public Works a written claim for the payment of P4,620.00
representing cost of painting not covered by the contract.
After hearing, Secretary of Public Works and Communications denied
the claim and two motion for reconsideration were also denied. On
appeal, the Auditor General also denied the claim. Guevarra appealed to
the Supreme Court pursuant to CA 327.
ISSUE: Whether the contract for the reconstruction of the school
building included the painting.
HELD:Yes.
Testimonies of the employees' should be given more weight than those
of the contractors. These government employees testified as to what
transpired in the performance of their duties. The presumption is that
official duty has been regularly performed. [Note: The main issue of the
case has nothing to do with COA. However, note that, claims and
disbursements of public funds should have be coursed to COA]
Pacete vs. Acting Chairman of COA, 185 SCRA 1
ELIAS V. PACETE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ACTING CHAIRMAN
OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE ASSISTANT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, MIGUEL PEALOSA, JR., in his capacity as
City Auditor and in his personal capacity; and THE CITY
TREASURER, respondents
On July 22, 1968, petitioner Elias V. Pacete was appointed by the then
Mayor Antonio C. Acharon of General Santos City as City Attorney of the
said city.
On June 24, 1971, Mayor Acharon was charged with murder in the
Court of First Instance of General Santos City and was detained without
bail. A few months later, on November 8, 1971, Mayor Acharon ran for
and was reelected as City Mayor of General Santos City pending the
criminal case against him and even while he was in jail. On January 1,
1972, Mayor Acharon issued Administrative Order No. 1 designating
Vice Mayor Erlindo R. Grafilo as Acting Mayor. On June 29, 1972,
Acharon, while still in prison, issued another memorandum which had
the effect of revoking the aforementioned January 1, 1972
memorandum.
Subsequently, Acharon filed two cases with the Supreme Court
challenging the authority of Acting Mayor Grafilo to act as such,
claiming that notwithstanding the fact that he was confined as a
detention prisoner due to the murder charge against him. Acharon may
lawfully discharge the duties and functions of the Office of the Mayor of
General Santos City. Both petitions, City of General Santos and Hon.
Antonio Acharon v. Atty. Erlindo Grafilo, et al., G.R. No. 35303 and
Antonio C. Acharon v. Pedro Samson C. Anomas, et al., G.R. No. L-33835,
were dismissed by the Court. The Court, in a Resolution dated October
20, 1972 stated that "the continued detention of . . . Antonio Acharon in
jail, pending hearing and determination of his case of murder, for which
he has been denied bail, constitutes temporary incapacity to discharge
the duties of his office of Mayor of General Santos City, under Section 17
of Republic Act No. 6388 which incapacity justifies the assumption of
the Office of Mayor by respondent Vice-Mayor Erlindo Grafilo . . . [City
of General Santos and Hon. Antonio C. Acharon v. Atty. Erlindo Grafilo,
et al., G.R. No. L-35303, October 20, 1972].
In the meantime, acting Mayor Erlindo Grafilo suspended petitioner
Elias V. Pacete as City Attorney for a period of ten (10) days effective
July 11, 1972.
Finally, on July 20, 1972, notice was served on petitioner that he had
been removed as the City Attorney of General Santos City on the ground
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of loss of confidence. Ostensibly, the Acting Mayor's loss of confidence
in petitioner was the result of the legal opinion of the latter impugning
the authority of Acting Mayor Grafilo to act as such and upholding the
authority of Mayor Acharon to discharge the functions of the Office of
the Mayor even while the latter was in prison.
Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission the termination of
his services as City Attorney. The Acting Commissioner on Civil Service
in an indorsement dated October 13, 1972 directed Acting Mayor
Grafilo to allow Atty. Pacete to continue in service as City Attorney
pending resolution of the merits of his appeal. Acting Mayor Grafilo
disregarded the directive of the Civil Service Commissioner branding
the same as an illegal order and contrary to the Supreme Court
decisions in Claudio vs. Subido, 40 SCRA 481 and Besa vs. PNB, 33
SCRA 330. On September 14, 1972, Acting Mayor Grafilo appointed
Atty. Hilarion Polistico as City Attorney of General Santos City.
On October 12, 1972, petitioner filed with the City Treasurer of General
Santos City a claim for the payment of his back salaries in the amount
of P2,275.00 corresponding to the period from July 11 to October 15,
1972 invoking in support of his claim the aforementioned directive of
the Commission on Civil Service. Petitioner's voucher was forwarded
by respondent City Treasurer to respondent City Auditor who in turn
referred the same to the Auditor General in an indorsement dated
October 26, 1972 for decision. The Auditor General referred the claim
to the Office of the President for opinion. On February 18, 1974, the
respondent Assistant Executive Secretary, by Authority of the
President, rendered an opinion stating that: (1) the termination of
petitioner's services as City Attorney by Acting Mayor Grafilo was in
accordance with law and; (2) Atty. Pacete may not rightfully demand
payment of back salaries for the period during which he was out of the
service and was physically and legally not discharging his duties as City
Attorney of General Santos City [Annex "I" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 64].
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
respondent Assistant Executive Secretary on July 8, 1974 [Annex "J" to
the Petition; Rollo, p. 72]. On May 22, 1974, the Commission on Audit,
which by virtue of the 1973 Constitution took over the powers and
functions of the Auditor General, rendered a decision disallowing
petitioner's claim for backwages.
Consequently, respondent City Auditor Miguel Pen alosa, Jr. refused to
pass in audit petitioner's claim for backwages [Annex "R" to the
Petition; Rollo, p. 103].
On October 15, 1974, petitioner filed the present petition with
essentially the following prayers: (1) payment of backwages from the
time petitioner was suspended on July 11, 1972 until the final
termination of his case; and (2) payment by respondent City Auditor
Miguel Pen alosa, Jr. of damages for his refusal to pass in audit
petitioner's claim for backwages. Petitioner did not pray for
reinstatement.
After the filing by the parties of their respective pleadings, the Court,
through its Second Division, resolved on June 30, 1975, to consider the
case submitted for decision. Unfortunately, no action was taken thereon
until after the organization of the Court upon the ratification of the
1987 Constitution.
On February 8, 1988, the Court, noting the considerable length of time
during which the case has been pending and to determine whether
supervening events have rendered the case moot and academic
required the parties to move in the premises.
The respondents City Auditor and City Treasurer of General Santos City
filed a manifestation claiming that the case has been moot and
academic because petitioner has been appointed Hearing Officer IV of
the National Police Commission on February 25, 1976. On the other
hand, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation stating that: (1) there
is no showing that the parties have lost interest in the case; and (2)
there is no supervening event which would render the case moot and
academic. Likewise, petitioner filed a manifestation underscoring his
interest in pursuing the case and reiterating his claims for backwages
and damages.
Petitioner first assails the legality of the opinion of respondent
Assistant Executive Secretary contending that the decision of the
Page5
Auditor General cannot be reviewed by the Office of the President
 Constitutional Law II:
Art. IX. The Constitutional Commissions
without violating the principles of separation of powers and non-
delegation of powers.
This contention is unmeritorious because the Office of the President
did not review the ruling of the Auditor General. Instead, what
transpired was the referral of petitioner's case by the Auditor General
to the Office of the President for opinion, on the basis of which the
respondent Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit, who as noted
earlier took over the functions of the Auditor General, rendered a
decision disallowing petitioner's claim (Annex "K" to the Petition;
Rollo, p. 102). In other words, the respondent Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Audit did issue a separate decision rejecting
petitioner's money claim. It cannot, therefore be claimed that the
Commission on Audit (formerly the Auditor General) abdicated in favor
of the Office of the President its authority over cases involving the
settlement of accounts or money claims against the government.
Petitioner next contends that the failure of the Auditor General to
decide his claim within sixty (60) days from the presentation of the
same resulted in the automatic grant of petitioner's claim for
backwages in accordance with Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 327.
This contention is bereft of merit. Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 327
provides:
Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims,
other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act
and decide the same within sixty (60) days, exclusive of Sundays and
holidays, after their presentation.
In Carabao, Inc. v. Agricultural Productivity Commission, G.R. No. L-
29304, September 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 224, the Court held that in case of
failure by the Auditor General to decide a claim within sixty (60) days, a
claimant's remedy is to institute mandamus proceedings to compel the
rendition of a decision by the Auditor General. The lapse of the sixty
(60) day period does not result in the automatic grant of the claim.
Nowhere in Commonwealth Act No. 327 can the petitioner's theory of
automatic grant be inferred.
Having resolved the preliminary issues, the Court will now deal with
petitioner's claim for backwages which is anchored on the legality of
the termination of the services of petitioner as City Attorney of General
Santos City, which, in turn, hinges on the issue of whether or not the
position of City Attorney is confidential, for which loss of confidence is
a valid ground for termination.
This is not the first time that this question has been raised before the
Court. In Besa v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. L,26838, May 29,
1970, 33 SCRA 331, the Court ruled that the position of Chief Legal
Counsel of the Philippine National Bank is both confidential and
technical in nature. In Claudio v. Subido, G.R. No. L-30865, August 31,
1971, 40 SCRA 481, 484, the Court likewise ruled that "[t]he position in
question, that of the City Legal Officer, in one that requires the utmost
confidence on the part of the Mayor."
The same conclusion was reached by the Court in Cadiente v. Santos,
G.R. No. L-35592, June 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 280, where petitioner
Cadiente was discharged as the City Legal Officer of Davao City by the
newly elected mayor on the ground that the position was primarily
confidential in nature. In upholding Cadiente's termination, the Court
stated the following:
In resolving the merits of the instant case, We find as an undeniable fact
that the position of a City Legal Officer is one which is "primarily
confidential." This Court held in the case of Claudio vs. Subido, L-30865,
August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 481, that the position of a City Legal Officer
is one requiring that utmost confidence on the part of the mayor be
extended to said officer. The relationship existing between a lawyer and
his client, whether a private individual or a public officer, is one that
depends on the highest degree of trust that the latter entertains for the
counsel selected. As stated in the case of Pinero vs. Hechanova, L-
22562, October 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 4176 (citing De los Santos vs.
Mallare, 87 Phil. 289), the phrase 'primarily confidential' denotes not
only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the
office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of
intercourse, without embarrassment on freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust on confidential matters of state,".
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Compiled by rago
The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends
upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long
as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no
removal (Corpus vs. Cuaderno, L-23721, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 591-
596). When such confidence is lost and the officer holding such
position is separated from the service, such cessation entails no
removal but an expiration of his term. In the case of Hernandez vs.
Villegas, L-17287, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 548, it was held
It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding
primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as confidence
in them endures.
The termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground
of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office
involved no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office -
two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized
in the law of Public Officers.
The Court, after a careful consideration of the instant case, finds no
cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the aforecited cases that the
position of Legal Counsel or City Attorney is confidential in nature, for
which loss of confidence is a valid ground for termination. Hence, the
Court must rule that petitioner is not entitled to the backwages
claimed. Moreover, having determined the legality of petitioner's
termination from service as City Attorney, the Court must likewise hold
that respondent City Auditor Miguel Pen alosa, Jr. cannot be held liable
for damages since his refusal to pass in audit petitioner's claim for
backwages was pursuant to a lawful order made by the respondent
Acting Commissioner on Audit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Pacete v. Secretary of Commission, 40 SCRA 58
An appointment made by the President when the Congress is in
recess shall take effect immediately without the necessity of
confirmation from the Commission of Appointments.
A distinction is made between the exercise of such presidential
prerogative requiring confirmation by the Commission when
Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former the
President nominates and only upon the consent of the Commission
may the person thus assume office. It is not so with reference to ad
interim appointments. It takes effect at once. The confirmation
stands; it must be given force and effect pursuant to Rule 21 of the
Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments which states:
Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be
reconsidered on a motion by a member presented not more
than one day after their approval. If a majority of the members
present concur to grant reconsideration, the appointment may
be laid on the table, this shall be reopened and submitted anew
to the Commission.
3. Prohibited Exemptions from COA jurisdiction (Sec. 3)
4. Report (Sec. 4)
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