Analysis
March 9, 2010
Summary: A quarrel has erupted
within the Turkish judiciary over an
investigation into Operation Sledge-
hammer— an alleged plot by some
elements in the military to take over
the government. Despite complaints
of improprieties committed in the
process of arresting people and
searching homes, the government
has decided to back the investiga-
tion.
While it is clear that the military has
lost its political clout and that the
probability of a military interven-
tion has all but disappeared, such
changes do not confirm that Turkish
democracy is deepening. To consoli-
date democracy, Turkish politics is
in need of a grand compromise.
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Less Military May Not Mean More Democracy
by İlter Turan*
ISTANBUL — Parts of the Turkish
judiciary have recently launched a new
investigation on an alleged plot by
some elements in the military to take
over the government under the code
name Operation Sledgehammer. Re-
tired four star generals as well as doz-
ens of active duty and non-commis-
sioned officers have been taken in for
questioning. Some remain in custody
while others have already been arrest-
ed. This is in addition to the ongoing
Ergenekon trials, which allege that a
major clandestine organization has
been bringing retired military officers,
bureaucrats, university professors, and
other civilians together to take over the
government by unorthodox means.
In addition, a recent quarrel has
broken out within the judiciary re-
garding the improprieties public pros-
ecutors and judges have committed in
the process of arraigning people and
searching homes. The government has
become party to the quarrel, appearing
to side with those who are investigat-
ing the military, but not others who
have chosen to investigate activity that
allegedly violates laws to protect secu-
lar nature of the Republic, its bureau-
cracy and educational system. Turkish
politics seem to be ridden with seeds
of instability and uncertainty. What is
the background to this state of affairs?
*
lter Turan is currently a professor of political science at Bilgi University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001.
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of German Marshall Fund of the United
States (GMF).
Ever since the transition to political
competition (1946-1950), Turkish
politics has been characterized by
fluctuating tensions between the insti-
tutions of state and those of politics.
In Turkish political jargon, the insti-
tutions of state refer primarily to the
military, the courts, the bureaucracy,
and the universities while those of
politics comprise the legislature and
the Council of Ministers. The office of
the president, viewed earlier as a state
institution, is nowadays coming to be
viewed as an institution of politics.
The distinction, connoting that certain
domains of governmental activity
are matters of state and are outside
the discretion of elected politicians,
became important after Turkey made a
transition to competitive politics since
the men of state, feeling themselves
responsible for preserving the achieve-
ments of the republic, wanted to make
sure that these would be protected
against the whims of politicians whose
interest in getting votes was likely to
undermine them.
The Democratic Party governments
of Adnan Menderes that ruled Turkey
after the transition to competitive
politics during 1950-1960 were highly
suspicious of bureaucrats, thinking
that they had close ties to the opposi-
tion Republican People’s Party, the
founding party of the republic. Men-
Analysis
deres tried to co-opt the upper ranks of the bureaucracy to
achieve control. His populist policies eventually produced
economic hardships and loss of voter support. It tried to
compensate the loss by restricting opposition and offering
symbolic concessions on the regulation of religion. These
were judged by the state establishment as undermining the
secular foundations of the Republic. Turkey’s initial demo-
cratic experiment was ended by a military junta of lower-
ranking officers.
The military rulers made a new constitution through which
they tried to delineate the domain of the state. A National
Security Council was established to advise the government
on protecting the Republic against internal and external
enemies, the court system was rendered fully autonomous
from elected officials, a Constitutional Court was estab-
lished and the powers of the Council of State, a high admin-
istrative court, were expanded. Full university autonomy
took away any powers the government had on appointing
administrators and running universities.
The fact that the 1960 military intervention had been
carried out by a clandestine committee of lower-rank-
ing officers encouraged the post-1960 military leadership
to assume a more activist stance vis-a-vis politics so as to
restrain the interventionist tendencies of lower-ranking
officers. Twice, in 1971 and 1980, the top command of the
armed forces intervened in the political process, indirectly
and directly, respectively. The 1980 intervention, by writing
a new constitution, went far in consolidating the position
of the military as a veto group that sets the limits of politi-
cal decisions. This position was used often to arrest or even
reverse changes intended to enhance the public role of
religion, especially in light of the fact that after 1983, main
political actors almost always included a religiously-
oriented party in government. In this endeavor, the military
also found support in the court system, with the Constitu-
tional Court leading. On a regular basis, the Constitutional
Court determined that religiously-oriented parties had used
religion for political ends and closed them down.
The military and the courts were the two highly profes-
sional organs of the state that party politics had been able to
penetrate least. They remained as the pillars of the state that
had otherwise been slowly conquered by electorally-based
politics. The bureaucrats, for example, whose appointments
2
were more open to the discretion of the political leadership,
had gradually accepted the idea of receiving instructions
from politicians while the universities had been penetrated
by prevailing political tendencies with faculty members
becoming highly fragmented.
Starting in 1980, rapid changes in Turkey and in the world
began to erode the unique position of the military. The
abandoning of import-substitution oriented economics
in 1980 initiated a period of growth rendering the new
highly complex economy much more sensitive to politi-
cal events. Centers of power multiplied, and governance
became complicated. Furthermore, the end of the bipolar
world for which the demise of the Soviet Union constituted
a coup de grace transformed the international environment
such that a military intervention became a political near
impossibility. The sustenance of democracy was particularly
important for Turkey as a member of NATO and an EU
candidate. Some military leaders appear to have appreciated
the implications of these changes for the political role of the
military while others thought military interventions were
still an open option. Public comments by retired generals
revealed a split among the military leadership. Those op-
posing intervention apparently had the upper hand.
The judiciary also became affected by the changes. With the
expansion of the university system, law schools began to
produce a larger number of graduates. Many from conser-
vative backgrounds with degrees from provincial universi-
ties began to join the court system. Their social and political
outlook was in greater harmony with the conservative poli-
ticians that ruled Turkey than their more senior colleagues.
In 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which
recently splintered from the more radically religious Felicity
Party, won the elections. In 2007, it won by a bigger margin
and elected one of its own as president. The secularist state
establishment feared that all state defenses against elected
politicians were falling, allowing the government to imple-
ment its presumed hidden agenda to dismantle the secular
state. In a pervasive atmosphere of distrust, whatever the
government did was seen as having a religious purpose. The
government, ignoring the criticisms whether justified or
not, argued that it was simply democratizing the system.
In retrospect, it seems that the ascent of AKP to power was a
Analysis
triggering event for some military elements to plan clan-
destine measures to “save” the secular state. Such planning
appears to have been facilitated by NATO-derived practices
and institutional frameworks developed during the Cold
War to fight the adversary behind the lines if national terri-
tory fell under occupation. Under the pretext of special war-
fare, plans appear to have been made for a military takeover.
These have now been exposed, hence the Ergenekon and
Operation Sledgehammer cases in court. Initially defend-
ing its men, retired or not, recently the military leadership
seems to have decided that facilitating investigations is
preferable to maintain credibility. Public prosecutors, on
the other hand, have come up with major conspiracy plans
but with scant evidence. Some subjects will probably receive
sentences, but many are likely to get acquitted.
The implication of some prosecutors and judges in the con-
spiracies has also initiated a battle between the High Coun-
cil of Judges and Prosecutors and the Minister of Justice on
who has the power to do what. The prime minister, joining
the debate, has signaled that powers of the courts are too
wide, that the elected officials should rule supreme. Inviting
the opposition to cooperate in amending the constitution,
he has threatened that otherwise he will proceed to affect
changes by submitting them to public referendum. The op-
position is calling for early elections.
It is clear that the military has lost its political clout while
the probability of a military intervention has all but dis-
appeared. The courts, on the other hand, are no longer
as uniformed on what defending the interests of the state
means. Such changes do not, however, confirm that Turk-
ish democracy is deepening. Checks on the government’s
exercise of power have been weakening. The prime minister
has been growing more authoritarian in word and deed,
while the government has began to behave increasingly par-
tisan in its daily conduct of business. The country is deeply
polarized and faces an impasse. An election 18 months away
may or may not offer a way out. Turkish politics is in need
of a grand compromise to consolidate democracy. Political
will, however, seems currently to be sorely lacking.
İlter Turan, Professor, Bilgi University
İlter Turan is currently a professor of political science at Istanbul’s Bilgi
University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001. His
previous employment included professorships at Koç University (1993-
1998) and Istanbul University (1964-1993), where he also served as the
chair of the International Relations Department (1987-1993), and the
director of the Center for the Study of the Balkans and the Middle East
(1985-1993). Dr. Turan is the past president of the Turkish Political
Science Association and has been a member of the Executive Commit-
tee and a vice president of the International Political Science Associa-
tion (2000-2006). He has served as the program chair of the 21st World
Congress of Political Science in Santiago, Chile, July 12-16, 2009. He is
board chair of the Health and Education Foundation and serves on the
board of several foundations and corporations. He is widely published
in English and Turkish on comparative politics, Turkish politics, and
foreign policy. His most recent writings have been on the domestic and
international politics of water, the Turkish parliament and its members,
and Turkish political parties. He is a frequent commentator on Turkish
politics on TV and newspapers.
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