[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000] (a) Lot No.
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA[2] COSCOLUELLA Y
BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals,[3] dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No.
CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of
the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered
the defendants-appellees (including herein
petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey
title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and
interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament
of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny
S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855
square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil,
which was duly probated and admitted in Special
Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the
following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following
property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
4002 (10942), which is registered in my name
according to the records of the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of
me, the aforementioned property and the rights
which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be
inherited and acknowledged by the children
and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition
(Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla
shall have already received the ownership of
the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease
of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall
expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation
until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of
Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of
Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom
he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the
obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as
 specified in the Fourth paragraph of his
testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza on the month of December of each
year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that
the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to
whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir
shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the
buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the
obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE
HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of
December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export
and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until
Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer,
lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have
respected my command in this my addition
(Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza,
shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my
heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to
my near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall
then have the obligation to give the ONE
HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria
Marlina shall die. I further command in this my
addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of
this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow
that should they decide to sell, lease,
mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others
than my near descendants and my sister."[4]
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was
transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his
name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his
wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora,
Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y
Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as
Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional
Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-
mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the
provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged
that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the
Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine
National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in
disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to
sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near
descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their
obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of
sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs
domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena
Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years
1985 up to the filing of the complaint as
mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated
demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th
paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in
case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the
property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall
likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs
of sugar per crop year to herein private
respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No.
1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the
cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the
deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a
new certificate of title in the names of the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were
declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the Order of
Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S.
Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private
respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of
the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property
and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs,
arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to
deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following
effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity
mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489
will be delivered not later than January of 1989,
more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25
piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing
in any of our names, Mary Rose
Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin,
during December of each sugar
crop year, in Azucar Sugar
Central; and, this is considered
compliance of the annuity as
mentioned, and in the same
manner will compliance of the
annuity be in the next
succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year
1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied
in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as
mentioned therein and which is as herein
agreed upon, taking into consideration the
composite price of sugar during each sugar
crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or
delivered on a staggered cash installment, payable on
or before the end of December of every sugar crop
year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of
crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of
crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of
crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of
crop year 1991-92."[5]
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid
Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial
delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar
crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with
a decision, dismissing the complaint and disposing as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing
findings, the Court finds that the action is
prematurely filed as no cause of action against
the defendants has as yet arose in favor of
plaintiff. While there maybe the non-
performance of the command as mandated
exaction from them simply because they are
the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title
holder/owner of the lot in question, does not
warrant the filing of the present complaint. The
remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in
the category as creditor of the left estate, it is
opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate
proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of
Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full
meaning and semblance to her claim under
the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the
Complaint being prematurely filed is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."[6]
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court;
ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having
established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive
100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce
of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's
obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs
of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver
such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant;
defendants-appellee's admitted non-
compliance with said obligation since 1985;
and, the punitive consequences enjoined by
both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of
Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of
Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance,
this Court deems it proper to order the
reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from
the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of
Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must
institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja
Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an
administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to
Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her
right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive
her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of
the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET
ASIDE and another one entered ordering
defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392,
together with its fruits and interests, to the estate
of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."[7]
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court
of Appeals, petitioner found his way to this
Court via the present petition, contending that the
Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot
1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the
basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that
the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a
modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the
New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
resolving the appeal in accordance with Article 882 of
the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in
deviating from the sole issue raised which is the
absence or prematurity of the cause of action.
Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find
application as there was no modal institution and the
testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be
substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should
the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private
respondent be not complied with. And since the
testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no
valid substitution and such testamentary provision
cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no
valid substitution for the reason that the substituted heirs
are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely
referred to as "near descendants" without a definite
identity or reference as to who are the "near
descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843[8] and
845[9] of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be
deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary
to his supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated
from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety
of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
prematurity of cause of action, there was no such
deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private
respondent had a cause of action against the
petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution
was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had
a legally demandable right against the petitioner
pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of
Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent[10] and compulsory heirs are
called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate
children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate
parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory
heirs.[11] Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law,
without need of further proceedings, and the
successional rights were transmitted to them from the
moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance
includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably,
whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of
subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at
the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of
the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by
the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were
likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his
death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot
No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the
condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered
to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the
death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs
succeeded to his rights and title over the said property,
and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to
deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private
respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir
reciprocally corresponds to the right of private
respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or
performance of which is now being demanded by the
latter through the institution of the case at bar.
Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action
against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil
Code on modal institutions is not applicable because
what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's
near descendants should there be noncompliance
with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to
private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a
person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs
first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator
may either (1) provide for the designation of another
heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original
heir should die before him/her, renounce the
inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a
simple substitution,[12] or (2) leave his/her property to
one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommissary substitution.[13] The Codicil sued upon
contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation.[14] In the case
under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil
do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default
due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What
the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the
Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and
turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and
on this point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary
substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve
the property and to transmit the same later to the
second heir.[15] In the case under consideration, the
instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to
alienate the property provided the negotiation is with
the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus,
a very important element of a fideicommissary
substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing
upon the first heir the preservation of the property and
its transmission to the second heir. "Without this
obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator
in his will, there is no fideicommissary
substitution."[16] Also, the near descendants' right to
inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will
only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs
not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to
private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary
substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the
second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree
from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary
substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related
by first degree to the second heir.[17] In the case under
scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to
the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is
in the nature of a modal institution and therefore,
Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law
in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code
provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the
institution or the application of the property left
by the testator, or the charge imposed on him,
shall not be considered as a condition unless it
appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be
claimed at once provided that the instituted
heir or his heirs give security for compliance with
the wishes of the testator and for the return of
anything he or they may receive, together with
its fruits and interests, if he or they should
disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an
institution referred to in the preceding article
cannot take effect in the exact manner stated
by the testator, it shall be complied with in a
manner most analogous to and in conformity
with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in
Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as
an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a
modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of
the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the
property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed
by the testator upon the heir.[18] A "mode" imposes an
obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not
affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.[19] On
the other hand, in a conditional testamentary
disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in
order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator.
The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the
mode obligates but does not suspend.[20] To some
extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.[21]
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can
be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that
subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It
is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an
obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-
in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the
herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela
Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the
testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance
and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee,
dependent on the performance of the said obligation.
It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not
complied with, the property shall be turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution
of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently
modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the
instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy
of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally
acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir
should not be considered a condition unless it clearly
appears from the Will itself that such was the intention
of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should
be considered as modal and not conditional.[22]
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of
petitioner that the private respondent has only a right
of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself
from the instituted heir because the right to seize was
expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or
mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises
on the face of the Will, as to the application of any of
its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained
from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made.[23] Such
construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its
parts must be adopted.[24]
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under
obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar
yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is
imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his
heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they
sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the
property involved. The Codicil further provides that in
the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not
respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the
property and turn it over to the testatrix's near
descendants. The non-performance of the said
obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the
property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near
descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly
imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir
but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction
imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of
said obligation should equally apply to the instituted
heir and his successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by
virtue of the amicable settlement, the said obligation
imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the
lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had
become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is
deemed to have made a substantial and constructive
compliance of his obligation through the
consummated settlement between the lessee and the
private respondent, and having consummated a
settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the
private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation
under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of
subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn,
revocable and free act by which a person disposes of
his property, to take effect after his death.[25] Since the
Will expresses the manner in which a person intends
how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires
of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will
cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement
which would thereby defeat the very purpose of
making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 23,
1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 112443. January 25, 2002]
TERESITA P. BORDALBA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS
OF NICANOR JAYME, namely, CANDIDA FLORES,
EMANNUEL JAYME, DINA JAYME DEJORAS, EVELIA
JAYME, and GESILA JAYME; AND HEIRS OF ASUNCION
JAYME-BACLAY, namely, ANGELO JAYME-BACLAY,
CARMEN JAYME-DACLAN and ELNORA JAYME
BACLAY, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to set aside the October 20, 1992 Decision of the
Court of Appeals[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, which affirmed with
modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386.
The instant controversy stemmed from Lot No. 1242 (Lot No.
799-C) with an area of 1,853 square meters and located at
Barrio Looc, Mandaue City. The subject lot is part of a parcel of
land situated on the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in
Mandaue City, and originally owned by the late spouses
Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, an
extra-judicial partition,[3] written in the Spanish language was
executed, describing said parcel of land as
2. otra parcela de terreno urbano en el barrio de Look,
Mandawe, Cebu, que linda al N. con la Calle Mabini y
propiodades de F. Jayme; al E. linda con propiodades de
Fernando Antigua; al S. linda con propiodades de Lucas y
Victoriano Jayme, y al O. linda con la Calle Plaridel. La
propiodad descrita esta avaluada, con todas sus mejoras, en
la cantidad de MIL Y CINCUENTA PESOS ---------------------------------
--------------- P1,050.00.[4]
and disposing, inter alia, the same parcel of land as follows:
1) 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the
deceased spouse of private respondent Candida Flores and
the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and
Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion
Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents Angelo
Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;
2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of
petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba; and
3) 1/3 to an unidentified party.
Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is
Nicanor Jaymes house, which his family occupied since 1945.
Sometime in July 1964, Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez,
petitioners mother, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch IV, an amended application for the registration [5] of the
lot described with the following boundaries:
N - Fruelana Jayme & Road
S - Felicitas de Latonio
E - Agustin de Jayme
W - Porfirio Jayme, Lot No. 1 and Vivencio Abellana
Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to
be registered was originally a part of a land owned by her late
parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de
Jayme; and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in an
extra-judicial partition. She further stated that a portion of the lot
for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with
her permission.
Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-
Baclay filed their opposition[6] contending that said application
included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947 extra-
judicial partition. The case was, however, dismissed for lack of
interest of the parties.
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands of
Cebu City an application[7] dated January 10, 1979, seeking the
issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of the
aborted application of her mother, Elena Jayme, now known as
Lot No. 1242 (799-C), described as follows:
North: Froilan Jayme and Road
East: Agustin Jayme
South: Alfredo Alivio and Spouses Hilario Gandecila
West: Hilario Gandecila Porferio Jayme and Heirs of Vevencio
Abellanosa[8]
On April 16, 1980, petitioner was successfully granted Free
Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-571
(FP) over said lot.[9] Thereafter, petitioner caused the subdivision
and titling of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), into 6 lots,[10] as well as the
disposition of two parcels thereof, thus:
1) Lot No. 1242-A with an area of 581 square meters covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) in the name of
spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, to whom
petitioner sold said lot;
2) Lot No. 1242-B with an area of 420 square meters covered
by TCT No. 22772 in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba, and
which the latter mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Mandaue;
3) Lot No. 1242-C with an area of 210 square meters covered
by TCT 22773 in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba;
4) Lot No. 1242-D with an area of 210 square meters covered
by TCT 22774 in the name of Teresita Bordalba;
5) Lot No. 1242-E with an area of 216 square meters covered
by TCT 22775 in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba;
6) Lot No. 1242-F with an area of 216 square meters and
covered by TCT No. 22776 in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba.
Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the
aforesaid Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title over Lot
No. 1242, as well as the conveyances made by petitioner
involving the lot subject of the controversy, private respondents
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28,
the instant complaint against petitioner Teresita Bordalba,
spouses Genaro U. Cabahug, and Rita Capala, Rural Bank of
Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
In the said complaint, private respondents prayed that Free
Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), as well as TCT
Nos. 22771-22776 be declared void and ordered
cancelled. Private respondents also prayed that they be
adjudged owners of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), and that spouses
Genaro V. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank
of Mandaue be declared buyers and mortgagee in bad faith,
respectively. In addition, they asked the court to award them
actual, compensatory, and moral damages plus attorneys fees
in the amount of P20,000.00.
Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242
(799-C) was acquired by her through purchase from her
mother,[11] who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an
owner since 1947. In her answer, petitioner traced her mothers
ownership of the lot partly from the 1947 deed of extra-judicial
partition presented by private respondents,[12] and claimed that
Nicanor Jayme, and Candida Flores occupied a portion of Lot
No. 1242 (799-C) by mere tolerance of her mother. On cross-
examination, petitioner admitted that the properties of the late
Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme were
partitioned by their heirs in 1947, but claimed that she was not
aware of the existence of said Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures in the
said Deed to be the signature of her mother.[13]
On May 28, 1990, the trial court, finding that fraud was
employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421
and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and
ordered its cancellation. However, it declared that spouses
Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank
of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith,
respectively; and consequently upheld as valid the sale of Lot
No. 1242-A covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP)
to spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, and the
mortgage of Lot No. 1242-B covered by TCT No. 22772 in favor
of the Rural Bank of Mandaue. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Decision is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs by:
1) declaring Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 as well as the Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-57 (FP) and all subsequent certificates
of title as a result of the subdivision of Lot No. 1242 except TCT
NO. 22771 (FP) as null and void and ordering the Register of
Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel them;
2) declaring spouses defendants Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita
Capala as buyers in good faith and are the legal and rightful
owners of Lot No. 1242-A as described in TCT No. 22771 (FP);
3) declaring the Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. as mortgagee in
good faith and the mortgage lien in its favor be carried over to
and be annotated in the new certificate of title to be issued
under the names of the plaintiffs;
4) declaring the plaintiffs as the legal and rightful owners of Lot
1242 and ordering the issuance of the certificate of title in their
names;
5) dismissing the claims of the defendant spouses Cabahug
and Capala and the defendant Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc.
for lack of merit;
6) ordering the defendant Teresita Bordalba to pay plaintiffs
the following amounts:
(a) P5,000.00 as actual and litigation expenses;
(b) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, and,
7) ordering defendant Bordalba to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Both petitioner Teresita Bordalba and private respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that since
private respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No.
1242 (799-C), petitioner should be ordered to reconvey 1/3 of
Lot No. 1242 (799-C) to private respondents. The decretal
portion of the respondent court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is MODIFIED to order the
reconveyance of one-third of the subject land in favor of the
plaintiff-appellees in lieu of the cancellation of the Certificates
of Title issued and their declaration as the owners of Lot No.
1242 in its entirety. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[15]
 Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings
decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that the with the deceased person, or communication made by the
testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which deceased to the witness.[19]
touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony
should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same
of their witnesses in the present case is based, inter alia, on the
violated the dead mans statute. Likewise, petitioner questions
1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and
the right of private respondents to inherit from the late Nicanor
not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the
Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity
questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial
between the disputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in
court.
the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private
The contentions are without merit. It is doctrinal that findings
respondents are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion
of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial court
Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their
are binding upon this Court. While there are exceptions to this
heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to
rule, petitioner has not convinced us that this case falls under
substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may
one of them.[16]
assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous
The Court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.[20]
trial court that petitioner resorted to fraud and
Anent the issue of identity, the disparity in the boundaries of
misrepresentation in obtaining a free patent and title over the
Lot No. 1242 (799-C) vis--vis the boundaries of the lot referred to
lot under scrutiny. The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out
in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition can be explained by
that misrepresentation tainted petitioners application, insofar as
the fact that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is only a portion of the entire
her declaration that the land applied for was not occupied or
parcel of land described in the Deed, a 1/3 pro-indiviso portion
claimed by any other person. Her declaration is belied by the
of which was adjudicated each to, first, petitioners mother,
extra-judicial partition which she acknowledged, her mothers
second, to the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents,
aborted attempt to have the lot registered, private respondents
and third, to an unidentified party. Logically therefore, their
predecessors-in-interests opposition thereto, and by the
boundaries will not be similar. At any rate, the records show that
occupancy of a portion of the said lot by Nicanor Jayme and
the parcel of land adjudicated to the predecessors-in-interest
his family since 1945.
of the parties herein was the lot found on the corner of Plaridel
It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects and Mabini Streets in Looc, Mandaue City.As admitted further
only holders of title in good faith, and does not permit its by both parties, Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the land
provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or allotted to their predecessors-in-interest in the 1947 Deed of
as a means to enrich oneself at the expense of others.[17] Extra-judicial Partition. Moreover, petitioners mother
acknowledged in her application for registration of Lot No. 1242
As to the alleged violation of the dead mans
that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was the source of her
statute,[18] suffice it to state that said rule finds no application in
claim over the lot sought to be registered. She further admitted
the present case. The dead mans statute does not operate to
that the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the
close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to
parcel of land inherited by her and her co-heirs, to the extent of
1/3 share each. Under Section 31, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules
on Evidence, where one derives title to property from another,
the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the
title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.
Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of
land over which private respondents predecessors-in-interest is
entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which was disregarded by
petitioner when she secured a Free Patent and Original
Certificate of Title in her name, to the exclusion of private
respondents predecessors-in-interest, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in upholding the right of
private respondents as co-owners, and ordering the petitioner
to reconvey 1/3 of the lot in question to them.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court is
unable to determine what part of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is within
the boundaries of the parcel of land inherited in the 1947 Deed
of Extra-judicial Partition by the predecessors-in-interest of the
parties herein. This is so because private respondents did not
show the extent of the said land mentioned in the 1947 Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition in relation to Lot No. 1242 (799-C). While
they presented the boundaries of the parcel of land
adjudicated in the Deed, to wit:
North: Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme
East: Propiodades de Fernando Antigua
South: Propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme
West: Calle Plaridel
they did not, however, show where these boundaries are found
in relation to the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C). Absent a
fixed boundary of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed,
which they claim Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is a part of, the Court
cannot determine the extent to which the lot now known as Lot
No. 1242 (799-C) is included. Admittedly, the north boundary of
Lot No. 1242 (799-C) (Property of Froilan Jaime and Mabini
Street) is similar to the north boundary of the land mentioned in
the Deed. With only one reference point, however, the south,
east and west boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) cannot be
established with certainty to be within the parcel of land
described in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
In Beo v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court held that in order
that an action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is
indispensable that he who brings the action must fully prove not
only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed
by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. So
that when the record does not show that the land subject
matter of the action has been exactly determined, the action
cannot prosper, inasmuch as the plaintiff's ownership rights in
the land claimed do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively
proven at the trial.
In the present case, while it is true that private respondents
were not able to show the extent of their 1/3 pro indiviso right
over Lot No. 1242 (799-C), they have nevertheless established
their claim over the said lot. Hence, in line with our ruling in the
case of Laluan v. Malpaya,[22] the prudent recourse would be to
remand the case to the lower court for a new trial.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the October 20,
1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419,
and the May 28, 1990 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386, insofar as
it relates to the recognition of the 1/3 share of private
respondents over Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is AFFIRMED. The case is
remanded to the trial court in order to determine what part of
Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included in the parcel of land
adjudicated in the 1947 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition to the
predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 118464. December 21, 1998]
HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI and ROSARIO CUARIO, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA S. REYES as Attorney-in-
Fact of JOSEFINA S. REYES, BERNARDITA S. PALILIO,
HERMINIA S. PALILIO, REMEDIOS A. SAMPAYO,
ILUMINADA A. SAMPAYO, ENRICO A. SAMPAYO, CARLOS
A. SAMPAYO, GENEROSO C. SAMPAYO, MYRNA C.
SAMPAYO, ROSALINO C. SAMPAYO, MANUEL C.
SAMPAYO, DELIA A. SAMPAYO, CORAZON C. SAMPAYO,
NILO C. SAMPAYO, and LOLITA A. SAMPAYO in her own
behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of NORMA
A. SAMPAYO, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the 30
March 1994 Decision and 21 December 1994 Resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals which upheld the right of private
respondents as heirs of Lourdes Sampayo to demand
partition under Art. 494 of the Civil Code.
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario
Cuario, were the co-owners of the property in litigation
consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the corner of Zamora and
Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City, covered by TCT No. T15374,
with a house erected thereon.[1] On 17 March 1986 Lourdes
Sampayo died intestate without issue.[2] Subsequently, on 1 April
1987 private respondents Josefina S. Reyes, Bernardita S. Palilio,
Herminia S. Palilio, Remedios A. Sampayo, Iluminada A.
Sampayo, Enrico A. Sampayo, Carlos A. Sampayo, Generoso C.
Sampayo, Myrna C. Sampayo, Rosalina C. Sampayo, Manuel C.
Sampayo, Delia A. Sampayo, Corazon C. Sampayo, Nilo C.
Sampayo, Lolita A. Sampayo and Norma A. Sampayo, all
represented by their Attorney-in-Fact Lydia S. Reyes, with Lolita
A. Sampayo acting also in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-
Fact of Norma A. Sampayo, all claiming to be collateral relatives
of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo, filed an action for partition
and damages before RTCBr. 54, Lucena City.[3]
The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the
partition on the ground that private respondents failed to
produce any document to prove that they were the rightful
heirs of Lourdes Sampayo.[4] On 30 August 1987 Ignacio Conti
died and was substituted as party-defendant by his children
Asuncion, Francisco, Milagros, Joselito, Luisito, Diego and
Teresita, all surnamed Conti.[5]
At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo
Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo to prove that they were the
collateral heirs of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and
therefore entitled to her rights as co-owner of the subject
lot. Bringing with her the original
copy of her certificate of live birth showing that her father was I
nocentes Reyes and her mother was Josefina Sampayo,[6] Lydi
a Sampayo Reyes testified that she was one of the nieces of
Lourdes Sampayo, being the daughter of Josefina Sampayo,
the only living sibling of Lourdes. Lydia also testified that Lourdes
had another sister named Remedios J. Sampayo who died in
1948, and two brothers, Manuel J. Sampayo and Luis J.
Sampayo who died in 1983 and 1960, respectively. To prove
that Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel were siblings of
Lourdes, their baptismal certificates together with a photocopy
of the birth certificate of Manuel Sampayo were offered in
evidence. These documents showed that their father and
mother, like Lourdes Sampayo, were Antonio Sampayo and
Brigida Jaraza.
The certificates of baptism presented as part of the
testimony of Lydia Sampayo Reyes were prepared by Rev.
Franklin C. Rivero who duly certified that all data therein written
were in accordance with the church records, hence, the lower
left portion of the documents bearing the seal of the church
with the notation as to where the documents were logged in
particular.[7] The baptismal certificates were presented in lieu of
the birth certificates because the repository of
those documents, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lucena
City, had been razed by fire on two separate occasions, 27
November 1974 and 30 August 1983, thus all civil registration
records were totally burned.[8] On the other hand, a photocopy
of Manuel's birth certificate dated 25 October 1919 (Exh.
"I")[9] showed that it was issued by the Local Civil Registrar of
Lucena, Tayabas (now Lucena City).
Adelaida Sampayo, widow of Manuel Sampayo, testified
that her husband Manuel was the brother of the deceased
Lourdes, and with the death of Manuel, Luis and Remedios, the
only living sibling of Lourdes was Josefina.[10]
To rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes had
over the subject lot, petitioners presented Rosario Cuario Conti,
Rosa Ladines Malundas and Rodolfo Espineli. Rosario testified
that the subject property was co-owned in equal shares by her
husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and that her
family (Rosario) had been staying in the subject property since
1937.[11] In fact, she said that her late husband Ignacio Conti
paid for the real estate taxes[12] and spent for the necessary
repairs and improvements thereon[13] because by agreement
Lourdes would leave her share of the property to them.[14]
However, as correctly found by the trial court, no will, either
testamentary or holographic, was presented by petitioners to
substantiate this claim.[15] Rosario also disclosed that when
Lourdes died her remains were taken by her relatives from their
house.[16] When cross examined on who those relatives were,
she replied that the only one she remembered was Josefina
since there were many relatives who came. When asked who
Josefina's parents were, she said she could not recall. Likewise,
when asked who the parents of Lourdes were, Rosario denied
having ever known them.[17]
Another witness, Rosa Ladines Malundas, narrated that she
used to be the neighbor and hairdresser of the deceased
Lourdes Sampayo who told her that upon her death her share
would go to Ignacio Conti whom she considered as her brother
since both of them were "adopted" by their foster parents
Gabriel Cord and Anastacia Allarey Cord,[18] although she
admitted that she did not know whether Lourdes had other
relatives.[19]
According to another witness, Rodolfo Espineli, he took
pictures of the tombs bearing the tombstones of Gabriel Cord
and Anastacia Allarey Cord and Ignacio Conti as well as that of
Lourdes Sampayo who was supposed to have been interred
beside her "adoptive" parents. However, as revealed by Rosario
during her direct examination, Lourdes was not in fact interred
there because her relatives took her remains.[20]
On 4 April 1991 the trial court declared private respondents
as the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. It further ordered
private respondents and petitioners to
submit a project of partition of the residential house and lot for
confirmation by the court.[21]
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
contending that the trial court erred in finding that private
respondents were the heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and that they
were entitled to the partition of the lot and the improvements
thereon.[22]
On 30 March 1994 the Court of Appeals affirmed the
assailed RTC decision and held[23]-
In the instant case, plaintiffs [now private respondents] were
able to prove and establish by preponderance of evidence
that they are the collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes
Sampayo and therefore the lower court did not err in ordering
herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] and defendants
[now petitioners] to submit a project of partition of the
residential house and lot owned in common by the deceased
Lourdes Sampayo and defendant spouses Conti for
confirmation by the court x x x x Considering our earlier finding
that the lower court did not err in declaring herein plaintiffs
[now private respondents] as heirs of deceased Sampayo and
therefore entitled to inherit her property, the argument of the
appellants [now petitioners] that the plaintiffs [now private
respondents] are not entitled to partition is devoid of merit
(insertions in [ ] supplied).
Respondent court also ruled, citing Hernandez v.
Padua[24] and Marabilles v. Quito[25], that a prior and separate
judicial declaration of heirship was not necessary[26] and that
private respondents became the co-owners of the portion of
the property owned and registered in the name of Lourdes
Sampayo upon her death and, consequently, entitled to the
immediate possession thereof and all other incidents/rights of
ownership as provided for by law including the right
to demand partition under Art. 777 of the Civil Code,[27] and
Ilustre v. Alaras Frondosa[28] holding that the property belongs to
the heirs at the moment of death of the decedent, as
completely as if he had executed and delivered to them a
deed for the same before his death.
The appellate court subsequently denying a motion for
reconsideration upheld the probative value of the
documentary and testimonial evidence of private respondents
and faulted petitioners for not having subpoenaed Josefina if
they believed that she was a vital witness in the case.[29] Hence,
petitioners pursued this case arguing that a complaint for
partition to claim a supposed share of the deceased co-owner
cannot prosper without prior settlement of the latter's estate and
compliance with all legal requirements, especially publication,
and private respondents were not able to prove by competent
evidence their relationship with the deceased.[30]
There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the
estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any
action originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained in
Quison v. Salud [31] -
Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the
present plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the
appellants that they are not entitled to maintain this action
because there is no evidence that any proceedings have
been taken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro
Quison, and that without such settlement, the heirs cannot
maintain this action. There is nothing in this point. As well by the
Civil Code as by the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the
property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once
to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject
to theclaims of administration and the property may be taken
from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses,
but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title,
upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his
heirs. Without
some showing that a judicial administrator had been appointe
d in proceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right
of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.
Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction
with Arts. 777 and 494[32] of the Civil Code, from the death of
Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which
is the right to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-
ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so
demanding partition private respondents merely exercised the
right originally pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-
interest.
Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication
would have been correct had the action been for the partition
of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with
extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the
summary settlement of estates of small value.[33] But what
private respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of
Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited from her through
intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition
between co-owners. The applicable law in point is Sec. 1 of Rule
69 of the Rules of Court -
Sec. 1. Complaint in an action for partition of real estate. - A
person having the right to compel the partition of real estate
may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his
complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
description of the real estate of which partition is demanded
and joining as defendants all the other persons interested in
the property.
A cursory reading of the aforecited rule shows that
publication is not required as erroneously maintained by
petitioners. There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an action for
partition. First, whether theplaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the
property sought to be partitioned, and second, if answered in
the affirmative, the manner of the division of the property, i.e.,
what portion should go to which co-owner.[34]Thus, in this case,
we must determine whether private respondents, by
preponderance of evidence, have been able to establish that
they are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of
the late Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be, either a sister, a
nephew or a niece. These, private respondents were able to
prove in the trial court as well as before respondent Court of
Appeals.
Petitioners however insist that there was no such proof of
filiation because: (a) mere photocopies of birth certificates do
not prove filiation; (b) certifications on non-availability of
records of birth do not prove filiation; (c) baptismal certificates
do not prove filiation of alleged collateral relatives of the
deceased; and, (d) the testimonies of Lydia S. Reyes, alleged
daughter of Josefina Reyes, and Adelaida Sampayo, alleged
sister-in-law of Josefina and Lourdes, were incompetent as Lydia
was made to testify on events which happened before her birth
while Adelaida testified on matters merely narrated to her.[35]
We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and
testimonial evidence submitted are competent and adequate
proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes
Sampayo. Private respondents assert that they are co-owners of
one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share of the subject property by way
of legal or intestate succession.
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by his will or by operation of
law.[36] Legal or intestate succession takes place if a person dies
without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently
lost its validity.[37] If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.[38] It
was established during the trial that Lourdes died intestate and
without issue. Private respondents as sister, nephews and nieces
now claim to be the collateral relatives of Lourdes.
Under Art. 172 of the Family Code,[39] the filiation of
legitimate children shall be proved by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence
of a record of birth or a parents admission of such legitimate
filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the
parent. Such other proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name
has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.[40]By analogy, this method of proving
filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.
Public documents are the written official acts, or records of
the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country.[41] The baptismal certificates presented in
evidence by private respondents are public documents. Parish
priests continue to be the legal custodians of the parish records
and are authorized to issue true copies, in the form of
certificates, of the entries contained therein.[42]
The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S.
Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the
official recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S. v. de
Vera (28 Phil. 105 [1914]),[43] thus -
x x x the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered
as entries made in the course of the business under Section 43
of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The
baptisms administered by the church are one of its
transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and
recorded in the book of the church during the course of its
business.
It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence
only of the administration of the sacrament, but in this case,
there were four (4) baptismal certificates which, when taken
together, uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and
Luis had the same set of parents, as indicated
therein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of Adelaida
Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers
Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios, the only sibling left was
Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates have
acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation.
Petitioners' objection to the photocopy of the certificate of
birth of Manuel Sampayo was properly discarded by the court
a quo and respondent Court of Appeals. According to Sec. 3,
par. (1), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself except when
the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced
in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror. The loss or
destruction of the original certificate of birth of Manuel J.
Sampayo was duly established by the certification issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena City to the effect
that its office was completely destroyed by fire on 27 November
1974 and 30 August 1983, respectively, and as a consequence
thereof, all civil registration records were totally burned.
Apparently, there seems to be some merit in petitioners
contention that the testimony of Adelaida Sampayo cannot
prove filiation for being hearsay considering that there was no
declaration ante litem motam as required by the rules, i.e., that
the declaration relating to pedigree was made before the
controversy occurred. Nonetheless, petitioners made no move
to dispute her testimony in open court when she was mentioning
who the brothers and sisters of Lourdes were. As correctly
observed by the trial court in explicit terms, "the documentary
and testimonial evidence were not disputed by defendants"
(now petitioners).[44] Notably, when Rosario Cuario Conti took
the witness stand, she admitted that she was not aware of the
identities of the parents of the deceased. Clearly, this
runs counter to the relationship akin to filial bonding which she
professed she had enjoyed with the decedent. As
wife of Ignacio Conti, she was supposedly a "sister-in-law" of the
deceased Lourdes Sampayo who regarded Ignacio as a
brother. However, in sum, we rule that all the pieces of evidence
adduced, taken together, clearly preponderate to the right of
private respondents to maintain the action for partition. Absent
any reversible error in the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, this petition for review on certiorari will not lie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated 30 March 1994 and Resolution dated 21 December 1994
of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.