CENTENERA VS.

SOTTO

Facts: On June 20, 1940, Mariano Garchitonera filed a motion to approve and be decreed that certificates of title be
issued in his name. He alleged that on May 14, 1931, a decision by the lower court granting Rita Garchitonera as heiress
of her father Andres is subject to lien in favor of Mariano and other creditors. After the judgement was modified by the
SC, lots 1,2,3, and 4 were adjudicated to Mariano. Sotto, Hobias, and Pataan opposed the motion.

Appeal of Obias

Appellant Obias complains in his appeal that the lower court erred in awarding to Mariano Garchitorena the title of lots
1, 6, and 7 of subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd., belonging originally to Ramon and Jose Alvarez. Instead of 300 hectares
to be excluded from lot 1 (that is a public domain) it should be 961 hectares, 38 acres, and 9 cantares. The lower court
disposed the opposition. SC affirmed. Supreme Court declared that from the evidence "it conclusively appears that the
late Jose Alvarez and his successors had a considerable extent of land in the same place where the applicant's land is
situated, and taking also into account that the land was surveyed for purposes of registration, we find that the weight of
the evidence indicates that the land claimed by the opponent Ramon Alvarez had been included in the applicant's plan.
This land has an area of 500 hectares. According to Ramon Alvarez, it appears that his father, Ibo Alvarez, had held the
tract since 1905 and that at the death of said Ibo Alvarez, Ramon Alvarez and his co-owner, Jose Alvarez entered into
possession and have remained therein since."

There cannot be any doubt that Ramon and Jose Alvarez have been finally declared as the owners of the 500 hectares in
question, and such declaration is good for all purposes, including the issuance of the corresponding certificates of title to
said owners of their successors in interest, such as buyer Mariano Garchitorena.

Appeal of Pataan

Lower court erred in holding that the free patent title number 1406 is null and void. SC decided that there was no error.

Appeal of Sotto

Appellant alleges that he cannot be prejudiced by judgments or orders issued in other cases in which he has not been a
party, and said other cases are the petition for land registration filed by Rita Garchitorena, decided by the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur on May 14, 1931, with the modification decreed by the Supreme Court on March 4, 1933

By virtue of execution, lots in question were attached and sold in public auction to Mariano who happened to be the
only buyer despite the opposition of Sotto.

On April 27, 1939, Mariano bought the 500 hectares adjudicated by SC to Ramon and Jose Alvarez. From the foregoing
undisputed facts, no issue of facts having been raised in any of the appeals in this case, it appears that Rita Garchitorena
has never become the owner of the lots in question, it appearing that the adjudication made in her favor was subject to
the provisions of sections 712 and 713 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which in substance means without prejudice to
the rights of the creditors of her deceased father, Andres Garchitorena.

Issue: WON from moment of death, estate of the deceased shall automatically belong to his heir/heirs

Held: Succession takes effect from the time of the death of the owner. Such provision does not create succession which,
as a matter of fact does not exist, as in the case of what the deceased could have left his daughter.

No succession shall be declared unless and until a liquidation of assets and debts left by the deceased shall have been
made and all his creditors fully pay. Until a final judgement/liquidation is made and all debts are paid, there is no way of
determining if his heirs may inherent anything. The right to inherent remains inchoate. It partake the nature of hope.

In the case, after the lot had been sold to Mariano which the debt of Andres were paid, no property of asset remained to
be adjudicated to his daughter Rita. Consequently, at the public auction in which appellant alleges he bought the lots in
question from Rita Garchitorena to collect the amount of P960.84, as a matter of fact appellant bought nothing, it
appearing that what he bought as belonging to Rita Garchitorena did not belong to the latter.
LIMJOCO VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGRANTE

Facts: Pedro is an applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain, and operate an ice plant. PSC
through Ibanez authorized the said operation. Petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commissioner to
allow the substitution of the legal representative of Pedro for the latter as a party applicant in the case then pending
before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in
contravention of law.

If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute his
application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that right. As declared by the
commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from what the commission said
regarding his other properties and business, he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said
plant had he not died. His transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen
and continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence before it, that
his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to
prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it
constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the
commission might have denied application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the
application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his
memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule,
should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a
certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his
estate and judicial administrator after his death.

Issue:

Whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered an artificial or judicial person

Held:

Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased
person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of
article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of
his death.

It is the creation of the law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made, and although
natural persons as heirs, devisees, or creditors, have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal
entity. The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until there has been a due administrator. T

The estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement
and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those
rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death.
MANUEL BARRIOS Y BARREDO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MARIA PASCUALA DOLOR, ET AL., defendants-appellees, 42
PHIL 44

Facts: The plaintiff has brought an action for the recovery from the defendants, heirs of the late Don

Ciriaco Demonteverde, of one-half of a sugar estate and the stock thereon, which he claims

to have purchased from the said Don Ciriaco Demonteverde. In support of his contention as

to the law of the case he attached to the complaint a public instrument which appears to

have been executed by himself and Demonteverde, February 3, 1883, in which, according to

the plaintiff, a stipulation is made for a contract of partnership for the operation of the said

estate, and, furthermore, a community, of ownership is established with respect to the estate

in favor of the two parties to this instrument. It does not appear that this instrument has been

recorded in the registry of property.