Republic of the Philippines knew that the appellant abhorred children playing on the roof of the carinderia and
dren playing on the roof of the carinderia and berated them for it. His
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 137347 March 4, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
PO3 FERDINAND FALLORINA Y FERNANDO, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
For automatic review is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, convicting
appellant PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando of murder for the killing of eleven-year-old Vincent Jorojoro, Jr.
while the latter was flying his kite on top of a roof. The court a quo sentenced the appellant to suffer the
death penalty.
The accusatory portion of the Information charging the appellant with murder reads:
That on or about the 26th day of September 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
with intent to kill, by means of treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of VINCENT JOROJORO, JR. y MORADAS, a minor, eleven (11) years of age, by then and
there, shooting him with a gun, hitting him on the head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and
mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment on October 20, 1998, the appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Case for the Prosecution3
Eleven-year-old Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. was the third child of Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro. The family lived at
Sitio Militar, Barangay Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon City. Vincent, nicknamed "Hataw," was a grade three
pupil whose education was sponsored by the Spouses Petinato, an American couple, through an educational
foundation.4
The appellant was an officer of the Philippine National Police detailed in the Traffic Management Group
(TMG) based in Camp Crame, Quezon City, but was on detached service with the Motorcycle Unit of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).
At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent asked permission from his mother Felicisima if he could
play outside. She agreed.5 Together with his playmate Whilcon "Buddha" Rodriguez, Vincent played with his
kite on top of the roof of an abandoned carinderia beside the road in Sitio Militar, Barangay Bahay Toro.
Beside thiscarinderia was a basketball court, where fourteen-year-old Ricardo Salvo and his three friends,
nicknamed L.A., Nono and Puti, were playing backan, a game of basketball.
Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from the main road across the basketball court. He
was nonplussed when he looked at the person driving the motorcycle and recognized the appellant. Ricardo
friend Ong-ong had previously been scolded by the appellant for playing on the roof.
Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When the appellant saw Vincent and
Whilcon, the former stopped his motorcycle and shouted at them, "Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo
magsibaba d'yan!" After hearing the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon immediately jumped down from the
roof.6 Vincent, meanwhile, was lying on his stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he heard the
appellant's shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. Vincent turned his back, ready to get down
from the roof. Suddenly, the appellant pointed his .45 caliber pistol7 towards the direction of Vincent and
fired a shot. Vincent was hit on the left parietal area. He fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the canal
beside the abandoned carinderia and the basketball court.8
Whilcon rushed to help Vincent up but was shocked when he saw blood on the latter's head. Whilcon
retreated and left his friend.9 The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter's hapless body in a
waiting tricycle and brought him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead on
arrival.
Meantime, word reached Vincent's parents that their son was shot and brought to the hospital. They rushed
to the hospital, only to see their son's already lifeless body. The appellant was nowhere to be found.
Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot of the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted an autopsy where he made the following findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds.
Abrasion, 7.0 x 2.0 cms., right arm, middle third, postero-lateral aspect.
Contused-abrasion, 14.5 x 2.5 cms., postero-lateral chest wall, right side.
Gunshot Wound, Entrance, 3.0 x 0.8 cms., roughly ovaloid, with irregular edges, abrasion collar
widest postero-inferiorly, located at the head, left parietal area, 9.0 cms. above and 8.0 cms.
behind the left external auditory meatus, directed forward upward and from left to right, involving
the scalp, fracturing the left parietal bone (punched-in), lacerating the left and right cerebral
hemispheres of the brain, fracturing the right parietal bone (punched-out), lacerating the scalp,
making an Exit wound, 3.3 x 1.0 cms., stellate with everted and irregular edges, 12.0 cms. above
and 2.0 cms. in front of the right external auditory meatus.
Intracranial hemorrhage, subdural and subarachnoid, extensive, bilateral.
Scalp hematoma, fronto-parietal areas, bilateral.
Visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, one-fourth (1/4) filled with partially digested food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUND, HEAD.10
Dr. Baluyot testified that the victim died from a single gunshot wound in the head. The bullet entered the left
upper back portion of the head (above the level of the left ear)11 and exited to the right side.12 Dr. Baluyot
signed Vincent's certificate of death.13
At about 3:00 p.m., SPO2 Felix Pajarillo and Police Inspector Abelardo P. Aquino proceeded to the scene of
the shooting but failed to find the victim and the appellant. They proceeded to the Quezon City General
Hospital where they heard that the victim had died. They returned to the crime scene and recovered an
empty shell from a .45 caliber gun.14
On September 28, 1998, Major Isidro Suyo, the Chief of the MMDA Motorcycle Unit to which the appellant
was assigned on detached service, reported to the Sangandaan Police Station that the appellant had not
reported for duty.15 At 2:10 p.m. of September 29, 1998, Police Senior Superintendent Alfonso Nalangan, the
Regional Director of the PNP-TMG, NCR, surrendered the appellant to the Sangandaan Police Station
together with his .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial No. AOC-38701.16
Meantime, upon the urging of Vicente Jorojoro, Ricardo was brought to the Department of Justice where he
was enrolled under its Witness Protection Program. He gave his sworn statement to NBI Special Agent
Roberto Divinagracia on September 29, 1998.17 On the same date, P/Insp. Abelardo Aquino wrote the Chief
of the PNP Crime Laboratory Examination Unit requesting for the ballistic examination of the .45 caliber
pistol with Serial No. AOC-38701 and the empty shell of a .45 caliber gun found at the scene of the
shooting.18 Before noon on September 30, 1998, Divinagracia arrived at the station and turned over two
witnesses, Raymond Castro and Ricardo Salvo. He also turned over the witnesses' sworn statements.19 On
October 2, 1998, on orders of the police station commander,20 Pajarillo took pictures of the crime scene,
including the carinderia and the roof with a bullet hole as part of the office filing.21 He did not inform the
prosecution that he took such pictures, nor did he furnish it with copies thereof. However, the appellant's
counsel learned of the existence of the said pictures.
On October 5, 1998, P/Insp. Mario Prado signed Firearms Identification Report No. FAIB-124-98 stating that:
FINDINGS:
Microscopic examination and comparison of the specimen marked "FAP" revealed the
same individual characteristics with cartridge cases fired from the above-mentioned
firearm.
CONCLUSION:
The specimen marked "FAP" was fired from the above-mentioned caliber .45 Thompson
Auto Ordnance pistol with serial number AOC-38701.22
Vincent's family suffered mental anguish as a result of his death. As evidenced by receipts, they spent
P49,174 for the funeral.23
Case for the Appellant
The appellant denied shooting Vincent. He testified that at about 1:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Macario
Ortiz, a resident of Sitio San Jose, Quezon City, asked for police assistance; Macario's brother-in-law was
drunk and armed with a knife, and was creating trouble in their house. The appellant's house was located
along a narrow alley (eskinita) perpendicular to the main road. It was 200 meters away from Macario's
house.24 Responding to the call, the appellant took his .45 service revolver, cocked it, put the safety lock in
place and tucked the gun at his right waistline. He brought out his motorcycle from the garage and slowly
negotiated the bumpy alley leading to the main road. Macario, who was waiting for him at the main road,
called his attention to his revolver which was about to fall off from his waist. The appellant got distracted and
brought his motorcycle to the right side of the road, near the abandoned carinderia where he stopped. As he
stepped his right foot on the ground to keep himself from falling, the appellant lost his balance and slipped to
the right. At this point, the revolver fell to the ground near his foot and suddenly went off. Bystanders
shouted, "Ano yon, ano yon, mukhang may tinamaan." He picked up his gun and examined it. He put the
safety latch back on and tucked it at his right waistline. He then told Macario to wait for a while to check if
somebody was really hit. He went near the abandoned carinderia and saw Vincent sprawled to the ground.
He picked up the bloodied child, boarded him on a tricycle on queue and instructed its driver, Boy Candaje,
to bring the boy to the hospital.25 On board the tricycle were Jeffrey Dalansay and Milbert Doring.
The appellant rode his motorcycle and proceeded to his mother's house in Caloocan City but did not inform
her of the incident. He then called his superior officer, Major Isidro Suyo, at the Base 103, located at Roces
Avenue, Quezon City. The appellant informed Major Suyo that he met an accident; that his gun fell and fired;
and, that the bullet accidentally hit a child. He also told his superior that he might not be able to report for
work that day and the following day. He assured his superior that he would surrender later. He then went to
Valenzuela City to the house of his friend PO3 Angelito Lam, who was a motorcycle unit cop. The appellant
stayed there for three days. He also visited friends during that time.
On September 29, 1998, he went to the office of Major Suyo and surrendered his .45 caliber pistol. Major
Suyo accompanied and turned over the appellant to the commanding officer at Camp Crame, Quezon City.
The appellant was subjected to a neuro and drug test. He stated that the results of the drug test were
negative. The appellant was then referred to the Sangandaan Police Station for investigation.26 The
pictures27 of the crime scene were given to him by Barangay Tanod Johnny Yaket, shown in one of the
pictures pointing to a bullet hole. The appellant's testimony was corroborated in pari materia by Macario
Ortiz.
Leonel Angelo Balaoro, Vincent's thirteen-year-old playmate, testified that at 1:30 p.m. of September 26,
1998, he was playing basketball at Barangay Bahay Toro, at the basketball court along the road beside the
chapel. With him were Ricardo, Puti and Nono. Vincent was on the rooftop of the carinderia with Whilcon.
While Puti was shooting the ball, an explosion ensued. He and Ricardo ran beside the chapel near the
basketball court. He looked back towards the basketball court and saw the appellant, about 15 meters away
from the canal, holding the prostrate and bloodied Vincent. He did not see the appellant shoot Vincent. He
did not report what he saw to the police authorities. He was ordered by his father to testify for the appellant.
He also testified that his mother was related to Daniel, the appellant's brother.
On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of murder, qualified by
treachery and aggravated by abuse of public position. The trial court did not appreciate in favor of the
appellant the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined in and penalized by Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and in view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage by the accused of his public position (par. 1, Art. 14,
Revised Penal Code), is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the amounts
of P49,174.00, as actual damages; P50,000.00, as moral damages; P25,000.00, as exemplary
damages; and, P50,000.00, as death indemnity.
The accused is to pay the costs.
The .45 caliber pistol, service firearm (Exh. "R") of the accused, shall remain under the custody of
the Court and shall be disposed of in accordance with the existing rules and regulations upon the
finality of this decision.28
The appellant assigned the following errors for resolution:
1. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE CREDENCE TO RELEVANT PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE, WHICH IF CONSIDERED COULD HAVE ALTERED THE CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT BY THE
COURT AND THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
2. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED BY OVERSTEPPING THE LINE OF JUDGING AND ADVOCACY,
AND GOING INTO THE REALM OF SPECULATION, PATENTLY DEMONSTRATING BIAS AND
PARTIALITY.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF RICARDO SALVO,
ALLEGED PROSECUTION EYEWITNESS, WHOSE TESTIMONY IS WANTING IN PROBABILITY, AS IT IS
CONTRARY TO THE COMMON EXPERIENCE OF MANKIND.
4. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN INEQUITABLY APPRECIATING EXCULPATORY AND
INCULPATORY FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN FAVOR
OF THE ACCUSED.
5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
 6. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF HIS POSITION BY ACCUSED.29
The appellant asserts that the trial court failed to appreciate in his favor the physical evidence, viz., the hole
found on the rooftop of the carinderia where Vincent was when he was shot. The appellant contends that
the picture30taken on October 2, 1998 by no less than SPO2 Felix Pajarillo, one of the principal witnesses of
the prosecution, and the pictures31 showing Barangay Tanod Yaket pointing to a hole on the roof buttress the
defense of the appellant that the shooting was accidental. The appellant maintains that his service revolver
fell to the ground, hit a hard object, and as the barrel of the gun was pointed to an oblique direction, it fired,
hitting the victim who was on the rooftop. The bullet hit the back portion of the victim's head, before exiting
and hitting the rooftop. The appellant posits that the pictures belie Ricardo's testimony that he deliberately
shot the victim, and, instead, complements Dr. Baluyot's testimony that the gunshot wound came from
somewhere behind the victim, somewhere lower than the point of entrance. The appellant invokes P/Insp.
Mario Prado's testimony that if a gun hits the ground in an oblique position, the gun will fire and the bullet
will exit in the same position as the gun, that is, also in an oblique position.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, asserts that the contention of the appellant is based on
speculations and surmises, the factual basis for his conclusion not having been proven by competent and
credible evidence. There is no evidence on record that the hole shown in the pictures32 was caused by a
bullet from a .45 caliber pistol. The appellant did not present Barangay Tanod Johnny Yaket, who was shown
in the pictures, to testify on the matter. The appellant failed to prove that any slug was found on the rooftop
or under the roof which came from the appellant's .45 caliber pistol. According to the Solicitor General, the
pictures relied upon by the appellant cannot overcome the positive and straightforward testimony of the
young eyewitness Ricardo Salvo.
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal
liability is a factual issue. The appellant was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, his
affirmative defense that the victim's death was caused by his gun accidentally going off, the bullet hitting the
victim without his fault or intention of causing it; hence, is exempt from criminal liability under Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
The basis for the exemption is the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused. For
the accused to be guilty of a felony, it must be committed either with criminal intent or with fault or
negligence.33
The elements of this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care;
(3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without any fault or intention of causing it.34 An
accident is an occurrence that "happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about through
some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences." If the consequences are
plainly foreseeable, it will be a case of negligence.
In Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court held that an accident is a fortuitive
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or
partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstance is unusual or unexpected by the
person to whom it happens. Negligence, on the other hand, is the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand without which such other person suffers injury. Accident and negligence are intrinsically
contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.36 In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should
be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. 37 The appellant must
rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution because by admitting
having caused the death of the victim, he can no longer be acquitted.
In this case, the appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, his defense.
First. The appellant appended to his counter-affidavit in the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor the pictures
showing the hole on the roof of the carinderia38 to prove that he shot the victim accidentally. However, when
the investigating prosecutor propounded clarificatory questions on the appellant relating to the pictures, the
latter refused to answer. This can be gleaned from the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, thus:
Classificatory questions were propounded on the respondent but were refused to be answered.
This certainly led the undersigned to cast doubt on respondent's allegations. The defenses set forth
by the respondent are evidentiary in character and best appreciated in a full-blown trial; and that
the same is not sufficient to overcome probable cause.39
Second. The appellant did not see what part of the gun hit the victim.40 There is no evidence showing that
the gun hit a hard object when it fell to the ground, what part of the gun hit the ground and the position of
the gun when it fell from the appellant's waist.
Third. In answer to the clarificatory questions of the court, the appellant testified that the chamber of his
pistol was loaded with bullets and was cocked when he placed it on his right waistline.41 He also testified that
the gun's safety lock was on. He was asked if the gun would fire if the hammer is moved backward with the
safety lock in place, and the appellant admitted that even if he pulled hard on the trigger, the gun would not
fire:
Q Is this your service firearm?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So the chamber might have been loaded when you went out of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What about the hammer, how was the hammer at that time when you tucked the gun in your
waistline?
A The hammer was cocked like this.
COURT:
Can you not stipulate that the hammer is moved backwards near the safety grip.
ATTY. AND PROS. SINTAY:
Admitted, Your Honor.
ATTY. PEREZ:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q You are a policeman, if there is a bullet inside the barrel of the gun and then the hammer is
moved backwards and therefore it is open, that means that if you pull the trigger, the bullet will
fire because the hammer will move forward and then hit the base of the bullet?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Therefore, the gun was cocked when you came out?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q You did not place the safety lock before you went out of your house?
A I safety (sic) it, sir.
Q So when you boarded the motorcycle, the gun was on a safety lock?
A Yes, Your Honor.
 Q Will you please place the safety lock of that gun, point it upwards.
(witness did as instructed)
It is now on a safety locked (sic)?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Pull the trigger if the hammer will move forward?
(witness did as instructed)
A It will not, Your Honor.
COURT: (to the parties)
Q Can you not admit that at this position, the accused pulled the trigger, the hammer did not
move forward?
PROS. SINTAY AND ATTY. PRINCIPE:
Admitted, Your Honor.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q And therefore at this position, even if I pull the trigger many times, a bullet will not come out
from the muzzle of the gun because the hammer is on a safety locked (sic)?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Even if I pushed it very hard, it will not fire the gun?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Alright, I will ask you again a question. If the hammer of the gun is like this and therefore it is
open but it is on a safety lock, there is space between the safety grip which is found below the
hammer, there is a space, is it not?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q That even if I pushed the safety grip forward, like this.
The Court gave the gun to the accused for him to demonstrate.
(to the witness)
You push it forward in order to push the hammer. Hard if you want but do not remove the safety
lock.
(witness did as instructed)
The witness tried to push the safety grip and it does not touch the hammer even if the hammer is
cocked.42
Fourth. The trial court was witness as the appellant's counsel himself proved that the defense proffered by
the appellant was incredible. This can be gleaned from the decision of the trial court:
3. More importantly, and which the Court considers it as providential, when the counsel of the
accused was holding the gun in a cocked position and the safety lock put in place, the gun
accidentally dropped on the cemented floor of the courtroom and the gun did not fire and neither
was the safety lock moved to its unlock position to cause the hammer of the gun to move forward.
The safety lock of the gun remained in the same position as it was when it dropped on the floor.43
Fifth. After the shooting, the appellant refused to surrender himself and his service firearm. He hid from the
investigating police officers and concealed himself in the house of his friend SPO3 Angelito Lam in Valenzuela
City, and transferred from one house to another for three days to prevent his arrest:
Q So did you surrender that afternoon of September 26, 1998?
A No, Your Honor.
Q I thought you were surrendering to Major Suyo?
A I was but I was not able to surrender to Major Suyo, Your Honor.
Q Why, you were already able to talk to Major Suyo?
A Because at that time I was already confused and did not know what to do, Your Honor.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q What is your relation with PO3 Angelito Lam of Valenzuela?
A Just my co-motorcycle unit cop in the TMG, sir.
Q Did I hear you right that you slept at the residence of PO3 Lam for three days?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why instead of going home to your residence at Bahay Toro?
A Because I am worried, sir.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q So what did you do for three days in the house of PO3 Lam?
A During daytime, I go to my friends, other friends and in the evening, I go back to the house of
PO3 Lam, Your Honor.
Q So if you were able to visit your friends on September 27 or 28, 1998 and then returned to the
house of PO3 Lam in the evening, why did you not go to Major Suyo or to your 103 Base?
A Your Honor, during those days I am really calling Major Suyo.
Q Why did you not go to your office at Camp Crame, Quezon City?
A At that time, I did not have money, Your Honor.
Q What is the connection of you having money to that of informing your officer that you will
surrender?
A What I know, Your Honor, is that if I do that I will already be detained and that I will have no
money to spend.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q Mr. Witness, from the time of the incident up to Sept. 29, 1998, you did not even visit your
family in Barangay Bahay Toro?
A No, sir.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Did you send somebody to visit your family?
A No, Your Honor.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q Did you cause to blotter the shooting incident of Vincent?
A I was not able to do that, sir.
Q You did not even talk to the Bgy. Officials in Bgy. Bahay Toro?
A No sir, because I already brought the child to the hospital.44
The conduct of the appellant after the shooting belies his claim that the death of the victim was accidental
and that he was not negligent.
We agree with the encompassing disquisitions of the trial court in its decision on this matter:
The coup de grace against the claim of the accused, a policeman, that the victim was accidentally
shot was his failure to surrender himself and his gun immediately after the incident. As a police
officer, it is hard to believe that he would choose to flee and keep himself out of sight for about
three (3) days if he indeed was not at fault. It is beyond human comprehension that a policeman,
who professes innocence would come out into the open only three (3) days from the incident and
claim that the victim was accidentally shot. Human behavior dictates, especially when the accused
is a policeman, that when one is innocent of some acts or when one is in the performance of a
lawful act but causes injury to another without fault or negligence, he would, at the first moment,
 surrender to the authorities and give an account of the accident. His failure to do so would invite
suspicion and whatever account or statement he would give later on becomes doubtful. A: He came from their house, Your Honor.
For the accused, therefore, to claim that Vincent was accidentally shot is odious, if not, an insult to Q: What was his attire, I am referring to Ferdinand Fallorina?
human intelligence; it is incredible and unbelievable, and more of a fantasy than a reality. It was a A: He was wearing white shirt and blue pants, Your Honor.
deliberate and intentional act, contrary to accused's claim, that it happened outside the sway of his
will.45 ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
It is a well-entrenched rule that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the Q: At that time that Fallorina shot the victim, was Buddha still there?
witnesses, its assessment of the credibility of the said witnesses and the probative weight of their A: He ran, sir. He jumped in this place, sir.
testimonies are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect by the appellate court, as the trial judge was in (Witness is pointing to a place near the canal already marked as Exhibit O-14).
a better position to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses as they testified.46 We have Q: Now from the witness stand that you are now seated. Can you tell the Court how far where
carefully reviewed the records of the case and found no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court. (sic) you from Fallorina at that time of the shooting?
The testimony of prosecution witness Ricardo Salvo deserves credence. He testified in a positive and COURT:
straightforward manner, which testimony had the earmarks of truth and sincerity. Even as he was subjected Can the prosecution and the accused stipulate that the distance pointed to by the witness is more
to a grueling cross-examination by the appellant's counsel, he never wavered in his testimony. He positively or less 7 meters.
identified the appellant as the assailant and narrated in detail how the latter deliberately aimed his gun and
shot the victim. The relevant portions of his testimony are quoted: ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q: While playing basketball with Nono, LA and Puti, do you remember of any unusual incident Q: How about the distance of Fallorina from Vincent, can you tell that?
which took place? COURT: (to the witness)
A: Yes, sir. Can you point a distance between Fallorina and the boy at that time the body (sic) was shot?
Q: What was that unusual incident? COURT:
A: When Vincent was shot, sir. 10 meters more or less?
Q: Who shot Vincent?
A: Ferdinand Fallorina, sir. Q: How long have you known Ferdinand Fallorina before the incident?
A: More or less two years, sir.
Q: And in what place that Vincent was shot by Fallorina? Q: Why do you know him?
A: He was at the roof of the karinderia, sir. A: I usually see him in that place at Sitio Militar, especially on Sundays, sir.
Q: Was there any companion of Vincent?
A: Yes, sir. Q: How many shots did you hear?
Q: What was the position of Vincent at that time that you saw him and Fallorina shot him? A: Only one, sir.
A: "Nakatalikod po siya." Q: Do you recognize the gun used by Fallorina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You included in this Exhibit O your drawing the figure of a certain Jeffrey and you and his Q: What was that gun?
tricycle? Why did you include this drawing? A: .45 cal., sir.
A: Because it was in the tricycle where Vincent was boarded to and brought to the hospital. Q: Are you familiar with .45 cal.?
(Witness referring to Exhibit O-11) A: No, sir.
Q: And who was the driver of that tricycle? Q: Why do you know that it was .45 cal.?
A: It was Jeffrey who drove the tricycle, sir. A: Because that kind of gun, I usually see that in the movies, sir.
Q: You also drew here a motorcycle already marked as Exhibit O-7. Why did you include the Q: Ricardo, you said that you have known Fallorina for two (2) years and you saw him shot
motorcycle? Vincent on September 26, 1998 at around 2:30 in the afternoon. Please look around the courtroom
A: Because Fallorina was riding on that motorcycle at that time. now and point at the person of PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina?
COURT: (to the witness) CT. INTERPRETER:
Q: So when Ferdinand Fallorina shot the boy, the motorcycle was moving? Witness is pointing to a male person the one seated at the back of the lady and wearing a yellow
A: It was stationary, your Honor. shirt and maong pants and when asked of his name, he stated his name as Ferdinand Fallorina.
Q: Did you see where he came from, I am referring to Fallorina before you saw him shot the ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
boy? Q: Can you tell to the Court whether you heard utterances at that time that he shot the victim?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: "Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo magsisibaba diyan!"
necessarily incurred in his search and capture.55
Q: After Fallorina shot Vincent Jorojoro, you saw Vincent Jorojoro falling from the roof, what
about Fallorina, what did he do?
A: He was still on board his motorcycle and then he went at the back of the karinderia where
Vincent fell, Your Honor.
Q: And after he went at the back of the karinderia and looked at Vincent Jorojoro, what did he
do?
A: He carried Vincent, Your Honor.
Q: And after carrying Vincent, what did he do?
A: He boarded Vincent in the tricycle.
Q: What about the gun, what did he do with the gun?
A: I do not know anymore.47
The appellant even uttered invectives at the victim and Whilcon before he shot the victim. In fine, his act was
deliberate and intentional.
It bears stressing that of the eyewitnesses listed in the Information as witnesses for the prosecution, only
Ricardo Salvo remained steadfast after he was brought under the Witness Protection Program of the
Department of Justice. He explained that the reason why he testified for the prosecution, despite the fact
that the appellant was a policeman, was because he pitied the victim's mother who was always
crying,48 unable to obtain justice for her son. We find no ill motive why Ricardo would falsely testify against
the appellant. It was only his purest intention of ferreting out the truth in this incident and that justice be
done to the victim.49 Hence, the testimony of Ricardo is entitled to full faith and credence.
The Crime Committed by the Appellant
We agree with the trial court that the appellant committed murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code qualified by treachery. As the trial court correctly pointed out, Vincent was shot intentionally while his
back was turned against the appellant. The little boy was merely flying his kite and was ready to get down
from the roof when the appellant fired a shot directed at him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part.50 Nonetheless,
Vincent was an eleven-year-old boy. He could not possibly put up a defense against the appellant, a police
officer who was armed with a gun. It is not so much as to put emphasis on the age of the victim, rather it is
more of a description of the young victim's state of helplessness. 51 Minor children, who by reason of their
tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child,
treachery exists.52 The abuse of superior strength as alleged in the Information is already absorbed by
treachery and need not be considered as a separate aggravating circumstance.53
We, however, note that the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position
in this case. We reverse the trial court on this score.
There is no dispute that the appellant is a policeman and that he used his service firearm, the .45 caliber
pistol, in shooting the victim. However, there is no evidence on record that the appellant took advantage of
his position as a policeman when he shot the victim.54 The shooting occurred only when the appellant saw
the victim on the rooftop playing with his kite. The trial court erred in appreciating abuse of public position
against the appellant.
The trial court did not, however, err in ruling that the appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender. Surrender is said to be voluntary when it is done by the accused spontaneously and
made in such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense
In this case, the appellant deliberately evaded arrest, hid in the house of PO3 Lam in Valenzuela City, and
even moved from one house to another for three days. The appellant was a policeman who swore to obey
the law. He made it difficult for his brother-officers to arrest him and terminate their investigation. It was
only after the lapse of three days that the appellant gave himself up and surrendered his service firearm.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since
there is no modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime, the appellant should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no
modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the amount of
P49,174 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity; and P25,000 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on leave.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.
People vs PO3 Fallorina
People vs PO3 Fallorina
G.R. No. 137347
March 4, 2004
Facts:
At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent Jorojoro, an eleven-year old minor and the third child of
Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro, residing at Sitio Militar, Brgy. Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon City, asked
permission from his mother Felicisima if he could play outside. She agreed. Together with his playmate
Whilcon Buddha Rodriguez, Vincent played with his kite on top of the roof of an abandoned carinderia
beside the road.
Beside the carinderia was a basketball court, where a fourteen-year old witness Ricardo Salvo and his three
friends, were playing basketball. Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from the main
road across the basketball court. Cognizant to Ricardo of the appellant, PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina, a Philippine
National Police (PNP) officer, detailed in the Traffic Management Group (TMG), knew that he abhorred kids
playing on the roof, since one of his friends was previously been scolded by the appellant before.
Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When PO3 Fallorina saw them, the
former stopped his motorcycle, he shouted and badmouthed at them. After hearing the shouts of the
appellant, Whilcon rushed to jump off from the roof while Vincent was lying on his stomach on the roof flying
his kite. When he heard the appellants shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. As soon as Vincent
turned his back, ready to get down from the roof, suddenly, the appellant pointed the .45 caliber pistol
towards the direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the canal
beside the abandoned carinderia and the basketball court.
The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latters hapless body in a waiting tricycle and brought him
to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead on arrival caused by a single gunshot
wound in the head.
Issues:
(a) Whether the appellant is exempted from criminal liability?
(b) Whether the appellant can offset an aggravating circumstance by taking advantage of his public position
from a mitigating circumstance of his voluntary surrender?
Held:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cites that the basis for exemption from a criminal liability under
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is the complete absence of intent and negligence on
the part of the accused. For the accused to be guilty for a felony, it must be committed either with criminal
intent or with fault or negligence.
Thusly, the elements of exempting circumstances are (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due
care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without any fault or intention of causing it.
In the case at bar, the Court a quo erred in inequitably appreciating exculpatory and inculpatory facts and
circumstances which should have been considered in favor of the accused. The court also failed to appreciate
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the accused since it was only after three days
that the appellant gave himself up and surrendered his service firearm. And lastly, the court considered the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his position by the accused.
On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant-accused of murder, qualified
by treachery and aggravated by abuse of public position. The trial court did not appreciate in favor of the
appellant the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender.
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, found the accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined and penalized by Article 248 of the RPC, as
amended by the Republic Act No. 7659, and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage by the accused of his public position (par. 1, Art. 14, RPC). Hence, the accused is hereby
ordered to indemnify the heirs of late Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the amounts of actual damages of P49,174.00
(paid for funeral services); P50,000.00 for moral damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
P50,000.00 as death indemnity. The court a quo sentenced the appellant to suffer the Death Penalty.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. L-37908 October 23, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
BENJAMIN ONG y KHO, and BIENVENIDO QUINTOS y SUMALJAG previously convicted as affirmed in G.R.
No. L-34497, accused, BLDOMERO AMBORSIO, alias "VAL", Defendant-appellant.
On the night of April 23, 1971, victim Henry Chua was last seen alive in the company of his friend Benjamin
Ong. As Chua failed to return to his home,his family, alarmed by his mysterious desappearance, sought the
help of the National Bureau of Investigation, the Manila Police Department, and the Philippine Constabulary
to locate him. Knowing that Bajamin Ong was the last person with Chua before the disappearance of the
latter, the NBI tried to contact Ong. Ong also disappeared, so the various police agnecies began a manhunt
for the apprehension of Ong.
Banjamin Ong was apprehended on August 29, 1971, in Stio patanda, Barrio Balugo, Oas, albay, Brouth to
Ligao, Albay, Ong denied any knowledge of the desappearance of Chua. When Ong was transferred to
CampVicente Lim in Laguna, he attempted to commit suicide. On September 1, 1971, when Ong was turned
over to the NBI for investigation, he unhesitatingly confessed his responsiblity for the killing of Henry Chua.
Ong implicated Bienvienido Quintos as one of his companions in the cirme. When quintos was arrested he
also admitted his participation in the crime, and pointed to Fernando Tan and Baldomero Ambrosio as their
companions in the perpetration of the crime, stating the details of its execution.
Based on the confessions of Ong and Quintos, the NBI and the Manila Police Department were able to
recover the body of Henry Chua in a state of advanced decomposition. The Identity of the body of Chua was
confirmed by Siy Giap Chua, brother of Henry. 1 both Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos were tried (CCC-
VII-922-Rizal, for "kidnapping with Murder") and convicted by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal,
Seventh, Judicial District, (Judge Onofre A.Villaluz) in the "Sentence", dated October 11, 1971. 2 As both Ong
and Quintos were sentenced to death, the criminal case was elevated on automatic review to this Court (G.R.
No. L-34497). This Court in its decision dated January 30, 1975, 3 found the two accused Benjamin Ong y Kho
and Bienvenido Quintos y Sumaljag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and use of
motor vehicle offset by the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and one analoguous to passion or
obfuscation, thereby imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on both of them. 4 Said decision became
final and executory on February 19, 1975. 5
At the time Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos were tried and convicted by the trial court, accused
Baldomero Ambrosio and Fernando Tan, Alias Oscar Tan, were still at large. 6
After the arrest of accused Baldomero Ambrosio sometime in August of 1972, 7 an information was filed by
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal against him, to wit:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Benjamin Ong y Kho, Bienvenido Quintos y Sumaljag, Fernando Tan
alias "Oscar Tan", and Baldomero Ambrosio alias "Val" of the crime of Kidnapping with Murder, committed as
follows:
That on or about April 23 to April 24, 1971, inclusive, in the municipality of Paraaque, province of Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above named accused, being then private
individuals, conspiring and confederating totether and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and with treachery and known premeditation and for the purpose of killing one Henry
Chua and thereafter extorting money from his family through the use of a ransom note, kidnapped and
carried away said Henry Chua, initially by means of friendly gestures and later through the use of force, in an
automobile, and later after having taken him to an uninhabited place in Caloocan City, with the use of force
detained him (Henry Chua) and killed him in the following manner, to wit: The accused after gagging and
tying up Henry Chua and repeatedly threatening him with death, assured him that if he would write and sign
a ransom note for the payment by his family of the sum of $50,000.00 (US), he would not be killed and would
be released upon receipt of the ransom note, he was again gagged and tied up by the accused, and
thereafter stabbed in the abdominal region, several times with an ice-pick, inflicting upon him (Henry Chua)
mortal wounds on his vital organs, which directly caused his death.
All contrary to law with the following generic aggravating circumstances:
(a) Evident premeditations;
(b) Grave abuse of confidence;
(c) Nighttime;
(d) Use of an motor vehicle ;
(e) Use of uperior strenght;
(f) Cruelty. 8
The accused Baldomero Ambrosio pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on August 26, 1972, was tried, and
the trial court rendered its decision dated October 17, 1973, with dispositive portion, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Baldomero Ambrosio, Guilty, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidanapping with Murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 267
thereto, as charged in the Information, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Death; to
indemnify the heirs of the offended party the amount of P12,000.00; to pay moral damges in the amount of
P10,000.00 and another P10,000.00 as exemplary damges jointly and severally with Benjamin Ong and
Bienvienido Quintos; and to pay his proportionable share of the costs.
So Ordered. 9
The evidence for the prosecution, essentially the same as presented and reviewed by automatic appeal, by
this Court in G.R. No. L,34497, established its version as follows:
Dr. Ricardo Ibarrola, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation stated that he conducted
the autopsy of the deceased Henry Chua, and prepared the necropsy report Exh. "M". The body of the
deceased at the time of the autopsy was already in a far advanced state of decomposition. The brains, lungs.
and other soft tissues of the body were already tot:ally decomposed while some of the internal organs, like
the heart and the liver were already autolized. Dr. Ibarrola located two stab wounds on the liver, caused by a
sharp pointed piercing implement, most probably an ice-pick. He attributed death to these stab wounds,
although he gave the considered opinion that death could have been hastened by asphyxiation as the
probability existed that Henry Chua was by alive. 10
The body of Henry Chua was Identified by his brother, Siy Giap who was present when the body was
exhumed from a shallow grave in Barrio Makatipo Caloocan City. His Identification of the body was based on
the clothes and shoes worn by the deceased, as well as the personal effects found on it, including an
expensive Piaget white gold watch, a lighter, a wallet with driver's license, Diner's card and other personal
papers. 11
Agents Enrique Lacanilao and Diego Gutierrez of the National Bureau of Investigation investigated the
accused Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos. The original and supplementary extrajudicial confessions of
Ong and Quintos 12 which led to the successful discovery of the place where Henry Chua was buried and the
subsequent exhumation of the body 13 were Identified by these agents. These witnesses also revealed the
recovery of the rope with which Chua's hands were tied and the flannel cloth with which he was gagged
when he was killed. 14 Both agents testified on the re-enactment of the crime." 15 In the course of
investigation of accused Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos, the accused Baldomero Ambrosio was
implicated. When accused Ambrosio was arrested in August of 1972, he was brought to the NBI office by the
Chief of Police of Batan, Aklan. Ambrosio voluntarily gave the extrajudicial statement Exhibit "S". 16
Ceferino Castro of the Baliwag Police Department narrated the discovery of Henry Chua's Mustang car with
Plate No. 1602 which was abandoned near a gasoline station at barrio They, Baliwag, Bulacan. The pictures of
the car were identified. 17
Patrolman Marciano Roque of the Caloocan City Police Department, narrated the alleged plan to kin Chua as
initiated by Benjamin Ong. Roque knew Ong for more than five years as the Assistant Manager of the Acme
Shoes Rubber and Plastic Corporation, a company situated in Caloocan City, owned by Ong's brother-in-law
Chua Pak. During the first week of April, 1971, Roque went to the Acme office to get a pair of rubber sandals.
Benjamin Ong invited Roque for a ride in Ong's car, where Ong revealed his plan to kidnap a person who
allegedly cheated Ong in gambling games. Roque tried to discourage Ong from carrying out his plan. The
latter insisted and asked Roque to assist him during the several meetings that followed between Ong and
Roque. Roque claimed he was taken by Ong to Barrio Matipo, Caloocan City, and shown the place where Ong
planned to bury the person he planned to kidnap and kill. In one of the meetings between Roque and Ong,
the former saw a man seated at the rear of Ong's car and the latter referred to that man as his godson who
will help him in the execution of the crime. That man turned out to be the accused Baldomero Ambrosia Ong
tried to persuade Roque to join the plan as the father of the intended victim happens to be a very rich man
and the ransom money they expected to get would enable Roque to leave the police force and retire. Roque
tried to avoid Ong and urged the latter to forget the matter. 18
Bienvenido Quintos who was previously accused and convicted of the crimes," of murder, 19 implicated
Balintawak. Ambrosio when the former testified in his defense during that trial of CCC-VII-922-Rizal against
Ong and Quintos. 20 Quintos stated that he could recognize his co-accused, then at large, Fernando Tan and
Baldomero Ambrosia On April 23, 1971, Quintos and Tan met Ong and Ambrosio at the Barrio Fiesta
restaurant in Caloocan City. At about 9:00 p.m. they went to the Brown Derby restaurant at Quezon
Boulevard Extension, riding in the Chevrolet car of Ong. They , proceeded afterwards to Roxas Boulevard
where Ong ordered his driver Ambrosio to stop at the Amihan Night Club. While Ambrosio and Quintos
stayed in the car, Ong and Tan went inside the night club. Tan returned to the car and invited Quintos to go
to the nearby Wigwam Night Club. After a while, Tan and Quintos returned. Tan sat beside the driver
Ambrosio while Quintos sat at the rear seat. They followed another car a Mustang from Dewey
Boulevard to Cruelty Hall, then to Quiapo, Espana and Quezon Boulevard Extension, Quezon City. They
passed Sto. Domingo Church, made a U-turn, and turned right to Talayan Village. Quintos saw the car they
were following stop in a dark place, and Ambrosio alighted from their Chevrolet car. Tan pulled a gun as he
went to the other parked car the Mustang. Quintos followed the two and he saw Tan approach and point
a gun at a man while Ambrosio pulled that man out of the Mustang. That man was the victim, Henry Chua.
Tan and Ambrosio forced Chua to the rear seat of the Chevrolet car, then compelled him to lie down on the
floor. Ambrosio took a rope and tied the feet and hands of the victim, while Tan took a flannel cloth and
gagged that man. They took the route going to San Francisco del Monte Avenue. In the meantime, Ong rode
in the Mustang car and followed them. They, all went to Novaliches road. At a narrow street along the way
both cars stopped. Tan and Ambrosio took the victim from the car as Ong arrived. That man was made to
walk and then made to lie down face up. Ong gave Tan an ice-pick and ordered "patayin na iyan " (kill him
already), who in turn gave the ice-pick to Ambrosia For his part, Ambrosio gave the ice-pick to Quintos.
However, Quintos returned it to Tan, who said "Hindi ka pa pala puwede " (You are not capable yet).
Whereupon, Tan told Ambrosio to focus a flashlight on the center of the front side of the body of Henry
Chua. Tan stabbed Chua twice on the chest. While Tan lighted their way, Ambrosio carried the upper portion
of the body, while Quintos carrying the lower portion. When Quintos got tired, Tan gave him the flashlight
while Tan and Ambrosio carried the body to a hole. The hole was covered by Ambrosio Ong then stepped
repeatedly over the covered hole to compress the earth. They, returned to the car. Ong drove the Mustang
car together with Tan. Quintos and Ambrosio rode in the Chevrolet car, driven by the latter. They, followed
the Mustang to the highway. Later, it was parked and abandoned near a gasoline station. Then Ong and Tan
joined Quintos and Ambrosio in the Chevrolet and they proceeded to Manila. 21
The version of the defense is as follows:
Accused Baldomero Ambrosio stated that in 1971, he was a family driver of Roger Chen, and before that
employment, he worked for seven years at the Acme Shoes Rubber Corporation. Accused Benjamin Ong was
the manager of the Acme Shoes Rubber Corporation while the accused Tan was a supervisor in the same
company. Ambrosio alleged that Tan was a man of bad reputation, involved in a killing incident and
kidnapping of a woman. 22
In the evening of April 23, 1971, Ong, with Tan and Quintos, picked up Ambrosio from his place so that the
latter could drive for Ong. They, went to a restaurant at Balintawak known as Barrio Fiesta. They then went
to the Amihan Night Club at the Dewey Boulevard. Ong, Quintos and Tan alighted from the car while
Ambrosia remained in the car and he slept. (Barrio trio woke up Ambrosio at about 1:00 a.m. Tan and
Quintos rode with Ambrosio where Ong was riding. They went towards Espana. At the Araneta Avenue, the
car where Ong was riding stopped. Tan ordered Ambrosio to stop in front of the car. Tan and Quintos went to
the other car. Tan introduced himself as a policeman, then he opened the door of the car and pulled the
driver out. 23
'The narration of Ambrosio as to how the crimes," happened substantially coincided in details to the manner
it was described by Quintos. 24 Ambrosia however, claimed that he did not participate voluntarily in the
crime, but rather he was ordered by Tan as to all the acts he did during the execution of the offense.
Accused Ambrosio admitted that at about 4:00 p.m. of April 24, 1971, he and his wife went to Arayat,
Pampanga. They, stayed two days in Arayat, then he proceeded to his brother's place in Balintawak. He then
went to Aklan up to the time he. 25 He denied that Ong pointed was arrested in August of 1972. to him as a
godson in the presence of Patrolman Roque. 26 Ambrosio likewise denied that even before April 23, 1971, he
was already with Ong, Quintos and Tan and that Ambrosio already dug that hole in Novaliches where the
body of Chua was placed. 27
He also claimed that the extrajudicial statement Exhibit S " was signed by him because he was maltreated. 28
The principal thrust of the defense's argument that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this case (complex crimes," of kidnapping with murder) because its jurisdiction as a Circuit Criminal
Court is limited to ... (a) crimes committed by public officers, crimes against persons and crimes against
property as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complex with other
crimes," and kidnapping is not one of the crimes that may be tried and decided by that court, becomes of no
moment when this Court in G.R. No. 34497 ruled that Ong and Quintos were guilty of murder and not
kidnapping with murder. 29 The co-accused of Ambrosio were, therefore, tried and convicted of the crimes,"
of murder, a crimes," against persons, certainly within the jurisdiction of the circuit criminal court that
rendered judgment in this case.
The only issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the accused Ambrosio voluntarily participated in the
commission of the crime. That the crimes," of murder was committed has already been established by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt when this Court convicted Ong and Quintos in G.R. No. L-34497. This
Court already ruled that "Conspiracy, connivance and unity of purpose and intention among the accused
were present throughout in the execution of this crime. The four participated in the planning and execution
of the crimes," and were at the scene in all its stages. They cannot escape the consequences of any of their
acts even if they deviated in some detail from what they originally thought of. Conspiracy implies concert of
design and not participation in every detail of the execution. Thus, treachery should be considered against all
persons participating or cooperating in the perpetration of the crime." 30
The defense of the accused Ambrosio that he was an unwilling participant in the killing of Henry Chua
because of threats made by Fernando Tan, to Our mind, cannot be given credence. Quintos, as shown in his
testimony, (Exh. "1") by narrated how Ambrosio participated in the crime, manifesting voluntariness in his
acts throughout the execution of the same. Ambrosio was the one who pulled Chua from the Mustang car.
Ambrosio provided the rope and tied the hands and feet of Chua. He was the one who drove the car with the
victim inside to that place in Novaliches where they by Chua after killing him. He focused the flashlight on the
chest of the victim when Tan stabbed him. He helped carry the victim to the hole where he was buried, and
Ambrosio covered the hole with earth using a spade. Exhibit "I" for the defense is certainly binding on it.
Ambrosio admitted that he went to different places and to Aklan after the crimes," was committed, and he
was arrested only in August of 1972, nearly two years after the crimes," was committed. He never revealed
to the authorities the crimes," that he alleged to be an unwilling participant of in that long span of time. He
also admitted that there were at least two times when he could have escaped from the group of Ong when
the crimes," was being executed and yet Ambrosio never did so. During the execution of the felon', Ambrosio
never by act or deed protested to the group regarding its cruel commission. We also cannot fully understand
why Ambrosio had to join the group of Tan, if according to Ambrosia himself, Tan was a man of bad
reputation. 31 Tan has never been apprehended. The defense of Ambrosio that he was threatened by Tan to
participate in the crimes," stands uncorroborated, as contradicted by the testimony of Quintos.The inevitable
conclusion is that Ambrosio voluntarily participated in the commission of the crime.
The trial court did not err in discrediting Ambrosio's claim that he was maltreated by the agents of the law to
extract his extra-judicial statement. (Exhs. "S"). He never did protest the alleged maltreatment before the
Regional Director Nestor Gonzales before whom he signed the statement. Although he had all the chances to
do so, he never filed charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him. 32 The confession of the
accused Exhibits "S" is, therefore, admissible against him.
As to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in the commission of the crime, this Court
already ruled in G.R. No. L-34497, that treachery (alevosia) qualified the killing of Chua to murder. Chua's
hands were tied and his mouth was gagged when he was stabbed twice with an ice-pick. Chua was
defenseless and helpless enabling the accused to commit the crimes," without risk to them. The aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery. The aggravating circumstance of
nighttime (nocturnidad) cannot be absorbed in treachery because in this crimes," treachery arose from the
defenseless position of Chua when he was killed, while nighttime was purposely sought by the accused to
facilitate immunity in the commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place
(despoblado) is also present, due to the deliberate selection of an isolated place (Barrio Makatipo Novaliches,
Caloocan City) for killing and burying the victim. Abuse of confidence cannot be considered as an aggravating
circumstance present in the crime, because it does not appear that the victim Chua ever reposed confidence
on Ong. Chua knew that he was far stronger in money and influence than Ong. The fact that Henry Chua
invited Ong night clubbing on that fatal evening and accommodated the latter in his car did not show that
Chua had confidence in Ong.
The aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of the crimes," can be considered
present because the Biscayne car of Ong was used to trail the victim's car and to facilitate the commission of
the crimes," and the escape of the accused.
Cruelty (ensaamiento) cannot be considered because there is no evidence that the victim Chua was by while
still alive to make him suffer.
Evident premeditation attended the commission of the crimes, because the accused meditated, planned, and
tenaciously persisted in the accomplishment of the crime.
Accused Ong was given the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and one analogous to passion and
obfuscation" 33 because Chua previously threatened Ong for non-payment of debt arising from gambling,
causing Ong humiliation and shame. 34
Taking into consideration the above aggravating and mitigating circumstances, Ong was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. 35 Accused Quintos, although no mitigating circumstance could be appreciated in his
favor, was also sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Ong and Quintos were also sentenced "jointly and severally
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Henry Chua in the amount of P12,000.00; to pay moral damages in
the asphyxiation of P50,000.00; and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay their
proportionate share of the costs. 36
The present case (G.R. No. L-37908) already pending review iii this Court when G.R. No. L-34497 was decided
on January 30, 1975, should have been decided together with the latter case, as they arose from the same
crime, involving the same accused.
It is Our considered view that the accused Baidomero Ambrosio stands in this case on a similarly situated
position as convicted accused Bienvenido Quintos in G.R. No. L-34497, and should, therefore be sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, and not death.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated October 17, 1973, is hereby, MODIFIED, finding the
accused Baidomero Ambrosio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetual to indemnify jointly and severally with his co-accused, the heirs of the deceased Henry
Chua in the asphyxiation of P12,000.00; to pay moral damages in the asphyxiation of P50,000.00; and
another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay his proportionate share of the costs.
SOORDERED.
Fernando, C.J, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The role played by Baldomero Ambrosio, the godson of Benjamin Ong, in the murder of Henry Chua, is
described in this Court's decision in People vs. Ong, L-34497, 62 SCRA 174, 2 10, as follows:
When they reached a dark and secluded place, Benjamin Ong urged Chua to stop the car for the former to
urinate to which the latter obliged. The Biscayne car where Fernando Tan, Bienvenido Quintos and
Baldomero Ambrosio were riding, stopped. Fernando Tan poked his gun at Chua and pulled him down from
his Mustang car with Ambrosio giving help.
His hands were tied, his mouth gagged with a flannel cloth, and he was placed in the Biscayne car. Tan and
Bienvenido Quintos then rested their feet on him. Then Ambrosio drove the Biscayne while Ong drove the
Mustang. They proceeded towards Barrio Makatipo, Novaliches, Caloocan City, where Henry Chua was
stabbed to death and buried.
There can be no doubt as to Ambrosio's complicity in the murder of Chua.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The role played by Baldomero Ambrosio, the godson of Benjamin Ong, in the murder of Henry Chua, is
described in this Court's decision in People vs. Ong, L-34497, 62 SCRA 174, 2 10, as follows:
When they reached a dark and secluded place, Benjamin Ong urged Chua to stop the car for the former to
urinate to which the latter obliged. The Biscayne car where Fernando Tan, Bienvenido Quintos and
Baldomero Ambrosio were riding, stopped. Fernando Tan poked his gun at Chua and pulled him down from
his Mustang car with Ambrosio giving help.
His hands were tied, his mouth gagged with a flannel cloth, and he was placed in the Biscayne car. Tan and
Bienvenido Quintos then rested their feet on him. Then Ambrosio drove the Biscayne while Ong drove the
Mustang. They proceeded towards Barrio Makatipo, Novaliches, Caloocan City, where Henry Chua was
stabbed to death and buried.
There can be no doubt as to Ambrosio's complicity in the murder of Chua.
Criminal Case Digest: People vs Ong G.R. No. 137348 June 21, 2004
People vs Ong
G.R. No. 137348
June 21, 2004
Criminal Case Digest
Facts:
Based on prosecution through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, in the afternoon of July 23, 1998, a
confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief
Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged illicit drug activities of accused William Ong and Ching De
Ming @ Robert Tiu. As per order of Chief Inspector Ferro, a team of eight decided to conduct a buy-bust
operation. Once, CI confirmed the meeting time and venue with the drug dealer, and exchanges of gift-
wrapped packages rendered of one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance by the accused
Ong and boodle money placed in a W. Brown plastic bag by SPO1 Gonzales, thereafter, the latter arrested
Ong while the CI and the back-up agents arrested co-accused De Ming.
The two (2) accused were brought to the police office where the corresponding booking sheets and arrest
report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the illegal drug substance, was referred to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, positive for methyl amphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug.
However, the appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused William Ong, a Chinese citizen from
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), claimed that he came to the Philippines in 1997 to look for a job.
Initially, he worked in a pancit factory in Quezon City, but later hunted for another job, was referred by his
friend Kian Ling to Ong Sin for a possible job as a technician in a bihon factory owned by Sin. Subsequently,
without any knowledge of his new job, William Ong was later taken to the police station and there he met
the other accused Ching De Ming for the first time. He maintained innocence to the crime charged.
On his part, accused Ching De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in the RTW
business. On that same date of the commission of the crime, while waiting for his girlfriend and her mother,
whose mother Avenlina Cardoz, testified in De Mings favor and corroborated with his story, that he was
approached by persons unknown to him. He was misidentified as one of the accused and dragged him out of
his car and brought to the other car, took his clutch bag, then after a few hours, at Camp Crame, they
removed his blindfold. He denied knowing Ong and the charge of conspiring with him to deliver shabu in New
Manila, Quezon City.
On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them the penalty of
death. It likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million pesos. However, the case was on
automatic review. Appellants insist on their innocence. They claim that their guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not the arraignment of appellants violates Rule 116, Section (a) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure?
Held:
The aforementioned provision on Arraignment and Plea provides that (a) The accused must be arraigned
before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be
made in open court by the judge of clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint
or information.
The trial court held that the arraignment of appellants violated the above rule. Appellants are Chinese
nationals. Their Certificate of Arraignment states that they were informed of the accusations against them. It
does not, however, indicate whether the information was read in the language or dialect known to them.
Both accused Ong and De Ming were arraigned, assisted by counsel de parte, and both entered a plea of not
guilty. From the records, it was clear that appellants only knew the Chinese language, however the appellants
were arraigned on an information written in the English language. The requirement that the information
should be read in a language or dialect known to the accused is mandatory. It must be strictly complied with
as it is intended to protect the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause the
of the accusation against him. The constitutional protection is part of due process. Failure to observe the
rules necessarily nullifies the arraignment. After the arraignment and in the course of the trial, the lower
court had to secure the services of a certain Richard Ng Lee as Chinese interpreter.
Hence, it is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, and he was likewise the one who
closed the deal with accused William Ong, and set the venue and time of the meeting. Since only the CI had
personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the court held that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the
poseur-buyer but merely the deliveryman. His testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu
is hearsay and standing alone cannot be the basis of the conviction of the appellants.
The buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of
arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. However, to determine whether there was valid entrapment
or whether proper procedures were undertaken by the police officers, in effecting the buy-bust operation, it
is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid
out through relevant, material and competent evidence.
In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The confidential
information who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it was
perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no
personal knowledge of the same and not part of the buy-bust operation.
Although, the court is sharply aware of the compelling considerations why confidential informants are usually
not presented by the prosecution. Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to those
who would have cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable.
In sum, there is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an informer. The problem has to be
resolved on a case to case basis and calls for balancing the state interest in protecting the people from crimes
against the individuals right to prepare his defense. The balance must be adjusted by giving due weight to
the following factors, among others: (1) the crime charged, (2) the possible defenses, (3) the possible
significance of the informers testimony, and (4) other relevant factors.
In the present case, the crime charged against the appellants is capital in character and can result in the
imposition of the death penalty. The prosecution has to prove all the material elements of the alleged sale of
shabu and the resulting buy-bust operation. Where the testimony of the informer is indispensable. It should
be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person enjoy high importance in our scale of values. It cannot be
diminished except by a value of higher significance. Moreover, the mishandling and transfer of custody of the
alleged confiscated methyl amphetamine hydrochloride further shattered the case of the prosecution. There
is no crime of illegal sale of regulated drug when there is a nagging doubt on whether the substance
confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be regulated drug.
The court decided to reverse and set aside its former decision. Appellants Ong and De Ming @ Tiu are
acquitted of the crime of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and are ordered
immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 213216 April 20, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICKY ARGUTA alias "JOEL" and WILSON CAHIPE alias "SIWIT," Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellants Ricky Arguta alias "Joel" (Arguta) and
Wilson Cahipe alias "Siwit" (Cahipe; collectively, accused-appellants) assailing the Decision2 dated April 24,
2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 01462, which affirmed with modification the
Decision3 dated July 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 6 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos.
97-02-76 and 97-02-77 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Rape,
defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended.
The Facts
On January 30, 1997 two (2) criminal informations were filed before the RTC charging Cahipe with two (2)
counts of Rape, and Arguta of one (1) count of the same crime, viz.:
Crim. Case No. 97..:02-76
That on or about the 5th day of December 1996 in the Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Leyte, Philippines
and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [accused-appellants], conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, motivated by lewd design. with the use of a bladed weapon,
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal
knowledge of [AAA],4 without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to Law.
Tacloban City, January 30, 1997.
Crim. Case No. 97-02-77
That on or about the 5th day of December 1996, in the Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Cahipc],
motivated by lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to Law.
Tacloban City, January 30, 1997.5
According to the prosecution, at around 8 o'clock6 in the evening of December 5, 1996, AAA was instructed
by her father to fetch her sister in school. However, AAA failed to find her sister and decided to go back
home. On her way home, accused-appellants intercepted AAA, threatened her with a bladed weapon,
dragged her to a cottage at a nearby beach resort, and bound her hands and feet. Thereafter, they removed
her clothes and placed her on the floor. Arguta then mounted AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina.
After Arguta satisfied his lust, Cahipe took over and raped her. Thereafter, accused-appellants left AAA at the
cottage. An hour later, Cahipe returned and dragged AAA to a store owned by a certain Lino Ostero7
(Ostero). There Cahipe undressed her again, mounted her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. Afterwards,
AAA was returned to the cottage. The next day, AAA's father found her crying at the cottage.8
Further, the prosecution offered the findings of the physical examination by a certain Dr. Eilleen Colaba on
AAA, stating, inter alia, that: (a) AAA's genitalia was grossly normal, which means no abnormality; (b) AAA has
complete healed hymenal lacerations at the 5 o'clock and 7 o'clock positions and a partially healed hymenal
laceration at the 12 o'clock position; and (c) AAA's genitalia is negative for the presence of spermatozoa.9
In their defense, accused-appellants both denied the accusations leveled against them, and offered their
respective alibis. Cahipe claimed that on the date and time of the alleged incident he was minding Ostero's
store. On the other hand, Arguta averred that he was at Ostero' s house watching television during the time
that the incident supposedly occurred. They both asserted that they did not know why AAA would accuse
them of raping her.10
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision11 dated July 25, 2008, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Simple Rape in Crim. Case No. 97-02-76 and, accordingly, sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordered them to pay AAA, jointly and severally, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Further, the RTC found Cahipe not guilty of the crime of Rape
in Crim. Case No. 97-02-77 and, accordingly, acquitted him due to insufficiency of evidence.12
In finding the guilt of accused-appellants, the RTC held that AAA's testimony, as well as the medico-legal
report, established that on December 5, 1996, accused-appellants intercepted AAA, threatened her with a
bladed weapon, dragged her to a nearby cottage, undressed her, bound her, and took turns raping her. The R
TC did not lend credence to accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi, in light of the positive assertions
made by AAA, and considering that it was not physically impossible for them to have been at the place of the
crime on the date of the incident.13
However, as regards the second count of Rape against Cahipe, the RTC opined that it would be unusual for
AAA, who had just been raped and left alone in the cottage, to not attempt to escape or shout for help when
she was being transported to Ostero' s store and back to the cottage, observing that AAA had to pass
Ostero's house before reaching the latter's store. According to the R TC, these pose serious doubts as to the
existence of the second rape charge, thus, necessitating its dismissal.14
Dissatisfied, accused-appellants appealed their conviction to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision15 dated April 24, 2014, the CA affirmed accused-appellants' conviction with modification
ordering the accused-appellants to jointly and severally pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, in addition to the other amounts already awarded, and imposed interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of its Decision until fully paid.16
Agreeing with the R TC' s findings, the CA ruled that AAA' s categorical and straightforward testimony
prevailed over accused-appellants' denial and alibi. It observed that accused-appellants were in the vicinity of
the locus criminis at the time of the incident, and that the two could easily reach the cottage where the rape
occurred.17 Thus, it concluded that accused-appellants' actions fell squarely within the definition of Rape
under Article 266-A of the RPC, noting that accused-appellants had carnal knowledge of AAA, and such was
attained through force, threat, or intimidation.18
Aggrieved, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether accused-appellants' conviction for Rape should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for
review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even
reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.19 The
appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of
the penal law.20 Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to modify accused-
appellants' conviction from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape, as will be explained hereunder.
In this case, the Court notes that the rape occurred during the effectivity of the old rape provision of the RPC,
i.e., Article 335,21 and, thus, the latter provision is controlling in this case, to wit:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under this provision, the elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (b)
said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation; or the victim was deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim was under twelve (12) years of age or demented.22
The provision also states that if the act is committed either with the use of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or
more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher penalty.23 In People
v. Lamberte,24 the Court clarified the legal effect of the presence of both circumstances, as follows:
The presence of either circumstance - "use of a deadly weapon" or "by two or more persons" - qualifies the
crime.1wphi1 If one is present, the remaining circumstance, if also attendant, is not a generic aggravating
circumstance. That was our ruling in People vs. Garcia, [192 Phil. 311, 342] (1981) reading:
In the prosecution of the cases at bar, two circumstances are present, namely. 1. use of a deadly weapon and
2. that two persons committed the rapes. The first was alleged in the information while the second was
proved during trial. In both cases, the Court appreciated the first as a qualifying circumstance and the second
as a generic aggravating circumstance, in accordance with settled jurisprudence according to the trial court.
We do not agree. Under the law above quoted, either circumstance is qualifying. When the two
circumstances are present, there is no legal basis to consider the remaining circumstance as a generic
aggravating circumstance for either is not considered as such under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
enumerating what are aggravating circumstances. Hence, the correct penalty is the lesser penalty, which is
reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph
2, No. 2, Revised Penal Code.25 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, records reveal that accused-appellants threatened AAA with a bladed instrument and tied her up
before having carnal knowledge of her without her consent. Jurisprudence holds that force or intimidation,
as an element of Rape, need not be irresistible; as long as the assailant's objective is accomplished, any
question of whether the force employed was irresistible or not becomes irrelevant. Intimidation must be
viewed from the lens of the victim's perception and judgment and it is enough that the victim fears that
something will happen to her should she resist her assailant's advances.26 In this regard, case law provides
that the act of holding a bladed instrument, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or, at least, intimidation,
and threatening the victim with the same is sufficient to bring her into submission.27
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of fact made by the courts a
quo that accused-appellants are guilty as charged, i.e., of raping AAA with the use of a deadly weapon, as the
same are supported by the records. It must be noted that the assessment and findings of the trial court are
generally accorded great weight, and are conclusive and binding to the Court if not tainted with arbitrariness
or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence,28 as in this case. Nevertheless,
considering that the crime was committed by two (2) persons, the accused-appellants herein, with the use of
a bladed weapon, it is only appropriate to increase their conviction from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 934629 provides that "[p]ersons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." Pursuant thereto, accused-appellants should be sentenced with
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.30
Finally, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases the award of damages in favor of AAA
to the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality
of judgment until fully paid.31
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated April 24, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-
CR HC No. 01462 is hereby AFFIRMED, finding accused-appellants Ricky Arguta alias "Joel" and Wilson Cahipe
alias "Siwit" (accused-appellants) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape as defined
and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code with MODIFICATION sentencing accused-
appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ordering them to
jointly and severally pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all
the monetary awards from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137050. July 11, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GEORGE CORTES y ORTEGA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is before the Court on automatic review of the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Surigao del
Sur, Branch 29, Bislig, finding accused George Cortes y Ortega guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death.
On August 12, 1998, provincial prosecutor Alfredo J. Pondoc of Surigao del Sur filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, Bislig, an Information for murder against accused George Cortes y Ortega,
which reads as follows:
That on or about 11:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, of June 24, 1998, at P. Lindo Street, Saint Paul
District, Nangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with treachery and evident premeditation, armed with a knife and with intent to kill
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assault and stabbed one Edlyn S. Gamboa, a
16 year old girl, thereby inflicting the latter multiple stab wounds on her body which caused her
instantaneous death as certified by the doctor, to the damage and prejudice of the victims heirs.
Contrary to law: In violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
On June 24, 1998, at about eleven oclock in the evening, Junilla Macaldo was sitting on a bench outside her
house located at P. Lindo St., Saint Paul District, Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. While thus seated, Edlyn
Gamboa came to her asking for the whereabouts of Yen-yen Ibua. Junilla noticed that Edlyn was followed by
accused George Cortes. Junilla then instructed Edlyn to go upstairs of the house. When Edlyn complied,
accused followed her and successively stabbed her several times. Junilla tried to help Edlyn, but accused
overpowered her. In a moment, Edlyn was able to run away despite being wounded; however, she collapsed
five (5) meters away from where she was stabbed. Junilla shouted for help. At this juncture, accused
scampered away. Edlyn was able to stand up but again collapsed after walking about five (5) steps. She was
brought to the Babano Medical Clinic, where she expired.
Accused admitted that he stabbed Edlyn. He mistook Edlyn for her male companion against whom he had an
altercation earlier. He committed the mistake because at the time of the incident, accused was very drunk
and the place was very dark. He only learned that he had stabbed the wrong person the following morning
through the radio vigilantes program.
On August 28, 1998 the trial court arraigned the accused.[3] He entered a plea of guilty.[4] In virtue of his
plea of guilty, the trial court proceeded to satisfy itself of the voluntariness of the plea by propounding
questions to the accused to find out if he understood his plea and the legal consequence thereof. Accused,
assisted by counsel, reiterated his plea of guilty and the extra judicial confession he executed before the
police.
Nonetheless, the prosecution proceeded to present evidence to prove the presence of aggravating
circumstances. The accused on the other hand presented evidence proving the mitigating circumstances that
attended the commission of the crime.
The prosecution alleged that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty, nighttime,
abuse of superior strength, disrespect to sex, and intoxication were present in the commission of the crime.
The accused, on the other hand, raised the attendance of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender, plea of guilty, mistaken identity and the alternative mitigating circumstance of intoxication.
On September 2, 1998, the trial court after considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
attendant found the existence of the aggravating circumstances and appreciated only the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty that was offset by one of the aggravating circumstances. The trial court then
proceeded to rule on the appropriate penalty to be imposed on the accused. The trial court rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by the Republic Act 7659, otherwise
known as the Death Penalty Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death, to indemnify the
family of the victim in the amount of P60,000.00, and to pay damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and cost
Hence, this review
Accused raises the following errors imputed to the trial court:
1. In finding that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty, nighttime, abuse of
superior strength, sex and intoxication attended the commission of the crime charged; and
2. In imposing the death penalty upon accused instead of reclusion perpetua.
According to the accused, the prosecution failed to prove the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and other circumstances attending the commission of the crime.
We agree with the accused that the prosecution did not prove the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation. The prosecution failed to establish the following elements of this aggravating circumstance:
(a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused clung to that determination, and (c) a lapse of time between the determination and the execution
sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act
As to the aggravating circumstance of cruelty, although the accused stabbed the victim several times, the
same could not be considered as cruelty because there was no showing that it was intended to prolong the
suffering of the victim. For cruelty to be appreciated against the accused, it must be shown that the accused,
for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully as he inflicted on him
unnecessary physical and moral pain. The crime is aggravated because by deliberately increasing the
suffering of the victim the offender denotes sadism and consequently a marked degree of malice and
perversity. The mere fact of inflicting various successive wounds upon a person in order to cause his death,
no appreciable time intervening between the infliction of one (1) wound and that of another to show that he
had wanted to prolong the suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for taking this aggravating circumstance
into consideration.[8]
As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not be considered for the simple reason
that it was not specifically sought in the commission of the crime. Night-time becomes an aggravating
circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by the offender; (2) the offender takes advantage of it; or (3)
it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from identification or
capture.[9] In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that accused purposely sought the cover of darkness to
perpetrate the crime, or to conceal his identity.
The trial court erred in further appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, so that it can not be appreciated separately as another
aggravating circumstance.[10] Here, treachery qualified the offense to murder.
As to the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex, the same could not be considered as it was not shown
that accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest disrespect
for her womanhood.[11] In fact, the accused mistook the victim for a man.
Ordinarily, intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the
circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if
it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it is
habitual or intentional, it is considered an aggravating circumstance. A person pleading in toxication to
mitigate penalty must present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission
of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same time, that person must show
proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his
resolve to commit the crime.[12]
Accused argues that in the absence of any of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information and
considering that there was one mitigating circumstance attendant, that of plea of guilty, the penalty
imposable is not death but reclusion perpetua.
The Solicitor General agrees with the accused that the only aggravating circumstance present was treachery
which qualified the killing to murder and that there were two mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and
intoxication, not habitual. The penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, not death, in accordance with Article 63 in
relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6759.
We also award P50,000.00 as moral damages in keeping with current jurisprudence. Moral damages is
proper considering the mental anguish suffered by the heirs of the victim on account of her untimely and
gruesome death.[13]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, Bislig, in Criminal Case No.
2026 convicting accused George Cortes y Ortega of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the
penalty imposed. In lieu of the death penalty, the accused George Cortes y Ortega is hereby sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as death indemnity, and fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and
Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., abroad on official leave.
Quisumbing, J., on official leave.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., on leave.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130508. April 5, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO REGALA y ABRIOL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
Armando Regala appeals from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 7929 rendered by the Regional Trial Court
of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 46, 5th Judicial Region, convicting him of the crime of Robbery with Rape.
The information against accused-appellant on November 27, 1995, filed by 2nd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Jesus C. Castillo, reads as follows: Sppedsc
"That on or about September 11, 1995, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Bangon, Municipality of Aroroy,
Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused confederating
together and helping one another, with intent to gain, violence and intimidation upon persons, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the kitchen of the house of Consuelo Arevalo and when
inside, hogtied said Consuelo Arevalo and granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic), take, steal, rob and carry away
cash amount of P3,000.00 and two (2) gold rings worth P6,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of owner
Consuelo Arevalo in the total amount of P9,000.00, Philippine Currency; and in pursuance of the commission
of the crime of robbery against the will and consent of the granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic) wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously accused Armando Regala y Abriol has for two times sexually abused and/or
intercoursed with her, while hogtied on the bed and in the kitchen.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Accused-appellant was apprehended by the police four days after the incident. He was identified at a police
line-up by Nerissa and her grandmother. Calrsc
The prosecution presented three witnesses: Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy,
Masbate, who personally examined the rape victim; Nerissa Tagala, the rape victim, 17 years old, a third year
high school student; and her grandmother, Consuelo Arevalo, who was her companion when the robbery
with rape transpired at Consuelos house.
The prosecutions version is stated in Appellees Brief as follows: Sccalr
"On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 oclock in the evening at Barangay Bangon, Aroroy, Masbate, then 16-
year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother (Consuelo Arevalo) were sleeping, when appellant
Armando Regala and his two other companions entered the formers house. (pp. 6-7, TSN, August 26, 1996).
Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen by removing the pieces of wood under
the stove. Appellant went to the room of Nerissa and her grandmother and poked an 8-inch gun on them,
one after the other. (p. 8, TSN, August 26, 1996)
Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied by appellant and his companions. Thereafter, Nerissa was raped
by appellant Armando Regala in bed while her grandmother was on the floor. After the rape, appellant and
his two companions counted the money which they took from the "aparador." (pp. 9-10, TSN, August 26,
1996)
Appellant and his companions then ran away with P3,000 in cash, 2 pieces of ring valued at P6,000 and two
wrist watches worth P5,000. (pp. 11-13, TSN, August 26, 1996)
The following day, September 12, 1995, Nerissa went to the Rural Health Clinic of Aroroy, Masbate for
medical examination. In the Medical Report presented by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, it
was shown that Nerissa sustained laceration of the hymen at 4:00 oclock and 7:00 oclock positions (fresh
wounds), indicating a possible sexual assault upon the victim. (p. 16, TSN, August 26, 1996)[2]
The defense presented accused-appellant who testified that on September 11, 1995, he was staying in the
house of Antonio Ramilo at barangay Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate. Ramilo was the manager in the gold
panning business where accused-appellant was employed. Antonio Ramilo testified and corroborated his
defense and stated that accused-appellant was in his house, which is about 5 kilometers away from Barangay
Bangon. Calrspped
The trial court held that the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive identification of the accused. The
dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, as penalized under Par. 2 of Art. 294 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the victim
Consuelo Arevalo the sum of P9,000.00, the cash and value of the looted articles; to indemnify the victim
Nerissa Tagala the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the further sum of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. No subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs."[3]
Armando has appealed to this Court pleading that: Scedp
(1) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXIST TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY
THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
(2) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.[4]
which alleged errors were discussed jointly.
In essence, accused-appellant questions the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence in identifying him as
one of the perpetrators of the crime charged. He claims that the complaining witness could not have
positively identified him as there was no electricity nor any light in the place of the incident which took place
at 9:00 oclock in the evening. Consuelo Arevalo was able to identify accused-appellant only after he was
pinpointed by Nerissa, and made contradictory statements in court when she stated that accused-appellant
removed his mask after she was hogtied, and later stated that accused-appellant removed his mask before
she was hogtied. The medico-legal officer, Dr. Ulanday, herself testified that the complaining witness either
voluntarily submitted to a sexual act or was forced into one. Edpsc
The appellee insists that appellants lame defense of alibi cannot stand against the positive identification
made by the victim, and avers that the victim, a 16 year old barrio lass at the time the rape was committed,
was motivated by a sincere desire to seek and obtain justice. The Solicitor General also recommends an
additional award of compensatory damages of P50,000.00 in favor of Nerissa Tagala. Edp
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
There was sufficient evidence to establish the identity of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Misedp
Nerissa positively recounted the incident on the witness stand. She was sleeping with her grandmother in the
latters house when the accused-appellant Regala, together with the unidentified companions entered the
house. Regala pointed a gun, about 8 inches long, at her grandmother, and then at her, and hogtied both of
them. Regala took off her panty and her shorts, and removed his own "porontong" pants, and made sexual
intercourse ("itot") with her while she was hogtied in bed. Her grandmother was at the floor. She saw the
aparador of her grandmother being opened. She could not shout because the gun was pointed at her, and
she was afraid. Two companions of the accused-appellant entered the room as she was being raped. Two
rings valued at about P6,000.00 and 2 wrist watches (one "Seiko" and the other "Citizen") and money was
taken by the accused-appellant and his companions. After raping her in bed, Nerissa saw accused-appellant
counting the money taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to the kitchen, still hogtied, and
raped again.[5] On cross-examination, Nerissa stated that although there was no electricity, and the light in
the house was already off, she was able to see the face of Regala because at the time Regala was counting
the money, one of his companions was holding the flashlight "beamed to the money" and there was "some
reflection" on the face of Regala[6] She remembered the face of Regala because of an earring on his left
ear[7] which he was wearing when presented at the police line-up.[8]
Consuelo Arevalo testified and corroborated the testimony of her granddaughter. Armando Regala entered
the house with two companions, hogtied her and Nerissa, and were asking for money. After having sexual
intercourse with Nerissa, Regala took P3,000.00 in paper bills and coins from her aparador, and got a
stainless Seiko wristwatch and two gold rings valued at P6,000.00. She was able to recognize Regala because
of his earring on his left ear, and because he was pinpointed by Nerissa at the police station. She was not
able to shout at the time because her mouth was gagged with a piece of cloth by Regala.[9] On cross-
examination, Consuelo Arevalo declared that she was able to see Regala because he used her flashlight, and
he took off the mask he was wearing; she recognized Regala because of his earring and his flat top hair
cut.[10]
The Court gives its approbation to the finding of the trial court that the evidence was sufficient to clearly
establish the identity of Armando Regala as the person who, with two companions, committed the crime of
robbery accompanied by rape on the night of September 11, 1995. Nerissa Tagala positively identified
Armando Regala because at the time he was counting the money on her bed, the other companion of the
accused beamed the flashlight towards the money and there was a reflection on the face of Regala. Although
the three intruders were wearing masks when they entered the house, they removed their masks later.[11]
Our cases have held that wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight and starlight may, in proper situations, be
sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on this ground
unmeritorious.[12]
We are not persuaded by the contention of accused-appellant that the contradictory replies of Consuelo
Arevalo when asked whether Regala removed his mask "before"[13] or "after"[14] she and Nerissa were
hogtied exposed the fact that she was not able to identify the accused-appellant. The contradiction referred
to a minor detail and cannot detract from the fact that both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified Regala
as there was a flashlight used to focus at the money while it was being counted and there was a reflection on
the face of Regala. Both Nerissa and Consuelo remembered the earring on his left ear, which he was still
wearing at the time of the police line-up inside the police station. Misoedp
Dr. Conchita Ulandays testimony does not support the contention of accused-appellant that Nerissa
voluntarily submitted to the sexual advances of Regala. The admission of Dr. Ulanday that her findings point
to the fact that Nerissa "either voluntarily or was forced into sexual act" does not prove that Nerissa
voluntarily submitted to the sexual act. Dr. Ulanday testified that there was suggested evidence of
penetration as shown by the two lacerations at 4 oclock and at 7 oclock which were fresh wounds. That the
act was involuntary was clearly established by the fact that Nerissa was hogtied when she was sexually
attacked. As correctly pointed out by appellee, Nerissa was a 16-year old barrio lass, not exposed to the ways
of the world and was not shown to have any ill-motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant, who was a
stranger. And as repeatedly pronounced by this Court, it simply would be unnatural for a young and innocent
girl to concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter subject herself
to a public trial or ridicule if she was not, in fact, a victim of rape and deeply motivated by a sincere desire to
have the culprit apprehended and punished.[15]
The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was already in force. Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended now provides, under paragraph 1 thereof: Edpmis
"1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason of or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson."
The victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. There are cases[16] holding
that the additional rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery will not increase the penalty. In People
vs. Martinez,[17] accused Martinez and two (2) other unidentified persons, who remained at large, were
charged with the special complex crime of robbery with rape where all three raped the victim. The Court
imposed the penalty of death after considering two (2) aggravating circumstances, namely, nocturnidad and
use of a deadly weapon. However, the Court did not consider the two (2) other rapes as aggravating holding
that "(T)he special complex crime of robbery with rape has, therefore, been committed by the felonious acts
of appellant and his cohorts, with all acts or rape on that occasion being integrated in one composite crime."
Jjsc
There are likewise cases[18] which held that the multiplicity of rapes committed could be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance. In People vs. Candelario[19] where three (3) of the four (4) armed men who
robbed the victim "alternately raped her twice for each of them", this Court, citing People vs. Obtinalia,[20]
ruled that "(T)he characterization of the offense as robbery with rape, however, is not changed simply
because there were several rapes committed. The multiplicity of rapes should instead be taken into account
in raising the penalty to death." Scjj
It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be
considered as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of
the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the same code regarding
mitigating circumstances where there is a specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous
circumstances. Sjcj
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the robbery)
would result in an "anomalous situation" where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery
with one rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes.[21] However, the remedy lies with
the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender[22] and no person should be
brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute.[23]
In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not be
considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper. Supreme
As regards the civil indemnity, we find well-taken the recommendation of the Solicitor General that
compensatory damages should be awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Nerissa Tagala is entitled to an
award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00, which is given in favor of the offended party in rape.[24]
Also a conviction for rape carries with it the award of moral damages to the victim since it is recognized that
the victims injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the ordinary crime of rape to warrant per
se an award of P50,000.00 as moral damages.[25]
WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ill-motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant, who was a stranger. Hence, Dr. Ulandays testimony does
of Robbery with Rape, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Nerissa Tagala is entitled to an not support the contention of accused-appellant that the victim voluntarily submitted to sexual advances of
additional award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Court Regala.

SO ORDERED. The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was already in force. Under Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code as amended, now provides, under paragraph 1 thereof: (1) The penalty of
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason of or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.
Criminal Case: People vs Regala G.R. No. 130508 April 5, 2000
People vs Regala In this case, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not be considered as
G.R. No. 130508 aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper. The judgment convicting
April 5, 2000 Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, where the
Criminal Case Digest victim is entitled to an additional award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

Facts: Republic of the Philippines

On the night of September 11, 1995, at Barangay Bangon in Aroroy, Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa SUPREME COURT
Tagala and her grandmother, Counselo Arevalo, were sleeping, when appellant Armando Regala and his two Manila
other companions entered the formers house.
EN BANC
Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen and went to the room of the victims
and poked at 8-inch gun on them, one after the other, and hogtied both of them. Armando raped Nerissa in
bed while her grandmother was hogtied on the floor. Later, she saw her grandmothers aparador being
opened where two rings, two wrist watches, and money were taken from the aparador. After raping her in G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971
bed, Nerissa saw accused-appellant counting the money taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was
brought to the kitchen, still hogtied and was raped again by the accused. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
He was convicted in the lower court but accused-appellant appealed his criminal case at the Regional Trial JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR., alias "BOY," EDGARDO
Court in Masbate. He questioned the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence in identifying him as one of AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants.
the perpetrators of the crime charged. And based on medico-legal, Dr. Conchita Ulanday, a health officer of
Aroroy, testified herself that the complaining witness either voluntarily submitted to a sexual act or was Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for plaintiff-appellee.
forced into one.
Baizas, Alberto and Associates, Andreciano F. Caballero and Lota, Paraiso, Garcia and Dueas for defendant-
Issue: appellant Jaime G. Jose.
(a) Whether additional rape committed in a crime of robbery be considered as an aggravating circumstance?
Mabanag, Eliger and Associates for defendant-appellant Basilio Pineda, Jr.
Held:
On cross-examination, both Nerissa Tagala and Consuelo Arevalo, separately testified that they saw the face Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for defendant-appellant Edgardo P. Aquino.
of Regala, despite of no electricity at the commission of the crime, because he used a flashlight and took off
the mask he was wearing, and thus, they remembered him wearing an earring of his left ear, which he was Antonio Coronel Law Office and Roberto J. Ignacio for defendant-appellant Rogelio S. Canial.
still wearing at the time of the police line-up inside the police station.

The trial court held that contradiction referred to a minor detail, cannot detract from the fact, that both
Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified the accused-appellant. As correctly pointed out by the appellee, PER CURIAM:
the victim was a 16-year old barrio lass, not exposed to the ways of the world and was not shown to have any
The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as follows:
The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR. Alias "BOY," EDUARDO
AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias "EDDIE" and ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA alias "ROGER," as principals, WONG LAY
PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of the crime of
Forcible Abduction with rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named principal accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, forcibly abduct the
undersigned complainant against her will, and did, then and there take her, pursuant to their common
criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, where each of the four (4) accused, by means of force and
intimidation, and with the use of a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant
against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions
of the civil code.
That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION y ENVOLTARIO without taking a
direct part in the execution of the offense either by forcing, inducing the principal accused to execute, or
cooperating in its execution by an indispensable act, did, then and there cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts, that is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and permitting the
principal accused in sequestering the undersigned complainant in one of the rooms of the Swanky Hotel then
under the control of the accused Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero and Jessie Guion y Envoltario,
thus supplying material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense.
That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating circumstances:
1. Use of a motor vehicle.
2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make its discovery
difficult;
3. Abuse of superior strength;
4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added ignominy to the natural
effects of the act; and
5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other
wrong not necessary for the commission.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the above-quoted amended
complaint; however, in an order dated July 11, 1967, the court reserved judgment "until such time as the
prosecution shall have concluded presenting all of its evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances listed
in the complaint." Upon the other hand, the rest of the defendants went to trial on their respective pleas of
not guilty. After the merits, the court below rendered its decision on October 2, 1967, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Caal, Eduardo Aquino and Basilio Pineda, Jr.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape as described under Art. 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to the death penalty to be
executed at a date to be set and in the manner provided for by law; and each to indemnify the complainant
in the amount of ten thousand pesos. On the ground that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie
case against the accomplices Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, the
Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the case dismissed against the
aforementioned accused.
Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime Jose identified by pointing to it from the
window of the courtroom and pictures of which were submitted and marked as Exhibits "M" and "M-1," and
which Jaime Jose in his testimony admitted belonged to him, pursuant to Art. 45 of the Revised Penal Code,
which requires the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime, the Court hereby
orders its confiscation.
This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino, and
Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards Rogelio Caal. However, for practical purposes all of them
shall hereafter be referred to as appellants.
The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25 years old and single;
she graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll College and finished the secretarial course in 1960 at St.
Theresa's College. Movie actress by profession, she was receiving P8,000.00 per picture. It was part of her
work to perform in radio broadcasts and television shows, where she was paid P800.00 per month in
permanent shows, P300.00 per month in live promotional shows, and from P100.00 to P200.00 per
appearance as guest in other shows.
So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward bound from
the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her bantam car accompanied by her maid Helen
Calderon, who was also at the front seat. Her house was at No. 48, 12th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
She was already near her destination when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men aboard (later
identified as the four appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to bump it. She stepped on her brakes to
avoid a collision, and then pressed on the gas and swerved her car to the left, at which moment she was
already in front of her house gate; but because the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also
accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time. This prompted Miss De la Riva, who
was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda stopped the car which he was driving, jumped
out of it and rushed towards her.
The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car continuously.
Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left arm. The girl held on
tenaciously to her car's steering wheel and, together with her maid, started to scream. Her strength,
however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her out of her car. Seeing her
mistress' predicament, the maid jumped out of the car and took hold of Miss De la Riva's right arm in an
effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able to drag Miss De la Riva toward the Pontiac
convertible car, whose motor was all the while running.
When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac car, the three men inside
started to assist their friend: one of them held her by the neck, while the two others held her arms and legs.
All three were now pulling Miss De la Riva inside the car. Before she was completely in, appellant Pineda
jumped unto the driver's seat and sped away in the direction of Broadway Street. The maid was left behind.
The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio Pineda, Jr.
was at the wheel, while Rogelio Caal was seated beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated the appellants to
release her; but all she got in response were jeers, abusive and impolite language that the appellants and
threats that the appellants would finish her with their Thompson and throw acid at her face if she did not
keep quiet. In the meantime, the two men seated on each side of Miss De la Riva started to get busy with her
body: Jose put one arm around the complainant and forced his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his arms
on her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She continuously implored her captors to
release her, telling them that she was the only breadwinner in the family and that her mother was alone at
home and needed her company because her father was already dead. Upon learning of the demise of Miss
De la Riva's father, Aquino remarked that the situation was much better than he thought since no one could
take revenge against them. By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize the futility of her pleas. She
made the sign of the cross and started to pray. The appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now and
then Aquino would stand up and talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two would exchange knowing
glances with Caal and Jose.
The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards Victoria Street. Then
the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue. When the car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his pocket and, with the help of
Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva. The latter was told not to shout or else she would be stabbed or shot with a
Thompson. Not long after, the car came to a stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City The blindfolded lady was
led out of the car to one of the rooms on the second floor of the hotel.
Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold was removed. She saw Pineda and
Aquino standing in front of her, and Jose and Caal sitting beside her, all of them smiling meaningfully.
Pineda told the complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The other three expressed their approval and
ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The complainant ignored the command. One of the appellants suggested
putting off the light so that the complainant would not be ashamed. The idea, however, was rejected by the
others, who said that it would be more pleasurable for them if the light was on. Miss De la Riva was told to
remove her stocking in order, according to them, to make the proceedings more exciting. Reluctantly, she did
as directed, but so slowly did she proceed with the assigned task that the appellants cursed her and
threatened her again with the Thompson and the acid. They started pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of
them pulled down the zipper of her dress; another unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her dress
to prevent it from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her dress, together with her brassiere, fell
on the floor.
The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front of her and
feasting their eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes, during which the
complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around. Then Pineda picked up her
clothes and left the room with his other companions. The complainant tried to look for a blanket with which
to cover herself, but she could not find one.
Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was sitting on the
bed trying to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him to ask his friends to release her. Instead of
answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned her down on the bed. Miss De la Riva and Jose struggled
against each other; and because the complainant was putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed her and hit her
several times on the stomach and other parts of the body. The complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her
attacker was able to force them open. Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He
then left the room.
The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between him and Miss De
la Riva during which he hit, her on different parts of the body. Like Jose, Aquino succeeded in abusing the
complainant. The girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino called the others into the room. They poured water
on her face and slapped her to revive her. Afterwards, three of the accused left the room, leaving Pineda and
the complainant After some struggle during which Pineda hit her, the former succeeded in forcing his carnal
desire on the latter. When the complainant went into a state of shock for the second time, the three other
men went into the room again poured water on the complainant's face and slapped her several times. The
complainant heard them say that they had to revive her so she would know what was happening. Jose,
Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now appellant Canal's turn. There was a struggle between him
and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three appellants before him, he hit the complainant on different parts of
the body and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.
Mention must be made of the fact that while each of mention must be made the four appellants was
struggling with the complainant, the other three were outside the room, just behind the door, threatening
the complainant with acid and telling her to give in because she could not, after all, escape what with their
presence.
After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her clothes, told
her to get dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her face and comb her hair, to give the impression
that nothing had happened to her. They told her to tell her mother that she was mistaken by a group of men
for a hostess, and that when the group found out that she was a movie actress, she was released without
being harmed. She was warned not to inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended, they
would simply post bail and later hunt her up and disfigure her face with acid. The appellants then blindfolded
Miss De la Riva again and led her down from the hotel room. Because she was stumbling, she had to be
carried into the car. Inside the car, a appellant Jose held her head down on his lap, and kept it in that position
during the trip, to prevent her from being seen by others.
Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss De la Riva. They finally
decided on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel
5 to make it appear, according to them, that the complainant had just come from the studio. Pineda asked
Jose to alight and call a taxicab, but to choose one which did not come from a well-known company. Jose did
as requested, letting several taxicabs pass by before flagging a UBL taxicab. After they warned again Miss De
la Riva not to inform anyone of what had happened to her, appellant Canal accompanied her to the taxicab.
The time was a little past 6:00 o'clock. When Miss De la Riva was already inside the cab and alone with the
driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept asking the driver if a car was following them;
and each time the driver answered her in the negative.
It was 6:30 o'clock or some two hours after the abduction when Miss De la Riva reached home. Her
mother, her brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers, policemen and reporters, were at the
house. Upon seeing her mother, the complainant ran toward her and said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been
raped. All four of them raped me." The mother brought her daughter upstairs. Upon her mother's
instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath and a douche. The older woman also instructed her
daughter to douche himself two or three times daily with a strong solution to prevent infection and
pregnancy. The family doctor, who was afterwards summoned, treated the complainant for external physical
injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the sexual assaults. Neither was Pat. Pablo Pascual, the
police officer who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva residence when the latter
received from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching. When Miss De la Riva arrived home from her
harrowing experience, Pat. Pascual attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested him to postpone the
interrogation until she could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were still undecided on what
to do.
On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant family gathered to discuss what steps, if any, should be
taken. After some agonizing moments, a decision was reached: the authorities had to be informed. Thus,
early on the morning of June 29, 1967, or on the fourth day after the incident, Miss De la Riva, accompanied
by her lawyer, Atty. Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the family, went to the Quezon City Police
Department Headquarters, filed a complaint and executed a statement (Exh. "B") wherein she narrated the
incident and gave descriptions of the four men who abused her. In the afternoon of the same day, the
complainant submitted herself ito a medico-internal examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief Medico-
Legal Officer.
During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat. Pascual was also at
the NBI office. There he received a telephone call from the police headquarters to the effect that one of the
suspects had been apprehended. That evening, the complainant and Pat. Pascual proceeded to the
headquarters where Miss De la Riva identified appellant Jaime Jose from among a group of persons inside
the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City as one of the four men he abducted and raped her. She
executed another statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein she made a formal identification of Jose and related the
role played by him.
At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement (Exh. "I") before Pat. Marcos
G. Vias. In his statement, which was duly sworn. Jose admitted that he knew about, and was involved in, the
June 26 incident. He named the other line appellants as his companions. Jose stated, among other things,
that upon the initiative of Pineda, he and the other three waited for Miss De la Riva to come out of the ABS
Studio; that his group gave chase to the complainant's car; that it was Pineda who blindfolded her and that
only Pineda and Aquino criminally assaulted the complainant.
After Exh, "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Vinas with a picture of appellant Edgardo
Aquino. The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who declared in her sworn statement (Exh. "B-3") that the
man in the picture was one of her abductors and rapists. The same picture was shown to Jose, who, in
another sworn statement (Exh. "I-l"), identified the man in the picture as appellant Aquino.
After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the authorities: Pineda and Caal
on July 1, 1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino on July 5, 1967, in the province of Batangas. On the evening of July 1,
1967. Miss De la Riva pointed to Pineda and Caal as among the four persons who abducted and raped her.
She picked them out from among several person in the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City. Later in
the same evening, Miss De la Riva executed a sworn statement (Exh. B-2)wherein she made the same
identification of the two appellants from among a group of persons in the Office of the Chief of the Detective
Bureau, adding that appellant Caal had tattoo marks on his right hip. After the identification, one of the
policemen took appellant Caal downstairs and undressed him, and he saw, imprinted on the said appellant's
right hip, the words "Bahala na Gang."
Appellant Caal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day of their arrest. In his
statement (Exh. "G"), appellant Caal confirmed the information previously given by Jose that the four of
them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that they had planned to abduct and
rape her. Appellant Caal admitted that all four of them participated in the commission of the crime, but he
would make it appear that insofar as he was concerned the complainant yielded her body to him on
condition that he would release her. Pineda executed a statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other
three companions wept to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva was there, they made
plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his group followed her car and snatched her and
took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear, however, that the complainant voluntarily acceded
to having sexual intercourse with him.
In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions and bruises on different
parts of the complainant's body, as well as of genital injuries. On the witness stand the doctor was shown
several photographs of the complainant taken in his presence and under his supervision. With the aid of the
photographs and the medical reports, the doctor explained to the court that he found contusions or bruises
on the complainant's chest, shoulders, arms and fore-arms, right arm index finger, thighs, right knee and
legs. He also declared that when he was examining her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight tenderness
around the neck, on the abdominal wall and at the sites of the extragenital physical injuries, and that on
pressing the said injuries, he elicited a sigh of pain or tenderness on the part of the subject. The injuries,
according to Dr. Brion, could have been caused blows administered by a closed fist or by the palm of the
hand, and could have been inflicted on the subject while she was being raped. It was the doctor's opinion
that they could have been sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital examination,
the doctor declared that he found injuries on the subject's genitalia which could have been produced by
sexual intercourse committed on June 26, 1967. He said that he failed to find spermatozoa. He explained,
however, that spermatozoa are not usually found in the vagina after the lapse of three days from the last
intercourse, not to mention the possibility that the subject might have douched herself.
The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Caal) took the witness stand. We quote
hereunder the portions of the decision under review relative to the theory of the defense:
Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog Cocktail Lounge somewhere in
Mabini street in Manila, and there killed time from 9:30 in the evening of June 25 until closing time, which
was about 3:30 in the early morning of the next day. At the cocktail lounge they had listened to the music
while enjoying some drinks. Between them they had consumed a whole bottle of whisky, so much so that at
least Aquino became drunk, according to his own testimony. They had been joined at their table by a certain
Frankie whom they met only that night. Come time to go home, their new acquaintance asked to be dropped
at his home in Cubao. The five men piled into the red-bodied, black topped two-door convertible Plymouth
(Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel repaired to Cubao After dislodging their new friend,
Pineda steered the car to Espaa Extension to bring Aquino to his home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in
Espaa Extension before the Rotonda a small car whizzed to them almost hitting them. They saw that the
driver was a woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast of the small car he shouted, "Putang ina mo,
kamuntik na kaming mamatay." The woman continued on her way. Now Pineda saying "let us teach her a
lesson," sped after her and when she swerved ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car behind being
hurriedly got down, striding to the small car, opened the door and started dragging the girl out. Both Jose
and Aquino confirm the presence of another woman inside the girl's car, who helped the girl struggle to get
free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle lasted about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in
pushing the girl into the red convertible. All the three accused insist they did nothing to aid Pineda: but they
also admit that they did nothing to stop him.
Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just to scare the girl who was in
truth so scared that she begged them to let her be and return her to her home. She turned to Jose in appeal,
but this one told her he could net do anything as the "boss" was Pineda. Aquino heard her plead with Jose
"do you not have a sister yourself?" but did not bear the other plea 'do you not have a mother?' Then Pineda
stopped at the corner of the street where he had forcibly snatched the girl presumably to return her, but
then suddenly changing his mind he said, 'why don't you do a strip tease for us. I'll pay you P1,000.00 and the
girl taunted, 'are you kidding?': that after a little while she consented to do the performance as long as it
would not last too long and provided the spectators were limited to the four of them.
Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie alighted first, but not before
Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from one of them to cover her face as she went up the Hotel. The
three followed, and when they saw the pair enter a room, they quickly caught up. All the three accused
testify that as soon as they got into the room, Maggie de la Riva asked the boys to close the windows before
she. undressed in front of them. They themselves also removed their clothing. Two of them removed their
pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda and Caal stripped to the skin "because it was hot." The three
accused declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and they heard him promise her that he
would pay the balance of P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show which lasted about 10 minutes began with the
naked girl walking back and forth the room about 4 to 5 times. This accomplished, all of them dressed up
once more and the three accused (Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Caal) left the room to wait in
the car for Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still discussing the mode of payment of
the balance. Three minutes later Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda joined them. Now, the question of how
and where to drop Maggie came up and it is testified to by the accused that it was Maggie's idea that they
should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had just come from her work.
Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along Buendia Avenue. Aquino testifies how,
on June 29 Pineda went to him with a problem. He did not have the P900.00 with which to pay Maggie the
balance of her "show" and he was afraid that if he did not pay, Maggie would have her goons after him. He
wanted Aquino to go with him to Lipa City where he had relatives and where he could help raise the money.
Aquino readily obliged, and to make the company complete they invited Caal to join them. They used
another car of Jaime Jose, different from the one they had used the day before. At Lipa, Aquino detached
himself from his compassions and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly to visit his relatives. In the
meantime his two companions had remained in the City and had, according to Canal, gone to live in a house
very close to the municipal hall building. They later moved to another house where the PC and Quezon City
police posse found and arrested them. Aquino was the last to be apprehended, when having read in the
newspapers that he was wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife of the governor of
Batangas.
The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies one's credulity and reason,
and had utterly to counteract the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the complainant's testimony and
Dr. Brion's medical report and testimony. We quote with approval the able dissertion of the trial judge on
this point:
As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the proposition that nothing happened in
Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease exhibition which the complaint agreed to do for them for fee of P1,000.00,
P100.00 down and the balance to be paid "later." The flaw in this connection lies in its utter inverisimilitude.
The Court cannot believe that any woman exists, even one habitual engaged in this kind of entertainment
(which Maggie de la Riva has not been proven to be) who would consent (and as easily and promptly as
defense claims) to do a performance, not even for all money in the worlds after the rough handling she
experienced from these wolves in men's clothing who now hungered for a show. There is no fury to match a
woman stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far stronger than her yen for money, and her revenge much
more keen. The Court cannot believe that after the rudeness and meanness of these men to her, Maggie
would in so short an interval of time forget her indignation and so readily consent to satisfy their immoral
curiosity about her. The woman in her would urge her to turn the men's hankering as a weapon of revenge
by denying them their pleasure.
Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again something beyond even the wildest
expectations. Assuming that the woman whom the accused had abducted was in this kind of trade assuming
that the price offered was to her satisfaction, whom woman would be willing to perform first and be paid
later? It is simply preposterous to believe that Maggie de la Riva should have consent to do a striptease act
for a measly down-payment of P100.00 and the balance to be paid God knows when. Since when are
exposition of the flesh paid on the installment basis? By the very precautious nature of their pitiful calling,
women who sell their attractions are usually very shrewed and it is to be expected that they could demand
full payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to collect later when she did not even know who these
man were, where they lived, whether they could be trusted with a promise to pay later (!) whether she could
ever find them again? If there is anything that had struck the Court about the complaint, it is her courage, her
intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a most stupid one that, could have been persuaded
to do what the defense want this Court to believe Maggie de la Riva consented to do.
Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this circumstances during their interview
with anyone, either the press, their police interrogator, the person who negotiated their surrender (as in the
case of Aquino) or even their counsel. One cannot escape the very strong suspicion that this story is a last
ditch, desperate attempt to save the day for the accused. It truly underscores the hopelessness of their stand
and projects all the more clearly their guilt.

Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was there need for this? The Court realizes
that in its desperate need of an explanation for Maggie's positive identification of Caal as the man with the
tattoo mark on his right buttock, the defense concocted the sickeningly incident story that the four men
removed their underclothing in the presence of a woman simply "because it was hot." What kind of men
were these who were so devoid of any sense of decency that they thought nothing of adding insult to injury
by not only inducing a woman a strip before them, but for forcing her to perform before a naked audience?
And then they have gall to argue that "nothing" happened. For males of cold and phlegmatic blood and
disposition it could be credible, but not for men of torrid regions like ours where quick passions and hot
tempers are the rule rather than the exception!
All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the version of the defense has
not been able to explain away a very vital piece of evidence of prosecution which, if unexplained, cannot but
reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the physical (external and internal) examination conducted on
the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of June 29, the pertinent findings of which quoted earlier in
this decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de la Riva was examined she bore on her
body traces of physical and sexual assault.
The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of the following: (1) the insinuation
that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda were left behind in the hotel room the bruises and the sexual
attack could have taken place then. But then, the defense itself says that these two persons rejoined the
three after three or four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time, for Boy Pineda to have
attacked the girl and inflicted on her all of these injuries; (2) it was suggested by the defense that Maggie de
la Riva could have inflicted all of those injuries upon herself just to make out a case against the accused. The
examining physician rules out this preposterous proposition, verily it does not take much stretch of the
imagination to see how utterly impossible this would be, and for what purpose? Was P900.00 which she had
failed to collect worth that much self-torture? And what about all the shame, embarrassment and publicity
she would (as she eventually did) expose herself to? If she really had not been raped would she have gone
thru all of these tribulation?
A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more to lose in the notoriety the case will
reap her, her honor and that of her family, than in the redress she demands (Canastre 82-480; Medina, C.A.
1943 O.G. 151; Medina y Puno, CA O.G. 338; CA 55 O.G. 7666; Galamito, L-6302, August 25, 1954); (3) it
could also be argued that the contusions and bruises could have been inflicted on Maggie during her struggle
with Pineda when the latter pulled and pushed her into the red convertible car. The telltale injuries,
however, discount this possibility, for the location in which many of the bruises and traumas were located
(particularly on the inner portion of her thighs) could not have been cause by any struggle save by those of a
woman trying to resists the brutal and bestial attack on her honor.
In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and uncorroborated testimony should not be
rated any credence at all as against the concerted declaration of the the accused. In the first place, it is not
correct to say that Maggie's declaration was uncorroborated she has for corroboration nothing less than
the written extra-judicial statements of Jose and Canal. But even assuming that Maggie stood alone in her
statements, the cases cited by the accused in their Memorandum notwithstanding which the Court does not
consider in point anyway, jurisprudence has confirmed the ruling that numbers is the least vital element in
gauging the weight of evidence. What is more important is which of the declarations is the more credible, the
more logical, the more reasonable, the more prone to be biased or polluted. (Ricarte 44 OG 2234; Damian
CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it should be borne in maid that in the most detestable crime of
rape in which a man is at his worst the testimony of the offended party most often is the only one available
to prove directly its commission and that corroboration by other eyewitnesses would in certain cases place a
serious doubt as to the probability of its commission, so trial courts of justice are most often placed in a
position of having to accept such uncorroborated testimony if the same is in regards conclusive, logical and
probable (Landicho, VIII ACR 530).
We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs.
1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Caal deny having had anything to do with the abduction of Miss De la
Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they generously
contend that even as to him the act was purged at any taint of criminality by the complainant's subsequent
consent to perform a striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the existence of
the element of lewd design. This line of defense has evidently leg no to stand on. The evidence is clear and
overwhelming that all the appellants participated in the forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the
witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that they helped one another in dragging her into the car
against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while inside the car, Jose and Aquino, between
whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing his lips on hers, and the latter touching her
thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing glances were in the meanwhile being exchanged
among the four; and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This testimony,
whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to
establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint. In the light thereof, appellants' protestation that
they were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis.
2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise been
clearly established. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's vagina
disproves the fact of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who testified as an expert,
declared that semen is not usually found in the vagina after three days from the last intercourse, especially if
the subject has douched herself within that period. In the present case, the examination was conducted on
the fourth day after the incident, and the complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy.
Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the important
consideration being, not the emission of semen, but penetration (People vs Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980).
Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the cervix were caused by the tough tip of a noozle deliberately
used by the complainant to strengthen her alleged fabricated tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult
to imagine that any sane woman, who is single and earning as much Miss Dela Riva did, would inflict injuries
on her genital organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed instrument in order to strike back at four
strangers who allegedly would not pay her the sum of P900.00 due her for a striptease act. Besides, Dr. Brion
testified that the insertion of such an instrument in the genital organ would not result in the kind of injuries
he found in the mucosa of the cervix.
3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission of successive
rapes by the four appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva's arrival at her house in the morning of June 26, 1967, she
immediately told her mother, " Mommy Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." This
utterance, which is part of the res gestae, commands strong probative value, considering that it was made by
the complainant to her mother who, in cases of this nature was the most logical person in whom a daughter
would confide the truth. Aquino and Canal would make capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva stated to the
reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not abused. Her statement to the press is understandable.
At that time the complainant, who had not yet consulted her family on a matter which concerned her
reputation as well as that of her family, and her career, was not then in a position to reveal publicly what had
happened to her. This is one reason why the complainant did not immediately inform the authorities of the
tragedy that befell her. Another reason is that she was threatened with disfiguration. And there were, of
course, the traumas found by Dr. Brion on different parts of the complainant's body. Could they, too, have
been self-inflicted? Or, as suggested, could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda alone, when
the story given by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were left in the hotel room for only
three or four minutes, and that they came out to join them in what they would picture to be a cordial
atmosphere, the complainant even allegedly suggesting that she be dropped on a spot where people would
reasonably presume her to have come from a studio? Equally important is the complainant's public
disclosure of her tragedy, which led to the examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks of future
public ridicule and diminution of popularity and earnings as a movie actress.
4. Jose and Canal seek the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from the mass of evidence on
the grounds that they were secured from them by force and intimidation, and that the incriminating details
therein were supplied by the police investigators. We are not convinced that the statements were
involuntarily given, or that the details recited therein were concocted by the authorities. The statements
were given in the presence of several people and subscribed and sworn to before the City Fiscal of Quezon
City, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated the use of inordinate methods by the police.
They are replete with details which could hardly be known to the police; and although it is suggested that the
authorities could have secured such details from their various informers, no evidence at all was presented to
establish the truth of such allegation. While in their statements Jose and Canal admitted having waited
together with the two other appellants for Miss De la Riva at the ABS Studio, each of them attempted in
the same statements to exculpate himself: appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino criminally
abused the complainant; while appellant Canal would make it appear that the complainant willingly allowed
him to have sexual intercourse with her. Had the statements been prepared by the authorities, they would
hardly have contained matters which were apparently designed to exculpate the affiants. It is significant, too,
that the said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or relatives of the alleged use of
force and intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario of the Quezon City Police Department, who examined
appellant Canal after the latter made his statement, found no trace of injury on any part of the said
appellant's body in spite of the claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that one of his arms was
burned with a cigarette lighter. In the circumstances, and considering, further, that the police officers who
took down their statements categorically denied on the witness stand that the two appellants were tortured,
or that any detail in the statements was supplied by them or by anyone other than the affiants themselves,
We see no reason to depart from the trial court's well-considered conclusion that the statements were
voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the in-custody statements of Jose and Canal, We find that the
mass of evidence for the prosecution on record will suffice to secure the conviction of the two.
The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the other ground that
he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda
vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436).
The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of
which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel ..." While the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United States, in this
jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil., 258
(1912), in connection with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment.
Implementing the said constitutional provision, We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court
that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled ... (b) to be present and defend in person
and by attorney at every stage of the proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the
judgment." The only instances where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests,
are during the second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest (Rule
113, Section 18). The rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction,
not only because it has no binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution
the meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered. And even there the
said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of unanimity in the voting by the
members of the United States Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases.
5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in gross
miscarriage of justice. He contends that because the charge against him and his co-appellants is a capital
offense and the amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would raise the
penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all stages of the trial. The
contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission of
all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not
that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant
circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29, 1964,
citing People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29, 1961, and People vs. Parete, L-15515, April 29, 1961). Because of the
aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his
evidence, much less to require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested
the court to allow him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the better part of discretion on
the part of the trial court to grant his request. (Cf. People vs. Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.) The
case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court ordered a new trial
because it found for a fact that the accused, who had pleaded guilty, "did not intend to admit that he
committed the offense with the aggravating circumstances" mentioned in the information. We are not in a
position to make a similar finding here. The transcript of the proceedings during the arraignment shows that
Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota prefaced his client's plea of guilty with the statement that .
I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple language of the contents of aggravating
circumstances and apprised him of the penalty he would get, and we have given said accused time to think.
After a while I consulted him for three times and his decision was still the same.
Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had always been averse to
Pineda's idea of pleading guilty, because "I know the circumstances called for the imposition of the maximum
penalty considering the aggravating circumstances," but that he acceded to his client's wish only after the
fiscal had stated that he would recommend to the court the imposition of life imprisonment on his client. To
be sure, any such recommendation does not bind the Court. The situation here, therefore, is far different
from that obtaining in U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra.
6. Two of the appellants Jose and Caal bewail the enormous publicity that attended the case
from the start of investigation to the trial. In spite of the said publicity, however, it appears that the court a
quo was able to give the appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three of the seven (7) original accused were
acquitted. For another thing, Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been influenced by
adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a presumption of
innocence and to fair trial."
We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit the crimes imputed to
them in the amended information quoted at the beginning of this decision. There is no doubt at all that the
forcible abduction of the complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City, was a necessary if not
indispensable means which enabled them to commit the various and the successive acts of rape upon her
person. It bears noting, however, that even while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of
forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that each of the three succeeding (crimes of the same
nature can not legally be considered as still connected with the abduction in other words, they should be
detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the former can
no longer be complexed with the latter.
What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No. 4111 which took effect
on June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows:
ART. 335. When and how rape committed.Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof,
the penalty shall be likewise death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed,
the latter is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer
the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed.
Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the proper
penalty to be imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite
finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes was attended with the following
aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate
the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four
appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy,
since the appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten
minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime
more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and Ca__al, none
of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should,
however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in
the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be
three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should likewise be made to suffer the
extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.)
In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court applied by
analogy Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum duration of all the penalties
therein imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the
most severe of the penalties imposed upon the appellant, which should not exceed forty years." The said
court is of the opinion that since a man has only one life to pay for a wrong, the ends of justice would be
served, and society and the victim would be vindicated just as well, if only one death penalty were imposed
on each of the appellants.
We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only be taken into account in
connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in the imposition of the penalty (People vs.
Escares, 55 Off. Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death penalty should be imposed because man has only
one life, the trial court ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it cited, namely, U.S. vs. Balaba, 37
Phil., 260, where this Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, found the accused guilty of two
murders and one homicide and imposed upon him two death sentences for the murders and a prison term
for the homicide. In not applying the said principle, the court a quo said that the case of Balaba is different
from the present case, for while in the former case the accused was found to have committed three distinct
offenses, here only one offense is charged, even if complex. As We have explained earlier herein, four crimes
were committed, charged and proved. There is, therefore, no substantial difference between the two cases
insofar as the basic philosophy involved is concerned, for the fact remains that in the case of Balaba this
Court did not hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the accused by the trial court. In People
vs. Peralta, et al., L-19060, October 29, 1968, in which this Court imposed on each of the six accused three
death penalties for three distinct and separate crimes of murder, We said that "since it is the settled rule that
once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then each conspirator must be
held liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and
severity of the appropriate penalties prescribed by law." In the said case (which was promulgated after the
decision of the court a quo had been handed down) We had occasion to discuss at length the legality and
practicality of imposing multiple death penalties, thus:
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, an exercise in futility. It
is contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict, like all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And
because of this physiological and biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple
death penalties is impractical and futile because after the service of one capital penalty, the execution of the
rest of the death penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the multiple
imposition of death penalties suffers from four basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing
multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3)
it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the
practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.
The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts. The
imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses
charged and proved, whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and character of the penalty
or penalties imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not concern itself
with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency subject
to varied factors like the successful escape of the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the
prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature,
gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed simultaneously. A
cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only two moves of serving two or more (multiple)
penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the
nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.
The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical importance. The
sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity,
which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of only one death sentence irrespective of the
number of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of the convict in
its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no small measure.
Hence, the imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively serve as deterrent to an improvident
grant of pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary
authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.
Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to pardon (one of the
presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalties
to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum forty
(40) years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life
imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life
sentence.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among them and of our finding
as regards the nature and number of the crimes committed, as well as of the presence of aggravating
circumstances, four death penalties should be imposed in the premises.
Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation asking for reversal
of that portion of the judgment of the court below ordering the confiscation of the car used by the appellants
in abducting the complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door Pontiac sedan with Motor No. WT-
222410, Serial No. 2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171, alleged by the intervenor to be in
the custody of Major Ernesto San Diego of the Quezon City Police Department. The car is registered in the
name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez.
On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of an appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought the car from the
Malayan Motors Corporation and simultaneously executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of
the purchase price of P13,200, which was stipulated to be payable in 24 monthly installments of P550
beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4, 1969. The mortgage was duly registered with the Land Transportation
Commission and inscribed in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. The mortgage lien was annotated on the motor
registration certificate. On April 17, 1967, for value received and with notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan
Motors Corporation assigned its credit against Mrs. Gomez, as well as the chattel mortgage, to the
intervenor. The assignment was duly registered with the Land Transportation Commission and annotated on
the registration certificate.
Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor filed on July 5, 1967, an
action for replevin against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court of First Instance of Manila) as a preliminary step
to foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the court issued an order for the seizure of the car.
The sheriff, however, could not enforce the writ of replevin because the car was not in Mrs. Gomez'
possession, the same having been used by her son, appellant Jaime G. Jose, together with the other
appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss De la Riva, as a result of which the car was seized by the
Quezon City police and placed in the custody of Major San Diego, who refused to surrender it to the sheriff
on the ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial of the criminal case.
During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the intervenor filed with
the said court a petition for intervention. The said petition was not, however, acted upon. On October 2,
1967, the trial court rendered its judgment in the present case ordering the car's confiscation as an
instrument of the crime. Although not notified of the said decision, the intervenor filed, on October 17, 1967,
a motion for reconsideration of the order of confiscation; but the same was denied on October 31, 1967, on
the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the automatic elevation thereof
to this Court. The intervenor then filed a petition for relief from judgement, but the same was also denied.
On February 5, 1968, judgement was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to deliver the car to
the intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or, in the alternative, to pay the
intervenor the sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from July 5, 1968, the premium
bond, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. The judgment became final and executory. Attempts to execute
the judgment against the properties of Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ of execution was returned by
the sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the present petition for intervention was filed with this Court, which
allowed the intervenor to file a brief. In his brief the Solicitor General contends, among others, that the court
a quo having found that appellant Jose is the owner of the car, the order of confiscation is correct.
Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in the absence of
strong evidence to the contrary, must be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the only basis of the
court a quo in concluding that the said car belongs to appellant Jose were the latter's statements during the
trial of the criminal case to that effect; that the said statement were not, however, intended to be, nor could
constitute, a claim of ownership over the car adverse to his mother, but were made simply in answer to
questions propounded in court for the sole purpose of establishing the identity of the defendant who
furnished the car used by the appellants in the commission of the crime; that the chattel mortgage on the car
and its assignment in the favor of the intervenor were made several months before the date of commission
of the crimes charged, which circumstance forecloses the possibility of collusion to prevent the State from
confiscating the car; that the final judgement in the replevin case can only be executed by delivering the
possession of the car to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and the Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of
the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this Court
that the order of the court below for confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that the said
car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993.
other persons who conspired to commit the crime. The SC modified the judgment as follows: appellants
Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal manifestation on the part of the
Solicitor General to the effect that Rogelio Caal, one of the herein appellants, died in prison on December
28, 1970. As a result of this development, this case is hereby dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as
his criminal liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de oficio.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio
Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a
consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall, jointly
and severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of
40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.
Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo for its
confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver its possession
to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance with the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.
Barredo and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.
CASE DIGEST: People v. Jaime Jose, G.R. No. L-28232
Title: People v. Jaime Jose, G.R. No. L-28232
Subject Matter: Conspiracy
Facts:
On June 26, 1967, four principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Caal
conspired together, confederated with and mutually helped one another, then and there, to willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design to forcibly abduct Magdalena Maggie dela Riva, 25 years old
and single, a movie actress by profession at the time of the incident, where the four principal accused, by
means of force and intimidation using a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the complainant against
her will, and brought her to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, and hence committed the crime of Forcible
Abduction with Rape.
Having established the element of conspiracy, the trial court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape and sentences each of them to the death penalty.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court made a proper ruling of the case considering the element of conspiracy.
Held:
No, the trial courts ruling was not proper. The SC ruled that since the element of conspiracy was present,
where the act of one is the act of all, each of the accused is also liable for the crime committed by each of the
Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., and Eduardo Aquino are guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a
consequence thereof, each of them is likewise convicted with four death penalties and to indemnify the
victim of the sum of P10,000 in each of the four crimes. The case against Rogelio Caal was dismissed only in
so far as the criminal liability is concerned due to his death in prison prior to promulgation of judgment.
Case Digest of Criminal Cases: People vs Jaime Jose y Gomez, et al. G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971
People vs Jaime Jose y Gomez, et al.
G.R. No. L-28232
February 6, 1971
Case Digest of Criminal Cases
Digested Cases
Facts:
On June 26, 1967, four (4) principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., alias Boy, Eduardo Aquino Alias
Eddie and Rogelio Caal; together with Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon and Jessie Guion as accomplices,
conspired together, confederated with and mutually helped one another, then and there, to willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design to forcibly abduct Magdalena Maggie de la Riva, 25 years old
and single, a movie actress by profession at the time of the incident, where the four principal accused, by
means of force and intimidation using a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the complainant against
her will, and brought her to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, and hence committed the crime of Forcible
Abduction with Rape.
Wherefore, the court finds that the accomplices Pueng, Guanzon and Guion, on the ground that the
prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against them, the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in
their behalf is hereby granted, and the case dismissed against them.
(Facts of this case are too descriptive. Id rather not include much details on the scene of the crime to protect
the complainants repute).
Issue:
(a) What kind of rape was committed?
Held:
Undoubtedly, rape is that which is punishable by the penalty reclusion perpetua to death, under paragraph 3,
Article 335, as amended by Republic Act 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964. Under the law, rape is
committed by having canal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) by using
force and intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason and otherwise unconscious; and (3) when
the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two
next preceding paragraphs shall be present. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed,
and the latter is the more serious; hence, pursuant to the provision of Art 48 of the RPC, the penalty
prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the extreme
penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed.
However, said crime as attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants
having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of
superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another;
(c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complaint to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for
ten minutes before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime
more humiliating; and (d) the use of motor vehicle.
Of the three principal-appellants (Jose, Aquino and Caal), none of them may claim aggravating
circumstances has been offset by the mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be
credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least
affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three
aggravating circumstances remaining.
Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo for its
confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver its possession
to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance with the judgment of the First
Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof.
Before the actual promulgation of the decision, the Court received a formal manifestation on the part of the
Solicitor general to the effect that Rogelio Caal, one of the herein appellants, died in prison on December
28, 1970. As a result, the case is dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de officio.
Wherefore, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and
Eduardo P. Aquino are pronounced GUILTY of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each
and every one of them likewise convicted of three (3) of the crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each
of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall jointly and severally, indemnify the
complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay
one-fourth of the costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20183 June 30, 1966
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO BERDIDA Y INGUITO, ET AL., defendants.
EDUARDO BERDIDA Y INGUITO, LORETO SABERON Y CASAS, VICENTE ABERAS Y CORDERO and JESUS FELICIA
Y BALIDBID, defendants and appellants.
Senen S. Ceniza, Emilio G. Opinion and Agustin R. Romeras for defendants and appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General A. A. Alafriz, Acting Assistant Solicitor General I. C. Borromeo and Solicitor S. C.
Jacob for plaintiff and appellee.
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of death sentence pursuant to the Rules of Court.1
On 10 May 1960, an information for frustrated murder2 of Antonio Maravilla and another information for
murder3 of Federico Caalete, were filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Said informations were
directed against the same eight accused: Eduardo Berdida y Inguito, Jesus Felicia y Balidbid, Vicente Aberas y
Cordero, Cristoto Mitilla y Paral, Demetrio Garin y Payos, Protacio Libres y Corona, Loreto Saberon y Casas
and Mario Mustrado y Sumaya.

After the defendants pleaded not guilty at their arraignment on 16 May 1960, the two cases were tried
jointly. Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by defendants Cristoto Mitilla and Mario Mustrado, after the
prosecution rested its case, the court dismissed the charges against Mario Mustrado, with costs de oficio.
After the trial, the Court of First Instance rendered on 27 July 1962 the decision now under review. Its
dispositive portion states:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the defendants Eduardo Berdida, Loreto Saberon,
Vicente Aberas and Jesus Felicia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. This Court has in
previous cases endeavored to avoid the imposition of the capital punishment. In the case at bar, however,
where the offenders, pretending to be police officers, kidnapped the victims and mercilessly beat one of
them to death, the Court finds no other alternative, in pursuance to the mandate of the law, but to impose,
as it hereby imposes upon the said defendants, the death penalty, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs
of Federico Caalete in the sum of P4,000.00 and to pay the costs. May God have mercy on their souls.
In Criminal Case No. 52338, above-said defendants are also hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of attempted murder and considering the aggravating circumstances present, they are sentenced
each to suffer a maximum penalty of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor and a minimum of SIX (6) YEARS of
prision correccional, and to pay the costs, without prejudice on the part of the complainant to institute a
separate civil action for the recovery of damages.
The defendants Garin, Mitilla and Libres are hereby acquitted, in both cases, with costs de oficio, and their
immediate release is hereby ordered.
So ordered.
The records show the prosecution's evidence, as follows:
At about 10 o'clock in the evening of 7 May 1960, Antonio Maravilla, Federico Caalete, Virgilio Haban and
Pedrito Rapadas left the store of one Mang Terio at Mabuhay Street, North Harbor, Tondo, Manila, and
proceeded walking towards their homes. They were met on their way by Eduardo Berdida, Antonio Louie,
one Tiquio and one alias Ifugao, who identified themselves as detectives, told them not to move, and pointed
sharp and long bolos to them.4 Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete raised their hands, but Pedrito
Rapadas and Virgilio Haban were able to run away. Antonio Louie then dealt a fist blow on Antonio Maravilla.
After that, the group took Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete along the rail tracks, telling them that
they had done something wrong.
At the end of the rail tracks, said group tied the hands of Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete. After
doing this, they dragged the two and took them to a place in Pier 8 at the North Harbor near Vicente Aberas'
house. In said place, there were others who joined the group, among them, Jesus Felicia, Loreto Saberon and
Vicente Aberas. At this point Eduardo Berdida told Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete to dig their
graves, but they refused. Arturo Macabebe, who also joined the group, took two sticks of cigarettes and told
Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete to smoke. Antonio Maravilla again refused. Following said refusal,
the victims were hit with a piece of wood. Eduardo Berdida and Jesus Felicia then held Antonio Maravilla and
Federico Caalete, respectively, by the hands and from behind. As they were thus held, Vicente Aberas
delivered fist blows on them, first on Antonio Maravilla, then on Federico Caalete.5 Furthermore, Loreto
Saberon also held Federico Caalete while others gave fist blows to the latter.6 At about 1 o'clock in the
morning of 8 May 1960, Antonio Maravilla lost consciousness, shortly after hearing Loreto Saberon say that
the group would cut off the ears of Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete for appetizer or "pulutan".7
Antonio Maravilla's sister, Elizabeth, had meanwhile been informed by Virgilio Haban, one of those who were
able to run away, that her brother and Federico Caalete were taken by armed men. She therefore went out
with some companions in search of her brother. She asked the help of Patrolman Carlos Pili, who was then at
the corner of Kaguitingan and Lakandula Streets in front of Pier 6. Patrolmen Amado Santos and Fabricante
also joined them. As the other policemen took to separate directions, Patrolman Pili and Elizabeth Maravilla
went along Mabuhay Street. They came upon a group of men, between Piers 6 and 8, who were hesitant to
answer their inquiries. So they proceeded further, entering a small alley. As they went on, Elizabeth found
the shoes of her brother. So they continued until they met Vicente Aberas, stripped to the waist, with
bloodstains on his hands.8 Patrolman Pili detained him. Since somebody threatened them should they
proceed any further, Patrolman Pili and Elizabeth Maravilla went to Precinct 3, taking along Vicente Aberas.
Assistance from the Mobile Patrol was then requested. Accompanied by her neighbors and more policemen,
Elizabeth, together with Patrolman Pili, returned and went further to the interior of Mabuhay Street. Finally,
they came upon Federico Caalete and Antonio Maravilla, sprawled on the ground, the former face down,
the latter flat on his back. Federico Caalete was found dead. Antonio Maravilla was alive, though his face
was swollen, rendering him barely recognizable. Antonio Maravilla was taken to the North General Hospital.
Patrolman Pili, meanwhile, went still further to the interior and saw, about 12 meters away from where they
found the victims, a group drinking liquor. At the approach of Patrolman Pili, about four men ran away,
leaving behind four men, namely, Loreto Saberon, Mario Mustrado, Cristoto Mitilla and Protacio Libres, the
last mentioned being then drunk and asleep on a bamboo bed.9 A Mobile Patrol car thereafter arrived and
apprehended them, except Libres. Patrolman Pili next went towards a house near Tagumpay Street in which
direction the others had fled. In said house, which was that of Crisanta Melgar, the patrolman found some
persons who pretended to be sleeping, namely, Demetrio Garin, Jesus Felicia and Eduardo Berdida.
Patrolman Pili brought them outside and they were taken by the Mobile Patrol to the Detective Bureau.
Furthermore, the body of Federico Caalete was examined at the scene where it was found by officers of the
Mobile Patrol. Detective Bureau agents likewise went to said place. Finding bloodstains near an a alley to
Tagumpay Street, they went to a house thereat and found Protacio Libres sleeping on a bamboo bed. Said
detectives took Libres to the headquarters.
At the police station, all the apprehended suspects were made to mingle with other persons. Antonio
Maravilla, who was fetched to point out therefrom the persons who attacked him and Federico Caalete
identified Eduardo Berdida, Vicente Aberas, Loreto Saberon and Jesus Felicia.
An autopsy was made on 8 May 1960 on the body of Federico Caalete by Dr. Luis Larion, Medical Examiner
of the Manila Police Department. The post mortem findings in his report are as follows: (Exh. M):
CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM:
Hemorrhage extensive, subarachnoid brain.
CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM: Sometime between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening of 7 May 1960 Crisanta Melgar was filling drums with
water in her house at 1205 Tagumpay Street, Tondo, Manila. Shortly thereafter, Eduardo Berdida, Loreto
Laceration, blood vessels, brain and spleen. Saberon and Jesus Felicia arrived. Since her husband was on night duty and her brother- in-law was ill,
RESPIRATORY SYSTEM: Crisanta Melgar asked the three to remain and help her fill up the drums with water, intending to sell the
Contusion, posterior lung, bilateral. same the next morning. Said defendants consented and for some time helped Crisanta fill the drums with
Congestion, lungs, bilateral. water. At about 9 o'clock in the evening, however, said defendants went to sleep in the ground floor of
GASTROINTESTINAL SYSTEM: Crisanta's new house, still under construction, adjacent to the house aforementioned. At about midnight a
About 150 cc. partially digested rice meal with slight alcoholic odor. policeman and someone in civilian clothes knocked at the door and inquired from Crisanta if there were
Hemoperitoneum about 100 cc. blood, abdominal cavity. three persons sleeping in her house. She said yes, and opened the door. The policeman then told Crisanta
that a dead man was found near their place. The one in civilian attire went to the back of the house. Crisanta
SPLEEN: Maceration spleen. told the policeman she knew nothing of any incident and that the three men had been in her house for some
time. She then awoke the defendants Berdida, Saberon and Felicia. The policeman told them to stand up and
PANCREAS: Contusion, hemorrhagic, pancreas. the man in civilian was asked if they were the ones involved. Said man looked at the defendants and replied
in the negative. The policeman and the civilian then left and the defendants went back to sleep. After a
BONES AND JOINTS: while, Crisanta, who was restless and could not sleep, went down, awoke the defendants, and told them that
it was better for them to leave. So, the said defendants left, but a policeman stopped them at Tagumpay
Fracture-separation, left parieto-occipital and right fronto-temporal skull. Street and took them to the police headquarters.

MISCELLANEOUS: As to the defendant Vicente Aberas, his defense of alibi is as follows:

Wound, stab, non-penetrating, 1.3 x 0.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. deep, right lumbar region.
Wound, lacerated, 3 x 0.5 cm. occipital region.
Wound, lacerated, 2.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 1 cm. deep, non-penetrating, left abdomen.
Hematoma, frontal, right; left, parieto-occipital, and occipital, scalp, head.
Contusion, multiple, left forehead; left lower eyelids; left face; nose; lower lip; left lateral neck; posterior
neck; left shoulder; left and right posterior chest.
Contused abrasion, anterior left lower chest and right abdomen.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Shock and hemorrhage due to traumatic fracture of the skull with maceration of spleen, contusion of the
lungs and extensive subarachnoid hemorrhages in the brain.
Antonio Maravilla, as shown in the medico-legal certificate of Dr. Cumalinga Espinosa of the North General
Hospital (Exh. R), sustained these injuries:
Contusion with abrasion, and periorbital hematoma, eye right.
Contusion upper and lower lip.
Contusion 2" mental region.
Contusion with slight hematoma, malar right, and mandible bilateral.
Abrasion, 3", lateral neck left.
Abrasion, 2" #2 level of the 10th rib right, along the MCL.
For the defense of herein appellants, the following evidence was presented to establish alibi:
In the evening of 7 May 1960, he was on board the fishing boat "Don Paulino." At about 10:30 o'clock in the
evening, after unloading their catch of fish, he left for home, bringing with him a tulingan fish. Juan, a co-
worker of his, invited him to drink beer in a store near Pier 8. For some time they stayed there, then he left
for home. On the way he met five men beating up somebody. Approaching them, he asked them to have pity
on the man and not to beat him. Someone in the group, armed with a club, warned him not to interfere, so,
becoming afraid, he left. In reaching home, he took off his shirt, cut the fish he brought with him in half,
lengthwise, and took one of the halves to the house of Emiliano Retone, another co-worker of his, who did
not report for work that day. Retone invited him to drink gin. After drinking, he headed for home, but on his
way he met two policemen and a woman. After being asked where he came from, which he answered, and
whether he had seen a fight, to which he said yes, he was taken to Precinct 3.
Appellants would, first of all, assail Antonio Maravilla's testimony identifying them as the assailants, for the
reason that he lost consciousness, and, therefore, could not be relied upon to make said identification.
Appellants would further insist on their defense of alibi. Antonio Maravilla, it is true, lost consciousness' at
about 1 o'clock in the morning of 8 May 1960. It is however equally true that before his sense faded out he
saw herein appellants perform their atrocities on himself as well as on Federico Caalete. It cannot therefore
be doubted that he made no mistake in pointing out to herein appellants as definitely among their assailants.
This he did, not only at the police station but also in open court during the trial. It is furthermore not
disputed by defendants-appellants that Antonio Maravilla has no reason or motive to falsely accuse them of
murder and attempted murder. The positive identification he made must therefore be given credence.
It follows that the defense of alibi cannot be sustained. The rule is settled, to the point of being trite, that the
defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification by prosecution witnesses, pointing to the
accused as participants in the crime. 10

The trial court, moreover, found the above-related defenses of alibi not credible. For, according to said court,
if defendants Berdida, Felicia and Saberon really went to help Crisanta Melgar, their provincemate, fill drums
with water at her house, it is rather unusual that they went to sleep at about 9 o'clock in the evening.
Furthermore, the policeman who inquired about persons sleeping in Crisanta Melgar's house strangely knew
their number, that is, three persons. And, finally, it is unbelievable that said policeman did not take them to
the headquarters for identification by Antonio Maravilla himself.1wph1.t to the time Antonio Maravilla lost consciousness, about 1 o'clock early the following morning, is sufficient
And, with respect to the defendant-appellant Vicente Aberas, the trial court found it too surprising to believe
that he went to such lengths of amiability, as to go, shirtless at that, to his friend Retone, at an unholy hour,
to share with him one-half of his tulingan fish. No previous agreement, or urgent need for such an act
obtained. It could have waited for the next morning, especially since, having allegedly come from work,
defendant Aberas must have been tired.
As this Court stated in People vs. Constante, L-14639, December 28, 1964, the defense of alibi is an issue of
fact that hinges on credibility; that the credibility of an alibi depends so much on the credibility of the
witnesses who seek to establish it; and that, in this inspect, the relative weight which the trial judge assigns
to the testimony of said witnesses must, unless patently and clearly inconsistent with the evidence on
record, be accepted. For, as is well recognized, his proximate contact with those who take to the witness
chair places him, compared to appellate Justices, in the more competent position to discriminate be between
the true and the false.
And in the present appeal, we find no warrant to depart from the lower court's finding on defendants-
appellants' defense of alibi.
It is also contended by appellants that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, abuse of superior
strength, and evident premeditation should not be appreciated in fixing the penalty. Appellants would argue
that nighttime was not purposely sought to facilitate the offense or to afford impunity. At any rate, they
would further argue, nighttime as well as abuse of superior strength are deemed absorbed in treachery. As to
evident premeditation, they aver that the premeditation, if any, is not evident, for lack of sufficient lapse of
time between the execution of the offense and a previous showing of intent to commit it, so as to show that
the offenders clung to their determination to commit the crime.
The presence of one generic aggravating circumstance, apart from the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
suffices to fix the penalty for murder at the extreme punishment of death. For there is no mitigating
circumstance in the present case. From the facts and evidence of record in this case, it is clear that appellants
took advantage of nighttime in committing the felonies charged. For it appears that to carry out a sentence
they had pronounced upon Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete for the death of one Pabling, they had
evidently chosen to execute their victims under cover of darkness, at the dead of night, when the
neighborhood was asleep. Inasmuch as the treachery consisted in the fact that the victims' hands were tied
at the time they were beaten, the circumstance of nighttime is not absorbed in treachery, but can be
perceived distinctly therefrom, since the treachery rests upon an independent factual basis. A special case
therefore is present to which the rule that nighttime is absorbed in treachery does no apply. 11
In addition, the presence of evident premeditation is likewise borne out by the record. For the victims were
told at the start, when they were taken captives, that they had done something wrong, that they were the
ones who stabbed and killed one Pabling, and that for this reason they were to go with the group (T.s.n., 10
October 1960, pp. 20, 22; Exh. D). Not only that; the victims were then taken to a spot where they were
ordered to dig their graves. The assailants were previously armed with deadly weapons, and their assault was
a concerted and group action. From the time of apprehension of the victims, About 10 o'clock in the evening,
time for the offenders to meditate and reflect on the consequences of their act.
In People vs. Lopez, 69 Phil. 298, this Court found the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
present, in view of the repeated statements of the defendants that the hour of reckoning of the victim would
arrive, the existing enmity between them, the fact that they were previously armed with deadly weapons,
and the fact that the aggression was simultaneous and continuous until the deceased was left unconscious
on the ground. And in People vs. Lazada, 70 Phil. 525, four hours was held sufficient lapse of time for
purposes of the presence of evident premeditation. Furthermore, sufficient lapse of time in this regard is not
simply a matter of the precise number of hours, but of the reasonable opportunity, under the situation and
circumstances, to ponder and reflect upon the consequences. In the present case, we find the facts and
circumstances obtaining sufficient to support the trial court's finding of the attendance of evident
premeditation.
Following previous instances, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased in this case should be increased to
P6,000. 12
Anent the attempted murder case, no appeal therefrom was taken. The record shows that defendants
perfected no appeal from the judgment below. The present automatic review is limited only to the murder
case in which the death penalty was imposed. It was only because of the joint trial that the record of the
attempted murder case was likewise elevated herein. Since no appeal was taken in the attempted murder
case, the judgment with respect thereto has become final. It therefore cannot now be reviewed herein, as
some of the appellants would ask. And defendants-appellants, who are detained, should accordingly be
deemed to have started serving their respective sentence in said attempted murder case from the time the
decision of the trial court became final as to said case.
Wherefore, the death penalty imposed on defendants-appellants is hereby affirmed, and the indemnity to
the heirs of Federico Caalete is hereby increased from P4,000 to P6,000, with costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,
concur.