1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Acts of lasciviousness; elements. The elements of acts of lasciviousness

under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) That the
offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) That it is done
under any of the following circumstances: a. By using force or intimidation;
or b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
or c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) That the
offended party is another person of either sex. People of the Philippines v.
Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014.

Complex crime of carnapping with homicide; when present; proof required. To

prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be
proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was
the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The
appellate court correctly observed that the killing of Jesus cannot qualify
the carnapping into a special complex crime because the carnapping was merely
an afterthought when the victims death was already fait accompli. Thus,
appellant is guilty only of simple carnapping. People of the Philippines v.
Joel Aquino y Cendana, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014.

Damages; when awarded when death occurs due to a crime. It is enshrined in

jurisprudence that when death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may
be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2)
actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and
(5) temperate damages. There being no aggravating circumstance since abuse of
superior strength is absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the
award of P75,000.00 as moral damages should be decreased to P50,000.00. Such
an amount is granted even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional
suffering of the victims heirs. Pursuant to current jurisprudence, the award
of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 and exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00 is correct. The amount of actual damages duly proven in
court in the sum of P60,100.00 is likewise upheld. Finally, the Supreme Court
imposed interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages from the date of
finality of this ruling until fully paid. People of the Philippines v. Joel
Aquino y Cendana, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014.

Homicide; guilt beyond reasonable doubt; non-identification and non-

presentation of the weapon. The non-identification and non-presentation of
the weapon actually used in the killing did not diminish the merit of the
conviction primarily because other competent evidence and the testimonies of
witnesses had directly and positively identified and incriminated Ricardo as
the assailant of Lino. Hence, the establishment beyond reasonable doubt of
Ricardos guilt for the homicide did not require the production of the weapon
used in the killing as evidence in court, for in arriving at its findings on
the culpability of Ricardo the trial court clearly looked at, considered and
appreciated the entirety of the record and the evidence. For sure, the weapon
actually used was not indispensable considering that the finding of guilt was
based on other evidence proving his commission of the crime. Ricardo Medina,
Jr. y Oriel v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014.

Justifying circumstance; defense of a relative; requisites. In order that

defense of a relative is to be appreciated in favor of accused Ricardo, the
following requisites must concur, namely: (1) unlawful aggression by the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
the aggression; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person
attacked, that the person making the defense took no part in the provocation.
Like in self-defense, it is the accused who carries the burden to prove
convincingly the attendance and concurrence of these requisites because his
invocation of this defense amounts to an admission of having inflicted the
fatal injury on the victim. Ricardo Medina, Jr. y Oriel v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014.
Murder; elements. To be convicted of murder, the following must be
established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the
killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes
parricide nor infanticide. People of the Philippines v. Joel Aquino y
Cendana, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014.

Personal property; concept of. In Laurel v. Abrogar, the Supreme Court (SC)
reviewed the existing laws and jurisprudence on the generally accepted concept
of personal property in civil law as anything susceptible of
appropriation. It includes ownership of telephone services, which are
protected by the penal provisions on theft. SC therein upheld the Amended
Information charging the petitioner with the crime of theft against PLDT
inasmuch as the allegation was that the former was engaged in international
simple resale (ISR) or the unauthorized routing and completing of
international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air
wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic
exchange facilities of the country where destined. SC reasoned that since
PLDT encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits telephone calls using
its complex communications infrastructure and facilities, the use of these
communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft, which is the
unlawful taking of telephone services and business. SC then concluded that the
business of providing telecommunications and telephone services is personal
property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and that the act of
engaging in ISR is an act of subtraction penalized under said article.
Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished without
the installation of telecommunications equipment to the PLDT telephone
lines. World Wide Web Corporation, et al. v. People of the Philippines, et
al. , and
Planet Internet Corporation v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company,G.R. Nos. 161106/161266, January 13, 2014.

Qualifying circumstance; treachery; when present. The essence of treachery is

the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the victim was
forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated
since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible
for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that Jesus
was stabbed by the group on the lateral part of his body while he was under
the impression that they were simply leaving the place where they had
a shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle driver is
seated on the motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level of the
roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers who are
seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be
forewarned of the intended stabbing of his body both from the people seated in
the side car and those seated behind him. Thus, the trial courts finding of
treachery was affirmed. People of the Philippines v. Joel Aquino y
Cendana, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014.

Rape; failure of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate rape. AAAs
delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the proper authorities is
insignificant and does not affect the veracity of her charges. It should be
remembered that accused Pareja threatened to kill her if she told anyone of
the incidents. The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without
loss of time to persons close to her or to report the matter to the
authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually
molested and that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and
fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a
fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal
charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather
than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders making good their
threats to kill or hurt their victims. People of the Philippines v. Bernabe
Pareja y Cruz, G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014.

Rape; lust is no respecter of time or place, and rape defies constraints of

time and space. The courts take judicial notice of the interesting fact that
among poor couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does
not seem to be a problem despite the presence of other persons around them.
Considering the cramped space and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps
have gotten used to quick and less disturbing modes of sexual congresses which
elude the attention of family members; otherwise, under the circumstances, it
would be almost impossible to copulate with them around even when asleep. It
is also not impossible nor incredible for the family members to be in deep
slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault is being committed. One
may also suppose that growing children sleep more soundly than grown-ups and
are not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the night.
There is no merit in appellants contention that there can be no rape in a
room where other people are present. There is no rule that rape can be
committed only in seclusion. The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that
lust is no respecter of time and place, and rape can be committed in even
the unlikeliest of places. People of the Philippines v. Bernabe Pareja y
Cruz, G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014.

Rape; testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit. It is
settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child victims are given full weight
and credit, because when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
Here, AAAs testimony is not only consistent and straightforward, but is
further corroborated by other evidence. People of the Philippines v. Roel
Vergara y Clavero, G.R. No. 199226, January 15, 2014.

Rape; two modes of committing rape. The enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 or
the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, revolutionized the concept of rape with the
recognition of sexual violence on sex-related orifices other than a
womans organ is included in the crime of rape; and the crimes expansion to
cover gender-free rape. The transformation mainly consisted of the
reclassification of rape as a crime against persons and the introduction of
rape by sexual assault as differentiated from the traditional rape
through carnal knowledge or rape through sexual intercourse. Thus, under
the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways: 1. Article 266-A
paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as organ
rape or penile rape. The central element in rape through sexual
intercourse is carnal knowledge, which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called
instrument or object rape, or gender-free rape. It must be attended by
any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph
1. People of the Philippines v. Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, G.R. No. 202122,
January 15, 2014.

Statutory rape; elements. Rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) is termed statutory

rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law
punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12)
years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not
relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman
and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does
not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the
childs consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern
good from evil. In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA in
the afternoon of September 12, 2004, when AAA was just nine years old. People
of the Philippines v. Roel Vergara y Clavero, G.R. No. 199226, January 15,
2014.

Theft; elements. For theft to be committed in this case, the following

elements must be shown to exist: (1) the taking by petitioners (2) of PLDTs
personal property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the consent of PLDT (5)
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
the use of force upon things. Here, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take
issue with categorizing the earnings and business as personal properties of
PLDT. However, in Laurel v. Abrogar, the Supreme Court has already held that
the use of PLDTs communications facilities without its consent constitutes
theft of its telephone services and business. World Wide Web Corporation, et
al. v. People of the Philippines, et al./Planet Internet Corporation v.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,G.R. Nos. 161106/161266, January
13, 2014.

Aiding or abetting; Unsolicited Commercial Communications; Child Pornography.

Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and application in
existing laws. When a person aids or abets another in destroying a forest,
smuggling merchandise into the country, or interfering in the peaceful
picketing of laborers, his action is essentially physical and so is
susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in character. These forms of aiding
or abetting lend themselves to the tests of common sense and human experience.
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister
predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of
public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. What
is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not
punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the
interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other
countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3)
on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny. Jose Jesus M. Disini Jr., et al v. The
Secretary of Justice, et al, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014.

Conspiracy; direct proof. While direct proof is not essential to establish

conspiracy as it may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime which point to a joint
purpose, design, concerted action, and community of interests, records are,
however, bereft of any showing as to how the particular acts of petitioners
figured into the common design of taking out the subject volume and inserting
the falsified documents therein. It would be a stretch to conclude that the
act of Castro of inviting Atibula to Atienzas party, without any other proof
of Castros participation, was instrumental or, at the very least, reasonably
connected to Atienza and his own alleged participation in the above-stated
crimes. Hence, the prosecutions theory of conspiracy does not deserve any
merit. Ricardo L. Atienza and Alfredo A. Castro v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014.

Conspiracy; existence of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more

persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit
a felony. People of the Philippines v. Javier Morilla y Avellano, G.R. No.
189833, February 5, 2014.

Conspiracy; totality of the factual circumstances doctrine. In conspiracy, it

need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in
express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the
minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof
of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts
of some complete whole. In this case, the totality of the factual
circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in
a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs. People of the Philippines
v. Javier Morilla y Avellano, G.R. No. 189833, February 5, 2014.

Consummated homicide; elements. The crime of homicide is committed when: (1)

a person is killed; (2) the accused killed that person without any justifying
circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed;
and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey
Guevarra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014.

Cyberlibel; only the author of the libelous statement or article

penalized. Cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in
relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already punishes it. In effect,
Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, merely
affirms that online defamation constitutes similar means for committing
libel. But the Supreme Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the
cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article.
Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code
provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media
is distinct from that of print. The internet is characterized as encouraging a
freewheeling, anything goes writing style. In a sense, they are a world apart
in terms of quickness of the readers reaction to defamatory statements
posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the
networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are
disseminated down the line to other internet users. Jose Jesus M. Disini Jr.,
et al v. The Secretary of Justice, et al, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014.
Damages. The Supreme Court (SC) noted that the trial court and the Court of
Appeals did not award actual damages. In lieu thereof, the SC awarded
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, as it cannot be denied that the
heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not
proved. This award is adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may
be recognized or vindicated, and not for the purpose of indemnification. In
addition, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of the judgment until fully paid. People of the
Philippines v. Wilfredo Gunda Alias Fred, G.R. No. 195525, February 5,
2014.

Frustrated homicide; elements. The crime of frustrated homicide is committed

when: (1) an accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of
a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of
the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code is present. Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014.

Intent to kill. The petitioners intent to kill was clearly established by

the nature and number of wounds sustained by their victims. Evidence to prove
intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other things, of
the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at
the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim. Rodolfo Guevarra and
Joey Guevarra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170462, February 5,
2014.

Libel; elements. The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a

discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the
charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
There is actual malice or malice in fact when the offender makes the
defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not. The reckless disregard standard used
here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published.
Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual
malice. Jose Jesus M. Disini Jr., et al v. The Secretary of Justice, et
al, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014.

Murder; penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no other aggravating
circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court of
Appeals correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties. It must be emphasized,
however, that appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of
R.A. 9346 which states that persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. People
of the Philippines v. Wilfredo Gunda Alias Fred, G.R. No. 195525,
February 5, 2014.

Political offense doctrine; concept. Under the political offense doctrine,

common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as common offenses and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. Any
ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of
rebellion. Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the
killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political
complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and
punished as rebellion alone. Saturnino C. Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, et
al, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014.

Qualifying circumstance; treachery. There is treachery when the offender

commits a crime against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. People of the Philippines v. Wilfredo Gunda Alias Fred, G.R.
No. 195525, February 5, 2014.

Rape; conviction solely on the testimony of the victim. Appellant questions

the weighty trust placed by the trial court on the singular and uncorroborated
testimony of AAA as the basis for his conviction. On this point, the Supreme
Court reminded appellant that it is a fundamental principle in jurisprudence
involving rape that the accused may be convicted based solely on the testimony
of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing
and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. People of
the Philippines v. Mervin Gahi, G.R. No. 202976, February 19, 2014.

Rape; conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual

assault. The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual
assault is of utmost importance in establishing the truth or falsity of the
charge of rape. In the case at bar, the actuations of AAA after the alleged
rape is totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. It is contrary to
normal human behavior for AAA to willingly go with her abusers mother, and
worse, to live with her abusers entire family in one roof for eight (8)
days sans any attempt to escape. It goes against the grain of human experience
for a woman who has been robbed of her honor and chastity not to seize an
opportunity to escape from the clutches of her malefactor. People of the
Philippines v. Felimon Patentes y Zamora, G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014.

Rape; one count for each separate act of sexual assault. The appellant,
citing People v. Aaron, insists that he cannot be convicted of three (3)
counts of rape despite the three (3) penetrations because he was motivated by
a single criminal intent. However, it appears from the facts that the
appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of
AAA. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of
five (5) minutes wherein the appellant would rest after satiating his lust
upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape
AAA. Hence, it can be clearly inferredfrom the foregoing that when the
appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault
upon AAA, he was not motivated by a single impulse, but rather by several
criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is
indubitable. The three insertions into AAA were in satiation of successive but
distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellants conviction for three
counts of rape is proper. People of the Philippines v. Manolito Lucena y
Velasquez, G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014.

Rape; credibility of victims testimony. It is jurisprudentially settled

that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is
sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to
convict the accused. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the fate of the accused in a
rape case, ultimately and oftentimes, hinges on the credibility of the
victims testimony. People of the Philippines v. Mervin Gahi, G.R. No.
202976, February 19, 2014.

Rape; damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a finding of rape is

distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based
on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of
sound discretion. The award of moral damages, on the other hand, is
automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than
the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has
actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. In addition, the
award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code
if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. In
this case, since the qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon was
present in the commission of the crime. People of the Philippines v. Manolito
Lucena y Velasquez, G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014.

Rape; elements. The elements of rape (under paragraph 1, subparagraph a of

Article 266-A) are as follows: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act is
accomplished by using force, (threat) or intimidation. People of the
Philippines v. Aurelio Jastiva, G.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014.
Rape; elements. The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are:
(1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) said act was
accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the
victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim
is under 12 years of age or is demented. People of the Philippines v. Felimon
Patentes y Zamora, G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014.

Rape; impregnation not an element of rape. With regard to appellants first

point, the Supreme Court (SC) agreed with the statement made by the Court of
Appeals that it is not absurd nor contrary to human experience that AAA gave
birth ten (10) months after the alleged sexual assault as there may be cases
of long gestations. In any event, SC dismissed appellants contention as
immaterial to the case at bar because jurisprudence reveals that impregnation
is not an element of rape. It is well-entrenched in case law that the rape
victims pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining
whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the
crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by
the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important
and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against
the latters will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by
the victim in a truthful manner. People of the Philippines v. Mervin
Gahi, G.R. No. 202976, February 19, 2014.

Rape; force or intimidation need not be irresistible in rape. The force and
violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or
irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the
force or intimidation be so great or be of such character as could not be
resisted it is only necessary that the force or intimidationbe sufficient to
consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Further, it should be
viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the
commission of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of
such degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission.
Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as when the latter
is threatened with death. People of the Philippines v. Manolito Lucena y
Velasquez, G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014.

Rape; inconsistencies in the victims testimony. Anent the inconsistent

statements made by AAA in her testimony which were pointed out by appellant,
the Supreme Court agreed with the assessment made by the Court of Appeals that
these are but minor discrepancies that do little to affect the central issue
of rape which is involved in this case. Instead of diminishing AAAs
credibility, such variance on minor details has the net effect of bolstering
the truthfulness of AAAs accusations. A few discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and
not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the
credibility of the witnesses because they discount the possibility of their
being rehearsed testimony. People of the Philippines v. Mervin Gahi, G.R. No.
202976, February 19, 2014.

Rape; penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, provides that [w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon x x x the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As it
was properly alleged and proved that the appellant used a gun in order to
consummate his evil desires, thus, both lower courts correctly imposed upon
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. People of the
Philippines v. Manolito Lucena y Velasquez, G.R. No. 190632, February 26,
2014.

Rape; physical evidence. Absence of external signs or physical injuries does

not negate the commission of rape since proof of injuries is not an essential
element of the crime. And, it is also a precept that physical evidence is of
the highest order and speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present any scintilla of proof
to support its claim. In fact, contrary to the prosecutions claim that AAA
was dragged, tied, mauled, slapped and boxed, the medical certificate revealed
no telltale sign of the prosecutions allegations. It has to be noted that
the medical examination was conducted the day after AAAs supposed escape
from appellant. People of the Philippines v. Felimon Patentes y Zamora, G.R.
No. 190178, February 12, 2014.

Rape; physical resistance not an essential element of rape. It must be borne

in mind that when a rape victim becomes paralyzed with fear, she cannot be
expected to think and act coherently. Further, as has been consistently held
by this Court, physical resistance is not an essential element of rape and
need not be established when intimidation is exercised upon the victim, and,
the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapists embrace because
of fear for her life and personal safety. The victims failure to shout or
offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the
criminal acts of her aggressor. It bears stressing that not every rape victim
can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual
expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional
stress are unpredictable; people react differently. People of the Philippines
v. Manolito Lucena y Velasquez, G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014.

Rape; sweetheart theory. For the sweetheart theory to be believed when

invoked by the accused, convincing evidence to prove the existence of the
supposed relationship must be presented by the proponent of the theory. For
the [sweetheart] theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed
relationship must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to
adduce such evidence renders his claim to be self-serving and of no probative
value. For the satisfaction of the Court, there should be a corroboration by
their common friends or, if none, a substantiation by tokens of such a
relationship such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like. In the
present case, although it is a person other than the accused who is claiming
to be the victims sweetheart and the father of her child, such an assertion
must nonetheless be believably demonstrated by the evidence. The defense
failed to discharge the burden of proving that AAA and Jackie Gucela had any
kind of romantic or sexual relationship which resulted in AAAs
pregnancy. People of the Philippines v. Mervin Gahi, G.R. No. 202976,
February 19, 2014.

Rape; three guiding principles in rape prosecutions. The three guiding

principles in rape prosecutions are as follows: (1) an accusation of rape is
easy to make, and difficult to prove, but it is even more difficult to
disprove; (2) bearing in mind the intrinsic nature of the crime, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost care and caution;
and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits;
and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. So, when a woman
says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that the crime of rape was committed. In a long line of cases, the Supreme
Court has held that if the testimony of the rape victim is accurate and
credible, a conviction for rape may issue upon the sole basis of the victims
testimony. This is because no decent and sensible woman will publicly admit to
being raped and, thus, run the risk of public contempt unless she is, in fact,
a rape victim. People of the Philippines v. Aurelio Jastiva, G.R. No. 199268,
February 12, 2014.

Self-defense; elements. By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect,

admitted to the commission of the acts for which they were charged, albeit
under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated them. With this
admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to show that the
killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended
by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
persons resorting to self-defense. Of all the burdens the petitioners carried,
the most important of all is the element of unlawful aggression. Unlawful
aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person. The element of unlawful aggression must be
proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can
be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had
committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense. Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014.

Conspiracy; liability of conspirators. Assuming that the prosecution

witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the fatal wounds on Joey
during the commotion, Erwins liability is not diminished since he and the
others with him acted with concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey.
Conspiracy makes all the assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct
participation. Since about 15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on their
one helpless victim, relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head, and stabbed him
on the stomach until he was dead, there is no question that the accused took
advantage of their superior strength. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the
decision of the lower courts finding accused Erwin guilty of murder. People
of the Philippines v. Erwin Tamayo y Bautisa, G.R. No. 196960, March 12,
2014.

Rape; rape victim with a mental disability either deprived of reason or

demented. Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
provides for two circumstances when having carnal knowledge of a woman with a
mental disability is considered rape, to wit: paragraph 1(b) when the
offended party is deprived of reason; and paragraph 1(d) when the offended
party is demented. Under paragraph 1(d), the term demented refers to a person
who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality,
characterized by marked decline from the individuals former intellectual
level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand,
under paragraph 1(b), the phrase deprived of reason has been interpreted to
include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation. People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Ventura Sr., G.R. No.
205230, March 12, 2014.
Rape; when rape victim is deprived of reason but not demented. Since AAA is
mentally deficient, she should properly be classified as a person who is
deprived of reason, and not one who is demented. Hence, carnal
knowledge of a mentally deficient individual is rape under subparagraph (b)
and not subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1) of the RPC, as amended.
Nevertheless, the erroneous reference to paragraph 1(d) in the Information
will not exonerate Ventura because he failed to raise this as an objection,
and the particular facts stated in the Information were protestation
sufficient to inform him of the nature of the charge against him. From the
foregoing, all that needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress
between the rapist and his victim, and the latters mental
retardation. People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Ventura Sr., G.R. No.
205230, March 12, 2014.

Rape; exact date of rape incident not an essential element. AAAs failure to
recall the exact date of the first rape and the number of times she was
sexually assaulted by Ventura prior to March 24, 2005, does not militate
against her credibility since rape victims are not expected to cherish in
their memories an accurate account of the dates, number of times and manner
they were violated. This is especially true in the case of AAA who obviously
cannot be expected to act like an adult who would have the courage and
intelligence to disregard the threat to her life and complain immediately that
she had been sexually assaulted. AAAs testimony was clear that every time
Ventura would rape her, he would threaten her against revealing the offense.
Given AAAs mental condition, it can well substitute for violence and
intimidation enough to cow her into submission. The Supreme Court had
repeatedly held that the exact date when the victim was sexually abused is not
an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is
carnal knowledge of a woman. Indeed, the precise time of the crime has no
substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the time or place of
commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. Inconsistencies and
discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to the elements of the
crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal. Hence, the allegation in the
information, which states that the rape was committed on or about March 24,
2005, is sufficient to affirm the conviction of Ventura in the said
case. People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Ventura Sr., G.R. No. 205230,
March 12, 2014.

Statutory rape; elements; proof of force, intimidation or consent not

necessary. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman
below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the
sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are
not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent
is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age,
the law presumes that the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable
of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to convict an accused
of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of proving:
(a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the
sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant. People of the
Philippines v. Guillermo B. Candano Jr., G.R. No. 207819, March 12, 2014.

Statutory rape; elements; proof of force, intimidation or consent not

necessary. A judicious review of the records of this case would reveal that
the aforementioned elements of statutory rape are present. First, the
presentation of AAAs Certificate of Live Birth showing that she was born on
July 25, 1998 has proven that she was below 12 years of age when the three (3)
rape incidents happened on December 26 and 27, 1996, and in June 2000,
respectively. Second, the prosecution proved that Cadano indeed had carnal
knowledge of AAA on three (3) separate occasions through the latters
positive, categorical, and spontaneous testimony, as corroborated by the
medico-legal report. People of the Philippines v. Guillermo B. Candano
Jr., G.R. No. 207819, March 12, 2014.

2. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody rule. There are links that must be
established in the chain of custody in a buybust situation, namely: first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third,
the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and, fourth, the turnover and submission
of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. In
this case, the prosecution established clearly the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated shabu. People of the Philippines v. Glenn Salvador y
Balverde, et al, G.R. No. 190621, February 10, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody rule; marking. Appellants contention
that the marking of the seized sachets of shabu should have been made in his
presence while at the scene of the crime instead of in the police station
fails to impress. It is clear from the earlier cited Sec. 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165 that in a buy-bust situation,
the marking of the dangerous drug may be done in the presence of the violator
in the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending team.
Appellant should not confuse buy-bust situation from search and seizure
conducted by virtue of a court-issued warrant. It is in the latter case that
physical inventory (which includes the marking) is made at the place where the
search warrant is served. Nonetheless, non-compliance with the requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items. People of the Philippines v. Glenn Salvador y Balverde, et al, G.R.
No. 190621, February 10, 2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody rule; when substantial compliance is

allowed. The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers
conducted the required physical inventory and photographed the objects
confiscated does not ipso facto result in the unlawful arrest of the accused
or render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. This is due to
the proviso added in the implementing rules stating that it must still be
shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence have not been preserved. What is crucial is
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved for
they will be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. People of the Philippines v. Glenn Salvador y Balverde, et al, G.R.
No. 190621, February 10, 2014.

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(g); private persons acting in
conspiracy with public officers may be indicted. The only question that needs
to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a private
person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019
even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has
died prior to the filing of the Information. Respondent contends that by
reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was
charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may
not prosper. The Supreme Court was not persuaded. It held that, it is true
that by reason of Secretary Enriles death, there is no longer any public
officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It
does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no
longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The
only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal
liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis
of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated
differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no
public officer who allegedly violated Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict
Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were
it not for his death, he should have been charged. People of the Philippines
v. Henry T. Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014.

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(g); private persons acting in
conspiracy with public officers may be indicted. The requirement before a
private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such
person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer.
If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in
court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the
private person may be indicted alone. People of the Philippines v. Henry T.
Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; drug den. A drug den is a lair or hideaway where
prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its existence
may be proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof
of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of
the house, or its general reputation among police officers. In this case, this
fact was proven by none other than the testimony of PO2 Martinez, the poseur-
buyer, who after buying the shabu had told the appellant that he wanted to
sniff the same to which the latter responded by requiring the former to pay a
rental fee of P10.00. The appellant, thereafter, allowed PO2 Martinez to enter
his house and directed him to proceed to one of the rooms located at the right
side of the sala. Upon entering the said room, PO2 Martinez saw three other
persons already sniffing shabu. People of the Philippines v. Vicente
Rom, G.R. No. 198452, February 19, 2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of drugs; elements. With regard to

the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the
following elements must be proven: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possesses the said drug. People of the Philippines v. Vicente
Rom, G.R. No. 198452, February 19, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; elements. In a successful
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following
elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug in evidence. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction, which
happens the moment the exchange of money and drugs between the buyer and the
seller takes place. People of the Philippines v. Glenn Salvador y Balverde,
et al, G.R. No. 190621. February 10, 2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; chain of custody. To secure

conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the identity of the prohibited
drug seized from the accused must be proved with moral certainty. The
prosecution must establish with such measure of certitude that the substance
bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered
as evidence in court. Proof of the chain of custody from the time of seizure
to the time such evidence is presented in court ensures the absence of doubt
concerning the integrity of such vital evidence. This requires as a minimum
that the police mark the seized item (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation. People of the Philippines v.
Merlita Palomares y Costuna, G.R. No. 200915, February 12, 2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; chain of custody. The Supreme
Court has ruled that immediate marking could be made at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team. Here, however, the evidence is
unclear as to where the responsible police officer marked the seized substance
and whether it was done in Merlitas presence. In fact, it is also not clear
from the evidence which police officer did the marking since P02 Mallari and
P02 Flores gave conflicting testimonies on this point.This uncertainty
concerning a vital element of the crime warrants overturning the judgment of
conviction. Besides, neither P02 Mallari nor P02 Flores testified that they
conducted a physical inventory and took photos of the article that was seized
from Merlita. In fact, their joint affidavit of arrest made no mention of any
inventory taking or photographing of the same. And they did not bother at all
to offer some justification for the omission. People of the Philippines v.
Merlita Palomares y Costuna, G.R. No. 200915, February 12, 2014.
Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty; procedure
lapses in handling of shabu negates presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower courts
erred in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in the performance
that a police officer enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and
of ill motive that would induce him to falsify his testimony. The regularity
of the performance of the police officers duties leaves much to be desired
in this case given the lapses in their handling of the allegedly
confiscated shabu. The totality of all the procedural lapses effectively
produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus
delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frame-up. The Supreme Court
had previously held that these lapses negate the presumption that official
duties have been regularly performed by the police officers. Any taint of
irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption
unavailable. Indeed, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. It should be noted that the
presumption is precisely just that a presumption. Once challenged by
evidence, as in this case, it cannot be regarded as binding truth. People of
the Philippines v. Jerry Caranto y Propeta, G.R. No. 193768, March 5, 2014.

R.A. 3019; Section 3(e); proof of the extent of damage is not essential. The
third element of the offense that the act of the accused caused undue injury
to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of the functions of the
accused was established here. Proof of the extent of damage is not
essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or the benefit
received is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible. In
the present case, the prosecutions evidence duly proved that petitioners,
using their official positions, by dishonesty and breach of sworn duty,
facilitated the approval and release of government funds amounting to
P20,000,000 supposedly for the purchase of combat clothing and individual
equipment (CCIE) items of PNP personnel. However, the recipients of the
P20,000,000 turned out to be fictitious PNP personnel, and up to now the
P20,000,000 remains unaccounted for. Thus, petitioners should be made liable
for their deceit and misrepresentation and should compensate the government
for the actual damage the government has suffered. Danilo O. Garcia and Joven
SD. Brizuela v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197204,
March 26, 2014.
 R.A. 9165; Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. 9165; inventory and marking of
seized items in warrantless seizures. From a cursory reading of Section 21(a)
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165, it can be gleaned that
in cases of warrantless seizures, as in this case, inventory and marking of
the seized item can be conducted at the nearest police station or office of
the apprehending authorities, whichever is practicable, and not necessarily at
the place of seizure. As held in People v. Resurreccion, marking upon
immediate confiscation does not exclude the possibility that marking can be
done at the police station or office of the apprehending team. Thus, in the
present case, the apprehending team cannot be faulted if the inventory and
marking were done at their office where appellant was immediately brought for
custody and further investigation. Indeed, the fact that the inventory and
marking of the subject item were not made onsite is of no moment and will not
lead to appellants exoneration. People of the Philippines v. Manuel S.
Aplat, G.R. No. 191727, March 31, 2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; drug pushers sell to any
prospective customer, in any place and at any time. The Supreme Court (SC)
had occasion to show the unacceptability of the contention of the appellant
that the testimony of the poseur-buyer was absurd, illogical, contrary to
reason and highly incredible for no person who is engaged in an illegal
transaction would leave the door of the house open after such transaction. In
case after case, SC observed that drug pushers sell their prohibited articles
to any prospective customer, be he a stranger or not, in private as well as in
public places, even in the daytime. Indeed, the drug pushers have become
increasingly daring, dangerous and, worse, openlydefiant of the law. Hence,
what matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller
or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement and the acts
constituting the sale and the delivery of the prohibited drugs. People of the
Philippines v. Vicente Rom, G.R. No. 198452, February 19, 2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal transportation of methamphetamine hydrochloride;

penalty. Originally, under Section 15 of R.A. 6425, the penalty for illegal
transportation of methamphetamine hydrochloride was imprisonment ranging from
six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to
twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1683, the penalty
was amended to life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to
thirty thousand pesos. The penalty was further amended in Republic Act No.
7659, where the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. People of the
Philippines v. Javier Morilla y Avellano, G.R. No. 189833, February 5, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; possession of drugs is prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi. Definitely, the records do not show that the appellant
had the legal authority to possess the four heat-sealed plastic packets
of shabu. Settled is the rule that possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient
to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession. As such, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to
explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi, which the appellant in
this case miserably failed to do. People of the Philippines v. Vicente
Rom, G.R. No. 198452, February 19, 2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; transport defined. Morilla and Mayor Mitra were
caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the dangerous drugs on
board their vehicles. Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act
means to carry or convey from one place to another. It was well
established during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance following the
lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very
act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it
is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of
the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of
criminal intent, motive or knowledge. People of the Philippines v. Javier
Morilla y Avellano, G.R. No. 189833, February 5, 2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; lapses in the strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 must be explained in terms of
their justifiable grounds. The Supreme Court recognized that under varied
field conditions the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible, and it ruled that under the
implementing guidelines of the said Section non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items. SC added that the prosecution bears the burden
of proving justifiable cause. In the present case, the prosecution did not
bother to offer an explanation for why an inventory and photograph of the
seized evidence was not made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at
the police station, as required by the Implementing Rules in case of
warrantless arrests, or why the marking of the seized item was not made at the
place of seizure in the presence of Beran. Indeed, the very identity of the
subject shabu cannot be established with certainty by the testimony alone of
P03 Sia since the rules insist upon independent proof of its identity, such as
the immediate marking thereof upon seizure. People of the Philippines v.
Joselito Beran y Zapanta, G.R. No. 203028, January 15, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; mandatory nature. The chain of custody
rule requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the object seized was picked up to the time it was offered in evidence,
in such a way that every person who touched it would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
possession of the witness, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. People of
the Philippines v. Joselito Beran y Zapanta, G.R. No. 203028, January 15,
2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; marking of evidence in seizures

covered by search warrants distinguished from marking of evidence in
warrantless seizures such as a buy-bust operation. Concerning the marking of
evidence seized in a buy-bust operation or under a search warrant, vis-a-
vis the physical inventory and photograph, it must be noted that there are
distinctions as to time and place under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Thus,
whereas in seizures covered by search warrants, the physical inventory and
photograph must be conducted in the place of the search warrant, in
warrantless seizures such as a buy-bust operation the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, consistent with the
chain of custody rule. It needs no elaboration that the immediate marking
of the item seized in a buy-bust operation in the presence of the accused is
indispensable to establish its identity in court. Here, none of the buy-bust
team attested that they saw P03 Sia take custody of the confiscated shabu, and
later mark the sachet at the DAID-WPD office. Even granting that P03 Sia did
mark the same sachet at the precinct, breaks in the chain of custody had
already taken place, first, when he confiscated it from Beran without anyone
observing him do so and without marking the subject sachet at the place of
apprehension, and then as he was transporting it to the precinct, thus casting
serious doubt upon the value of the said links to prove the corpus
delicti. Moreover, the records also show that P03 Sia submitted the sachet to
the laboratory only on the next day, without explaining how he preserved his
exclusive custody thereof overnight. People of the Philippines v. Joselito
Beran y Zapanta, G.R. No. 203028, January 15, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody rule; when relaxed. There are occasions
when the chain of custody rule is relaxed such as when the marking of the
seized items immediately after seizure and confiscation is allowed to be
undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as
long as it is done in the presence of an accused in illegal drugs cases.
However, even a less-than-stringent application of the requirement would not
suffice to sustain the conviction in this case. There was no categorical
statement from any of the prosecution witnesses that markings were made, much
less immediately upon confiscation of the seized items. There was also no
showing that markings were made in the presence of the accused in this
case. Lito Lopez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188653. January 29,
2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody rule; links to be established. The

links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation
are: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover
of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug
to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to
the court. Lito Lopez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188653. January
29, 2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of drugs; elements. The elements of

illegal possession of drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item
or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the said drug. P/Insp. Fajardo testified as to the recovery from the appellant
of another 12 pieces of plastic sachets of shabu. After the latter was
arrested, P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on
the appellant. This search resulted to the confiscation of 12 more plastic
sachets, the contents of which also tested positive for shabu. The testimony
of P/Insp. Fajardo was amply corroborated by PO2 Trambulo, whose own account
dovetailed the formers narration of events. Both police officers also
identified in court the twelve plastic sachets of shabu that were confiscated
from the appellant. People of the Philippines v. Donald Vasquez y
Sandigan, G.R. No. 200304, January 15, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of drugs; penalties. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance in this case, the imposable penalty on the appellant should be
the indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. The penalty imposed
by the Court of Appeals, thus, falls within the range of the proper imposable
penalty. No fine was imposed considering that in Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, a fine can be imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty
is reclusion perpetua to death. People of the Philippines v. Donald Vasquez y
Sandigan, G.R. No. 200304, January 15, 2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; elements. To secure a conviction

for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following
elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. As held in People v. Chua Tan Lee, in a
prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, what is material is proof that the
accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti. In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and
PO2 Trambulo established that a buy-bust operation was legitimately carried
out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap the appellant. P/Insp.
Fajardo, the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant as the one who
sold to her six plastic bags of shabu that were contained in a big brown
envelope for the price of P250,000.00. She likewise identified the six plastic
bags of shabu, which contained the markings she placed thereon after the same
were seized from the appellant. When subjected to laboratory examination, the
white crystalline powder contained in the plastic bags tested positive
for shabu. People of the Philippines v. Donald Vasquez y Sandigan, G.R. No.
200304, January 15, 2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; penalties. Article 6363 of the
Revised Penal Code mandates that when the law prescribes a penalty composed
of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be
applied. Thus, in this case, considering that no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attended the appellants violation of Section 15, Article III
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed
the trial courts imposition of reclusion perpetua. The P5,000,000.00 fine
imposed by the trial court on the appellant is also in accord with Section 15,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. People of the Philippines
v. Donald Vasquez y Sandigan, G.R. No. 200304, January 15, 2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale or possession of drugs; the evidence of

the corpus delicti must be independently established beyond reasonable
doubt. It is well-settled that in the prosecution of cases involving the
illegal sale or illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the evidence of
the corpus delicti, which is the dangerous drug itself, must be independently
established beyond reasonable doubt. In People v. Pagaduan, the Supreme Court
ruled that proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal prosecution for the sale
of illegal drugs demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in
establishing the corpus delicti, the body of the crime whose core is the
confiscated illicit drug. The prosecution must establish by records or
testimony the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit, from the time it came
into the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the
laboratory to determine its composition, and all the way to the time it is
offered in evidence. In the instant case, from the testimony of P03 Sia it is
clear that the apprehending operatives did not, immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the illegal item, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused, his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and an elected
public official, notwithstanding that they were supposed to have been
conducting a planned sting operation. Worse, the prosecution did not bother to
explain why they failed to observe them, although they knew these procedures
were intended to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the item
seized. Moreover, none of the other witnesses of the prosecution could
corroborate the culpatory narrative of P03 Sia at any of its material points
to create the successive links in the custody of the seized drug. People of
the Philippines v. Joselito Beran y Zapanta, G.R. No. 203028, January 15,
2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs;
chain of custody;corpus delicti. In both cases of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must show the chain of custody
over the dangerous drug in order to establish the corpus delicti, which is the
dangerous drug itself. The chain of custody rule comes into play as a mode of
authenticating the seized illegal drug as evidence. It includes testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which
it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link
in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
Indeed, it is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence
from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in
court is one and the same as that seized from the accused. This step initiates
the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted
searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment
suits based on planting of evidence and on allegations of robbery or
theft. Lito Lopez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188653. January 29,
2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs;
chain of custody; effect of failure to mark. Failure of the authorities to
immediately mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity
of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties. Failure to mark the drugs immediately
after they were seized from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution
evidence, warranting acquittal on reasonable doubt. The Chemistry Report,
containing a description of the items seized, does not show or make any
mention of any markings made on all the items seized. As a matter of fact,
during the trial, PO3 Desuasido seemingly could not readily identify the
plastic sachets he allegedly seized inside petitioners house. The
conflicting testimonies of the police officers and lack of evidence lead to a
reasonable conclusion that no markings were actually made on the seized
items. Lito Lopez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188653. January 29,
2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs;
chain of custody; marking. The rule requires that the marking of the seized
items should be done in the presence of the apprehended violator and
immediately upon confiscation to ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence. Marking after
seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the
seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence
serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or
related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence. Lito Lopez v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 188653. January 29, 2014.