Republic of the Philippines amendment to the Constitution.
If these members of Congress had been counted, the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1123 March 5, 1947
ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.
Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto Serrano, J. Antonio Araneta,
Antonio Barredo, and Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Secretary of Justice Ozaeta, Solicitor General Taada, and First Assistant Solicitor General
Reyes for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution
designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of
the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto." The members of the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the
Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants, and the petitioners are eight
senators, seventeen representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the
Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party. The validity of the above-mentioned
resolution is attacked as contrary to the Constitution.
The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation of facts. In our view of the case it is
unnecessary to go into the facts at length. We will mention only the facts essential for the
proper understanding of the issues. For this purpose it suffices to say that three of the
plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by a
majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and
representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were
suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress
following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight
representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except
to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not
been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the
House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the
House when the present petition was filed.
As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the
passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the
computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. The
respondents deny that this Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the
courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. There is some merit in the petitioners' contention
that this is confusing jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law, with
conclusiveness of an enactment or resolution, which is a matter of evidence and practice.
This objection, however, is purely academic. Whatever distinction there is in the juridical
sense between the two concepts, in practice and in their operation they boil down to the
same thing. Basically the two notions are synonymous in that both are founded on the
regard which the judiciary accords a co-equal coordinate, and independent departments
of the Government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to
the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under
the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions
are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with
such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provision. (16 C.J.S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of
powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities.
The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political
question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities
are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the
courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government.
But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman vs. Miller, a relatively
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court reported and annotated in 122 A.L.R.,
695. The case, by a majority decision delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, is authority
for the conclusion that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not justiciable.
The Court further held that the decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of
State, of the questions of whether an amendment has been adopted within a reasonable
time from the date of submission to the state legislature, is not subject to review by the
court.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to
ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a
scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory
process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of
(only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political
character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign
legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of
this power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds
of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public
interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into its action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions, are
that of a ratification. As the Mississippi Supreme Court has once said: all consistent only with an intimate control over the amending process in the
courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the course of amendment by
subjecting to judicial interference matters that we believe were intrusted by
There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free
the Constitution solely to the political branch of government.
exercise of it to be obstructed, or that could render it dangerous to the stability
of the government; because the measure derives all its vital force from the
action of the people at the ballot box, and there can never be danger in The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some
submitting in an established form, to a free people, the proposition whether respects as subject to judicial construction, in others as subject to the final
they will change their fundamental law. The means provided for the exercise of authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the conclusion arrived at
their sovereign right of changing their constitution should receive such a in Dillon vs. Gloss, that the Constitution impliedly requires that a properly
construction as not to trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties and submitted amendment must die unless ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor
embarrassments in its exercise are in derogation of the right of free does the Court now disapprove its prior assumption of power to make such a
government, which is inherent in the people; and the best security against pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only Congress has constitutional
tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed privilege to the people of power to determine if there is any such implication in Article 5 of the
the State to change their constitution in the mode prescribed by the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's opinion declares that Congress has
instrument. (Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note, 10 L.R.A., N.S., 150.) the exclusive power to decide the "political questions" of whether as State
whose legislature has once acted upon a proposed amendment may
subsequently reverse its position, and whether, in the circumstances of such a
Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and
case as this, an amendment is dead because an "unreasonable" time has
Douglas, in Miller vs.Coleman, supra, finds no basis for discriminating between proposal
elapsed. No such division between the political and judicial branches of the
and ratification. From his forceful opinion we quote the following paragraphs:
government is made by Article 5 which grants power over the amending of the
Constitution to Congress alone. Undivided control of that process has been
The Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control submission of given by the Article exclusively and completely to Congress. The process itself
constitutional amendments. Final determination by Congress that ratification is "political" in its entirely, from submission until an amendment becomes part
by three-fourths of the States has taken place "is conclusive upon the courts." of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or
In the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the interference at any point.
Constitution. However, whether submission, intervening procedure or
Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the commands of the
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to which the other three justices
Constitution, call for decisions by a "political department" of questions of a
subscribed, arrives at the same conclusion. Though his thesis was the petitioner's lack of
type which this Court has frequently designated "political." And decision of a
standing in court a point which not having been raised by the parties herein we will
"political question" by the "political department" to which the Constitution has
not decide his reasoning inevitably extends to a consideration of the nature of the
committed it "conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers,
legislative proceeding the legality of which the petitioners in that case assailed. From a
citizens and subjects of . . . government." Proclamation under authority of
different angle he sees the matter as political, saying:
Congress that an amendment has been ratified will carry with it a solemn
assurance by the Congress that ratification has taken place as the Constitution
commands. Upon this assurance a proclaimed amendment must be accepted as The right of the Kansas senators to be here is rested on recognition by
a part of the Constitution, leaving to the judiciary its traditional authority of Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130; 66 Law. ed., 505; 42 S. Ct., 217, of a voter's right
interpretation. To the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even to protect his franchise. The historic source of this doctrine and the reasons for
impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the exclusive it were explained in Nixon vs. Herndon, 273 U.S., 436, 540; 71 Law. ed., 759,
constitutional authority of Congress over submission and ratification of 761; 47 S. Ct., 446. That was an action for $5,000 damages against the Judges of
amendments, we are unable to agree. Elections for refusing to permit the plaintiff to vote at a primary election in
Texas. In disposing of the objection that the plaintiff had no cause of action
because the subject matter of the suit was political, Mr. Justice Homes thus
The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper
spoke for the Court: "Of course the petition concerns political action, but it
procedure is being followed between submission and final adoption. However,
alleges and seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage may be
it is apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements upon a supposed
caused by such political action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly
limitation of a "reasonable time" within which Congress may accept
has been doubted for over two hundred years, since Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld.
ratification; as to whether duly authorized State officials have proceeded
Raym., 938; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521; 3 Ld. Raym., 320; 92
properly in ratifying or voting for ratification; or whether a State may reverse
Eng. Reprint, 710, and has been recognized by this Court." "Private damage" is
 the clue to the famous ruling in Ashby vs. White, supra, and determines its
scope as well as that of cases in this Court of which it is the justification. The
judgment of Lord Holt is permeated with the conception that a voter's
franchise is a personal right, assessable in money damages, of which the exact
amount "is peculiarly appropriate for the determination of a
jury," see Wiley vs. Sinkler, 179 U.S., 58, 65; 45 Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct., 17, and
for which there is no remedy outside the law courts. "Although this matter
relates to the parliament," said Lord Holt, "yet it is an injury precedaneous to
the parliament, as my Lord Hale said in the case of Bernardiston vs. Some, 2
Lev., 114, 116; 83 Eng. Reprint, 175. The parliament cannot judge of this injury,
nor give damage to the plaintiff for it: they cannot make him a recompense." (2
Ld. Raym., 938, 958; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521.)
The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the practice which has followed it leave
intra-parliamentary controversies to parliaments and outside the scrutiny of
law courts. The procedures for voting in legislative assemblies who are
members, how and when they should vote, what is the requisite number of
votes for different phases of legislative activity, what votes were cast and how
they were counted surely are matters that not merely concern political
action but are of the very essence of political action, if "political" has any
connotation at all. Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 649, 670, et seq.; 36
Law. ed., 294, 302; 12 S. Ct., 495; Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130, 137; 66 Law.
ed., 505, 511; 42 S. Ct., 217. In no sense are they matters of "private damage."
They pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political representatives
executing the legislative process. To open the law courts to such controversies
is to have courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by
procedures for voting in legislative assemblies. If the doctrine of
Ashby vs. White vindicating the private rights of a voting citizen has not been
doubted for over two hundred years, it is equally significant that for over two
hundred years Ashby vs. White has not been sought to be put to purposes like
the present. In seeking redress here these Kansas senators have wholly
misconceived the functions of this Court. The writ of certiorari to the Kansas
Supreme Court should therefore be dismissed.
We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they accord with sound principles of
political jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced thought on the working of
constitutional and popular government as conceived in the fundamental law. Taken as
persuasive authorities, they offer enlightening understanding of the spirit of the United
States institutions after which ours are patterned.
But these concurring opinions have more than persuasive value. As will be presently
shown, they are the opinions which should operate to adjudicate the questions raised by
the pleadings. To make the point clear, it is necessary, at the risk of unduly lengthening
this decision, to make a statement and an analysis of the Coleman vs. Miller case.
Fortunately, the annotation on that case in the American Law Reports, supra, comes to
out aid and lightens our labor in this phase of the controversy.
Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in mandamus brought in the Supreme
Court of Kansas by twenty-one members of the Senate, including twenty senators who
had voted against a resolution ratifying the Child Labor Amendment, and by three
members of the House of Representatives, to compel the Secretary of the Senate to erase
in indorsement on the resolution to the effect that it had been adopted by the Senate and
to indorse thereon the words "as not passed." They sought to restrain the offices of the
Senate and House of Representatives from signing the resolution, and the Secretary of
State of Kansas from authenticating it and delivering it to the Governor.
The background of the petition appears to have been that the Child Labor Amendment
was proposed by Congress in June, 1924; that in January, 1925, the legislature of Kansad
adopted a resolution rejecting it and a copy of the resolution was sent to the Secretary of
State of the United States; that in January, 1927, a new resolution was introduced in the
Senate of Kansas ratifying the proposed amendment; that there were forty senators,
twenty of whom voted for and twenty against the resolution; and that as a result of the
tie, the Lieutenant Governor cast his vote in favor of the resolution.
The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was challenged, and the petition set forth
prior rejection of the proposed amendment and alleged that in the period from June 1924
to March 1927, the proposed amendment had been rejected by both houses of the
legislatures of twenty-six states and had been ratified only in five states, and that by
reason of that rejection and the failure of ratification within a reasonable time, the
proposed amendment had lost its vitality.
The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction of all the issues but dismissed the
petition on the merits. When the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States the
questions were framed substantially in the following manner:
First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is, whether the petitioners had standing to
seek to have the judgment of the state court reversed; second, whether the Lieutenant
Governor had the right to vote in case of a tie, as he did, it being the contention of the
petitioners that "in the light of the powers and duties of the Lieutenant Governor and his
relation to the Senate under the state Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court of
the state, the Lieutenant Governor was not a part of the 'legislature' so that under Article
5 of the Federal Constitution, he could be permitted to have a deciding vote on the
ratification of the proposed amendment, when the Senate was equally divided"; and third,
the effect of the previous rejection of the amendment and of the lapse of time after its
submission.
The first question was decided in the affirmative. The second question, regarding the
authority of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the court avoided, stating: "Whether this
contention presents a justiciable controversy, or a question which is political in its nature
and hence not justiciable, is a question upon which the Court is equally divided and
therefore the court expresses no opinion upon that point." On the third question, the
Court reached the conclusion before referred to, namely, (1) that the efficacy of
ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a
political question, within the ultimate power of Congress in the exercise of its control and
of the promulgation of the adoption of amendment, and (2) that the decision by Congress,
in its control of the action of the Secretary of State, of the questions whether an
amendment to the Federal Constitution has been adopted within a reasonable time, is not
subject to review by the court.
The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas was affirmed but in
the grounds stated in the United States Supreme Court's decision. The nine justices were
aligned in three groups. Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas opined that the
petitioners had no personality to bring the petition and that all the questions raised are
political and non-justiciable Justices Butler and McReynolds opined that all the questions
were justiciable; that the Court had jurisdiction of all such questions, and that the petition
should have been granted and the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed on
the ground that the proposal to amend had died of old age. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice
Stone and Mr. Justice Reed regarded some of the issues as political and non-justiciable,
passed by the question of the authority of the Lieutenant Governor to case a deciding
vote, on the ground that the Court was equally divided, and took jurisdiction of the rest of
the questions.
The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds, on the
one hand and the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed, on the other, was
on the question of jurisdiction; on the result to be reached, these two groups were
divided. The agreement between Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas, on the
one hand, and the Chief Justice and Justices Stone and Reed, on the other, was on the
result and on that part of the decision which declares certain questions political and non-
justiciable.
As the annotator in American Law Reports observes, therefore going four opinions "show
interestingly divergent but confusing positions of the Justices on the issues discussed. "It
cites an article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, amusingly entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half,"
which, in the light of the divergencies in the opinions rendered, aptly queries" whether
the proper procedure for the Supreme Court would not have been to reverse the
judgment below and direct dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction." It says that these
divergencies and line-ups of the justices "leave power to dictate the result and the
grounds upon which the decision should be rested with the four justices who concurred
in Mr. Justice Black's opinion." Referring to the failure of the Court to decide the question
of the right of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the article points out that from the
opinions rendered the "equally divided" court would seem under any circumstances to
bean equal division of an odd number of justices, and asks "What really did happen? Did a
justice refuse to vote on this issue? And if he did, was it because he could not make up his
mind, or is it possible to saw a justice vertically in half during the conference and have
him walk away whole?" But speaking in a more serious vein, the commentator says that
decision of the issue could not be avoided on grounds of irrelevance, since if the court had
jurisdiction of the case, decision of the issue in favor of the petitioners would have
required reversal of the judgment below regardless of the disposal of the other issues.
From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring opinions should be considered as
laying down the rule of the case.
The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. This is the rule prevailing
in England. In the United States, "In point of numbers, the jurisdictions are divided almost
equally pro and con the general principle (of these, two or three have changed from their
original position), two or three adopted a special variety of view (as in Illinois), three or
four are not clear, and one or two have not yet made their decisions." (IV Wigmore on
Evidence, 3d Edition, 685, footnote.) It is important to bear in mind, in this connection,
that the United States Supreme Court is on the side of those which favor the rule.
(Harwood vs. Wentworth, 40 Law. ed., 1069; Lyon vs. Wood, 38 Law. ed., 854;
Field vs. Clark, 36 Law. ed., 294.)
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making
body, we choose to follow the rule. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2)
the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be
provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of
either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the
clerk or secretary, or printed by their order;Provided, That in the case of Acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy
signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof
of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."
But there is more than statutory sanction for conclusiveness.
This topic has been the subject of a great number of decisions and commentaries written
with evident vehemence. Arguments for and against the rule have been extensive and
exhaustive. It would be presumptuous on our part to pretend to add more, even if we
could, to what has already been said. Which such vast mass of cases to guide our
judgment and discretion, our labor is reduced to an intelligent selection and borrowing of
materials and arguments under the criterion of adaptability to a sound public policy.
The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as contrasted with those which opposed it
are, in our opinion, almost decisive. Some of these reasons are summarized in 50
American Jurisprudence, section 150 as follows:
SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. It has been declared that the rule
against going behind the enrolled bill is required by the respect due to a
coequal and independent department of the government, and it would be an
inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate
power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to endless confusion in the
administration of the law. The rule is also one of convenience, because courts
could not rely on the published session laws, but would be required to look
beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to any printed bills
and amendments which might be found after the adjournment of the
legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled
bills, authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for years, it might be
ascertained from the journals that an act theretofore enforced had never
 become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that these is quite enough Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence considered a classic, and described by one
uncertainty as to what the law is without saying that no one may be certain who himself is a noted jurist, author, and scholar, as "a permanent contribution to
that an act of the legislature has become such until the issue has been American law" and having "put the matured nineteenth-century law in form to be used in
determined by some court whose decision might not be regarded as conclusive a new era of growth" unequivocally identifies himself with those who believe in the
in an action between the parties. soundness of the rule. The distinguished professor, in answer to the argument of
Constitutional necessity, i.e., the impossibility of securing in any other way the
enforcement of constitutional restrictions on legislative action, says:
From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV Wigmore on Evidence, 696, 697, we
extract these passages:
(1) In the first place, note that it is impossible of consistent application. If, as it
is urged, the Judiciary are bound to enforce the constitutional requirements of
I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my
three readings, a two-thirds vote, and the like, and if therefore an act must be
estimation, few things would be more mischievous than the introduction of the
declared no law which in fact was not read three times or voted upon by two-
opposite rule. . . . The rule contended for is that the Court should look at the
thirds, this duty is a duty to determine according to the actual facts of the
journals of the Legislature to ascertain whether the copy of the act attested and
readings and the votes. Now the journals may not represent the actual facts.
filed with the Secretary of State conforms in its contents with the statements of
That duty cannot allow us to stop with the journals, if it can be shown beyond
such journals. This proposition means, if it has any legal value whatever, that,
doubt that the facts were otherwise than therein represented. The duty to
in the event of a material discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled
uphold a law which in fact was constitutionally voted upon is quite as strong as
copy, the former is to be taken as the standard of veracity and the act is to be
the duty to repudiate an act unconstitutionally voted upon. The Court will be
rejected. This is the test which is to be applied not only to the statutes now
going as far wrong in repudiating an act based on proper votes falsified in the
before the Court, but to all statutes; not only to laws which have been recently
journal as it will be in upholding an act based on improper votes falsified in the
passed, but to laws the most ancient. To my mind, nothing can be more certain
enrollment. This supposed duty, in short, is to see that the constitutional
than that the acceptance of this doctrine by the Court would unsettle the entire
facts did exist; and it cannot stop short with the journals. Yet, singularly
statute law of the State. We have before us some evidence of the little reliability
enough, it is unanimously conceded that an examination into facts as provable
of these legislative journals. . . . Can any one deny that if the laws of the State
by the testimony of members present is not allowable. If to support that it be
are to be tested by a comparison with these journals, so imperfect, so
said that such an inquiry would be too uncertain and impracticable, then it is
unauthenticated, the stability of all written law will be shaken to its very
answered that this concedes the supposed constitutional duty not to be
foundations? . . . We are to remember the danger, under the prevalence of such
inexorable, after all; for if the duty to get at the facts is a real and inevitable
a doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of
one, it must be a duty to get at them at any cost; and if it is merely a duty that is
this character. It is scarcely too much to say that the legal existence of almost
limited by policy and practical convenience, then the argument changes into
every legislative act would be at the mercy of all persons having access to these
the second one above, namely, how far it is feasible to push the inquiry with
journals. . . . ([1866], Beasley, C.J., in Pangborn vs. Young, 32 N.J.L., 29, 34.)
regard to policy and practical convenience; and from this point of view there
can be but one answer.
But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the Courts, then
less than a quorum of each House may be the aid of corrupt presiding officers
(2) In the second place, the fact that the scruple of constitutional duty is
imposed laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of the Constitution. It
treated thus inconsistently and pushed only up to a certain point suggests that
must be admitted that the consequence stated would be possible. Public
it perhaps is based on some fallacious assumption whose defect is exposed
authority and political power must of necessity be confided to officers, who
only by carrying it to its logical consequences. Such indeed seems to be the
being human may violate the trusts reposed in them. This perhaps cannot be
case. It rests on the fallacious motion that every constitutional provision is "per
avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that
se" capable of being enforced through the Judiciary and must be safeguarded
the Judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been
by the Judiciary because it can be in no other way. Yet there is certainly a large
able at all times with truth to say that its high places have not been disgraced.
field of constitutional provision which does not come before the Judiciary for
The framers of our government have not constituted it with faculties to
enforcement, and may remain unenforced without any possibility or judicial
supervise coordinate departments and correct or prevent abuses of their
remedy. It is not necessary to invoke in illustration such provisions as a clause
authority. It cannot authenticate a statute; that power does not belong to it; nor
requiring the Governor to appoint a certain officer, or the Legislature to pass a
can it keep a legislative journal. (1869, Frazer, J., in Evans vs. Brownem 30 Ind.,
law for a certain purpose; here the Constitution may remain unexecuted by the
514, 524.)
failure of Governor or Legislature to act, and yet the Judiciary cannot safeguard
and enforce the constitutional duty. A clearer illustration may be had by
imagining the Constitution to require the Executive to appoint an officer or to
 call out the militia whenever to the best of his belief a certain state of facts Court examined the journal in that case to find out whether or not the contention of the
exists; suppose he appoints or calls out when in truth he has no such belief; can appellant was right. We think the petitioners are in error.
the Judiciary attempt to enforce the Constitution by inquiring into his belief?
Or suppose the Constitution to enjoin on the Legislators to pass a law upon a
It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
certain subject whenever in their belief certain conditions exist; can the
amended by Act No. 2210, that, roughly, it provides two methods of proving legislative
Judiciary declare the law void by inquiring and ascertaining that the
proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
Legislature, or its majority, did not have such a belief? Or suppose the
certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of the
Constitution commands the Judiciary to decide a case only after consulting a
Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall
soothsayer, and in a given case the Judiciary do not consult one; what is to be
be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
done?

The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all probability,
These instances illustrate a general situation in which the judicial function of
those were the documents offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly
applying and enforcing the Constitution ceases to operate. That situation exists
authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed before the Court; and it has
where the Constitution enjoins duties which affect the motives and judgment
not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would not have held the
of a particular independent department of government, Legislature,
copyconclusive proof of the due enactment of the law. It is to be remembered that the
Executive, and Judiciary. Such duties are simply beyond enforcement by any
Court expressly stated that it "passed over the question" of whether the enrolled bill was
other department if the one charged fails to perform them. The Constitution
conclusive as to its contents and the mode of its passage.
may provide that no legislator shall take a bribe, but an act would not be
treated as void because the majority had been bribed. So far as the Constitution
attempts to lay injunctions in matters leading up to and motivating the action Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the
of a department, injunctions must be left to the conscience of that department disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of
to obey or disobey. Now the act of the Legislature as a whole is for this purpose the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in
of the same nature as the vote of a single legislator. The Constitution may either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court
expressly enjoin each legislator not to vote until he has carefully thought over found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother
the matter of legislation; so, too, it may expressly enjoin the whole Legislature itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It
not to act finally until it has three times heard the proposition read aloud. It is did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into
for the Legislature alone, in the latter case as well as in the former, to take the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter,
notice of this injunction; and it is no more the function of the Judiciary in the and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each
one case than in the other to try to keep the Legislature to its duty: other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the
court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would
give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified
xxx xxx xxx
copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof."
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to
check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the
In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of
Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and
whether the senators and representatives who were ignored in the computation of the
higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a
necessary three-fourths vote were members of Congress within the meaning of section 1
faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to
of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.
improve the legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual
errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities
with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and The petition is dismissed without costs.
honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to
reflect credit upon the name of popular government. (4 Wigmore on Evidence,
Moran, C.J., Pablo, and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.
699-702.)

The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this
jurisdiction, citing the case of United States vs. Pons (34 Phil., 729). It is argued that this
Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J., with whom concurs PADILLA, J., concurring:
Although I maintain that we have jurisdiction as petitioners contend, I can't vote for them,
because the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive
upon us.
A. The overwhelming majority of the state courts are of the opinion that the question
whether an amendment to the existing constitution has been duly proposed in the
manner required by such constitution properly belongs to the judiciary. That is the
position taken by Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Washington and Wisconsin. (See 12 C. J., 880 and 16C.J.S., 437.) (See also 11 Am.
Jur., 639.) Only North Dakota and Oklahoma have adopted a different view. (16 C.J.S., 437,
notes 41 and 43.)
"The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a
constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to the
requirements of an existing constitution is a judicial question."
(McConaughy vs. Secretary of State, 106 Minn., 392, 409; 119 N.W., 408.) (12
C.J., 880.)
"An examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly
exercised the authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission,
or ratification of constitutional amendments. It has been judicially determined
whether a proposed amendment received the constitutional majority of votes.
(Knight vs.Shelton, 134 Fed., 423; Rice vs. Palmer, 78 Ark., 432; 96 S. W. 396;
Green vs. State Canvassers, 5 Ida., 130; 47 P., 259; 95 Am. S.R., 169; In re Denny,
156 Ind., 104; 59 N.E., 359; 51 L. R. A., 722; Dayton vs. St. Paul, 22 Minn., 400;
Tecumseh Nat. Bank vs. Saunders, 51 Nebr., 801; 71 N.W., 779; Bott vs. Wurts,
63 N.J.L., 289; 43 A., 744, 881; 45 L.R.A., 251; State vs. Foraker, 46 Oh. St., 677;
23 N.E., 491; 6 L.R.A., 422.)" (12 C.J., 880.)
As our constitutional system ("limitation" of powers) is more analogous to state systems
than to the Federal theory of "grant" of powers, it is proper to assume that the members
of our Constitutional convention, composed mostly of lawyers, and even the members of
the American Congress that approved the Tydings-McDuffie enabling legislation,
contemplated the adoption of such constitutional practice in this portion of the world.
Hence, my conclusion that in Philippine polity, courts may and should take cognizance of
the subject of this controversy.
B. The petitioners' grievance is that, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution (Article
XV), the proposed amendment was not approved "by a vote of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives." They complain that certain
Senators and some members of the House of Representatives were not allowed to
participate and were not considered in determining the required three fourths vote.
The respondents, besides denying our power to revised the counting, assert that the
persons mentioned, for all practical purposed did not belong to the Congress of the
Philippines on the day the amendment was debated and approved.
Central target of attack is Republic Act No. 73 "to submit to the Filipino people, for
approval or disapproval, the amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be
appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in a
Resolution of both Houses, etc."
Petitioners would have a declaration of invalidity of that piece of legislation. Its first
section provides that "the amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be
appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in a
Resolution of both Houses, adopted on September eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty-
six, shall be submitted to the people, for approval or disapproval, at a general election
which shall be held on March eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, in accordance
with the provisions of this Act."
By this provision, the Legislative Department with the concurrence of the Executive,
declares in the most solemn manner that the resolution proposing the amendment was
duly carried. Therefore, it would be pertinent to inquire whether those petitioners who
are members of the Congress that approved Republic Act No. 73 are not precluded from
questioning its validity or veracity, unless they assert and prove that in Congress they
opposed its enactment. In default of a contrary showing, it is not reasonable to suppose
that as members of Congress they endorsed-- or at least are bound by the declarations
of Republic Act No. 73? And if a private party is estopped from challenging the
constitutional efficacy of a law whose enactment he has procured (see 16 C.J.S., 198 and
11 Am. Jur., 767) should not a member of Congress be estopped from impugning a statute
he helped (presumably) to pass? Parenthetically it should be added that the remaining
petitioners, as mere citizens, would probably have no suable claim. (Cf. 16 C.J.S., 169.)
C. But perhaps these points should be left to future study and decision, because the
instant litigation may be solved by the application of other well-established principles
founded mainly on the traditional respect which one department of the Government
entertains for the actions of the others.
On account of the separation of powers, which I firmly believe, I agree to the applicability
and binding effect of section 313 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2210, which, in
my opinion, has not been abrogated by the Rules of Court. I likewise believe the
soundness of the doctrine expounded by the authoritative Wigmore on a question
admittedly within the domain of the law on evidence: conclusiveness of the enrolled bill
of resolution upon the judicial authorities.
D. Withal, should that principle of conclusiveness be denied, the respondents could
plausibly fall back on the time-honored rule that the courts may not go behind the
legislative journals to contradict their veracity. (United States vs.Pons, 34 Phil., 729.)
According to the minutes of the joint session Exhibit 3, in the Senate sixteenth (16)
senators approved the resolution against five (5), with no absences; whereas in the house
sixty-eight (68) congressmen voted "yes", eighteen(18) voted "no", one abstained from
voting and one was absent. Therefore, 16 being three-fourths of the total membership of
twenty-one of the Senate (16 plus 5), and 68 being more than three-fourths of the total
membership of eighty-eight (88) of the House of Representatives (68 plus 18 plus 1 plus
1), it is crystal clear that the measure was upheld by the number of votes prescribed by
the Constitution.
True, there are in the said exhibit statements by two Senators and one congressman to
the effect that the votes did not constitute the majority required by the Constitution.
However, in the fact of the incontestable arithmetical computation above shown, those
protests must be attributed to their erroneous counting of votes; none of them having
then asserted that "there were absent Senators or Congressmen who had not been taken
into account. "Ford although we might have judicial notice of the number of proclaimed
members of Congress, still we are no better qualified than the Legislature to determine
the number of its actual membership at any given moment, what with demises or
demissions, remotions or suspensions.
HILADO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result of the majority opinion as well as in the grounds supporting the
same in so far as they are not inconsistent with the applicable reasons supporting my
concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). But I dissent from that part of the
majority opinion (page 3, ante) wherein it is stated that if the suspended members of the
Senate and House of Representatives had been counted "the affirmative votes in favor of
the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths of vote in
either branch of Congress."
The basic theories underlying my aforesaid concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino, supra,
are, first, that the questions therein raised were political in nature within the exclusive
province of the legislature, and, second, that the judiciary does not possess jurisdiction
over such questions. It is to me evidence that the questions involved in the present
proceeding are no less political than those involved in that former Senate case. It is
deemed unnecessary to dwell at more length upon the grounds of my said concurring
opinion.
The ground for my dissent from the above-quoted statement of the majority opinion in
the instant proceeding is that the suspension of the said members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives being a political question, the judiciary, being without
jurisdiction to interfere with the determination thereof by the proper political
department of the government, has perforce to abide by said determination if it were to
go any further in the consideration of the case. In other words, any further discussion of
the case in this Court will have to start from the premise that said members have been
suspended by the respective Houses of Congress and that we, being powerless to
interfere with the matter of said suspension, must consider ourselves bound by the
determination of said political branches of the government. As said by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Philipps vs. Payne (2 Otto. [U.S.], 130; 23 Law. ed., 649), "in cases
involving the action of the political departments of the government, the judiciary is bound
by such action." (Williams vs. Insurance Co., 13 Pet., 420; Garcia vs. Lee, 12 Pet., 511;
Kennel vs. Chambers, 14 How., 38; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet., 209; Nabob of
Carnatio vs. East Ind. Co., Ves., Jr., 60; Lucer vs. Barbon, 7 How., 1; R.I. vs. Mass., 12 Pet.,
714.)
If, then, we are to proceed, as I think we should, upon the premise that said members
have been thus suspended, there will be to my mind, absolutely no justification, ground
nor reason for counting them in the determination of whether or not the required three-
fourths vote was attained. Their case was entirely different from that of members who,
not having been suspended nor otherwise disqualified, had the right to vote upon the
resolution. In the case of the latter, they had, like all other members similarly situated,
three alternatives, namely, to vote in favor of the resolution, to vote against it, or to
abstain from voting. If they voted in favor, of course, their votes had to be counted
amount those supporting the resolution. If they voted against, of course, their votes had
to be counted with those opposing. And if they abstained from voting, there would be
sound justification for counting them as not in favor of the resolution, because by their
very abstention they impliedly but necessarily would signify that they did not favor the
resolution, for it is obvious that if they did, they would have voted in favor of it. On the
other hand, those suspended members who, by reason of the suspension, whose validity
or legality we are devoid of jurisdiction to inquire into, cannot be similarly treated. In
their case there would be no way of determining which way their votes would have gone
or whether or not they would have abstained from voting. In this connection, in
considering the hypothesis of their voting in case they had not been suspended, I must go
upon the assumption that while those suspended members may belong to the political
party which, as a party, was opposed to the resolution, still they would have
voted independently and following their individual convictions. In this connection, it might
not be amiss to mention that there were quite a number of minority members of the
legislature who voted for the resolution. Hence, we are not in a position to say that said
suspended members, if they had not been suspended, would have voted against the
resolution, nor in favor of it either, nor that they would have abstained from voting. Why
then should they bed counted with the members who voted against the resolution or
those who, having the right to vote, abstained from doing so? Why should we count them
as though we knew that they would have voted against the resolution, or even that they
would have abstained from voting? Soundly construed, I submit that the Constitution
does not, and could not, include suspended members in the determination of the required
three-fourths vote.
I take it, that the drafters in providing in Article XV, section 1, of the Constitution that
"The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting(emphasis supplied) separately . . .",
advisedly used the vital and all-important word "voting" therein. I take it, that they meant
to refer to the members voting, undoubtedly expecting that all members not suspended
or otherwise disqualified, would cast their votes one way or the other. But I am here even
making a concession in favor of the opponents when I say that those who, with the right
to vote, abstain from voting, may be counted among those not in favor of the measure. But
what I cannot bring myself to conceive is that the quoted provision should have intended
to count suspended or disqualified members as opposed to the measure, or not being in
favor of it, without it being possible to know which way they would have voted or that
they would have abstained from voting that they would never have voted in favor of the
measure. If I should ask why we should not count such suspended or disqualified
members among those in favor of the measure, I am sure those who opine differently
would answer, because we do not know that they would have voted in favor of it. By the
same token, if they should ask me why we should not count them among those against the
measure, I would answer that we do not know that they would have voted against it or
that they would have abstained from voting. All this inevitably leads to the conclusion
the only one possible that such suspended or disqualified members should not and
cannot be counted due to that very impossibility of knowing which way they would have
voted or whether they would have abstained from voting. I stand for a sound and rational
construction of the constitutional precept.
PARAS, J.:
I fully concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Hilado.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
To surrender or not to surrender, that is the question.
The last bastion of democracy is in danger.
Those who are manning it are summoned to give up without the least resistance, and the
banner of the Constitution is silently and meekly hauled down from its pole to be offered
as a booty to the haughty standard bearers of a new brand of Farcism. In t he words of
Cicero, "recedere de statu suae dignitatis."
Cardinal moral bearings have been lost in the psychological chaos suffered by those,
throwing overboard all ideals as burdensome and dangerous ballast, in desperate efforts
to attain at all costs individual survival, even in ignominy, could not stand the impact of
initial defeats at the hands of invading fearsome military hordes.
The present is liable to confusion. Our minds are subjected to determinate and
indeterminate ideological pressures. Very often man walks in the darkness of a blind alley
obeying the pullings and pushings of hidden and unhidden forces, or the arcane
predeterminations of the genes of human chromosomes. A rudderless ship floating in the
middle of an ocean without any visible shoreline, is bound to be wrecked at the advent of
the first typhoon. From early youth we begin to hear and learn about the true ideals. Since
then we set them as the guiding stars in our actions and decisions, but in the long travel of
life, many times the clouds dim or completely darken those stars and then we have only
to rely on our faith in their existence and on habit, becoming unerring if long enough
followed, of adjusting our conduct to their guidance in calm and cloudless nights. We are
sitting in judgment to pass upon the conflicts, disputes and disagreements of our
fellowmen. Let us not forget that the day shall come that we will be judged on how are are
judging. Posterity shall always have the final say. When the time solvent has dissolved the
human snag, then shall be rendered the final verdict as to whether we have faced our task
fearlessly or whether our hearts have shrunk upon the magnitude of our duties and have
chosen the most comfortable path of retreat. Then it will be conclusively known whether
did keep burning the tripod fire in the temples of old. Some of us will just return into
anonymity, covered by the cold mist of historical oblivion; others will have their names as
by words repeatedly pronounced with popular hate or general contempt; and still others
will be remembered with universal gratefulness, love and veneration, the guard on
accorded to all those who remained faithful to the fundamental tenets of justice.
Winnowing time will sift the chaff from the grain.
This is one of the cases upon which future generations will decide if this tribunal has the
sturdy courage to keep its responsibility in proper high level. It will need the passing of
decades and perhaps centuries before a conclusive verdict is rendered, whether we
should merit the scorn of our fellow citizens and our decision shall be cursed as the Dred
Scot decision of Chief Justice Taney, the one that plunged the United States into civil war,
or whether in the heart of each future Filipino citizen there will be a shrine in which our
memory will be remembered with gratefulness, because we have shown the far-reaching
judicial statesmanship of Chief Justice Marshall, the legal genius who fixed and held the
rock bottom foundations which made of the American Constitution the veritable supreme
law of the land and established the role of the tribunals as the ultimate keepers of the
Constitution. But for sure it will be rendered, and it will be impartial and unbiased,
exacting and pitiless, with unappealable finality, and for the one condemned Dante wrote
this lapidary line: "lasciate ogni speranza."
Unless the vision of our mental eyes should be shut up by the opaque cornea of stubborn
refusal to see reality or should be impaired by the polaroid visors of prejudice, there is no
question that at the time when the resolution in question, proposing an amendment to
the Constitution, was adopted, the members of the Senate were 24 and the members of
the House of Representatives were 96, and that the 16 members of the Senate who voted
in favor of the resolution, by undisputable mathematical computation, do not constituted
three-fourths of the 24 members thereof, and the 68 members of the House of
Representatives who voted for the resolution, by equally simple arithmetical operation,
do not constitute three-fourths of the 96 members of the said chamber. The official
certifications made by the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress to the effect
that three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and three-fourths of all the members
of the House of Representatives voted for the resolution, being untrue, cannot change the
facts. Nothing in existence can. The certification, being a clear falsification of public
document punished by article 171 of the Revised Penal Code with prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed P5,000, cannot give reality to a fiction based in a narration of facts that
is in conflict with the absolute metaphysical reality of the events.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Petitioners are citizens of the Philippines, taxpayers and electors, and besides some of
them are members of the Senate, others are members of the House of Representatives,
and still others are presidents of political parties, duly registered, with considerable
following in all parts of the Philippines.
The first three respondents are chairman and members, respectively, of the Commission
on Elections and the remaining three are respectively the Treasurer of the Philippines,
the Auditor General and the Director of the Bureau of Printing.
Petitioners alleged that the Senate is actually composed of 24 Senators, 8 elected in 1941
and 16 in April 23, 1946, and that the House of Representatives is composed of 98
members, elected on April 23, 1946, minus 2d who resigned to assume other positions in
the Government.
On September 18, 1946, there was presented for adoption by the Congress of the
Philippines a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines
to be appended as an ordinance thereto, which reads as follows:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, of the Philippines in
joint session assembled, by a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the
Members of each House voting separately. To propose, as they do hereby
propose, the following amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be
appended as an Ordinance thereto:
ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section
eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of
the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with
the President of the United States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and
forty-six, pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered seven
hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of July,
nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development,
and utilization, of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and
sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and
the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens
of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same
manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the
Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of
the Philippines."
This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by
a majority of the votes cast in an election at which it is submitted to the people
for the ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
Sixteen Senators voted in favor of the resolution and 5 against it, and 68 Representatives
voted in favor and 18 against.
Thereafter, Congress passed Republic Act No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on March
11, 1947, for the purpose of submitting to the people the proposed amendment embodied
in the resolution, and appropriating P1,000,000 for said purpose.
Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 73 as unconstitutional because Congress
may not, by said act, submit to the people for approval or disapproval the proposed
amendment to the Constitution embodied in resolution Exhibit B inasmuch as, to comply
with the express provisions of Article XV of the Constitution, requiring the affirmative
votes of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, three-fourths of the 24 members of the Senate is
constituted by at least 18 Senators, 2 more than those who actually voted for the
resolution in question, and three-fourths of the 98 members of the House of
Representatives should at least be 72 Representatives, or 4 more than those who actually
voted for the resolution.
Respondents deny that the Senate is composed of 24 Senators, by excluding from them
petitioners Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero and allege that the House of
Representatives is not composed of 98 members but of only 90. They admit that at the
joint session of Congress to consider the resolution Exhibit B, in favor of the resolution 16
votes were cast in the Senate and in the House of Representatives 68 and 5 in the Senate
and 18 in the House of Representatives had voted against. They admit the approval of
Republic Act No. 73 and that necessary steps to hold the plebiscite therein provided are
being taken, but deny that said act is unconstitutional, and byway of defense, allege that
the resolution Exhibit B was adopted by three-fourths of all the qualified members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately and, consequently, Republic
Act No. 73, ordering its submission to the people for approval or disapproval, fixing a date
for a general election, and appropriating public funds for said purpose, is valid and
constitutional.
At the hearing of this case both parties submitted the following stipulation:
The parties through their undersigned counsel hereby stipulate the following facts:
1. That Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero were, by the
majority vote of the Commission on Elections, proclaimed elected senators in
the election of April 23, 1946;
2. That when the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, the said senators-elect
took part in the election of the President of that body; but that before the
senators-elect were sworn in by the President of the Senate, a resolution was
presented, and subsequently approved, to defer the administration of oath and
the seating of Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, pending
the hearing and decision of the protest lodged against their election;
3. That on the 25th of May, 1946, the said senators individually took their
alleged oath of office before notaries public, and not on the floor, and filed said
oaths with the Secretary of the Senate during the noon recess of the said date;
4. That Messrs. Vera and Romero filed with the Auditor of the Senate other
oaths of office accomplished by them outside of the floor before a notary public
and the Secretary of the Senate, on September 5 and August 31, 1946,
respectively; and that their corresponding salaries from April 23, 1946, were
paid on August 31, 1946;
5. That Mr. Diokno, having left for the United States, his son Jose W. Diokno
filed a copy of Mr. Diokno's alleged oath of office dated May 25, 1946, with the
Auditor of the Senate on October 15,1946, and on said date his salary was paid
corresponding to the period from April 23 to October 15, 1946;
6. That all three have subsequently received their salaries every fifteen days;
7. That since the approval of the resolution deferring their seating and oaths up
to the present time, the said Messrs. Vera, Diokno, and Romero have not been
allowed to sit and take part in the deliberations of the Senate and to vote
therein, not do their names appear in the roll of the Senate;
8. That before May 25, 1946, the corresponding provincial boards of
canvassers certified as having been elected in the election held on April 23,
1946, ninety-eight representatives, among them Messrs. Alejo Santos and Jesus
B. Lava for Bulacan, Jose Cando and Constancio P. Padilla for Nueva Ecija,
Amado M. Yuson and Luis Taruc for Pampanga, Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac,
and Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros Occidental;
9. That the aforesaid eight members-elect of the House of Representatives took
part in the election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives held on May
25, 1946;
10. That before the members-elect of the House of Representatives were sworn
in by the Speaker, Mr. Topacio Nueno, representative for Manila, submitted a
resolution to defer the taking of oath and seating of Luis Taruc and Amado
Yuson for Pampanga, Constancio P. Padilla and Jose Cando for Nueva Ecija,
Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac, Alejo Santos and Jesus Lava for Bulacan, and
Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros Occidental "pending the hearing and decision on
the protests lodged against their election," copy of the resolution being
attached to and made part of this stipulation as Exhibit 1 thereof;
11. That the resolution Exhibit 1 was, upon motion of Representative Escareal
and approved by the House, referred for study to a committee of seven, which
up to the present has not reported, as shown by the Congressional Record for
the House of Representatives;
12. That the eight representatives-elect included in the resolution were not
shown in on the floor and have not been so sworn in or allowed to sit up to the
present time, nor have they participated in any of the proceedings of the House
of Representatives except during the debate of the Escareal motion referred to
in paragraph 11 hereof, nor cast any vote therein since May 25, 1946, and their
names do not appear in the roll of the members of the House except as shown
by the Congressional Record of the House of Representatives, nor in the roll
inserted in the official program for the inauguration of the Republic of the
Philippines hereto attached as Exhibit 2 hereof;
13. That the eight representatives-elect above mentioned took their alleged
oaths of office on the date set opposite their names, as follows:
Jose Cando May 25, 1946
Vicente Gustilo May 25, 1946
Constancio Padilla May 22, 1946
Alejo Santos May 23, 1946
Luis M. Taruc May 25, 1946
Amado M. Yuson May 25, 1946
Jesus B. Lava May 25, 1946
Alejandro Simpauco May 25, 1946
all of which oaths were taken before notaries public, with the exception of the
first four who took their oaths before Mr. Narciso Pimentel, Secretary of the
House;
14. That said oaths were filed with the Auditor through the office of the
Secretary of the House of Representatives;
 15. That the persons mentioned in paragraph 13 were paid salaries for the
term beginning April 23, 1946, up to the present, with the exception of Messrs.
Luis Taruc and Jesus Lava, to whom payment was suspended since August 16;
16. That Messrs. Alejo Santos and Vicente F. Gustilo took their oaths before the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and were allowed to sit on September
30, 1946, the last day of the Special Sessions;
17. That in addition to the eight persons above mentioned, two members of the
House, Representatives Jose C. Zulueta and Narciso Ramos, had resigned
before the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution was
discussed and passed on September 18,1946;
18. That the voting on the resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution was made by the Secretary calling the roll of each house and the
votes cast were as shown in the attached certificate of the Secretary of the
House of Representatives hereto attached, marked Exhibit 3 and made a part
hereof; and
19. That the Congressional Records for the Senate and House of
Representatives and the alleged oaths of office are made a part of this
Stipulation by reference thereto, respondents reserving the right to question
their materiality and admissibility.
Manila, Philippines, November 25, 1946.
For the petitioners: For the respondents:
JOSE E. ROMERO ROMAN OZAETAin this case as members of the Congress which adopted the resolution, in open violation
ANTONIO BARREDO Secretary of Justice
JOSE B.L. REYES within the bounds of the Constitution which, as representatives of the people, they should
First Asst. Solicitor
PETITIONER'S PERSONALITY
Whether petitioners have or have not the personality to file the petition in this case is the
first question we have to consider.
No party raised the question, but it having arisen in the course of the Court's deliberation,
we should not evade deciding it and giving what in law and justice should be the answer.
To our mind there is no doubt that petitioners have the personality to institute the
present recourse of prohibition. If petitioners should lack that personality, such legal
defect would not certainly have failed to be noticed by respondents themselves.
Respondents' failure to raise the question indicates their conviction that petitioners have
the necessary legal personality to file the petition, and we do not see any reason why such
personality should be put in doubt.
Petitioners are divided into three groups: the first is composed of senators; the second, of
representatives; and the third, of presidents of four political parties.
All of the individuals composing the first two groups, with the exception of Senators Jose
O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, are members of either of the two houses of
Congress and took part in the consideration of Resolution Exhibit B and of Republic Act
No. 73, while the above three excepted senators were the ones who were excluded in the
consideration of said resolution and act and were not counted for purposes of
determining the three-fourths constitutional rule in the adoption of the resolution.
In paragraph eight of the petition it is alleged that respondents have taken all the
necessary steps for the holding of the general election on March 11, 1947, and that the
carrying out of said acts "constitute an attempt to enforce the resolution and act
aforementioned in open violation of the Constitution," is without or in excess of
respondents' jurisdiction and powers, "violative of the rights of the petitioners who are
members of the Congress, and will cause the illegal expenditure and disbursement of
public funds and end in an irreparable injury to the taxpayers and the citizens of the
Philippines, among whom are the petitioners and those represented by them in their
capacities mentioned above."
There should not be any question that the petitioners who are either senators or
members of the House of Representatives have direct interest in the legal issues involved
of the Constitution, and passed the act intended to make effective such unconstitutional
resolution. Being members of Congress, they are even duty bound to see that the latter act
uphold,
unless they are to commit a flagrant betrayal of public trust. They are
General
representatives of the sovereign people and it is their sacred duty to see to it that the
fundamental law embodying the will of the sovereign people is not trampled upon.
The four political parties represented by the third group of petitioners, represent large
groups of our population, perhaps nearly one-half of the latter, and the numerous persons
they represent are directly interested and will personally be affected by the question
whether the Constitution should be lightly taken and can easily be violated without any
relief and whether it can be amended by a process openly repugnant to the letter of the
Constitution itself.
As a matter of fact, the vital questions raised in this case affect directly each and every
one of the citizens and inhabitants of this country. Whether our Constitution is, as it is
supposed to be, a paramount law or just a mere scrap of paper, only good to be thrown
into a waste basket, is a matter of far-reaching importance to the security, property,
personal freedom, life, honor, and interests of the citizens. That vital question will
necessarily affect the way of life of the whole people and of its most unimportant unit.
Each and every one of the individuals inhabiting this land of ours shall have to make plans
for the future depending on how the question is finally decided. No one can remain
indifferent; otherwise, it will at his peril.
Our conclusion is that petitioners have full legal personality to institute the present
action; and much more, those who are members of Congress have the legal duty to
institute it, lest they should betray the trust reposed in them by the electorate.
24 SENATORS
The first question raised by respondents' answer refers to the actual number of the
members of the Senate. According to petitioners there are 24 of them while according to
respondents there are only 21, excluding Senators Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose
E. Romero, because, according to them, "they are not duly qualified and sworn in
members of the Senate."
This allegation appears to be belied by the first seven paragraphs of the stipulation of
facts submitted by both parties.
No amount of sophism, of mental gymnastics or logo-daedaly may change the meanings
and effects of the words placed by respondents themselves in said seven paragraphs. No
amount of argument may delude anyone into believing that Senators Vera, Diokno, and
Romero are not senators notwithstanding their having been proclaimed as elected
senators, their having taken part in the election of the President of the Senate, their
having taken their oaths of office, and their receiving salaries as senators.
Such a paradoxical proposition could have been driven into acceptance in the
undeveloped brains of the pithecanthropus or gigantopithecus of five hundred millennia
ago, but it would be unpardonably insulting o the human mind of the twentieth century.
Our conclusion is that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero should be counted as members
of the Senate, without taking into consideration whatever legal effects the Pendatun
resolution may have produced, a question upon which we have already elaborated in our
opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). Suspended or not suspended, they are senators
anyway, and there is no way of ignoring a fact so clear and simple as the presence of the
sun at day time. Therefore, counting said three Senators, there are 24 Senators in all in
the present Senate.
96 REPRESENTATIVES
The next question raised by respondents is their denial of petitioners' allegations to the
effect that the present House of Representatives is composed of 98 members and their
own allegation to the effect that at present "only 90 members have qualified, have been
fully sworn in, and have taken their seats as such."
Again respondents' allegations are belied by paragraphs eight to seventeen of the
stipulation of facts.
The disagreement between the parties is as to whether or not Representatives Cando,
Gustilo, Padilla, Santos, Taruc, Yuson, Lava and Simpauco, mentioned in paragraph 13 of
the stipulation of facts, are members of the House of Representatives.
The facts stipulated by the parties proved conclusively that said eight persons are actual
members of the House of Representatives. We may even add that the conclusiveness
about said eight representatives is even greater than in the case of Senators Vera, Diokno,
and Romero, because no resolution of suspension has ever been adopted by the House of
Representatives against said eight members, who are being deprived of the exercise of
some of their official functions and privileges by the unipersonal, groundless, dictatorial
act of the Speaker.
That illegal deprivation, whose counterpart can only be found in countries where the
insolence of totalitarian rulers have replaced all constitutional guarantees and all
concepts of decent government, raises again a constitutional question: whether it is
permissible for the Speaker of the House of Representatives to exercise the arbitrary
power of depriving representatives duly elected by the people of their constitutional
functions, privileges, and prerogatives. To allow the existence of such an arbitrary power
and to permit its exercise unchecked is to make of democracy a mockery.
The exercise of such an arbitrary power constitutes a want on onslaught against the
sovereignty itself of the people, an onslaught which may cause the people sooner or later
to take justice in their own hands. No system of representative government may subsist if
those elected by the people may so easily be silenced or obliterated from the exercise of
their constitutional functions.
From the stipulation of facts, there should not be any question that at the last national
election, 98 representatives were elected and at the time the resolution Exhibit B was
adopted on September 18, 1946, 96 of them were actual members of the House, as two
(Representatives Zulueta and Ramos) has resigned.
Applying the three-fourth rule, if there were 24 senators at the time the resolution was
adopted; three-fourths of them should at least be 18 and not the 16 who only voted in
favor of the resolution, and if there were 96 representatives, three-fourths of them should
certainly be more than the 68 who voted for the resolution. The necessary consequence is
that, since not three-fourths of the senators and representatives voting separately have
voted in favor of the resolution as required by Article XV of the Constitution, there can be
no question that the resolution has not been validly adopted.
We cannot but regret that our brethren, those who have signed or are in agreement with
the majority opinion, have skipped the questions as to the actual membership of the
Senate and House of Representatives, notwithstanding the fact that they are among the
first important ones squarely raised by the pleadings of both parties. If they had taken
them into consideration, it would seem clear that their sense of fairness will bring them
to the same conclusion we now arrived at, at least, with respect to the actual membership
of the House of Representatives.
To avoid repeating the arguments advanced by the parties, we have made part of this
opinion, as Appendices A, B, and C,1 the memoranda presented by both petitioners and
respondents, where their attorneys appear to have amply and ably discussed the
question. The perusal of the memoranda will show petitioners' contentions to be standing
on stronger ground and, therefore, we generally agree with their arguments.
In what follows we will try to analyze the positions taken in the majority opinion.

Upon our conclusions as to the membership of the Senate and House of Representatives,
POLITICAL QUESTIONS
it appears evident that the remedy sought for in the petition should be granted.

The majority enunciates the proposition that "political questions are not within the
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
province of the judiciary," except "by express constitutional or statutory provision" to the
contrary. Then argues that "a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under
Without judging respondents' own estimate as to the strength of their own position the 'enrolled bill rule' out of respect to the political departments."
concerning the questions of the actual membership of the Senate and House of
Representatives, it seems that during the oral and in the written arguments they have
The doctrine is predicated "on the principle of the separation of powers."
retreated to the theory of conclusiveness of the certification of authenticity made by the
presiding officers and secretaries of both House of Congress as their last redoubt.
This question of separation of powers is the subject of discussion in the case of Vera vs.
Avelino, supra. We deem unnecessary to repeat what we have already said in our opinion
The resolution in question begins as follows: "Resolved by the Senate and House of
in said case, where we have elaborated on the question.
Representatives of the Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote of not less than
three-fourths of all the members of each House voting separately, . . .."
Although the majority maintains that what they call the doctrine that political questions
are not within the province of the judiciary is "too well-established to need citation of
Just because the adoption of the resolution, with the above statement, appears to be
authorities," they recognize the difficulty "in determining what matters fall under the
certified over the signatures of the President of the Senate and the House of
meaning of political questions."
Representatives and the Secretaries of both Houses, respondents want us to accept
blindly as a fact what is not. They want us to accept unconditionally as a dogma, as
absolute as a creed of faith, what, as we have shown, appears to be a brazen official This alleged doctrine should not be accepted at its face value. We do not accept it even as
falsehood. a good doctrine. It is a general proposition made without a full comprehension of its
scope and consequences. No judicial discernment lies behind it.
Our reason revolts against such an unethical proposition.
The confession that the "difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the
meaning of political question" shows conclusively that the so-called doctrine has
An intimation or suggestion that we, in the sacred temple of justice, throwing overboard
recklessly been advanced.
all scruples, in the administration of justice, could accept as true what we know is not and
then perform our official functions upon that voluntary self-delusion, is too shocking and
absurb to be entertained even for a moment. Anyone who keeps the minimum sense of This allegedly "well-established" doctrine is no doctrine at all in view of the confessed
justice will not fail to feel aghast at the perversion or miscarriage of justice which difficulty in determining what matters fall within the designation of political question.
necessarily will result from the suggestion. The majority itself admits that the term "is not susceptible of exact definition, and
precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the
restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the acts of the political
But the theory is advanced as a basis to attack the jurisdiction of this Court to inquire
department of the government."
behind the false certification made by the presiding officers and the secretaries of the two
Houses of Congress.
Doctrine is that "what is taught; what is held; put forth as true, and supported by a
teacher, a school, or a sect; a principle or position, or the body of principles, in any branch
Respondents rely on the theory of, in the words of the majority opinion, "the
of knowledge; tenet; dogma; principle of faith. "It is a synonym of principle, position,
conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution."
opinion, article, maxim, rule, and axiom. in its general sense, doctrine applies to any
speculative truth or working principle, especially as taught to others or recommended to
their acceptance. Therefore, to be true, it should be expressed on simple and self-evident
terms. A doctrine in which one of the elemental or nuclear terms is the subject of an
endless debate is a misnomer and paradox.
A doctrine is advanced and accepted as an established truth, as a starting point for
developing new propositions, as a guiding principle in the solution of many problems. It is
a groundwork for the building of an intellectual system. It is the basis of a more or less
complex legal structure. If not the cornerstone, it should at least be one of the main
columns of an architectonic construction. If that groundwork, cornerstone or column is
supported by a thing whose existence still remains in dispute, it is liable to fall.
We irrevocably refuse to accept and sanction such a pseudo-doctrine which is based on
the unsettled meaning of political question. The general proposition that "political
questions are not within the province of the judiciary" is just one of the many numerous
general pronouncements made as an excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy or
uncourageous tribunals to refuse to decide hard or ticklish legal issues submitted to
them.
It belongs to the category of that much-vaunted principle of separation of powers, the
handful of sand with which judicial ostriches blind themselves, as if self-inflicted
blindness may solve a problem or may act as a conjuration to drive away a danger or an
evil.
We agree with the majority that the proposal to amend the Constitution and the process
to make it effective, as provided in Article XV of the Constitution, are matters of political
nature, but we cannot agree with their conclusion that a litigation as to whether said
article has been complied with a violated is beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunals,
because to arrive at this conclusion we must accept as a major premise the pseudo-
doctrine which we have precisely exposed as erroneous and false.
Is there anything more political in nature than the Constitution? Shall all questions
relating to it, therefore, betaken away from the courts? Then, what about the
constitutional provision conferring the Supreme Court with the power to decide "all cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty or a law?"
COLEMAN versus MILLER
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coleman vs. Miller (122 A. L. R., 625)
is invoked as the mainstay of the majority position.
No less than eight pages of the majority opinion are occupied by the exposition and
analysis of the decision of the Supreme Court.
The case is invoked as authority for the conclusion that "the efficacy of ratification by the
State legislature of a proposed amendment to the federal Constitution" and that "the
decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State of the questions of whether
an amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission to
the State legislature," are political questions and not justiciable.
At the outset it must be noted that the two above mentioned questions have no similarity
or analogy with the constitutional questions herein discussed. The questions as to the
efficacy of the ratification by the Senate of Kansas of the Child Labor amendment
proposed by the United States Congress in June, 1924, and upon the decision of said
Congress, "in its control of the Secretary of State," whether the amendment has been
adopted "within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the State legislature,"
either one of them does not raise a controversy of violation of specific provisions of the
Constitution as the ones raised in the present case.
No specific constitutional provision has been mentioned to have been violated because in
January, 1925, the Legislature of Kansas rejected the amendment, a copy of the rejection
having been sent to the Secretary of State of the United States, and in January, 1927, a
new resolution ratifying the amendment was adopted by the Senate of Kansas on a 21-20
division, the Lieutenant Governor casting the deciding vote. Neither was there such
mention of constitutional violation as to the effect of the previous rejection and of the
lapse of time after submission of the amendment to the State legislature.
No constitutional provision has been pointed out to have been violated because the
Lieutenant Governor had cast his vote or because by the lapse of time from June, 1924 to
March, 1927, the proposed amendment had allegedly lost its vitality.
It is only natural that, in the absence of a constitutional provision upon the efficacy of
ratification by a State legislature of a proposed amendment, it was within the ultimate
power of the United States Congress to decide the question, in its decision rendered in the
exercise of its constitutional power, to control the action of the Secretary of State, and the
promulgation of the adoption of amendment could not be controlled by the courts.
Evidently, the invoked authority has no bearing at all with the matters in controversy in
the present case.
We note, as observed in the majority opinion, that the four opinions in Coleman vs. Miller,
according to the American Law Reports, show "interestingly divergent but confusing
positions of the justices," and are the subject of an amusing article in 48 Yale Law Journal,
1455, entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," asking how it happened that the nine-member
United States Supreme Court could not reach a decision on the question of the right of the
Lieutenant Governor of Kansas to cast his vote, because the odd number of justices was
"equally divided."
How such a "confusing" and "amusing" four-opinion decision in Coleman vs. Miller could
be an authority is beyond our comprehension.
 GREEN versus WELLER
One of the authorities upon which the majority relies is the decision of the Mississippi
Supreme Court in Green vs.Miller (32 Miss., 650), quoting one paragraph thereof.
Here again we have a case of inapplicable authority, unless taken in its reversed effect.
The Mississippi Supreme Court maintains that there is nothing in the nature of the
submission to the people of a proposal to amend the Constitution which should cause the
free exercise of it to be obstructed or that could render it dangerous to the stability of the
government, but in making this pronouncement, it assumes that the submission is made
"in a established form," adding that the means provided for the exercise by the people of
their sovereign right of changing the fundamental law should receive such a construction
as not to trample upon the exercise of their right, and that the best security against
tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed privilege to the people of the state to
change their Constitution "in the mode prescribed by the instrument."
So the authority, if clearly interpreted, will lead us to the conclusion that the majority
position is wrong because the Mississippi Supreme Court, in making the pronouncement,
upon the assumption that the submission to the people is made "in a established form"
and "in the mode prescribed" by the Constitution, namely, in accordance with the
provisions of the instrument, the pronouncements would be the opposite if, as in the
present case, the submission of the proposal of amendment to the people is made through
a process flagrantly violative of the Constitution, aggravated by wanton falsification of
public records and tyrannical trampling of the constitutional prerogatives of duly elected
representatives of the people.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined in by Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas, in the "confusing" and "amusing" decision in
Coleman vs. Miller, is also invoked by the majority, but this other authority seems equally
reluctant to offer its helping hand to a helpless, desperate position.
The major premise of the concurring opinion is as follows: "The Constitution granted
Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional amendments."
Everybody ought to know that no such an unlimited, unchecked, omnipotent power is
granted by our fundamental law to the Congress of the Philippines. Our Congress may
propose amendments or call a convention to make the proposal, but that is all. Nowhere
in the Constitution can be found any word, any grammatical sign, not even the faintest
hint that in submitting the proposed amendments to the people, Congress shall have
"exclusive power to control the submission." That submission must be provided by law,
and no law may be enacted and come into effect by the exclusive power of Congress. It
needs the concurring action of the President of the Philippines. And if the law happens to
violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. After
the law is enacted, its execution devolves upon the Executive Department. As a matter of
fact, it is the Executive Department which actually submits to the people the proposed
amendment. Congress fixes the date of submission, but the President of the Philippines
may refuse to submit it in the day fixed by law if war, rebellion, or insurrection prevents a
plebiscite from proceeding.
After showing that Mr. Justice Black started his argument from a major premise not
obtainable in the Philippines, his conclusions cannot help the majority in anyway.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the "confusing" and "amusing" case
of Coleman vs. Miller is the next authority invoked by the majority, but the opinion does
not offered much help. The justice maintains that the proceedings for voting in legislative
assemblies "are matters that concern not merely political actions but are also of the very
essence of political action," and then advances the following argument: "To open the law-
courts to such controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes
engendered by procedures for voting in legislative assemblies."
The argument has no weight at all. The argument merely displays an attitude, one of
simple distaste for the idea, but fails to give any sensible reason for the attitude. Ina
totalitarian regime, where decisions are rendered not in answer to the promptings of a
sense of justice, but as expressions of moods, caprices and whims of arbitrary rulers, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's attitude could be taken as the law, but then it would be necessary to
elevate him first to the category of a fuehrer.
In our jurisdiction personal attitudes are not the law. Here, justice must be founded on
reason, but never on passing unreasoned moods, judicial or otherwise.
We regret that we cannot agree with the majority's sharing Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
views, which in their judgment are in accord "with sound principles of political
jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced thought on the workings of
constitutional and popular government. "Our regret is not for ourselves alone but for
those who happen to accept as authority the unreasoned and unexplained mental attitude
of a judicial officer of a foreign country, praising it even with the much-abused label as
"liberal," notwithstanding the fact that it represents the whimsical rule of personal
attitudes and not the rule of well-matured reason.
THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY
This theory is amply discussed in the memoranda of the parties attached hereto as
Appendices A, B, and C. Although we consider it unnecessary to enlarge the discussion,
we deem it convenient to make a little analysis of what is stated in the majority opinion.
Respondents contend, with the full approval of the majority, that a duly authenticated bill
or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
The present case is a conclusive evidence of the absurdity of the theory. How can we
accept the absolute verity of the presiding officers' certification that the resolution in
question has been adopted by three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives, when as a matter of undisputable fact the certification is false?
How can we accept a theory which elevates a false-hood to the category of truth?
The majority alleges that the rule is the one prevailing in England. Because the English
have committed the nonsense of accepting the theory, is that reason for Filipinos to
follow suit? Why, in the administration of justice, should our tribunals not think
independently? Our temple of justice is not presided by simians trained in the art of
imitation but by human beings, and human beings must act according to reason, never
just to imitate what is wrong, although such mistakes may happen to be consecrated as a
judicial precedent. It would be inconceivable for our courts to commit such a blunder.
Repeating what Wigmore has said (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 685, footnote), the majority
states that in the United States the jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con on
the theory, although in petitioners' memorandum Appendix A there appears more up-to-
date evidence to the effect that there is a great majority for the rejection. But to our mind,
mere numbers as to pro and con seem to us immaterial in the decision as to whether the
theory is or is not correct. Numbers do not make reason nor justice.
The majority contends that the theory conforms to the express policy of our law-making
body, invoking to said effect the now obsolete section 313 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210.
Even if we should follow the anachronistic practice of deciding issues upon the authority
of laws which have been repealed or abolished, still the evidence pointed out by the
majority does not support their contention. Section 313 alluded to enumerates the
evidence that may prove the procedures of the defunct Philippine Commission or of any
legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippines, with the proviso that the
existence of a copy of acts of said commission or the Philippine Legislature, signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, is a conclusive proof "of the provisions of
such acts and of the due enactment thereof."
This proviso has been repealed by its non-inclusion in the Rules of Court. Sections 5 and
41 of Rule 123 show conclusively that this Supreme Court, in making the rules effective
since July 1, 1940, rejected the proviso as unreasonable and unjust. Section 5 provides
that we may take judicial notice of the official acts of Congress and section 41 provides
what evidence can be used to prove said official acts, but nowhere in the rules can a
provision be found that would make conclusive a certification by the presiding officers
and secretaries of both House of Congress even if we know by conclusive evidence that
the certification is false.
The allegation that the theory in question conforms to the express policy of our
lawmaking body, upon the very evidence used in support thereof, after a little analysis,
has to banish as a mid-summer night's dream.
50 AMERICAN JURISDICTION, SECTION 150
In support of the theory of conclusiveness of the enrollment, the authority of 50 American
Jurisprudence, 150 is invoked as reasons for the theory.
We will analyze the reasons adduced:
1. Respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government. This must be
the strongest one, when it is first mentioned. It is so flimsy to require much discussion.
Shall we sacrifice truth and justice for the sake of a social courtesy, the mutual respect
that must be shown between different departments of the government? Has our sense of
evaluation of spiritual values become so perverted that we can make such a blunder in
our choice? Since when have the social or official amenities become of paramount value
to the extent of overshadowing the principles of truth and justice?
2. Because without the theory, courts would have to make "a n inquisition into the
conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power." This second reason is
premised not on a democratic attitude, but rather on a Fascistic one. It is premised on the
false belief that the members of the majority are a king of emperos of Japan, to be
worshipped but never to be discussed. The ideology depicted by the second reason
should be relegated to where it belongs: the archeological museum.
3. "The rule is also one of convenience." This reason again shows a perverted evaluation
of human values. Is justice to be sacrificed for the sake of convenience?
4. "Otherwise after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills authenticated
as executed by the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the journals that
an act heretofore enforced had never become a law." This last reason personifies
unreasonableness to the nth degree. So we leave it as it is, as a perpetual evidence of the
extent to which legal stupidity may reach.
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
Now let us examine the arguments of the next authority invoked by the majority,
Wigmore on Evidence. We will also analyzed the arguments relied upon.
1. That to go beyond the enrolled bill "would unsettle the entire statute law of the State."
This argument, as it appears quoted in the majority decision, is premised on the
unreliability of legislative journals, and it seems to depict a mind poisoned by prejudice,
as shown by the following: "We are to remember the danger, under the prevalence of
such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this
character. It is scarcely too much to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative
action would be at the mercy of all persons having access to these journals. . . ."
The argument should be taken into consideration in connection with American
experience, which seems not to be too flattering to our former metropolis.
Our own personal experience of more than a decade in legislative processes convinces us
that Wigmore's assumption does not obtain in the Philippines. It is true that in the pre-
constitution legislative enactments we have seen few instances in which there had been
disagreement between what has actually been passed, as shown by the journal, and the
authenticated enrolled bill. But the instances were so few to justify entertaining here the
same fears entertained by Wigmore in America. Although those instances were few, we
fought to correct the evil in the Constitutional Convention, where we were able to
introduce the following revolutionary provision in the Constitution: "No bill shall be
passed by either House unless it shall be printed and copies thereof in their final from
furnished each member at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the
President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last
reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its
passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
journal." (Section 21 [2], Article VI of the Constitution.)
This provision is an effective guarantee against the situation depicted by Wigmore's fears.
2. To the argument that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the courts, then less
than a quorum of each House may by the aid of presiding officers impose laws upon the
State in defiance of the inhibition of the Constitution, Wigmore answers: "This perhaps
cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the
judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been able at all times
with truth to say that its high places have not been disgraced."
The answer is unconvincing. Because there can be and there have been blundering,
disgraceful, or corrupt judicial officers is no reason why arbitrary presiding officers and
members of the legislature should be allowed to have their way unchecked. Precisely the
system of checks and balances established by the Constitution presupposes the
possibility of error and corruption in any department of government and the system is
established to put a check on them.
When the question of an unconstitutional, arbitrary or corrupt action by the legislature is
placed at the bar of justice, the judiciary must not shrink from its duty. If there is
corruption in the judiciary, our laws provide the proper remedy. Even we, the members
of the highest tribunal, cannot with impunity commit "culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, or other high crimes" without being liable to be removed
from office on impeachment, and we hope, if there is such a case, that the House of
Representatives and the Senate will do their duty in accordance with Article IX of the
Constitution, and not follow the uncourageous example which is given under the
intellectual tutelage of Wigmore.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL NUMERICAL RULES
The three-fourth rule has been provided in Article XV of the Constitution as a guarantee
against the adoption of amendments to the fundamental law by mere majorities.
The Constitution must be accorded more stability than ordinary laws and if any change is
to be introduced in it, it must be in answer to a pressing public need so powerful as to
sway the will of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives. Said three-fourth rule has been adopted by the Constitutional
Convention, as all the other numerical rules, with the purpose of avoiding any doubt that
it must be complied with mathematical precision, with the same certainty of all numbers
and fractions expressed or expressible in arithmetical figures.
Where the Constitution says three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, it means an exact number, not susceptible of
any more or less. All the members means that no single member should be excluded in
the counting. It means not excluding three Senators and eight Representatives as
respondents want us to do in order not to cause any inconvenience to the presiding
officers and secretaries of both Houses of Congress who had the boldness of certifying
that the three-fourth rule had been complied within the adoption of the resolution in
question, when such a certification is as false as any falsehood can be.
The three-fourth rule must not be left to the caprice of arbitrary majorities, otherwise it
would be the death knell of constitutionalism in our country. If a constitutional provision
can be so trifled with, as has happened in the adoption of the resolution in question, it
would mean breaking faith with the vitality of a government of laws, to enthrone in its
stead a whimsical government of men.
The Constitution contains several numerical provisions. It requires that the Senate shall
be composed of 24 Senators (section 2, Article VI); that Congress shall by law make an
apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not
otherwise (section 5, Article VI); that each House may expel a member with the
concurrence of two-third of all the members (section 10 [3], Article VI); that electoral
tribunals shall each be composed of nine members, three Justices of the Supreme Court
and six legislature members (section 11, Article VI); that to overrun the veto of the
President, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House is necessary
(section 20 [1], Article VI), and in certain cases the concurrence of three-fourths of all the
members of each House is necessary (section 20 [2], Article VI); that Congress shall, with
the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House, have the sole power to
declare war (section 25, Article VI); that no treaty or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the
Supreme Court (section 10, Article VIII); that the House of Representatives shall have the
sole power of impeachment by a vote of two-thirds of all its members (section 2, Article
IX); and that the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments, but no person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate (section 3, Article IX).
So it can be seen that the numerical rules inserted in the Constitution affect matters not of
momentary but of momentous importance. Each and every one of them should be given
effect with religious scruple, not only because our loyalty to the sovereign people so
requires, but also because by inserting them the Constitutional Convention had abided by
the wise teachings of experience.
By denying the petition and allowing those responsible for the unconstitutional adoption
of the resolution in question to have their way is to set up a precedent that eventually
may lead to the supremacy of an empire of lawlessness. It will be tantamount to opening
Pandora's box of evils and disasters.
The power to declare was can only be exercised by Congress with the concurrence of two-
thirds of all the members of each House. From now on, by the simple expediency of
certification by the presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses that two-thirds had
voted where a bare majority had voted in fact, said majority may plunge our people into a
maelstrome of war.
The Constitution provides that the power of impeachment needs the vote of two-thirds of
all the members of the House of Representatives. From now on, a mere plurality of one
will be enough to put impeachable high officials, including the President, on the carpet.
To convict an impeached officer the fundamental law requires the concurrence of three-
fourths of all the members of the Senate. From now on, that three-fourth rule may be
dispensed with or circumvented by not counting three actual Senators, as has been done
in the resolution in question, and thereby oust the President of the Philippines if he
happens not to be in the good graces of a senatorial majority.
Without entering into the merits of the proposed constitutional amendment, to submit
which to the people high-handed means have been resorted to, there can be no question
that it is of vital importance to the people and it will affect future generations to
unimaginable extent. The Constitutional Convention had thought it wise that before such
a momentous proposal could be submitted to the people the three-fourth rule should be
adhered to by Congress.
QUOTATION FROM THE JALANDONI CASE
Months ago we stated: "It is high time to sound the clarion call that will summon all the
forces of liberalism to wage a crusade for human freedom. They should put on the armor
of righteousness and rally behind the banner for the vindication of the principles and
guarantees embodied in the Constitution and the high purposes of the Chapter of the
United Nations." This, we said in our dissenting opinion in People vs. Jalandoni, L-777.
Concerning the judgment that the future may pass upon the actuations of the Supreme
Court, in that same opinion we ventured that the historian army, under the heading of
"Epoch of Great Reaction," write as follows:
At no epoch of its history has the Supreme Court shown to be most reactionary
and retrogressive. When the victims of a constitutional violation, perpetrated
by a group of the highest officials of the government, came to if for redress, it
adopted a hands-off policy, showing lack of the necessary vitality to grapple
with the situation and finding refuge in a comfortable retreat, completely
disappointing those who have pinned their faith and hope in it as the first pillar
of the Constitution and the inexpugnable bulwark of human fundamental
rights. The issue of human freedom was disposed of by them most
discouragingly by nullifying the right of an accused to be free on bail on appeal,
in flagrant violation of a constitutional guarantee and of one of the
fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
Upon touching the decision of this Court in the instant case, the same historian may
record that the highest tribunal of the new Republic of the Philippines has struck the
hardest blow to the Philippine constitutional system, by refusing to do its duty in giving
redress in a clear case of violation of the fundamental law, to the great disappointment,
despair and apallment of millions of souls all over the world who are pinning their hopes
on constitutionalism for the survival of humanity.
The ideal of one world oftenly enunciated by progressive leaders in the deliberations of
the several organs of the United Nations is predicated in the adoption of a single standard
of laws, compulsory within all jurisdictions of our planet. The ethology of all mankind
must be shaped under the pattern of that single legal standard. But the whole system is
liable to crash if it is not founded on the rock bed of the elemental principle that the
majesty of the law must always be held supreme.
To keep inviolate this primary principle it is necessary that some of the existing social
organs, moral attitudes and habits of thinking should undergo reforms and overhauling,
and many fixed traditional ideas should be discarded to be replaced with more
progressive ones and inconsonance with truth and reason. Among these ideas are the
wrong ones which are used as premises for the majority opinion in this case.
The role of innovators and reformers is hard and often thankless, but innovation and
reform should continuously be undertaken if death by stagnation is to be avoided. New
truths must be discovered and new ideas created. New formulas must be devised and
invented, and those outworn discarded. Good and useful traditions must be preserved,
but those hampering the progressive evolution of cultured should be stored in the
museum of memory. The past and the present are just stepping stones for the fulfilment
of the promises of the future.
Since the last decade of the nineteenth century, physical science had progressed by leaps
and bounds. Polonium and radium were discovered by Madam Curie, Rontgen discovered
the X-ray, and Rutherford the alpha, beta and gamma particles. Atom ceased to be the CONCEPCION, J.:
smallest unit of matter to become an under-microscopic planetarian system of neutrons,
protons, and electrons.
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for
refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
Ion exchangers are utilized to make of electrons veritable lamps of Aladdin. Plants are
grown in plain water, without any soil, but only with anions and cations. Sawdust has
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609,
ceased to be a waste matter, and from it is produced wood sugar, weighing one-half of the
otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the
sawdust processed. Inter-stellar space vacuum, almost absolute, is being achieved to
Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25%
serve ends that contribute to human welfare. Bacteria and other microbes are harnessed
on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated
to serve useful human purposes. The aspergillus niger is made to manufacture the acetic
a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the
to produce vinegar for the asking. The penicillum notatum and the bacillus brevis are
payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in
made to produce penicillin and tyrothricin, two wonder drugs that are saving many lives
November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. which is
from formerly lethal infections. DDT decimates harmful insects, thus checking effectively
engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer
malaria, an illness that used to claim more than one million victims a year in the world.
by plywood and hardwood producers bought foreign exchange for the importation of
The creation of synthetics had enriched the material treasures offered to man by nature.
urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of said
Means of transportation are developed to achieve supersonic speeds. Many scientific
glues and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In
dreams are fast becoming marvelous realities. Thus, science marches on. There is no
May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of
reason why the administration of justice should not progress onward, synchronized with
P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
the rhythm of general human advancement towards a better future.

The fact that the majorities of the two chambers of Congress have without any qualm
violated Article XV of the Constitution and the majority of this Court, instead of granting
the proper relief provided by law, preferred to adopt the comfortable attitude of
indifferent by-standers, creates a situation that seems to be ogling for more violations of
the fundamental law. The final results no one is in a position to foresee.
Our vote is for the granting of the petition.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying
upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959,
declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said
fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request
for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank
issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor
of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the
exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea
and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of
Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently
affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.
The only question for determination in this case is whether or not "urea" and
"formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The
pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:

G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of
section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner, the importation of the following:.
vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines,
xxx xxx xxx
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central
Bank, respondents.
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.
Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.
 Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts
be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
Republic of the Philippines
stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision
should be construed as "urea andformaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that
EN BANC
respondents herein, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred
in holding otherwise. In this connection, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and
"formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic resin
glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed, through its
Commissioner, the view that:
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974

Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed

HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner,
as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde
vs.
under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE
This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of
fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of
Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila,
plywood.
MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA,
JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO,
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER,
different from urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO
the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA,
bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and
"urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" MARINA FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of the Municipal
and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic Board, respondents.
resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in
support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual
petitioner.
statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate
the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central
Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for respondent Mayor of
L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L- Manila.
12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which
uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.
upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by
the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1;
Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de
mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and Castro, Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The
approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the Executive Secretary and Commissioner of Civil Service.
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.
decree.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which
became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-
Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of
Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House
of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April
21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to
the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by
Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a
minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the
President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case
of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20,
1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo
Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment
recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings
as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives
that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with
amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the
one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the
ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter signified
its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be
printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House
of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the
Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted
four printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his
signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became
Republic Act No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by
respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5,
1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into
law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by
the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved
on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the
Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines,
explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both
Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by
Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no
effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification that the
invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his
signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he
and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers
of both Houses of Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was
officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to
the Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable and against public
policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of
Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the
department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners,
operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the
provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to
recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor
presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A.
Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction
and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel
respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service,
the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal
board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it
was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that
body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an
official trip, this Court issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner
Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor
purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-called Republic Act
4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law until
further orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as Vice-
Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave
of this Court, appeared as amici curiae, and have filed extensive and highly enlightening
memoranda on the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of
United States Federal and State Courts, have been submitted on the question of whether
the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this
jurisdiction. A similar question came up before this Court and elicited differing opinions
in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil. Reports 1.
While the majority of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot
be truly said that the question has been laid to rest and that the decision therein
constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress
proposing an amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance
thereto (the so-called parity rights provision) had been passed by "a vote of three-fourths
of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" pursuant to Article
XV of the Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel
V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a
political question which was not within the province of the judiciary in view of the
principle of separation of powers in our government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied
upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that
"if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled
bill rule" born of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla,
holding that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and affirming
categorically that "the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are
conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No.
2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears
indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative
body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of
Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or of
either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by
copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order;
provided, that in the case of acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is in existence a copy signed by
the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall
be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses,
namely, by the signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the
printed copy of the approved bill. 2 It has been held that this procedure is merely a mode
of authentication, 3 to signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him
has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or rejection. 4 The
function of an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered
approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided for in
the Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are
mandatory such that their absence would render the statute invalid. 5 The affirmative
view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers the power of veto,
which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary 6 There is less reason to make the
attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where the Constitution does not even
provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the
President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding
officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated
enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment. 7 Another case
however, under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive
evidence.8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is
conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not
unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as
follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by
the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an
official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has
passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their
presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall
be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication
as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill
not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and
of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due
to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to
coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it
has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not
required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other
records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion
reached in a number of decisions, 10 although they are silent as to whether the journals
may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a
bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said
Constitution does contain the following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in
its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question
shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered
in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall
have been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished its
Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except
when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its
immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment
thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the
Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-
equal department of the government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent
clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had
never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even
greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made
by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in
Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not
add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other
words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that
is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e] very bill passed by the Congress
shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra,
the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution,
said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it
follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding
officer, of the proof that it has "passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional
requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would
only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the
statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding.
This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or
absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute.
The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer,
and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the
journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject
to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court
is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief
Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to
incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky
undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest
error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the
Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification
and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction
and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic
Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE
VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA"
is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The
temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in
defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of
societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on
individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity"
must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably
acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation,
which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to
withhold fulfillment.Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-
preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body
politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to
its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism
wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental
rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political
ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and
obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and
broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will
of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and
dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority
that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted
under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA
7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally
infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the
crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice
of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have
transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced
hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by
him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids
on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or
any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence
to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself
or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section
1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for
such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived
from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring
supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not
be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance
of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight
(8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080,
as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of
Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA
6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d)
Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case
No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to
the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the
charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to
give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary
to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of
preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to
prove lack of probable cause.The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of
the law under which they are charged were never raised in thatOmnibus Motion thus
indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim.
Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify
the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558
on the ground that the facts allegedtherein did not constitute an indictable offense since
the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended
Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the
Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June
2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September
2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law
is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving
the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due
process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so,
whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be
in harmony with the Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this
fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the
postulate of constitutional adjudication.This strong predilection for constitutionality takes
its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach
upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based
on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts
must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining
whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should
proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of
the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a
measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first
ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of
constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court,the constitutionality of the
challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available
grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally
deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly
and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down
on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party
challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that
there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing,there can be
no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As
tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably
failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his
violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and
conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable
certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by
receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any
other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c)
by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or
accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense
and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines;
and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated
or acquired is at leastP50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel,
in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in
identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little
difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing
or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or
combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law,
indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner
is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuses formerPRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE
VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan
or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and JohnDOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himselfAND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquireBY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN
THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
(P200,000,000.00)tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-
accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas,AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF
STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF
STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION
SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF
SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE
BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-
PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount ofMORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is
obviously none - that will confuse petitioner inhis defense. Although subject to proof, these
factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and
provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such
unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him
as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory
definition of the terms "combination" and"series" in the key phrase "a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word"pattern" in
Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional
for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to
due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered
uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them;[6] much less do we have to define every word
we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the
form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute
will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative
will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed
in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute
will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification,[7] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal
meaning to those words.[8] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of
combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual
characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial
and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in
their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill
which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A
COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE
HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more
means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are
included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not
twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two
different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or
series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said,
that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under
ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. So x x x x
 REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even
two acts may already result in such
a bigamount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a series
of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such
as. Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the
plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts
mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular
crime. But when we say acts of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr.
President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two
(2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g.,
raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of
assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or
criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all ofwhich fall under
Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive
meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically
providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan[9] that this
term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant
to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common
purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful
scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term
'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal
accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid
common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or
methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a
conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance
on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been
formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its
face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are
merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify
a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet
fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed
against such activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the
assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether
the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that
the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute
to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes
and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions,
especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the
details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is
vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."[14]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself
as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value
to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks
on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for
this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of
free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme
Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that "claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek
to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a
legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on
its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied
to the conduct of others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that
"one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."[20] As has been
pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth
challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of
due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review
the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected.[22] It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete
factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed
out in Younger v. Harris[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly
strong medicine," to be employed"sparingly and only as a last resort,"[25] and is generally
disfavored.[26] In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions
which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the
conduct with which the defendant is charged.[27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the
Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined
than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words
in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the
law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every
other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched
presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner
cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who
voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated
upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered
his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional
anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to
illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for
uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is
susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillochallenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among
others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law
meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its
vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the
Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits
through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross
inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because
they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged
and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The
phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence"
merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of
the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information
does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without
justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D.
Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978,
Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt
practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as
amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize
is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is
unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the
use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which was understood in its primary and general acceptation.Consequently, in that case,
petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of
the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only
proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a
criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor
the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal.[29] The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is
indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application
of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard
of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also
important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable
doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it
gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.[30] The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep.
Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is
alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will
prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the
information, does that not work against the right of the accused especially so if
the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the
totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation,
bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is
an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information three pairs
 of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt,
but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just
because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved
two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element
of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of
plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of
overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he
was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only
able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as
required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is
just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential
element of the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable
doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount
involved is P100 million.Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of
corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million,
but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the
amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount
involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million,
then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner
refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains
with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to
constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime
suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution
needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at
least P50,000,000.00.There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate,
supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed
fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50)
raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable
doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion
that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden
wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely
a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason
and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required
to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the
establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his
submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that
Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the
crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the
Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the
Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction
under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an
accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive
element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of
evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there
is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the
predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by
applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important
element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of
plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par.
(d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4
is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x
xx
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a
criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or
establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of
a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without
invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution
is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the
fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even
granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced
by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily
resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec.
4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance is heldinvalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the
application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared
invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case
although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated
independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best
be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is
a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring
Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens
rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended
information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and
criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and
that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of
Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be
evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to
establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.[33]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the
transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section
4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and
faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder,
the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts
constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be
proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by
the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an
element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his
criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no
reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal
in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying
criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."[35]
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to
have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it
among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous
crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these
groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very
nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an
animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her
growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is
raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death;
and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of
other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is
detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim
or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or
intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the
SO ORDERED.
structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly
lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to Republic of the Philippines
the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs SUPREME COURT
over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes Manila
like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving
government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed
EN BANC
to cause further destruction and damage to society.

G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that
it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently
wrong, they are mala in se[37] and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners,
special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in vs.
se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.
prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance
against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
DECISION

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law
of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds.Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the
day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned
by People v. Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this
Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and
becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of
officials in high places which have shakenits very foundation. The anatomy of graft and
corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the
government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of thenational treasury. Such is the Plunder Law,
especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if
left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and
institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will
of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the
avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few
issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by
petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial
under a virginal statute. This continuing
saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners
Spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez seeking to annul and set aside the
Resolutions, dated 11 June 20041 and 27 January 20052 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in E.O. Case No. 2000-36. In the Resolution of 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En
Bancdirected the Law Department to file the appropriate Information with the proper
court against petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for violation of
Section 10(g) and (j)3 in relation to Section 45(j)4 of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise
known as The Voters Registration Act of 1996.5 Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
thereon was denied.
The factual antecedents leading to the instant Petition are presented hereunder:
On 12 July 2000, private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino Apostol 6 filed a
Complaint-Affidavit7 with the COMELEC thru the Office of the Election Officer in Burauen,
Leyte, charging petitioners with violation of Section 261(y)(2)8 and Section 261(y)(5)9 of
the Omnibus Election Code, similarly referred to as Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and Section
1210 of Republic Act No. 8189.
Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal ages and residents of
113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City; on 9 May
2000 and 11 May 2000, petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez,
applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen,
Leyte, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 42454095 and 07902952,
respectively; in their sworn applications, petitioners made false and untruthful
representations in violation of Section 1011 of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by indicating
therein that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and
in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong
Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City, and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng
Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, as evidenced by Voter Registration
Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that petitioners, knowing fully well said truth,
intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in said applications corresponding
to the length of time which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte. In fine, private
respondent charged petitioners, to wit:
Respondent-spouses, Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez
committed and consummated election offenses in violation of our election
laws, specifically, Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (2), for knowingly
making any false or untruthful statements relative to any data or information
required in the application for registration, and of Sec. 261, paragraph (y),
subparagraph (5), committed by any person who, being a registered voter,
registers anew without filing an application for cancellation of his previous
registration, both of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881), and of Sec. 12,
RA 8189 (Voter Registration Act) for failure to apply for transfer of registration
records due to change of residence to another city or municipality."12
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted
by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against
petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.
Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss13 dated 2 April 2001.
They contended therein that they did not make any false or untruthful statements in their
application for registration. They avowed that they intended to reside in Burauen, Leyte,
since the year 1989. On 9 May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen, Leyte, by
leasing for five (5) years, the house of Juanito and Fe Renomeron at No. 935, San Jose
Street in Burauen, Leyte. On even date, the Barangay District III Council of Burauen
passed a Resolution of Welcome, expressing therein its gratitude and appreciation to
petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for choosing the Barangay as his official residence.14
On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal, COMELEC Investigating
Officer, issued a Resolution, recommending to the COMELEC Law Department
(Investigation and Prosecution Division), the filing of the appropriate Information against
petitioners, disposing, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution
Division), RECOMMENDS to file the necessary information against Carlos Sison
Romualdez before the proper Regional Trial Court for violation of Section 10
(g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic Act 8189 and to authorize
the Director IV of the Law Department to designate a Comelec Prosecutor to
handle the prosecution of the case with the duty to submit periodic report after
every hearing of the case.15
On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to depart from the
recommendatory Resolution of 28 November 2003, and ordered, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department is hereby directed to
file the appropriate information with the proper court against respondents
CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA ROMUALDEZ for violation of Section
10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of the Republic Act No. 8189. 16
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.
Acting on the Motion, the COMELEC found no cogent reason to disturb the assailed En
Banc Resolution of 11 June 2004,17 rationalizing, thus:
However, perusal of the records reveal (sic) that the arguments and issues
raised in the Motion for Reconsideration are merely a rehash of the arguments
advanced by the Respondents in [their] Memorandum received by the Law
Department on 17 April 2001, the same [w]as already considered by the
Investigating Officer and was discussed in her recommendation which
eventually was made as the basis for the En Bancs resolution.
As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing of request for the
cancellation and transfer of Voting Registration Record does not automatically
cancel the registration records. The fact remains that at the time of application
for registration as new voter of the herein Respondents on May 9 and 11, 2001
in the Office of Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte their registration in Barangay
4419-A, Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame Quezon City was still valid and
subsisting.18
On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law Department of the COMELEC filed
with the RTC, Burauen, Leyte, separate Informations against petitioner Carlos S.
Romualdez19 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No.
8189, and against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez20 for violation of Section 10(g), in
relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, subsequently docketed as Crim. Case
No. BN-06-03-4185 and Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4183, respectively. Moreover, separate
Informations for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No.
8189 were filed against petitioners.21
Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition, submitting the following
arguments:
 I We are not persuaded.

RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS First. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION; in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for
and violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.

II A reading of the relevant laws is in order, thus:

COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PREMISED ITS Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provide as follows:
RESOLUTION ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND FAILED TO CONSIDER
CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT
SEC. 10 Registration of Voters. - A qualified voter shall be registered in the
CONCLUSION.22
permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he
resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall
On 4 May 2006, petitioners filed a Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of personally accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed by the
Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt, 23 alleging that two separate Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during
Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, were filed with the RTC by the COMELEC office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.
against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section
45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9184; and for violation of
The application shall contain the following data:
Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No.
BN-06-03-9185. Similarly, the Motion alleged that the COMELEC filed with the RTC, two
separate Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, against petitioner Erlinda R. xxxx
Romualdez, charging her with the same offenses as those charged against petitioner
Carlos S. Romualdez, and thereafter, docketed as Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9182, and
(g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;
No. BN-06-03-9183.

xxxx
On 20 June 2006, this Court issued a Resolution24 denying for lack of merit petitioners
Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for
Indirect Contempt. (j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of any precinct;

We shall now resolve, in seriatim, the arguments raised by petitioners.
Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged by private
respondent are entirely different from those which they stand to be accused of before the
RTC by the COMELEC. According to petitioners, private respondents complaint charged
them for allegedly violating, to wit: 1) Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the
Omnibus Election Code, and 2) Section 12 of the Voters Registration Act; however, the
COMELEC En Bancdirected in the assailed Resolutions, that they be charged for violations
of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act.
Essentially, petitioners are of the view that they were not accorded due process of law.
Specifically, their right to refute or submit documentary evidence against the new charges
which COMELEC ordered to be filed against them. Moreover, petitioners insist that
Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act is vague as it does not refer to a definite
Moreover, Section 45(j) of the same Act, recites, thus:
provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense; hence, it
runs contrary to Section 14(1)25 and Section 14(2),26 Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of
the applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints,
with four identification size copies of his latest photograph, attached thereto,
to be taken at the expense of the Commission.
Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the Election
Officer shall inform him of the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed
by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to it that the accomplished application
contains all the data therein required and that the applicants specimen
signatures, fingerprints, and photographs are properly affixed in all copies of
the voters application.
SEC. 45. Election Offense. The following shall be considered election offenses
under this Act:
 xxxx This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve."

(j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act. 7. Respondent-spouses, registered as new voters of the Municipality of
Burauen, Leyte, [in spite of] the fact that they were and still are, registered
voters of Quezon City as early as June 22, 1997;
Significantly, the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit which was filed with the Law
Department of the COMELEC, support the charge directed by the COMELEC En Banc to be
filed against petitioners with the RTC. Even a mere perusal of the Complaint-Affidavit 7.1 That, Double Registration is an election offense.
would readily show that Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 was specifically mentioned
therein. On the matter of the acts covered by Section 10(g) and (j), the Complaint-
A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to register once.
Affidavit, spells out the following allegations, to wit:

If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a subsisting

5. Respondent-spouses made false and untruthful representations in their
registration, the new application for registration will be
applications (Annexes "B" and "C") in violation of the requirements of Section
disapproved. The registrant is also liable not only for an election
10, RA 8189 (The Voters Registration Act):
offense of double registration, but also for another election offense
of knowingly making any false or untruthful statement relative to
5.1 Respondent-spouses, in their sworn applications (Annexes "B" any data or information required in the application for registration.
and "C", claimed to be residents of 935 San Jose [S]treet, Burauen,
Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of
In fact, when a person applies for registration as a voter, he or she
113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa [S]treet, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
fills up a Voter Registration Record form in his or her own
Quezon City and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng
handwriting, which contains a Certification which reads:
Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, a copy of the
Certification issued by Hon. Emmanuel V. Gozon, Punong Barangay,
Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City is hereto attached and made "I do solemnly swear that the above statements regarding my
an integral part hereof, as Annex "D"; person are true and correct; that I possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications of a voter; that the thumbprints,
specimen signatures and photographs appearing herein are mine;
5.2 Respondent-spouses knowing fully well said truth, intentionally
and that I am not registered as a voter in any other precinct."27
and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in their applications
(Annexes "B" and "C") corresponding to the length of time they have
resided in Burauen, Leyte; Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election
offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from those for
which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first
6. Respondent-spouses, in (sic) all intents and purposes, were and still are
place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges as contained in the
residents and registered voters of Quezon City, as evidenced by Voter
Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the
Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively; photocopies
denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section
of which are hereto attached as Annexes "E" and "F"[.] Likewise, attached is a
261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic
"Certification" (Annex "G") of Ms. Evelyn B. Bautista, Officer-in-Charge of the
Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC against
Office of the Election Officer, Fourth District, Quezon City, dated May 31, 2000,
petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same set of
together with a certified copy of the computer print-out of the list of voters of
facts as originally alleged in the private respondents Complaint-Affidavit.
Precinct No. 4419-A (Annex "G-1" ) containing the names of voters Carlos
Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez. The Certification reads as follows:
Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying on the case of Lacson v.
Executive Secretary.28Citing Lacson, petitioners argue that the real nature of the criminal
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per office record MR. CARLOS
charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information; and
ROMUALDEZ and MS. ERLINDA REYES ROMUALDEZ are registered
that the object of such written accusations was to furnish the accused with such a
voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon
description of the charge against him, as will enable him to make his defense. Let it be
City, Precinct Number 4419A with voters affidavit serial nos.
said that, in Lacson, this court resolved the issue of whether under the allegations in the
26195824 and 26195823, respectively.
subject Informations therein, it is the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court which
has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against therein petitioner and intervenors.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial.29 Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real
nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint
or Information.30
Petitioners reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due
process because, as we have said, the charges contained in private respondents
Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on
the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private respondents
Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the Informations filed with the
RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners
cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against
the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process
because they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private
respondents Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-
Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law
Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before the said body.
Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at
bar, we agree with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were
reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the charges against them. It likewise
bears stressing that preliminary investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were
informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They were given
the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages,
petitioners actively participated.
The instant case calls to our minds Orquinaza v. People,31 wherein the concerned police
officer therein designated the offense charged as sexual harassment; but, the prosecutor
found that there was no transgression of the anti-sexual harassment law, and instead,
filed an Information charging therein petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. On a claim
that there was deprivation of due process, therein petitioner argued that the Information
for acts of lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted was for
sexual harassment. The court held that the designation by the police officer of the offense
is not conclusive as it is within the competence of the prosecutor to assess the evidence
submitted and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged.
Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained all the allegations to
support the charge of acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code; hence, the
conduct of another preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness
would be a futile exercise because the complainant would only be presenting the same
facts and evidence which have already been studied by the prosecutor.32 The court
frowns upon such superfluity which only serves to delay the prosecution and disposition
of the criminal complaint.33
Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189
vague, on the ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987
Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof.
Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a
definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense.
We are not convinced.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.34 However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal
statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that
facial invalidation35 or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not
appropriate.36 We have so enunciated in no uncertain terms in Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan, 37 thus:
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been
pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes
found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as
applied' to a particular defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the
ground of ambiguity." While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-
vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu
Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because
it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v.
Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute.
Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was
unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not
because of vagueness.
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a
mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the
courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual
requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be
made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness.
In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court
in these words:
 "[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and
requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is
rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of
the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided."
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of
statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the constitutionality
of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated
must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant
has been charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to
bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No.
8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the
instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and
(j) of Republic Act No. 8189the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An
expanded examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners case
would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there must
be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not
conjectural or anticipatory.
We further quote the relevant ruling in David v. Arroyo on the proscription anent a facial
challenge:38
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a
law that "reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive
control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly,
lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and
"constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly
be held void on its face and when such summary action is inappropriate. But
the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth
adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that
its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise
unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from
pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls
within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate
state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct." Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017
pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject
to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally
disfavored;" The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules
governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a
law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it
may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other
situations not before the Court. A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law
explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks
an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation.
Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as
applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are
not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their
own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges
are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates
the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the
overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from
the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent
effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring
suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect
on the speech of those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require
the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the
basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction
that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression.
Xxx xxx xxx
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there
 can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners
did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of
vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine"
which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is
subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is
also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on
its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.
Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. 39 This Court
has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude.40
As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses
under the same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification that a
violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense. The
language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no other
interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no guesswork. We do not
see herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague.
Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or
meaning of which they do not understand. This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan42 where therein petitioner sought for statutory definition of particular
words in the challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada rejected the argument.
This Court reasoned:
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words
of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The
intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed.
Perforce, this Court has underlined that an act will not be held invalid merely because it
might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially
where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in
advance as in all other statutes.43
The evident intent of the legislature in including in the catena of election offenses the
violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, is to subsume as punishable,
not only the commission of proscribed acts, but also the omission of acts enjoined to be
observed. On this score, the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The
law articulates the policy of the State to systematize the present method of registration in
order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. A reading of
Section 45 (j) conjointly with the provisions upon which petitioners are charged, i.e.,
Sections 10 (g) and (j) would reveal that the matters that are required to be set forth
under the aforesaid sections are crucial to the achievement of a clean, complete,
permanent and updated list of voters. The factual information required by the law is
sought not for mere embellishment.
There is a definitive governmental purpose when the law requires that such facts should
be set forth in the application. The periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place
of registration delve into the matter of residency, a requisite which a voter must satisfy to
be deemed a qualified voter and registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of
the city or municipality wherein he resides. Of even rationality exists in the case of the
requirement in Section 10 (j), mandating that the applicant should state that he/she is not
a registered voter of any precinct. Multiple voting by so-called flying voters are glaring
anomalies which this country strives to defeat. The requirement that such facts as
required by Section 10 (g) and Section 10 (j) be stated in the voters application form for
registration is directly relevant to the right of suffrage, which the State has the right to
regulate.

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not

It is the opportune time to allude to the case of People v. Gatchalian44 where the therein
rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
assailed law contains a similar provision as herein assailed before us. Republic Act No.
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;
602 also penalizes any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of the Act. The
much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no
Court dismissed the challenged, and declared the provision constitutional. The Court
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to
in Gatchalian read the challenged provision, "any of the provisions of this [A]ct"
define each and every word in an enactment.Congress is not restricted in
conjointly with Section 3 thereof which was the pertinent portion of the law upon which
the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words
therein accused was prosecuted. Gatchalian considered the terms as all-embracing;
employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity
hence, the same must include what is enjoined in Section 3 thereof which embodies the
of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered
very fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted. This Court ruled that the
from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law."
law by legislative fiat intends to punish not only those expressly declared unlawful but
even those not so declared but are clearly enjoined to be observed to carry out the
fundamental purpose of the law.45 Gatchalian remains good law, and stands unchallenged.
It also does not escape the mind of this Court that the phraseology in Section 45(j) is
employed by Congress in a number of our laws.46 These provisions have not been
declared unconstitutional.
Moreover, every statute has in its favor the presumption of validity. 47 To justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not
one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.48 We hold that petitioners failed to
overcome the heavy presumption in favor of the law. Its constitutionality must be upheld
in the absence of substantial grounds for overthrowing the same.
A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of constitutionality
unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota. In the case at bar, the lis mota is the
alleged grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC in finding probable cause for the filing
of criminal charges against petitioners.
Third. Petitioners maintain that the COMELEC En Banc, premised its finding on a
misapprehension of facts, and committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing
of Informations against them with the RTC.
We are once again unimpressed.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC finds statutory
expression under Section 26549 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code.50 The task of the COMELEC whenever any election offense charge
is filed before it is to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case, and make a
determination of probable cause. Under Section 8(b), Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the investigating officer makes a determination of whether there is a
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed. 51 In Baytan v.
COMELEC,52 this Court, sufficiently elucidated on the matter of probable cause in the
prosecution of election offenses, viz:
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of
election offenses rests in the COMELEC's sound discretion. The COMELEC
exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offense and malpractices. Generally, the Court will
not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be
provided by law.53
It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable cause by the
COMELEC in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.54
According to the COMELEC En Banc, the investigating officer, in the case at bar, held that
there was sufficient cause for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners, and found
no reason to depart therefrom. Without question, on May 9 and 11 of 2001, petitioners
applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen,
Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of petitioners registration records as registered
voters of Precinct No. 4419-A of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon
City. The directive by the COMELEC which affirmed the Resolution55 of 28 November
2000 of Investigating Officer Atty. Tangaro-Casingal does not appear to be wanting in
factual basis, such that a reasonably prudent man would conclude that there exists
probable cause to hold petitioners for trial. Thus, in the aforesaid Resolution, the
Investigating Officer, found:
A violation therefore of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election
offense.
In the instant case, when respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda
Romualdez filed their respective applications for registration as new voters
with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte on May 9 and 11, 2001,
respectively, they stated under oath that they are not registered voters in other
precinct (VRR Nos. 42454095 and 07902941). However, contrary to their
statements, records show they are still registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-
A, barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, as per VRR
Nos. 26195825 and 26195823. In other words, respondents registration
records in Quezon City is (sic) still in existence.
While it may be true that respondents had written the City Election Officer of
District IV, Quezon City for cancellation of their voters registration record as
voters (sic) therein, they cannot presume that the same will be favorably acted
upon. Besides, RA 8189 provides for the procedure in cases of transfer of
residence to another city/municipality which must be complied with, to wit:
"Section 12. Change of Residence to Another City or Municipality. Any
registered voter who has transferred residence to another city or municipality
may apply with the Election Officer of his new residence for the transfer of his
registration records.
The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the requirements
of notice and hearing and the approval of the Election Registration Board, in
accordance with this Act. Upon approval, of the application for transfer, and
 after notice of such approval to the Election Officer of their former residence of
the voter, said Election Officer shall transmit by registered mail the voters
registration record to the Election Officer of the voters new residence."
They cannot claim ignorance of the abovestated provision on the procedure for
transfer of registration records by reason of transferred new residence to
another municipality. Based on the affidavit executed by one Eufemia S.
Cotoner, she alleged that the refusal of the Assistant Election Officer Ms.
Estrella Perez to accept the letter of respondents was due to improper
procedure because respondents should have filed the required request for
transfer with the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte. Despite this knowledge,
however, they proceeded to register as new voters of Burauen, Leyte,
notwithstanding the existence of their previous registrations in Quezon City.
In their subsequent affidavit of Transfer of Voters Registration under Section
12 of Republic Act 8189, respondents admitted that they erroneously filed an
application as a new voter (sic) with the office of the Election Officer of
Burauen, Leyte, by reason of an honest mistake, which they now desire to
correct. (underscoring ours).
Respondents lose sight of the fact that a statutory offense, such as violation of
election law, is mala prohibita. Proof of criminal intent is not necessary. Good
faith, ignorance or lack of malice is beside the point. Commission of the act is
sufficient. It is the act itself that is punished.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department respectfully submits that there is
probable cause to hold respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez
for trial in violation of Section 10(g) and (j) in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189. There is no doubt that they applied for registration as
new voters of Burauen, Leyte consciously, freely and voluntarily.56
We take occasion to reiterate that the Constitution grants to the COMELEC the power to
prosecute cases or violations of election laws. Article IX (C), Section 2 (6) of the 1987
Constitution, provides:
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court
for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and where appropriate,
prosecute cases or violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
This power to prosecute necessarily involves the power to determine who shall be
prosecuted, and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute. 57 Evidently, must
this power to prosecute also include the right to determine under which laws prosecution
will be pursued. The courts cannot dictate the prosecution nor usurp its discretionary
powers. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutors discretion and control of
the criminal prosecution.58Its rationale cannot be doubted. For the business of a court of
justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of
the prosecution to prosecute.59 Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the
selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more
than courts should correct the blunders of the defense.60
Fourth. In People v. Delgado,61 this Court said that when the COMELEC, through its duly
authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and
upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the Information in the proper court,
said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent
disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The records show
that Informations charging petitioners with violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation
to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 had been filed with the RTC. The case must,
thus, be allowed to take its due course.
It may be recalled that petitioners prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before this Court to restrain the COMELEC from
executing its Resolutions of 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005. In a Resolution dated 20
June 2006, this Court En Banc denied for lack of merit petitioners Motion Reiterating
Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt.
Logically, the normal course of trial is expected to have continued in the proceedings a
quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 and
27 January 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for
appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.: of the termination of the publication of the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on
this article is of the opinion that the word "laws" include regulations and circulars issued
in accordance with the same. He says:
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding
him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of
Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en
of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Sentencia de 22 de Junio de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion
generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las
The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting
mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo
of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell
ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus
the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of
disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia
such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim
de su publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no
that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or
fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil
omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and
Espaol, Vol. I. p. 52).
effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said
circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general
applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year
Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's
issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect. conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did
not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or
after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation,
We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the
for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange
publication of the circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to
in his possession thereof.
become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions,
decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by
law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the
make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the Circular is being raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by
guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been
Printing. raised in the court below and which is within the issues made by the parties in their
pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the question of non-publication
is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published
However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by
as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such
Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the
circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular
fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette.
or committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This
Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall
question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court
take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
below.
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank
is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its
issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant,
U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, with costs de oficio.
circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in
question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must
first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and Republic of the Philippines
its penalties. SUPREME COURT
Manila
Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the
effectivity of laws, (Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after EN BANC
their promulgation, and that their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day
G.R. No. 84111 December 22, 1989
JIMMY O. YAOKASIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, SALVADOR M. MISON and the DISTRICT
COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF TACLOBAN, VICENTE D. YUTANGCO, respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition questions the power of automatic review of the Commissioner of Customs
over the decision of the Collector of Customs in protest and seizure cases.
On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/ sacks of refined sugar,
which were being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody
of the Bureau of Customs.
The petitioner presented a sales invoice from the Jordan Trading of Iloilo (Annex A,
Petition) to prove that the sugar was purchased locally. The District Collector of Customs,
however, proceeded with the seizure of the bags of sugar.
On June 3 and 6, 1988, show-cause hearings were conducted. On June 7, 1988, the District
Collector of Customs ordered the release of the sugar as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered subject Nine Thousand (9,000)
sacks/bags of refined sugar are hereby ordered released to Mr.
Jimmy O. Yaokasin, consignee/claimant and the immediate
withdrawal of Customs Guard within its bodega's premises. (p. 276,
Rollo.)
On June 10, 1988, the decision, together with the entire records of the case, were
transmitted to, and received by, the Commissioner of Customs (Annex H, Petition, p. 277,
Rollo).
On June 14, 1988, without modifying his decision, the District Collector of Customs
ordered the warehouse, wherein the bags of sugar were stored, to be sealed.
On June 19, 1988, the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Board (EIIB) filed a Motion
for Reconsideration (Annex I, Petition, p. 278, Rollo), for "further hearing on the merits"
(p. 279, Rollo), based on evidence that the seized sugar was of foreign origin. Petitioner
opposed the motion for being merely pro forma and/or that the same was, in effect, a
motion for new trial.
Hearing Officer Paula Alcazaren set the Motion for reconsideration for hearing on July 13,
1988.
But before that, or on July 4, 1988, the Commissioner of Customs by "2nd Indorsement"
returned to the District Collector of Customs the:
... folder of Tacloban S.I. No. 06-01 (R.P. vs. 9000 bags/sacks of
refined sugar, MR. JIMMY YAOKASIN, consignee/claimant), together
with the proposed decision, for hearing and/or resolution of the
government is motion for reconsideration ... . (p. 437, Rollo, Emphasis
Ours.)
On the same date, July 4, 1988, petitioner applied for and secured a writ of replevin from
the Regional Trial Court of Leyte (CC 7627, Branch VII), through a Petition/Complaint for
certiorari Prohibition with Replevin and Damages with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Restraining Order (Annex L, Petition, p. 288, Rollo).
On July 12, 1988, respondent District Collector of Customs filed an Answer assailing the
court's jurisdiction. On the same day, the District Collector and the Commissioner of
Customs filed in the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with
Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order to annul the
July 4, 1988 "Order Granting Replevin with Temporary Restraining Order" (CA-G.R. SP
NO. 15090; p. 396, Rollo).
On July 15, 1988, the Collector of Customs reconsidered his June 7, 1988 decision, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the undersigned hereby reconsiders his Decision,
finds that the 9,000 bags/sacks of refined sugar in question are of
foreign origin, smuggled into the country, and declares them
forfeited in favor of the government.
Considering the provision in the quoted Customs Memorandum
Order, especially the latter part thereof prohibiting the release of the
articles in question to the claimant, and considering also that the
said sacks of sugar are presently stored in the bodega of claimant,
and considering further that there are no facilities for storage in
Tacloban City, for security reasons, the Honorable Commissioner of
Customs is respectfully and earnestly urged to order the immediate
transfer of the sugar from the said bodega to any Customs Warehouse,
preferably in Manila and to this end to order the setting aside of such
sum of money in order to effectively accomplish this purpose." (p. 11,
Rollo.)
Also, on the same day, the Court of Appeals: (a) gave due course to respondent's petition;
and (b) restrained Judge Pedro S. Espina, Regional Trial Court, Leyte, from further
proceeding in Civil Case No. 7627, and from enforcing his Order of July 4, 1988.
It is petitioner's contention that the June 7, 1988 decision of the District Collector of
Customs became final and executory, in view of the absence of an appeal therefrom by the
"aggrieved party" (himself) within the 15-day period provided for in Sec. 2313 of the
Tariff and Customs Code. Hence, the release of the 9,000 bags of sugar must be upheld.
On the other hand, the District Collector and the Commissioner of Customs argue that
since the June 7, 1988 decision is adverse to the government, the case should go to the
Commissioner of Customs on automatic review, pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 20-
87, dated May 18, 1987, of former Acting Commissioner of Customs Alexander Padilla,
which provides:
CUSTOMS MEMORANDUM ORDER
NO. 20-87
TO: All Collectors of Customs and Others Concerned
Effective immediately, you are hereby directed to implement strictly
the following
Decisions of the Collector of Customs in seizure
and protest cases are subject to review by the
Commissioner upon appeal as provided under
existing laws; provided, however, that where a
decision of the Collector of Customs in such
seizure and protest cases is adverse to the
government it shall automatically be
reviewed by the Commissioner of Customs. (PD.
No. 1, Annex C.)
In view thereof, no releases in any seizure or like cases may be
effected unless and until the decision of the Collector has been
confirmed in writing by the Commissioner of Customs.
For immediate and strict compliance.
(p. 436, Rollo; Emphasis Ours)
The memorandum order implements Section 12 (Art. IV, Part. IV, Vol. I) of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan (hereafter, "PLAN") which provides:
12. The Collector of Customs at each principal port of entry shall be
the official head of the customs service in his port and district
responsible to the Commissioner. He shall have the authority to take
final action on the enforcement of tariff and customs laws within his
collection district and on administrative matters in accordance with
Chapter III, Part II of this Plan. Decisions of the Collector of Customs
in seizure and protest cases are subject to review by the
Commissioner upon appeal as provided under existing
laws; provided, however, that where a decision of a Collector of
Customs in such seizure and protest cases is adverse to the
government, it shall automatically be reviewed by the Commissioner
of Customs which, if affirmed, shall automatically be elevated for final
review by the Secretary of Finance; provided, further that if within
thirty days from receipt of the records of the case by the Commissioner
of Customs or the Secretary of Finance, no decision is rendered by the
Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of Finance, the decision
under review shall become final and executory. (Emphasis supplied)
In Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September 24, 1972, former President Marcos decreed
and ordered that the Plan be (4 adopted, approved, and made as part of the law of the
land." Under the 1987 Constitution, "[a]ll existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instruction, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art.
XVIII). While some provisions of the Plan have ceased to be operative because of
subsequent reorganizations, other provisions, such as Section 12 have not been repealed
by subsequent legislation.
Section 12 of the Plan applies to petitioner's shipment of 9,000 bags of sugar. Taxes being
the lifeblood of the Government, Section 12, which the Commissioner of Customs in his
Customs Memorandum Order No. 20-87, enjoined all collectors to follow strictly, is
intended to protect the interest of the Government in the collection of taxes and customs
duties in those seizure and protest cases which, without the automatic review provided
therein, neither the Commissioner of Customs nor the Secretary of Finance would
probably ever know about. Without the automatic review by the Commissioner of
Customs and the Secretary of Finance, a collector in any of our country's far-flung ports,
would have absolute and unbridled discretion to determine whether goods seized by him
are locally produced, hence, not dutiable or of foreign origin, and therefore subject to
payment of customs duties and taxes. His decision, unless appealed by the aggrieved
party (the owner of the goods), would become final with 'the no one the wiser except
himself and the owner of the goods. The owner of the goods cannot be expected to appeal
the collector's decision when it is favorable to him. A decision that is favorable to the
taxpayer would correspondingly be unfavorable to the Government, but who will appeal
the collector's decision in that case certainly not the collector.
Evidently, it was to cure this anomalous situation (which may have already defrauded our
government of huge amounts of uncollected taxes), that the provision for automatic
review by the Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of Finance of unappealed
seizure and protest cases was conceived to protect the government against corrupt and SO ORDERED.
conniving customs collectors.

Section 12 of the Plan and Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code do not conflict
with each other. They may co-exist. Section 2313 of the Code provides for the procedure
for the review of the decision of a collector in seizure and protest cases upon appeal by
the aggrieved party, i.e., the importer or owner of the goods. On the other hand, Section
12 of the Plan refers to the general procedure in appeals in seizure and protest cases with
a special proviso on automatic review when the collector's decision is adverse to the
government. Section 2313 and the proviso in Section 12, although they both relate to the
review of seizure and protest cases, refer to two different situations when the
collector's decision is adverse to the importer or owner of the goods, and when the
decision is adverse to the government.

The decision of the Court in the case of Sy Man vs. Jacinto (93 Phil. 1093 [19531]), which
the petitioner invokes as precedent, is riot in point. In the present case the Acting
Commissioner, in issuing the memorandum circular, was directing strict compliance with
an existing provision of law, which mandates automatic review of decisions of collectors
in seizure and protest cases which are adverse to the government. On the other hand,
in Sy Man, the memorandum order of the Insular Collector of Customs directed the
elevation of records in seizure and forfeiture cases for automatic review even if he had
not been expressly granted such power under the then existing law.

The objection to the enforcement of Section 12 of the Plan and CMO No. 20-87 on the
ground that they had not been published in the Official Gazette, is not well taken. The
Plan, as part of P.D. No. 1, was "adopted, approved and made as part of the law of the
land" and published in Volume 68, No. 40, p. 7797 of the Official Gazette issue of October
2, 1972.

Article 2 of the Civil Code, which requires laws to be published in the Official Gazette,
does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 which is only an administrative order of the
Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates. the customs collectors.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 (an Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette) enumerates what shall be published in the Official
Gazette besides legislative acts and resolutions of a public natureof the Congress of the
Philippines. Executive and administrative orders and proclamations, shall also be
published in the Official Gazette, except such as have no general applicability." CMO No. 20-
87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an
issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs
collectors). "It need not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to
all concerned" (Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27).

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. The temporary
restraining order which we issued in this case is hereby made permanent. Cost against
the petitioner.