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LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.
G.R. No. 118712
October 6, 1995 (2D)

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. 118745
October 6, 1995

Facts: Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No.
118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of
Appeals, granting private respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. However, upon motion filed by
private respondents, the petitions were ordered consolidated. Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the
Resolution, denying their motion for reconsideration.

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to
transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Aggrieved
by the alleged lapses of the DAR and LBP with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their
land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents argued that
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the LBP, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an
accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are
cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and
the LBP merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as
landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must
be deposited in cash or in bonds. The respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor of private
respondents. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied the same, hence, the
instant petitions.

Issue: Whether or not the deposit may be made in other forms besides cash or LBP bonds

Held: In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations
when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in
behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that
the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". If it were the intention to include a "trust account"
among the valid modes of deposit that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to
have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed.

The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to
be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of
compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule
that there must be full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is
transferred.

Issue: Whether or not there should be a distinction the deposit of compensation and determination of just
compensation

Held: To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf
as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding
that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties is an oppressive exercise of
eminent domain. It is unnecessary to distinguish between deposit of compensation (provisional) under Section
16(e) and determination of just compensation (final) under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the
landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same the landowner
is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately
compensated.

Reyes v. NHA G.R. No. 147511

FACTS: Petitioners sugarcane lands were ordered expropriated in favor of respondent National Housing
Authority (NHA) for the public purpose of the expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to
accommodate the squatters relocated from the Metropolitan Manila Area. The trial court ordered the
expropriation of said lots and the payment of just compensation. Respondent allegedly failed to follow court
orders as they allegedly did not relocate the squatters to the expropriated land in violation of the stated public
purpose for expropriation and had not paid just compensation fixed by the court. Petitioners also questioned
the public nature of the construction of low cost housing units on the expropriated land. Petitioners further
aver that the land should be returned to them for the failure of respondent to pay just compensation.
Petitioners then prayed for respondent NHA to be enjoined from disposing and alienating the expropriated
properties and that judgement be rendered forfeiting all its rights under the expropriation judgment. The trial
court dismissed the decision which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether
or not the expropriation of the sugarcane lands constitutes taking for public purpose HELD: The court held that
the expropriation of the sugarcane lands constitutes taking for public purpose as it is in compliance with the
public use requirement. The constitution determined two cases which connote public use: 1. the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into smaller lots for resale at cost to individuals and 2. the transfer of
utilities and other private enterprises to the government through the exercise of his power. At present,
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The
expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in
furtherance of the social justice set in the constitution. The constitution provides for the exercise of the power
of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of just compensation. However, the court ruled in
several cases that non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover
possession of their expropriated lots. Petitioners are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated
lots devoted for public use but may only demand for the market value of the same. However, respondents
refusal to pay just compensation because of the alleged failure of petitioners to pay capital gains tax is
unjustified. The expropriation judgment to pay just compensation is not subject to any condition. And,
although the right to enter upon and appropriate the land to public use is completed upon payment, title to
expropriated property shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. If property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court, the final
compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to
the time when compensation is actually paid. Therefore, petitioners are not entitled to the return of the
expropriated property. However, respondent should pay the outstanding balance of the property plus legal
interest at 12% per annum. Note: Constitutional restraints of the power of eminent domain: 1. Public use 2.
Just Compensation Concept of Public use - synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare,
and public convenience. Whatever may be employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use. Constitutional limitation of just compensation - the sum equivalent to the Market Value of the
property