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TORTS and DAMAGES

Suzara vs Benipayo (1989)

Facts:

1. Suzara et al entered into employment contracts with Magsaysay lines to work aboard vessels
owned/operated/manned by the latter for a period of 12 calendar months and with different
rating/position, salary, overtime pay and allowance. The contracts were approved by the National
Seamen Board.

2. Upon arrival at the port of Vancouver, Canada, demands for increase in wages were made
through the help of the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), a militant worldwide
especially in Canada, Australia, Scandinavia, and various European countries, interdicting foreign vessels
and demanding wage increases for third world seamen.

3. Wages were increased but complaints were filed by Magsaysay before the NSB. NSB ordered the
return of the additional wages paid for being obtained thru violent means and for lacking NSB approval.
NLRC affirmed the order.

4. Meanwhile, Magsaysay filed estafa charges against the seamen.

5. In this petition, the seamen seeks for the reversal of the NLRC decision and the quashal of the
complaints for estafa.

Issue:

Whether the increase in wages needed the approval of the NSB to be legal (NO)

Ratio:

1. There is nothing in the record supporting the finding that the workers resorted to violent means
to obtain an increase in their wages.

2. It is impractical for the NSB to require the petitioners, caught in the middle of a labor struggle
between the ITF and owners of ocean going vessels halfway around the world in Vancouver, British
Columbia to first secure the approval of the NSB in Manila before signing an agreement which the
employer was willing to sign

3. Accdg to the case of Vir-Jen: The form contracts approved by the National Seamen Board are
designed to protect Filipino seamen not foreign shipowners who can take care of themselves. The
standard forms embody the basic minimums which must be incorporated as parts of the employment
contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code).lwph1.t They are
not collective bargaining agreements or immutable contracts which the parties cannot improve upon or
modify in the course of the agreed period of time

4. The NSB, the Department of Labor and Employment and all its agencies exist primarily for the
workingman's interest and the nation's as a whole.
MITSUI VS. CA, 287 SCRA 366

MENDOZA, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. is a foreign corporation represented in the Philippines by its agent,
Magsaysay Agencies. It entered into a contract of carriage through Meister Transport, Inc., an
international freight forwarder, with private respondent Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing Corporation
to transport goods of the latter from Manila to Le Havre, France. Petitioner undertook to deliver the
goods to France 28 days from initial loading. On July 24, 1991, petitioner's vessel loaded private
respondent's container van for carriage at the said port of origin.

However, in Kaoshiung, Taiwan the goods were not transshipped immediately, with the result that the
shipment arrived in Le Havre only on November 14, 1991. The consignee allegedly paid only half the
value of the said goods on the ground that they did not arrive in France until the "off season" in that
country. The remaining half was allegedly charged to the account of private respondent which in turn
demanded payment from petitioner through its agent.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent's action is for "loss or damage" to goods shipped, within the
meaning of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).

Ruling:

No. The suit is not for "loss or damage" to goods contemplated in 3(6), the question of prescription of
action is governed not by the COGSA but by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code which provides for a prescriptive
period of ten years. As defined in the Civil Code and as applied to Section 3(6), paragraph 4 of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, "loss" contemplates merely a situation where no delivery at all was made
by the shipper of the goods because the same had perished, gone out of commerce, or disappeared in
such a way that their existence is unknown or they cannot be recovered.

There would be some merit in appellant's insistence that the damages suffered by him as a result of the
delay in the shipment of his cargo are not covered by the prescriptive provision of the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act above referred to, if such damages were due, not to the deterioration and decay of the goods
while in transit, but to other causes independent of the condition of the cargo upon arrival, like a drop in
their market value.
Case Title: People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729

Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an appeal that urges the revocation of a
demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manila presented by the defendant. The defendant,
accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality
while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shores of the city. In the
said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime,
which resulted to the dismissal of the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard merchant
vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters.

Held:

Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus the Philippine courts have a
right of jurisdiction over the said offense. The Court said that having the opium smoked within our
territorial waters even though aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public order because it
causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore, the demurrer is revoked
and the Court ordered further proceedings.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE
AND SURETY CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-49407 19 August 1988

Facts:

National Development Company (NDC) appointed Maritime Company of the Philippines (MCP) as its
agent to manage and operate its vessel, Dona Nati, for and in behalf of its account. In 1964, while en
route to Japan from San Francisco, Dona Nati collided with a Japanese vessel, SS Yasushima Maru,
causing its cargo to be damaged and lost. The private respondent, as insurer to the consigners, paid
almost Php400,000.00 for said lost and damaged cargo. Hence, the private respondent instituted an
action to recover from NDC.

Issue:

Which laws govern the loss and destruction of goods due to collision of vessels outside Philippine
waters?

Ruling:

In a previously decided case, it was held that the law of the country to which the goods are to be
transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration
pursuant to Article 1753 of the Civil Code. It is immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign
waters, such as Ise Bay, Japan.

It appears, however, that collision falls among matters not specifically regulated by the Civil Code,
hence, we apply Articles 826 to 839, Book Three of the Code of Commerce, which deal exclusively with
collision of vessels.
Everett Steamship Corporation vs. CA

G.R. No.122494, October 8, 1998

BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Validity of the Bill of lading in a contract of carriage

BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

Private respondent imported 3 crates of bus spare parts marked as MARCO C/No. 12, MARCO C/No. 13
and MARCO C/No. 14, from its supplier, Maruman Trading Company, Ltd. (Maruman Trading), a foreign
corporation based in Inazawa, Aichi, Japan. The crates were shipped from Nagoya, Japan to Manila on
board "ADELFAEVERETTE," a vessel owned by petitioner's principal, Everett Orient Lines. Upon arrival at
the port of Manila, it was discovered that the crate marked MARCO C/No. 14 was missing. Private
respondent claim upon petitioner for the value of the lost cargo amounting to One Million Five Hundred
Fifty Two Thousand Five Hundred (Y1, 552,500.00) Yen, the amount shown in an Invoice No. MTM-941,
dated November 14, 1991. However, petitioner offered to pay only One Hundred Thousand
(Y100,000.00) Yen, the maximum amount stipulated under Clause 18 of the covering bill of lading which
limits the liability of petitioner. Private respondent rejected the offer and thereafter instituted a suit for
collection. The trial court rendered a decision in favour of the private respondents and this was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Thus, this instant petition.

ISSUES:

1. Is the petitioner liable for the actual value and not the maximum value recoverable under the
bill of lading?

2. Is private respondent, as consignee, who is not a signatory to the bill of lading bound by the
stipulations thereof?

ARGUMENTS:

1. The Petitioner is only liable for the maximum value recoverable under the bill of lading.

Clause 18 of the covering bill of lading:

18. All claims for which the carrier may be liable shall be adjusted and settled on the basis of the
shipper's net invoice cost plus freight and insurance premiums, if paid, and in no event shall the carrier
be liable for any loss of possible profits or any consequential loss.

The carrier shall not be liable for any loss of or any damage to or in any connection with, goods in an
amount exceeding One Hundred thousand Yen in Japanese Currency (Y100,000.00) or its equivalent in
any other currency per package or customary freight unit (whichever is least) unless the value of the
goods higher than this amount is declared in writing by the shipper before receipt of the goods by the
carrier and inserted in the Bill of Lading and extra freight is paid as required. (Emphasis supplied)

Pertinent provisions that is applicable as to this case:

Art. 1749. A stipulation that the common carrier's liability is limited to the value of the goods appearing
in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding.

Art. 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances,
and has been freely and fairly agreed upon.

Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions of law, it is required that the stipulation limiting the common
carrier's liability for loss must be "reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been freely and
fairly agreed upon."

The above stipulations are reasonable and just. In the bill of lading, the carrier made it clear that its
liability would only be up to One Hundred Thousand (Y100,000.00) Yen. However, the shipper, Maruman
Trading, had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was higher than the limited
liability of the carrier. Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher valuation, it had itself to
blame for not complying with the stipulations.

2. Private Respondents are still bound by the stipulations of the bill of lading

In Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (supra), it was held that even if the consignee
was not a signatory to the contract of carriage between the shipper and the carrier, the consignee can
still be bound by the contract.

RULING:

The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

In fine, the liability of petitioner for the loss of the cargo is limited to One Hundred Thousand
(Y100,000.00) Yen, pursuant to Clause 18 of the bill of lading..
Georgia W. Babcock, Appellant,

Mabel B. Jackson, as Executrix of William H. Jackson, Deceased, Respondent.

________________________________________

Court of Appeals of New York

Argued January 23, 1963

Decided May 9, 1963

________________________________________

12 NY2d 473

CITE TITLE AS: Babcock v Jackson

________________________________________

[*476] OPINION OF THE COURT

FULD, J.

On Friday, September 16, 1960, Miss Georgia Babcock and her friends, Mr. and Mrs. William Jackson, all
residents of Rochester, left that city in Mr. Jackson's automobile, Miss Babcock as guest, for a week-end
trip to Canada. Some hours later, as Mr. Jackson was driving in the Province of Ontario, he apparently
lost control of the car; it went off the highway into an adjacent stone wall, and Miss Babcock was
seriously injured. Upon her return to this State, she brought [*477]the present action against William
Jackson, alleging negligence on his part in operating his automobile. [1]

At the time of the accident, there was in force in Ontario a statute providing that "the owner or driver of
a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers for compensation,
is not liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being
carried in * * * the motor vehicle" (Highway Traffic Act of Province of Ontario [Ontario Rev. Stat. (1960),
ch. 172], 105, subd. [2]). Even though no such bar is recognized under this State's substantive law of
torts (see, e.g., Higgins v. Mason, 255 N. Y. 104, 108; Nelson v. Nygren, 259 N. Y. 71), the defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the law of the place where the accident occurred
governs and that Ontario's guest statute bars recovery. The court at Special Term, agreeing with the
defendant, granted the motion and the Appellate Division, over a strong dissent by Justice Halpern,
affirmed the judgment of dismissal without opinion.

The question presented is simply drawn. Shall the law of the place of the tort [2] invariably govern the
availability of relief for the tort or shall the applicable choice of law rule also reflect a consideration of
other factors which are relevant to the purposes served by the enforcement or denial of the remedy?

The traditional choice of law rule, embodied in the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws ( 384), and
until recently unquestioningly followed in this court (see, e.g., Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc., 298 N. Y. 62, 66;
Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, 5 N Y 2d 1016,modfg. 6 A D 2d 223), has been that the substantive
rights and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence are determinable by the law of the place of the
tort. (See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws [3d ed., 1949], p. 260; Leflar, The Law of Conflict of Laws [1959], p.
207; Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws [2d ed., 1951], p. 182.) It had its conceptual foundation in
the vested rights doctrine, namely, that a right to recover for a foreign tort owes its creation to the law
of the [*478] jurisdiction where the injury occurred and depends for its existence and extent solely on
such law. (See Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws [1942], pp. 30-36; Reese, The Ever Changing Rules
of Choice of Law, Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Internationaal Recht [1962], 389.) Although espoused by
such great figures as Justice Holmes (see Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. R. Co., 194 U. S. 120) and Professor
Beale (2 Conflict of Laws [1935], pp. 1286-1292), the vested rights doctrine has long since been
discredited because it fails to take account of underlying policy considerations in evaluating the
significance to be ascribed to the circumstance that an act had a foreign situs in determining the rights
and liabilities which arise out of that act. [3]"The vice of the vested rights theory", it has been aptly
stated, "is that it affects to decide concrete cases upon generalities which do not state the practical
considerations involved". (Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 Yale L. J. 468,
482-483.) More particularly, as applied to torts, the theory ignores the interest which jurisdictions other
than that where the tort occurred may have in the resolution of particular issues. It is for this very
reason that, despite the advantages of certainty, ease of application and predictability which it affords
(see Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Col. L. Rev. 959, 976), there has in recent
years been increasing criticism of the traditional rule by commentators [4]and a judicial trend towards
its abandonment or modification. [5][*479]

Significantly, it was dissatisfaction with "the mechanical formulae of the conflicts of law" (Vanston
Committee v. Green, 329 U. S. 156, 162) which led to judicial departure from similarly inflexible choice
of law rules in the field of contracts, grounded, like the torts rule, on the vested rights doctrine.
According to those traditional rules, matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a
contract were determinable by the internal law of the place where the contract was made, while
matters connected with their performance were regulated by the internal law of the place where the
contract was to be performed. (See Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 280 N. Y. 135, 141; see, also,
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, 332, 358; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws [3d ed., 1949], pp. 342-343.)

In Auten v. Auten (308 N. Y. 155), however, this court abandoned such rules and applied what has been
termed the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory of the conflict of laws. "Under this
theory," we declared in the Auten case, "the courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the parties'
intention or the place of making or performance, lay emphasis rather upon the law of the place 'which
has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute' " (308 N. Y., at p. 160). The "center of
gravity" rule of Auten has not only been applied in other cases in this State, [6]as well as in other
jurisdictions, [7]but has supplanted the prior rigid and set contract rules in the most current draft of the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws. (See Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, 332b [Tentative Draft No.
6, 1960].)

Realization of the unjust and anomalous results which may ensue from application of the traditional rule
in tort cases has also prompted judicial search for a more satisfactory alternative in that area. In the
much discussed case of Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines (9 N Y 2d 34), this court declined to apply the law of
the place of the tort as respects the issue of the quantum of the recovery in a death action arising out of
an airplane crash, [*480] where the decedent had been a New York resident and his relationship with
the defendant airline had originated in this State. In his opinion for the court, Chief Judge Desmond
described, with force and logic, the shortcomings of the traditional rule (9 N Y 2d, at p. 39):

"Modern conditions make it unjust and anomalous to subject the traveling citizen of this State to the
varying laws of other States through and over which they move. * * * An air traveler from New York may
in a flight of a few hours' duration pass through * * * commonwealths [limiting death damage awards].
His plane may meet with disaster in a State he never intended to cross but into which the plane has
flown because of bad weather or other unexpected developments, or an airplane's catastrophic descent
may begin in one State and end in another. The place of injury becomes entirely fortuitous. Our courts
should if possible provide protection for our own State's people against unfair and anachronistic
treatment of the lawsuits which result from these disasters."

The emphasis in Kilberg was plainly that the merely fortuitous circumstance that the wrong and injury
occurred in Massachusetts did not give that State a controlling concern or interest in the amount of the
tort recovery as against the competing interest of New York in providing its residents or users of
transportation facilities there originating with full compensation for wrongful death. Although the
Kilberg case did not expressly adopt the "center of gravity" theory, its weighing of the contacts or
interests of the respective jurisdictions to determine their bearing on the issue of the extent of the
recovery is consistent with that approach. (See Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 1961 Ann. Sur. Amer. Law, 29,
45.)

The same judicial disposition is also reflected in a variety of other decisions, some of recent date, others
of earlier origin, relating to workmen's compensation, [8]tortious occurrences aristing [*481] out of a
contract, [9]issues affecting the survival of a tort right of action [10]and intrafamilial immunity from tort
[11]and situations involving a form of statutory liability. [12]These numerous cases differ in many ways
but they are all similar in two important respects. First, by one rationale or another, they rejected the
inexorable application of the law of the place of the tort where that place has no reasonable or relevant
interest in the particular issue involved. And, second, in each of these cases the courts, after examining
the particular circumstances presented, applied the law of some jurisdiction other than the place of the
tort because it had a more compelling interest in the application of its law to the legal issue involved.

The "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" doctrine adopted by this court in conflicts cases
involving contracts impresses us as likewise affording the appropriate approach for accommodating the
competing interests in tort cases with multi-State contacts. Justice, fairness and "the best practical
result" (Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 280 N. Y. 135, 141, supra) may best be achieved by giving
controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the
occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation. The
merit of such a rule is that "it gives to the place 'having the most interest in the problem' paramount
control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context" and thereby allows the forum to
apply "the policy of the jurisdiction 'most [*482] intimately concerned with the outcome of [the]
particular litigation.' " (Auten v. Auten, 308 N. Y. 155, 161, supra.)

Such, indeed, is the approach adopted in the most recent revision of the Conflict of Laws Restatement in
the field of torts. According to the principles there set out, "The local law of the state which has the
most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and
liabilities in tort" (Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, 379[1]; also Introductory Note to Topic 1 of
Chapter 9, p. 3 [Tentative Draft No. 8, 1963]), and the relative importance of the relationships or
contacts of the respective jurisdictions is to be evaluated in the light of "the issues, the character of the
tort and the relevant purposes of the tort rules involved" ( 379[2], [3]).

Comparison of the relative "contacts" and "interests" of New York and Ontario in this litigation, vis-a-vis
the issue here presented, makes it clear that the concern of New York is unquestionably the greater and
more direct and that the interest of Ontario is at best minimal. The present action involves injuries
sustained by a New York guest as the result of the negligence of a New York host in the operation of an
automobile, garaged, licensed and undoubtedly insured in New York, in the course of a week-end
journey which began and was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole relationship with the
occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the accident occurred there.

New York's policy of requiring a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries caused by his negligence
cannot be doubted as attested by the fact that the Legislature of this State has repeatedly refused to
enact a statute denying or limiting recovery in such cases (see, e.g., 1930 Sen. Int. No. 339, Pr. No. 349;
1935 Sen. Int. No. 168, Pr. No. 170; 1960 Sen. Int. No. 3662, Pr. No. 3967) and our courts have neither
reason nor warrant for departing from that policy simply because the accident, solely affecting New York
residents and arising out of the operation of a New York based automobile, happened beyond its
borders. Per contra, Ontario has no conceivable interest in denying a remedy to a New York guest
against his New York host for injuries suffered in Ontario by reason of conduct which was tortious under
Ontario law. The object of Ontario's guest statute, it has been said, is "to prevent the fraudulent
assertion [*483] of claims by passengers, in collusion with the drivers, against insurance companies"
(Survey of Canadian Legislation, 1 U. Toronto L. J. 358, 366) and, quite obviously, the fraudulent claims
intended to be prevented by the statute are those asserted against Ontario defendants and their
insurance carriers, not New York defendants and their insurance carriers. Whether New York defendants
are imposed upon or their insurers defrauded by a New York plaintiff is scarcely a valid legislative
concern of Ontario simply because the accident occurred there, any more so than if the accident had
happened in some other jurisdiction.

It is hardly necessary to say that Ontario's interest is quite different from what it would have been had
the issue related to the manner in which the defendant had been driving his car at the time of the
accident. Where the defendant's exercise of due care in the operation of his automobile is in issue, the
jurisdiction in which the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred will usually have a predominant, if not
exclusive, concern. In such a case, it is appropriate to look to the law of the place of the tort so as to give
effect to that jurisdiction's interest in regulating conduct within its borders, and it would be almost
unthinkable to seek the applicable rule in the law of some other place.

The issue here, however, is not whether the defendant offended against a rule of the road prescribed by
Ontario for motorists generally or whether he violated some standard of conduct imposed by that
jurisdiction, but rather whether the plaintiff, because she was a guest in the defendant's automobile, is
barred from recovering damages for a wrong concededly committed. As to that issue, it is New York, the
place where the parties resided, where their guest- host relationship arose and where the trip began
and was to end, rather than Ontario, the place of the fortuitous occurrence of the accident, which has
the dominant contacts and the superior claim for application of its law. Although the rightness or
wrongness of defendant's conduct may depend upon the law of the particular jurisdiction through which
the automobile passes, the rights and liabilities of the parties which stem from their guest-host
relationship should remain constant and not vary and shift as the automobile proceeds from place to
place. Indeed, such a result, we note, [*484] accords with "the interests of the host in procuring liability
insurance adequate under the applicable law, and the interests of his insurer in reasonable calculability
of the premium." (Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 Yale L. J. 595, 603.)

Although the traditional rule has in the past been applied by this court in giving controlling effect to the
guest statute of the foreign jurisdiction in which the accident occurred (see, e.g., Smith v. Clute, 277 N.
Y. 407; Kerfoot v. Kelley, 294 N. Y. 288; Naphtali v. Lafazan, 8 N Y 2d 1097, affg. 8 A D 2d 22), it is not
amiss to point out that the question here posed was neither raised nor considered in those cases and
that the question has never been presented in so stark a manner as in the case before us with a statute
so unique as Ontario's. [13]Be that as it may, however, reconsideration of the inflexible traditional rule
persuades us, as already indicated, that, in failing to take into account essential policy considerations
and objectives, its application may lead to unjust and anomalous results. This being so, the rule,
formulated as it was by the courts, should be discarded. (Cf. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N Y 2d 656, 667; Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349, 355.) [14]

In conclusion, then, there is no reason why all issues arising out of a tort claim must be resolved by
reference to the law of the same jurisdiction. Where the issue involves standards of conduct, it is more
than likely that it is the law of the place of the tort which will be controlling but the disposition of other
issues must turn, as does the issue of the standard of conduct itself, on the law of the jurisdiction which
has the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue presented. [*485]

The judgment appealed from should be reversed, with costs, and the motion to dismiss the complaint
denied.

________________________________________

VAN VOORHIS, J. (Dissenting).

The decision about to be made of this appeal changes the established law of this State, one of the most
recent decisions the other way being Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels (5 N Y 2d 1016), where all of
the "significant contacts" were with New York State except the mountain which plaintiff's intestate was
climbing when she met her death. The defense of immunity of a charitable corporation under the
Oregon law, where the accident occurred, was inapplicable under the law of New York where the
defendant corporation was organized and staffed, and plaintiff and his intestate resided. Nevertheless
the court declined to strike that defense from the answer, based upon Oregon law. Concerning, as it did,
solely the status of the defendant corporation, Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels presented a stronger
case for the application of New York law than does the present. The case of Auten v. Auten (308 N. Y.
155), involving a separation agreement between English people and providing for the support of a wife
and children to continue to live in England, accomplished no such revolution in the law as the present
appeal. Auten v. Auten dealt with contracts, the agreement was held to be governed by the law of the
country where it was mainly to be performed, which had previously been the law, and the salient
expressions "center of gravity", "grouping of contacts", and similar catchwords were employed as a
shorthand reference to the reconciliation of such rigid concepts in the conflict of laws as the formulae
making applicable the place where the contract was signed or where it was to be performed rules
which themselves were occasionally in conflict with one another. In the course of the opinion it was
stated that "even if we were not to place our emphasis on the law of the place with the most significant
contacts, but were instead simply to apply the rule that matters of performance and breach are
governed by the law of the place of performance, the same result would follow" (308 N. Y., p. 163). The
decision in Auten v. Auten rationalized and rendered more workable the existing law of contracts. The
name "grouping of contacts" was simply a label to identify the rationalization of existing decisions on
the conflict of laws in [*486] contract cases which were technically inconsistent, in some instances. The
difference between the present case and Auten v. Auten is that Auten did not materially change the law,
but sought to formulate what had previously been decided. The present case makes substantial changes
in the law of torts. The expressions "center of gravity", "grouping of contacts," and "significant contacts"
are catchwords which were not employed to define and are inadequate to define a principle of law, and
were neither applied to nor are they applicable in the realm of torts.

Any idea is without foundation that cases such as the present render more uniform the laws of torts in
the several States of the United States. Attempts to make the law or public policy of New York State
prevail over the laws and policies of other States where citizens of New York State are concerned are
simply a form of extraterritoriality which can be turned against us wherever actions are brought in the
courts of New York which involve citizens of other States. This is no substitute for uniform State laws or
for obtaining uniformity by covering the subject by Federal law. Undoubtedly ease of travel and
communication, and the increase in interstate business have rendered more awkward discrepancies
between the laws of the States in many respects. But this is not a condition to be cured by introducing
or extending principles of extraterritoriality, as though we were living in the days of the Roman or British
Empire, when the concepts were formed that the rights of a Roman or an Englishman were so significant
that they must be enforced throughout the world even where they were otherwise unlikely to be
honored by "lesser breeds without the law." Importing the principles of extraterritoriality into the
conflicts of laws between the States of the United States can only make confusion worse confounded. If
extraterritoriality is to be the criterion, what would happen, for example, in case of an automobile
accident where some of the passengers came from or were picked up in States or countries where
causes of action against the driver were prohibited, others where gross negligence needed to be shown,
some, perhaps, from States where contributory negligence and others where comparative negligence
prevailed? In the majority opinion it is said that "Where the defendant's exercise of due care in the
operation of his automobile is in issue, the jurisdiction in which the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred
[*487] will usually have a predominant, if not exclusive, concern." This is hardly consistent with the
statement in the footnote that gross negligence would not need to be established in an action by a
passenger if the accident occurred in a State whose statute so required. If the status of the passenger as
a New Yorker would prevent the operation of a statute in a sister State or neighboring country which
granted immunity to the driver in suits by passengers, it is said that it would also prevent the operation
of a statute which instead of granting immunity permits recovery only in case of gross negligence. There
are passenger statutes or common-law decisions requiring gross negligence or its substantial equivalent
to be shown in 29 States. One wonders what would happen if contributory negligence were eliminated
as a defense by statute in another jurisdiction? Or if comparative negligence were established as the
rule in the other State?

In my view there is no overriding consideration of public policy which justifies or directs this change in
the established rule or renders necessary or advisable the confusion which such a change will introduce.

The judgment dismissing the complaint should be affirmed.

Chief Judge Desmond and Judges Dye, Burke and Foster concur with Judge Fuld; Judge Van Voorhis
dissents in an opinion in which Judge Scileppi concurs.

Judgment reversed, with costs in all courts, and matter remitted to Special Term for further proceedings
in accordance with the opinion herein.
MARRIAGE

Van Dorn vs. Romillo 139 SCRA 139

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married
in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were
divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit
against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the
Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an
accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her
nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be
served.
Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal
Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding
against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then
filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on
January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though
they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)

Facts:

The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari
praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC
declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article
36.

On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984,
Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In
1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on
several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her
husbands last name as hers in the invitation.

March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts brought
danger and dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus
submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation
where Fely used her newhusbands last name as evidences.

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince
1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences
sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.

Issue:

Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?

Held:

The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to


assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment,
by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.

Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Llorente vs CA and Llorente 345 SCRA 592

Facts:

In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and Paula Llorente
got married in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American citizen.

In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered that Paula was already living
illicitly with Ceferino Llorente (brother of Lorenzo). Ceferino and Paula even had a son.

Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her monetary support. Eventually,
Lorenzo and Paula agreed in writing Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula if the latter agrees to
waive all monetary support from Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the United States.

In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California. Paula was represented by an
American counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce became final.

Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno. They had three children.

In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate to Alicia and their
children (nothing for Paula). In 1983, he went to court for the wills probate and to have Alicia as the
administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo died.
Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate.

The trial court ruled that Lorenzos marriage with Alicia is void because the divorce he obtained abroad
is void. The trial court ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a Filipino hence divorce is not applicable to him. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

ISSUES: Whether or not Lorenzos divorce abroad should be recognized.

HELD: Yes. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American citizen in 1943. Hence,
when he obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an American citizen. Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides:

Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philipine laws relating to family rights, duties, or status are no
longer applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad must be respected. The rule
is: aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to determine the effects of
the divorce as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.

Anent the issue on Lorenzos last will and testament, it must be respected. He is an alien and is not
covered by our laws on succession. However, since the will was submitted to our courts for probate,
then the case was remanded to the lower court where the foreign law must be alleged in order to prove
the validity of the will.
Republic vs. Orbecido GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his
wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed
with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry under Philippine law.
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA
GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents. G.R. No. 142820, June
20, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a
Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14,
1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.

Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested to
Wolfgang.

Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been
promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.

Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose
of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between her and
Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of
support and custody of their children.

1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for reconsideration.

Ruling: Yes.

A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality, as in the case at
bar.

The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment even after the
same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or
alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.

2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards
child custody and support.

Ruling: Yes.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody
to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court
(now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with
regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the
German court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmens participation in the proceedings in
the German court, the records remain unclear.

Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was
correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the children.
CORPUZ v. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010)

FACTS:

Petitioner Corpuz, a naturalized Canadian citizen married respondent Sto. Tomas but subsequently filed
for divorce in Canada which was granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. Two years
later, Corpuz fell in love with another Filipina. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the
Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration,
an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the
Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a competent
judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz
cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can
institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino
citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grant aliens the right to institute a
petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RESOLUTION:

No. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens BUT the
foreign divorce decree obtained by such alien, may be proven in court and recognized according to our
rules of evidence. Thus, it serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of the alien, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
Fujiki v Marinay 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC: dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to
file the petition.

ISSUES & RULING:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave
v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
Yes. [t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact.Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the
civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity
of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation
or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Yes. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment
on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the family rights and duties, or on
the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a
foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under
the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent
with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations.
PATENT

Fredco v. Harvard University, G.R. No. 185917, June 1, 2011

Facts:

In 2005, Fredco Manufacturing Corporation filed a petition for cancellation before the Bureau of Legal
Affairs of the Philippine Intellectual Property Office against the President and Fellows of Harvard College
for the registration of its mark Harvard Veritas Shield Symbol under the Classes 16, 18, 21, 25 and 28
of the Nice International Classification of Goods an Services alleging that its predecessor-in-interest,
New York Garments Manufacturing & Export Co., Inc., has been already using the mark Harvard since
1985 when it registered the same mark under Class 25 of the Nice Classification. Thus, Harvard
University is not a prior user of the mark in the Philippines and, therefore, has no right to register the
mark.

On the other hand, Harvard University claimed that the mark Harvard has been adopted by Harvard
University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA since 1639. Furthermore, it alleges that the name and
mark Harvard and Harvard Veritas Shield Symbol is registered in more than 50 countries, including
the Philippines, and has been used in commerce since 1872. In fact, the name and mark is rated as one
of the top brands of the world, being worth between $750M and $1B.

Decision of BLA-IPO

The Bureau of Legal Affairs, IPO ruled in favour of Fredco ordering the cancellation of Harvard
Universitys mark under Class 25 only because the other classes were not confusingly similar with
respect to the goods and services of Fredco.

Decision of ODG-IPO

Harvard University appealed before the Office of the Director General of IPO wherein ODG-IPO reversed
the decision of BLA-IPO. The Director General ruled that the applicant must also be the owner of the
mark sought to be registered aside from the use of it. Thus, Fredco is not the owner of the mark because
it failed to explain how its predecessor got the mark Harvard. There was also no evidence of the
permission of Harvard University for Fredco to use the mark.

Decision of the Court of Appeals

Fredco appealed the decision of the Director General before the Court of Appeals, which then affirmed
the decision of ODG-IPO considering the facts found by the Director General. CA ruled that Harvard
University had been using the marks way before Fredco and the petitioners failed to explain its use of
the marks bearing the words Harvard, USA, Established 1936 and Cambridge, Massachusetts
within an oblong device.

Issue:

W/N CA erred in affirming the decision of ODG-IPO

Held:
The Petition has no merit.

Although R.A. 166 Section 2 states that before a mark can be registered, it must have been actually used
in commerce for not less than two months in the Philippines prior to filing an application for its
registration, a trademark registered in a foreign country which is a member of the Paris Convention is
allowed to register without the requirement of use in the commerce in the Philippines. Under Section 37
of R.A. 166, registration based on home certificate is allowed and does not require the use of the mark
in the Philippines. Furthermore, R.A. 8293 Section 239.2 provides that marks which have been
registered under R.A. 166 shall remain in force but shall be subject to the provisions of R.A. 8293, which
does not require the prior use of the mark in the Philippines.

Why the petition must fail?

1. The inclusion of the origin Cambridge, Massachusetts in Fredcos mark connotes that Fredco is
associated with Harvard University, which is really not true. The registration of Fredcos mark should
have been rejected.

2. The Philippines is a signatory of the Paris Convention, which provides for the protection against
violation of intellectual property rights to all the member countries regardless of whether the
trademarks is registered or not in a particular country.

1980, Luis Villafuerte issued a memo to the Director of Patents ordering the latter to reject all pending
applications of marks which involves a well-known brand around the world by applicants other than the
owner of the mark.

1983, Roberto Ongpin affirmed the memo of Villafuerte by commanding the Director of Patents to
implement measures which will comply with the provisions of the Paris Convention. He provided criteria
that should be considered to any marks that are well-known in the Philippines or marks that belong to
persons subject to the protection of the Convention.

Currently, well-known marks are protected under Section 123.1(e) of R.A. 8293. Additionally, Rule 102
of the Rules and Regulations on Trademarks, Service Marks, Trade Names and Marked or Stamped
Containers provides for the criteria in determining a well-known mark. The use of the mark in commerce
is not anymore required because it is enough that any combination of the criteria be met in order for a
mark to be well-known.

The ODG-IPO traced the origin of the mark Harvard. It ruled that Harvard University had been using
the mark centuries before Fredco although the latter may have used the mark first in the Philippines
before the former.

Likewise, CA ruled that the name and mark Harvard and Harvard Veritas Shield Symbol were first
used in the United States since 1953 under Class 25.

Finally, the Supreme Court declared the mark Harvard to be well-known internationally, including the
Philippines.