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CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................... 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................... 3
1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 6
1.1. Purpose of Report ................................................................................................... 6
1.2. Methodology ............................................................................................................ 6
1.3. Structure of the Report ............................................................................................ 7
2 THE INFRACO INITIATIVE ..................................................................................... 8
2.1. Mission .................................................................................................................... 8
2.2. The Approach .......................................................................................................... 8
2.3. InfraCo Structure ..................................................................................................... 9
Figure 1: Governance and operating arrangements .............................................................. 9
2.4. InfraCo Funding ....................................................................................................... 9
2.5. Focus ..................................................................................................................... 10
3 EARLY STAGE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN EMERGING
MARKETS ............................................................................................................. 11
3.1. The Development Process .................................................................................... 11
Figure 2: The Project Preparation Process Phase 1 ......................................................... 11
Figure 3: The Project Preparation Process Phase 2 ......................................................... 12
Figure 4: The Project Preparation Process Phase 3 ......................................................... 12
Figure 5: The Project Preparation Process Phase 4 ......................................................... 13
3.2. The Development Approach.................................................................................. 13
3.3. Constraints and Challenges to Developers ........................................................... 13
3.4. Development Phase Funding ................................................................................ 14
3.5. The Developers Exit ............................................................................................. 14
4 OPERATIONAL REVIEW - ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE ............................. 15
4.1. The Project Portfolio .............................................................................................. 15
Table 1: Projects under Development ................................................................................. 15
Table 2: Priority Project Pipeline ......................................................................................... 17
4.2. Evaluation of Project Development Activities ........................................................ 18
4.2.1. Kpone IPP ............................................................................................................. 18
4.2.2. Sandrandano Water .............................................................................................. 19
4.2.3. Aba Power ............................................................................................................. 20
4.2.4. Can Tho Infrastructure .......................................................................................... 21
4.2.5. Cape Verde Wind Project ...................................................................................... 21
4.2.6. Kalangala Infrastructure Project ............................................................................ 22
4.2.6.1. Ferry ...................................................................................................................... 22
4.2.6.2. Water ..................................................................................................................... 22
4.2.6.3. Power .................................................................................................................... 23
4.2.6.4. Road ...................................................................................................................... 23
4.2.7. Beira Land Development ....................................................................................... 24
4.2.8. Antara Cold Storage Facility.................................................................................. 25
4.2.9. Kampala Sanitation Rehabilitation ........................................................................ 26
4.2.10. Nfrasi Housing ....................................................................................................... 26
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
InfraCo Limited (InfraCo) was launched in April 2005 as a pilot initiative for three years, to test the
proposition that donor funds could be effectively used to support a privately managed infrastructure
development company, facilitate the early stage development of infrastructure projects, and
stimulate greater private sector involvement. InfraCos central objective is to identify, create and
structure viable business opportunities in various infrastructure sub-sectors and to offer them
through a transparent process to private investors for implementation.
Over the last 24 months, the Board and Management have taken a concept, overcoming
substantial hurdles and built a new business with a growing potential and recognition. InfraCo has
developed an impressive portfolio mix and pipeline of projects, with a creditable number of Higher
Developmental Value (HDV) projects which offer the potential for the widening of access to
infrastructure services to the rural and in some cases urban poor, thus making a contribution to
poverty alleviation.
InfraCo has achieved, and in some respects surpassed, the targets that were set on establishment.
By the end of Year 1, InfraCo had signed 5 exclusive agreements and conducted 4 feasibility
studies. This achievement is far greater than the target of 1 exclusive agreement.
By the end of Year 2, InfraCo achieved one agreed sale. The target of 2 sales agreed was not
achieved. However, they were able to sign 8 additional exclusivity agreements and undertake 9
feasibility studies. This surpassed the target requirements. In achieving the agreed Aba power
sale InfraCo has proven the model by attracting a private sector investor that would not otherwise
have been interested in the deal, and secured a return on its relatively small investment. InfraCo is
on course to surpass the third year business target outcomes, with 5 sales envisaged.
Further, InfraCo has contributed to the development of innovative approaches and practices to
infrastructure development in emerging markets, with a potential for replication. These include:
The development in Kalangala is an integrated project covering water, power, road and
ferry services for rural communities which, on an individual project basis, may not have
been economically justified to undertake.
Utilising its relatively high risk tolerance, and limited patient equity to reinvigorate long
stalled projects as in Kpone, Kalangala and Aba.
Project visits undertaken during the review confirm that the InfraCo approach has secured buy in
from key stakeholders in central and local government institutions and communities in the locations
in which they are operating. Stakeholders contacted during the review generally expressed the
view that the model is significantly different and compares favourably to other technical assistance
facilities with which they have had experience.
The review included an evaluation of the base case and scenario analyses contained in the revised
InfraCo business plan. The evaluation revealed that under the downside case assumptions, total
expenditure over the period to 2009 would exceed the currently available resources of US$20m.
Were this situation to be realised, the Board of InfraCo would be forced to defer expenditures
resulting in indefinite delay in closing of some of the portfolio.
Most importantly, the review also revealed that InfraCo had forward committed to projects under its
current development portfolio all US$20 million that had been provided to the initiative by DFID and
DGIS. This effectively means that InfraCo cannot increase its development portfolio or indeed
participate in new opportunities without additional financial resources.
Overall, the assessment revealed that the Boards leadership and governance of the company
have been exemplary. The stewardship and effectiveness of the Board in governing the activities
of InfraCo has been critical to the achievements of the company to date. InfraCos Management
team have performed well in accordance with operating procedures and requirements under the
service contract. They have proven their capacity through the portfolio they have assembled and
the innovation which they have brought to the project development effort.
The InfraCo concept is proven both in terms of its ability to attract private sector investment and in
its added developmental value to alleviate poverty through the provision of access to infrastructure
services to the poor in the emerging markets of Africa in particular and, to a more limited extent,
Asia. However, InfraCo faces significant challenges that will need to be addressed if it is to
continue to progress. Key amongst these are InfraCos lack of balance sheet strength which
constrains its operations and hinders its credibility. Further, its lack of ready access to grant
funding, limits its ability to structure a higher number and timely closure of HDV deals and meet
third party development costs for project development. The Technical Assistance Funding (TAF),
which has hitherto enabled InfraCo to meet these costs, will itself soon be exhausted.
The Review recommends that the pilot should be scaled up to a full project development facility.
This central recommendation is underpinned with a number of actions to ensure organisational
sustainability, a higher level of development impact and an enhancement of operational efficacy.
The recommended actions include the following:
PIDG should authorise InfraCo to extend an invitation to DFIs, region specific funds, and
local and international institutional investors to participate in the InfraCo initiative.
PIDG should in 2007 provide InfraCo with an additional US$40 - US$60 million funding
commitment over a 5 year period for its African development operations with draw down to
nd
commence from 2 Quarter 2008.
PIDG should support InfraCo to raise an Africa specific investment fund, to be managed by
InfraCo to facilitate the provision of a portion of equity finance where appropriate to the
projects developed.
PIDG should commit to the replenishment of the TAF directly, or through a special window
within InfraCo.
PIDG should examine the adequacy of resources within GPOBA with a view to effectively
resourcing the fund, so that it can effectively engage with its client base and thus increase
poverty reduction benefits of its projects.
InfraCo should devise and implement a regional marketing strategy with a view to
promoting awareness, building networks and forging partnerships particularly with other
PIDG instruments; subject to additional funds being committed.
InfraCo should continue to implement financial and operational systems and controls in line
with organisational growth and market benchmarks.
Subject to the commitment of new funding, the InfraCo Board should review the terms of
the existing contract and re-negotiate with IMS a new contract, which will take into account
new additional funding and the fact that the market conditions under which the existing
contract was concluded have changed, due largely to the demonstration effect of InfraCo
and concomitant reduced risks.
It is further recommended that going forward, the Board retains the flexibility to negotiate
arrangements for developer and fund management services, which will ensure the optimal
use of the financial resources and advise PIDG accordingly.
1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this report is to present the findings of the Mid-Term review of the
InfraCo initiative. InfraCo was established by the Private Infrastructure
Development Group (PIDG), currently supported by the Development Agencies
from Austria (ADA), the Netherlands (DGIS), Sweden (SIDA), Switzerland (SECO)
the UK (DFID), and by the World Bank.
InfraCo Limited (InfraCo) was launched in April 2005 as a pilot initiative for three
years, to test the proposition that public funds (donor funds) could be effectively
used to support a privately managed infrastructure development company to
facilitate the early stage development of infrastructure projects. InfraCos central
objective is to identify, create and structure viable business opportunities in various
infrastructure sub-sectors and to offer them, through a transparent process, to
private investors for implementation.
The key rationale for InfraCo therefore is to bridge the gap between public and
private sector delivery of infrastructure and act as the catalyst for increased Private
Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) in emerging markets. InfraCos mandate is to
act as principal (not an advisor) in this process and complement the activities of
other PIDG initiatives.
To enable PIDG to better understand progress over the last 24 months and to aid
the decision making process on the options for further funding beyond the pilot
project, the PIDG have commissioned the services of The Consultants to
undertake a mid-term review of InfraCos activities.
Performance of InfraCo.
1.2. Methodology
The main activities of the review included, without limitation, an assessment of: the
current projects, the performance in terms of achievement of project goals,
developmental impacts of InfraCo activities, the key successes and challenges to
date, the quality of the project pipeline, the appropriateness of operational,
financial and management procedures, the effectiveness of the process of
identification and development of potential investment, project risks and risk
mitigation, the potential private sector market for the sale of projects, the level of
awareness of InfraCos brand. (The detailed scope is given in the full terms of
reference at Appendix I).
Discussions with both the PMU and the PIDG members to elicit views on
the effectiveness of InfraCo, its operations, the arrangements for reporting
on its activities and the efficiency of the financial management of the
facility.
Discussions with the InfraCo Board and IMS to gain a full understanding of
the strategy, planning, budgeting operational and due diligence for new
projects, and, governance arrangements put in place between the
company, its shareholders and IMS.
Chapter 3 provides a critical analysis of the requirements for executing early stage
infrastructure development in emerging markets.
Chapter 4 presents details of the analysis of the operational review and InfraCos
progress to date.
In Chapter 5, the main conclusions drawn from the review are documented
2.1. Mission
Significant focus is being placed on the need for new solutions for the development
and delivery of infrastructure in LDEs, particularly in Africa. The aim of the PIDG is
to facilitate the provision of infrastructure needed to eliminate poverty in developing
countries by encouraging private investment.
Alongside its project development brief, in order to deliver projects and improve the
general business climate, InfraCo will also work closely with the other PIDG
initiatives (EAIF, GuaranCo, DevCo Advisory), as well as PPIAF, World Bank and
donors, in order to identify the support required for policy, legal and regulatory
developments, and capacity building requirements.
Not compete with the private sector, rather seek to stimulate expanded
private sector involvement in infrastructure development;
Seek to balance the goal of attaining attractive sales value with the goal of
promoting opportunities with a high developmental impact;
Over the long term, seek sufficient revenue from successful sales to cover
its general operating costs, the direct project preparation costs of sold
opportunities and to make a contribution to the costs of unsold
opportunities;
The Company was initially established with a three year Pilot Phase business plan.
World Bank,
SECO, DFID,
Public/Private
Infrastructure Infraco Ltd
World Bank,
Development
Trust
D
4 non-
Donors InfraCo
executive
directors Management
Board (including Team(s)
Managing Director)
(IMSIMS)
The Board was structured to lead the establishment and strategic direction of
InfraCo. The Board is actively involved in governance and decision making for the
Company to safeguard Shareholders assets while enabling the Company to
operate in a flexible and commercial manner. The Board additionally designed the
process to secure management services, and provides oversight of the
Management team and the development activities.
The day-to-day management of the Company is the responsibility IMS and the IMS
Managing Director who were appointed in April 2005 after a successful bidding
process.
InfraCo was launched in May 2005 with initial capital of US$10 million from DFID.
The Directorate-General of Development Co-operation of the Netherlands (DGIS)
provided a further capital injection of US$10 million in 2006. This additional
funding signalled an extension of the three year initial pilot phase to four years.
2.5. Focus
Have a high development impact, are pro-poor and on which the local
impact of InfraCo can be demonstrated.
10
Development Activities:
Deliverables:
Market Screening:-
Signed MOU with
Financial Resources of Offtakers and Payment Security
Host Governments or
International Market Appetite
Parastatal
Preliminary Market ; Technical; Financial;
Short List / Secure
Legal & Regulatory Framework; and Environmental Studies
Project Partners
Quick & Dirty Reviews
Project Definition Paper
Approvals to
Issues to Consider: Proceed to Phase2
Fast Tracking Project Development Establish Management
Optimum Early Stage Funding Structure
11
Financial
Phase1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Close
Development Activities:
Build Local/International Consortia
Further Financial Appraisals
Negotiate HOT with Host Government/Parastatal Deliverables:
Preliminary Discussions with Sources of Finance Signed PDA with Consortia
Prepare PIM Members Agreement on
Costs Going Forward
HOT with Govt/Parastatal
Preliminary PIM
Issues to Consider: Substantive Project
Out source Development Process with Single Point Reports for bankability
Responsibility LOI from
Formal Market Study Sources of Finance
Conceptual Designs & Preliminary Environmental Studies
Review Local Regulatory & Legal Framework
Development Activities:
Monitoring Progress by International PSP
Deliverable:
Issues to Consider: (Procured by Project Sponsors with
PPP Concession
Single Point of Responsibility):
Preliminary Info
More Detailed Engineering Work & Technical Studies
Memorandum
Detailed Environmental Studies
EPC Documentation
Negotiation of Full Concession
Prepare documentation for EPC contracts use of D&B
methodology
Work on CPs to Secure Finance
12
Development Activities:
Monitoring Progress by Project Sponsors
Deliverable:
Issues to Consider: Financial Close
Use of Innovative Financial Products and Risk Mitigation
Strategies
Finalise all Loan Documentation
Work on CPs to Secure Finance
In many situations, the project developer seeks to develop opportunities which are
primarily off market, where his expertise and local contact base are able to source
opportunities rather than respond in a direct manner to openly advertised
competitive situations. Unless the project developer is in a commercial relationship
with a particular company within a given sector, he will concentrate on those
opportunities which maximise his local knowledge, contact base and in country
experience and developmental and negotiating skills, by bringing together
operating, construction and financing partners under the umbrella of a Single
Purpose Entity (SPE). The SPE holds all licences, permits, concessions and joint
venture agreements between the parties, as well as performing the cash flow
function for investment and operations. This overall approach will allow the expert
developer to maximise his potential returns, whilst also enabling him to mitigate his
own development costs.
The constraints and challenges facing developers are similar, but not identical, to
those facing the construction, operating and financing / investment partners. The
developer is in essence an entrepreneur. The developer has to be aware of the
medium / long term appetite for the projects and the markets that they serve.
Other than any carried interest, he does not normally remain an active or even the
lead participant beyond financial close. Consequently, the developer needs to be
aware of the main issues affecting long term participation in infrastructure projects
in emerging markets, including without limitation:
13
The transparencies of the legal and fiscal processes and the ability of the
project partners to enforce the project agreements;
On entry of the strategic and operating partners in the project, it is the assembled
Project Sponsor group which then bears the cost of development on a pro-rata
basis, according to their respective shareholdings in the SPE.
The developer will bear the initial costs for as long as is appropriate and then
contribute, as may be required on an agreed basis in order to protect his interest,
until his agreed exit point. The agreed exit point may be at an early stage with a
small carried interest, or financial close with a partial exit and carried interest.
Alternatively, the developer may choose to participate more fully in the financing of
the project and become a significant shareholder in his own right, seeking an exit
when the project is sold on at completion, or within two or three years of
operations, with a higher degree of return. It is of interest to note however, that
corporate developers - including without limitation project sponsors - retain their
interest in projects for longer periods principally to either protect strategic interests,
operate the business and/or give comfort to financial investors.
14
This section presents the findings of the review and examines key operational, financial
and design issues. The issues examined include: origination and quality of the project
portfolio, approach and status of each project under development, adequacy and utilisation
of funding, brand awareness, responsiveness to local needs, adequacy of operational and
financial controls, management performance and board governance and decision making.
The section concludes with a summary of the key successes achieved during the pilot
phase, and challenges that InfraCo must address going forward.
From start of operations 24 months ago, InfraCo has created a portfolio of projects
with a total direct investment potential of approximately US$800 million in the
countries in which they are located. The table below provides a summary of the
projects with Joint Development Agreement (JDA), Memoranda of Understanding
(MOU) or letters of intent.
15
The portfolio in Table 1 indicates that InfraCo has succeeded in implementing its
strategy for portfolio development.
The portfolio has a mix of large commercially attractive and high developmental
value (HDV) projects. Ideally, the quality of the portfolio could have been
enhanced if it included one or two more Kpone IPP type projects. Such a balance
is important because successful and timely exit from large projects such as Kpone
IPP will provide long term income, that could be directed to HDV projects which, by
their nature, are high risk, more difficult to package and develop and often do not
yield a significant premium over cost recovery when they are sold to the private
sector.
16
Mumbai Waste India Digester reducing waste to bio-gas for power $0.5m
to Energy production
Nam Nhone Laos Supply electricity and reduce import from Thailand $1.0m
Hydropower
Lagos Ferry Nigeria New private commercial ferry service for the city of $2.0m
Project Lagos, Nigeria
Togo Ethanol Togo Integrated project for local production of Ethanol $4.0m
derived from sugar and exported to Sweden
Kalangushi Zambia New private hydro project to serve regional market $5.0m
Hydro
Tinco Export Sri Lanka Development of infrastructure for new EPZ $2.0m
Processing
Zone
Infrastructure
Coal Export Mozambique Export terminal for coal produced in Mozambique $2.5m
Terminal for international markets
Source: InfraCo Management 2007
There is good strategic fit between this project pipeline and InfraCos areas of
focus and contribution. Pursuance of these projects would extend the number of
countries in which InfraCo operates and broaden InfraCos reach and development
impact. Additionally, this pipeline includes two large projects which, if successfully
17
In terms of portfolio establishment, InfraCo has made creditable progress in its first
24 months to create a focused and well defined portfolio of projects. Creation of
this portfolio required an exhaustive identification, screening and selection process
by both the Board and the Management Team. The number, scale and size of
projects compare favourably when assessed with portfolios of other small
development entities and technical assistance facilities. It should be noted that the
Board is no longer able to commit to any new project development activity as
committed funding from PIDG has been allocated to the existing projects under
development.
A review of the status and development activity for each of the projects is outlined
below.
A 10 acre site for the plant has been secured and is currently being
cleared and fenced. The site works are expected to be completed in April
2007. An in-principle agreement has been reached with Volta River
Authority (VRA) that the project will be able to connect to the new
backbone 330 kV which will run immediately adjacent to the site. This line
will be built in 2008 under West African Power Pool funding (funded by the
World Bank). This is advantageous for the project since it would minimise
grid interconnection costs. The location also offers other advantages. For
example:- the Tema landing point of the West African Gas Pipeline
Company (WAGPCO) is located 1.5 km south west of the site and access
to sea water for cooling is available less than 1 km to the south.
18
InfraCos third party expenses paid in the project to date are in excess of
US$620,000, of which US$239,000 is paid out of a TAF grant. In addition,
InfraCo has incurred approximately US$75,000 in travel expenses and has
used 220 man days of internal time. This is well within the initial
committed budget of US$4.76 million, however, the main cost items,
specifically legal fees, have as yet not been incurred largely due to delays
in Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) negotiations.
The development plan includes the following activities for the next six
months:- finalise the Gas Supply Agreement, the Grid Interconnection
Agreement, the PPA negotiations; prepare EPC specification and RFP
documents and the preparation of PIM and road shows to potential equity
investors and lenders. The budgeted cost for activities to closure is
US$5,000,000 for external costs and US$2,500,000 for internal costs.
InfraCo has given a commitment to Cenpower to fund all external costs.
InfraCo is in discussion with a number of parties concerning an equity
participation in the deal. An early entry by one of these parties would
accord InfraCo the opportunity to share the development cost going
forward. This notwithstanding, it should be noted that monies expended to
date and any further expenditure will be recouped with a premium at
financial closure, or at the time of exit. InfraCo can expect a higher
premium on exit, the further it drives this transaction to financial closure or
beyond, by virtue of the value it has created and a declining equity risk
premium in the project.
Given the rising national demand for power and priority which Government
has placed on the power sector, Cenpower is benefiting from a broad
consensus of support within Government and the relevant independent
agencies. This bodes well for its efforts to secure the relevant PPAs and a
timely financial closure for this project.
This project aims to provide safe clean drinking water to the poorer
municipalities adjacent to the capital city Antananarivo, Madagascar. The
project will have substantial positive health impacts and economic benefits,
by eliminating the time and cost of obtaining water from traditional sources
and increasing the quantity and quality of water provided.
It is envisaged that the project will also facilitate the regeneration of these
relatively poor areas and boost residential and industrial development,
which has been severely constrained because of the lack of piped water.
Successful regeneration of these areas will relieve population pressure on
the inner city and facilitate the economic development of the greater
metropolitan area. The Government of Madagascar is strongly supportive
19
InfraCo has expended some US$25,000 to date on the initial review and
consulting services. Development costs are estimated at US$2 million for
which InfraCo will make commitments once the JDA is signed. This will
cover, inter alia, all third party costs such as; EIA and engineering design.
Both InfraCo and Sandandrano have agreed that a technical and operating
partner should be brought into the project as soon as possible in order to
add technical expertise to the consortium and to share in the development
costs.
Indicative capital cost estimates are approximately US$25 million for the
project. This will cover the provision of relevant infrastructure in 11
municipalities as well as a bulk treatment plant and distribution network.
Funding sources are anticipated to be a combination of DFIs, GPOBA and
other concessional sources.
EAIF, IFC and EIB have expressed strong interest in providing finance to
the project and were instrumental in securing the participation of InfraCo.
InfraCo responded favourably to the offer but indicated that it would wish
that payment be made in full, within 30 days of any agreement being made
20
between GPL and the investor. GPL has formally confirmed its agreement
to these terms.
The Can Tho Project is an oil tank farm and terminal supporting petroleum
distribution logistics. Vietnam has no refinery capacity and imports all its
annual 12 million tonnes of petroleum products and it is envisaged that this
platform will become the national oil distribution logistics hub. The project
is in the Vietnamese Governments national master plan. The sponsor,
CAWACO, has all the main approvals and licences for construction of the
facility and for project operation.
th
During the 4 Quarter 2006, CAWACO requested that InfraCo withdraw
from the project and it is reported that CAWACO has partnered with a
Korean based firm at more favourable terms. InfraCos exposure to this
deal with the exception of management time was US$15,000 which was its
contribution to a pre-feasibility study. InfraCo is seeking to recover its
costs from CAWACO.
Such events are not unusual in the development arena. Sponsors will
always seize the opportunity to maximise their position and/or returns in a
specific deal. InfraCo Management recognises this and has a policy to
secure interests as early as possible through agreements with significant
penalties for any termination without cause.
The aim of this project is the development of three wind farm sites in
Santiago, St Vicente and Sal islands The World Bank referred this project
to InfraCo after two failed public sector procurement exercises. The
project potentially provides substantial economic and environmental
benefits. Currently the country utilises expensive imported fuels to
generate electricity and desalinate water.
21
support have been received from the World Bank - via a GEF grant - and
SIDA.
While the project has substantial economic benefits, InfraCo expects that
OBA and other grant funding will be necessary to assure connection
subsidies for the poor.
The project was established following an MOU between InfraCo and the
Government of Uganda in September 2005. There has been significant
advancement in the project since its inception. A project company
Kalangala Infrastructure Services (KIS) has been formed which is wholly
owned by InfraCo. The key milestones achieved for each of the project
components are highlighted below:
4.2.6.1. Ferry
nd
Target date for signing for procurement of ferry 2 Quarter
2007.
4.2.6.2. Water
22
4.2.6.3. Power
4.2.6.4. Road
In addition to the above milestones, a full EIA for the project has
been completed.
The sources of debt will include FMO LDC Fund, Stanbic Bank,
with USAID/GuaranCo credit support. Approaches have also been
made to OBA for ongoing revenue support.
23
An MOU has been signed between the four shareholders. A JDA has
been negotiated and is awaiting final approvals. It is envisaged that
InfraCo will be one of four shareholders in the project company, each with
24
a 25% equity holding. The remaining shareholders being the City of Beira,
Arcadis, Euroconsult and CETA Limited.
The initial technical review has not revealed any significant technical
constraints. The partners have approached consultants for expressions of
interest to undertake various studies including demand assessment, EIA,
legal framework analysis and technical costings.
The Antara project is another good example of a project which had stalled
for a period of 10 years before InfraCos involvement in 2006. Preliminary
analysis indicates a robust business case. The total estimated capital
requirement for this project is US$16 million. It is expected that US$10
million of debt financing will be sourced from the IFC and commercial
banks with the US$6 million equity financed from private investors.
25
A JDA has been signed between InfraCo and National Water and
Sewerage Company (NWSC). It is intended that over 95% of the project
will be debt financed, with a limited tranche of equity-like instruments and
grants.
A steering committee has been established with the NWSC. RFPs for the
procurement of consultants for demand and financial studies as well as
Owners engineer have been completed.
26
The ability to lift small scale farmers from poor subsistence farming to a
long term economically sustainable irrigated farming environment will
produce an immediate local and long term, regional, positive sustainable
economic benefit. In addition, the ability to grow winter wheat using the
same system will allow for additional regional food security.
InfraCo has signed MOU with both commercial farmers and small scale
farmers. A JDA with the commercial farmers is agreed in principle.
27
A summary of the risks identified with each project is given in Appendix VI. An
outline of typical risks identified is given below.
Attracting suitable buyers for some of the projects (particularly HDVs) may
be a challenging task. This could result in project preparation being
completed but delayed due to securing enough capital for implementation.
In this regard it should be noted that an exit strategy is always identified by
InfraCo prior to embarking on a project and the possibility of delays in
project closings is always factored into InfraCos business planning.
All of InfraCos projects have Central and Local Government support in the
countries in which they are located. This therefore minimises the level of
political risk on a macro level. It should however be noted that elections
are due in Ghana in 2008, and it is in this country that InfraCo currently
has the greatest exposure.
28
29
End of Year 2: InfraCo achieved one agreed sale - Aba (Nigeria). The target of 2
sales agreed was not achieved though it is expected that Kalangala will close in
2007. InfraCo signed 8 exclusivity agreements (Chiansi, Kampala, Antara, Cape
Verde, Sandrandano, Nfrasi, Can Tho and Ninh Thuan) and undertook 9 feasibility
studies (Chiansi, Beira, Kampala, Antara, Cape Verde, Sandandrano, Nfrasi, Can
Tho and Ninh Tuan). This surpassed the target requirements. The agreed cash
sale value of Aba covers its core cost.
The type of institutions that could provide the exit for InfraCo on the
aforementioned projects include, international strategic investors and operators,
Africa specific funds, the local private sector including pension funds and insurance
companies.
The Board has been instrumental in realising the vision to establish, direct
and develop the growth and pre-eminence of InfraCo to date. At inception
the Board ensured that the various systems, policies, processes and
controls were implemented, and conducted an open tender process which
culminated in the appointment of IMS as the preferred Management team.
The Board initiated and led the strategic planning process which defined
the aims and parameters of InfraCo and the resultant impressive and well
balanced project portfolio. Importantly, the Board has ensured that the
development portfolio has a good mix between projects with high
commercial value and those with low commercial, but high developmental
value, thus ensuring the broadening of the developmental impact on the
one hand and organisational sustainability on the other.
In essence the Board acts as a filter in the project screening and adoption
process and regularly assesses progress reports on the development
activities of the team. Through this process, the Board has made a
significant contribution with respect to the projects selected for
development as well as the development of strategy for each project.
Furthermore, the Board ensures that for each project a full Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) is undertaken as part of the development
activity. Many of the resulting innovations and achievements in the project
development activities are stimulated by the probing and challenging
contributions of the Board.
30
the Board and establishing a risk register for each project under
development.
The Board also instituted a separate audit on compliance with the anti-
corruption policy of Transparency International. This revealed substantial
compliance. Both the Board and Management have agreed on actions to
ensure 100% compliance.
It is evident that the Management team have the capability and experience
in the field of project development and have approached their task with
enthusiasm, commercial rigour and a commitment to contribute to poverty
alleviation through the provision of reliable and affordable infrastructure
services. If the momentum of their project development effort is
maintained, additional projects could achieve financial closure within the
next 12 months, thus offering a potential for significant and practical
developmental impact to large numbers of people whose lives and
livelihoods could be substantially transformed.
31
An evaluation of the sources and use of funds is set out below as at 31 December
2006. This is followed by an evaluation of the financial projections of the company
assuming there is no additional funding from PIDG, i.e. base case scenario.
The table below sets out the sources and uses of funds and compares it
with the projections made in the alternative business plan. The alternative
business plan was the term used in the InfraCo/IMS service contract to
denote an extension of InfraCo activities once additional funding became
available beyond the original financing provided by DFID.
32
Alternative Actual
Business Plan Receipts and Expenditure
Sources of Funds
Receipt from Trust 5,734,102
DFID 10,270,650
DGIS 5,520,951
TAF 2,415,106
Sale of Rights 746,975
Total Sources of Funds 6,481,077 18,206707
Uses Of Funds
Set Up Costs 209,678 600,898
IMS Fixed Fees
Salaries and benefits 2,318,583 2,081,524
Office Expenses 281,235 367,990
Total G&A 77,314 86,690
Tax Legal and Audit 102,219 183,871
Bookkeeping and VAT 83,308 114,187
Total Project Travel 406,251 972,484
Total US /UK Travel 91,728 152,367
Development Costs 609,861 1,864,278
Performance Fee 524,193 526,500
Success Fee 560,233 -
Bank Charges - 17,516
Exchange Variation - 32,886
33
The alternative business plan projected additional revenue flows from sale
of rights. InfraCo has achieved a sale with respect to its rights in Aba
Power, the payment of US$480,000 under the agreement is due within 30
days of the signing of the development agreement between GPL and the
new investor - Contour Global - which is expected to be completed by the
end of June 2007.
Further to the above, InfraCo is currently in negotiations with SIDA for the
provision of a 5 year standby guarantee of US$6.5m to support
commercial loans to InfraCo.
34
35
4.6.2. Kpone IPP: An illustration of the Project Development Cycle, Value Creation, Costs and Risks
Signature of MOU 0 External Costs: Nil Project found not technically, regulatory or commercially
feasible
Internal Costs: Travel: US$10,000 Time: 30 man days
Partner not found suitable
Pre-feasibility study 0 External Costs: Technical, Regulatory and commercial Project found not technically, regulatory or commercially
Feasibility studies: US$230,000; Background check: feasible
US$10,000
Partner not found suitable
Internal Costs Travel: US$10,000; Time: 60 man days
Signature of JDA US$500,000 External Costs: Government change of deregulation process, country risks,
Nigerian gas supply risk, Permitting risk, Licensing risk, EPC
Legal: US$15,000 price risk, Financing risk
Secured Site US$1,000,000 External Costs: Site related payments: US$170,000; Legal: Government change of deregulation process, country risks,
US$30,000 Nigerian gas supply risk, Permitting risk, Licensing risk, EPC
price risk, Financing risk
Internal Costs: Travel: US$10,000; Time: 30 man days
Obtained EIA Permit US$1,500,000 External Costs: EIA: US$200,000 Government change of deregulation process, country risks,
Nigerian gas supply risk, Licensing risk, EPC price risk,
Internal Costs: Travel: US$5,000; Time: 40 man days Financing risk
36
Secured Generation US$2,000,000 External Costs: Modelling: US$20,000 Government change of deregulation process, country risks,
Licence Nigerian gas supply risk, EPC price risk, Financing risk
Internal Costs: Travel: US$5,000; Time: 40 man days
*Appointment of US$2,000,000 External Costs: Government change of deregulation process, country risks,
financial and Legal Nigerian gas supply risk, EPC price risk, Financing risk
advisors Internal Costs: Travel: US$5,000; Time: 20 man days
Secured PPA US$5,000,000 External Costs: Financial Advisory: US$50,000 per month Country risks, Nigerian gas supply risk, EPC price risk,
Financing risk
Legal Advisory: US$400,000 per month; Technical Advisory
280 man-days Internal Costs: Travel: US$20,000; Time: 120 man days
Secured Fuel Supply US$7,000,000 External Costs: Financial Advisory: US$50,000 per month Country risks, EPC price risk, Financing risk
Agreement
Legal Advisory: US$200,000 per month; Fuel Advisory:
US$50,000 per month
Detailed EPC US$7,000,000 External Costs: Financial Advisory: US$50,000 per month Country risk, Financing risk
Specifications and
tender documents Legal Advisory: US$50,000 per month; Technical Advisory:
prepared US$150,000
37
Partial sale agreed US$10,000,000 External Costs: Financial Advisory: US$200,000 per month Country risk, Financing risk
(i.e. entry of
additional sponsors) Legal Advisory: US$100,000 per month
EPC Contract signed US$10,000,000 External Costs: Financial Advisory: US$50,000 per month Country risk, Financing risk
Legal Advisory: US$200,000 per month
38
The Management team of InfraCo recently updated the InfraCo business plan for
presentation to its Board and PIDG. This revised business plan incorporates a
series of sensitivity analyses around their Base Case financial projections. This
section evaluates the Base Case projections and associated analyses provided by
InfraCo. The evaluation was limited to the aforementioned assessment.
Consequently, the evaluation does not include any assessment of design, build
quality, integrity or accuracy of the IMS financial model or indeed the underlying
assumptions or accuracy of the input data which could be deemed to fall outside
the scope of this review (this notwithstanding there is no reason to doubt the
veracity of the model).
(i) 16 Project MOUs will be signed over the five year period of
analysis. 11 of these are expected to progress to the JDA Stage,
with 8 reaching financial closure.
(ii) 25% of the project portfolio and 36% of projects closed will be
HDV projects. (This is a higher percentage than that contained
within the original IMS Business Plan and is strongly supported by
the Board).
(iv) Non-HDV projects will have a carried interest component that will
make a cash contribution over a 15 year period.
(v) A project mortality rate of 50%, without cost recovery for projects
that do not achieve financial closure.
It should be noted that the high level of HDV projects within the portfolio
have important implications for the Base Case financial projections. HDV
projects consume similar resources and levels of expenditure as other
projects. For example, the Chiansi Irrigation Infrastructure Project,
requires approximately the same level of technical, legal and financial
39
40
Cash Inputs
Total closed projects 8
Equity injections into InfraCo 19,654,620
- of which HDV 3
TAF Funding 4,335,662
Taxes Paid 0
41
2,000,000
(2,000,000)
(4,000,000)
(6,000,000)
(8,000,000)
(10,000,000)
(12,000,000)
30-Jun-05 30-Jun-06 30-Jun-07 30-Jun-08 30-Jun-09 30-Jun-10 30-Jun-11 30-Jun-12 30-Jun-13 30-Jun-14 30-Jun-15
The tables above provide a summary of the Base Case financial results for the
period to the end of 2011. The cash flow forecast is based on the aforementioned
assumptions and project development activity. No additional funding from PIDG
other than the DGIS committed balance of US$5 million is expected. The table
identifies by line item each of the major costs of InfraCo: (i) operating costs, (ii)
success fees for closing of HDV projects (iii) success fees for closing of other
projects.
It can be argued that the cash balance at end June 2011 has been arrived at
utilising assumptions that are not easily predictable, e.g. a key assumption being
that proceeds from sales will flow on a timely basis to meet funding shortfalls which
could begin to occur from second quarter 2008. Furthermore it should be noted
that, under certain sensitivity scenarios, without additional funding from the
shareholders, InfraCo will not have sufficient funds to sustain its planned level of
operations beyond 2009.
42
The lack of additional funds to continue current and projected level of operations
and project development could impact negatively on InfraCo and the projects
developed in that:
InfraCo will not be able to achieve its objective and will give its projects a
negative perception in the marketplace.
It will amount to a poor use of donor funds as the projects will be stalled
and InfraCo will find it difficult to pass on or sell the projects to other
parties.
To mitigate the above, new commitments for additional funding by end 2008 are
urgently required in order to ensure InfraCo continues its operations with
confidence.
The above notwithstanding, it should be noted that the cash flow deficit described
is mainly related to the fact that InfraCo has rapidly built up a pipeline of projects
and thus is dependant on external funding until revenues from such projects, in the
form of both cash and carried interests, can be secured. Furthermore, DFID DGIS
and SIDA, are considering making new investments in InfraCo. Should this
investment be forthcoming, this will provide InfraCo with the additional financial
resources required to enable it to attain self-financing of its operations beyond
2009.
43
4.7.3. Findings
The KPIs abstracted from the InfraCo financial model for the different
scenarios are summarised in Table 7 below. However, the key issues
arising from the Scenario analysis are as follows:
44
Most importantly the review also revealed that InfraCo has forward
committed to projects under its current development portfolio all
US$20 million that had been provided to the initiative by DFID and
DGIS. This effectively means that InfraCo cannot increase its
development portfolio or indeed participate in new opportunities
without additional financial resources.
45
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This final section outlines the success and challenges identified during the review.
The mix of the portfolio and pipeline also offers the potential for part of the
fees received from the successful sale of the large Kpone type projects to
make a contribution to the development of HDV projects in the future.
InfraCo has, in many respects, achieved and even surpassed the targets that
were set on establishment and all indications are that it is on course to meet
its third year targets. In terms of agreed sales, it has only achieved one in
principle agreed sale instead of the two that was the target by end of Year 2.
However, in achieving the Aba power sale it has proven the model by
attracting a private sector investor that would not otherwise have been
interested in the deal and secured a return on its relatively small investment.
4.8.1.3. Innovation
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(d) Utilising its relatively higher risk tolerance and (limited) patient equity
to reinvigorate long stalled projects as in Kpone and Aba.
The InfraCo model has secured buy in from key stakeholders in central and
local government institutions and communities in the locations in which they
are operating. Stakeholders views are particularly positive with respect to its
championing of projects, speed of operations, technical capacity, non-
bureaucratic approach, commitment to pro-poor schemes, mentoring
approach with governments and communities, and its propensity to take on
deals that have been stalled for long periods. All these factors have earned
admiration from various stakeholders. In this respect, the government
representatives that were contacted during the review believe the model is
significantly different and compares favourably with other technical assistance
facilities with which they have had experience.
InfraCos lack of balance sheet constrains its operations and hinders its
credibility. In this sense, some existing and potential public and private sector
partners, cast doubt on its ability to deliver projects to closure. Some argue
that InfraCo needs to be involved post-closure in a meaningful manner (albeit
for a limited period) to ensure stability and hence continuity of the project
implementation and operation. Additionally, it should be recognised that it
may be necessary for InfraCo to remain in the project post-closure, or give
assurances to that, in order to give confidence to the constituents it wishes to
attract.
It should also be noted that these same types of project will require an
element of subsidy during the investment and operational phases, both in
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terms of connection and tariff support. In this regard, it is crucial that InfraCo
has ready access to facilities such as GPOBA, to enable it to structure HDV
deals in a timely and successful manner, thus continuing its contribution to
poverty alleviation. In this respect, it should be noted that the increasing
popularity of GPOBA has resulted in a dramatic increase in its volume of
work. The fund is receiving an ever increasing number of applications which
is pressurising its very meagre resources. Furthermore, as a World Bank
administered Trust Fund, it relies largely on WB staffing resources to assist
with the processing of transactions which may not always be amongst the
priorities of the Bank.
Sales receipts from HDV projects in many cases could be very low: it may not
even be possible to always achieve full cost recovery for such type of
projects. It may therefore be necessary for InfraCo to have a critical mass of
projects in its portfolio at any one time that would yield significant levels of
return to ensure that, over time, the organisation becomes financially
sustainable whilst at the same time fulfilling its development mission.
These include the DFID led AsPIFF, IFCs Project Preparation Facility,
ECOWAS Project Preparation and Development Unit, SADC Project
Preparation Facility and the ADB Nepad IPPF.
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The challenge for InfraCo would be to redefine its area of focus and modus
operandi so as not to duplicate effort, but rather institute a collaborative
working relationship with these facilities.
This will be more pertinent in the case of the AsPIFF, a dedicated Asian
facility, which may be established under InfraCo.
Given the limited resources at its disposal, InfraCo has quite rightly focused
on projects in Africa, where the need was greatest. In doing so, they have
obtained a degree of acceptance and recognition. However, from a regional
perspective, InfraCo would have greater credibility if regional institutions and
nationals were admitted to participate at all levels of the organisation. This
would convey greater acceptance and build capacity in a manner which would
be more cost effective for its operations, and be more sustainable in the long
term.
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Through a strategic planning, identification, screening and engagement process, InfraCo has
built an impressive array of projects with signed development agreements, in various sectors
and countries. Importantly, the portfolio of projects under development and pipeline contain a
number of HDV projects which, if implemented, will have a significant developmental impact
particularly for the rural and in some cases urban poor, thus making a contribution to poverty
alleviation and gender equality.
Overall, in many respects, InfraCo has achieved and even surpassed the targets that were
set on establishment. By the end of Year 1, InfraCo had signed 5 exclusive agreements
(Beira, Kalangala, Kpone, Aba and KIS Renewables) and conducted 4 feasibility studies
(Kalangala, Kpone, Aba and KIS Renewables). This achievement is far greater than the
requisite, target of 1 exclusive agreement.
By the end of Year 2, InfraCo achieved one agreed sale - Aba (Nigeria). The target of 2 sales
agreed was not achieved though it is expected that Kalangala will close in 2007. InfraCo
signed 8 additional exclusivity agreements (Chiansi, Kampala, Antara, Cape Verde,
Sandrandano, Nfrasi, Can Tho and Ninh Thuan) and undertook 9 feasibility studies (Chiansi,
Beira, Kampala, Antara, Cape Verde, Sandandrano, Nfrasi, Can Tho and Ninh Tuan). This
surpassed the target requirements. In achieving the agreed Aba power sale it has proven the
model by attracting a private sector investor that would not otherwise have been interested in
the deal, and secured a return on its relatively small investment.
Based on the current development status and progress being made, it is reasonable to
assume that InfraCo would be able to sell, by the end of Year 3, some or all of its interests in
5 projects i.e. Tema, Kalangala, KIS Renewables, Antara and Chiansi. All indications are that
they should be able to cover their core running costs and generate a premium on most
projects to finance additional development. Such an achievement would also surpass the
expected target outcomes.
(b) Development in Kalangala of an integrated project covering water, power, road and
ferry services for rural communities which, on an individual project basis, may not
have been economically justified to undertake.
(d) Utilisation of (limited) patient equity to reinvigorate long stalled projects as in Kpone
and Aba.
Through such innovation, there is now the realistic prospect of providing timely and cost
efficient access to infrastructure services for economically marginalised populations.
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The review of the base case and scenario analyses contained in the revised InfraCo business
plan model revealed that, taking the downside case assumptions, the total expenditure over
the period to 2009 would exceed the currently available resources of US$20m. Were this
situation to be realised, the Board of InfraCo would be forced to defer expenditures resulting
in indefinite delay in closing of some of the portfolio.
Most importantly, the review also revealed that InfraCo had forward committed to projects
under its current development portfolio all US$20 million that had been provided to the
initiative by DFID and DGIS. This effectively means that InfraCo cannot increase its
development portfolio or indeed participate in new opportunities without additional financial
resources.
The base case forecasts could be deemed achievable, provided that InfraCo is:
Creates project structures and negotiates a degree of participation which protects its
exit position.
Project visits undertaken during the review confirm that InfraCo has secured buy in from key
stakeholders in central and local government institutions and communities, in the locations in
which they are operating.
Stakeholders views are particularly positive with respect to its championing of projects, speed
of operations, technical capacity, non-bureaucratic approach, commitment to pro-poor
schemes, mentoring approach with governments and communities, and its propensity to take
on deals that have been stalled for long periods. All these factors have earned admiration
from various stakeholders. In this respect, government representatives contacted during the
review unanimously expressed the view that the model is significantly different and compares
favourably to other technical assistance facilities with which they have had experience.
The stewardship and effectiveness of the Board of Directors in governing the activities of
InfraCo has been critical to the achievements of the company to date. With respect to the
governance of the company the Board has established an internal audit committee which
operates within an internal audit plan. The Board has also instituted separate audit on
compliance with the anti-corruption policy of Transparency International.
Another key contribution of the Board, is acting as a filtration mechanism in the project
screening process and in the regular assessment of the development activities of the
company. The Board also ensures that for each project a full Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) is undertaken. Indeed many of the resulting innovations and achievements
are stimulated by the probing and challenging contributions of the Board.
The Board has additionally been active in sourcing additional funding for the company, forging
closer relationships between InfraCo and other DFIs as well as between InfraCo and other
PIDG instruments.
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6 RECOMMENDATIONS
This review confirms that the InfraCo concept is proven both in terms of its ability to attract private
sector investment and in its added developmental value, to stimulate the provision of access to
infrastructure services in the emerging markets of Africa in particular and, to a more limited extent, in
Asia. A number of challenges have been identified. In this regard, the recommendations proposed
below seek to overcome these challenges and enhance the InfraCo initiative with respect to:
Sustainability.
Development impact.
Operational efficacy.
The InfraCo pilot programme should be scaled up to a full project development facility. In
doing so, consideration should be given to the following:
(a) Establish separate windows or entities for the Asian and African operations
Subject to additional funding, InfraCo should consider the establishment of these two
windows or entities, to ensure a more comprehensive and focused approach to the
development effort in these two different and distinct regions. This proposed
structure will also better enable InfraCo to secure the participation of Governments
and Regional institutions, whose mandates are normally geographically limited in its
ownership and operations. Additionally such a structure allows for AsPIFF, on its
establishment, to essentially become the Asian window of InfraCo.
Given the long gestation period of infrastructure development, the returns normally
accrue at closure with a balloon payment and a small carried interest. This
inconsistency in the revenue stream means that cash reserves are continuously
depleted until the next payment is realised.
In the longer term, given its capabilities, InfraCo should also consider participating in
joint ventures with others to offer Project Delivery Services. These services could be
delivered on behalf of public agencies in projects where the private sector benefits
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are limited or uncertain, but private sector expertise in the packaging and operations,
necessary and essential. However, an important element of this service delivery will
be InfraCos control over the development process.
PDIG should authorise InfraCo to extend an invitation to DFIs, region specific funds,
local and international institutional investors to participate in the InfraCo initiative.
The outline of a new structure such as that proposed in Figure 6 below, will allow
potential investors to either participate through PIDG, or, at either of the regional
windows, investment fund or operational entities. This outline structure would require
further examination and detailed design.
PIDG
The advantages of securing the participation of additional entities as described above is that
they will:
InfraCos lack of balance sheet strength has been identified as a key weakness in its business
model. Furthermore analysis of cash flow projections reveal that InfraCo would need a
substantial cash injection by 2008 to meet its operational commitments. In this respect, the
following are proposed:
PIDG should, in 2007, provide InfraCo with an additional US$40 - US$60 million
funding commitment for a 5 year period for its Africa development operations with
nd
draw down to commence from 2 Quarter 2008.
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number of HDV projects. Commitment for this additional funding should be secured
as soon as is practicable. Draw down from any additional funding should continue to
be on the demonstration of a case of need basis.
Given InfraCos present geographic focus, PIDG should support InfraCo to raise an
Africa-specific infrastructure investment fund to be managed by InfraCo.
The role of the PIDG in the capital structure of the Fund would be to demonstrate
support and provide subordinated capital to provide an incentive for others to join in
the initiative. The exact sizing of each level of capital would be determined after a full
study of the likely capital structure of such a fund and consultations with potential
investors.
TAF supports InfraCo by providing funding for third party costs. This funding
is reportedly close to exhaustion with no confirmed commitment for
replenishment. Should this source of funding not be renewed, this would
have a detrimental impact on the development of HDV projects.
(ii) GPOBA
In this regard PIDG should, with its other development partners, examine the
adequacy of the resources within GPOBA with a view to adequately
resourcing the Fund so that it can efficiently process applications, better
engage with its increasing client base, and thus increase the poverty
reduction benefits of its projects.
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could offer the opportunity for the two institutions to learn more about the
workings of each other and to develop a modus operandi for their effective
co-operation in the future.
InfraCo should devise and implement a regional marketing strategy with a view to
promoting awareness, building networks and forging partnerships subject to
additional funds being committed.
Whilst it is recognised that Management in the first two years had to focus on the
practicalities of building a new company and at the same time identifying deals, it is
now appropriate that consideration be given to a scale-up of marketing and
communications activity, particularly with respect to building relationships and
alliances with governments, regional institutions, regional project preparation facilities
and local financial and commercial private sector institutions. To this end, there is a
need for a scale-up of communications and regional relationship building activity.
The Chairman and Managing Director should be instrumental in directing and leading
this activity supported by the communications team InfraCo are currently recruiting.
(c) Institute financial and operational systems and controls in line with
organisational growth and market benchmarks
(ii) Incorporate, within quarterly progress report to the Board, quantitative and
qualitative information regarding risks associated with each project.
InfraCos Board and Management have, over the last two years, achieved a large measure of
success and acquired the unique market and transaction experience relevant to this initiative.
Subject to new funding, the InfraCo Board should review the terms of the existing contract
and renegotiate with IMS a new contract which will take into account new additional funding
secured and the fact that the market conditions, under which the existing contract was
concluded, have changed due largely to the demonstration effect of InfraCo and concomitant
reduced risks.
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The above notwithstanding, it is recommended that going forward the Board retains the
flexibility to negotiate arrangements for developer and fund management services which will
ensure the optimal use of the financial resources at its disposal, and advise PIDG
accordingly.
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