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To cite this Article Lahav, Gallya and Guiraudon, Virginie(2006) 'Actors and venues in immigration control: Closing the
gap between political demands and policy outcomes', West European Politics, 29: 2, 201 223
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/01402380500512551
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West European Politics,
Vol. 29, No. 2, 201 223, March 2006
This account reviews the state of the literature on migration since the West European
Politics special issue on migration was published in 1994. Particular attention is
dedicated to the theme of immigration control and the critical question of policy gaps
between immigration policy goals and outcomes. Regarding policy gaps, we identify
three dimensions of this thesis that are addressed in some form by the contributors to
the volume. These include: the disjuncture between public opinion and policy elites at
the decision-making and implementation stages; the relationship between principals
(states) and agents; and the dynamic between international and domestic arenas of
policy-making. Oering a comparative analytical framework to empirically map the
variations that exist across countries and policy stages and levels, this essay
disaggregates the various components and actors involved in migration policy-making.
It suggests that in order to test the gap thesis, a more nuanced empirical analysis of an
expanded migration policy eld composed of multiple actors and venues is warranted.
countries and on the agenda of European Union (EU) forums and other
international venues. What has changed most since the Baldwin Edwards/
Schain volume is not so much the nature of immigration politics as the fact
that mainstream political scientists are now analysing its dynamics, its
impact on policy, on migration patterns and migrant incorporation. While
the 1994 collection was the earliest of its kind a broad and fairly
comprehensive survey of national models of both immigration and
immigrant policies in dierent European countries many scholars in the
eld continued to focus on their own national context and remained largely
descriptive and/or normative in their approach.
This bias was particularly agrant when studies focused on policies aimed
at immigrants once they had settled in Europe. As Adrian Favell (2001)
wrote in an incisive survey of that literature, despite the proliferation of
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that immigration can be controlled has been at the core of most of the
literature in migration studies. Broadly speaking, countries solicit and/or
stem immigration ows. Yet a popular discourse among migration scholars
as immigration policy-making has become more complex and multi-tiered is
that states have lost control over immigration (Sassen 1996). The notion of
a policy gap (Cornelius et al. 2004) between restrictive goals and liberal or
expansive outcomes has gained credence. There are however dierent
versions of that argument.
For most sociologists in the eld, the gap stems from the irrelevance of
policy in their view when analysing migration dynamics. States are plainly
misguided in their belief that policy can inuence inevitable migration ows.
A notable work in this vein is Douglas Masseys March of Folly (1998)
article in which he argued that when governments such as that of the US
believe that stimulating the development of countries of origin and erecting
borders in the sending countries stem ows they risk increasing them instead.
In this logic, development is seen to increase migration as migrants tend to be
rather educated persons feeling dislocated and relatively deprived. Borders
then make the process uni-directional rather than circular (i.e. immigration
becomes permanent since border-crossing has a high cost). There are in fact
European examples of counterproductive deterrence policies, including the
shift from circular to permanent immigration, exemplied by the case of
EastWest migrants as the Schengen border becomes more of a reality and
strict visa policies are in force in the new member states.
We agree with the premises of such immigration studies that policies are
only one element aecting the dynamics of migration and the destination of
immigrants, and their eects are not always those intended. One could add
that policies in the migrants country of origin and in other domains can
better explain changes in migration ows than measures regulating the entry
and stay of foreigners. Political scientists such as Eiko Thielemann, whose
research is featured in this volume, have also underlined that policies do not
always matter. He reminds us that governments attribute the ebb and ow of
asylum applications to their (restrictive) reforms while changes may depend
204 G. Lahav and V. Guiraudon
on the shift in conict areas and the colonial or kinship ties between the
country from which refugees are eeing and a particular EU member state
(Thielemann 2003). In fact, political scientists take for granted that policies
are not rational solutions based on social science models of migration dynamics
but stem from compromises between various interest groups, mediated by media
pressure and party politics. The complex politics that lead to policy choices are
the nitty-gritty that several articles in this volume seek to disaggregate.
Another strand of the migration policy literature also envisages a gap
between goals and outcomes. Gary Freeman (1995, 2002), in particular, who
contributes an updated version of his theory of migration politics to this
collection, has long pointed out that there has been a discrepancy between
the desires of a largely anti-immigration public and the expansive bias of
policies. In his view, this reects the importance of organised interests in
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some but not all aspects of migration policy. Freemans theory is revisited
and tested in several of the contributions to this volume. Furthermore, the
notion of a gap between policy inputs and outcomes stated goals and
migration patterns is examined in a more comprehensive manner by
Freeman here than has been done before.
In addressing the gap hypotheses, scholars represented here examine vari-
ous types of policy demands, as well as a broad range of policy instruments at
the disposal of national governments taking into account the entire policy
process. Several contributions tackle the issue of policy implementation an
oft-missing variable in the public policy literature, especially with respect
to immigration control. Others study policy-making beyond the state at
the supranational level, in intergovernmental forums, and in bilateral and
multilateral contexts whereby states seek to externalise migration control
functions. In these ways, we aim to test the gap hypothesis anew by
contemplating the relationship between policy outputs and policy outcomes.
The need for a more comprehensive analysis of the policy process and a
more nuanced analysis of policy choices derives not only from theoretical
questions about policy gaps. It stems in part from the complexity of the
current demographic situation in Europe with respect to temporary and
permanent migration (see Appendix A for current gures). That is, despite
the widespread fortress Europe rhetoric, the political turn towards
restrictionism, and the securitisation of migration, there are substantial
legal entries each year in Europe. Almost two and half million international
migrants arrived legally in the European Economic Area and Switzerland in
2003, the last year when data were available (OECD 2005). The number is
greater than in the late 1990s when the annual average was 1.9 million.
While most migrants are unsolicited, such as family members of foreign
residents or nationals and asylum-seekers, since the 1990s the demographic
situation has become very nuanced, as the need for foreign workers has
coincided with the decline of the native labour force. Indeed, there has been a
developing trend of labour recruitment including skilled and unskilled,
seasonal, temporary and permanent migrants. European governments have
Actors and Venues in Immigration Control 205
also been actively recruiting foreign students, the competition for brains having
been accelerated by a drop in foreign student visas in the US following 9/11.
The number of foreign students increased by 30% in the UK and 36% in
France from 2001 to 2003, for example. The number of intra-company
transferees has also become signicant, since the principle of freedom of services
in the European Union allows member state rms to employ foreign workers.
To add to these trends, consider unwanted migrants such as asylum-
seekers, and recall that only 1020% of rejected asylum-seekers are actually
deported. National and EU political leaders alike invoke the need to ght
illegal migration, but they well know in which sectors of the economy these
measures are likely to work and they fear upsetting the boom in those
sectors that are more dependent on foreign labour (e.g. construction
industry, tourism). Several governments hosting large numbers of undocu-
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Analytical Framework
The State of the Academic Debate: The Gap Hypothesis
A major polemic in the migration eld has been the degree to which liberal
nation-states can control immigration. More than ever, as immigration has
been placed in a security framework, the question of border control has
come to the fore. The debate on how nation-states are responding to
increasing cross-pressures between market and rights-based tenets versus
political and security pressures for limiting migration is unresolved. Soci-
ologists (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996) and political economists (Hollield
1992; Sassen, 1996) have argued that national choices around migration
are constrained by international human rights and market norms. They
challenge more state-centric, neo-realist claims that assume that states have
Actors and Venues in Immigration Control 207
the power to protect and defend their territorial integrity (Zolberg 1981;
Weiner 1985).
The prevailing scholarship on immigration has been inconclusive with
regard to the role and nature of domestic actors on national immigration
policy-making. An inuential contingent of immigration scholarship has
pointed to exogenous constraints by international structures, such as the EU
and NAFTA, bilateral agreements, and human rights norms (Soysal 1994).
In the 1990s, they were seen to set the parameters of the political debate,
regardless of the presence of restrictionist populist media, public opinion or
the extreme-right (see Gurowitz 1999 and Joppke 1999 for a discussion of
the role of domestic versus international norms). Scholars have also
suggested that liberal immigration policies have emerged because negative
public opinion is not factored into elite decision-making or institutional
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linked to a number of other policy elds and consequently falls under the
jurisdiction of several administrative competences (e.g., foreign aairs,
home aairs, justice and labour ministries). Second, there has been erce
competition over the construction of the problem in the last decades and, in
particular, over linkages between migration and internal and external
security agendas that blur the contours of the immigration policy eld. Even
Tomas Hammars (1985) classical distinction between immigration control
and immigrant policy (i.e., the incorporation of settled migrants) is dicult
to unpack in empirical terms. Governments that sought to stem migration
ows in the 1990s reformed incorporation policy so as to deter new migrant
entries by rolling back rights and linking benets to legal residence. They
also prevented asylum-seekers from working and lodging them apart from
the local society with allowances in kind rather than cash. Hammar himself
has recently interpreted the shift of immigration control inward as a re-
bordering of the welfare state (Brochmann and Hammar 1999).
Thus, what we propose in this section is not a theory of immigration
politics Gary Freemans piece makes that contribution but rather a map
and an itinerary to guide our readers through this crowded and labyrinthine
eld. The itinerary takes us from the main factors that drive policy to the
main trends in outcomes. The map then identies the main actors in
immigration control at various policy stages. These actors operate at
dierent levels (local, national, international). They are not all state actors
but include private actors and members of civil society.
policy outcomes and the intervening variables that come in at various policy
stages. The second column provides some examples of the type of
institutional features that may aect the clout of the actors identied (see
column 1). Policy choices (column 3) are made by governments seeking re-
election in response to cross-pressures. Still, as column 4 reveals, there is
another set of actors at the implementation stage with varying capacity and
willingness to perform in accordance with stated policy goals. Variation may
exist sub-nationally and across the type of actors involved. The table
suggests that policy outcomes are a product of (a) the struggles between
actors in dierent elds (economy, politics, law), (b) the trade-os made by
elected leaders that face varying pressures depending on the institutional
characteristics of each eld, and (c) implementation structures. Any serious
comparative analysis of migration control must factor in these multiple
variables that exist across time and countries.
TAB LE 1
FR OM P OL ICY IN P UT S T O OU TCOM ES: FA C TOR S AN D T RE ND S
Institutional Policy
Input factors lters (vary implementation
and actors X-nationally) Policy choices constraints Policy outcomes
Labour demands Labour market institutions Labour recruitment away Attractiveness of the economy Rise of illegal migration
[business/labour and industrial relations from public eye
actors] system Ties between migrants and Rise of temporary labour
Shifting up to European destination countries migration and
Public opinion Electoral and party systems, level intra-company transfers
[political parties, size of extreme right, Capacity of local state agents
media] government type Externalisation of control Willingness of non-state Family reunion and asylum
to third parties agents to comply remain main legal
Liberal legal norms Protest culture, categories with much
[courts, NGOs, Judicial system cross-national variation
immigration
bureaucracies]
Source: Virginie Guiraudon (2005). Paper on Immigration Policy and Politics presented at the conference on Developments in European Politics, Bologna, 45
March. To appear in Developments in European Politics edited by Paul Heywood, Erik Jones, Martin Rhodes and Uli Sedelmeier (London: Palgrave,
forthcoming 2006).
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TAB LE 2
L EV E L S A ND AC T O R S I N E N L A R G E D M I G R A T I O N P O L IC Y - M A K I N G F IE LD
A PublicPolicy Gap?
The construction of immigration as a public problem highly salient in
public opinion and partisan politics requires us to revisit Gary Freemans
(2002) persuasive client politics model. Accordingly, policy is dominated by
liberal elites who are captured by self-interested bureaucrats and employers,
and alienated from rationally ignorant but restrictionist publics.
Indeed, there have been several reasons for dismissing public opinion.
First, immigration policy-making has long been conducted in the absence of
Actors and Venues in Immigration Control 213
explain divergence in levels of compliance and nally the values that guide
the actions of state and non-state law enforcers. As Ellermann shows in her
case of deportation, German bureaucrats latitude in implementation is
highly susceptible to public opposition. In contrast, van der Leuns study of
the Dutch human service sector suggests that autonomous bureaucrats may
have much more discretion in implementing ocial policy goals. Both cases
help account for the substantial variation in policy outcomes that we see not
only nationally, but locally, and across social spheres.
national adversaries when they work with their counterparts at the EU-level.
In the 1980s, when cooperation started, the venues less amenable to
restrictive immigration control policy were situated at the national level
where the judiciary, other ministries and agencies with diering goals and,
to a lesser extent, migrant-aid organisations hampered the enactment of a
restrictive immigration and asylum policy. Seizing opportunities stemming
from pre-existing policy settings and developing policy frames that linked
migration with European-wide security issues, law and order ocials were
able to circumvent national constraints in international cooperation forums
that still remained largely intergovernmental.
Second, the ocial goal of policy cooperation has often been reported to
be the sharing of the cost of hosting asylum-seekers among EU states as well
as the harmonisation of rules to prevent asylum-seekers from shopping for
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governments east and south of Europe have complained that they do not
have the means to take on this task. In buer zone countries, where
political stability and liberal democracy have yet to be established, there
may be a great risk for migrants as regimes such as Libya and Morocco are
instructed to prevent migrants from the sub-Sahara arriving in European
states. There have been many deaths at the EU external border, most
notably south of Spain and Italy and in the tunnel linking the UK to
mainland Europe, which shows the limits of the strategy of externalising
immigration control to third states (Lavenex in this volume).
Annex 1
TA BL E A1
F O R E IG N P O P U L A T I O N S A ND RE FU G E E F L O W S I N S E L EC T E D E U R O P E A N C O U N T R I E S
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