SECOND DIVISION petitioners refused to sign the same.
Thereafter, petitioners were placed
G.R. No. 189176, March 19, 2014
BARRY LANIER AND PERLITA LANIER, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
While the determination of probable cause is primarily an executive
function, the Court would not hesitate to interfere if there is a clear
showing that Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving
at the conclusion he reached.
Guided by this principle, we shall resolve whether the Court of Appeals
erred in reinstating the Information against petitioners.
Assailed in this Petition for Review is the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 85736 reversing the Department of
Justice (DOJ) Resolutions dated 6 May 2004 and 17 June 2004 which
nullified the provincial prosecutors Resolution finding probable cause to
indict petitioners for illegal possession of prohibited drugs and the Regional
Trial Courts (RTC) Order granting the Motion to Withdraw the Information.
First, the factual antecedents.
In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, SPO1 Juan Gorion (SPO1 Gorion) and PO2
Noemi Remaneses (PO2 Remaneses) attested that Task Force Roulette of
the Aklan Police Provincial Office (APPO) and the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) received information from an asset that
petitioners Barry Lanier and Perlita Lanier (Perlita) were engaged in selling
illegal drugs in Boracay Island. The police operatives conducted a testbuy
at petitioners residence in Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island where they
were able to purchase P5,000.00 worth of shabu and P1,000.00 worth
of marijuana from petitioners. On the basis of the testbuy operation, they
were able to secure a search warrant from the RTC of Aklan.3
SPO1 Gorion and PO2 Remaneses narrated that on 17 December 2003,
police operatives proceeded to the house of petitioners to serve the search
warrant. After presentment of the warrant, the police operatives, in the
presence of the Barangay Captain and some members of the media,
conducted the search. In the living room in the second floor, they
recovered three (3) sachets of shabu weighing 10.4 grams more or less,
inside a jewelry box. They also found one big pack containing
dried marijuana leaves weighing 950 grams and two gift packs containing
9 bricks of marijuana with an aggregate weight of 800 grams. A Receipt
for Property Seized was prepared by SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan, but
under arrest.4
On 18 December 2003, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Kalibo, Aklan
filed an Information charging petitioners of violation of Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165, which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 17th day of December, 2003, in the morning, at
Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Municipality of Malay, Province of
Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating,
and mutually helping each other, without authority of law, have in their
possession, custody and control one (1) big pack of suspected dried
Marijuana leaves weighing more or less NINE HUNDRED FIFTY (950)
grams, Nine (9) bricks of suspected dried Marijuana leaves weighing more
or less EIGHT HUNDRED (800) grams and Three (3) plastic sachet[s] of
suspected shabu weighing more or less 10.4 grams which members of the
Task Force Roulette of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, and the joint
elements of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency confiscated from their
possession and control in the course of a search by virtue of Search
Warrant Number 462003 issued by Honorable Judge Marietta J. Homena
Valencia, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Kalibo, Aklan.5
On 23 December 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary
Investigation/Reinvestigation.6
On 9 January 2004, a Motion to Quash the Information7 was filed before
the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. Petitioners questioned why the police did not
arrest them after allegedly receiving the marked money during the test
buy operation and why the marked money was not presented as evidence.
Petitioners cried frame up and accused the police of planting the illegal
drugs. In their CounterAffidavit, petitioners claimed that around 4:00
a.m. on 17 December 2003, several men demanded entry into their house.
When Perlita opened the door, two men pointed their guns at her and
declared a raid. More than 15 people stormed into their house. She also
saw 5 to 6 men, who were carrying backpacks, go into the masters
bedroom. The police officers called petitioners to the masters bedroom
and showed them sachets of shabu allegedly found inside a box
and marijuana leaves found in gift packs. They were forced to sign the
inventory receipt but they refused to do so. Petitioners ascribed illmotives
on the part of the police officers on behest of the Barangay Captain
against whom the petitioners had filed an administrative complaint.8
Petitioners attached to their motion the affidavits of their witnesses and
the Home Study Report in Special Proceeding No. 6829 of the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan with 75 pages of character references and a drugtest report
showing that they were tested negative for illegal drugs.
On 28 January 2004, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to
Quash. And on 9 February 2004, the trial court remanded the case to the
provincial prosecutor for preliminary investigation.
In a Resolution dated 8 March 2004, the provincial prosecutor upheld the
Information and directed the return of the records to the trial court for
disposition.
On 28 March 2004, however, petitioners filed a petition for review before
the DOJ assailing the 8 March 2004 Resolution of the provincial
prosecutor. On 6 May 2004, the Secretary of Justice acted on the petition
favorably and directed the withdrawal of the Information which directive
the provincial prosecutor heeded by filing a Motion to Withdraw
Information before the trial court. The trial court granted the Motion to
Withdraw Information on 24 June 2004.
The Secretary of Justice gave more credence to the version of petitioners
that the illegal drugs seized were planted. The Secretary of Justice took
note of the testimony of SPO1 Gorion during the clarificatory hearing on
20 February 2004 that there were two groups the raiding team and the
search team that entered the house of petitioners. The fact that the
raiding team arrived ahead of the search team bolstered petitioners
assertion that the illegal drugs seized were planted by the raiding team.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari seeking to annul the DOJ Resolutions directing the
withdrawal of the Information against petitioners and the RTCs Order
granting the Motion to Withdraw filed by the provincial prosecutor.
On 26 September 2008, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the
DOJ Resolutions and the RTC Order and reinstated the Information against
petitioners in Criminal Case No. 6972. The appellate court declared that
the petition for review was filed within the extension granted by the court;
that the People, through the OSG, correctly filed the petition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court because the Court of Appeals may review the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice only in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion; that the Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the provincial prosecutor complied with the
condition sine qua non of exhausting all plain, speedy and adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law; and that the petition
for certiorari bore the proper verification of the OSG as the Peoples
statutory counsel.
In the main, the appellate court found that there is probable cause to
sustain petitioners indictment.
Petitioners elevated the case to this Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals and consequently, the withdrawal of the
Information for illegal possession of prohibited drugs filed against them.
Petitioners now proffer essentially the same arguments presented before
the Court of Appeals:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The petition for review before the Court of Appeals assailing the
RTC Order is fatally defective because: a) it was filed out of time;
b) it substituted a lost appeal; and, c) it was not preceded by a
timely motion for reconsideration.
2. The petition for review before the Court of Appeals assailing the
DOJ Resolutions is fatally defective because: a) it was filed out of
time; and, b) it had become moot and academic when the RTC
granted the withdrawal of the Information.
3. The fact that the police officers were able to move around the
house, unescorted by competent witnesses, and were able to
predetermine the precise weight of the illegal drugs prior to the
arrival of the weighing scale placed in serious doubt the real
sources of the alleged illegal drugs.
4. The admissions made by the arresting officers during the
clarificatory hearings, pointing to the illegality of the search and
thereby rendering inadmissible all evidence obtained therefrom,
negated the existence of probable cause.
According to petitioners, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is riddled
with procedural lapses. First, petitioners point out that the motion for
extension of time filed by respondent prior to the filing of the petition for
review before the Court of Appeals is patently defective, because, while
the motion for extension did not implead the RTC Judge of Kalibo, the
latter was made a respondent in the petition for review. Since the RTC
Judge was not furnished a copy of the motion for extension, said motion
became a mere scrap of paper which did not toll the running of the period
to file the petition for review. Hence, the petition for review was filed out
of time.
It is not necessary that the contents of a motion for extension should be
similar to a petition for certiorari. When the OSG in his motion for
extension failed to implead the trial court judge, much less assail his
Order, said omission should not limit the pitch and reach of the petition.
Otherwise, the prayer for more time would be pointless. It is sufficient that
the motion for extension state the material dates, as the Motion of the
OSG did, showing the timeliness of its filing. The grant of the Motion for
Extension occasioned the timeliness of the review of both the DOJ
Resolutions and the RTC Order.
Second, petitioners question the failure of respondent to file a motion for
reconsideration from the RTC Order before filing a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
Wellestablished is the rule that a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari . The rule
however admits of exceptions,9 the most relevant of which is where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court. The RTC Order was anchored on the twin
Resolutions issued by the DOJ granting the petition for review and
directing the provincial prosecutor to withdraw the Information. Thus, the
appellate court correctly treated the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
submitted by the OSG before the DOJ as a substantial compliance with the
condition of exhausting all plain, speedy and adequate remedies before
filing a certiorari petition. Clearly, the facts, issues and arguments that
would have been raised in a motion for reconsideration in the RTC are
rooted on the DOJs finding of the nonexistence of probable cause.
Third, petitioners claim that the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with the
DOJ was filed out of time. Petitioners cited paragraph 1 of the Motion
which states that the 6 May 2004 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
was received on 7 May 2004. Thus, respondent had until 17 May 2004 to
file the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, but the motion was filed only
on 25 May 2004.
A reading of the Motion for Extension indeed reveals that the OSG stated
in Paragraph 1 that they received the 6 May 2004 Resolution on 7 May
2004. Differently, the OSG, in its Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,
stated that the 6 May 2004 Resolution was received on 18 May 2004.
Records show that the OSG erred in indicating in the motion for extension
7 May 2004 as the receipt date. 7 May 2004 was actually the mailing date
as recorded in the registry receipt attached to the 6 May 2004
Resolution.10Verily, the variance in dates could be attributed to a mere
clerical error. The OSG received a copy of the 6 May 2004 Resolution on
18 May 2004. And the OSG complied with the 10day reglementary period
within which to file its Motion for Reconsideration by filing it on 26 May
2004.
Fourth, petitioners maintain that the petition for certiorari had become
moot and academic as against the Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice
when the RTC Judge assumed jurisdiction over the case and granted the
motion to withdraw the information.
In Verzano, Jr. v. Paro,11 we had the occasion to rule that while generally
it is the Secretary of Justice who has the authority to review the decisions
of the prosecutors, the Court Appeals has the authority to correct the acts
of the prosecutorial officers tainted with grave abuse of discretion
notwithstanding the filing of the informations before the trial court. The
authority of the Court of Appeals is bolstered by the fact that the petition
filed before it was one under Rule 65, such that it has the jurisdiction to
determine whether or not the prosecutor and/or the Secretary of Justice
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.12 The filing or withdrawal, as in this case, of an Information
before the RTC does not foreclose the review on the basis of grave abuse
of discretion the resolution of a prosecutor, or the Secretary of Justice on
the issue of probable cause.
On the merits of the case, petitioners defend the Secretary of Justice in
ordering the withdrawal of the Information on the ground that the pieces
of evidence obtained through an illegal search becomes inadmissible in
evidence. Petitioners explain that the search was illegal because it violated
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure when the search
was not made in the presence of the lawful occupants of the house.
Petitioners aver that the Secretary of Justice correctly rejected the version
of the police officers based on the existing records. Petitioners noted that
the time of search recorded on the Receipt for Property Seized is 5:10
a.m., while it as admitted by one police officer that they were about to
gain entry in the house only at 5:30 a.m. Petitioners raise doubts on how
the police officers were able to determine and record the exact weight of
the illegal drugs when the weighing scale, as admitted by the SPO1 Gorio,
came at around 8:00 p.m.
It is wellsettled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the
findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non
existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations,
unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general rule rests
on the principle of separation of powers, dictating that the determination
of probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an
executive function; while the exception hinges on the limiting principle of
checks and balances, whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action
of certiorari, has been tasked by the present Constitution to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.13
Judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a
determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the
determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation. Courts
are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the executive
branch; it may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise
has been made in grave abuse of discretion.14
As a requisite to the filing of a criminal complaint, probable cause pertains
to facts and circumstances sufficient to incite a wellfounded belief that a
crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. Only
such facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent
are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere
probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but
less than evidence that would justify a conviction. What is determined is
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a wellfounded belief that a
crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial.15
We quote with approval the appellate courts finding of probable cause
based on the following circumstances:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Before the police conducted the search in Spouses Laniers
residence, they had a thorough and careful surveillance of their
activities in the island of Boracay;
2. The police officers conducted a testbuy on Spouses Lanier who
themselves sold to SPO1 Juben Vega and his FilipinoAmerican
companion shabu and marijuana worth six thousand (P6,000.00)
pesos;
3. Based on the surveillance and testbuy, Executive Judge Marietta
HomenaValencia found probable cause and issued a search
warrant on Spouses Laniers residence. There, the police officers
recovered approximately 1.750 kilograms of
dried marijuana leaves and 10.4 grams of shabu in the presence
of Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapano, two (2) members of the
media and Perlita Lanier herself;
4. The testimonies of SPO1 Juan Gorion and SPO1 Juben Vega of the
APPO and PO2 Noemi Ramaneses of PDEA were consistent on what
transpired from the time they received a tip regarding the illegal
drug activities of Spouses Lanier up to the time of the
implementation of the search warrant was completed;
5. The defense failed to destroy the presumption of regularity in favor
of the police officers who conducted the search;
6. Spouses Lanier failed to substantiate their claim
that Barangay Captain Joel Gelito orchestrated the raid in
retaliation to the administrative complaint they allegedly filed
against him;
7. Failure to use and present marked money during the preliminary
investigation in itself does not weaken the existence of probable
cause against Spouses Lanier. For settled is the rule that in the
prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of
marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the
prosecution as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately
proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before
the court. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation
of any money used in the buybust operation. What is material to
a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.16
The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are: (1) the accused
is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited
or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.17
The presence of these elements was attested to by evidence such as the
Joint Affidavit of Arrest and the Receipt of the Properties seized. The police
officers averred that they recovered 3 sachets of shabuweighing 10.4
grams inside a jewelry box on petitioners living room. They also seized
one (1) big gift pack containing dried marijuana leaves weighing more or
less 950 grams and two (2) gift packs containing nine (9) bricks of
dried marijuana leaves weighing 800 grams on top of the head board of
petitioners bed. Moreover, the finding of a dangerous drug in the house or
within the premises of the house of the accused is prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi.18
When the Secretary of Justice concluded that there was planting of
evidence based on the lone fact that the raiding team arrived ahead of the
search team, he, in effect went into the merits of the defense. When he
made a determination based on his own appreciation of the pieces of
evidence for and against the accused, he effectively assumed the function
of a trial judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby,
acted outside his jurisdiction.19
Regarding the submission of petitioners that the remedy from the RTCs
Order to withdraw the filing of the Information should have been an
ordinary appeal, we rule that on a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the
RTC Order may be elevated to the Court of Appeals on certiorari.
There is, here, a basis for such finding.
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the ground
of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of Justice,
the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment
of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case,
the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it
before proceeding farther with the trial. While the Secretarys ruling is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts.20 When the trial courts Order rests
entirely on the assessment of the DOJ without doing its own independent
evaluation, the trial court effectively abdicates its judicial power and
refuses to perform a positive duty enjoined by law.
The RTC erroneously held that it has not yet effectively acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused as no commitment order has
yet been issued against them. In Crespo v. Mogul,21 the Court held that
once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of
the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within
the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court.
The rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the
case even before or after arraignment of the accused. When the trial court
grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash
the Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with the
directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so
not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of
Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.
The RTC clearly deferred to the finding of probable cause by the Secretary
of Justice without doing its own independent evaluation. The trial court
even expressed its apprehension that no prosecutor would be willing to
prosecute the case should the motion to withdraw be denied. The only
matter discussed by the trial court was its concurrence with the DOJ
relative to the service and conduct of the search for illegal drugs. The trial
court declared that the evidence is inadmissible in view of the manner the
search warrant was served. Settled is the rule that the presence or
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a
matter of defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full
blown trial on the merits. In the case at bar, the grounds relied upon by
petitioners should be fully explained and threshed out not in a preliminary
investigation but during trial as the same are matters of defense involving
factual issues.
At the risk of sounding repetitive, we must emphasize that the trial court,
having acquired jurisdiction over the case, is not bound by such resolution
but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While
the Secretarys ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
All told, the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error when it
nullified and set aside the Resolutions and Order, rendered by the
Secretary of Justice and the RTC, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 26 September
2008 and Resolution dated 31 July 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. SP No. 85736 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188191 March 12, 2014
ENRIQUE ALMERO y ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIRASOL BARTOLOME, CLARITA P.
MATIAS, ROSENDO P. MATIAS, and ANTONIO P.
MATIAS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure by Enrique Almero y Alcantara from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated 26 September 2008 and Resolution dated 29 May
2009 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 103030.1
THE MTC RULING IN CRIMINAL CASE No. 96-6531
Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-6531 for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and multiple physical injuries. After
private respondents reserved the right to institute a separate action for
damages, trial ensued. On 8 January 2007, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Labo, Camarines Norte found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to
suffer prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Petitioner filed an Application for Probation on 7 September 2007,
reasoning that he was informed of his conviction only upon being served
the warrant for his arrest.2 Prosecutor Analie Velarde opposed his
application on the ground that he was known to be uncooperative,
habitually absent, and had even neglected to inform the court of his
change of address. On 22 February 2007, the MTC denied his application,
prompting petitioner to file a special civil action with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). While his first Petition raised the sole issue of the denial of
his application for probation, he filed a Supplemental Petition,3 which a)
assailed the validity of the promulgation of the 8 January 2007 judgment;
and b) impleaded private complainants Mirasol Bartolome, Clarita P.
Matias, Rosendo P. Matias and Antonio P. Matias.
THE RTC RULING IN SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-0012
In his supplemental Petition, petitioner stated that upon close scrutiny, he
discovered that the judgment itself was premature and flawed, because
the MTC never ruled upon his Formal Offer of Exhibits.4 The RTC found
that the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering judgment
without first ruling on his Formal Offer of Exhibits since, technically,
petitioner had not yet rested his case. It also ruled that the promulgation
of judgment was similarly tainted with grave abuse of discretion, because
petitioner was not present at the time, in violation of Section 6, Rule 120
of the Rules of Court. Without addressing the issue of probation, the
dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for Certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The judgment promulgated on 22 February, 2007 is
hereby SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED and the case is remanded to the
Municipal Trial Court of Labo, Camarines Norte for further proceedings.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City or any person
acting in his behalf to release immediately petitioner ENRIQUE ALMERO Y
ALCANTARA from detention by virtue of the property bond posted by him
for his provisional liberty in Criminal Case No. 96-6531, unless he is being
detained for some other lawful cause or causes.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.5
THE CA RULING
The CA ruled that the RTC should have confined itself to determining
whether or not the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners application for probation. Since no appeal or other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available
against the denial of probation, a Rule 65 petition is clearly the appropriate
remedy. However, the trial court erred in taking cognizance of
supplemental grounds assailing the judgment of conviction, because an
application for probation is a waiver of the right to appeal from the
judgment of conviction and effectively renders the same final. The CA
ruled that even assuming petitioner failed to be present at the
promulgation of judgment, he had no one but himself to blame for failing
to inform the MTC of his change of address.6
On the argument that private respondents possessed no legal personality
to represent the State in a criminal case, the CA held that petitioner
himself impleaded them in the certiorari petition before the RTC. The CA
also found that petitioner filed his application for probation only on 7
September 2007, or more than one month after he received notice of the
judgment of conviction. Inasmuch as the grant of probation rests solely on
the discretion of the court, the denial thereof cannot be considered grave
abuse, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial courts appealed January 28,
2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is
entered ordering the DISMISSAL of appellees petition for certiorari.7
Petitioner comes before this Court, assigning the following errors:
I. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that
private complainants have personality to appeal the 28 January
2008 Decision of the RTC.
II. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that
the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying petitioners judgment of
conviction.
III. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that
petitioner is not entitled to probation.8
OUR RULING
The Petition lacks merit.
Anent the first issue, petitioner argues that in criminal cases, the offended
party is the State, and that private complainants interest is limited to the
civil liability arising therefrom. Petitioner's application for probation
purportedly did not involve the civil aspect of the case. Heirs of the Late
Francisco Abueg v. Court of Appeals cited by the CA allegedly cannot
apply, since it does not even discuss the right of private complainants to
interpose an appeal.
In the Comment9 it filed, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
reiterated that what petitioner filed with the RTC was a petition for
certiorari, which is a special civil action. It cannot be considered an appeal
in a criminal case over which only the State has an interest, but an appeal
in a civil action from which private persons can appeal in the event of an
adverse outcome. Private respondents, in their Comment,10 argued that
the CA correctly applied Abueg, which is on all fours with the present case.
In Abueg, the accused was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property for crashing against and killing Francisco
Abueg. Instead of filing an appeal, the accused applied for probation. After
the CA affirmed the grant of probation, the Supreme Court entertained
and acted upon the petition for certiorari filed by the victims heirs.11
We agree with the submission of the respondents. While the present
petition originated from a criminal proceeding, what petitioner filed with
the RTC was a special civil action, in which he himself impleaded private
respondents. He cannot now belatedly change his stance to the prejudice
of private respondents, who would otherwise be deprived of recourse in a
civil action they did not initiate. In any case, this Court has consistently
ruled that private parties may be clothed with sufficient personality if the
facts show that the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and
if the issues in the action could be determined in a more just, speedy and
inexpensive manner.
In Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz,12 citing People v. Calo, Jr.,13 the
Supreme Court ruled:
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor
General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal proceeding
pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals, the ends of substantial
justice would be better served, and the issues in this action could be
determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by
entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended party in a criminal case,
private petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid grievance against
Judge Adaos order granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private
petitioners) father.14 (Citations omitted.)
Furthermore, in Paredes v. Gopengco, it was held that parties in criminal
cases have sufficient personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the
special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the
rules, to wit:
Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case before
petitioner judge, it cannot be gainsaid that respondents have sufficient
interest and personality as person(s) aggrieved by petitioner judges
ruling on his non-disqualification to file the special civil action under
sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. Recently in line with the underlying spirit of a
liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object,
as against the literal application of Rule 110, section 2, we held, overruling
the implication of an earlier case, that a widow possesses the right as an
offended party to file a criminal complaint for the murder of her deceased
husband.15
Petitioners second and third arguments are brought by an erroneous
understanding of the nature of probation and shall be discussed jointly.
Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency
conferred by the State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving
defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the
discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.16
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified
offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise
eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state of
time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires
that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail
of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the
accused to wager on the result of his appeal that when his conviction
is finally affirmed on appeal he now applies for probation as an "escape
hatch" thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his
conviction.17
Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused,
the rationale for the treatment of appeal and probation as mutually
exclusive remedies is that they rest on diametrically opposed legal
positions. An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted
the judgment. The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the
part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of
conviction.18 This was the reason why the Probation Law was amended:
precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of
conviction even if the sentence is probationable for the purpose of
securing an acquittal and applying for the probation only if the accused
fails in his bid.19
Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether
to question the judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily
deemed a waiver of his right to appeal.20 While he did not file an appeal
before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in
the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so
doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D.
1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive
remedies.
The assignment of errors in the Petition before us reflects the diametrically
opposed positions taken by accused petitioner. On the one hand, he
bewails the defects committed by the trial court during the promulgation
of the judgment, thus casting doubt on the judgment itself. Yet in the
same breath, he persists in his application for probation, despite the
waiver and admission of guilt implicit in any procedure for probation
precisely the unhealthy wager the law seeks to prevent.
Petitioner applied for probation beyond the reglementary period, yet the
trial court still allowed the filing before ultimately denying it for lack of
merit. Regarding this delay and the other defects imputed by petitioner to
the RTC, we concur with the findings of the CA:
(W)e find that public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion
in denying appellees application for probation. Granted that appellee had
not received the notice of the January 8, 2007 decision rendered in
Criminal Case No. 06-6531, it appears from the record that appellee had
no one but himself to blame for the procedural quagmire he subsequently
found himself in. In denying appellees motion for reconsideration of the
September 18, 2007 denial of the application for probation, public
respondent distinctly ruled as follows:
x x x. (T)he application has been filed out of time as accused himself
admitted in the motion.1wphi1 He blames Atty. Evan D. Dizon, his former
counsel, for not notifying the court of his change of address but Atty.
Dizon himself had been trying to contact accused since 2001 even before
he filed his formal offer of evidence since all notices sent to the accuseds
given address have been returned to this court since 2001. If it is true that
he moved to Cavite only in 2003, why were said notices returned with
notations unknown, unclaimed, or moved?21 Decision1
This Court will not countenance pleas for liberality in adverse outcomes
caused by the negligence and evasiveness of the parties themselves.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack
of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
103030 dated 26 September 2008 and 29 May 2009 are hereby
AFFIRMED, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170701 January 22, 2014
RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22,
Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADO-
TUA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the
dated October 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in CA-G.R. SP
No. 89939.
On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua (respondent) filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition2 for
herself and in behalf of her minor children, Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth
Lois, and J ezreel Abigail, for the issuance of a protection order, pursuant
to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act of 2004, against her husband, petitioner Ralph Tua. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 0464-05 and raffled-off to Branch 22.
Respondent claimed that she and her children had suffered from
petitioners abusive conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her
and the children physical harm for the purpose of controlling her actions or
decisions; that she was actually deprived of custody and access to her
minor children; and, that she was threatened to be deprived of her and
her childrens financial support.
Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati
City. They have three children, namely, Joshua Raphael born on February
9, 1999, Jesse Ruth Lois, born on June 27, 2000, and Jezreel Abigail, born
on December 25, 2001. In her Affidavit3 attached to the petition,
respondent claimed, among others, that: there was a time when petitioner
went to her room and cocked his gun and pointed the barrel of his gun to
his head as he wanted to convince her not to proceed with the legal
separation case she filed; she hid her fears although she was scared; there
was also an instance when petitioner fed her children with the fried
chicken that her youngest daughter had chewed and spat out; in order to
stop his child from crying, petitioner would threaten him with a belt; when
she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and insecure with the latter's
presence and asked him to stop coming to the house as often as he
wanted or she would apply for a protection order, petitioner got furious
and threatened her of withholding his financial support and even held her
by the nape and pushed her to lie flat on the bed; and, on May 4, 2005,
while she was at work, petitioner with companions went to her new home
and forcibly took the children and refused to give them back to her.
On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO),4 which we quote in full:
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) effective for thirty (30) days from date of receipt is
hereby issued against respondent Ralph P. Tua.
For the purpose of the implementation of the Temporary Protection Order,
the respondent (herein petitioner Ralph) is hereby ordered to:
1. Enjoin from committing and threatening to commit personally or
through another, physical, verbal and emotional harm or abuse
against the herein petitioner (respondent) and other family and
household members;
2. Restrain from harassing, annoying, texting, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner
(respondent) whether directly or indirectly or engaged in any
psychological form of harassment;
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
The Sheriff of this Court, the PNP Imus, Cavite, or any Officers of the Law
are hereby commanded to effect this Order immediately and to use
necessary force and measures under the law to implement this Order.
Let the hearing for Permanent Protection Order be set on June 9, 2005 at
2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.5
In his Comment6 to respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO,
petitioner denied respondents allegations and alleged, among others, that
he had been maintaining a separate abode from petitioner since November
2004; that it was respondent who verbally abused and threatened him
whenever their children's stay with him was extended; that respondent
had been staying with a certain Rebendor Zuiga despite the impropriety
and moral implications of such set-up; that despite their written
agreement that their minor children should stay in their conjugal home,
the latter violated the same when she surreptitiously moved out of their
conjugal dwelling with their minor children and stayed with said Zuiga;
and, that respondent is mentally, psychologically, spiritually and morally
unfit to keep the children in her custody. Petitioner contended that the
issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is unconstitutional for being violative
of the due process clause of the Constitution.
Without awaiting for the resolution of his Comment on the petition and
motion to lift TPO, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and hold departure
order assailing the May 23, 2005 TPO issued by the RTC.
On June 9, 2005, the CA, in order not to render the petition moot and to
avoid grave and irreparable injury, issued a temporary restraining order to
temporarily enjoin the parties and their agents from enforcing the assailed
May 23, 2005 TPO issued in Civil Case No. 0464-05.7
Petitioner later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with Manifestation,8 praying that the enforcement of all orders,
decision to be issued by the RTC and all the proceedings therein be
restrained. A hearing9 was, subsequently, conducted on the motion.
On October 28, 2005, the CA issued its assailed decision, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Temporary
Protection Order dated May 23, 2002 (sic) issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22 in Civil Case No. 0464-05 is UPHELD.10
In so ruling, the CA found that the petition filed by respondent under RA
9262 is still pending before the RTC; thus, the factual matters raised
therein could not be passed upon in the petition for certiorari filed with it.
The CA noted that during the pendency of the herein proceedings,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to quash warrant issued by the RTC and
which matter could not also be a subject of this petition which assails the
TPO dated May 23, 2005 and that the motion to quash should have been
filed with the RTC.
The CA found that the TPO dated May 23, 2005 was validly issued by the
RTC and found no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance thereof as the
same were in complete accord with the provision of RA 9262.
As to petitioner's argument that there was no basis for the issuance of the
TPO, considering that the provision authorizing such issuance is
unconstitutional, the CA ruled that since the matter raised herein was the
RTCs alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO, such matter
could be resolved without having to rule on the constitutionality of RA
9262 and its provisions. And that the requisites that the constitutionality of
the law in question be the very lis mota of the case was absent.
Dissatisfied, petitioner files the instant petition raising the following issues:
I We are not impressed.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE RESPECT
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING AND FINDING IN A MANNER
CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE THAT
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED NO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER ISSUED THE TEMPORARY
PROTECTIVE ORDER (TPO) DATED 23 MAY 2005 WITHOUT
OBSERVING DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND CONSIDERATIONS OF
JUSTICE AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN REFUSING TO RULE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF RA 9262 HAS
DECIDED THE CASE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH
ESTABLISHED LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT
CONTRARY TO ITS FINDINGS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
SAID LAW IS THE LIS MOTA OF THE CASE.11
Petitioner claims that contrary to the stance of the CA in not deciding the
issue of the constitutionality of RA 9262, the issue presented is the very lis
mota in the instant case.
The issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 was raised by petitioner in his
Comment to respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO dated
May 23, 2005 filed with the RTC. However, without awaiting for the
resolution of the same, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
assailing the TPO issued for violating the due process clause of the
Constitution. Contrary to the CA's finding that the matter raised in the
petition filed with it was the RTCs alleged grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the TPO which could be resolved without having to rule on the
constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions, we find that since petitioner
is assailing the validity of RA 9262 wherein respondent's right to a
protection order is based upon, the constitutionality of the said law must
first be decided upon. After all, the alleged unconstitutionality of RA 9262
is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a
protection order.12 Notwithstanding, however, we still find no merit to
declare RA 9262 unconstitutional.
Petitioner particularly directs his constitutional attack on Section 15 of RA
9262 contending that had there been no ex parte issuance of the TPO, he
would have been afforded due process of law and had properly presented
his side on the matter; that the questioned provision simply encourages
arbitrary enforcement repulsive to basic constitutional rights which affects
his life, liberty and property.
Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders
(TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of
filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should
be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs
mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court
shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order]
PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall
order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the
court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for
the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the
merits of the issuance of a PPO.
In Garcia v. Drilon,13 wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of
RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, we
struck down the challenge and held:
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence
against women and their children, their family or household members, and
to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended
parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the
victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail
access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim
from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated
family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent
the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and
support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary
custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent
their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed
and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility,
criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence
in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and
hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and
there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect
the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur.
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to
issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the
allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to
the petition.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative
of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment
which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the
hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or
dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already
have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and
possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts
could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and
children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court
shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent
directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service.
Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO
be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs
are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the
immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent
requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from
service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits
shall likewise be indicated on the notice.
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify,
must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause
why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for
protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be
heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.14
Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of legislative
power to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders.
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the
Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court
of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof." Hence, the
primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and
expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. 15 The act
of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in
pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes
involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of
justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.16
As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay, Section 14
pertinently provides:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How.
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by
the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing
acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who
receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of
the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the
application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available
Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the
order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad
that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of
the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after
the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay
Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or
direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any
proceeding before the Punong Barangay.1wphi1
Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the
perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her
child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.
Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature,
in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all
laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."17
Petitioner assails that the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO dated May 23, 2005 as the
petition was bereft of any indication of grounds for the issuance of the
same. Petitioner claims that while the issuance of the TPO is ex parte,
there must be a judicial determination of the basis thereof. He contends
that the allegations in respondent's affidavit attached to the petition, and
without admitting the same to be true, are nothing more than normal or
usual quarrels between a husband and wife which are not grave or
imminent enough to merit the issuance of a TPO.
We are not persuaded.
We quote again Section 15 of RA 9262 for ready reference, thus:
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders
(TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of
filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should
be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs
mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court
shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of
the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal
service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain
the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall
include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a
PPO.
Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of
the application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the
issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not be notified
or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within
the courts discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached
thereto, to determine that the violent acts against women and their
children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed.
And Section 5 of the same law provides:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed through
any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical
harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to
engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting
the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by
force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman
or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting
the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman
or her child of custody to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
children of financial support legally due her or her family,
or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient
financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling
the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling
the conjugal or common money, or properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for
the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to
engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by
force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation
directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate
family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This
shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public
or private places;
 (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the
residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the
property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or
inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her
child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's
child/children.
In this case, the alleged acts of petitioner among others, i.e., he cocked
the gun and pointed the same to his head in order to convince respondent
not to proceed with the legal separation case; feeding his other children
with the food which another child spat out; and threatening the crying
child with a belt to stop him from crying which was repeatedly done; and
holding respondent by her nape when he got furious that she was asking
him not to come often to their conjugal home and hold office thereat after
their agreed separation and threatening her of withholding half of the
financial support for the kids, while not conclusive, are enough bases for
the issuance of a TPO. Petitioner's actions would fall under the
enumeration of Section 5, more particularly, paragraphs a, d, e (2), f, h,
and i.
It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when there is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.18 We find that the CA did not err when it found no
grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in the issuance of the
TPO.
The factual matters herein raised by petitioner should be presented during
the hearing on the merits on the issuance of the Permanent Protection
Order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 28, 2005
of the Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939, upholding the
Regional Trial Court's issuance of the Temporary Protection Order dated
May 23, 2005, is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite is
hereby ORDERED to resolve with dispatch respondent's Petition for a
Permanent Protection Order.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C.
TOLENTINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P. SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch
XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F.
APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT.
GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS ALTUNA, respondents.
Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan Malabonga
and Cesar Maravilla for petitioners.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus
proceedings will be briefly stated. The three petitioners will be referred to
through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.
1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year),
AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at
large.
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were
arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of
Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an
allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not
disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against
NOLASCO.
3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises
at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of
petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents. In their COMMENT,
however, respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on
the same day"; that is late on august 6th.
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the
CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz
Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be
served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the
leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the
clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of
the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for
being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be
stated:
(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84
for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was
Branch 88.
(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in
writing was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Pao.
(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio
A. Lapus, were examined under oath by Judge Pao but only the
deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter deposed that
to his personal knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched
records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National
Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and local sources
intended to be used for rebellion. 1
5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the
following may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was
arrested by the searching party presumably without a warrant of arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and
additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items
in all. 3
(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on
August 10th, 4 the search was made in the presence of Dra. Marciana
Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No
mention was made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428
articles and documents attached to the Return was signed by the two
Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO
and TOLENTINO, were charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the
CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against
petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion/Subversion."
(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents)
against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge
Antonio P. Santos, presiding.
(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY
FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with
Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16th.
7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the
SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying, inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to
retain the seized 431 documents and articles, in connection with cases
that are presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon
City Fiscal's Office and the court. 5
(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to
comment on the Amended Return, which AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October
18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained
pursuant to the Search Warrant.
(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Pao admitted the Amended Return and
ruled that the seized documents "shall be subject to disposition of the
tribunal trying the case against respondent."
8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the
SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying that such of the 431 items
belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the
proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos
denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on the ground that the validity of
the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He
was apparently not aware of the Order of Judge Pao of December 13th
issued in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and
set aside the (1) Search Warrant issued by respondent RTC Judge Pao;
(2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and granting the Motion to
Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos
denying petitioners' Motion to Suppress.
This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the respondents or their duly authorized representatives from
introducing evidence obtained under the Search Warrant.
The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void
because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with
particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that
probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching
questions propounded to the applicant's witness. The respondents,
represented by the Solicitor General, contend otherwise, adding that the
questions raised cannot be entertained in this present petition without
petitioners first moving for the quashal of the disputed Search Warrant
with the issuing Judge.
We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be
seized as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist
Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the
National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party
Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible
supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals
not otherwise available to the public, and support money
from foreign or local sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the
seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It
is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable
regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and
instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public
contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the
crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching
team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of
the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact,
taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in
the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional
mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the
recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were
considered null and void for being too general. Thus:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and
other publications to promote the objectives and purposes
of the subversive organizations known as Movement for
Free Philippines. Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6
Movement. 6
The things to be seized under the warrant issued by
respondent judge were described as 'subversive
documents, propaganda materials, FAs, printing
paraphernalia and all other subversive materials Such
description hardly provided a definite guideline to the
search team as to what articles might be lawfully seized
thereunder. Said description is no different from if not
worse than, the description found in the search warrants
in "Burgos, et al. v. the Chief of Staff"which this Court
declared null and void for being too general. 7
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by
respondent judge allowed the seizure of printed copies of
the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for
publication, newspaper dummies subversive documents,
articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines,
mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the
language used is so all embracing as to include all
conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless
of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant
under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant
which is constitutionally objectionable. 8
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the
witness presented by the applicant for Search Warrant.
Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an
application for search warrant filed by Lt.
Col. Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would
like to know if you affirm the truth of your
answer in this deposition?
(The deposition instead)
A Yes, sir,
Q How long did it take you for the
surveillance?
A Almost a month, sir.
Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?
A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of
law.
Q So, you are more or less familiar with
the requisites of the application for search
warrant?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you come to know of the person
of Mila Aguilar-Roque?
A Because of our day and night
surveillance, Your Honor, there were so
many suspicious persons with documents.
Q What kind of documents do you refer to?
A Documents related to the Communist
Party of Philippines and New People's
Army.
Q What else?
A Conferences of the top ranking officials
from the National Democratic Front,
Organization of the Communist Party of the
Philippines ...
Q And may include what else?
A Other papers and documents like
Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of
these groups, Programs, List of possible
supporters, subversive books and
instructions, manuals not otherwise
available to the public and support money
from foreign and local sources. 9
The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the
applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable
cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search
warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a
cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. 10 Of the 8
questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to Identity. The 3rd and 5th
are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the
description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical to that in
the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The
examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the
deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not
satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may
issue. 11
Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the
illegality of a Search Warrant is with the Court that issued it instead of this
original, independent action to quash. The records show, however, that
petitioners did raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their
Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In fact, they already questioned the
admissibility of the evidence obtained under the Search Warrant, even
during the inquest investigation on August 10, 1984. And in the
SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion to Suppress on
December 12, 1984 claiming that the proceedings under the Search
Warrant were unlawful. Substantially, therefore, while not denominated as
a motion to quash, petitioners had questioned the legality of the Search
Warrant.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two
different Courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It
should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by
one Court, or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another
Court, or Branch, as a result of the service of the Search Warrant, the
SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with the criminal case for
orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the
Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case
should have the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully
obtained.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and
although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search warrant
should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to
AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus,
Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A
person charged with an offense may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search,
without a search warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It is also a
general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where
the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this
latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided
on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the
application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to
what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be
searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's
right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the
apprehension of criminals." 13
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which
is a crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not
been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested
within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her
dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion
that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City,
did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the
interest of public order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for
possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to
AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military
Commission No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and
articles.
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984
by respondent Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and
set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent from
introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the
Subversive Documents case hereby made permanent, the, personalities
seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible
introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before
Special Military commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner Mila
Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to
return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. BERNABE PAREJA
Y CRUZ, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.:
The accusedappellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is appealing the
January 19, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.H.C.
No. 03794, which affirmed in toto the conviction for Rape and Acts of
Lasciviousness meted out by Branch 113, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 041556CFM and 041557CFM.2
On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one
Attempted Rape. The Informations for the three charges read as follows:
I. For the two counts of Rape:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Criminal Case No. 041556CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of February, 2004, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the
common law spouse of the minor victims mother, through force, threats
and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit an act of sexual assault upon the person of [AAA3 ], a minor 13
years of age, by then and there mashing her breast and inserting his
finger inside her vagina against her will.4
Criminal Case No. 041557CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of December, 2003, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the
stepfather of [AAA], a minor 13 years of age, through force, threats and
intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of said minor against her will.5
II. For the charge of Attempted Rape:
Criminal Case No. 041558CFM
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ, being the common law spouse
of minor victims mother by means of force, threats and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of Rape against the person of minor, [AAA], a 13
years old minor by then and there crawling towards her direction where
she was sleeping, putting off her skirt, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produce[d] the crime of rape for the reason
other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is the timely arrival of
minor victims mother who confronted the accused, and which acts of child
abuse debased, degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of
said minor complainant as a human being.6
On June 17, 2004, Pareja, during his arraignment, pleaded not guilty to
the charges filed against him.7 After the completion of the pretrial
conference on September 16, 2004,8 trial on the merits ensued.
The antecedents of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness
and sexual abuse took place on three (3) different dates, particularly [in
December 2003], February 2004, and March 27, 2004.
AAAs parents separated when she was [only eight years old9 ]. At the
time of the commission of the aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with
her mother and with herein accusedappellant Bernabe Pareja who, by
then, was cohabiting with her mother, together with three (3) of their
children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.
The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the December 2003
incident]. AAAs mother was not in the house and was with her relatives
in Laguna. Taking advantage of the situation, [Pareja], while AAA was
asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then, [Pareja], who was already
naked, begun to undress AAA. [Pareja] then started to suck the breasts of
[AAA]. Not satisfied, [Pareja] likewise inserted his penis into AAAs anus.
Because of the excruciating pain that she felt, AAA immediately stood up
and rushed outside of their house.
Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the
[December 2003] incident for fear that [Pareja] might kill her. [Pareja]
threatened to kill AAA in the event that she would expose the incident to
anyone.
AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened
more than once. According to AAA, [i]n February 2004 [the February
2004 incident], she had again been molested by [Pareja]. Under the same
circumstances as the [December 2003 incident], with her mother not
around while she and her halfsiblings were asleep, [Pareja] again laid on
top of her and started to suck her breasts. But this time, [Pareja]
caressed [her] and held her vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it.
With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004
incident], it was AAAs mother who saw [Pareja] in the act of lifting the
skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAAs
mother immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to report the
said incident. AAA then narrated to the barangay officials that she had
been sexually abused by [Pareja] x x x many times x x x.
Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child
Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital for a medical and genital
examination. On March 29, 2004, Dr. Tan issued Provisional MedicoLegal
Report Number 2004030091. Her medicolegal report stated the
following conclusion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 57 oclock area, Type
of hymen: Crescentic
x x x
Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or Penetrating Trauma.
After the results of the medicolegal report confirmed that AAA was indeed
raped, AAAs mother then filed a complaint for rape before the Pasay City
Police Station.
To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill
motive of AAA against him as his defense. He denied raping [AAA] but
admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of his livein partner and
that they all stay in the same house.
Contrary to AAAs allegations, [Pareja] averred that it would have been
impossible that the alleged incidents happened. To justify the same,
[Pareja] described the layout of their house and argued that there was no
way that the alleged sexual abuses could have happened.
According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4)
meters wide by ten (10) meters, and was so small that they all have to sit
to be able to fit inside the house. Further, the vicinity where their house is
located was thickly populated with houses constructed side by side.
Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but to sleep beside her siblings.
All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine
how he could possibly still go about with his plan without AAAs siblings
nor their neighbors noticing the same.
Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations
hurled against him by AAA. He contended that AAA filed these charges
against him only as an act of revenge because AAA was mad at [him] for
being the reason behind her parents separation.10
Ruling of the RTC
On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of
attempted rape but convicted him of the crimes of rape and acts of
lasciviousness in the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents,
respectively. The dispositive portion of the Decision11 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y Cruz is hereby
acquitted from the charge of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 041558,
for want of evidence.
In Crim. Case No. 041556, the said accused is CONVICTED with Acts of
Lasciviousness and he is meted out the penalty of imprisonment, ranging
from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of
prision [correccional] as maximum.
In Crim. Case No. 041557, the said accused is CONVICTED as charged
with rape, and he is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his preventive
imprisonment.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party [AAA], the sum of
P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.12
The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of
Lasciviousness, gave more weight to the prosecutions evidence as against
Parejas baseless denial and imputation of ill motive. However, due to the
failure of the prosecution to present AAAs mother to testify about what
she had witnessed in March 2004, the RTC had to acquit Pareja of the
crime of Attempted Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack of evidence.
The RTC could not convict Pareja on the basis of AAAs testimony for being
hearsay evidence as she had no personal knowledge of what happened on
March 27, 2004 because she was sleeping at that time.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja appealed 13 to the Court of
Appeals, which on January 19, 2012, affirmed in toto the judgment of the
RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 041556 and 041557, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is
hereby DENIED and, consequently, DISMISSED. The appealed Decisions
rendered by Branch 113 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region in Pasay City on January 16, 2009 in Criminal Cases Nos.
041556 to 041557 are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Issues
Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court 15 and posited before us
the following errors as he did before the Court of Appeals:
I
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE
CRIMES CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] BASED
SOLELY ON THE PROSECUTION WITNESS TESTIMONY.16
In his Supplemental Brief17 Pareja added the following argument:
The private complainants actuations after the incident negate the
possibility that she was raped.18
Parejas main bone of contention is the reliance of the lower courts on the
testimony of AAA in convicting him for rape and acts of lasciviousness.
Simply put, Pareja is attacking the credibility of AAA for being
inconsistent. Moreover, he claimed, AAA acted as if nothing happened
after the alleged sexual abuse.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no reason to reverse Parejas conviction.
Core Issue: Credibility of AAA
Pareja claims that AAAs testimony cannot be the lone basis of his
conviction as it was riddled with inconsistencies.19
We find such argument untenable.
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court,
we follow certain guidelines that have overtime been established in
jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez,20 we enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the
testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly
observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage
point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of
witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of
the RTCs assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally
bound by the lower courts findings, particularly when no significant facts
and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred
with the RTC. (Citations omitted.)
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge
because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and
demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts
and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these
are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.21 While there are
recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial
reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate
courts on the matter of AAAs credibility.
Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony are
generally expected.22 As this Court stated in People v. Saludo23 :
Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in
detail. For such an offense is not analogous to a persons achievement or
accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is something
which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the
victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and
subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be
expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the
traumatic and horrifying experience she had undergone. (Citation
omitted.)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions,
accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard in
testing the credibility of a witness.24 The inconsistencies mentioned by
Pareja are trivial and nonconsequential matters that merely caused AAA
confusion when she was being questioned. The inconsistency regarding
the year of the December incident is not even a matter pertaining to AAAs
ordeal.25 The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape
becomes important only when it creates serious doubt as to the
commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for
purposes of conviction. In other words, the date of the commission of the
rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the
complainants narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of
the crime.26 Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an
essential element of the crime.27
In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling in People v.
Ladrillo,28 implying that our rulings therein are applicable to his case.
However, the factual circumstances in Ladrillo are prominently missing in
Parejas case. In particular, the main factor for Ladrillos acquittal in that
case was because his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him was violated when the Information
against him only stated that the crime was committed on or about the
year 1992. We said:
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec.
11, Rule 110, of the Rules Court which requires that the time of the
commission of the offense must be alleged as near to the actual date as
the information or complaint will permit. More importantly, it runs afoul of
the constitutionally protected right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Information is not
sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform accusedappellant of
the date on which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed.
The phrase on or about the year 1992 encompasses not only the twelve
(12 ) months of 1992 but includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992,
e.g., 1991 and 1993, for which accusedappellant has to virtually account
for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure of the prosecution to allege with
particularity the date of the commission of the offense and, worse, its
failure to prove during the trial the date of the commission of the offense
as alleged in the Information, deprived accusedappellant of his right to
intelligently prepare for his defense and convincingly refute the charges
against him. At most, accusedappellant could only establish his place of
residence in the year indicated in the Information and not for the
particular time he supposedly committed the rape.
x x x
Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the
Information that accusedappellant raped complainant in 1992 manifestly
shows that the date of the commission of the offense as alleged was based
merely on speculation and conjecture, and a conviction anchored mainly
thereon cannot satisfy the quantum of evidence required for a
pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
crime was committed on the date and place indicated in the
Information.29 (Citation omitted.)
In this case, although the dates of the December 2003 and February 2004
incidents were not specified, the period of time Pareja had to account for
was fairly short, unlike on or about the year 1992. Moreover, Ladrillo
was able to prove that he had only moved in the house where the rape
supposedly happened, in 1993, therefore negating the allegation that he
raped the victim in that house in 1992.30
While it may be true that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim
in Ladrillo contributed to his eventual acquittal, this Court said that they
alone were not enough to reverse Ladrillos conviction, viz:
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness
testimony that militates heavily against its being accorded the full credit it
was given by the trial court. Considered independently, the defects
might not suffice to overturn the trial courts judgment of
conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality, and in relation to the
testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a
powerful compulsion towards reversal of the assailed
judgment.31 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is worthy to note that Ladrillo also offered more than just a mere denial
of the crime charged against him to exculpate him from liability. He also
had an alibi, which, together with the other evidence, produced reasonable
doubt that he committed the crime as charged. In contrast, Pareja merely
denied the accusations against him and even imputed ill motive on AAA.
As regards Parejas concern about AAAs lone testimony being the basis of
his conviction, this Court has held:
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may
be sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be
trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be
sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the corroboration
of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case.32 (Citations omitted.)
Improbability of sexual abuse
in their small house and in the
presence of AAAs sleeping siblings
Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have sexually abused AAA,
considering that their house was so small that they had to sleep beside
each other, that in fact, when the alleged incidents happened, AAA was
sleeping beside her younger siblings, who would have noticed if anything
unusual was happening.33
This Court is not convinced. Parejas living conditions could have
prevented him from acting out on his beastly desires, but they did not.
This Court has observed that many of the rape cases appealed to us were
not always committed in seclusion. Lust is no respecter of time or
place,34 and rape defies constraints of time and space. In People v.
Sangil, Sr.,35 we expounded on such occurrence in this wise:
In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that
among poor couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation
does not seem to be a problem despite the presence of other persons
around them. Considering the cramped space and meager room for
privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to quick and less disturbing
modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of family members;
otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible to
copulate with them around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor
incredible for the family members to be in deep slumber and not be
awakened while the sexual assault is being committed. One may also
suppose that growing children sleep more soundly than grownups and
are not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the night.
There is no merit in appellants contention that there can be no rape in a
room where other people are present. There is no rule that rape can be
committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that lust is no
respecter of time and place, and rape can be committed in even the
unlikeliest of places. (Citations omitted.)
Demeanor of AAA
as a rape victim
Pareja asseverates that AAAs demeanor and conduct belie her claim that
she was raped. He said that the ordinary Filipina [would have
summoned] every ounce of her strength and courage to thwart any
attempt to besmirch her honor and blemish her purity. Pareja pointed
out that they lived in a thickly populated area such that any commotion
inside their house would have been easily heard by the neighbors, thus,
giving AAA the perfect opportunity to seek their help.36 Moreover, Pareja
said, AAAs delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the
authorities negates the possibility that he indeed committed the crimes.
AAAs belated confession, he claimed, cannot be dismissed as trivial as it
puts into serious doubt her credibility.37
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape
liability by shifting the blame on the victim for failing to manifest
resistance to sexual abuse. However, this Court has recognized the fact
that no clearcut behavior can be expected of a person being raped or has
been raped. It is a settled rule that failure of the victim to shout or seek
help do not negate rape. Even lack of resistance will not imply that the
victim has consented to the sexual act, especially when that person was
intimidated into submission by the accused. In cases where the rape is
committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common
law spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence.38
In this case, AAAs lack of resistance was brought about by her fear that
Pareja would make good on his threat to kill her if she ever spoke of the
incident.
AAAs conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually
abused by Pareja is also not enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as
heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or in accordance
with societys expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard
rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young
victim. One cannot be expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation
as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human mind placed under
emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard
reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of
them had to cope with different circumstances. 39

Likewise, AAAs delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the
proper authorities is insignificant and does not affect the veracity of her
charges. It should be remembered that Pareja threatened to kill her if she
told anyone of the incidents. In People v. Ogarte,40 we explained why a
rape victims deferral in reporting the crime does not equate to falsification
of the accusation, to wit:
The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time
to persons close to her or to report the matter to the authorities does not
perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually molested and
that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and
fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a
fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal
charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain,
rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders making
good their threats to kill or hurt their victims. (Citation omitted.)
Medical examination
not indispensable
Pareja avers that the MedicoLegal Report indicating that there is evidence
of blunt force or penetrating trauma upon examination of AAAs hymen,
cannot be given any significance, as it failed to indicate how and when
the said signs of physical trauma were inflicted. Furthermore, Pareja
said, the findings that AAAs hymen sustained trauma cannot be utilized as
evidence against him as the alleged sexual abuse that occurred in
December, was not by penetration of the vagina.41
This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of
rape on the basis of the sole testimony of the victim. In People v.
Colorado,42 we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape,
as even a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in
character and not essential to conviction. x x x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of
AAAs anus at the time she was examined is of no consequence. On the
contrary, the medical examination actually bolsters AAAs claim of being
raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not just by anal
penetration. However, as the prosecution failed to capitalize on such
evidence and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be
convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266A of the Revised Penal
Code.
In People v. Perez,43 this Court aptly held:
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who
are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young
woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself
by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the
desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a
girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would
impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not
true. (Citations omitted.)
Criminal Case No. 041557CFM:
The December 2003 Incident
In Criminal Case No. 041557CFM or the December 2003 incident, Pareja
was charged and convicted of the crime of rape by sexual assault. The
enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 or the AntiRape Law of 1997,
revolutionized the concept of rape with the recognition of sexual violence
on sexrelated orifices other than a womans organ is included in the
crime of rape; and the crimes expansion to cover genderfree rape. The
transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime
against persons and the introduction of rape by sexual assault as
differentiated from the traditional rape through carnal knowledge or rape
through sexual intercourse.44 Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article
335, the provision on rape in the Revised Penal Code and incorporated
therein Article 266A which reads:
Article 266A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting
his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:
1. Article 266A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse,
also known as organ rape or penile rape. 45 The central element in rape
through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge, which must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.46
2. Article 266A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called
instrument or object rape, or genderfree rape.47 It must be attended
by any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of
paragraph 1.48
In People v. Abulon,49 this Court differentiated the two modes of
committing rape as follows:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second,
the offender may be a man or a woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the
second, the offended party may be a man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the
vagina, while the second is committed by inserting the penis into
another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object
into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the
second.
Under Article 266A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
rape by sexual assault is [b]y any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003,
inserted his penis into her anus. While she may not have been certain
about the details of the February 2004 incident, she was positive that
Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly establishing
the occurrence of rape by sexual assault. In other words, her testimony
on this account was, as the Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and
probable.50
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003
incident is rape through carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be found
guilty of rape by sexual assault even though it was proven during trial.
This is due to the material differences and substantial distinctions between
the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not necessarily included in
the second, and viceversa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by
sexual assault when what he was charged with was rape through carnal
knowledge, would be to violate his constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.51
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of
lasciviousness under the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in
relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,52 to wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.
When there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished
by prisin correccional.
The elements of the above crime are as follows:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.53 (Citation
omitted.)
Clearly, the abovementioned elements are present in the December 2003
incident, and were sufficiently established during trial. Thus, even though
the crime charged against Pareja was for rape through carnal knowledge,
he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating
any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime
of rape.54
Nonetheless, the Court takes this case as an opportunity to remind the
State, the People of the Philippines, as represented by the public
prosecutor, to exert more diligence in crafting the Information, which
contains the charge against an accused. The primary duty of a lawyer in
public prosecution is to see that justice is done55 to the State, that its
penal laws are not broken and order maintained; to the victim, that his or
her rights are vindicated; and to the offender, that he is justly punished
for his crime. A faulty and defective Information, such as that in Criminal
Case No. 041556CFM, does not render full justice to the State, the
offended party, and even the offender. Thus, the public prosecutor should
always see to it that the Information is accurate and appropriate.
Criminal Case No. 041556CFM:
The February 2004 Incident
It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by
the prosecution against Pareja, especially AAAs testimony. In its scrutiny,
the RTC found AAAs declaration on the rape in the December 2003
incident credible enough to result in a conviction, albeit this Court had to
modify it as explained above. However, it did not find that the same level
of proof, i.e., beyond reasonable doubt, was fully satisfied by the
prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a second count of rape
against Pareja. In Criminal Case No. 041556CFM, or the February 2004
incident, the RTC considered AAAs confusion as to whether or not she was
actually penetrated by Pareja, and eventually resolved the matter in
Parejas favor.
This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang
Salaysay,56 stated that aside from sucking her breasts, Pareja also
inserted his finger in her vagina. However, she was not able to give a
clear and convincing account of such insertion during her testimony.
Despite being repeatedly asked by the prosecutor as to what followed after
her breasts were sucked, AAA failed to testify, in open court, that Pareja
also inserted his finger in her vagina. Moreover, later on, she added that
Pareja inserted his penis in her vagina during that incident. Thus, because
of the material omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be convicted
of rape in the February 2004 incident. Nonetheless, Parejas acts of
placing himself on top of AAA and sucking her breasts, fall under the crime
of acts of lasciviousness, which, as we have discussed above, is included in
the crime of rape.
Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja
sucked both her breasts in the February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was
correctly convicted by the courts a quo of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness.
Defense of Denial
and Improper Motive
Pareja sought to escape liability by denying the charges against him,
coupled with the attribution of ill motive against AAA. He claims that AAA
filed these cases against him because she was angry that he caused her
parents separation. Pareja added that these cases were initiated by AAAs
father, as revenge against him.57
Such contention is untenable. AAAs credibility cannot be diminished or
tainted by such imputation of ill motives. It is highly unthinkable for the
victim to falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill motives or
grudge.58 Furthermore, motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge
have never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of
a minor rape victim.59 In People v. Manuel,60 we held:
Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow examination of her private parts and subject herself to
public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and
impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her being. It is settled
jurisprudence that testimonies of childvictims are given full weight and
credit, since when a woman or a girlchild says that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.
Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code is prisin correccional in its full range. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,61 the minimum of the indeterminate penalty
shall be taken from the full range of the penalty next lower in
degree,62 i.e., arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month and 1 day to 6
months.63 The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall come from
the proper penalty64 that could be imposed under the Revised Penal Code
for Acts of Lasciviousness,65 which, in this case, absent any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, is the medium period of prisin correccional,
ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. 66
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award of
damages as follows: P20,000.00 as civil indemnity;67 P30,000.00 as moral
damages; and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,68 for each count of acts
of lasciviousness. All amounts shall bear legal interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CAG.R. CR.H.C. No. 03794 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. We find accusedappellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz
GUILTY of two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is
sentenced to two (2) indeterminate prison terms of 6 months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional, as
maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, all with interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City, and P/COL. NICOLAS
M. TORRES, P/INSP. ADONIS C. ABETO, PO MARIO LAMIS Y
FERNANDEZ, PO JOSE PAHAYUPAN, PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR.,
JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS,
DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO,
ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY
DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, and EDGAR HILADO, respondents.
At issue in this special civil action for certiorari is whether it is the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City or the Sandiganbayan that has
jurisdiction over the two criminal cases for kidnapping for ransom with
murder wherein some of the accused implicated as principals are members
of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On 13 January 1994, two informations for kidnapping for ransom with
murder were filed with the RTC of Bacolod City against fourteen persons,
five of whom are members of the PNP, namely, P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres,
P/Insp. Adonis C. Abeto, Police Officers Mario Lamis, Jose Pahayupan, and
Vicente Canuday, Jr.; the other nine are civilians. The informations, later
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in Branch 47 of the
said court, are similarly worded, except as to the names of the victims,
who are Rufino Gargar, Jr. in the first case and Danilo Lumangyao in the
second, thus:
The undersigned hereby accuses JEANETTE YANSON-
DUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS
BY INDUCTION), POLICE COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES (AS
PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION AND BY DIRECTION AND/OR
INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION), POLICE INSPECTOR
ADONIS C. ABETO, POLICE OFFICERS MARIO LAMIS Y
FERNANDEZ, JOSE PAHAYUPAN, VICENTE CANUDAY, JR.,
DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO,
ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY
DELGADO, ALL AS PRINCIPALS BY PARTICIPATION, CESAR
PECHA AND EDGAR HILADO, BOTH AS ACCESSORIES, of
the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER,
committed as follows:
That during the period beginning in the late afternoon of
August 6, 1992 and ending the late evening of the
following day in Sitio Pedrosa, Barangay Alijis, Bacolod
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and concurring in a common criminal intent
and execution thereof with one another, save for the
accessories for the purpose of extracting or extorting the
sum of P353, 000.00, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously to wit:
Acting upon the inducement of spouses Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and
Charles Dumancas, under the direction cooperation and undue influence,
exerted by P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, taking advantage of his position as
Station Commander of the Philippine National Police, Bacolod City Station,
with the direct participation and cooperation of Police Inspector Adonis C.
Abeto, other police officers Vicente Canuday, Jr., Jose Pahayupan, Mario
Lamis, civilian (police) agents Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia,
Teody Delgado, Jaime Gargallano, also taking advantage of their
respective positions, and Dominador Geroche, concurring and affirming in
the said criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct, kidnap and
detain one RUFINO GARGAR, JR. (Criminal Case No. 94-15562 and
DANILO LUMANGYAO (Criminal Case No. 94-15563), shortly thereafter at
around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of August 7, 1992, failing in their
aforesaid common purpose to extort money and in furtherance of said
conspiracy, with evident premeditation and treachery nocturnity and the
use of motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said victims,
while being handcuffed and blindfolded; that accused Cesar Pecha and
Edgar Hilado, with knowledge that the said Gargar [and Lumangyao, in
Crim. Case No. 94-15563 were victims] of violence, did then and there
secretly bury the corpses in a makeshift shallow grave for the purpose of
concealing the crime of murder in order to prevent its discovery for a fee
of P500.00 each; aforesaid act or acts has caused damage and prejudice
to the heirs of said victims, to wit:
P 50,000.00 as indemnity for death;
50,000.00 actual damages;
300,000.00 compensatory damages
(Lost income);
 100,000.00 moral damages;
50,000.00 exemplary damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW (Articles 268 and 248
in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code). 1
These cases were consolidated.
Each of the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Later, they filed
their respective motions for bail. At the hearings thereof, the prosecution
presented state witness Moises Grandeza, the alleged lone eyewitness and
co-conspirator in the commission of the complex crimes. After the
completion of his testimony, the trial court, per Judge Edgar G. Garvilles,
granted bail in favor of only six of the accused, namely, P/Insp. Adonis
Abeto, Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr., Charles
Dumancas, Edgar Hilado, and Cesar Pecha. The other eight accused who
were denied bail are now detained at the City Jail of Bacolod City.2
Through the testimony of Grandeza, the prosecution established that in
response to the complaint of spouses Charles and Jeanette Dumancas,
P/Col. Nicolas Torres instructed his men to look for Rufino Gargar and
Danilo Lumangyao who were allegedly members of the group that had
swindled the Dumancas spouses. On 6 August 1992, Police Officer Mario
Lamis, together with civilian agents, namely, Teody Delgado, Edwin
Divinagracia, Jaime Gargallano, Rolando Fernandez, and Moises Grandeza,
arrested and abducted the two swindling suspects. Conformably with
Torres's order, the two suspects were brought to Dragon Lodge Motel.
There, they were investigated by Police Inspector Adonis Abeto and Police
Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr.. They were then taken
to the Ceres Compound, where Jeanette Dumancas identified Lumangyao
as a member of the group that had swindled her. She then asked about
the money that the group had received from her. Upon being told by
Lumangyao that the money had already been divided among his partners
long time ago, she said to the accused, specifically to Dominador Geroche:
"Doming, bring these two to the PC or police and I will call Atty. Geocadin
so that proper cases could be filed against them." Thereafter, the two
suspects were transferred to D' Hacienda Motel, then to Moonlit Inn, then
to Casa Mel Lodge, and back to D' Hacienda Motel, where the two were
shot and killed. The team forthwith went to the office of P/Col. Torres and
reported that the killing had been done. The latter told them: "You who
are here inside, nobody knows what you have done, but you have to hide
because the NBI's are after you."3
Thereafter, the prosecution rested its case and the trial court started to
receive the evidence for the accused. Accused Torres and Abeto presented
their respective evidence. Presentation of evidence by the other accused
was, however, suspended because of the motions of several accused for
the inhibition of Judge Garvilles. Despite opposition by the prosecution,
Judge Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing both
cases, which were thereafter re-raffled to Branch 54, presided by herein
public respondent Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes.
On 24 June 1994, the private prosecutors moved for the transmittal of the
records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan on the ground that, pursuant to
our decision of 11 March 1994 in Republic of the Philippines vs.
Asuncion,4 the trial court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the
offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused
PNP officers. In his Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Transmit Records,
the State Prosecutor adopted the motion of the private prosecutors.5
In its order of 15 August 1994,6 the trial court, thru respondent Judge,
ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the subject
cases because the informations do not state that the offenses were
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. Citing
People vs. Montilla,7 it held that the allegation in the informations that the
accused PNP officers took advantage of their office in the commission of
the offense charged is merely an allegation of an aggravating
circumstance. It further stated that a public office is not a constituent
element of the offense of kidnapping with murder nor is the said offense
intimately connected with the office. It then denied the motion for transfer
of the records to the Sandiganbayan and declared that the trial of the case
should continue.
Relying on People vs. Montejo,8 the prosecution moved to reconsider the
said order.9
On 7 September 1994, 10 the trial court issued an order denying the
motion because People vs. Montejo is not applicable, since in that case
there was (a) an intimate connection between the offense charged and the
public position of the accused and (b) a total absence of personal motive;
whereas, in these cases, no such intimate connection exists and the
informations emphasize that the accused were moved by selfish motives of
ransom and extortion.
The respondent Judge then resumed the reception of the evidence for the
other accused. Accused Gargallano, Fernandez, Lamis, Delgado, and
Geroche, as well as his three witnesses, had already completed their
respective testimonies when, upon motion of the prosecution, the
respondent Judge voluntarily inhibited himself on 15 September 1994. The
cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of the RTC of Bacolod City.
On 5 December 1994, the prosecution, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed with us a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order challenging
the refusal of the respondent Judge to transfer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan.
On 12 December 1994, we required the respondents to comment on the
petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the public
respondent or his successor to desist from proceeding with the trial of the
subject cases. 11
On 27 February 1995, after considering the allegations, issues, and
arguments adduced in the petition as well as in the comments of the
private respondents, we gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. Most of them submitted
their memoranda, while the petitioner and some of the private
respondents adopted their initiatory pleadings as their memoranda.
On 22 March 1995, private respondent Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas filed an
urgent motion for the grant of bail, 12which we noted on 15 May 1995. 13
Deliberating on the arguments adduced by the parties, we are convinced
that public respondent Judge Magallanes committed no grave abuse of
discretion in holding that it is his court and not the Sandiganbayan which
has jurisdiction over the two cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder.
At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law governing
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by P.D. No. 1861, which pertinently provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees
in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by Law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of
16,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in
this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of
P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:
(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in cases originally decided by them in their respective
territorial jurisdiction.
(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders
of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction
over cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, in their respective
jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees.
Applying this section, we held in Aguinaldo vs. Domagas 14 that for the
Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or
felonies committed by public officers or employees under Section 4(a) (2)
above, it is not enough that the penalty prescribed therefor is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of
P6,000.00; it is also necessary that the offenses or felonies were
committed in relation to their office. We reiterated this pronouncement
in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 15 Natividad vs. Felix, 16 and Republic vs.
Asuncion, 17 In Sanchez, we restated the principle laid down in Montilla vs.
Hilario 18 that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to
the office if it cannot exist without the office, or if the office is a
constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for
instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title
Seven, of the Revised Penal Code. We also reiterated the principle
in People vs. Montejo 19 that the offense must be intimately connected
with the office of the offender, and we further intimated that the fact that
the offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the
information.20
There is no dispute that the prescribed penalties for the offenses charged
in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 before the court below are higher
than prision correcional or imprisonment for more than six years. The only
question that remains to be resolved then is whether the said offenses
were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.
Relying on its evidence and on the Montejo case, the petitioner submits
that the crimes charged in the subject cases were connected with public
office because the accused PNP officers, together with the civilian agents,
arrested the two swindling suspects in the course of the performance of
their duty and not out of personal motive, and if they demanded from the
two suspects the production of the money of the Dumancas spouses and
later killed the two; they did so in the course of the investigation
conducted by them as policemen. The petitioner further asserts that the
allegations in the informations reading "taking advantage of his position as
Station Commander of the Philippine National Police" and "taking
advantage of their respective positions" presuppose the exercise of the
functions attached to the office of the accused PNP officers and are
sufficient to show that the offenses charged were committed in relation to
their office. The petitioner then concludes that the cases below fall within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information, 21 and not by the result of evidence after
trial. 22
In Montejo 23 where the amended information alleged:
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups
of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen
and . . . special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and
high power guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo, which is
under his command . . . supervision and control, where his codefendants
were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest
and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them
to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said
Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his
codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in
consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of
the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions and
would not have peen committed had they not held their office; besides,
the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime; thus, there
was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the
accused.
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and
15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and
investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the
investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the
purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00, abducted,
kidnapped, and detained the two victims, and failing in their common
purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not
the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
The allegation of "taking advantage of his position" or "taking advantage of
their respective positions" incorporated in the informations is not sufficient
to bring the offenses within the definition of "offenses committed in
relation to public office." In Montilla vs. Hilario, 24 such an allegation was
considered merely as an allegation of an aggravating circumstance, 25 and
not as one that qualifies the crime as having been committed in relation to
public office, It says:
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element;
and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from
the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are
public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime.
Also, in Bartolome vs. People of the Philippines, 26 despite the allegation
that the accused public officers committed the crime of falsification of
official document by "taking advantage of their official positions," this
Court held that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case
because "[t]he information [did] not allege that there was an intimate
connection between the discharge of official duties and the commission of
the offense."
Accordingly, for lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses
were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or
were intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the
accused, the subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court 27 and not of the Sandiganbayan as insisted by the petitioner.
In Dumancas's and Torres's motions for the early resolution of this case
and in Abeto's Supplement to Comment with Motion to Dismiss all filed in
July 1995, it is contended that even assuming that the informations do
charge the accused PNP officers with crimes committed in relation to their
office, still the Regional Trial Court would have jurisdiction over the subject
cases in view of the amendments to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, introduced by R.A. No. 7975, which was approved on 30 March
1995, whose Section 2 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sanggunian
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(a) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and
up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions
corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on
appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts
where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or
not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall
be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them. (emphasis supplied).
As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan partly lost
its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violations of R.A. No.
3019, 28 as amended; R.A. No. 1379; 29 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code; 30 it retains only cases where the accused are
those enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above and, generally,
national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758).
Moreover, its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by
public officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer
determined by the prescribed penalty, viz., that which is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years or a fine of
P6,000.00; it is enough that they are committed by those public officials
and employees enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above. However, it
retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed
pursuant to or in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 31 2, 32 14, 33 and 14-A. 34
The respondents maintain that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 because none of the five PNP
officers involved therein occupy the rank of chief superintendent or higher,
or are classified as Grade "27" or higher under R.A. No. 6758 and of the
five, P/Col. Nicolas Torres has the highest rank, viz., Senior
Superintendent whose salary grade under the said Act is Grade "18."
Assuming then for the sake of argument that the informations in the said
cases allege that the crimes charged were committed by the five PNP
officers in relation to their office, it would appear indubitable that the
cases would fall within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Under Section 4
of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No. 7975:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions
corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent35 or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
However, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. 36 Under the above
assumption then, the cases should have been filed with the
Sandiganbayan since at the time the informations were filed, the
governing law was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No.
1861. But, would that jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan be affected by
R.A. No. 7975?
Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent
legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains
with the court until the case is finally terminated. 37 Hence, the
Sandiganbayan or the courts, as the case may be, cannot be divested of
jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of R.A. No. 7975. They
retain their jurisdiction until the end of the litigation.
In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction
over the subject criminal cases, as the informations were filed not before it
but before the Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the foregoing
assumption that the informations in the subject cases do charge the
respondent PNP officers with offenses committed in relation to their office
so that jurisdiction thereof would fall under the Sandiganbayan, and
assuming further that the informations had already been filed with the said
tribunal but hearing thereon has not begun yet, the Sandiganbayan can no
longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express provision of
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975. That section provides that upon the effectivity
of the Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not yet begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. Hence, cases which
were previously cognizable by the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of
the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred to the
latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been commenced in the
Sandiganbayan.
It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan because the same would anyway be transferred again to
the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation to
Section 2 thereof.
As regards the motions for bail of accused-respondents Jeanette
Dumancas and Nicolas Torres, the same must fail. Section 17, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 17 Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with
the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of
the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the
province or city. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or
municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed also
with any regional trial court of said place, or, if no judge thereof is
available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or
municipal circuit trial judge therein.
(b) Whenever the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused
seeks to be released on recognizance, the application therefor may be filed
only in the particular court where the case is pending, whether for
preliminary investigation, trial, on appeal.
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court
may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or
municipality where he is held.
In the instant case, the motions for bail filed by the said accused-
respondents with the Regional Trial Court where the cases against them
are pending were denied sometime in February, 1994
In Enrile vs. Salazar, 38 as reiterated in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, 39 this
Court said: "Only after that remedy [petition to be admitted to bail] was
denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court [be]
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals
if appropriate relief was also available there."
There is no showing that the said accused-respondents have questioned
the denial of their applications for bail in a petition for certiorari either
before the Court of Appeals or this Court. It was only on 26 December
1994, when they filed their respective comments on the instant petition,
that they challenged the denial premised on the ground that the evidence
of guilt against them was not strong. Even if their respective Comment
and Reiteration of Motion for Bail 40 and respondent Dumancas's Motion for
Bail 41 filed on 22 March 1995, were treated as petitions for certiorari, still
the same would not prosper for not having been seasonably filed. While
the Rules of Court does not fix a time-frame for the filing of a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, existing
jurisprudence requires that the same be filed within a reasonable period of
time from receipt of the questioned judgment or order. 42 And, in Philec
Workers' Union vs. Hon. Romeo A. Young 43 it was held that a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should be filed within a
reasonable period of three months from notice of the decision or order.
Here, about nine to ten months had already elapsed before the
respondents assailed the denial of their motions for bail. In any event, the
private respondents who were denied bail are not precluded from
reiterating before the trial court their plea for admission to bail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged orders are
AFFIRMED, and the motions for bail of accused-respondents Jeanette
Dumancas and Nicolas Torres are DENIED.
The temporary restraining order issued on 12 December 1994 is LIFTED,
and the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City is directed to immediately
resume the hearings of Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 and to
thereafter resolve them with reasonable and purposeful dispatch.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46934 April 15, 1988
ALFREDO CUYOS y TULOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NICOLAS P. GARCIA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, San
Fernando, Pampanga and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
De la Cruz, De Loso and Sison Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos, in this Petition for certiorari with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction seeks to set aside the Order dated 9 September
1977 issued by respondent Municipal Court Judge Nicolas P. Garcia in
Criminal Case No. 77-1848 (entitled " People of the Philippines, plaintiff vs.
Alfredo Cuyos y Tulor, accused") denying petitioner's Motion to Transfer
said case to the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga for trial on the
merits.
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, with homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and
damage to property, through reckless imprudence. Petitioner was driver of
a cargo truck which had collided with a Volkswagen automobile in a
vehicular accident which resulted in the death of one (1) person and
physical injuries to four (4) other people. The Amended Complaint against
petitioner read as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of June 1977, at about 6:10 P.M., at the
MacArthur Highway, barrio San Isidro, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a truck bearing
plate No. V 139 T Filipinos 1977, willfully and unlawfully drive and operate
the same in a negligent, imprudent and careless manner, and without due
regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations, and without taking the
necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to
property, causing by such negligence, imprudence and carelessness, the
said truck driven and operated by him bumped and hit a Volkswagen car
bearing plate no. E 604 Filipinos 1977, then driven by Antonio M.
Concepcion, as a result of which one of the occupants of the said car,
Victoriana Miranda Concepcion died in the said accident, and the other
occupants namely: Antonio Concepcion, Rhinna Lin Capili, Renee Ann
Capili and Lourdes Concepcion sustained serious physical injuries, and the
said car suffered damages in the amount of P18,000.00, belonging to
Antonio Concepcion, to the damage and prejudice of the offended parties.
Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment. After
arraignment, respondent Judge set the case for trial on 12,14 and 16
September 1977.
Before trial could commence, however, petitioner filed on 6 September
1977 a " Motion to Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance for
Trial" , alleging lack of jurisdiction over the case on the part of the
Municipal Court. Petitioner's argument was that the amended criminal
complaint alleged that the Volkswagen car involved in the accident had
suffered damages amounting to P18,000.00, and that under paragraph 3,
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime with which he was
charged would carry a fine in an amount ranging from the amount of the
damage to three (3) times the value of the damage alleged (i.e. 3 x
P18,000.00 or P54,000.00). Petitioner urged in his Motion that because
under Section 87 (e) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended (Republic
Act No. 296 as amended), the respondent Municipal Court of the Provincial
Capital of Pampanga, had jurisdiction only over offenses punishable by a
fine not exceeding P6,000.00, the case had to be transferred to the Court
of First Instance. On the same date, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to
Postpone the trial of the case relying on the same grounds set out in his
Motion to Transfer the Case to the Court of First Instance.
After a joint hearing of the two (2) Motions filed by petitioner, the
respondent Municipal judge issued an order dated 9 September 1977
denying the Motion to transfer the Case to the Court of First Instance and
set the trial of the case for 5 October 1977. A verbal Motion for
Reconsideration by petitioner was denied.
Hence the present Petition for Certiorari, assailing the jurisdiction of the
respondent court to try the criminal case against petitioner on the merits.
By a Resolution dated 26 September 1977, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the respondent Municipal Court from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 77-1848.
The sole issue raised in this Petition is whether or not the respondent
Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the
criminal case against petitioner.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated 27 October 1977, agreed with
and adopted the position taken by petitioner that respondent Municipal
Court has no jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. 77-1848. The Court
agrees with the Solicitor General.
Criminal Case No. 77-1848 involves a complex crime of homicide, multiple
serious physical injuries and damage to property, resulting from reckless
imprudence. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, in a prosecution
for a complex crime constituted by two (2) or more grave or less grave
felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime is to be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period. In the present case, one might, as
respondent Municipal Judge did, look only at the acts which constitute the
offenses comprising the complex crime here involved. One is likely to do
so through eyes which are culturally conditioned and so is likely to
assume, as did respondent Municipal Judge, that the most serious offense
of which petitioner is accused is homicide through reckless imprudence.
Under paragraph 2, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
imposable upon petitioner, should he be found guilty of homicide through
reckless imprudence, would be prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions contained in this Article shall not be applicable:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
automobile law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case the
defendants shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
xxx xxx xxx
At the time of the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioner before
the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, such Municipal Court in
the capital of the Province of Pampanga had jurisdiction to impose a
penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine not
exceeding P6,000. 00 or both. The applicable provision was the fourth
paragraph of Article 87 (c) of Republic Act No. 296 as amended which
provided as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges
of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to
try parties charged with an offense committed within their respective
jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision
correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not
exceeding six thousand pesos or both, and in the absence of the district
judge, shall have like jurisdiction within the province as the Court of First
Instance to hear applications for bail.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if the basic assumption made earlier as to the relative gravity of
homicide through reckless imprudence and damage to property through
reckless imprudence were correct, the respondent Municipal Judge would
have to be vested with jurisdiction over the criminal charges against
petitioner.
As a technical legal proposition, however, the relative seriousness of
offenses is determined by the seriousness of the penalties attached by the
law to the several offenses. It was noted earlier that the imposable penalty
in case of homicide through reckless imprudence is prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods, i.e., a correctional penalty in the scale
of penalties set up in Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon the other
hand, the penalty for damage to property through reckless imprudence is
provided for in the third paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code which reads as follows:
When the execution of the Act covered by this Article shall
have only resulted in damage to the property of another,
the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an
amount equal to the value of paid damages to three-times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than P25.00.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 26 of the same Code, a fine may be an afflictive penalty (i.e.,
if it exceeds P6,000.00) or a correctional penalty (i.e., if it is P200.00 or
more but does not exceed P6,000.00). The offense so penalized with a fine
may be a grave felony (i.e. if the imposable fine is afflictive in nature) or
a less grave felony (i.e., if the imposable fine is merely correctional). 1 In
the instant case, the maximum fine which may be imposed upon petitioner
is P54,000.00 (3 x P18,000.00), obviously an afflictive penalty and hence,
in the scheme of the Revised Penal Code, more serious than the penalty
imposable for homicide through reckless imprudence.
In complex crimes, it is not uncommon that one constitutive offense
carries with it an afflictive penalty while the other or other constitutive
offenses carry with them only a correctional or even a light penalty.
Jurisdiction over the whole complex crime must logically be lodged with
the trial court having jurisdiction to impose the maximum and most
serious penalty imposable on an offense forming part of the complex
crime. A complex crime must be prosecuted integrally, as it were,
and not split into its component offenses and the latter made the subject
of multiple informations possibly brought in different courts. This is the
thrust of our case law on the matter.
In Angeles, etc., et al, v. Jose, et al., 2 the Court had occasion to deal with
a criminal information against one Domingo Mejia before the Court of First
Instance of Manila, charging him with the crime of damage to property in
the sum of P654.22 and with less serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, committed, in one single act. There, the respondent Court of
First Instance dismissed the criminal information upon the ground that the
penalty prescribed by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code was
only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods which was within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The prosecution then
invited attention to the fact that the fine which could be imposed by the
respondent court on account of the damage to property through reckless
imprudence was a sum ranging from P654.22 to P1,962.66 (P654.22 x 3)
which amount was beyond the jurisdiction of a Municipal Court to impose
as fine. In setting aside the order of dismissal by the respondent Court of
First Instance and remanding the case to the trial court further
proceedings, the Supreme Court said:
[The third paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code] simply means that if there is only damage to
property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if
there are also physical injuries there, should be an
additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be
split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for
the damage to property, for both the injuries and the
damage committed were caused by one single act of the
defendant and constitute what may be called a complex
crime of physical injuries and damage to property. It is
clear that the fine fixed by law in this case is beyond the
jurisdiction of the municipal court and within that of the
court of first instance. 3(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in Angeles, we held that the jurisdiction of the Court to take
cognizance of the case must be determined, not by the penalty for the
physical injuries charged but by the fine imposable for the damage to
property resulting from reckless imprudence. Damage to property through
reckless imprudence need not be a lighter offense than less serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Because the maximum fine
(P1,962.66) imposable upon the accused in the Angeles case was beyond
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Manila to impose, the criminal
case fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent Court of First Instance of
Manila.
People v. Villanueva 4 followed the rule set out in Angeles. In Villanueva,
the accused was charged before the Justice of Peace Court of Batangas,
Batangas with the crime of serious and less serious physical injuries, with
damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00, through reckless
imprudence. The Justice of Peace Court subsequently declared itself
without jurisdiction to try the case and forwarded the same to the Court of
First Instance. The latter court then declared itself similarly without
jurisdiction over the complex crime charged in the information, upon the
ground that the penalty for the graver offense of physical injuries through
reckless imprudence was only arresto mayor in its, maximum and medium
periods which penalty, even if applied in its maximum degree (in view of
the complex -nature of the crime), would remain within the jurisdiction of
the Justice of Peace Court. Upon appeal by the prosecution, the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held that the Court of First
Instance had jurisdiction over the complex crime there involved:
We find the appeal well taken, for this case comes squarely under the rule
laid down by us in Angeles, et al. v. ,rose, et al. [96 Phil. 151 (1954)],,
wherein we held that.
xxx xxx xxx
Consider that it is the court of first instance that would undoubtedly have
jurisdiction if the only offense that resulted from appellant's imprudence
were the damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00, it would be
absurd to hold that for the graver offense of serious and less serious
physical injuries combined with damage to property through reckless
imprudence, jurisdiction would lie in the justice of the peace court. The
presumption is against absurdity, and it is the duty of the courts to
interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd results. Our system of
apportionment of criminal jurisdictions among the various trial courts
proceeds on the basic theory that crimes cognizable by the Courts of First
Instance are more serious than those triable injustice of the peace or
municipal courts.
Moreover, we cannot discard the possibility that the
prosecution may not be able to prove all the supposed
offenses constituting the complex crime charge. Were we
to hold that it is the justice of the Peace court that has
jurisdiction in this case, if later the prosecution should fail
to prove the physical injuries aspect of the case and
establish only the damage to property in the amount of
P2,636.00, the inferior court would find itself without
jurisdiction to impose the fine for the damage to property
committed, since such fine can not be less than the
amount of the damage. Again, it is to avoid this further
absurdity that we must hold that the jurisdiction lies in the
court of first instance in this case. 5
The applicable rule on the allocation of jurisdiction between an inferior
court on the one hand and the Regional Trial Court on the other, in respect
of complex crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or
physical injuries and damage to property, was summarized by Mr. Justice
Barrera in People v. Malabanan: 6
It is true that, following the ruling of this Court in the case
of Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-6382, March
30,1954 (40 O.G. 18 supp.), in imposing the
corresponding penalty, to the quasi-offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in physical injuries and damage to
property, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should be
applied. However, there may be cases, as the one at
bar, where the imposable penalty for the physical injuries
charged would come within the jurisdiction of the
municipal or justice of the peace court while the fine, for
the damage to property, would fall on the Court of First
Instance. As the information cannot be split into two, one
for damages and another for the physical injuries, the
jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case
must be determined not by the corresponding penalty for
the physical injuries charged but by the fine imposable for
the damage to property resulting from the reckless
imprudence. 7 (Emphasis supplied)
It remains only to point out that under B.P. Blg. 129, the law presently in
effect, we would have to reach the same result: i.e., that the criminal case
against petitioner falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Under Section 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months, or a
fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence
they should have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine
does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the maximum fine imposable in the present case is P54,000.00, and
the maximum imprisonment imposable (for the homicide through reckless
imprudence) is six (6) years, clearly, the criminal charge involved falls
outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court and consequently
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent Municipal Court of 9 September
1977 is hereby SET ASIDE as null and void and the Temporary Restraining
Order issued by this Court on 26 September 1977 is hereby made
PERMANENT. Because the proceedings before the respondent Municipal
Court are null and void, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga will have to file
a new information against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, San
Fernando, Pampanga. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-75079 January 26, 1989
SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch
XIX, Regional Trial) Court of Manila and the COUNTRY BANKERS
INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
Apolinario M. Buaya for petitioner.
Romeo G. Velasquez for respondent Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation.
PARAS, J.:
Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition for certiorari,
seeks to annul and set aside the orders of denial issued by the respondent
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX on her Motion to
Quash/Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. L-83-
22252 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Solemnidad M. Buaya." The
Motion to Dismiss was anchored on the following grounds (a) the court has
no jurisdiction over the case and (b) the subject matter is purely civil in
nature.
It appears that petitioner was an insurance agent of the private
respondent, who was authorized to transact and underwrite insurance
business and collect the corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the
private respondent. Under the terms of the agency agreement, the
petitioner is required to make a periodic report and accounting of her
transactions and remit premium collections to the principal office of private
respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted
on petitioner's account which showed a shortage in the amount of
P358,850.72. As a result she was charged with estafa in Criminal Case No.
83-22252, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX with the
respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss. which motion was denied by respondent Judge in his
Order dated March 26, 1986. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of
this order of denial was also denied.
These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It
is the contention of petitioner that the Regional trial Court of Manila has no
jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds
she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City.
Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely
civil in nature because the fact that private respondent separately filed
Civil Case No. 83-14931 involving the same alleged misappropriated
amount is an acceptance that the subject transaction complained of is not
proper for a criminal action.
The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the consistent
rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory
in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the
subject of appeal until final judgment or order rendered (See. 2, Rule 41,
Rules of Court). the ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to
enter a Plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue
on appeal from the final judgment (Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171).
The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain
exceptions the reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or
accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of
proper venue.
Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila to take cognizance of this criminal case for estafa.
It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information
characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it must
be tried (Balite v. People, L-21475, Sept. 30,1966 cited in People v.
Masilang, 142 SCRA 680).
In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493) this
Court ruled that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in
criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment
provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the
complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined
by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings
the court may make after the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).
The information in the case at reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Solemnidad Buaya of the crime of estafa,
committed as follows:
That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance Corporation
represented by Elmer Banez duly organized and earth under the laws of
the Philippine with principal address at 9th floor, G.R. Antonio Bldg., T.M.
Kalaw, Ermita, in said City, in the following manner, to wit. the said having
been authorized to act as insurance agent of said corporation, among
whose duties were to remit collections due from customers thereat and to
account for and turn over the same to the said Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation represented by Elmer Banez, as soon as possible or
immediately upon demand, collected and received the amount of
P368,850.00 representing payments of insurance premiums from
customers, but herein accused, once in possession of said amount, far
from complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and refused to do so
and with intent to defraud, absconded with the whole amount thereby
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of EN BANC
P358,850.00 to her own personal used and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation in the amount of
P358,850.00 Philippine Currency.
G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44, Rollo)
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,
Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all vs.
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding
of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch
of the essential elements thereof took place. 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during
the period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila,
Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)
CRUZ, J.:
Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial
Court of Manila has jurisdiction. The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the
prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.
Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which
may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of the The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without
crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the
prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has its principal Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
place of business and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit
the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused damage and
prejudice to private respondent in Manila. The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.1 The referral-
complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was
Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3
nature, suffice it to state that evidentiary facts on this point have still to be
proved.
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the
crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX for further judge. 4
proceedings.

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues
that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the
Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by
law for the offenses charged does not exceed six months
imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal
cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by
complaint or by information filed directly in court without
need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan
Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information; Provided, further, That
when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the
corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to
before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish
Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to
Run," reading as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and
penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis
supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the
offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground
of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was
suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the
Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:
Sec. 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as
follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by
filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of
conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the
said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan
Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the
office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the
offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the
filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes
under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases"
applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the
following dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for
Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature
consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and
should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of
the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits.
Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without
distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary
examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only
proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive
the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays
that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on
his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30,
1983, two months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary
Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is
new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph,
which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject
to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies
that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary
procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph
obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those
offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This
interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be
read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to
discover the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the
offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should
follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section
1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting
in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not
more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective
of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree
that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a
preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be
deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means
that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the
case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326
which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings
referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the
submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law
does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise
of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that
the decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the
offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised
Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the
instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty
cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may
prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's
office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary
judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not
justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as
reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a
distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent
the problem here sought to be corrected.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the
petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and
ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with
Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as
this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have
interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal
Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after
the crime had already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated
October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal
Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
prescription. It is so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco
A. Carreon for appellee.
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case No.
2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated
murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of
death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the
sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges
contained in the information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First
Instance of Manila presided over by the honorable Buenaventura Ocampo
who, after the submission of the evidence of the prosecution and the
defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and
before arraignment, counsel de oficio for the accused moved that the
mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court, notwithstanding that it
had found out from the answers of the accused to questions propounded
to him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not
suffering from any mental derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be
confined for Hospital, there to be examined by medical experts who should
report their findings accordingly. This was done, and, according to the
report of the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of
the National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said
report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and Diagnosis," at
pages 13 and 14, reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since
admission. There was not a single moment during his whole 24
hours daily, that he was not under observation.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above.
The veracity of this motivation was determined in the
Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful was
checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved not
only reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a delusional
or hallucinatory motive behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or
symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found to be
intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully
aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally
decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and
conversation relative thereto, the motives, temptations and
provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an individual
with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and
once arriving at a decision he executes, irrespective of
consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at
Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his
commission of some overt acts. This is seen not only in the
present instance, but sometime when an employee in la
Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr.
Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar makers, and
felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a policeman
with a knife in hand after being provoked to a fight several times.
He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime
before when Mr. Nueno was running for a seat in the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his
apparently outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a
weakness of censorship especially in relation to rationalization
about the consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio
C. Guillen is not insane but is an individual with a personality
defect which in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic
Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and
notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by
the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled that Guillen,
not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he
committed on the date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel
for the accused, the Solicitor General and their respective memoranda, we
find that there is no disagreement between the prosecution and the
defense, as to the essential facts which caused the filing of the present
criminal case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although
not affirmed with any particular political group, has voted for the defeated
candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the
successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the
Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of the
Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he became disappointed in
President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the
promises made by him during the presidential election campaign; and his
disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas,
instead of looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and
campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he
determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of
assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity presented itself on the
night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the Liberal
Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd,
President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by
a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in government and politics,
stood on a platform erected for that purpose and delivered his speech
expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of the
advantages to be gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional
amendment granting American citizens the same rights granted to Filipino
nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his
purpose, but having lost said firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought
of two hand grenades which were given him by an American soldier in the
early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky.
He had likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas,
either by going to Malacaan, or following his intended victim in the
latter's trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where
the President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many
difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held
at Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom
he requested to prepare for him a document (Exhibit B), in accordance
with their pervious understanding in the preceding afternoon, when they
met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-
parity" meeting held there. On account of its materially in this case, we
deem it proper to quote hereunder the contents of said document. An
English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I
planned it, and I carried it out all by myself alone. It took me
many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to my own
conscience, to my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my
duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had
I expected to lives to spare, I would not have hesitated either ton
sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the welfare of the
people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the
loss of their husbands, of their sons, and there are millions now
suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man
to be blamed for all this: he had deceived the people, he had
astounded them with no other purpose than to entice them; he
even went to the extent of risking the heritage of our future
generations. For these reasons he should not continue any longer.
His life would mean nothing as compared with the welfare of
eighteen million souls. And why should I not give up my life too if
only the good of those eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I
am willing to bear up the consequences of my act. I t matters not
if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I am sure, that
I have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in my
performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the
request of Guillen by his nephew, was handed to him only at about 6
o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which reason said Exhibit
B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza
de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand
grenades concealed in a paper bag which also contained peanuts. He
buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot located close to
the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood
on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about
seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had
just closed his speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo
and was about to leave the platform.
General Castaeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing,
grenade and without losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from the
platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the
general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering
the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should
lie down. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a
group of persons who were standing close to the platform. Confusion
ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the
fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela )
who died on the following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by
the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) Alfredo Eva, Jose
Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two
hours after the occurrence. It appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one
spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was standing next to
him hurled an object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran away
towards a barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda.
Suspecting that person was the thrower of the object that exploded,
Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but
Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to
escape. Garcia pursued him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for
the real criminal and the author of the explosion, placed him under arrest.
In the meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of the Manila
Police Department were investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles
volunteered the information that the person with whom Angel Garcia was
wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted with
Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and had seen each other in the
plaza a few moments previous to the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen
was, within two hours after the occurrence, found in his home at 1724
Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters and identified
by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards the platform the
object which exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running
away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his
responsibility, although at the same time he tried to justify his action in
throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to his captors the
place where he had hidden his so called last will quoted above and marked
Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the
police headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he
had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the
presence of witnesses he signed a statement which contained his answers
to question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police,
who investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of
his voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the
declarations and made by him on the witness stand during the trial of this
case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors
are assigned allegedly committed by the trial court, namely: first, "in
finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of Simeon
Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of
murder and multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1
of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be
imposed upon the accused"; andfourth, "in considering the concurrence of
the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public
authorities in the commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements
made by the accused, shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when
Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to
put into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas,
he knew fully well that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his
possession at President Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not
prevent the persons who were around his main and intended victim from
being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the
bomb employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by
the trial judge (page 96 of transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated
that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the
President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were
some people around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the
killing of those who surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the
President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the
President being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In
other word, although it was not his main intention to kill the persons
surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in killing them also in
order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the
latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to
the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard
to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that
he should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different
felonies committed, the sum total of which shall not exceed three times
the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in accordance with
article 70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him,
the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the
consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should
be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in
order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that
either malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such
intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it has produced even
though it may not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of
such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol.
7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act
is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be
considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain:
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco
de B a comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado este a darselo al
fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna;
pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero
despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego
disparada por A desde la calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y el
estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C y si solo al
estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la de c
de imprudencia temeraria? La Sala de lo Criminal de la
Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno al procesado a
catorse anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un ao de prision
correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte del
estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y no de homicidio, por
haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte de C,
suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo
calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien debio
declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este
apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes
producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio
imponerse al reo la pena del delito de asesinato en el grado
maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la
pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en el antedicha
sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la
Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del articulo muy
principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18
junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p.
42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49
that is applicable. The case before us is clearly governed by the first clause
of article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing highly explosive hand
grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies,
namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2)
multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose
Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance
of treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered,
even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant
intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two
persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack, or become
aware of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance
of premeditation may not be properly taken into the account when the
person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one
who became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President
Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the intention to kill him,
thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over acts, but he did
not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we
qualify the injuries caused on the four other persons already named as
merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant
proof that , in violation of the provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code, the accused Guillen has committed among others the offense of
assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were directed
towards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas
for his failure to redeem his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at
him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the hand
grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation charging
Guillen with the commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a
finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed
by the accused with the single act of throwing a hand grenade at the
President, was attended by the various aggravating circumstances alleged
in the information, without any mitigating circumstance. But we do not
deem it necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in
any event article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that
the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum
period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. (Art. 248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the
extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and circumstances
hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to
affirm it, and we hereby do so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence
shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code,
under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial
court may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been
remanded. It is so ordered.
THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 130605. June 19, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIX UGANAP
alias Commander Matador, FAUSTINO UGANAP, SALVADOR
UGANAP, NONOY PANDAY, TIRSO ARANG and four (4) JOHN
DOES, accused.
FELIX UGANAP, accused-appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Petitioner is the lone appellant from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City[1] which convicted him alone for the murder of Pedro
Arang and acquitted the rest of the accused.
The information against Felix Uganap, Salvador Uganap, Faustino
Uganap, Nonoy Panday, Tirso Arang, and four John Does, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 23264-91, reads:
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of Murder
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about January 6, 1990, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping each other,
armed with firearm and a bladed weapon, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attacked, assaulted, stabbed and shot with said weapons one Pedro Arang,
thereby inflicting him mortal wounds which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Salvador Uganap died before he could be arrested; hence, trial
proceeded only as against Felix Uganap, Faustino Uganap, Nonoy Panday,
and Tirso Arang.
Six witnesses were presented by the prosecution, including one
eyewitness and the doctor who conducted the necropsy over the victims
body.
It was established from the testimonies that the victim and some of
the accused were close relatives. Accused Tirso Arang is the half-brother
of the victim, while accused-appellant Felix Uganap is also the victims
cousin. Accused Faustino Uganap is the brother-in-law of the victim, being
the brother of the latters wife, Leilani Arang. They are all members of the
Bagobo tribe.
The lone eyewitness, Samuel Arang, also a cousin of the victim,
testified that at around 8:30 in the evening of January 6, 1990, he was
walking home when he stopped near the house of Salvador Uganap, one of
the accused, to light a cigarette. He peeped through a hole in the wall of
the house and saw the five accused gathered together --- Felix Uganap
had a .38 revolver tucked to his waist, while Nonoy Panday held a
pistolized carbine.[3] The room was illuminated by a lamp.[4] Upon seeing
that they were armed, Samuel Arang moved away from the house and hid
behind a coconut tree. The accused left Salvador Uganaps house and went
to the victims house, which was about 30 meters away from where the
witness was.[5] Samuel Arang stated that he saw Salvador Uganap kick the
door of Pedro Arangs house; seconds later, Pedro opened the door,
carrying with him a kerosene lamp. Immediately, Felix Uganap shot
him. Pedro shouted for help, calling on his Tio Pelagio (the eyewitnesss
father). Upon seeing the shooting, Samuel Arang fled to his house where
he told his father of what he saw. As they were afraid, they did not
attempt to rescue the victim but waited until the next morning to attend to
the body.[6]
Samuel Arang correctly identified the four surviving accused in open
court.
The trial court also took into consideration the testimony of Nolly
Luchavez, who identified all the accused as members of a
religious vigilante group called Ituman. Luchavez was himself recruited
into the group when he was only 14 years old. Accused-appellant Felix
Uganap was the groups designated field commander, and carried the alias
Commander Matador. Accused Nonoy Panday was also a
commander. Luchavez left the group after five years, in 1990, disillusioned
that the group which he thought had good objectives turned out to be
nothing more than a gang of hired killers.[7]
Luchavezs testimony revealed that the plan to kill Pedro Arang was
proposed by Faustino Uganap at a coffee shop in Toril, Davao City on
December 18, 1989. Present at that meeting were the four other accused
and Luchavez. Faustino paid Felix P3,000.00 for the purpose. Luchavez
was supposed to knock on the door of Pedro Arangs house. He said that
the group intended to undertake the killing on December 24, but this was
aborted since they found out that the victim left town to visit his wife in
Tagum.[8] Hence, the plan was set to January 6.
Luchavez, however, was unable to go with the group to Pedro Arangs
house because he had a fever that day. Felix Uganap reportedly said, Well,
it is alright, anyway we have another mission.[9] The day after, he learned
from Tirso Arang and Felix Uganap that Pedro had been killed.
The trial court determined that the cause of the conflict between
Faustino Uganap and the victim was a piece of land.[10] Pedro wanted to
build his house therein but Faustino opposed it.
Two other prosecution witnesses corroborated the testimony of the
eyewitness, Samuel Arang. Ernito Libano and Alejandro Bualan, Jr. both
heard gunshots from the direction of Pedro Arangs house. Libano heard a
shout and recognized the victims voice. He also claimed that when he
looked out of his window he recognized Salvador Uganap, whose face was
illuminated by the sulo (torch) he was holding, as one of the persons
standing outside Pedro Arangs house.
Based on the necropsy report of Dr. Jose Ladrido, it was ascertained
that Pedro Arang died almost instantly from the multiple wounds he
sustained --- seven stab wounds and three gunshot wounds. The stab
wound that punctured the victims left kidney, and the gunshot wound that
penetrated the intestines, were fatal.
All the accused interposed denials and alibis. They denied that they
were together on the night of the incident, or that they went to the house
of Pedro Arang. Faustino said he was making copra with his nephew,
Margarito Arang. Nonoy Panday and Tirso Arang said that they were not in
town. Accused-appellant stated that he reported to work at Crown Fruits,
where he remained on duty as a guard the whole night. They all denied
being members of the vigilante group Ituman.
The conspiracy theory of the prosecution fell through with the lower
court, which found the evidence to be less than convincing. It held that
only two of the five accused, herein accused-appellant and the deceased
Salvador Uganap, were positively identified by witnesses Samuel Arang
and Ernito Libano on the night of the incident. Moreover, although Nolly
Luchavez testified that Faustino Uganap proposed the killing, there was no
showing that he participated in the killing as based on the account of
Samuel Arang he, as well as Nonoy Panday and Tirso Arang, merely stood
around while Felix Uganap assaulted Pedro Arang.[11]
The RTC likewise found that the purported eyewitness account that
Pedro was shot as soon as he opened the door was belied by the necropsy
report which indicated that the bullets entered the victims body from the
posterior. In fact, all stab and gunshot wounds were located on the victims
back.
The trial court pursued its point in this wise:
Analyzing further the Necropsy Report and testimony of Dr. Jose Ladrido,
the victim Pedro Arang could not have been shot while standing because
the gunshot wounds were located at the lower part of his body and (their)
projection was downwards. If Pedro Arang was shot while standing or even
in a prone position, the projection of the gunshot wounds would not be
downwards but at level.
The most logical explanation is that Pedro Arang was first stabbed and
when he was slumping down, he was shot.
At a distance of 30 meters from where witness Samuel Arang was standing
and taking into consideration the nighttime, and the relative position of
accused Salvador Uganap, who we believe is in front of the group, as he
was holding a lamp and therefore, his back was turned from witness
Samuel Arang, the latter could not have seen accused Felix Uganap
frontally shooting the victim Pedro Arang.[12]
Thus, the trial court concluded:
Collating the various testimon(ies) of (the) prosecution witnesses, we
surmised that Pedro Arang upon opening the door and realizing the
malevolent intention of the men standing outside, immediately turned his
back, but accused Salvador Uganap who was near him instantaneously
stabbed him at the back, hitting him at his left side. As Pedro Arang was
slumping down (on) the floor, accused Felix Uganap shot him, hitting him
at the upper middle part of his buttocks and right leg.[13]
From this mode of attack, the trial court concluded treachery. The
killing was thus qualified to murder.
Having acquitted accused Faustino Uganap, Nonoy Panday, and Tirso
Arang for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy as against them,
the RTC held that only Felix Uganap and Salvador Uganap were proved
culpable. Owing to the earlier death of Salavador Uganap, only Felix
Uganap, herein accused-appellant, was convicted.
The dispositive part of the RTC decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, accused Faustino Uganap, Nonoy
Panday and Tirso Arang are hereby acquitted of the crime charged and
they shall be released from custody immediately.
In pronouncing an acquittal, we are moved by the circumstances already
mentioned which though not enough to convince us of accuseds
innocence, nonetheless, preclude us from making a pronouncement that
the guilt had been established beyond reasonable doubt which is ought to
be, to justify their conviction (People vs. Joel Quintero y Ybasco, G.R. No.
80315-16, November 16, 1994).
As to accused Felix Uganap, his guilt having been established beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Accused Felix Uganap is further ordered to indemnify the family of Pedro
Arang the following:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Pedro Arang;
2. For loss of income, what was proved on record is that the
victim, at the time of his death, was 36 years old, in good
health, and working at a hacienda with wage of P1,000.00 per
month. Hence, using the formula repeatedly adopted by the
Supreme Court: [2/3 x (80 age of victim at time of death) x a
reasonable portion of the net income which would have been
received by the heirs as support], this Court fixes the award
for loss of earning capacity of the victim at P90,000.00; and
3. P5,000.00 for burial expenses.
SO ORDERED.[14]
In this appeal, Felix Uganap pleads a review of his conviction,
asseverating that there was no sufficient evidence to hold him guilty of the
murder of Pedro Arang. He bases his argument on the inconsistencies in
the testimony of the purported eyewitness, Samuel Arang, whose claim
that he saw accused-appellant shoot the victim as soon as the latter
opened the door was proven wrong by the location of the wounds on the
victims body. He asserts that the credibility of Samuel Arangs statements
being in serious question, his conviction could not stand in the absence of
positive identification of him as the assailant and murderer of Pedro Arang.
Accused-appellants argument capitalizes on the lower courts finding
of the absence of conspiracy. Without a finding of conspiracy, where the
perpetrators are perceived to further a common criminal design and thus,
the act of one is taken to be the act of all, a conviction of accused-
appellant must rest on evidence that points to him particularly as the
assailant and killer of Pedro Arang. Indeed, reasonable doubt of accused-
appellants guilt is engendered by the inadequacies of the lone eyewitnesss
testimony which, due to his distance (he witnessed the incident some 30
meters afar) and poor visibility (there was no moon that night and the only
illumination came from the sulo that Salvador Uganap held), failed to
clearly and convincingly point to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of
everyone else, as the perpetrator of the crime. The credibility of Samuel
Arangs account is further undermined by the fact that it is not supported
by the findings in the necropsy report (the location of the wounds does not
sustain the claim that the victim was frontally shot), a matter which the
defense insists could mean that the whole eyewitness claim was a
fabrication.
Certainly, the position of accused-appellant is easy to accept where,
setting the conspiracy theory aside, there is no direct evidence that
positively identifies him as the one who rendered the fatal blow or shot
which killed Pedro Arang. A diligent study of the records, however,
convinces the Court that a conspiracy to kill Pedro Arang was in fact
clearly and convincingly proven, and that accused-appellant was a part of
this conspiracy.
The review of criminal cases necessitates a re-examination of the
entire evidence on record. Although the absence of conspiracy, as with any
other finding of fact, will not be disturbed on appeal where the same is
consistent with the evidence presented, the Court is likewise not prohibited
from instituting a finding of conspiracy, in reversal of the findings of the
lower court, when its existence is manifest from the evidence at hand.
Conspiracy is revealed by the acts before, during and after the
commission of the crime which indicate joint purpose, concerted action,
and concurrence of sentiments.[15] In innumerable cases, the Court has
held that direct proof is not essential,[16] because conspiracy may be
equably inferred from the acts of the accused disclosing their joint purpose
and design. In the instant case, however, nothing less than direct proof of
a previous agreement to kill the victim, plus an eyewitness account of how
the conspirators effected their plan, was submitted into evidence but
disregarded by the trial court.
The testimony of Nolly Luchavez attests that a conspiracy was
hatched on December 18, 1989, when Faustino Uganaps proposal to kill
Pedro Arang was accepted by the rest of the accused. On that same
occasion, money changed hands and the evil deal was sealed. It was
accused-appellant himself who received the money from Faustino
Uganap. The criminal resolve was sustained for more than two weeks (the
first meeting was on December 18, 1989; the second meeting, December
24, 1989; the killing was done on January 6, 1990.).[17]
Because of the inadequacies of Samuel Arangs testimony, there is no
sufficient evidence to establish the precise mode of attack or extent of
participation of each of the accused. However, we are not prepared to
dismiss the entire testimony of Samuel Arang which does not merely dwell
on the attack at the victim but also on the incidents moments before the
attack, namely, that he saw the accused together at Salvador Uganaps
house, that they were armed, and that they left together for the house of
Pedro Arang. Shortly after these incidents, gunshots and a shout were
heard by both Ernito Libano and Alejandro Bualan, Jr. coming from the
direction of Pedro Arangs house. The next day, Pedros lifeless body was
found in that house.
Thus, we give full credence to the testimony of Samuel Arang on the
actuations of the accused moments before the killing. That his statements
on the mode of attack do not jive with the medical findings should not
operate to destroy the weight and credibility of his entire testimony.
xxx Even where a witness is found to have deliberately falsified the truth
in some particulars, and it was not shown that there was such intended
prevarication by complainant in this case, it is not required that the entire
testimony be rejected, since such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief
may be credited. [People vs. Gohol, 170 SCRA 585 (1989).] It is perfectly
reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some
facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. [People vs. Arbolante,
203 SCRA 85 (1991).][18]
Besides, a conspiracy having been unquestionably shown, it is
actually unnecessary to establish who among the malefactors inflicted the
fatal blow.[19] All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of
intent and character of participation.[20]
The plot against Pedro Arangs life having been explicitly established
by the testimony of Nolly Luchavez, it would be absurd to accept that
Faustino Uganap, Nonoy Panday and Tirso Arang were at the victims house
as mere onlookers.That they did not lift a finger against the victim is
beside the point, because the evidence shows that they were part of the
conspiracy from its inception. Much as we are prevented from disturbing
the acquittals granted them by the court a quo,[21] we reiterate the
existence of a conspiracy among the accused and hold herein accused-
appellant liable as one of the conspirators.
Neither may accused-appellant invoke the acquittal of the other
conspirators to merit the reversal of his conviction. The case of People vs.
Arlalejo[22] illustrates that
xxx there is nothing irregular with the acquittal of one of the supposed co-
conspirators and the conviction of another. Generally, conspiracy is only a
means by which a crime is committed as the mere act of conspiring is not
by itself punishable.Hence, it does not follow that one person alone cannot
be convicted when there is a finding of conspiracy. As long as the acquittal
of a co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy,
one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.
Unlike the case of Arlalejo, however, where the Court found that the
evidence proved only the existence of a conspiracy but not the culpability
of accused-appellant, the evidence in the instant case shows that the
conspirators (including herein accused-appellant) implemented their plan
to full effect.
The information alleges that the crime was attended by treachery and
evident premeditation.[23] The existence of any of these circumstances will
qualify the killing to murder. The evidence falls short of proving treachery,
but we find the presence of evident premeditation.
We have earlier determined that no convincing evidence was
submitted on the manner of attack. We cannot thus sustain the trial courts
finding of treachery based on its admitted surmise[24] on how the attack
took place. While dismissing as incredible Samuel Arangs testimony that
the victim was shot the moment he opened the door, it substituted in
place of evidence its own inference that Pedro Arang upon opening the
door xxx immediately turned his back, but accused Salavador Uganap who
was near him instantaneously stabbed him at the back, hitting him at his
left side. As Pedro Arang was slumping down the floor, accused Felix
Uganap shot him, hitting him at the upper middle part of his buttocks and
right leg.[25]This is purely conjecture on the part of the trial court. In
several cases, we have declined to appreciate treachery where no
particulars were shown as to the manner by which the aggression was
commenced and developed.[26] Treachery cannot be acknowledged on the
basis of mere presumptions or suppositions, but must be proven as clearly
as the crime itself.[27]
Similarly, the elements of evident premeditation must be established
with equal certainty and clarity as the criminal act itself before it can be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.[28] These elements are: (1) the
time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an overt act
manifestly indicating that they clung to their determination to commit the
crime; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the decision to commit
the crime and the execution thereof to allow the accused to reflect upon
the consequences of their act.[29] The essence, therefore, of evident
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent
within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[30]
All the elements of evident premeditation are met in this case. As
early as December 18, 1989, the conspirators had determined to kill Pedro
Arang. On December 24, 1989, they met to set their heinous plan into
effect but they had to postpone it because Pedro left for another town to
visit his wife. Still they clung to their resolve as they simply postponed the
execution to January 6, 1990. All these demonstrate that the criminal
intent had been harbored in dark reflection and calculation for more than
two weeks, where the malefactors had every opportunity to abandon it but
did not do so.
The Court also observes that another aggravating circumstance was
proven by the evidence. Nolly Luchavezs testimony that the taking of
Pedro Arangs life carried the price of P3,000.00 was categorical, credible,
and unrebutted.
PROSECUTOR GARCIA, JR.
 Q: Alright, you said the group was for hire. Was there any amount
involved during that meeting?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who had the money and to whom was the money given?
A: Given to us. The money came from Faustino (Uganap), intended for
Felix Uganap.
Q: How much was given by Faustino to Felix?
A: P3,000.00.
Q: Did you see?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you see (if) the money was counted by Felix?
A: Yes, sir, that was after we took our merienda, he immediately
counted the money.[31]
However, because under the Rules of Criminal Procedure as revised on
December 1, 2000, generic aggravating circumstances must be specifically
named in the information,[32] the Court will allow for this amendment to
retroact for the benefit of accused-appellant. Hence, the aggravating
circumstance of price or reward will not be appreciated.
The crime was committed before the amendatory provisions of
Republic Act No. 7659[33] took effect. Thus, at that time, the provisions of
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code set the penalty for murder
at reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Conformably
with People vs. Muoz[34] and reiterative cases[35], in the absence of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is applicable.
On the damages awarded for loss of earning capacity, we are inclined
to grant the same despite the non-availability of documentary
evidence.[36] In People vs. Dizon,[37] we stated that oral testimony will
suffice to prove net earning capacity where the victim was employed as a
daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws. Pedro Arang, a hacienda worker receiving wages of P1,000.00
a month,[38] was certainly earning far less than the minimum wage.
The trial court correctly adopted the formula used by this Court in
computing loss of earning capacity. Thus:
Net earning capacity = [2/3 x (80 age at time of death) x (gross
annual income reasonable and necessary
living expenses)][39]
As there is no proof of living expenses of the deceased, the net
income is estimated to be 50% of the gross annual income. [40] Hence, in
the instant case, the damages payable for loss of earning capacity is
computed as follows:
Net earning capacity = [2/3 x (80 - 36) x (P12,000.00 P6,000.00)]
= 2/3 x 44 x P6,000.00
= P176,000.00
Based on the foregoing, the damages representing loss of earning
capacity is set at P176,000.00.
The award of P5,000.00 as actual damages, representing burial
expenses, is sustained. [41]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the above
modifications. Accused-appellant Felix Uganap is hereby declared guilty of
murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is
further required to pay the heirs of Pedro Arang P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P176,000.00 as damages for loss of earning capacity, and
P5,000.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 132169. October 26, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SANICO
NUEVO @ SANY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On automatic review is the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11, finding accused Sanico
Nuevo @ Sany guilty of rape and sentencing him to death.
His conviction stemmed from the following information:[2]
That, in the evening, on or about the 4th day of December, 1994, in the
municipality of Godod, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, moved by lewd and unchaste design
and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse
with one ROBERTA CIDO, a 20 year old married woman, against her will
and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 335, Revised Penal Code).
 A plea of not guilty was entered upon arraignment.
During trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: (1)
complainant Roberta Cido; (2) Anselmo Cido, Jr., the complainants
husband; and (3) Dr. Esmeralda Nadela, a resident physician of the
Sindangan District Hospital, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte. They
testified as follows:
ROBERTA CIDO[3] recalled that at about 9:00 oclock in the evening of
December 4, 1994, Sanico Nuevo passed by their house and invited her
husband Anselmo Cido, Jr., to a drinking spree at the house of Anselmo,
Sr., her father-in-law.[4]She was left at home with her 10-month-old
daughter and her nine-year-old niece Gemma Atis. They slept in the living
room, cum bedroom, the only room in the house.[5] At around 11:00 P.M.,
appellant surreptitiously returned and entered their room. She was
awakened when appellant held her neck, pinned down her arms and took
off her clothing. While Sanico was removing her panties, she struggled to
extricate herself but to no avail. She was unable to shout because
appellant was covering her mouth. While she was lying on her back,
appellant laid on top of her and proceeded to forcibly have sexual
intercourse with her, at the same time pinning her down with a bolo. As
this was happening her niece Gemma, who was present, witnessed what
was being done to her. Appellant even warned Gemma not to reveal what
she saw and at the same time threatened Roberta not to tell her husband
about the incident or else he would kill her.[6] He thereafter left the house.
Roberta further testified that her husband Anselmo, Jr., returned
home only the morning after. She immediately told her husband about the
previous nights incident. The latter hastened to the house of Sanico but
did not find him. Appellant was arrested that same afternoon.[7]
Although Roberta testified on cross-examination, that she did not see
him because it was very dark that night, she identified him through his
voice.[8] She was certain it was he because she was very familiar with
appellants voice. Not only have they been neighbors since childhood, she
also heard the appellant when he invited her husband earlier that evening,
and when he warned her and her niece not to tell anyone what happened.
For his part, ANSELMO CIDO, JR., corroborated part of his wifes
story. He narrated that at around 9:00 P.M., December 4, 1994, Sanico
with companions dropped by their house and invited him to a drinking
spree in his fathers (Anselmo, Sr.) house, about 50 meters away from
theirs. While there, they drank until dawn. Sanico left his fathers place at
around 11:00 P.M., purportedly to answer the call of nature, and returned
only at around 1:00 A.M. of December 5, 1994. At the time Sanico left,
Anselmo, Jr., observed that he was carrying an 18-inch bolo. When
Anselmo, Jr., arrived home early in the morning, his wife told him of her
ordeal.[9]
DR. ESMERALDA NADELA testified on her medical findings contained
in her Medico-Legal Certificate dated December 6, 1994, which
document[10] she brought along and read in open court. She said Roberta
told her that the latter was submitting herself for medical examination
because she was raped, and that her last sexual contact with her husband
was a week before the incident. Nadela testified further that based on her
examination conducted two days after the alleged incident, no fresh
injuries were actually found on the victim; that only old lacerations were
present; that such absence was possible due to the victims previous child
birth; and that no spermatozoa was found on the victim, which was likely
because the examination was conducted only two days after the alleged
rape.[11]
For the defense, two witnesses were presented. First was the
appellant himself, SANICO NUEVO. He declared that he knew Roberta
since they were schoolmates in grade school and she was a former
neighbor. He lived about 100 meters from her house. Moreover, her
husband Anselmo, Jr., was his barkada. He recounted that at about 6:30
P.M., December 4, 1994, his father and he went to the house of Anselmo,
Sr., to buy Tanduay Rum and drank with their friends Rudy and Ami
Tinambakan. On the way, they had to pass by the house of Anselmo,
Jr. He denied he invited the younger Anselmo to go drinking as the latters
house was already close by. It was Anselmo, Jr., who later followed and
joined them until around 10:30 P.M. Appellant said he stayed in the house
of Anselmo, Sr., where he slept at around 12:00 oclock midnight. It was
already 6:30 A.M. the following day when he woke up. He denied raping
Roberta. He added that the house of Anselmo, Sr., was only about 35
meters from the house of Roberta.[12]
The second witness for the defense was EMELIO[13] NUEVO, brother of
appellant. He claimed that he was with his brother Sanico and two
neighbors the night of the incident. He corroborated his brothers story that
they were drinking at the house of Anselmo, Sr., and he noticed his
brother asleep on the upper floor of Anselmo Sr.s house, when he left at
around 5:00 A.M. early in the morning while the others were still dancing
downstairs. He admitted, however, that he told no one of seeing his
brother sleep in the house of Anselmo Sr., even when he found out that
his brother was to be arrested, and even when he saw him tied up and
already in the custody of the police. He did not disclose this fact, even
when he was already alone with his other brother who was a councilor of
their place. It was only in his testimony during trial that he chose to reveal
these facts in Sanicos defense. He also said he was not aware of any
misunderstanding between his brother and the spouses Roberta and
Anselmo, Jr.[14]
The trial court found the prosecutions version of events credible and
disbelieved that of the defense. It rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused SANICO NUEVO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the above-quoted
information with aggravating circumstances of dwelling (Article 14, (3) of
the Revised Penal Code; People vs. Padilla, 242 SCRA 629) and committed
in full view of the relative within the third degree of consanguinity (Sec. 11
R.A. 7659), but since no mitigating circumstances (sic) to offset the above
aggravating circumstances, the Court hereby sentences the accused
Sanico Nuevo to suffer the maximum penalty provided by law which is
DEATH and to pay the private offended party in the sum of P50,000.00.
COSTS de officio.
SO ORDERED.[15]
In his brief, appellant assigns one error only:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SANICO
NUEVO OF COMMITTING RAPE AGAINST ALLEGED VICTIM ROBERTA CIDO
DESPITE INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF HIS POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION.[16]
In resolving cases of rape, this Court is guided by the following
principles: (a) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but even more difficult for the appellant, although
innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where
only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; (c) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense (People
vs. Quijada, 321 SCRA 426 [1999]); and (d) the evaluation of the trial
court judges regarding the credibility of witnesses deserves utmost respect
on the ground that they are in the best position to observe the demeanor,
act, conduct, and attitude of the witnesses in court while testifying (People
vs. Maglente, 306 SCRA 546 [1999]).
In our view, the first issue for our resolution here is whether appellant
was sufficiently identified by the offended party based only on her
recognition of the sound of his voice. The second issue is whether the
prosecutions evidence suffices for the conviction of rape and the imposition
of the death penalty on him.
Appellant denies he raped Roberta Cido. He questions the certainty of
his identification as the offender. He avers that the night of the rape, there
was no moon and it was very dark. Nor was there any showing of
illumination from any source in and out of the house of the victim. Further,
she averred that she identified her rapist only because she recognized his
voice. According to appellant, such voice identification is insufficient to
prove he was the rapist.
In People vs. Reyes,[17] we held that once a person has gained
familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an easy task even
from a considerable distance. In a number of cases, we ruled that the
sound of the voice of a person is an acceptable means of identification
where it is established that the witness and the accused knew each other
personally and closely for a number of years.[18] Appellant did not deny
that he and Roberta had known each other since childhood[19]and that
appellant and Robertas husband were barkada.[20] It is not impossible then
that complainant could immediately recognize appellant through his voice
alone. In addition, appellants face was very near the victim[21] such that
the victim could not have misidentified him, even only by voice
recognition.
According to appellant, Roberta claims she smelled marijuana on the
rapist but she patently made a mistake since he should have smelled of
Tanduay Rum instead, because that was what he drank. In addition, he
argues that since no physical injury was found on Roberta to show that
there was force or intimidation inflicted on her, therefore, no rape had
happened.
As testified to by Dr. Nadela, however, lacerations or signs of injury
may not be present in this case due to the fact that the victim had already
given birth to a child.[22] Moreover, according to the victim,[23] appellants
penis was relatively small in size, about two and a half inches long. This is
consistent with Dr. Nadelas testimony that in some cases of women who
have already given birth, it would take an extra-large male organ to cause
lacerations. According to her, healed lacerations or the absence of
spermatozoa in the vaginal canal do not negate rape.[24] We are, thus,
constrained to say that appellants bland conclusion that no rape happened
for lack of physical injuries on the person of the victim is clearly a non-
sequitur.
Appellants claim that Roberta should have smelled him reeking of
liquor instead of marijuana is beside the point and deserves scant
consideration. Note that appellant and his five other companions shared
only four bottles of pocket-sized Tanduay mixed with softdrinks.[25] Thus,
it was not unlikely that he did not smell strongly of liquor. Further, note
that the drinking spree started at 8:30 P.M., and it was barely two hours
thereafter when appellant left the group, according to prosecution
witnesses. Besides, that Roberta said she detected the smell of marijuana
on her abuser does not change the fact that she identified him positively
and without any reservation as the perpetrator of the offense.
Considering the circumstances in this case, in the light of the
testimony by the victim and her witnesses as well as of those for the
defense, we agree with the trial court that Roberta had sufficiently
identified appellant as the person who raped her, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, against her will and without her
consent. Appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
We are, however, constrained to disagree concerning the penalty
imposed on him. An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case wide
open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct errors,
as may be found in the appealed judgment, even if unassigned.[26] This
salutary principle governs our automatic review of death penalty cases as SO ORDERED.
well.

Although not assigned as an error, it is our view that the trial court
erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance under par. 3, Section 11, THIRD DIVISION
R.A. 7659,[27] concerning the presence of a relative, to justify the
imposition of the death penalty.

In People vs. Amadore, we held that the attendance of any of the [G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002] AVELINO CASUPANAN and
circumstances under the provisions of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE
mandating the death penalty are in the nature of qualifying circumstances LAROYA, respondent.
and the absence of proper averment thereof in the complaint will bar the
imposition of that extreme penalty.[28] The information in this case did not
allege the qualifying circumstance, that the rape was committed in full
view of a niece (a relative within the third degree of
DECISION
consanguinity). Because of this deficiency, appellant was not properly
apprised of the extent of the punishment which the charges against him CARPIO, J.: The Case
entailed. Thus, it was an error to consider the foregoing circumstance in
the imposition of the proper penalty on appellant.
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the
Further, while the decision of the trial court held that dwelling and the Resolution[1] dated December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for
use of a deadly weapon aggravated the crime committed, we find that certiorari and the Resolution[2] dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion
these were not averred in the information. The Revised Rules of Criminal for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas,
Procedure, effective December 1, 2000, provides that every complaint or Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
circumstances with specificity.[29] This requirement of procedure has
retroactive effect and is applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
The Facts
the time of their passage insofar as it is favorable to the
appellant. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent.[30] Here, it was error to appreciate dwelling and the use of a deadly
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya
weapon as aggravating circumstances in the commission of the offense. In
for brevity) and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo
sum, we find that no aggravating as well as qualifying circumstances have
for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for
been properly pleaded and proved by the prosecution in this case. The
brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the
result is that the crime committed by appellant is only simple rape, which
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659, the
filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting
law prevailing at the time of commission thereof, is punished only
in damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the
with reclusion perpetua.
other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for
Moreover, on the civil aspect, modification is also in order. Private quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
complainant is entitled not only to P50,000 as civil indemnity, but following
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its
current jurisprudence, also to P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as
preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a
exemplary damages.
motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED. The considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the
appellant is declared GUILTY of the crime of simple rape beyond motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
reasonable doubt, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that
of reclusion perpetua. Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence,
the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of
appellant is also ordered to pay the offended party P50,000 as civil
the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the
indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary
Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari
damages.
under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity) of
Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66,[3] assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing
the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the
order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the
case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. The
Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a
substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on
the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is
a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
Capas RTC denied the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them
may think and believe that the accident was caused by the fault of the
other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself to be the aggrieved party,
opted to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the second
party. On the other hand, the second party, together with his operator,
believing themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file
a civil case for quasi-delict against the first party who is the very private
complainant in the criminal case.[4]
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal
case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case.
The Courts Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the
MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a
counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if
the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private
complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the
proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from
an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused
in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the
same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal
action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who
filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo,
the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal
case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as
it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that
Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of
dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya
argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the order of
dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for
a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition
raises the legal question of whether there is forum-shopping since they
filed only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-delict against
Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of
forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-
94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal [5] that the dismissal
was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of
dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of
dismissal expressly states it is with prejudice.[6] Absent a declaration that
the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without
prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a
dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an action
without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is
to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly
states that where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on
the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, to secure a favorable judgment.[8] Forum-shopping is present
when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights
of action and reliefs sought.[9] However, there is no forum-shopping in the
instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan
and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or
omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based
on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil
case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177
of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves,
by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of
the fault or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the
accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is
nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a
criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused
to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have
been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if
the accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985
Rules for brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate
civil action independently of the criminal action provided the offended
party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party
reserved the civil action before the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act or omission were
deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case. These civil actions
referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of
damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages for violation of
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict
under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal
action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was
deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules provided as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution
of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately
waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be
made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the accused.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1,
2000 and now provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be
made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not
yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2
of this rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal
actions. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted
with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising
from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and
may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any
reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the
criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The
prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil
Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the
civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct
and independent of the civil action deemed instituted in the criminal
action.[10]
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the
option to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by
reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution presents
its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation
if he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil
action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has
not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal
action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil
actions arising from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate
civil action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after
final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil
action was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil
action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action
until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied
only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule
did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed independently regardless of
the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
continues this procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action
has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot
be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already
been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it
may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall
last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the
civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be
consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action.
In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action
shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without
prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions
shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of
prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or
whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that
the separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended
upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111
also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a
separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
 The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are
not the offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action
against the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules provides as follows:
SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended
1985 Rules, expressly allows the offended party to bring an independent
civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated
in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can
file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section
3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the offended party may
bring such an action but the offended party may not recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly,
Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action,
not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs.
Cantos[12] where the Court held that the accused therein could validly
institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal
case filed his Answer with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that
time the Court noted the absence of clear-cut rules governing the
prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary
consequences and implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that the
trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case and
disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled that
the accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party after
the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules
which may be promulgated.The Court explained that a cross-claim,
counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only
unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the
criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in
the 2000 Rules precisely to address the lacuna mentioned
in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from filing a
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal
case. However, the same provision states that any cause of action which
could have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-
party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action. The present
Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil
action which shall proceed independently of the criminal action, even as
the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action
in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted
with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party
even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does
not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these
articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule
111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action
is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act
or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case
for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The
two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each
other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not
suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to
file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may
be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer
or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the
same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is
expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which
states that the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a
separate civil action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused
is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is
deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to
litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the
accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the
prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the
civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can
avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To
disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict,
while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny
him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the SO ORDERED.
law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by EN BANC

Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of
Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous. G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J.
trial court in the criminal case may vary with the decision of the trial court
BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
in the independent civil action. This possibility has always been recognized
vs.
ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER,
itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the independent
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
regardless of the result of the latter. In Azucena vs. Potenciano,[13] the
Court declared:
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto
Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for
x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to
petitioners.
subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result
of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would
render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the The Solicitor General for respondents.
clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced
the concept of a civil action separate and independent from the criminal
action although arising from the same act or omission. The Court,
however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable
decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other the
civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable
decisions may be more apparent than real. In any event, there are
sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote
possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect
on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on
December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering
the well-settled rule that -
x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent.[14]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24,
2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case
No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2]
search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani
Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
[Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We
Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles
used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers,
as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and
that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security
Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon
City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute
or successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence
against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case
No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People
v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to
answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7,
1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing
petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles as
evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of
the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation,
the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and
academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that
petitioners had come to this Court without having previously sought the
quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed,
petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this
Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that
issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take
cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by
the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7
and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this
special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to
suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in
the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power
of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular
case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches.
Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search warrants were
issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was
filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six
[6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay
in the filing of the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3,
Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983,
more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had
waited this long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at
first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years
had taught them that everything in this country, from release of public
funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter
of executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons
close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President
Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the
printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent,
through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the
Presidential Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope
that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally
decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our
judicial system, We find no ground to punish or chastise them for an error
in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by
petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had
abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby
refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
had used and marked as evidence some of the seized documents in
Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from challenging the
validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents.
These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can
do whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he
has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the
validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify
the search warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses,
as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec.
4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .6 This objection, however, may properly
be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded
during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal
been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses. properties that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:

2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued
two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units for the search and seizure of the following personal property:
C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection
is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter [a] Property subject of the offense;
address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one
place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other
concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6,
proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No.
20- 82[b] which states:
[c] Property used or intended to be used
as the means of committing an offense.
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of
committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended
and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be
Quezon City. owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may
or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-
quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than
search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and
the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and
intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and
seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient
illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one
that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or
and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be
possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos,
searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col.
Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under
Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search
the warrants.
warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the
typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place
for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & 4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were
D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code
the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements
place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20- intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which
82 [b]. may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered
immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where this legal
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises
provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable
to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the
by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the
executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant
tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing
usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless
officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when
such person acted as the agent of the owner.
he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building
described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing
officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land
ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8 and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the
case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground
remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that
although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone,
articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano 5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon
and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized. application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C.
Metrocom.10 The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of
Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom
Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the
search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned
documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a
probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a
search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied
for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with
the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published
or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the
broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in
possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used
and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense
of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended
..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements
of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of
the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for
the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent
judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the
statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and
Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit
clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and
things above-described were used and are continuously being used for
subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of,
illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for
Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the
Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant
or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant
may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled
that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said
joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of
sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general
warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in
this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment,
typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape
recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of
the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication,
letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive
organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM"
and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking
"Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the
search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the the military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners
Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 7, 1982. Thus:
for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held The President denied a request flied by government
too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the prosecutors for sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper
seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 and its printing presses, according to Information Minister
of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of Gregorio S. Cendana.
conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore
invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to
search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.
the We Forum offices in Quezon City and took a detailed
inventory of the equipment and all materials in the
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable premises.
chapter in English history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor
Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were
Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper
given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to
and its equipment remain at the disposal of the owners,
suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan
subject to the discretion of the court. 19
Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is
not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication
that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered
imminent danger to state security. is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo
to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall
addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM "
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and
case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers.
As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were
padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and 2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the
publication of said newspapers were discontinued. recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's
printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and
materials it uses. 21
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent
to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental
law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-
themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a 82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby
democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ
essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry. of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby
granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to
petitioners. No costs.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines
on the ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the SO ORDERED.
sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged
in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted
authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as
may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful
however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence
of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of
National Defense.

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was
reported that no less than President Marcos himself denied the request of