Luong 1

Thong Luong Dallas Baptist University

A CHRISTIAN RESPONSE TO NATURALISM

1. Introduction

The conflicts in epistemology are hard to avoid either in history of thought or in the

present day. The study of epistemology itself are not exclusively isolated, but integrally coherent

with human conception of many things, including theology, metaphysics, morality, aesthetics,

science, and many more. Some modern philosophers like Descartes and Kant believe that

epistemology is the gravitational center of everything. Whether this is true or not, it is still

subject to the realm of epistemological problems. Philosophers from the past to the present

debated some of these perennial problems: "Is there an objective reality? If so, how do we obtain

that knowledge?", "Is there knowledge that innate in us?" and "Is religious knowledge possible?"

There is of course no single answer to these problems in epistemology, for philosophers disagree

among themselves, and Christian philosophers are no exception. In the past, Christians have

adopted various positions and baptized them for good use; for instance, the Christian Platonists,

the Christian Aristotelians, the Christian empiricists, the Christian rationalists, the Christian

existentialists, and others. Some may prefer one position over the others for various reasons, both

philosophical and theological, but disagreement remains. Still, biblical worldview relies on

metaphysical theism as its conceptual frame of evaluation, hence any competing system other

than theism must be abandoned. In addition, historical surveys have revealed to us the conflicts

between Christian theism and its rivals, both of which cover the whole range of epistemology.

The focal aim of this paper is to point out the inconsistency of naturalism and to map out an

essential belief that Christians should include in their unitary epistemic paradigm.1

11
I understand a paradigm to roughly be a worldview; it supplies values, standards and methodologies. I
borrow the concept from Thomas Kuhn, a philosopher of science that brought frontal attack toward logical
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2. Prolegomena

Human reason is paradigmatically regulated, and most people are often unconcerned

about the object of investigation, a conceptual analysis of a prolegomena prior to a particular

epistemic commitment is necessary. "A prolegomena is a preliminary exercise to any subject

matter or discussion. Its purpose is to spell out the fundamental assumptions, methods, principles

and relationships that guide any specific inquiry."2 When it is absent, our epistemic paradigm

will be unchecked, inevitably lead to confusion, and possibly result in falsehood. Epistemology

is the study of knowledge. It explores the very nature of knowledge. A precondition to

epistemology is ontology (being or existence) which implies a metaphysics to validate

epistemology. It is obvious that there must be a reality prior to the human knowing, and the

reverse is logically contradictory. A second precondition to epistemology is the concept of

anthropology, which implies human nature is necessary to the discovery of knowledge. How we

are as humans affects how think in term of knowledge. Thus epistemology must yield its priority

to ontology first and then anthropology. My proposal for a Christian epistemology is fourfold:

(1) to argue for a metaphysical objectivity, that for knowledge to be possible there must be a

reality for it to ascribe to; (2) to introduce the concept of a priori knowledge; (3) to suggest that

interpretive realism is the highest satisfactory approach to reality; (4) and to defend the

possibility of religious epistemology.

3. Metaphysical Objectivity

It would be illogical to think that any epistemic inquiry is possible without a

metaphysical grounding. Even relativistic claims that "there is no truth", "there is no such thing

as objective reality", and "reality is a construction of the mind" are assertions about reality, and

positivism and traditional understanding of authority, rationality, objectivity, and modern science. Although this
concept is applied in science, mainly theoretical, it is, nonetheless, still applicable to religious epistemology.
2
See David K. Naugle, Philosophy A Student's Guide (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2012), 21.
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cannot be warranted unless there is a metaphysical truth on which they can be grounded upon.

These claims do not show that metaphysical objectivity is impossible, but affirms an

epistemological subjectivity of an agent. There are three possible sources for metaphysical

objectivity: (1) theism, (2) naturalism, and (3) nihilism. I have argued that metaphysical

objectivity is possible, nihilism is false because it is self-contradictory. It is "a denial of the

possibility of knowledge, a denial that anything is valuable."3 I argue that metaphysical

naturalism is incoherent and in need of replacement, and offer the traditional view of theism,

particularly biblical theism, in replacement of naturalism. Granted, a shift from metaphysical

naturalism to epistemological naturalism is possible, if and only if metaphysical naturalism is

true, but the reverse proposition is absurd. "Philosophical naturalism insists that the natural world

is complete in itself, self-contained and self-sufficient," writes William Hasker, "everything

which exists or occurs lies entirely within the domain of natural processes. Nothing comes into

nature or influences it from outside. There is no 'outside'; nature is all there is."4 Likewise,

naturalism attempts to eliminate God out of the picture. The contemporary understanding of

philosophical naturalism largely stems from the epistemological development during the modern

era of philosophy, particularly in the 18th century, by both philosophers David Hume (1711-

1776) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). The infection of Hume and Kant's epistemology, to this

day, has left an indelible mark on both Western and Eastern civilization; for instance, many

scientific, theological, and philosophical inquiries have been built upon this epistemic

framework. Their theory of knowledge have gave birth to the rise of epistemological naturalism

that dictates many explanatory principles in scientific evolutionism, theological liberalism and

3
James W. Sire, The Universe Next Door: Fifth Edition (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009), 94.
4
William Hasker, Metaphysics: Constructing a World View (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1983),
108.
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philosophical postmodernism. Traditionally, Hume noted for his dogmatic skepticism, while

Kant is notoriously known for his agnostic attitude toward the possibility of knowledge.

Hume is an empiricist that believes that all knowledge is derived from only sense

impression, or perception. Hume believes there are three pivotal beliefs that everyone holds to.

These pivotal beliefs include: the principle of causality (cause and effect), the external world (the

world outside the mind), and the substantial self (the "I"). Hume does not merely deny the

existence of these beliefs, but also asserts that these beliefs are unjustifiable through experience

and reason. Therefore, they cannot be known. This attitude extends to the knowledge of the

transcendent God. This is what Christian philosopher Ronald Nash calls "Hume's Gap," which

has infected the Evangelical outlook in such a way that "to the extentmany are either ignoring

or de-emphasizing the cognitive dimension of divine revelation."5 Although Hume probably

would not admit this, scholars like Colin Brown, Peter Kreeft and many others would not regard

his method of epistemology as empirical as he describes.6 Hume's epistemology does not begin

with experience, but with a presupposition that "all knowledge derives from experience". This is

not empirical, yet it is foundational to his epistemology. His epistemic methodology is not

derived inductively, but deductively from a particular foundational belief. This is controversial,

but Hume is, I believe, more likely to be a rationalist than an empiricist. Hume's view of

knowledge is wishful. According to Hume, his skepticism is infinitely regressive because he

denies the existence of the substantial self (the I). Contrary to Descartes, he even doubts the

very fact that he doubts. On what basis can he believe that skepticism can extend to the

possibility of all knowledge for all people in all time and all places, when he unequivocally

5
Ronald H. Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man: The Truth in Contemporary Theology (Grand
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1982), 23.
6
See Colin Brown's critique on Hume in his book Philosophy & the Christian Faith (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 1968), 72; and Peter Kreeft, Socrates Meet Hume (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2010).
 Luong 5

denies his own existence? Hume is epistemically nihilistic; since nihilism is false, therefore the

edifice of his knowledge also follows. Hume seems to take for granted that his total skepticism

claims to be omniscient, in which only God can truly do so.

Hume created a "Gap", while Kant created a "Wall" between faith and knowledge. Kant

describes his epistemology as a Copernican revolution in philosophy. Kant is, no doubt, brilliant,

and much of his philosophical contribution is profoundly right on many points. Like Hume,

however, Kant has seriously infected Christian thought. As I have mentioned in the

prolegomena, and with many pre-Kantian philosophers agreeing, ontology is a precondition for

epistemology; but Kant reverses this order, both chronologically and ontologically. Pre-Kantian

philosophers believe that knowledge is a matter of subjecting to a reality that is independent of

the mind. For Kant, the reality is re-centered on the subjective individual mind. Kant's theory of

knowledge is a synthesis of both rationalism and empiricism. According to Kant, there are two

distinct departments, the noumena (the real world or the thing in itself) and the phenomena

(the apparent world). Human knowledge will never be in contact with the noumena, since all

knowledge is perceptually modified by "the categories of the mind."7 Thus, the knowledge of the

real world, or the noumena, is impossible and unknowable. This idea led Kant to reject the

knowledge and traditional proof for the existence of God. Yet Kant still posits that faith in God

can serve as a useful purpose. Interestingly, Kant's intention was to aid and make room for the

Christian faith; he wrote that he had "found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make

room for faith."8 Kant's intention was good, but his method was deadly. Note that Kant's

definition of faith does not accord with the biblical teaching. Biblical faith is not a blind leap, but

7
According to Kant, categories are a priori or innate structure of the mind that unifies human perception.
These categories are a precondition for all knowledge. Without such, human perception would be unsystematic, or
chaotic, and knowledge will never be produced.
8
Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (New York, NY: Liberal Arts Press, 1950), 29.
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historically based. The apostle Peter wrote that he did not follow cleverly invented stories.9

What is wrong with Kant's theory of knowledge is that he never questioned the source of the

human mind's categories. Kant believes that humans possess the same categorical structure that

enables them to produce knowledge. It seems that Kant attempts to slip the knowledge of the

noumena out the back door. Ironically, Kants claim that human knowledge of the noumena (the

real world) is unknowable is a self-defeating one. If the real world is totally unknowable, that we

have no possibility of any epistemic access, then Kant cannot know that it is unknowable. Maybe

Kant should revise his epistemology to say that there are obstacles to achieving the knowledge of

the real world, and offer a productive method of reasoning. It seems that the proposition that we

"Kant" know anything at all is evidently false.

An alternative to metaphysical naturalism is Christian theism. Theism is a belief that

God is not wholly transcendent so that we have no knowledge thereof. He is immanent through

the Incarnation. The Gospel of John explicitly begins: "In the beginning was the Word, and the

Word was with God, and the Word was God."10 The Greek origin of the "Word" is logos, which

refers to the knowledge of the Incarnation. God, in partiality, reveals His character and nature

through Jesus Christ. The doctrine of creation reveals the degree of human conformity to the

character of God (the imago Dei), that humanity shares rational, moral, spiritual and personal

capacity with God. Moreover, God is immanent through the act of His covenant from the past to

the present. He is the God who promises and delivers.

There is no room for reconciliation between theism and naturalism. The logic is clear: if

the one is true then the other is false. Since, as I have argued, naturalism is a series of Hume and

9
See II Peter 1:16 (NIV).
10
John 1:1(NIV).
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Kant's inadequate and incoherent epistemology that attempts to reject the possibility of the

knowledge of God, metaphysical naturalism must yield its entirety to metaphysical theism.

Additionally, there are numerous ways to demonstrate the inconsistency of philosophical

naturalism. It seems that theism yields the best explanatory and exploratory principle for a

metaphysical objectivity. It is rational to build every other non-basic belief upon this

metaphysical framework. For the rest of this essay, I will argue for epistemological concepts that

entail the reference of metaphysical theism.

A Priori Knowledge

A priori knowledge is knowledge that does not depend on evidence from sensory

experience. It is knowledge without any reference to reality. It is an innate idea, that is, by

Innate Idea Christian theology understands that aptitude in man which naturally and necessarily

issues in some knowledge of God."11 Philosophers like Augustine, Descartes, and Leibniz,

commonly agreed that human beings have innate ideas, or categories of thought by virtue of their

creation by God. Contemporarily, most of the arguments are mainly constructed from a

philosophical analysis. The concept deserves a careful theological analysis as well. I argue that it

is important to affirm such a concept, since it affects the way we do scholarship for the Kingdom

of God, and solve the problem of cultural and historical embedding. Rejection of the concept

results in the belief that humans are born with a tabula rasa, a blank mind.12 It assumes that all

knowledge is a matter of acquisition, that humans totally are a condition of sociological, cultural,

and historical upbringing. Since theism is true, that God is the ultimate explanatory principle,

perhaps all ground of existence must be explained through His revealed knowledge. God having

revealed Himself is historically indisputable (the Incarnation), but how is it possible that the

11
Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1977), 41.
12
(CITE)
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finitude of the human mind can even grasp or apprehend the knowledge of His infinitude? The

fact that we know His revelation is something that must be examined. Since Christian theology

begins with Christology ontologically, but with creation chronologically, then perhaps the

doctrine of creation can reveal to us an explicit relationship with the concept of a priori

knowledge. Thus, Emil Brunner once stated:

Since God creates a world, He creates something, which is not God, namely, the world. In so doing He
creates the sphere of things, which, in principle, He places under the control of human knowledge. God has
given man reason, in order that he may learn to know the world, and to find himself at home in the world.
This world is, it is true, the creation of the Triune God, whom one can know through the intellect as such. 13

It is God that endowed humanity with the ability to reason in order that they may

apprehend His existence. To support Brunner's point, Herman Bavinck explains:

Knowledge (intellectual) cannot be derived from sensation...Knowledge proceeds from a principle of its
own, from innate ideas. Chief among these innate ideas is the idea of God. This is, as it were, the author's
stamp impressed upon his work. But by innate character of these ideas...means that the soul has by nature
the power, the "ability" and "disposition" to produce them out of its own store. 14

It is quite important to also include many other innate ideas of God besides the ability to

reason, including moral values and duties, appreciation of beauty, the existence of other minds,

and the external world. It is not surprising that many people, who have a superficial knowledge

of a particular, but lack both theological and philosophical knowledge, assume that the

acceptance of a competent method of knowing embraces only naturalism or empiricism. This is

evident in the discipline of psychology, sociology and science. They have been thoroughly

secularized for many centuries. For instance, Sigmund Freud's atheistic approach to

psychoanalysis theory; Emile Durkheim's thought of religion as a social phenomenon instead of

a personal encounter with a divine Being; and geneticist Richard Dawkins assumption that a

belief in God is illusory. All three of them commonly agree that everything can be epistemically

explained within a social, cultural and historical phenomenon. In order for naturalism to prevail,

13
Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption: Dogmatics Vol. II. (London, UK:
Lutterworth Press, 1952), 26.
14
Bavinck, 46.
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many have sought to reject the concept of a priori knowledge in order to explain things from an

epistemological naturalism. Naturalistic methodology is pervasive among today's cultural

assumption. It has been a driving force behind almost every academic enterprise. Many theist

thinkers have been tacitly influenced by this poisonous theory. This results in a hindrance for an

authentic Christian scholarship to take place in academia, both secular and religious. A priori

knowledge not only shapes theory, but also the existential world. It is biblically mandated that

Christians be engaged in the battle of ideas in obedience to Christ's commandment of making the

Kingdom of God on earth as it is in heaven.15 In doing so, Christians must attain a

comprehensive and coherent theory of knowing.

4. Interpretive Realism

There are problems to our knowledgeassumptions about reality. Our cultural and

environmental factors have greatly shaped and situated our character and thought. Even

differences can occur within a community, for we arrange our conceptual scheme differently.

That is to say we have consciously or unconsciously fit or placed our significant beliefs

selectively. It is important that we properly construct our worldview thinking, because, as Nash

rightly addressed, "many disagreements among individuals, societies, and nations are clashes of

competing worldviews."16 Realism, the view "which holds there is a real external world which

can be known", is a key word when it comes to problems in worldview.17 The human problem of

grasping the concept of realism is that epistemic subjectivity and selectivity is unavoidable, for

we think paradigmatically, provincially, and nominally. Human descriptions about reality are not

that they tell us nothing, but are fragmentary, and conceptualized of the real. It is not serious

15
Matthew 22:37
16
Ronald H. Nash, Worldviews in Conflict: Choosing Christianity in a World of Ideas (Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan, 1992), 18
17
Norman L. Geisler and Paul D.Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1980), 433.
 Luong 10

enough that we have to lapse into epistemic nominalism. The metaphysical view insists that

general terms are not referencing objectively existing universals, but that universals, like dog or

man, are simply names ascribed to entities sharing common traits.18 Nominalism faces a serious

dilemma upon encountering the Biblical truth (doctrine of Logos). Likewise, it is also dilemmatic

if one were to approach the Scripture and reality with the theory of naive realism. This theory of

knowledge regards reality as a true and exact description of the way things are. In term of

ontological status, it provides an adequate explanation but seems to lack an epistemological

status. Naive realism seems to neglect the noetic and cardiac effects of sin. Furthermore,

knowledge of reality cannot be automatically born in the absence of presuppositions. It is highly

probable that we have embraced some false beliefs in our presuppositions that undergird our

epistemic process, and yet presupposing involves some element of subjectivity and selectivity.

Michael Polanyi brilliantly expounds that there is a tacit dimension in the human knowing

process, saying: "that into every act of knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the

person knowing what is being known, and that this coefficient is no mere imperfection but a vital

component of his knowledge."19 Since tacit knowledge depends on where the attention is

focused, it logically follows that "there is no discovery without a desire to know and a belief that

there is something to know."20 Human desirability is a matter of the will, thus epistemic process

further involves some moral and virtuous dimensions. ."21 Because of that, epistemological naive

realism fails to account for knowledge disagreement; if this theory is a fairly exact description of

things, then everyone should be able to agree about what they describe. Moreover, it is

18
Naugle, 118.
19
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1958), viii.
20
Drusilla Scott, Everyman Revived: The Common Sense of Michael Polanyi (Grand Rapids, MI: William
B. Eerdman Publishing Company, 1985), 51.
21
Aurthur F. Holmes, Faith Seeks Understanding: A Christian Approach to Knowledge (Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdman Publishing Company, 1971), 13.
 Luong 11

inadequate to explain the intrinsic value of nature and humanity. Arthur Holmes regards naive

realism as a reflection of epistemological deism and naturalism. He then proceeds: "Historically

Descartes and Hobbes and Locke all regarded mechanistic physics this way...If nature operates

with the efficiency of a machine, each part moving according to fixed laws, then creation is not

as continually dependent on God's activity as theists have supposed. God is simply the designer

and maker of the machine. Because there are obstacles to obtain knowledge, because we are

creatures of finitude, because it is impossible to be objectively neutral, and because our

knowledge of reality is based on approximation, it is necessary that we be critical, constructive

and corrective about our assumptions and beliefs. This leads us to the conclusive theory of

interpretive realism. Here is how David Naugle aptly summarizes:

(1) an objective, independent reality exists; (2) the character of this reality is fixed and independent of any
observer; (3) human knowers have trustworthy cognitive capacities by which to apprehend this fixed
reality, but the influence of personal prejudices and worldview traditions conditions or relativizes the
knowing process; (4) truth and knowledge about the world, therefore, are partially discovered and certain
and partially invented and relative. 22

Thus, interpretive realism seems to succeed in giving a better explanatory reason that is

more faithful to reality than naive realism, since it offers us the possibility of a unifying

perspective for understanding reality as a whole and searching for meaning in each part.

Religious Epistemology

There has been a breakdown in religious epistemology in the last couple of centuries.

Frontal assumptions that everything is empirically verified (logical positivism), mechanistically

determined (naturalism), and relativistically described (postmodernism), including the lack of a

common frame of reference and shifted meaning in ordinary language, have torn off and

distorted the significance of religious epistemology. I strongly believe that our cognitive faculties

alone are reliable that it can generate a genuine religious experience, whether a person is rational

22
David K. Naugle, Worldview: The History of a Concept. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdman
Publishing Company, 2002), 324. He called this theory "critical realism" instead of interpretive realism.
 Luong 12

or not, but we must provide an ontological basis for a religious epistemology. I would like to

confine my argument based on the model of epistemic foundationalism for the proposition that

religious experience is possible, which implies religious epistemology is an inferential belief

because it stems from a foundational belief. If the foundational belief is true, then the inferential

belief is likely to be a justified true belief. Agree, that just because a foundational belief is true, it

does not follow that the inferred belief is true, but also depends on the validity of inferences. But

a necessary condition for the inferred belief to be true is that its foundational belief must be true.

The foundational belief that I refer to is the existence of God. Were His existence not actual, then

my religious experience would be illusory just as Freud and Dawkins would affirm, but if God's

existence is real and possesses no characteristic of potentiality, then I can within my own

epistemic right believe that religious experience is rational. One way to understand the rationality

of God's existence is based on the version of the ontological argument proposed by Anselm, that

God is, a being that which nothing greater can be thought. That God, by virtue of his nature, is

a necessary being, which means, a being which cannot cease to exist because He exists

necessarily; if He ceases to exist, then He is not a necessary being, and thus contradicts His own

nature. God provides to us an ultimate explanatory reason for all existence and possibility. Since

I have shown that metaphysical theism is true, epistemological deism and naturalism is

incoherent, and metaphysical naturalism is absurd, then religious experience is consequently

possible because it references to an ontological Being. Besides, the existence of God is only a

necessary condition, but we should also include sufficient conditions as well, and we can do so

through positive apologetics. Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga argued for the Reformed

epistemology that a religious belief and experience can be conferred as prima facie, an epistemic

theory which states that we are justified in holding the position until someone provides a sound
 Luong 13

contrary argument that cast doubt upon reliable cognitive faculties.23 This theory is regarded by

contemporary philosophers like Nicholas Wolterstorff, William Lane Craig, Jay Wood, Kelly

James Clark, Ronald Nash and many more as a coherently evaluative one which can be applied

to a wide range of human epistemic inquiry.

The discussion so far has centered on the burden of the religious side: that justification is

obligatory only toward believers, not skeptics. But now the situation becomes acute, anyone who

claims that skeptics are not subject to justification is seriously confused. In most cases, those

who denounce religious experience as illusory and delusory presuppose an absurd evidential

structure, including many misconceptions about the nature of religious belief. One major

misconception is that religious belief adheres to metaphysical anti-realism. To be clear, I am not

condemning evidentialism, because there are Christian evidentialists, and I myself am a soft

evidentialist as well. Skeptics often rely on epistemological evidentialism to criticize religious

epistemology. I think that it is erroneous to assert that evidentialism is incompatible with

religious epistemology, for there are different forms of evidentialism, but skeptics often cling to

the form of narrow evidentialism. Narrow epistemological evidentialism in itself is self-

referentially inconsistent, if the same procedure applies on its own. Narrow evidentialism

believes that for every belief to be true, it must be evidentially justifiable. Its attitude states,

"Give me proofs or evidences, then I will believe. It asserts that a believer must hold an

epistemic accessibility and responsibility, and philosophers like William Clifford, Earl Connee

and Richard Feldman would describe themselves to this. According to this assumption, given the

fact that a belief is true, I cannot hold on to that belief unless I am able to access my own process

of reasoning, and epistemic responsibility is analogous to moral duty in that I must at all times be

23
For more details on Alvin Plantinga's Reformed epistemology theory of knowledge see his Warranted
Christian Belief (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000).
 Luong 14

in control of my belief acquisitions. This theory is impossible to bear. The problem with the

proposition that everything must be (evidentially) justified is that we must still (evidentially)

justify that proposition itself. If every proposition demands a justification then no proposition can

ever be true, because of an infinite regress to the problem of justification. No one, of course,

really believes that; we want something to be true, and something has to be and is true self-

evidently. By the same token, not all justified belief will generate true knowledge (the Gettier

problem). 24 Since I have mentioned that selectivity and subjectivity are inescapable problems in

the epistemic process, hence the nature of justification is still essential but does not always

necessitate evidentialism. Moreover, the epistemic accessibility and responsibility cannot always

be done and properly. Suppose that I have done my epistemic accessibility, but as time went by, I

no longer have access to those reasons. Can I still, in my own right, hold on to that belief? What

if my cognitive faculties are no longer able to function properly as it used to, but I still maintain

the same belief, does it necessarily follow I must entirely give up that belief? In regard to

epistemic responsibility, there are knowledge that is innate in us by God, yet because we have

been tacitly and greatly influenced by our culture and community, including that our social

economic condition, race, gender and religious upbringing, it is very unlikely that we are

responsible for a certain belief that we hold. Plus, presuppositionalists were right to assert that

the occurrence of commitment is likely to be held in advance of evidence.

After all, epistemological evidentialism is still impotent, chosen, and a commitment to

prolong. Thus religious epistemology is not in jeopardy since its function is similar to that of the

narrow evidentialism. Since religious epistemology entails metaphysical realism, I admit that a

24
Traditionally, the concept of knowledge was defined as true justified belief. Plato was the first to
suggests a tripartite analysis of knowledge. A true justified belief is aptly defined by three propositions. For
instance, the proposition "S knows p if and only if: (1) S believes that p; (2) p is true; (3) S's belief that p is justified.
Until 1963, Edmund Gettier demonstrated that the proposition "S knows p" can still be true, while premise (3) is
false. For a succinct summary of the Gettier problem consult Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
 Luong 15

way to account for a true belief is to provide some evidences. Along with that, religious

epistemology does not overly restrict its frame of justification but also allows moral, virtuous

and communal dimensions. Omission of the cognitive dimension of God's revelation is a serious

error; this is a crucial that God can directly, creatively and mysteriously work through things in

any possibility. We should not elevate any methods to the supremacy and subordinate others

down to the subservient.

Conclusion

My final saying is we should not allow ourselves to be in any metaphysical naturalism.

We must secure a comprehensive and coherent approach to reality and knowledge. Our

epistemological approach, or worldview thinking, instructs our action and behavior. We must

possess the right approach, so that we can vividly feel and see God's presence through the glass

darkly. In God's kingdom, the Gospel extends to all realms of existence and possibility. The

Gospel should not be restrictively confined to the soteriological, but instead should be

cosmological, including epistemological. Charles Malik warns about reducing the Gospel to just

only a message of salvation, saying: "The problem is not only to win souls but to save minds. If

you win the whole world and lose the mind of the world, you will soon discover you have not

won the world. Indeed it may turn out that you have actually lost the world."25 To bring every

thought into captivity to Christ, to think biblically, to honor the Lordship of Christ over all

aspects of life, are not optional, but are the very heart of what it means to be a Christian.

25
Charles Malik, The Two Tasks (Westchester, IL: Cornerstone Books, 1980).
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