Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia

Wittgenstein on Language and Religion

Author(s): Alejandro Tomasini Bassols
Source: Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, T. 64, Fasc. 2/4, Horizontes Existencirios da
Filosofia / Sren Kierkegaard and Philosophy Today (Apr. - Dec., 2008), pp. 1291-1299
Published by: Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
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 ndRtin RPF-
GJD ndRtin 64*2008

Wittgenstein on Language and Religion

Alejandro Tomasini Bassols*

1. Religious themes have always been a concern for philosophy. Thus it is

standable that, given the great variety of philosophical schools, the v
cerning religion actually outlined and developed by philosophers through
history of their discipline should be fantastically different. Indeed, relig
been examined, inter alia, from the point of view of its cognitive claims, f
standpoint of class struggle and from the perspective of ethics and m
Each great conception of religion is historically justified in the sense that
sponds to the kind of debate typical of this or that particular period. Natu
applies as well to whom can be seen as the most influential thinker of ou
viz., Ludwig Wittgenstein. On the other hand, however vague its referen
be, surely vigorous, alive philosophy is what is known as 'analytical philo
that is, the school which envisages all philosophical problems (epistem
metaphysical, ethical, etc.) from the perspective of the philosophy of lan
Wittgenstein himself, together with Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Ru
responsible for this change in our general philosophical outlook. It is
to be expected that his contributions in the philosophy of religion should
upon his more general views on language. Wittgenstein had new and i
insights into the nature of religious belief, behaviour, attitudes and so on
way or another they derive from what he had to say about language
specifically, about religious language. On the other hand, it is well kn
Wittgenstein developed two quite different approaches to language and so
be inferred that he built two different conceptions of religion. I wan
however, that beneath the obvious and drastic differences that hold betw
views on language and religion contained in the Tractatus Logico-Phil
and those which emanate from the Philosophical Investigations there
trend of thought, one and the same set of basic insights. Part of my task
make them explicit.

2. 1 think it would not be a mistake to assert that the main point of Witt
continuous thinking on religion is that religious language has no factual
On his perspective, religious language is not meant to describe a special s
reality. So one feature that can be traced in both the young and the later
stein' thought is what could be called his 'anti-transcendentism'. But if t

* Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mixico (Ciudad de Mexico, Mexico).

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1292 Alejandro Tomasini Bassols

about heaven is not to speak about a partic

refer to a particular being and so on, the q
what is the specific content of religious expr
gious language for?
Let us quickly consider the Tractatus first.
the subject without repeating what has alread
theless and trying not to be repetitious, I wa
contains, among other things, the best possib
of the world. Indeed, it is a work written
or place in the book for "the other" or, m
the subject who speaks (and the author almos
enough what he gives us is the rationale of
ematics, science, ethics and religion. But how
the rest of us carried out? Obviously, such an
implicit premise, some unavowed thought
takes to be the right picture of the world is
any other person as well, i.e., by all of us. In
belief in Wittgenstein s Tractatus is the Scho
want, pursue, think and so on, the same or i
what misleading way: we do belong to a natu
perhaps why he says that "I am the microcos
premise alone that the whole, self-contained,
Now what does the subject have to say abou
tant Fregean idea should be emphasized here,
might be) can only be got at through lang
"through sense", but Wittgenstein did not fo
him the meaning of names is to be found in
is closer to Russell than to Frege on this part
clear that the formal, factual ontology and th
forward in the Tractatus are the two sides of
are just logically, but not conceptually, indep
sheer mistake to try to make Wittgenstein a
does not create reality: it merely reflects it. B
language. Now what language shows is that th
the facts that obtain. Every time we say som
to picture it. To say something is not just to p
is to state something that can be true or fals
be true or false we have to employ sentences
point of view, pictures of facts. A sentence i
become alive when they are endowed with a s

1 Cf. Wittgenstein, Ludwig - Tractatus Logico-Ph

Paul, 1978, 5.631 (b).
2 Ibidem, 5.63.

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 Wittgenstein on Language and Religion 1293

Wittgenstein s explanation of how a dead series of signs can bec

tence. What a useful sentence expresses is a proposition, whi
an actually expressed thought. A proposition is just a sentenc
someone, "a propositional sign in its projective relation to the w
words, we have a proposition when a picture (i.e., a well formed
ally thought out by someone (regardless of its being used sot
A thought, on the other hand, is a mental entity which is a logic
So thoughts and propositions may not coincide, for mental and
may differ. At any rate, it is clear that in the Tractatus the
Platonic entities, Fregean Gedanken and so on. Rather, a proposi
by a speaker when he says something or at least when he thinks i
point which should be stressed here is that the only thing a spe
can do is to speak about reality, that is, to state or depict facts.
Once the logic of our world has been given to us, Wittgenstei
there are certain things that logically cannot be said. Admitt
major paradox of the Tractatus for: isn't it Wittgenstein himsel
states what, according to his own stand, cannot be put into wor
that there is no chance whatever, within the framework of the T
come this difficulty. Maliciously, Russell himself was the first to
controversial but quite useful "Introduction". However, I shall n
here, among other things because I also think that the later Wit
is a completely different framework and with a completely diff
apparatus, did manage to avoid the problem. We shall come to th
now let us rather try to make clear Wittgenstein s point. After a
us to understand is neither new nor as absurd as it could seem at
rate, the only philosophical antecedent I know of concerning the
of language is to be found in Frege. For logical reasons which I s
now but which are well known, Frege was committed to the unac
the concept of a plane is not a concept, the concept of a dog is n
Wittgenstein, it can be argued, reasons in the same vein. W
willing to ask would be something like this: what kind of explan
all someone offer of, say, the logical structure of language, if in
his explanation he must have recourse to language itself and,
very logical structure he aims at explaining? Put in this way, W
tion does not seem absurd at all. What has to be grasped is that f
makes no sense to speak of language as if we were away, cut off
on a different platform. No speaker can refer to language as a w
such possibility, just as Frege thought that, given the structure
we simply cannot speak of concepts.
It follows that (and here language forces to utter nonsenses) "t
must be "things" we cannot speak about. It is clear, I think, fro
that, strictly speaking, there are no such things. Since our lang

3 Idem, 3.12.

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1294 Alejandro Tomasini Bassols

about reality and when we speak of reality w

is unavoidable for us to express ourselves as i
case too. Factuality and meaningfulness co
try either to catch facts in a non linguistic w
not amount to the stating of facts. Neverthe
language. Since religious language does not sat
Picture Theory, there is sense in which it is
religious language is not meaningful for th
facts. There is none the less another sense in
crucial. What has to be specified is its role in
The fact (if it be a fact) that the world is i
imply that it is not for me. Let us recall that
the world viewed from the perspective of the
is no such thing). So the world is and has to
that I judge it, in the sense that, for bette
attitude towards it. Facts do not change depe
life does. Now if we want to speak about my p
to it, about what has value in itself and about
has for me, I shall have to use language in a n
to state in words are not facts at all, but rath
possibility of being for me. So we have to
language. It is here that we can appreciate
and the first thing to be said about religio
that "God does not reveal itself in the world
do not speak about a special entity, having sp
and so on. We speak, although in a non litera
world as a whole, that is, about the meanin
the same thing, about the meaning of our life
same".5 The point of religious language is thu
what can only show itself.
It should be taken into account that for Wi
not mean concrete prayers or the languag
language was conceived by him mainly as tha
the word 'God' and related words are used
did show that the world, regardless of its actu
the world I have experience of. This shows th
here: the objective world and its being for m
second "element" that we are prone to speak
not to speak of something lying beyond the r
interpretation of religious language, the ou
to factual language. Obviously, there must be

4 Idem, 6.432.
5 Idem, 5.621.

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 Wittgenstein on Language and Religion 1295

leading in the attempt. For Wittgenstein, on the other hand, it

expressing something about the whole complex system of relatio
between me and the world and which is nothing but my life. Sin
are no longer dealing with facts, language is useless to express w
less are inclined to state. What is it that we want to say but cann
The meaning of life. It is then that the word 'God' is the right w
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein is cautious and rather spari
elucidations have only a somewhat critical flavour. It would
time he was more interested in rejecting all sorts of vacuous
about God than in giving long, detailed explanations about the u
gious language. By rejecting theism in general he was already on
but I would be prepared to admit that, however brilliant and pr
holds will unavoidably leave us unsatisfied, philosophically hu
we accepted his general stand we would nevertheless feel tha
was not enough and could not be the end of the story. As a mat
his general outlook, his views about language and its limits, he c
said something more. Fortunately, Wittgensteins thinking was i
tion and thus, soon after his official return to philosophy, in 1
produced a wholly original and completely new conception o
had decisive implications for our understanding of religion. Abo
I shall limit myself to state the following points:
a. language is basically conceived now from the point of v
cality, not from the point of view of its formal or logical fe
b. The new view is not a contribution to any kind of scien
It was designed to show the uselessness of philosophic
making explicit its conflicts with the rules of use.
With this in mind, it is easy to understand why and how the
to religious issues had to change dramatically. The point now wa
understand what could not be stated in words. The kind of q
now sensible to raise was rather: what is the purpose of religiou
should we speak of God at all?
Let us start by recalling the core of Wittgenstein s new concep
His proposal consists in viewing language as composed by a
number of "language-games". To each language-game there co
of life", which is nothing but an institutionalized, socialized
no speaker participates in all language-games, since no indivi
in all forms of life. A simple way to present Wittgenstein s con
pare society to a kind of market to which everybody has to go
is offered and has to be acquired are forms of life. In order to
form of life whatsoever, a person must also be familiar with th
"language", that is, he must also be a user of the correspondi
Paraphrasing Kant, we could say that language-games without fo
empty and forms of life without language-games are unintellig

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1296 Alejandro Tomasini Bassols

nobody can take part in the form of like of c

language-game of music (keys, notes, etc.). Th
the language-games of computers, different
course of religion. Accordingly, instead of spe
rather speak of religious language-games an
does Wittgenstein have to say about them?
Let us state clearly what our goal is: we aim
peculiar mode of meaning of religious express
what we have said, this is tantamount to askin
sions are employed and this requires us to des
to them and which in turn are reinforced and
Let me have recourse to an example I gave in
the following situation: two friends, a and b,
spent most of their lives together. They have a
travelled together and so on. However, thei
a is a handsome, rich and good hearted pers
multiple occasions his friend who, unknown t
him. Let us further imagine that a faces a wond
lovely and rich lady, he has secured for himsel
Now suddenly B is presented with an opportun
documents related to an awful crime are pr
to everybody's surprise, sent to jail where, tr
happened, he commits suicide, b then takes ov
body's condolences, marries his former friend
in secret) and starts a new and successful life.
many years later, when he at last perceives th
his life, he (to put it some way) "gets worried
his crime, a crime factually impossible to unc
to account for what happened. Now let us sup
that is, not only in words but in deeds: he
riage, his children, he repudiates his social s
completely different way. Let us assume that
given (this is already a fagon de parler, sinc
to feel free in a world in which as a matter o
He knows that he cannot erase the past: his fr
are no facts to be changed. But he wants, he n
and to repair somehow what he did. Now w
say to give expression to his new attitude (ass
he joins words to actions), to his remorse,
It is clear, I think, that psychological lang
What goes on in his brain is completely irr

6 Tomasini, Alejandro - "Conceptos Religiosos y Vld

sica: Cavilaciones Wittgensteinianas. Mexico: Plaza y V

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 Wittgenstein on Language and Religion 1297

not the language about "mental states" that would be useful h

not expressions like 'Oh Lord, forgive me!', 'Lord, do not let me
not send me to the flames!', 'Oh my God, forgive this sinner, y
God, please accept me again. I am ready to do anything whatsoev
expressions to be employed, the only possible ones?
Examples like this one can easily be either found or imagined.
what do they teach us? This is what we have to investigate now.
We said above that nobody can even in principle take part in a
open to him by society. So let us ask: what would a person lose,
porated religious language-games and who does not take par
form of life? What would he be lacking? From a Wittgenste
there are two lines of response, one relating to his capabilities o
one concerning praxis. Let us consider the former first. Obv
would be lacking a powerful linguistic tool. But what does this i
want to determine is: what in fact would he be deprived of?
insisted that the characteristic feature of religious language
image. The example above makes this clear. When the fellow
be forgiven, when he prays, is he talking to someone, to anothe
Is he engaged in normal conversation? Clearly not. He is usi
(let us call it this way) "super-person", a "super-being", to express
by reference to it that he expresses his state of mind. But (as w
that "being" does not respond at all. To pray is to use language a
doing were talking to someone special, someone who would unde
than anybody else, and who could eventually forgive us. In p
an image is involved. When the fellow in question begs not to b
flames, he is once more having recourse to an image, the im
terrible happening to him, of being burnt alive, although a
nothing threatens him.7 So the image is crucial and essential to
speaking, but what is its point? The answer is simple: it helps to
riences and, more importantly, it leads one in a certain directio
give meaning to one's life. Moreover, the image has a pragmatic r
induces us to act in a certain way. Accordingly, the most absurd
be to interpret religious expressions as a special kind of factual
tive language. That renders religious language and life utterly u
It could be asked: what is so important about an image, w
nothing but a linguistic device? As we said, this linguistic m
enables speakers to give colour to their lives. Once again we find
the thought that religion has something to do with the meanin
in turn does explain why people should rather die than aband
beliefs, that is, their religious symbols. We cannot simply a

7 1 recognize that, if the meaning of 'hell' is a place, I was never

literally what it is to be in it. For instance, I just have no idea whatever o
to be burnt.

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[298 Alejandro Tomasini Bassols

meaning to our lives to be destroyed and not

be so important to us that it is understandabl
the price is to risk their own lives for its sake
simple belief about facts, a scientific belief for
the assimilation of an image is not the out
ment, the conclusion of a rational process. In
rationality and irrationality. The realm of reli
Just as the language of colours helps us to d
of colours,8 so religious language helps us t
and acting. Religious language-games are no
hammers and knives, they are tools and th
when they are employed properly and they ar
speaker feel and behave in certain ways. Ment
religious only when they pass through the fil
entailed by it. For instance, religious emoti
Now what are typical religious feelings and em
tude, internal peace, acceptance, a special sort
trust, the need to be forgiven and so on. Reli
guided by the images we have been inculcated
the image of a god made man and crucified in
we shall be in a position to behave in accor
situations. For instance, we could give som
would want to be like Him; we might react ca
we would have accepted His teaching, and so o
that Wittgenstein indicates that there are alw
someone's speech and actions. So it is relativel
purely verbal commitment and to distinguish
best way to express the thought is to say that

3. In what sense is Wittgenstein s philosophy

kind of philosophical debate about religion
our progress toward a better understanding o
stein s clarifications, Le. , his descriptions of t
make it clear from the very beginning that in
we are not alluding to anything lying beyond
to be located within the four dimensional s
have nothing to do with proofs or disproofs a
natural beings and places, contrary to law eve
was to exhibit the rationale of religious lan
and the assessment of its place and importanc
can perfectly well elude all sort of conflict
and both common sense and science, on th

8 Just ask: how many colours are we entitled to a

names for colours, does perceive?

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 Wittgenstein on Language and Religion 1299

him and look at things the way he indicates, we are no long

between "rationality" and religion. Once we understand that re
are, so to speak, on different planes, the long lasted conflict b
religion just disappears. From this new perspective religion is a
that thanks to Wittgenstein, in the age of technology, can be
individual. We no longer have to face the "facts or supersti
Wittgenstein did show that it is nothing but a pseudo-problem.
initiate our children in the use of certain special linguistic tools
new horizons of feeling and action, and at the same time to in
world of knowledge. There is no contradiction or tension invol
In a wonderful tale, What Men Live By, Leon Tolstoy sa
live without parents, but they can't live without God. If by
he probably did, the whole dimension of human affection,
feelings, emotions and practices which give colour and mean
then it could be argued that Tolstoys dictum embodies Wit
better than any other one and also that he was right. The latter
standing of the functioning of language made him aware of
concerning religion and his original insights about the natu
puzzles enabled him to become the most successful defend
genuine religious life.

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